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Corruption and Development: Comparing Uganda and Singapore



There is no agreement among scholars or development practitioners as to how corruption affects or influences development. There are scholars who have argued that corruption may be economically desirable in certain circumstances, may potentially improve efficiency, may help growth and development especially in developing countries with significant natural resources such as oil, and may help inefficient, inept, and mismanaged bureaucracies by greasing the wheels (Bardhan 1997; Looney 2006; Kutan et al. 2013). On the other hand, there are also other scholars and empirical evidence which suggest that corruption is one of the greatest obstacles to economic and social development around the world because it redirects resources in unproductive areas where bribes can be easily sought and this can distort an economy (Khan 2006). This entry specifically discusses how corruption influences the key ingredients that facilitate the development process such as leadership, investment decision-making, protection or plundering of public resources/investments, generation or loss of revenues, and the practice of politics and elements of development such as education, health, and public investments in Uganda and Singapore.
Corruption and Development:
Comparing Uganda and
Pius Gumisiriza
and Robert Mukobi
School of Public Policy and Governance,
Uganda Management Institute, Kampala, Uganda
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic
Development, Kampala, Uganda
Corruption in this entry is dened as the abuse
of public power or authority for private benet
or prot (see Johnston 2010). In this entry devel-
opment is dened as a continuous and holistic
process of improving peoples lives and the envi-
ronment they live in (Chambers 2004). Uganda is
a sovereign country located in East Africa with an
estimated population of 39,570,125 people and
GDP of US$26.35 billion and has corruption
which is endemic (Uganda| CIA Factbook 2018).
Singapore is a sovereign country located in
South East Asia with an estimated population of
5,888,926 people and GDP of US$323.9 billion
and has very low levels of corruption (Singapore|
CIA Fact Book 2018).
There is no agreement among scholars or devel-
opment practitioners as to how corruption affects
or inuences development. There are scholars
who have argued that corruption may be econo-
mically desirable in certain circumstances, may
potentially improve efciency, may help growth
and development especially in developing coun-
tries with signicant natural resources such as oil,
and may help inefcient, inept, and mismanaged
bureaucracies by greasing the wheels (Bardhan
1997; Looney 2006; Kutan et al. 2013). On the
other hand, there are also other scholars and
empirical evidence which suggest that corruption
is one of the greatest obstacles to economic and
social development around the world because it
redirects resources in unproductive areas where
bribes can be easily sought and this can distort an
economy (Khan 2006). This entry specically
discusses how corruption inuences the key
ingredients that facilitate the development process
such as leadership, investment decision-making,
protection or plundering of public resources/
investments, generation or loss of revenues, and
the practice of politics and elements of develop-
ment such as education, health, and public invest-
ments in Uganda and Singapore.
#Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019
A. Farazmand (ed.), Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance,
Why Compare Uganda and Singapore?
Studying these two countries is quite interesting
because both countries were colonized by Britain
and got independence around the same time
between 1962 and 1965. In those years, Uganda
was generally more developed than Singapore,
and many commentators predicted that master-
minding an economic success was quite possible
for Uganda because the country is naturally
blessed with a very good climate, is very rich in
mineral resources, adopted a Westminster system
of government complete with an ofcial opposi-
tion party, and had a fairly disciplined civil ser-
vice, an independent judiciary, a relatively good
performing economy with an annual growth rate
of 3.3%, and relatively low levels of corruption.
