A new dawn for Bangsamoro democracy? Political autonomy and inclusive participation in post-conflict Mindanao

Abstract

BARMM inherited the structural flaws of the previous set-up in ARMM, that is, the architecture of domination and dependence underpinning the state of exclusion, injustice, insecurity and poverty in the BARMM. The enactment of the BOL and the establishment of the BARMM seek to reverse this legacy. This article provides a broad outline of key challenges towards genuine political autonomy that is essential for Bangsamoro’s continuous quest for self-determination. In doing so, we have outlined three sites of political domination and exclusion – dynastic clan politics and interdependence with national elites, absence of viable alternative local parties coupled with lack of active civil society in politics, and electoral violence and impunity. A key assertion in this article is that deep reforms are needed in these critical areas in order for BARMM to have an impact on the ground. Achieving political autonomy is not merely an outcome but an active process of empowerment and provision of opportunities for participation. In such an exclusive political order as BARMM, political inclusion is central to political autonomy.

Full text

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OBSERVATOIRE ASIE DU SUD-EST 2018/2019
A new dawn for Bangsamoro
democracy?
Political autonomy and inclusive
participation in post-conict
Mindanao
Imelda Deinla, Georgi Engelbrecht
Note d’actualité n°16 de l’Observatoire de l’Asie du Sud-Est
Août 2019
Introduction
State of local democracy: dynastic clans, dependency and impunity in the BARMM
The BOL, the plebiscite and May midterm elections
Conclusion
Observatoire de l’Asie du Sud-Est

2
Introduction
Will the establishment of a new former rebel-led
government in restive Mindanao, Philippines provide
a catalyst for political change in the region? After
decades of protracted war the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), the largest Muslim insurgent group in
Mindanao, has taken the reins of authority in the region
as a consequence of a political settlement with the
government of the Philippines. A new political entity,
the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (BARMM), was established in March 2019
after the ratication of the Bangsamoro Organic Law
(BOL) during the January and February 2019 plebiscites.
The BOL is the foundational instrument creating
the BARMM specifying its territories, structure
of government, and power- and wealth-sharing
arrangements with the central government to realize
the Muslim Filipinos’ aspirations for self-determination
and pursue their social, political, economic and cultural
development within the Philippines constitutional
framework. As an integral part of a comprehensive
peace settlement, the BARMM is meant to correct a
‘failed experiment’, the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) that was a creation of past peace
agreement in 1989 with the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF), the rst Muslim secessionist group that
waged war against the government in the ‘70s.
Similar to other negotiated settlements, former
rebels are given the task of governing and steering
their territory towards peaceful transition. Under the
BOL, greater autonomy and self-government by the
Bangsamoro people – encompassing the Muslims,
indigenous peoples and Christians living in the area –
will be exercised through a democratic political system
and an electoral system that will allow for democratic
participation, development of principled political parties,
and ensure accountability (Article IV, BOL). Designed for
inclusive and genuine partipation among diverse groups
and sectors, a parliamentary form of government has
been installed in BARMM. This regional parliamentary
system is an exception to the presidential system in place
in other regional and central Philippines. In the transition
period from 2019 to 2022 where the rst BARMM
elections will take place under the parliamentary setup,
an interim government, the Bangsamoro Transition
Authority (BTA) led by the MILF, exercises executive
and legislative functions. The BTA was inaugurated in
February 2019. It is composed of 80 members, 41 of
which are nominees of the MILF. Under the new political
arrangement, a MILF-led BTA is therefore mandated
to govern through democratic processes and re-build
democratic institutions in the BARMM.
Democracy and conict do not go well together. Nor
does post-conict settlement necessarily lead to a
democratic pathway. The kind of ‘liberal peace’ that
many governments and western development agencies
hope for has faltered in many places (see Richmond
2011). A range of factors such as political power
structures, socio-economic conditions, and historical
experiences determine the process of political transition
(Anten, Briscoe and Mezerra 2012). As observed in post-
conict democracy projects, building of democratic
institutions do not by themselves lead to democratic
change – nor to political autonomy. The experience of
BARMM’s predecessor, the ARMM, shows for example
that a lack of scal autonomy could undermine regional
autonomy. Additionally, democratic processes, such as
regular electoral exercises, have not broadened political
participation beyond the elites or dynastic families in
Mindanao as in many other parts of the Philippines.
