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This is an original manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Interventions.
International Journal of Postcolonial Studies on 25 January 2021, available online:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1369801X.2020.1863836
Article title
The reconfiguration of nationalist movements in a context of
crisis: Evidences from the case of Catalonia
Article type
Original Manuscript
Authors
Emma Martín-Díaz
University of Seville, Seville, Spain
Professor of Social Anthropology
Francisco J. Cuberos-Gallardo
University of Seville, Seville, Spain
Researcher in Social Anthropology
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Funding details
This article is linked to the research project Ethnic, media and ideological landscapes in
Europe. Multi-level analysis of the impact of migration and asylum on values from a gender
perspective (MIGRASCAPE), funded by the Regional Government of Andalusia (Junta de
Andalucía) and the European Regional Development Fund (FEDER).
Biographical notes
Emma Martín-Díaz is Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Seville. She is
specialized in Migration, Ethnic Relationships and Public Policies. Her PhD thesis, (1988),
focused on Andalusian immigrants in Cataluña, interethnic relationships and integration
policies. Since 1995 she has been carrying out research on “New Immigration” in Spain. The
topics include migration and Fordism, return migration, immigration, and labour markets in
Spain, migration, gender and citizenship, transnational social networks, and the multilevel
governance of cultural diversity. She participates in several masters and doctorates on
migration, ethnicity, gender, development, citizenship and Human Rights at different
Universities from Europe and Latin America. She has recently published the book
Challenging Austerity. Radical Left and Social Movements in the South of Europe (London:
Routledge, 2017) and is also author of several articles in international journals such as
Critical Sociology, Ethnic And Racial Studies, American Anthropologist and Journal of Latin
American cultural studies.
Francisco J. Cuberos-Gallardo is Post-Doctoral researcher at the University of Seville. He
holds a Ph.D. in Social Anthropology from the University of Seville. His PhD thesis (2012)
focused on Latin American immigrant associations in the city of Seville. Since then his main
research interests are linked to ethnicity and specially focused in migration, interculturality
2
and social integration in Latin America and Europe. Actually he is envolved in several
research projects on those items and has recently done anthropological fieldwork in Portugal,
Spain, Ecuador and Argentina. He has published several articles in international scientific
journals, including Ethnic and Racial Studies, Cultural Studies, Social Anthropology and
Journal of Urban History.
Abstract
Most theories on nationalism have rested on the assumption that nationalism was related to
the nation-state as the main holder of power in our time. It sought to endorse or question its
boundaries, but never the legitimacy of the model. Both state nationalists and
ethnonationalists shared an understanding of citizenship as a belonging nexus and as a
foundation of rights. However, the current processes of globalization and social breakdown
driven by neoliberal adjustment policies have favoured the emergence of new nationalist
movements that are not defined exclusively in relation to the state but also in relation to the
Market by establishing interfaces with other social movements.
This article concerns the pro-independence process in Catalonia to examine the readaptation
of new nationalist movements in the face of the crisis of the nation-state and the financial
crisis. We analyze the evolution of the independence process in Catalonia over ten years,
describing both the evolution of discourse and the development of new political practice, as
well as a readjustment of the positions of new and classical political actors. We conclude that
the rise of the self-determination movement in Catalonia reflects a significant discursive and
programmatic shift in ethnonationalism. The new nationalist projects appear as a solution to
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social problems generated by a nation-state that has lost competence in the framework of the
European Union and globalization, and also by anti-social cutback measures.
Keywords
Civil counter-power, emancipatory nationalism, globalization, Catalonia, Spain, crisis
Introduction
Classical theories on nationalism, proposed by Gellner (1983) and Smith (1977), have
employed, although with different nuances, the dichotomy between cultural nationalism and
civic nationalism. According to this perspective, cultural nationalism is based on emotional
arguments containing a strong affective component. With important exceptions which we will
point out, this has been the predominant approach in the analysis of peripheral nationalism
within established nation-states. This is the origin of the distinction between
ethnonationalism, a concept that implies ethnicity as the determinant factor, and state
nationalism, a definition that emphasizes the citizen’s social pact as the union bond. The
works of Ignatieff (1998) on Balkan nationalisms and the book by the Syrian-French writer,
Amin Maalouf (1998) on murderous identities, also followed this line. This tradition was
hegemonic in the social sciences but was far from unanimous. In 1977 Tom Nairn, in The
Break-up of Britain, gives more weight to the class factor than to ethnicity and citizenship,
breaking with the dichotomy between cultural nations and civic nations. From his point of
view, unequal development is the driving force of nationalism and those territories located on
the periphery of states were the most interested in raising the flag of nationalism. A few years
later, and following this same materialist approach, Hechter and Levi (1979) revisited the
theory of internal colonialism in order to highlight that it is precisely the peripheral situation
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within a given state that determines the adscription to a nationalist project. These authors
described the Catalonian case as a clear example of internal colonialism.
In all these cases, the analysis focused on the assumption that nationalism was related to the
nation-state as the main holder of power of our time. It sought to endorse or question its
borders, but never the legitimacy of the model. State nationalists and cultural nationalists
shared the understanding of citizenship as a belonging nexus and as the foundation of rights.
