New Directions in Corporate Social Responsibility and Ethics: Codes of Conduct in the Digital Environment

Abstract

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has an impact on many areas of society, and it has recently been active in the digital space, a growing area of business activity. However, certain factors prevent it from firmly establishing itself in this area. One of these factors is the lack of user trust. Certain instruments have been created to address this issue, such as codes of conduct that seek to mitigate the causes of distrust by making significant improvements in the regulations and ethical standards applicable to business transactions. These instruments are the product of industry self-regulation and complement rather than substitute for effective legal regulations. In light of some European Community (EC) directives, European legislators are addressing certain issues in this area, especially unfair business practices.

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Journal of Business Ethics
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-021-04753-z
ORIGINAL PAPER
New Directions inCorporate Social Responsibility andEthics: Codes
ofConduct intheDigital Environment
DavidLópezJiménez1 · Eduardo CarlosDittmar1 · JennyPatriciaVargasPortillo2
Received: 13 August 2020 / Accepted: 18 January 2021
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. part of Springer Nature 2021
Abstract
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has an impact on many areas of society, and it has recently been active in the digital
space, a growing area of business activity. However, certain factors prevent it from firmly establishing itself in this area. One
of these factors is the lack of user trust. Certain instruments have been created to address this issue, such as codes of con-
duct that seek to mitigate the causes of distrust by making significant improvements in the regulations and ethical standards
applicable to business transactions. These instruments are the product of industry self-regulation and complement rather
than substitute for effective legal regulations. In light of some European Community (EC) directives, European legislators
are addressing certain issues in this area, especially unfair business practices.
Keywords Statement of values· Law· Ethics· Business· Corporate social responsibility
Introduction
In recent years, the business world has become aware of the
need and benefits of having codes of conduct that express
its position on a number of issues, including the workplace,
finance, the environment, customer relationships, and deal-
ing with suppliers. These written documents are openly
available so that the public can observe how individual
companies apply the best practices in certain areas of their
operations.
The most common method for integrating ethics into the
management practices of a company is the creation and for-
malization of various written documents into a statement
of corporate ethics. There is a growing trend of establish-
ing formal corporate ethics documents that function as a
foundation for the development of corporate culture. The
philosophical bases of these documents are human virtues,
generally accepted social values, and universal ethical prin-
ciples. In the academic and business worlds, the term “code
of conduct” usually refers to documents that contain the
principles or rules that guide a company’s ethical conduct
(Melé etal. 2006).
An initiative for creating a code of conduct is part of what
is known as corporate social responsibility (CSR), a term
that has no universally accepted meaning.
Some say that CSR activities are nothing but a market-
ing strategy. This view contends that CSR activities seek to
increase profitability by improving a company’s image (Grif-
fin and Mahon 1997; Simpson and Kohers 2002). However,
some empirical studies do not identify a positive relation-
ship between CSR and profitability (Mcwilliams and Siegel
2000; Omran etal. 2002).
In our opinion, this view can be defended when there is
no independent and impartial body that evaluates compli-
ance with a code of conduct (when it is a code of conduct
that was unilaterally created and applied by the company
itself). Indeed, not all companies conduct audits to assess
compliance with the code of conduct (with a robust ethical
component) that they have voluntarily implemented.
A unilateral code of conduct—created and applied by a
company with no monitoring body to verify compliance—
can be viewed as a simple, unilateral declaration of will,
largely conceived as a strategy for enhancing a company’s
* Eduardo Carlos Dittmar
ecdittmar@eae.es
David López Jiménez
dlopez@eae.es
Jenny Patricia Vargas Portillo
jennypatricia.vargas@esic.edu
1 EAE Business School, C. Joaquín Costa 41, 28002Madrid,
Spain
2 ESIC Business & Marketing School, Av. Valdenigrales,
28223PozuelodeAlarcón, Spain
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D.López Jiménez et al.
1 3
image. It is likely that the passage of time has led to slightly
more sophistication in both the presentation and possibly
even the practice of codes of conduct. To some extent, it
is clear that these best practice documents are intended to
improve the public image of the companies that implement
them.
However, when a code of conduct created by a third party
also has an impartial and independent monitoring body that
a company voluntarily complies with, a positive view of
this situation should be taken since it demonstrates the com-
pany’s transparency. A company can then have a broad scope
and address all aspects of CSR or only one specific aspect.
At this point, Internet self-regulation comes into play.
Internet self-regulation enables codes of conduct to be
implemented in the digital field. These codes include articles
containing the best legal and ethical practices in digital com-
merce, and they are managed by entities independent of the
subscribing companies. They include all the current legisla-
tion pertinent to online business (consolidating such regula-
tions into a single document), plus the additional benefits of
ethical standards that offer more consumer protections than
the law provides. The code of conduct will involve establish-
ing certain guarantees that go beyond partially mandatory
law. Therefore, contractual clauses that are more beneficial
than the minimum legal regulations for the consumer and/or
user are valid. The so-called partially mandatory rules (from
German doctrine Halbzwingende Vorschriften) are applied,
which are modifiable only for the benefit of the consumer
but not vice versa.