The persistence of a closed or exclusive political order
in conict or post-conict areas like Mindanao has
severe consequences for peace and security (ex Adam
1980, Boegge 2010; Espesor 2017) as well as to the
success of democratic process. Such political order,
one that is a hybrid of formal and informal authorities,
is characterised by monopolistic, predatory and violent
exercise of power. In post-conict settlement, priority
is given to cessation of violence and political stability.
However, the failure to address in a timely manner what
is called ‘structures of domination’ could exacerbate
existing conditions of exclusion that could foment –
and cascade to new sources of conict (Braithwaite
and D’Costa 2018). Creating conditions for broader
political participation and representation in democratic
processes during transition could potentially empower
excluded groups, give support and greater legitimacy
to the transition authority, and provide checks on and
demand accountability of local and national power-
holders.
The recent democratic exercises – the BOL plebiscite
and the Philippine mid-term elections in 2019, present
an opportunity to assess the prospects and barriers
towards political inclusion and participation in BARMM.
While it may be premature to make this evaluation
considering the nascent establishment of the BARMM,
there is an urgency to it. Positive peace in the region
remains relatively fragile, even with the de-escalation
of conict between the MILF and government security
forces as shown by the near-absence of armed
confrontation since 2014 (International Alert) when the
peace agreement, the Comprehensive Agreement on
the Bangsamoro (CAB), was signed. The ve-month
long siege by the ISIS-afliated groups in Marawi City
in 2017, the destruction of the former historical core of
the town (now known as Ground Zero) and uncertainty
of rehabilitation of Marawi, continued ghting by
government forces with other non-state armed groups
such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
(BIFF) and Abu Sayaff Group (ASG), and incidents
including bombings, in Lamitan (Basilan), Jolo (Sulu) and
Zamboanga, manifest this fragility. This state of affairs
underscores the persistence of the narrative of exclusion
and attendant distrust of institutions. Our eldwork in the
region has conrmed that better services, education,
development and security sit on top of the wish-list of
the Bangsamoro; but there is also strong expectation,
particularly from the young generation, that BARMM
should deliver change in local politics and governance
(Deinla, 2019).

3
Figure 1. Comparative Scope between ARMM and the
new Bangsamoro Autonomous Region1
The BARMM is carved out of ve provinces (Basilan,
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-tawi),
three component cities (Marawi, Lamitan, and
Cotabato), 116 municipalities, and 2,590 barangays.
The ratication of the BOL in February 2019 expanded
the region to 4,908.05 square miles, and combined
population of over four million. While the region’s gross
regional domestic product (GRDP) posted a 7.2 percent
growth rate, poverty incidence is recorded at 1.99 million
in 2015 data (Dy 2019). ARMM is the poorest region in
the Philippines with only an average of US$280.34 per
capita income (Philippine Statistics Authority (2018).
State of local democracy: dynastic clans,
dependency and impunity in the BARMM
The BTA faces a tremendous task in re-shaping the
current state of local democracy, broadly, and specically
in facilitating inclusive participation. There are three critical
sites where the architecture of political domination is
situated in BARMM: dynastic clan politics, absence of
genuine political parties, rule of the guns and impunity. Well-
entrenched local power assymetries and highly corrupt
governance are part of the broader ecosystem of poverty,
injustice, illicit economy, and violence that perpetuates a
cycle of injustice, conict and insecurity in Mindanao (Eg
Lara and Chapman; Lara and Schoofs 2013). They play
a key role in community dispute or conict resolution that,
although providing much-needed security and local peace,
likewise bolster their power and inuence (ex Kreuzer
2005; Deinla 2018). These powerful clans have also used
political control of their areas to forge alliances or inuence
with national politicians. This symbiotic relationship allows
central government and national politicians to bestow
patronage on local politicians in exchange for delivering
solid votes for national candidates. Securing ‘vote-rich’
Mindanao has been a strategy of national politicians to win
national elections.