On the other hand, when Singapore separated
from Malaysia on 9 August 1965, the countrys
future was so bleak that few people believed it
could survive for 3 years. Its own founding Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew broke down publically
and cried because he too was not sure the country
would survive on its own. It had no natural
resource, its economic growth rate was 2.4%,
and corruption inherited from the colonial gov-
ernment was endemic. Uganda had better pros-
pects and was more developed than Singapore
generally, and in 1965 the Singaporean govern-
ment sent ofcials to East Africa to look for
business though few trade followed after that
(Rajivan 2008; Lee 2011). Fifty-ve years for-
ward, Uganda is one of the good stories gone
badly. It is still a third world country with GDP
of US$26.01 billion; corruption is an endemic
way of life, is ranked among the worst countries
in respecting the rule of law, has low Human
Development Index scores when compared to its
former peers, has consumed most of its indepen-
dence life in wars, and has never experienced a
peaceful transfer of political power from one pres-
ident to another. On the other hand, Singapore has
for many years been ranked among the least cor-
rupt countries in the world and had the worlds
fastest growing economy between 1960 and
2000 at the rate of 89%, its people have access
to world-class healthcare at a reasonable price, a
life expectancy of 84.07 years, an education in
world-class schools built by government, and
one of the best standards of living in the world
with a gross national product per capita higher
than that of most developed countries including
Australia, Canada, France, Italy, German, the
United Kingdom, and the United States (Lee
Corruption and Leadership
Singapore was blessed with an exceptionally
brilliant, determined, pragmatic, farsighted, cou-
rageous, and astute leader in the person of Lee
Kuan Yew who was ready to do whatever it
took to develop and defend Singapore. A fourth-
generation Peranakan Chinese Singaporean Lee
Kuan Yew was born on 16 September 1923, was
graded top Malayan boy in the Cambridge Senior
Examinations, and later excelled in law at
Cambridge University. He returned to Singapore
in 1950, gained public attention as a lawyer
defending trade unions and was a founding mem-
ber of the Peoples Action Party that won elections
in 1959 (Ghesquiere 2011). Lee Kuan Yew lik-
ened administering a country to managing a
corporate entity: If its managers mismanage a
companys resources, then it would go bust; if
management is efcient, dedicated, and know
what they are doing, the company will prosper.
The same applies to a country: if those entrusted
with public resources or authority in a country
uses them for private gain, the country will go
down the drain. In this regard, a corruption-free,
determined, efcient, and effective leadership
must be instituted rst if development is to be
achieved especially in a poor developing country.
Immediately after coming to power, Lee Kuan
Yew and his Peoples Action Party (PAP) govern-
ment deliberately established a meritocratic
system of governance that attracted people of
good education, character, sense of reality, imag-
ination, intelligence, dynamism, courage of their
convictions, high motivation, integrity, and lead-
ership into government. Opportunities were given
equally to all citizens regardless of race, language,
culture, age, sex, or religion. Recruitment, promo-
tion, and reward in the Singaporean civil service,
government statutory bodies, and companies were
and still are based on their contribution and
2 Corruption and Development: Comparing Uganda and Singapore
performance rather than seniority or personal
or group connections; for instance, headmasters
were recruited, promoted, or demoted in part
based on the results of their schools. Promotion
in the civil service was based on results achieved
through actual policy execution and on potential
capability, and quite remarkably, this principle
extended upward to include political leaders
such as parliamentarians and ministers. In each
election the PAP forced a painful measure on one
third of its parliamentarians by telling them not
to seek reelection. As a result of all these, the
Singaporean public service was built on talent,
competence, and professionalism that enhanced
efciency and effectiveness in service delivery
(Mauzy and Milne 2002). An effective, profes-
sional, and non-corrupt public service and politi-
cal leadership moved Singapore from humiliating
poverty in the 1960s to spectacular wealth by
1990. After achieving rst world status, it was
no longer sufcient for old guard leaders to hold
onto ofce if Singapore was to sustain its prosper-
ity. Lee Kuan Yew started the search for possible
successors in the 1960s. By the early 1970s,
he made it clear that he was not looking for
successors from among the partys old guard.