The autonomy of will principle seems to be making solid
inroads into the Internet and other converging technologies,
and this principle has been revived by the business world to
benefit potential consumers and/or users by providing new
and promising customer acquisition channels. These scenar-
ios are largely characterized by rapid changes in technology,
followed by the requisite legal changes. The premature aging
and subsequent abandonment of seemingly new structures
are prevalent, as is the questioning of traditionally accepted
truths, the legislative branch of government, and various
territorial entities (such as autonomous areas or regions,
nations, and in our case the European Union). This situation
has been evolving for more than a decade, making a strong
argument for a legal order in which self-regulation plays an
important role that complements current legislation. This is
particularly true for new technologies.
The self-regulation analyzed in this study requires an
examination of certain issues regarding this type of initiative
on the part of regulated entities, although it is sometimes
fostered by the public sector. It is a private sector, not a
public sector, initiative and is therefore not binding. Regard-
less, once the company has adhered to the code of conduct,
its compliance is mandatory. In other words, its adherence
is voluntary, but if it freely chooses to integrate itself into a
system of self-discipline, the commitments assumed under
the code of conduct must necessarily be respected. If they
are not observed, an unfair commercial practice will unfold,
as we show below.
Self-regulation is not a recent phenomenon. Any organi-
zation or subject is self-regulating, in one way or another.
Self-regulation is legally relevant when it goes beyond
the original private or domestic framework and exerts its
effects on a notably wider range of activities. In some cases,
it will have a supranational reach and involve government
authorities.
During the twentieth century, standards of conduct were
generally considered to be only marginally effective in regu-
lating social behavior. There was a general belief at that time
that the norms of self-regulation were not legally binding
and were only proposed moral standards; thus, there was
minimal compliance with ethics codes. However, the current
environment examined in this study has changed markedly.
An Assessment ofCorporate Social
Responsibility (CSR)
We are witnessing an unprecedented social and business rev-
olution. The concept of the company as an organization that
plays a leading role in a free society and that is not exclu-
sively dedicated to the generation of wealth and employment
is being more widely accepted. Thus, the Friedman school is
losing credibility, as it contends that the only responsibility
of a business is to maximize profit within the limits estab-
lished by the law and commercial practices.
Notably, the concept of the company has recently evolved
into the model of the socially responsible company. In this
regard, the idea that a company can be reduced to a legal
artifice that consists only of a series of private contracts
ignores the idea that a company is a collection, coalition, or
association of economic agents distinct from the individuals
working in the company. The set of resources accumulated
by the organization and its participants through external and
internal social relationships constitutes its social capital.
In addition, Freeman and Evan’s (1990) stakeholder the-
ory states that by appropriately considering the needs of
various stakeholders, managers can increase the efficiency
with which their organizations adapt to external demands.
Businesses currently coexist in a highly competitive envi-
ronment that forces them to differentiate themselves in every
way to survive in international markets, which includes the
digital realm, one of the newest business sectors.
The term “corporate social responsibility” has no univer-
sally accepted meaning, although it represents something
akin to the communication of values. That said, CSR con-
tinues to be a nebulous term that translates into a range of
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New Directions inCorporate Social Responsibility andEthics: Codes ofConduct intheDigital…
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different activities and objectives, depending on the com-
pany, entity, or organization.
Providing a generally accepted definition of corporate
or business social responsibility is not an easy task. Such
a definition would depend on, among other variables, the
geographical scope, ideological assumptions, the scientific,
economic, or sociological perspective itself or the politi-
cal theory based on which the researcher approaches this
topic. CSR can be defined as the set of domestic and inter-
national legal and ethical obligations and commitments to
the organization’s stakeholders, derived from the impacts
that the organization’s activities and operations have in the
social, work, environmental, and human rights arenas.
One of the most widely accepted definitions is from the
European Commission’s green paper on CSR, which defines
it as “a concept whereby companies integrate social and
environmental concerns in their business operations and
in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary
basis.” The United Nations, on the other hand, argues that
“Business has a social responsibility and moral duty to use
the power of markets to make globalization a positive force
for all.” The raison d’être of CSR is that companies have
a commitment that goes beyond financial and commercial
responsibilities (Hopkins 1999). Most CSR definitions
implicitly include business ethics and the relevance of stake-
holders beyond owners (Schmidheiny etal. 1997; Feigerlová
and Pauknerová 2020). In other words, CSR has become a
key activity in many corporations because it is considered
the right thing to do (Gan 2006; Allen and Peloza 2015).
An increasing number of companies are now willing to
fully assume their social responsibility since they recognize
that in today’s market economy, legitimacy to operate must
be granted by all of the organization’s agents or interest
groups (Yan 2019).
There is a twofold consideration to discuss here. First,
CSR is neither an end nor a means; rather, it is a basic prin-
ciple that should broadly govern a company’s set of business
activities and should be present in any decision-making pro-
cess. Second, CSR is closely related to the predisposition to
take business behavior to a higher level, one in which such
behavior is consistent with the norms, values, and social
expectations of all groups within and surrounding the organ-
ization but, at the same time, the primacy of the organiza-
tion’s economic function and domestic regulatory mandates
is recognized.
Although only businesses can take on social responsi-
bility, other interested parties—stakeholders (all those who
have an interest in or a relationship with the company, such
as workers, investors, and consumers)—can play a funda-
mental role in urging companies to adopt socially responsi-
ble practices (Embid Irujo 2004, 2006a; Eguidazu Palacios
2006; Moneva Abadía 2006; Díaz-Perdomo etal. 2020).