1 - Adapted from: ARMM Transition Portal 2019, “Maps of the
Bangsamoro,” Accessed: August 21, 2019. Retrieved from http://
www.armmtransition.ph/maps/
The case of BARMM is not an exception from the broader
trend on dynastic politics in the Philippines. However,
the region has one of the highest concentration of
enduring political dynasties that have been entrenched
for decades and continue to ourish (Mendoza et al
2016). In a 2013 study (excluding the island provinces of
Basilan, Sulu and Tawi Tawi), Maguindanao was found
to have the highest concentration of dynastic ofcials
(64.45%) while Lanao del Sur was fourth (59.47%)
(Mendoza, Lim, & Lopez , 2015). Maguindanao, at the
time controlled by the Ampatuan family and known to
be close allies of former President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo, was the site of the ‘Hello Garci’ scandal where
massive electoral fraud happened during the 2007
presidential elections. The gruesome slay of 57 civilians
and journalists on their way to le the certicate of
candidacy of rival politician (Mangudadatu) in what is
known as the ‘Maguindanao massacre’ was traced to
the Ampatuan clan. This latter incident demonstrates
the desperate lengths politicians would go to protect
their hold on power. After a period of pariah status,
the Ampatuans managed to secure several positions
in Maguindanao in the elections of 2013, 2016 and
2019, returning to its status as inuential clan which has
connections with other traditional elites, the MILF and
national government. Their return to local politics and
repositioning on the local level shows how versatile and
inventive clan power in the Bangsamoro is.
Political participation in BARRM is a privilege of the few
powerful clans. There are only about 30 families that
have dominated congressional, provincial and mayoral
elections in BARMM. In the next section, we will show
that politics is mainly a ‘family business’ where members
of the same family simultaneously hold various positions
of power in provinces. Many local politicians in BARMM
have complete dominance allowing them to run
uncontested during the elections or elding of ‘nuisance’
candidates. For example in Maguindanao, there were 12
unopposed mayoral candidates out of 37 municipalities
representing 32% of total elected mayors in the the
province. Maguindano has the highest percentage of
uncontested seats in BARMM. The mayoral and vice
mayoral candidates in key city of Lamitan in Basilan
(a wife and husband team) were unopposed in the 2019
elections. Table 1 below shows the list of families that
have dominated local politics in BARMM area since
the re-establishment of liberal democracy in 1986.

4
This new political conguration in the center has led
to new families and clans emerging to challenge old
families during this period such as the Mangudadatus
and Ampatuan in Maguindanao. Although some of ‘old’
clans may no longer be as prominent in current politcs,
they nonetheless retain their inuence and have the
capacity to reclaim political positions at the opportune
time (see Teehankee 2019).
Table 1. Political Dynasties in the Bangsamoro Region
A dependency – and opportunistic, relationship exists
between central and local politicians that is anathema
to forging genuine regional autonomy. This twisted
relationship is the target of the peace settlement and
the democratic surplus value potentially brought into
the game by the creation of the new entity. However,
the initial situation in BARMM mirrors the broader
dysfunction of Philippine political party system. Party
regulation, discipline and accountability are almost
non-existent, allowing politicians to switch party at
an opportunistic time – at least this is applicable to
those parties who are carried forward from ARMM.
The MILF established its own political party, the United
Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP) in 2014 in preparation
for the upcoming elections in 2016. However, UBJP did
not eld candidates in both the 2016 and 2019 elections.
UBJP prides itself on being a ‘genuine and principled’
politial party, but is only at a rst stage. First indicators
show that MILF is still in the periphery of politics.
The formation of political parties is only relevant to this
region – as in many other regions and provinces, when
it comes to securing patronage or election funding.
Local elections involve mainly local issues rather than
national issues. However, local politicians carry national
political parties and change regularly whenever there is
a change of national party in power. Local politicians
source out patronage and election funds from national
parties. Elections, particularly those involving national
elections, are a huge opportunity for patronage from
national ofcials in the form of campaign funds. Massive
vote-buying is commonplace. For example, a woman
politician in Lanao del Sur was known for giving an
‘FX car’ to families who have at least 10 ‘solid’ voters.
In Maguindanao, several cars parked in otherwise
poor municipalities during Ramadan were rumored
to be the zones of transactions involving the buying
of votes. In the 2019 midterm elections, there were
only a handful of politicians in BARMM that ran under
the past administration’s party, the Liberal Party (LP).
The provinces of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi and new BARMM
territories in North Cotabato – Aleosan, Carmen and
Pigkawayan, completely shunned the Liberal Party.