By 1988, only Lee Kuan Yew remained in the
Cabinet among the old guard. He stepped down
from power in 1990 on the 25th anniversary of
Singapores independence aged 65 and gave an
opportunity to a competent, tested, and young
generation of leaders to continue Singapore devel-
opment (Sonny et al. 2009; Lee 2011). On the
other hand, Ugandas past experience offers an
example of what can go wrong when you have
wrong people as leaders of government. Just
10 years after independence in 1972, Idi Amin
captured power through a coup détat, and his
rst act was to expel Ugandans of Indian origin
and distribute all their wealth and property to his
cronies. This act of stupidity and madness among
other atrocities turned Ugandas promising econ-
omy at that time into a tragedy as the Indians
formed the backbone of Ugandas economic and
professional life. The country could have done
better with this section of its people. President
Museveni is another leader whose 32 years stay
in power can illustrate how corruption in different
forms impact development of a country. There
is an extensive list of nationalist leaders who
successfully led anti-colonial ghts for freedom
and post-independence liberation movements, but
who failed or are failing to groom honest and
capable successors, and as a result their countries
are steeped in uncertainty, corruption, nepotism,
conict, and poverty, for insistence, former
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabi and the
late Libyan Dictator Muamar Gadha. Museveni
almost ts in this category, and his instance to stay
in power through repression and political patron-
age puts the modest development achievements
made in the last 50 years in jeopardy. Recruitment,
promotions, and punishment in the Ugandan pub-
lic service today are not based on merit but rather
on social connections and patronage, which has
bloated the public service with mediocre talent
resulting in the ineffective delivery of public
goods and services.
Avoiding Influence Peddling
According to Lee Kuan Yew, the founding Prime
Minister of independent Singapore, condence is
the most single one word that explains why for-
eign investors located their factories, banks, and
reneries in Singapore that contributed signi-
cantly to its economic miracle. Condence did
not come out of a vacuum but was a consequence
of a committed leadership that fought corruption
effectively and ensured that there was no inu-
ence peddling in giving or denying of contracts,
licenses, and permits to investors or misuse of
national resources and that peoples or public prop-
erty was protected from corruption or any other
form of abuse. For example in the 1970s and
1980s, Singapore avoided high-level inuence
peddling that helped her some disasters. This
example related to Singapore denying a license
to the Bank of Credit and Commerce International
whose shareholders included members of the
royal families of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Abu
Dhabi, and Dubai. The bank that had about
400 branches in over 70 countries applied for an
offshore banking license in Singapore in 1973,
1980, and 1982 and was rejected all the time.
Corruption and Development: Comparing Uganda and Singapore 3
Among the people that lobbied for it to be granted
a license unsuccessfully was Harold Wilson the
British Prime Minister. When it was closed down
in July 1991 because of dishonest operations, it
led to losses of US$11 billion for other banks,
depositors, and creditors, and Singapore escaped
unscathed because its leaders avoided inuence
peddling and refused to be compromised. Even
when the nancial crisis broke out in East Asia
and devastated currencies, stock markets, and
economies of the region, no bank in Singapore
faltered. Singapore did not stop at avoiding cor-
ruption at the very high level, but also severely
punished it when it was revealed to have hap-
pened. For example, in November 1986 one
of the associates of Mr. Teh Cheang Wan the
Minister for national development at the time
admitted under questioning by the CPIB that
between 1981 and 1982 he gave Cheang two
cash payments of S$400,000 each one in cash to
allow a development company to retain part of its
land which had been earmarked for compulsory
government acquisition and in the second to assist
a developer in the purchase of state land for pri-
vate development. Cheang denied receiving the
money and tried to inuence the Senior Assistant
Director of the CPIB for the case not to be pur-
sued. The cabinet secretary reported this and
said Cheang had asked to see the Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister replied he could not see him
until investigations were over. A week later on
15 December 1986, he was found dead in his
bed after taking his life rather than face disgrace
and ostracism. Other high-prole prosecutions of
corruption set clear precedent that corruption was
not a way of doing things in Singapore and this
did not only save public money but also attracted
many genuine investors (Lee 2011). On the other
hand, in Uganda high-level inuence peddling for
selsh interests especially by senior political
leaders and technocrats and impunity on the side
of those involved has not only sabotage invest-
ments but also directly lead to massive loss
of public money. There are so many examples
where millions of dollar projects have failed to
take off because of inuence peddling or direct
loss of millions of dollars at the hands of corrupt
ofcials. For example in March 2010, rather than
go through a proper competitive procurement
arrangement as stipulated in law, President
Museveni ordered that Mühlbauer Technology
Group, a company that had been recommended
to him by the then German ambassador to
Uganda, Reinhard Butchnolz, be given a contract
to produce National Identity Cards. The company
was expected to produce over 3.5 million IDs by
December 2010 and around 21 million by the end
of June 2012 when the project was supposed to
end, but the rm only released 400 IDs; by March
2012, the project had stalled, and government had
lost over UgShs 200 billion. The amount of public
money lost in similar circumstances at the hands
of government of ofcial runs in hundreds of
millions of dollars and lost investment opportuni-
ties sabotaged because of corruption are also sim-
ilar. This is aggravated by the fact that most of
such cases have happened with impunity. It is
such funds and investments that could have pro-
vided jobs to millions of unemployed Ugandan
youth and contribute to the countrys development
(see UDN 2013).
