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HİNDİSTAN İLE PAKİSTAN'DA YÜKSELEN POPÜLİZMİN İKİLİ İLİŞKİLERE ETKİSİ VE KEŞMİR SORUNU

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Abstract

Latin Amerika, Avrupa ve ABD’de kendinden sıkça söz ettiren bir inceleme konusu haline gelen popülizm, aynı zamanda Hindistan’da Modi’nin ve Pakistan’da İmran Khan’ın iktidara gelmesinden sonra Güney Asya bölgesinde güncel siyaseti belirleyen önemli bir unsur olarak görülmektedir. Bu makale, popülizm literatüründe oldukça az ele alınmış olan popülizm-uluslararası ilişkiler ilişkisine ve Güney Asya örneğine yoğunlaşmaktadır. Popülizmin yükselişi altında Hindistan ve Pakistan’ın dış politikaları gözle görülür bir dönüşüm geçirmiştir. Örneğin Khan, İslami tonu güçlendirilmiş bir popülizm anlayışıyla Pakistan siyasetini olduğu gibi şekillendirmiştir. Pakistan’ın ABD’den gitgide uzaklaşadursun Çin ve İran gibi müttefiklerle yakınlaşması, Modi’nin Hindistan’ının Pakistan ile ilişkilerinin daha da gerilmesine ortam sağlamaktadır. Tabii Modi’ye bakıldığında, onun sağ popülizminin keskin bir Müslüman karşıtlığı pratiğinden beslendiği görülecektir. Bu yönde bir söylemin yarattığı siyasal ortamda Müslümanlara karşı saldırıların artış göstermesi şaşırtıcı değildir. Benzer doğrultuda, Modi’nin söylemi, İslam ile ilişkilendirilen sözde tehdidin salt iç kaynaklı bir sorun teşkil etmediğine işaret etmektedir. Hatta Pakistan’ın şeytanlaştırılması, Modi’nin “Hint-Pasifik” kavramsallaştırmasında anlamını bulan etnosantrik dış siyaset görüşü ile örtüşmektedir. Bu doğrultuda, Modi’nin bölgede Pakistan’ın baş müttefiki olarak Çin’i de hedef alması da anlamlıdır. Modi’nin dış siyaset anlayışının sağ popülist motifleri Keşmir sorununda kolaylıkla ayırt edilebilir. Modi’nin, sorunu İsrail-Filistin çatışmasına benzetmesi ve bu eksende uluslararası hukuka taşıması göze çarpmaktadır. Keşmir’de tarihin en çatışmalı döneminin Modi-Khan döneminde yaşanmakta olduğu gözlemlenmektedir. Khan özelinde, Pakistan’ın Suudileri karşısına alarak Keşmir sorununu diğer İslam ülkeleri ile yakın ilişki geliştirme ve iç siyasette taban desteğini ilerletme çabaları dikkate değerdir. Ancak, bu şekilde, bölgede “Keşmirlilik” kimliğinin gitgide zayıflamakta olduğu ve İslami kimliğin öne çıkmasıyla ulus-aşırı İslamcı unsurların güç kazandığı bir gerçektir.
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