This state-of-the-art conceptualisation began to change as financial globalisation processes
destabilized the balance between the state and the market. In 1997 Castells published his
trilogy The Information Age, focusing his second volume on the "power of identity" and
identifying nationalisms such as Quebecer and Catalonian as project identities. Kaldor, in her
article "Nationalism and Globalisation" argues that "the current wave of nationalism has to be
understood as a response to globalization and not as evidence for the enduring nature of the
national idea" (2004).
This article is grounded on the premises suggested by Castells and Kaldor. Its objective is to
examine, from a study of contemporary Catalonian nationalism, how new nationalist
movements have readapted to a context marked by both the crisis of the nation-state and the
financial crisis of 2008. Attention will be paid to the relationships between new nationalisms
and new social movements, although the role of traditional political organisations will also be
studied. We think that the rise of the self-determination movement in Catalonia is a
manifestation of a reflexivity process understood within the framework of the transformations
of nation-states, resulting from globalisation and leading to a triple crisis: of competence, of
legitimacy, and of representation (Martín-Díaz 2003). In this context, self-determination
movements fit into the model of project identity suggested by Castells and must be seen as a
response to a situation of structural crisis for the model of the nation-state that characterized
the first modernity (Beck 1997), and worsened due to the economic crisis that affected the
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European Union (Aixelà-Cabré 2018). Following the reflection begun by Brown, our initial
hypothesis is that it is not possible to maintain the dichotomy between ethnic and civic
nationalisms considering the crisis of the citizenship model of modernity (Brown 1999).
The data for this case study were collected using visual and discourse analysis of documents
such as political posters, spots, statements, press releases, Internet websites, and pieces of
news from political organizations supporting or opposing the processes of deliberation about
self-determination in Catalonia from 2012 to 2018, specially in the months before and after
the referendum on self-determination of October 1, 2017. We made a systematic compilation
of written and audiovisual documents, and we carried out an intensive study of the discourse
of various actors, including organizations and political representatives, academics, and
Catalan citizens of different profiles. We were interested in recording speeches and political
practices built on Catalan and Spanish nationalism, both within Catalonia and in other areas
of the state. On different occasions, generally coinciding with significant dates in the
development of the independence process, we moved to Catalonia to participate first hand in
events of special importance.
The acceleration of the events and the resurgence of the political conflict in Catalonia
favoured the visibility of speeches, mobilizations, parliamentary initiatives, and other more or
less ritualized practices, which in this convulsive stage served to densely condense and
disseminate values and objectives directly associated with Catalan nationalism as a political
project. The analysis of all this allows us to contextualize the forms, functions, and meanings
that the Catalan nationalist movement assumed during a specific historical period, and how
this project was mobilized around deep notions such as democracy, rights, sovereignty, and
community.
New nationalist movements, civil counterpower, and emancipatory nationalisms
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The current processes of globalization and social breakdown driven by neoliberal adjustment
policies have favoured the emergence of new nationalist manifestations that invite study from
the perspective of collective action. These new nationalist movements are not defined
exclusively in relation to the state, but also in relation to the Market by establishing interfaces
with other social movements.
In the same way that the education system (Gellner 1983) or the extension of the printer
(Anderson 1991) were key factors in the development of classical nationalism, today the
proliferation of new information and communication technology has fostered the redefinition
of political, socio-economic, and cultural frames, which has shaped the configuration of
nationalist movements (Crameri 2015). In this sense, the movement for self-determination fit
the model of project identity; that is, it conformed when a social actor constructed a new
identity from the cultural background of his or her environment with the aim of transforming
social structures and exercising counter-power. “The capacity of social actors to challenge the
power embedded in the institutions of society for the purpose of claiming representation for
their values and interests” (Castells 2012, as quoted in Crameri 2015).
As Castells has pointed out, human beings construct meaning the interaction with their
natural and social environment. Our neuronal networks interconnect with nature and social
networks by means of communication processes. The current advances in information and
communication technology and the extension of mass media have changed the nature of
social life, diversifying the production of meaning and configuring a communication network
that is in constant change and is simultaneously global and local (Castells 2012). In
contemporary society, communication networks play a key role in the construction of
hegemony. The conjunction of financial and media networks form a meta-network that
exercises social power in interaction with other networks (such as political, criminal, cultural,
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or scientific networks). Thus, macrosociological dynamics are interconnected with
microsociological processes.
At the macrosociological level, social protest is related to two groups: political groups and
civil groups. Following Edwards (2009) Crameri states that it is impossible to divorce civil
associations from “political society”, “Otherwise, they are unable effectively to exercise what
Manuel Castells calls ‘counterpower’” (Crameri 2015, 108).
It is obvious that, especially in the case of ethnonationalist movements, emotional and
symbolic links with the territory deeply influence collective action. The construction of
identities, threats, and social projects is essential in any phenomenon of protest. Emotions,
such as outrage, anger, or grievance are powerful personal incentives for participating in
mobilization (Jasper 1998; Gould 2004; Poma 2014).