Corruption and the Formation/
Nurturing of State-Owned Enterprises
The Singaporean government took the lead
in establishing, nurturing, and protecting state-
owned enterprises and industries including a
National Iron and Steel Mills, a shipping line
(Neptune Orient Lines), an Airline (Singapore
Airlines), and a factory for small ammunition
and a high-tech company (Singapore Technolo-
gies) that among other things set up wafer fabri-
cation plants, assembled cars, refrigerators, air
conditioners, radios, television sets, shipbuilding,
and tape recorders. When these became success-
ful, government decided to turn state monopolies
such as the Public Utilities Board, Port of
Singapore Authority, and Singapore telecom into
separate entities, free from ministerial control, to
be run as protable and competitive companies.
These were selected after careful evaluation,
implemented with extreme precaution, and their
performance was continuously reviewed to ensure
4 Corruption and Development: Comparing Uganda and Singapore
that they are efcient, market friendly, and prot
making. They would be liquidated or merged
or closed down if they systematically made losses
(Ali 2000). Most enterprises succeeded, and as a
result Singapore had a huge SOE sector estimated
to be 21.8% of GDP in 1998 (Lee 2011). At
independence in 1962, the government of Prime
Minister Milton Apollo Obote in Uganda did not
only inherit fairly function SOEs from the colo-
nial state but also formed new ones that were
performing very well, although most of them
were under stress due to Amins economic
destruction. President Museveni and his NRA
rebels espoused a vision to build an integrated
and self-sustaining economy using a strong
socialist-nationalist economic program during
their bush war days. Their plan hit a dead end
when Museveni turned to donors for aid to help
him resuscitate a collapsed economy at the begin-
ning of the early 1990s and was forced to abandon
their ideology. Museveni quickly became neolib-
eral economic orthodoxy convert, and with the
guidance of donors especially the World Bank
and IMF, he implemented wide structural adjust-
ment policies that included wholesale privatiza-
tion of state-owned enterprises including those
that were even performing better such as the
Uganda Commercial Bank, retrenched many gov-
ernment workers, removed agricultural subsidies,
and liberalized the economy among other reforms.
The proponents of this dispensation credit these
reforms for the impressive economic growth and
macroeconomic stability Uganda registered from
the 1990s to the early 2000s manifested in GDP
growth average of 6%, single digit annual and
core ination, stable exchange rate, and tremen-
dous reduction in poverty head count
(ADB/OECD 2003). However, it was during the
privatization of public enterprises in the 1990s
when real massive systematic corruption was exe-
cuted in Musevenis regime. Almost all public
enterprises including those that were performing
well such as Uganda Commercial bank were
privatized at giveaway prices, and many enter-
prises were taken over by high-ranking corrupt
government. The worst part of the whole process
was that the proceeds from the privatization were
also misappropriated and not accounted and most
privatized enterprises later collapsed in the hands
of private owners (Nakaweesi 2015). This is
almost the opposite of what Singapore did to
achieve an economic miracle.