However, in the vast majority of cases, a company’s adop-
tion of CSR has more to do with achieving its own stra-
tegic objectives than with moral issues (Escamilla Solano
etal. 2019). The reality that can be observed on a daily
basis is that companies and organizations manipulate values
in a seemingly frivolous manner that is almost exclusively
oriented toward business interests and image enhancement.
Similarly, it seems that businesses are motivated to build and
communicate their corporate values because doing so gen-
erates significant dividends and enhances an organization’s
image and reputation in comparison with the competition.
However, this assessment is not accurate since it does not
address the essence of what, as we shall see, is happening
in the knowledge society and, in particular, with the codes
of conduct regulating commercial transactions. Businesses
that have committed to adhering to a code of conduct must
change their behaviors accordingly. Otherwise, their poten-
tial consumers and/or users may be able to demand compli-
ance, as measured by an appropriate monitoring body that
manages the respective code of conduct. Thus, if a noncom-
pliant company does not remediate an infraction, it may be
expelled based on the self-disciplining mechanism linked to
the code of conduct (Darnaculleta and Gardella 2008). The
monitoring body could actively publicize an expulsion or
similar penalty, resulting in significant harm to the image or
reputation of the noncompliant company.
The new socially responsible measures that we will
examine can help to significantly improve how a company
operates on the Internet, and they can indirectly improve
its bottom line, thereby strengthening its competitive posi-
tion (Kramer and Porter 2003). The financial cost of social
responsibility can sometimes be high, but social responsibil-
ity can provide significant value for a company’s image or
reputation. In the digital world, this will translate into a sub-
stantial sense of consumer and/or user trust when conducting
business with a company committed to the best available
legal and ethical practices, as documented in the code of
conduct that the company has adopted (Sharma and Lijuan
2014). In the case of e-contracting, consumer trust seems
to be a prerequisite and an indispensable condition for the
comprehensive development of e-commerce. It is, therefore,
essential to guarantee that consumer interests in the online
environment will be protected just as well as or even better
than in the physical world. From a meta-legal perspective,
trust is an indicator of the absence of risk or of the level of
risk mitigation since we all strive to control the risks in our
lives and to avoid uncontrolled risks. This value grows as
expectations are satisfied and is entirely subjective.
The priorities of pursuing material gain and earning a
profit in economic activities are usually taken for granted.
However, they are not the only goals or business priorities
since certain ethical values are conspicuously present and,
sometimes, publicly recognized (Sen 2003). Ethics is an
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D.López Jiménez et al.
1 3
inherent part of business activity (Frontrodona Felip etal.
1998); however, until recently, there has been scant research
on this topic (Kaptein and Schwartz 2008). In this regard,
three viewpoints should be discussed. First, companies and
organizations are, in their own way, analogically moral
agents (Goodpaster and Matthews 1982). Second, it is appro-
priate to speak not only of ethics within a company but also
of business ethics. This leads to the third viewpoint, which
is that an organization has values—or nonvalues—beyond
its profit orientation, which are the organization’s ethics.
These organizational ethics will necessarily look different
from individual morality.
One of the visible manifestations of corporate commit-
ment to ethical behavior is a written code of conduct (Alex-
ander and Harding 2003). The term “code of conduct” refers
to certain rules of “correct” behavior established by asso-
ciations involved in a particular sector of business activity
(in our case, the digital environment), with the objective of
establishing norms of reciprocal behavior among themselves
and other economic agents.
Business codes of conduct have clear origins in the cor-
porate world, as they were developed by companies to for-
mulate their own internal rules of operation, although they
sometimes also contained principles for interacting with
other companies and potential consumers and/or users. In
this regard, some contend that consumer transactions with
online sellers increase in proportion to their positive percep-
tions of the ethics of these sellers (Lu etal. 2013; Bauman
and Bachmann 2017; Sullivan and Kim 2018).
In general, codes of ethics are intended to communicate
an organization’s character or to highlight compliance with
certain practices. Since the success of a business largely
depends on consumer trust, widespread unethical activity
leads to a loss of market sentiment, making it difficult for the
business to survive (Qu etal 2017; Hallikainen and Lauk-
kanen 2018). In fact, information security and privacy are
some of the main drivers for digital companies to promote
practices that generate trust in the virtual world (Sharma and
Lijuan 2014; Lee etal 2018).
Codes of conduct now play an important role as a CSR
management tool. We are witnessing a significant prolifera-
tion of businesses adopting codes of conduct. In fact, practi-
cally all professional associations, sectors of business activ-
ity, conglomerates, organizations, institutions, or groups
have considered the development of conduct guidelines in
some form or other, have drafted codes of conduct, or even
have a tradition of conduct norms (Cowton and Thompson
2000). If self-regulatory instruments are accompanied by
institutionalized sanctions, it is safe to assume that people
will typically comply with them. According to human behav-
ior theory, with respect to the expected benefit of noncom-
pliance, compliance will be inversely proportional to the
severity of sanctions and the probability that they will be
applied (Becker 1993).
In this study, we discuss the characteristics of codes of
conduct, a product of self-regulation, in digital business. It
has become relatively common for companies, especially
those that operate transnationally, to have established a code
of conduct to inform the public of their governing commit-
ments and principles. It is also common in certain fields
such as virtual environments to adhere to a code of conduct
managed by an independent and impartial third party that
provides a high-quality regulatory function. Although these
instruments have certain commonalities with typical busi-
ness codes of conduct, they feature some special attributes
that we discuss in this paper.