Only the inuential Hataman couple in Basilan (former
governor of ARMM and Anak Mindanao representative)
who run under the LP banner won the elections.
Congressman Mujiv Hataman is currently the Speaker
of the House of Representatives that is controlled by
the party of President Rodrigo Duterte, the Partido
Demokratiko ng Pilipinas Lakas ng Bayan (PDPLB).
There are whispers he will also run for the position of
Chief Minister in 2022. Table 2 below shows the party
‘afliation’ of local politicians during the 2019 elections.
Table 2. Party ‘afliation’ of local politicians during the
2019 elections
Local political parties are not generally viable. The lack
of viable local parties does not bode well for BARMM to
allow it to exercise its political autonomy from the center
as well as remove the opportunistic relationship between
local and national politicians. There are only ve local
parties out of 16 political parties that participated in the
last elections. The dependency relationship between
local and national politicians is further exacerbated by
the fact that there is not, as yet, viable alternative local
parties. There have been initiatives to form regional

5
parties in the past, such as the Ompiah Party (OP) and
Peoples’ Consultative Party (PCP) both based in Lanao
del Sur, but foundered (see Meisburger 2012). Both OP
and PCP were however resurrected in the 2019 elections
and elded local candidates in the province. OP, which
elded candidates in seven municipalities won one
mayoral seat in the municipality of Madalum while PCP
did not perform well. Local parties are also connected to
powerful politicians. OP is said to be connected to the
ruling clan in Lanao del Sur, the Adiong clan. However,
OP is also claimed or appropriated by most politicians
due to its progeny as a religious party founded by the
ulamas. It held the governatorial seat in 1990-1999 but
also got caught up in patronage and corruption scandal
(see Brecht-Drouart 2103). The Maguindanao Reform
Party (MRP) was founded by the Mangudadato clan.
MRP won in one municipality in Maguindanao out of the
3 municipalities it participated in. Two other local parties
in Maguidanao, the Umpungan ng Mapagmalasakit
and Kusog Baryohanon, participated but did not win.
The UBJP did not participate in the 2019 elections and
announced its neutrality; it focused instead its efforts in
campaigning for the ratication of the BOL. As such it
helped to secure the victory of the pro-BOL camp in
Cotabato City against the will of Mayor Cynthia Guaiani-
Sayadi, who still managed to be elected for another
term in the municipal city elections of May 2019. This
interesting development indicates that the UBJP can
gather relative support, provided it is specic and with
a clear objective, going beyond slogans and the usual
politicking in the region.
Electoral violence – and impunity, is a feature of BARMM
electoral democracy (see Meisburger 2012 and Soriano
2015). There has not been a time that the region is
excluded from the Commission on Election’s list of
‘election hotspots’. Rule of clans – and guns, rather than
rule of law prevail in this restive region. Elections are a
demonstration of clan power and their capacity to retain
their authority or challenge other powerful clans. On a
positive note, intensity of the competition and violence
has been succeedingly declining from 2013 over 2016
to 2019. Incidents are still occuring, but the elections in
2019 have been largely considered relatively peaceful
in several traditional hot-spots such as Marawi City or
various Maguindanao municipalities. Even in Sulu, a
hot-bed of rido and clan feuds, was spared from large-
scale election turmoil.
A major cause or trigger of conict in Mindanao
is political contest and that spikes in crimes and
violence have been correlated to elections (Lara 2010).
Table 3 shows a comparative incidence of election-
related violence in Mindanao in 2016 and 2019. An
over-stretched system of the security sector in the
Bangsamoro core territory and beyond – along with
episodic allegations of corruption or complicity (Espesor
2017), coupled with the inability of formal justice system
to bring perpetrators of violence to justice have resulted
in a climate of impunity. More than 10 years after the
killings, the accused in the Maguindanao massacre are
yet to be sentenced.
Table 3.
*Count established through independent NGO reports, media and
social media. Refers exclusively to violent incidents, from a gunght to
st-ght with injury. Defect of voting machines, vote-buying and other
non-violent incidents are not included.
The BOL, the plebiscite and May midterm elections
The BOL provides for the legal framework, structures and
mechanisms through which Bangsamoro self-governance
could be realized. Apart from the parliamentary set-up
that is intended for broader representation among various
groups and sectors, the BOL empowers BARMM to enact
its own legislation that will lay down new rules, provide
incentives for good political practices or disincentives
for abuses or predatory behaviour, reshape political
representation and facilitate accountable governance.