Loss of Revenues
High levels of corruption directly or indirectly
lead to loss of money such as direct stealing
of colossal sums of money by public ofcials,
uncollected government revenue through tax
exemptions, and evasion and loss of foreign aid
as a punishment for corruption, all of which affect
development as juxtaposed between the Ugandan
and Singaporean experiences. It is estimated that
Uganda has lost over US$5 billion through
direct stealing or misuse of public money in the
last 18 years (Mugerwa 2016). This is enough
money to access safe water to 100% of the popu-
lation or building at least six referral hospitals and
put up a power dam of 600 MW that can supply
electricity to 80% of the population. On tax
exemption, Uganda Resource Authority and
African Development Bank estimated that
Uganda lost over US$ 400 million between 2005
and 2010 that resulted into loss of tax effort by
3.1 percentage points (Lwanga and Mawejje
2014). In 2012, as a punishment for continuous
mega corruption scandals in the Ofce of the
Prime Minister, the World Bank withdrew US$
280 million that affected core public projects in
health, education, water, and agriculture sectors.
In 2014, the Ministry of Finance ofcials in
Uganda admitted to the Parliamentary Public
Accounts Committee that they abused billions
of shillings in tax exemptions to selected private
companies and organizations. For example,
BIDCO Uganda Ltd. beneted from a VAT
exemption for 8 years and a tax holiday
for 25 years where more than Shs 540 billion
(US$ 150 million) was lost (Mugerwa 2014).
This direct and indirect corrupt loss of money in
Uganda has not reduced to date, yet the countrys
debt burden both internal and external is sky-
rocketing through the roof. Now, almost over
30% of the national budget is used to nance
these debts, which has left many critical areas
Corruption and Development: Comparing Uganda and Singapore 5
such as agriculture and job, creating infrastructure
for the youth terribly underfunded, no wonder the
resultant youth unemployment is estimated at a
staggering 80% or above. In Uganda it involves
15 procedures and 33 days to register a business.
At every procedure, there have to be bribe and
extortion from incompetent and inept bureaucrats.
This is disincentive for investors no wonder
Uganda is 150th for cost of doing business
(Martini 2013). On the other hand, because
Singapore quickly converted itself into one of
the least corrupt countries in the world, its gov-
ernment raised sufcient revenue to nance
both operating and development programs and
established a virtuous cycle of low expenditure,
low taxation, high investment, and high produc-
tivity which led to the fastest economic growth
in the whole world from the 1960s to 1990. The
government did not need to borrow foreign funds
and had annual budget surpluses year after year
when they were in recession (Lee 2011).
Corruption and Elections
Elections are a key determinant of who governs
and how in any democratic society which ulti-
mately inuences development in that society.
The use of money cannot be avoided in elections,
but also commercialization cannot be accepted
because it distorts the very essence of elections
where by those that spent a lot of money to get
elected must recover their costs and also accumu-
late funds for the next election and the system is
self-perpetuating and brings into leadership peo-
ple who may not serve the will of the voters after
paying them. Elections are supposed to be free,
fair, and acceptable to all (Chauvet and Collier
2009; Lee 2011). In Uganda, elections are not
only commercialized, but the entire electoral pro-
cesses are all marred with corruption. From the
very top at presidential level to the village, there is
usually bribing of voters, electoral polling agents,
and buying off media outlets so that they can carry
out biased reporting; electoral ofcials are bribed
to do ballot stafng, unevenly distribute supplies
of voting materials at polling stations, ensure that
boxes of the ticked ballot papers disappear before
reaching tally centers, or falsify results, and some-
times polling agents are bribed to abandon the
polling stations on the election day. The inability
to have credible electoral reforms and rampant
electoral malpractices has led to loss of condence
in change of government through democratic
means and sometimes has led to political strife
and strikes where lives have been lost and
properties destroyed. The issue of huge money
in Ugandan elections is explainable through spe-
cic examples. In the 2011 campaign period,
President Museveni chaired a Cabinet meeting
on 8 December 2010 to request Cabinet to pass a
supplementary budget amounting to Shs 380 bil-
lion for State House. Most electoral commentators
noted that much of this money was used to nance
his campaigns. In the 2015/2016 budgets, the
government included UgShs 4 trillion (US$ 1.2
billion) which was not properly budgeted for, but
people in the inner circle knew that this was meant
to ensure that the incumbent won the March 2016
elections. The use of money in elections has also
had direct negative impact on Uganda develop-
ment in the past. For example, after elections most
candidates nd themselves in unpayable debts; at
national level, after every election, Uganda nds
itself in serious ination; most investors withhold
their money, and there are always violence and
court disputes against electoral outcomes (Tangri
and Mwenda 2013). On the other hand, Singapore
avoided the use of huge amounts of money to win
elections that has had a direct bearing on its devel-
opment. Both the ruling party and the opposition
kept election expenses small and well below the
amount allowed by law. There was no need for the
government to replenish its coffers after elections
and between elections; there were no gifts for
voters. The PAP got people to vote for them
again and again by providing jobs, building
schools, hospitals, community centers, and most
important of all, homes which they owned. Oppo-
sition parties also did not need money. They won
positions because the electorate wanted opposi-
tion MPs to pressure the government for more
concessions (Lee 2011). This did not only save
money for individual candidates and parties but
also the nation and was used for other purposes.