Self‑regulation: Concepts andAttributes
In recent years, we have all witnessed, and in some cases
been the protagonists of, a vigorous push, propelled by vari-
ous forces, for “soft law.” Soft law is quasilegal, nonbinding
law that is mostly oriented toward the protection of consum-
ers and/or users in digital matters. While it does not have the
weight of legal norms, nonbinding or voluntary law is a set
of instruments that can significantly affect the legislative
panorama and promote the legal standardization of certain
practices (Lachaud 2018). Similarly, nonbinding law can
facilitate the interpretation of legal norms affected by CSR
activities (Embid Irujo 2006b). Notably, although soft law
is not legally binding, this fact does not imply that it com-
pletely lacks any legal force. In fact, the practices addressed
in soft laws exist within reference frameworks established
by public entities.
The possibility that private organizations and subjects can
also pursue general interests must be recognized. Similarly,
certain private normative instruments created by these pri-
vate entities can be an important tool for public administra-
tion as well.
Self-regulation involves the observance of certain
standards of conduct—ethical principles and standards—
the fulfillment of which has been previously established
as an objective. At the same time, it is also an expression
by a particular industry sector of a commitment to social
responsibility.
Since self-regulation is more informal than legislation
and lacks the coercive power of a government entity, it can
be very ineffective if it is not supported by a favorable cul-
tural environment and all the parties involved.
Additionally, self-regulation cannot become an excuse to
relieve lawmakers of their obligations. Rather, it is a com-
plement to legislation that is inevitably very general and
ambiguous.
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New Directions inCorporate Social Responsibility andEthics: Codes ofConduct intheDigital…
1 3
Globalization and the unfettered pace of technologi-
cal innovation in various sectors, especially the Internet,
make it difficult to anticipate all the problems that may
arise in areas such as the protection of consumers and/or
electronic users. There is a framework that facilitates the
creation of procedures that enable appropriate solutions
for all. In turn, government authorities are required to con-
stantly monitor the policies that define these protections
(Barkatullah and Djumadi 2018).
We can argue that the professionalization of the busi-
ness sector leads to its own self-regulation. Regulatory
pressure from government authorities, who tend to encour-
age and sometimes even impose self-regulation, is simply
a manifestation of the need to improve the professional-
ism of companies. They all must acquire more specialized
knowledge and take more responsibility for the risks of
putting that knowledge into practice. In short, they must
have a better service orientation (in our case, e-commerce)
toward their consumers and/or users.
The higher the level of professionalism of those
engaged in a given activity is, the higher the degree of
voluntary compliance with the rules governing that activ-
ity. This is true regardless of whether the rules are legal
and binding or the product of self-regulation.
The application of self-regulation is particularly appro-
priate in areas where experience has shown that legal
consumer protection is lacking. In such cases, voluntary
participation by the consumers and users targeted by those
who create and market products, as well as by information
service providers, increasingly appears to be an unavoid-
able element for ensuring adequate consumer protections.
This voluntary participation takes place within an interest-
ing private protection mechanism that complements other
public regulatory instruments, resulting in a greater degree
of protection for consumers and users.
Clearly, self-regulation takes place between society and
government, between the private and the public. This is
inherent to the type of self-discipline discussed here that
emerges from the private sector to gain public relevance.
In fact, the major finding regarding self-regulation is that
there is no government-private sector schism since self-
regulation does not entail a complete separation of the two.
On the contrary, self-regulation allows this new product of
society to fully develop and empower the creative capacity
of private subjects, who can then use, collect, and organize
it while public and private interests converge.
The essence of self-regulation is that it is based on
the options, rules, and decisions of actors in the market-
place, while legal regulations are created based on deci-
sions made by government authorities. As the term itself
indicates, self-regulation does not mean the absence of
standards or regulations. Rather, its meaning derives from
the fact that rules are adopted in a completely voluntary
manner, although they may have been fueled by different
interests.
There are two main reasons why private organizations self-
regulate. First, they want to fill a gap that lawmakers are unable
or unwilling to fill. Second, they choose to comply with rules
that are stricter than those imposed by the legal system (even
when they themselves drafted those rules) to earn high lev-
els of trust from those on the potential receiving end of these
rules (i.e., potential consumers and users). In this regard, one
example is a private association that approves or voluntarily
submits to a code of conduct.
Currently, the prevailing idea is that pure self-regulation is
not the most convenient; instead, there is increasingly more
support for the theory of mixed self-regulation or coregulation,
of which success lies in collaborating with the government
either for the creation of codes or for the granting of certain
prerogatives to those with certain demands so that it becomes,
in the last instance, the entity in charge of resolving controver-
sies raised in the field of self-regulation systems.
The position to which we have just referred was glimpsed
decades ago, specifically in the 1980s, by authors such as Bod-
dewyn (1992), who, in taking into account relations emerging
between the government and private individuals or agents,
listed up to four different systems of self-regulation. First,
there is Pure Self-Regulation, where standards are developed,
used, and complied with by the industry involved in the sys-
tem. Second, there is Coopted Self-Regulation, according to
which the industry, on its own will, involves third parties such
as consumers, government representatives, and experts in the
field in creating, developing, and complying with standards
that will govern the system of self-regulation. Third, we have
Negotiated Self-Regulation, where the industry voluntarily
negotiates the creation and development of standards and their
compliance with outsiders or third parties, which may include
consumer associations or a government department. Fourth
and lastly, with Mandated Self-Regulation, the government
orders the industry to create, develop, and comply with regula-
tions so that they can coercively regulate themselves.