All of these are in the pipeline of the Bangsamoro Transition
Authority (BTA) which is tasked to govern BARMM for 3
years until the year 2022 when new elections are held.
BARMM ofcials are optimistic that the codes can be
drafted by the end of the year 2019 so that 2020 can be
the time to fully implement the transition plan and roll out
bureaucracy and governance. However, it is still contingent
on budget and the Block Grant to be utilized next year.
On its 6th month, the BTA constituted as exercising
both executive and legislative powers under the
leadership of Ebrahim Al Murad, former MILF chief
and now Chief Minister, has gradually eased into its
role as the transitional governing body in Bangsamoro.
A Bangsamoro Transition Plan (BTP) has been agreed
between the national and regional government that will
serve as roadmap for the regional leaders until a regular
government is elected in 2022.
A glimpse of how BTA performs in the transition period
could perhaps be discerned from its composition.
The membership of the BTA shows that it is a product
of accommodation between MILF and the national
government which was responsible in appointing
the body. It was also in response for calls for broader
representation to include some members from the
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) with whom the
government forged a past agreement for the creation
of ARMM. Also appointed was Commander Bravo,
a former renegade commander of the MILF and skeptic
of the peace process, but someone who still eased
into the transition after returning back to the fold of the
law in recent years. Bravo’s Northwestern Mindanao
Front of the MILF-BIAF followed the ceasere with the
government without many lapses since the MoA-AD

6
war2 and restrained itself during the Marawi siege. Whilst
initially Bravo was criticized for harshly implementing
the Shariah in his communities, this has now subsided,
partially due to his accommodation with the status
quo but also more lenient approaches without harsh
measures such as executions. Bravos’ appointment
and that of the MNLF signals both the government and
MILF’s commitment for inclusive peace and to forge
broad consensus on the Bangsamoro future. Bravo’s
camps in Lanao are now targets of socio-economic
interventions from government side and the commander
has apparently a positive rapport with General Galvez,
the current Ofce of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process (OPAPP) head.
Adapted from a report from Arguillas (2019) of
MindaNews, Table 4 shows that BTA membership,
a mix of rebels and traditional politicians, of old and
new leaders, representation from different sectors,
ethnic groups, and non-Moro indigenous peoples, and
inclusion of at least 10 women, seek to present a fresh
2 - The Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MoA-
AD) was the peace agreement signed between then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the MILF in 2008 but was declared
unconstitutional by the Philippine Supreme Court in 2012. The
declaration of illegality of the agreement triggered hostilities from MILF.
and dynamic beginning for the Bangsamoro.
The appointment process was not, however, without
its controversy, a symptom that BARMM is not immune
from national political dynamics. A night before the oath-
taking ceremony with President Duterte, some nominees
who were mostly from civil society were taken out of
the list for being identied as close to the opposition
Liberal Party or perceived to be ‘dilawan’ (yellow), a
term labelled to the critics of the Duterte administration.
The appointment of heads of regional departments
or ministries has also been generally welcomed that
represent a mix of politicians, technocrats, rebels
and emerging leaders. The MILF has had a free
hand in choosing the cabinet which also manifests
its commitment for delivering better governnance
outcomes for the Bangsamoro people. However, the
predominance of old or aging MILF ofcials is seen
more as a ‘reward’, rather as strategic appointment
to achieve better governance. In conversations, it is
often highlighted that young BTA staff members are
Table 4. Members of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority

7
supporting these appointees and managing the nitty-
gritty and technical aspects of the position. Certain
ministries such as Education are now also supported
with former and current personalities of the CSO NGO
landscape in the Bangsamoro.
How the BTA will perform in the coming months will
largely depend on how it can sustain ‘unity in diversity’
and its capacity to drive BARMM through the different
layers and levels of local governance. In terms of its
relationship with central government, mechanisms have
been put in place such as coordinating teams etc., to
iron out issues. The Intergovernmental-Relations Body
is a case in point. BARMM’s relationship with local
government units is more complex given that these units
have operated like a efdom of their own. A positive
beginning has been set with the ouvertures of the DILG
of BARMM under leadership of Atty. Naguib Sinarimbo.