6 Corruption and Development: Comparing Uganda and Singapore
Corruption and Health
A healthy population is not only essential but also
a prerequisite for economic growth and develop-
ment. Healthy populations live longer, are more
productive, and save more. Many complex factors
inuence a countrys ability to provide quality
health services for its people including, for
instance, investments in transport infrastructure
such as roads that easily improve access to health
services, ination targets that can constrain health
spending, civil service reform that may create or
limit opportunities to hiring more health workers,
and corruption that siphons off public resources
meant to help citizen access better health services.
Corruption has been well documented as an
impediment that can prevent access or develop-
ment of a good healthcare system in a country
especially those that are still developing. In the
case of Uganda, the health sector in Uganda is
rated the second most corrupt institution, and this
has negatively affected the quality of health ser-
vices provided. In 2005, the Global Fund for
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis suspended
all donations to Uganda when over 1.6 million US
dollars of grants went missing. It is estimated that
over two-thirds of drugs meant for free distribu-
tion in the public sector are lost due to theft,
expired medicine is knowingly dispensed to
patients, 6877% of formal user charges are mis-
appropriated or pocketed by workers, there is poor
supervision and investment in medical services,
and doctor to patient ratio is 1:15,000. As a result
of all these deciencies and corruption, 16 women
die daily due to maternal complications or failure
to access critical health services, infant mortality
rate is 60.82 deaths/1,000 live births, and life
expectancy at birth for males is 53.1 years
(Gnocato et al. 2014), and almost all top-ranked
government ofcials seek their treatment in for-
eign countries or private hospitals in the country
that can be quite expensive, and the taxpayer foots
the bill which over US$ 100 million per year
which is a lot of money for a country like Uganda.
The gaps and challenges are so huge and complex
that xing them requires not only training enough,
recruitment and retaining health works, remuner-
ating them adequately, building and equipping
health facilities, and eliminating both petty and
grand corruption, but also benchmarking best
practices from countries like Singapore that got
it right. Singapore realized and implemented a
range of policies that support corruption-free
healthcare system. For example, the Singaporean
government believes that nobody in their country
even a foreigner should go without healthcare and
have a health savings plan called Medisave; the
government sets prices for private insurance com-
panies; healthcare costs for services and proce-
dures are completely transparent; there are high
healthcare subsidies for those with low incomes;
and the government invests heavily in medical
education. Because of this, the country enjoys
one of the most successful healthcare systems in
the world. Its citizens have low infant mortality
rates, and its people have a life expectancy of up to
84 years.
Corruption and Environment
In 1945, Sir Winston Churchill visited Uganda
and called it the Pearl of Africa because of its
beautiful and good environment. The country is
very blessed with massive green vegetation, trop-
ical forests, wetlands, and water sources including
rivers and lakes. However, endemic corruption in
the form embezzlement of money by public of-
cials during implementation of environmental
programs, petty and grand corruption when
granting permits and natural resources exploita-
tion have had severe consequences on the envi-
ronment and environmental protection efforts.