What makes self-regulation a legally relevant phenomenon
is that it must be considered by public authorities? We are thus
faced with a situation in which Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence
maintains a very defined position, since the determining factor
is not public interest, which it considers in its initial manifesta-
tions, but governmental interest or the interest of public powers
beyond what that strictly affects the government (Black 1996).
Codes ofConduct: AParadigm
forE‑commerce Self‑regulation
Codes of conduct are sometimes integrated into what can be
called a system of self-regulation. For their coexistence, two
assumptions must be applied: the documentation of good
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D.López Jiménez et al.
1 3
practices or codes of conduct and the presence of an impar-
tial and independent control body responsible for ensuring
full compliance. A lack of prescriptive assumptions or their
malfunctioning will lead the system to, in addition to being
ineffective, be incomplete. Next, we discuss certain consid-
erations regarding each of the aforementioned factors.
On the one hand, the documentation of good practices
or codes of conduct will imply the establishment of certain
guarantees that go beyond legislation, which is a require-
ment for us to find ourselves before a true document of good
practices because otherwise, we could be faced with a mere
legislative compilation or a more or less didactic explanation
of the prevailing regulations. The document of good prac-
tices would govern, in its entirety, improvements performed
(both legal and ethical) with respect to the potential con-
sumer and/or user, but not in the downgrading of consumer
protective legislation. In other words, when the legal norm
is partially mandatory, its content cannot be excluded to the
detriment of the party the law is intended to protect. Among
other aspects, the norm will regulate issues related to hir-
ing and interactive advertising, which is publicly known to
society in general, making it possible to consult it electroni-
cally and enabling its consistency, at a minimum, within the
languages of the places of establishment of the companies
adhering to them.
On the other hand, the second assumption to which we
allude concerns the independent control body established,
where appropriate, to resolve disputes between affiliated
companies and consumers or users who, in one way or
another, undertake the contracting or provision of a good
and/or service, including activities aimed at promoting inter-
active advertising. In other words, the extrajudicial dispute
resolution mechanism will rule on the existence or nonex-
istence of a possible violation of the good practices docu-
ment (a code of conduct) in which it is integrated, imposing,
where appropriate, the sanction that proceeds according to
the articles of the latter.
There are certain legal standards in various European
nations that establish the need for codes of conduct to
regulate e-commerce. One such regulation in Spain is
Law 34/2002, Article 18 (11 July), on Information Ser-
vice Providers and Electronic Commerce. Article 18 pro-
vides directional guidance more than regulatory strictures,
which are almost nonexistent in this statute. The commu-
nity legislator also seeks to promote codes of conduct. In
this sense, it is worth mentioning, among others, Article
5 of Directive 84/450/CEE of September 10, 1984 on mis-
leading advertising as amended by Directive 97/55/CEE of
October 6, 1997 and Article 16 of Directive 2000/31/CE
of June 8 on certain legal aspects of information society
services and e-commerce in the internal market in particu-
lar. Codes of conduct should not be limited to reiterating
the law; rather, they should also be designed to encompass
certain areas such as technology, in general, and e-com-
merce, in particular. In other words, they must go beyond
the legal statute in the areas they pretend to govern. In fact,
they must specify the general principles established in the
law when they are being adapted to specific circumstances.
One should not assume that all codes of conduct are
very similar, regardless of where they are implemented.
This is not the case at all—it is an assumption that reveals
an ignorance of the details of codes of conduct. While they
may share common themes or topics, most often there will
be significant differences.
Importantly, for a code of conduct to be effective, it
must contain a documented process for its own modifica-
tion and be considered a living document. By their very
nature, policies regarding business ethics must be dynamic
since practical views about what is fair and right—both for
organizations and for society overall—change over time,
while the foundational principles are preserved.
One of the most significant characteristics of codes of
conduct is that they fill the space between ethical standards
and positive regulatory provisions but without being either
one or the other. A nuance of the current codes of conduct
in e-commerce is that although compliance is voluntary,
they provide more guaranteed protections of consumers
and/or users than the relevant government legislation.
Once an information service provider formally imple-
ments a code of conduct, it has the binding force of law
between the contracting parties (the information service
provider and the entity managing the self-regulatory sys-
tem of which the code of conduct is a part). By establish-
ing membership (the fact that some of the rules in codes of
conduct have a distinct ethical bias notwithstanding), they
enhance the base level of consumer protection provided by
the law. Potential consumers and users who benefit from
these protections have the right to request the full content
of these codes of conduct.
The contractual legal relationship, that is, the obliga-
tory relationship established by the e-contract between
the information service provider and the consumer and/
or user, is an economic relationship regulated by the legal
norms or rules agreed upon between the service provider
and the entity managing the self-regulatory system. It is
incorporated in good faith (a general legal principle) into
the code of conduct by its use (habitual or normative use)
and by law. The behavioral model that good faith entails
has an element of loyalty toward achieving the proposed
goal, as well as an element of safeguarding the trust placed
in each party’s behavior since it assumes a certain good-
will in the reciprocal behavior of the contracting parties.
In contractual relationships, the principle of good faith is
associated with trust and honesty. Specific applications of
the good faith principle in business are prevalent in activi-
ties that involve mutual trust. Consequently, good faith is
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New Directions inCorporate Social Responsibility andEthics: Codes ofConduct intheDigital…
1 3
especially important in bilateral or multilateral endeavors.