The stakes have been set high with the ratication
of the BOL. Failure for BOL to work towards self-
determinations is not an option given the high
expectations on the ground. The MILF-led Bangsamoro
government will need to challenge the political status
quo or be co-opted by it. The other half of the parliament
coming from ARMM structures however is equally in a
position of responsibility. The Bangsamoro Transition
Authority is an aggrupation of various political forces,
sectors and interests. A failure of BTA should not be
exclusively equated to a failure of the MILF but rather the
Bangsamoro consensus.
The BOL plebiscite demonstrates that a Bangsamoro
consensus could be formed and that a broad coalition
could be forged involving different political groups,
ethnicities and sectors, including civil society. Both the
process and outcomes of the BOL plebiscite tested the
political salience of the MILF, its capacity to coalesce to
achieve common interests as well as the willingness of
diverse groups to be part of and embrace what BARMM
stands for. While there have been opposition towards
the ratication of the BOL the outcomes reect a desire
among diverse Bangsamoro groups to chart a different
course for the region. The politicians themselves
acknowledge that there is no other option but BARMM.
Whether that is due to the pressure from above, the
President who gave his unconditional support for the
peace process, or from genuine support for BOL, only
means that there is broad support for BARMM.
The opposition itself is not about the ‘demerits’ of the
law itself but more on perceived threats to entrenched
political interests. In Sulu, apart from having questioned
before the Supreme Court the legality of votes being
counted as a region, rather than on per province basis,
the Tans, the ruling clans, have not put forward an
argument that BARMM will do more harm than good
to the region. Sakur Tan met Chief Minister Murad
already, although the occasion was formal rather than
an expression of rapprochment. In Cotabato City
where there were episodes of threats and intimidation
(from both camps) and even explosions on the eve
of the plebiscite (not all related to the plebiscite),
the incumbent mayor Cynthia Guiani-Sayadi, naturally
campaigned for the NO vote and against the inclusion of
the city which was not technically part of the ARMM but
its regional capital. Interestingly, Mayor Guiani seemed
to have made her peace with the arrangement following
her victory in the elections and the establishment of
the BTA. The City of Basilan rejected inclusion to the
BARMM on the strength of campaigning for the NO vote
by the Akbar clan. The ruling clan in Lanao del Norte,
the Dimaporos, did not object to the BOL per se but
against the inclusion of six municipalities that could
potentially reduce the internal revenue allocation of the
province.
A consequence of the BOL plebiscite was the
mobilization of civil society, particularly BARMM-based
local non-government organizations. While civil society
organizations have been active in the peace process
and humanitarian work, they are not politically inuential.
The campaign for the ratication of the BOL generated
a space to inuence the outcome of a political exercise
– the plebiscite. Various CSOs from the academe,
youth, professionals, churches and mosques, and
Islamic leaders have come together to campaign
for the Yes vote in Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur
(Moner 2019). The plebiscite became the venue for one
of the biggest multisectoral gatherings in Mindanao.
But the plebiscite also shows the limits of civil society
mobilization in Mindanao. It could not always stand up
against powerful interests. The Cotabato vote was on
thin ice and Duterte himself visited the town, advocating
for the Bangsamoro, but interestingly without direct
encouragement to vote for Yes. The outcomes in Sulu
demonstrate the predominance of clan power in BARMM
politics that is also capable of negating central power.
Even in less contested areas like in Marawi City, where
the people hope that BOL will speed up rehabilitation,
the clans played a dominant role in ensuring a positive
outcome. Table 5 below shows the plebiscite outcomes
in BARMM.
Table 5. Plebiscite outcomes in BARMM3
Lacking viable challenge to political dynasties,
the midterm elections were predictably ‘business-as-
usual’ in the region. The MILF through the UBJP did not
eld candidates nor did civil society actively campaign
for alternative political leaders. Even before the plebiscite
organizations such as IAG and KAS aimed to work
together with the UBJP on political party formation.
3 - None of the six petitioned Lanao del Norte towns will be
included in the new BARMM, while 63 out of 67 barangays
in North Cotabato voted Yes. These include Midsayap (13),
Pigkawayan (12), Kabacan (7), and Carmen (7). It also won in 22
barangays in Pikit and in two barangays in Aleosan.