Since the early 1990s, Uganda has lost 26.4% of
its forest cover, destroyed or encroached on fragile
ecosystems like rivers, lakes, wetlands, and hill-
sides, and this has resulted in severe social-
economic consequences including landslides,
ooding, food insecurity, migration, conicts, dis-
eases, poverty, drought, loss of lives, and proper-
ties and climate change. Most Ugandans depend
and will continue to depend on the environment
for their livelihoods both as a source of subsis-
tence and as a basis for production, and its
destruction puts human survival at risk (NEMA
2014). On the other hand, from the early 1960s,
Singapore designed and executed deliberate envi-
ronmental policies and strategies that aimed to
Corruption and Development: Comparing Uganda and Singapore 7
protect environmental standards. Even when they
were undergoing rapid industrialization and
urbanization, Singapore still searched for some
dramatic way to achieve rst world standards in
a third world region and distinguish themselves
from other third world countries. They settled
for a clean and green Singapore. They set up
corruption-free committees who worked to trans-
form Singapore into a tropical garden city by
planting millions of trees, palms, and shrubs;
kept down ies and mosquitoes; and cleaned up
smelly drains, canals, and the Singapore River and
Kallang Basin. Within no time there was a distinct
spruceness of public spaces. This raised the
morale of people and gave them pride in their
surroundings and boosted tourism and investment
(Lee 2011). After the 1990s, because of the
increasing concerns over global environmental
issues such as global warming and preservation
of biodiversity coupled with a growing populat-
ion that expected higher standards of living,
Singapore undertook a major environmental pol-
icy review, and a new Green Plan was born. This
plan was issued in 1992 which aimed to balance
environmental and developmental needs. After
the year 2000, the plan was reviewed, and new
issues that had emerged such as transboundary air
pollution and climate change caused by green-
house gas emissions were incorporated. The out-
come of this was another new plan (Singapore
Green Plan (SGP) 2012) that aimed to move
beyond from just being clean and green and
toward attaining environmental sustainability.
All these plans have been effectively implemented
mainly because of clean leadership that keeps
misuse of public resources at the very minimal.
It is not just the good policies on paper that matter,
because even Uganda has fantastic environmental
policies and laws on paper. The problem has been
implantation and specically the misuse of
entrusted authority or resources. That is what sep-
arates Uganda and Singapore.
Corruption and Education
Education is a backbone for any countrys devel-
opment. Corruption in the education sector may
take different manifestations, for instance, divert-
ing money and other resources into non-existing
or ctitious areas, for example, cheating of exams,
ghost teachers, ghost schools, and ghost pupils
which may affect the quality of the curriculum.
In the case of Uganda and Singapore, their attitude
and actions against corruption have had sharply
contrasting outcomes on education. In Uganda,
corruption in the education sector is both prac-
ticed directly at the government level and also
other players in the sector such as owners and
managers of institutions like schools, both gov-
ernment and private. It has been estimated
that Uganda loses over UgShs 40 billion (US$
11 millions) annually to ghost teachers, pupils,
and schools. This is an equivalent of 360 class-
room blocks or salary of 6,820 teachers a year.
In addition, because of liberalization, many actors
in Uganda are engaged in the education sector
mainly aiming at prot making. Thus most of
these schools admit inappropriately high student
numbers, parents are made to pay more money,
yet these institutions do not pay enough salaries to
teachers which have resulted into moonlighting,
teacher absenteeism, and low-quality teaching
leading to poor education achievement, high
dropout rate, and high unemployment among
the youth that go through such a system (NDPII
2015). On the other hand, the Singaporean
government established high-quality education
through transparent and accountable use of its
resources, providing high-quality infrastructures,
better rewards for teachers, and equipment geared
toward vocational and science training. They
selected their cream students from each year grad-
uates and sent them to the top universities in
advanced countries. The government also put in
place high-quality vocational schools to prepare
less academically inclined students with skills to
earn a better living in vocational careers, gave
scholarships to bright poor children to allow
them realize their full potential, prevent building
up of a permanent underclass, and allow an
upward social mobility. Disadvantaged pupils
who were unable to pass the basic primary school
leaving examination received intensive support
including hands-on vocational training, life
skills, and counseling to those with emotional
8 Corruption and Development: Comparing Uganda and Singapore
difculties, and all this contributed to social
cohesion in Singapores multiethnic society
(Lee 2011).