It is a fundamental pillar of the law of obligations, espe-
cially in e-contracts.
In this regard, it should be noted that the ethics content
(in a code of conduct) is not equivalent to a company’s or an
organization’s compliance with its legal obligations. Legal-
ity is an ethical principle since compliance with the law is
ethically obligatory. However, as previously stated, organiza-
tional ethics are not reduced to that moral minimum. In fact,
ethics often implies going above and beyond the law. Here,
one of the main features of CSR can be observed.
Some codes of conduct have not been applied because
they have not been properly formalized or because no one
is responsible for enforcing them. In other words, for a code
of conduct to be effective, it must be enforceable (Raiborn
and Payne 1990; Nitsch etal. 2005). The greatest poten-
tial for effective self-regulation is seen in organizations that
have an appropriate level of maturity and development and
that are able to apply internal codes and voluntary technical
standards as a matter of course, as if they were positive law.
The codes of conduct promoted by European Community
(EC) legislators and, subsequently, by Spanish legislators are
appropriate instruments for regulating the business sectors
that directly or indirectly participate in e-commerce. That
is, they are an ideal tool for implementing the EC’s goal of
unifying fragmented consumer groups. This lack of unity
weakens the EC’s position vis-à-vis the business commu-
nity; thus, self-regulation is a truly significant step toward
giving consumers a more powerful voice in the European
Union.
Furthermore, codes of conduct cannot establish rules that
are more permissive than the minimum required by law, nor
can they openly contradict mandatory law (López Jiménez
etal. 2020). Consequently, codes of conduct cannot lower
legal standards established by law, whether mandatory or
partially mandatory, to benefit consumers. However, they
can indeed significantly improve existing guidance appli-
cable to potential consumers and/or users, which is a weak
area in e-commerce contracts.
The code of conduct is the most widely used instrument
for establishing trust in the self-regulation of e-commerce,
and it is made possible by virtue of the principle of auton-
omy of will. The rules presented in best practice documents
for e-commerce are a manifestation of self-regulation. In
other words, they are autonomous rules emanating from the
principle of autonomy of will that is based on Article 1255
of the Spanish Civil Code, which recognizes the regulatory
power of autonomy of will in contracts. Contractual rules
are similar to legal regulations in that the contracting parties
must adapt their behavior to fulfill the terms of the contract.
However, since it is born from legislative power, a legal
regulation is heteronomous—it is general and abstract. On
the other hand, a contractual rule is autonomous since it is
born from the will of the contracting parties—it is private,
specific, and concrete.
We must stipulate that codes of conduct consist of a set
of rules that are deontological in nature (Vázquez Fernán-
dez 1991; Santaella López 2003; Barkatullah and Djumadi
2018). That is, they represent the best professional practices
that provide a high level of legal security. It is this security
that results in their target groups, whose trust is critical for
the success of e-commerce, taking a positive view of them.
Since codes of conduct are governed by the autonomy of will
of the parties, the information used for their approval will
be more extensive and complete. Moreover, their content
will seek to protect the interests of the parties concerned in
a more equitable manner.
In e-commerce, codes of conduct are voluntary docu-
ments (Lachaud 2018). They include a set of principles,
rules, and practices that are certified by an independent
third party. While they are being drafted, these documents
consider the interests of consumer and user organizations,
disabled individuals, or other affected groups. They regu-
late matters relating to precontractual, contractual, and post-
contractual procedures (in e-contracting) without involving
other issues, such as interactive advertising, security, pri-
vacy, accessibility, the comprehensive protection of minors,
and other related issues.
The rules presented in codes of conduct are usually much
more focused on the specific problem at hand since the peo-
ple who are closest to the problem have created these codes.
The various groups that interact in e-commerce include the
following: consumers and users, businesspeople, public offi-
cials, and other agents with potential impacts. The future
projections of such texts, the result of self-regulation, may
well depart from their ethical and in some cases even con-
tractual nature to become effective normative bodies with
the close cooperation of public authorities. Moreover, in this
sense, some countries have coined a certain expression to
refer to codes of conduct developed between businessmen,
consumers, and public authorities, which are institutional or
functional codes (Garvin 1983).
While almost all European countries are aware of the ben-
efits of codes of conduct, they apply them differently in the
area of e-commerce. For example, Denmark, Sweden, Aus-
tria, and Finland use codes of conduct to supplement general
legislation, and the entities responsible for consumer issues
are heavily involved in creating such codes. The United
Kingdom, Ireland, and the Netherlands use codes of con-
duct widely, although the government entities responsible
for consumer affairs have a less formal role. Finally, as a
complement to general regulation, self-regulation is much
less developed in countries such as Spain, where it is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon and where the country’s legal tra-
dition and socioeconomic structure make mandatory rules
a better option.
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D.López Jiménez et al.
1 3
Compliance with the articles of a code of conduct is a
contractual commitment between the companies adhering to
the code and the entity managing the self-regulatory system
of which the code is a part. The day-to-day management of
the code is the responsibility of the monitoring body, while
the resolution of disputes between member companies and
consumers and/or users is the purview of specified extraju-
dicial mediation entities.
The ethics content of e-commerce self-monitoring sys-
tems does not conflict with the judicial function exclusively
entrusted to judges and courts. According to Article 117.3
of the Spanish Constitution, the judicial function consists
of the power to judge and enforce judicial decisions, and
there is no conflict or overlap between this function and
e-commerce self-regulatory systems. Extrajudicial dispute
resolution bodies will issue decisions only on the ethical or
deontological correctness of the issue submitted to them.