8
In a conversation with one of the authors, UBJP ofcials
have acknowledged the difculty of building a party
machine from scratch. UBJP however acknowledges
the various democratic inuences on the Bangsamoro
political tradition including diverse systems such as the
Malaysian, Turkish, British and German ones.
Whilst the campaign period will begin anew in 2021 in
preparation for the 2022 elections, the coming year shall
be a litmus test for preparation and sustainability of the
UBJP and other political parties. It can be expected that
regional and local politics in BARMM will be divided into
two phases. First, the time from present until 2020/21
with BTA being in the driver’s seat seeking to deliver
services but also playing the political game with the elites
and clans. Second, the immediate campaign period of
2022. With prominent Moro leaders getting ready for
2022, coalitions are expected to shift and also impact
the MILF on the ground. To maintain an equilibrium
without being co-opted into local vested interests will be
a challenge. Early signs of a complicated political game
can be seen for instance in the recent proposal to divide
Maguindanao into two parts, a return to the experiment
of Shariff Kabunsuan in the Ampatuan era.
The midterm election results signify that electoral
democracy in BARMM remains a family affair. Most of
the elected ofcials in congressional, provincial and
municipal levels are either incumbents, new members
of same families (sons, daughters or spouses seeking
new ofces or on rotation for the various posts), or
from successful challenge of rival powerful families
(Table 6). Kinship, rather than parties, matter most in
Mindanao politics. Besides, except for the Liberal Party,
almost all of the national parties used by the politicians
are all part of or support the Coalition for Change of
the Duterte administration. Parties have no or little
effect on the election outcomes. Although most of the
elected ofcials used PDPLB and allied parties, it was
the power of clans that decided the elections. This is
demonstrated in the fact that the Hatamans won the
elections in Basilan and even trounced the incumbents.
The alliance among Hataman, Hataman-Salliman and
Furigay families defeated long time powerhouse clan of
the Akbars in Basilan. The Tans of Sulu swept all but
one of key seats in the province. Three Adiongs coveted
the major positions in Lanao del Sur. The National Unity
Party (NUP) running against PDPLB swept all major
seats in Tawi-Tawi. Also, new political parties that were
set up by Duterte supporters such as the Pederalismo
ng Dugong Dakilang Samahan (PDDS), Partido Federal
ng Pilipinas, Katipunan ng Demokratikong Pilipino,
Democratic Party of the Philippines, did not win any
seat in the elections. These results show that in local
Mindanao politics, the Duterte ‘phenomenon’ alone is
not enough to win the elections.
The senatorial elections in BARMM, although almost
a landslide win for Duterte’s anointed candidates,
could not also be reduced to Duterte factor. Clans and
elders usually decide for the other members and for
the community. How they make a decision of who to
vote for is also a subject of speculations that implicate
patronage and money politics. Chances of a Mindanao
candidate vying for national ofce being voted for in the
region are not straightforward. Regional ties or the fact
that one comes from Mindanao does not translate to
votes. Samira Gutoc from the opposition Liberal Party
won in Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao, but not in
the island provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi Tawi.
Mangudadatu, an administration candidate, won in all
5 provinces except in Basilan. This means that to carry
a Bangsamoro to national ofce one would need the
support of the whole of BARMM.
Table 6. May 2019 election results in key positions in BARMM
Women’s participation, particularly Muslim women,
in politics remains low. To advocate women’s rights
and issues in BARMM would require more women in
political leadership role. The last elections reect a male-
dominated political landscape. There are only six women
out of the 37 major positions in BARMM who won the
elections. These are women who have strong record of
political leadership but also possess political lineages.

9
The 2019 exercises in BARMM have been observed to
be the most ‘peaceful’ in recent times. This is attributed
in most part to the declaration of martial law that
imposes tight inspection and control of guns. BARMM
however remains a highly securitised space since the
Marawi siege in 2017 and heightened threats posed by
extremists and other armed groups in the region. There
is an estimated 72 out of nationwide total of 77 private
armed groups identied by the Philippine National Police
operating in BARMM area and which are supposed
to be dismantled in the normalization stage of the
peace process. Despite being declared as ‘Category
Red Election Hotspot’, meaning the highest code for
violence incidence, by the Commission on Elections,
the plebiscite in January and February, as well as the
May elections turned out to be relatively ‘peaceful and
orderly’ compared to past exercises. Although there
were 144 reported incidents of election-related violence,
these involved mostly grenade explosions and stghts
and less gun violence as was more common in previous
elections (International Alert 2019).