This entry concludes that corruption has a
very signicant impact on development in coun-
try. It is important for countries to learn from one
another especially to those that have achieved
excellency even in the face of serious difculty,
and Singapore is a model for many on the African
continent especially Uganda.
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Development Management
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ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
1. What is Remarkable about Singapore? 2. How Singapore Became Independent: Lee Kuan Yew and the People's Action Party (PAP) 3. Locations of Power: The state and the government 4. The People's Action Party: The structure and operation of a dominant party 5. Ideology of the Leaders and for the Populace 6. Economic Policy for an Independent Singapore 7. Supplying Social Services to the People 8. The Dictates of Ethnicity: Language policy, education and self-help 9. The Successors: Leadership trends in the PAP 10. Authoritarian aspects of PAP rule 11. Elections, Electoral Innovation, and the Opposition 12. The Growth of Civil Society 13. Deterence and Diplomacy 14. Singapore in the Future
This paper explores the impact of elections on economic policies and governance in developing countries. We distinguish between a structural effect, which increases accountability, and a cyclical effect which may be disruptive. Since the effects are offsetting, neither can be analysed in isolation. We implement an econometric analysis on more than 80 developing countries using positive changes in the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment of the World Bank and the International Country Risk Guide as signalling improvements in economic policy and governance. We find that both structural and cyclical effects matter. The cyclical effect suggests that mid-term is the best moment for policy change. We investigate the structural effect by comparing different frequencies of elections. Except at the extremes, a higher frequency of elections improves both policy and governance net of any cyclical effect. The important exception to this benign net effect is if the electoral process is badly conducted. Badly conducted elections have no structural efficacy for policy improvement. A reasonable interpretation of our results is that honest elections increase accountability and thereby discipline governments to improve economic policy and governance, but that if candidates can win by fraud this chain is broken. —Lisa Chauvet and Paul Collier
In this paper we start with a discussion of some of the different denotations of the problem of corruption. We then consider the ways in which the damaging consequences of corruption operate in a developing economy, while not ignoring its possible redeeming features in some cases. We pursue the question of why corruption is perceptibly so different in different societies and also persistent. Finally, we examine the feasible policy issues that arise in this context.
Ideas for development
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Chambers R (2004) Ideas for development. IDS working paper 238. IDS, Sussex. Retrieved from www. 487.8068&rep=rep1. On 16 Aug 2018
From third world to first: Singapore's success. ICAC 29th Caribbean conference of accountants
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Ghesquiere H (2011) From third world to first: Singapore's success. ICAC 29th Caribbean conference of accountants. Retrieved from wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Report-on-Singapores-Success-from-third-world-to-first.pdf. On 12 Sept 2018
Women, health and corruption: redefining partnerships for social change. Graduate Institute Geneva
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Gnocato K, Harford A, Kailee J, Shelley E (2014) Women, health and corruption: redefining partnerships for social change. Graduate Institute Geneva. Retrieved from files/sites/about-us/discover-the-institute/geneva-chall enge/docs/Women%20health%20and%20corruption% 20.pdf. On 28 Sept 2018
First, do no harm -then, build trust: anti-corruption strategies in fragile situations
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Johnston M (2010) First, do no harm -then, build trust: anti-corruption strategies in fragile situations. World developments report 2011. The World Bank, Washington, DC
From third world to first: Singapore and the Asian economic boom
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Lee KY (2011) From third world to first: Singapore and the Asian economic boom. Harper Collins, New York Looney R (2006) Can Iraq overcome the oil curse? World Econ 7(1):21. Retrieved from https://www. 23725038_Can_Iraq_Overcome_the_Oil_Curse/links/ 573f332c08ae9f741b321a14/Can-Iraq-Overcome-the-Oil-Curse.pdf. On 12 Sept 2018
Macroeconomic effects of budget deficits in Uganda: A VAR-VECM approach. Economic Policy Research Centre
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Lwanga J, Mawejje J (2014) Macroeconomic effects of budget deficits in Uganda: A VAR-VECM approach. Economic Policy Research Centre, Kampala