Almost always, the existing body of law must frame any
discussion of ethical behavior. Therefore, the first ethical
mandate that e-commerce self-regulatory systems must ful-
fill is the need to align e-commerce transactions with current
legislation.
Consumers require mechanisms that are quick and inex-
pensive or even free, since the price of the contracted good
or service is often low. These mechanisms must also be
effective in resolving disputes that may arise between the
parties that have entered into a contractual relationship.
Another feature of self-regulatory systems is that the pro-
cessing of complaints by consumers and/or users is free.
They do not incur any cost for the resolution of the dispute
due to the procedures created by the self-disciplinary bod-
ies, unlike the costs inherent to using judicial mechanisms.
These judicial processes not only entail high costs for the
litigants but also very frequently involve a long wait for the
resolution of the dispute by the judges and magistrates pre-
siding over the matter in civil court. The purpose of this
reference to judges and magistrates is to highlight the fact
that extrajudicial conflict resolution is usually presided over
by experts in the field who offer a better chance of providing
an appropriate solution to the dispute.
Finally, in line with what has been highlighted, it is worth
mentioning that self-regulation systems, with the aim of
solving the difference that separates parties (entrepreneurs,
and consumers or users), have established mediation. By
virtue of the latter, an attempt is made to prevent the conflict
from reaching the judicial or extrajudicial dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms that govern e-contracting and interactive
advertising. In recent years, one of the essential objectives
of the European Union has been to improve citizens’ access
to justice. Directive 2008/52 of May 21 on mediation in
civil and commercial matters has served as an important
step in this direction, since, among other aspects, it invites
Member States to reflect on the role of Alternative Dispute
Resolution. From the aforementioned Directive, Member
States are urged to promote mediation in all of their man-
dates, promote the initial and continuing training of media-
tors and specialized organizations, and develop codes of
conduct that serve as a guide in this realm. Mediation is a
friendly and peaceful system, despite not binding and thus
lacking the decision-making power of dispute resolution. At
all times, parties have the power to negotiate and determine
applicable regulations. The mediator acts as a neutral third
party who facilitates communication between the parties
while guaranteeing confidentiality for the resolution of the
dispute that faces them. The presence of good faith between
the parties is essential, since they must behave as collabora-
tors and not as adversaries with the goal of resolving the
conflict that separates them.
Noncompliance withCodes ofConduct
asanUnfair Commercial Practice
Adherence to an e-commerce code of conduct allows a com-
pany to display certain accreditation symbols, like a trust
badge or seal. The ability to display this type of badge has
a beneficial impact on a company’s image, as it is widely
recognized by other businesses (competitors) and by cur-
rent or potential consumers and/or users (Kuhlmann 1990;
Bock 2000; Gierl and Winkler 2000; Russell and Lane 2002;
Kroeber-Riel and Weinberg 2003; Özpolat and Jank 2015;
Mattison Thompson etal 2019). Thus, participation in a self-
regulation mechanism provides added value to a company,
and protecting consumers through self-regulation to retain
their trust is in the interest of companies that self-regulate. If
as a management tool, e-commerce self-regulation generates
trust at a macro level, then each individual code of conduct
has the same effect on its subscribers.
The trust badges displayed on the websites of companies
that adhere to a self-regulatory system enable consumers to
choose between those that are publicly committed to best
business and ethical practices and those that are not (Mat-
tison Thompson etal 2019). Only the former offer added
value to the product or service being marketed. Furthermore,
customers will choose the website of a business that offers
higher added value over the websites of other vendors; thus,
this added value represents a competitive advantage (Chen
etal. 2013). Therefore, consumer loyalty in e-commerce is
partly due to the added value perceived by customers (Frost
etal. 2010; Seckler etal. 2015; Kim etal. 2016).
Displaying a trust badge that represents adherence to a
certain self-regulatory system means that the business dis-
playing it is committed to complying, in all its activities,
with the corresponding code of conduct. These trust badges
constitute a recognition of the quality of the companies that
earn and display them, as they seek better positioning in the
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New Directions inCorporate Social Responsibility andEthics: Codes ofConduct intheDigital…
1 3
market. A benefit of the prestige that such badges represent
is that this prestige translates into more e-commerce transac-
tions. A click on the trust badge will link to the text of the
code of conduct (McCabe etal. 1996; Chonko etal. 2003).
In the Anglo-Saxon world, especially in the United States,
there is a growing belief that breaches of a company’s own
code of conduct (particularly when it is used as a marketing
tool or for promoting the company’s corporate image) rep-
resent acts of unfair competition, specifically deceitful acts
and misleading advertising (Lu 2000).
This notion is gaining ground in Europe, as Directive
2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil (11 May 2005) concerning unfair business-to-consumer
commercial practices in the internal market (“Unfair Com-
mercial Practices Directive”) marks an important step in
the integration of self-regulatory systems with the unfair
competition legal regime. Indeed, in certain circumstances,
unfair commercial practices include noncompliance with the
commitments in codes of conduct.
In this regard, Article 6(2)(b) of a proposed version of
Directive 2005/29/EC detailed the commercial practices
considered to be misleading, including the failure to com-
ply with a code of conduct, if such codes and the companies
adhering to them had been made public (López Jiménez
etal. 2013). If this language had been approved, it would
have seriously hindered the growth of self-regulation since
by imposing a heavy cost of compliance, it would have dis-
couraged the adoption of codes of conduct.