The zero casualty in Barangay elections during the
September 2018 Barangay elections and fewer incidents
of gun violence during the May elections in Marawi City
has given some hope to the residents for better electoral
practices in the future. ‘A big leap towards genuine
democracy’, remarked then military Colonel, now Brig.
General Romeo Brawner of the Joint Task Force Ranao
and current Commander 103rd brigade in Marawi City
(Mindanews 2018). However there were still reports
of massive vote buying and instances of tampering
or malfunctioning of election machines (Rappler.com
2019). Despite the near absence of deaths in these
political exercises, International Alert however posits
that the Bangsamoro elections tensions have created
new strings of conict among rival clans.
Conclusion
BARMM inherited the structural aws of the previous
set-up in ARMM, that is, the architecture of domination
and dependence underpinning the state of exclusion,
injustice, insecurity and poverty in the BARMM.
The enactment of the BOL and the establishment of the
BARMM seek to reverse this legacy. This article is not a
comprehensive nor denitive assessment of the region’s
prospects for democracy nor of MILF-led BTA’s capacity
to undertake political reforms. The purpose is to provide
a broad outline of key challenges towards genuine
political autonomy that is essential for Bangsamoro’s
continuous quest for self-determination. In doing so,
we have outlined three sites of political domination and
exclusion – dynastic clan politics and interdependence
with national elites, absence of viable alternative local
parties coupled with lack of active civil society in politics,
and electoral violence and impunity. A key assertion in
this article is that deep reforms are needed in these
critical areas in order for BARMM to have an impact on
the ground. Achieving political autonomy is not merely
an outcome but an active process of empowerment and
provision of opportunities for participation. In such an
exclusive political order as BARMM, political inclusion is
central to political autonomy.
The BARMM is young and a work in progress. The recent
plebiscite and elections, as well as the initial challenges
and burden of expectations should not be seen as
a measure of its trajectory. Rather, these exercises
manifest the inherent difculties that the BTA would
need to navigate in the coming three years if it wants to
produce relevant results for its people. The diversity in
the BTA composition offers opportunity for diversity of
voices, including loud clamor for an anti-political dynasty
law in BARMM. It will need to work hard and fast to pass
important legislation such as the relationship between
BARMM and local government units and the BARMM
electoral system. At the same time, it needs to deliver
much-needed services in health and education and
facilitate job-creation. The MILF would need to steer
the BARMM to produce results in this short transition
period and to transform itself as capable government
ofcials. It needs to step up in the political arena if it
wants to keep its leadership role. The 2022 elections
is an opportunity not to be missed for the UBJP and to
present itself as a reliable and trustworthy alternative to
existing dominant clans and their wider networks.
For the range of deliverables and expectations, BARMM
needs an independent and credible civil society. The BTA
has to encourage civil society organizations to support
its work, provide feedback, and act as interface between
BARMM and the community. Some NGOs are already
performing a semi-formal role as BARMM support
but ther impact remains to be seen. The civil society
for its part needs to re-constitute itself as independent
groups and assist in demanding accountability of public
ofcials. A free, independent and secured media should
be supported in stirring up effective and accountable
local governance.
The international community could support the BTA as
an institution and its various units according to needs,
provided that the new agents of the Bangsamoro are
genuinely interested in tailored assistance. Development
actors should not be focused on the provision and
supply of services or capacity-building for the sake of
it, no matter what analysis they may have of the BTA.
They should rather be supporting organic mechanisms
and players to ll in the gaps identied by BARMM and
provide technical support to strengthen them when
needed. Many young Moro technocrats acknowledge
the weak legacy of ARMM and various obstacles in the
structure of the institutions. This was also largely due
to an absence of local government and imbalances on
the steering level. The feedback coming from several
voices a few months into the BTA’s term is emphasis
on rebuilding, developing and shaping government. This
would require on one hand basic capacity-building and
on another hand, a moderate approach of expectations
and learning. The BARMM is a fragile institution that
needs to be invested with trust by the Bangsamoro
people as it is the support from below that could carry it
through towards the ardous road to peace.
We acknowledge the valuable research assistance
provided by Primitivo Ragandang III for this article.

10
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