Article 6(2)(b) of the version that was ultimately adopted
appropriately considers noncompliance with a code of con-
duct to be a misleading commercial practice only when a
business explicitly mentions its adoption of such a code in its
statements of commercial practices. The underlying ration-
ale of Article 6(2)(b) is that when a business publicizes its
adoption of a code of conduct, legitimate expectations are
produced. Thus, when a company does not comply with the
commitments in its code of conduct, such behavior is con-
sidered to be a false claim and, therefore, an unfair practice
under Directive 2005/29/EC.
Regardless, the final wording of the Directive should not
be interpreted to mean that a simple violation by a business
of its code of conduct is considered an unfair practice; rather,
it means that an unfair practice occurs if a business violates
the code and then fails to comply with the decision of the
code’s supervisory body regarding the violation. In other
words, two conditions need to exist for a code of conduct
violation to be considered an unfair commercial practice
under the Directive. First, the business has explicitly stated
its compliance with the code in its advertising, and second,
the business has failed to comply with a decision by the
monitoring body responsible for applying the code.
Thus, an unfair practice occurs only when a business
explicitly pledges to follow certain “best practices.” A
violation of a code of conduct should not be considered
fraudulent if the company has only expressed its intention
to make a “best effort.”
Notably, in this regard, two types of penalties may be
imposed on a company that violates its code of ethics.
First, the monitoring body of the self-regulatory system
may decide, depending on the seriousness of the case, to
issue a simple warning, to suspend rights, or to expel the
company in question (Ferrell and Hartline 2014). The pen-
alties imposed may be actively publicized. Second, the
appropriate public authorities may impose a legal penalty
for violations of applicable regulations. There are cases
in which certain systems of self-discipline can be pro-
nounced, generally taking the form of nonbinding opin-
ions among nonadhering companies. Thus, a claim can be
presented to third parties for having violated the articles
of the ethical code in question, which, we insist, are not
obliged to observe. In the latter case, the control body,
normally at the request of a party, will assess the behav-
ior of the company that violates the corresponding ethical
code. Such ruling will only have the value of mere opinion,
so unless the company has assumed the competence of
the control body, it is not obliged, in any way, to observe.
Regardless, it is worth mentioning the various reasons
why the service provider may not adhere to a code of con-
duct at a certain point in time. On the one hand, given
that entrepreneurs are completely free to decide when
they wish to enter and leave the self-regulation system—
in which the document that we could call good practices
is integrated—they can express their willingness to stop
being linked by the aforementioned document, giving,
where appropriate, timely notice from a certain date. On
the other hand, the abandonment of the system of self-
discipline may not follow a voluntary decision made by
the entrepreneur, who up to that moment had been adher-
ing, but may have happened as a result of the sanctioning
activity of the control body. Note that particularly serious
cases can determine the conveniently publicized expulsion
of the associate.
Additionally, under the Unfair Commercial Practices
Directive, a misleading practice occurs when a business or
professional presents the rights granted by law to consumers
or users as if they were a distinctive feature of the product
or service offered. Furthermore, when a service provider
displays a trust badge that advertises adherence to a code of
conduct that merely restates what the law provides, such a
display is also considered to be a misleading practice. More-
over, it is also a misleading practice if a code of conduct
is presented as a distinctive feature or some sort of legal
improvement when the code actually offers less consumer/
user protection than currently applicable regulations. Both
cases constitute misleading advertising and unfair commer-
cial practices.
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D.López Jiménez et al.
1 3
A business that adopts high-quality business practices
that follow the prevailing law pertaining to e-commerce
and that are documented in a code of conduct will be
viewed positively by government officials and by its com-
petition and potential clients. Of course, this depends on
a number of things, such as the level of compliance with
advertising regulations, the protection of information,
minors, and intellectual and industrial property, electronic
security, and accessibility, among other matters.
Conclusions
CSR is a challenge for both current and future organi-
zations. An increasing number of companies rightfully
choose to follow socially responsible practices. They
recognize that in the current market economy, all those
interest groups that interact with them (their stakeholders)
support their legitimacy as businesses.
One of the most recent trends in CSR is the adoption
of e-commerce codes of conduct. In addition to current,
relevant legal regulations, these documents include a set
of ethical enhancements to these regulations. These ethics
standards contribute to a high level of trust on the part of
the target audience for these codes of conduct: consum-
ers and businesses that are committed to complying with
them.
Although a business’s adoption of a code of conduct is
completely voluntary, once it has formalized its commit-
ment (through the principle of autonomy of will), it must
comply. Noncompliance in continental Europe and Anglo-
Saxon countries is considered misleading to the public and
could be considered an unfair commercial practice subject
to penalty. A business that is thusly penalized could suffer a
significant loss of credibility with the public.
Codes of conduct are a manifestation of self-regulation,
which is a new tool for public administration. In its broadest
sense, self-regulation refers to the ability and tendency of all
individuals and organizations to regulate their own conduct.
Thus, self-regulation can be seen as the private production
and application of rules by the same entities that develop,
apply, or control such rules. It does not imply the absence of
rules but, rather, the application of norms that originate from
autonomy of will instead of government officials.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of
interest.
Ethical Approval The authors declare that they comply with Ethical
Standards.
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