The peak of contemporary movements for self-determination in Catalonia was the result of a
reflexivity process understood within the reference framework of the profound changes
occurring in the ambit of the nation-states due to globalization and leading to triple crises: of
competences, of legitimacy, and of representation. In this context, the movements of self-
determination can be seen as examples of the project identity proposed by Castells. They
must be studied as a response to the structural crisis of the political model, a crisis that was
sharpened by the economic crisis that was particularly punishing to the European Union.
Thus, by means of protest, the new nationalist movements are attempting to produce a
gemeinschaft that could be politically useful and emotionally satisfactory in a territory in
which its inhabitants contemplated at some point in their recent history the possibility of
building their own nation-state. As Guibernau points out, “if the state fails to assimilate
national minorities…the ‘estrangement’ from the state may imply a profound sense of
emotional detachment” (2014b, 107).
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The author states that in this case minorities confront the majority nationalism instilled by the
state with what she calls a “novel emancipatory nationalism.” According to Guibernau,
“Emancipatory nationalism emerges from nations or parts of nations included within larger
states which, through history, have ignored, neglected, punished or forbidden internal
diversity” (2014b, 108).
“Emancipatory nationalism” is not be understood in terms of “bottom up” versus “top down.”
In the case of the independence movement in Catalonia, this perspective is criticized by
Crameri for ignoring the crucial role of cultural elites. The author points out that “it has been
the conversion of the Catalan middle classes to support independence rather than “pragmatic
catalanism” that has turned what was a hitherto minor component of Catalan Nationalism into
a mass seccession movement” (2015, 118). We provide evidences of this assertion in the
pages below.
Guibernau remarks on the Janus-faced nature of nationalism. In some cases, nationalism is
associated whith xenophobia and racism; in others, it is associated with a strong commitment
to defending human rights and democracy: “Thus, nationalism, on some occasions, is
associated with backward ethnic political discourses, whereas in others, it stands as a new
progressive social movement in favour of the emancipation of peoples” (2013, 369).
According to the author, emancipatory nationalism in the West adopts a democratic face:
“emancipatory nationalism defines itself as democratic, abiding the rule of law respecting
human rights, social justice and having the compromise to obtain legitimacy through popular
sovereignty; that is, by the people’s consent.” Guibernau defines emancipatory nationalism as
“an ‘opposition movement’ in search of greater political recognition for the nations it claims
to represent” (Guibernau 2014b, 108). Following Lijphart (1984) she argues that, while in the
case of the Spanish state a model of majoritarian democracy has been applied, a “consensus
democracy” would be better suited to reflect the national diversity (Guibernau 2014b, 111).
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In their own words, “Emancipatory nationalism stands a step forward in the deepening of
democracy by accepting the principle of consent…It signals a key transition in the life of the
nation’s willingness to act and be recognized as a ‘demos’ able to decide upon its political
future” (Guibernau 2013, 372).
Chronicle of a rupture. From the crisis of the Statute to the consolidation of the
independence movement
On September 30, 2005, the Parliament of Catalonia approved a reform of the Statute of
Autonomy with which it had governed legally since 1979. The project sanctioned important
developments, including the recognition of Catalonia as a nation and a redistribution of
political competences that reinforced the role of the Catalan Administration and deepened the
decentralization of the model. These changes soon resulted in strong tensions, which were
reflected in the process of approval of the legal text in the Spanish Congress of Deputies.
During this process the original project experienced a series of cuts that were considered
unacceptable by the party that at the time monopolized the independence option in Catalonia,
Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC). However, the Spanish nationalism embodied by the
Popular Party (PP), then in the majority in the central government, was not satisfied and
showed its frontal opposition to the new Statute. In July 2006, the PP filed an
unconstitutionality appeal before the Constitutional Court challenging 128 of the 223 articles
included in the law. And four years later, on June 28, 2010, this court issued a judgment
declaring a total of 14 articles totally or partially unconstitutional. The decision of the
Constitutional Court nullified the designation of Catalonia as a nation that was affirmed in the
Statute, emphasized the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, and disallowed the
legitimacy of the Catalan government in the exercise of powers reserved to the Spanish state,
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including holding of referenda (El País, July 9, 2010). Within Spanish nationalism, the PP
interpreted this to mean that the ruling of the Constitutional Court supported its position of
rejecting the new Statute in defense of Spanish unity. But within Catalonia, a very important
part of the population felt the rejection as an external interference in the right of the Catalans
to make their own decisions. The publication of this judgement fixed in time the origin of the
so-called pro-independence process (el Procés). The new Statute, whose processing had
motivated very limited interest among Catalans, opened the way to an open debate on how
Catalonia fit within the Spanish state. Since then and up to the present, a growing number of
Catalans have become attached to a discourse that advocates the construction of a state of
their own, and are actively involved in initiatives of various kinds to advance this goal. For
10 years, both discourse and political practices in Catalonia have undergone profound
changes, which in turn have made possible the emergence of new protagonists and an
adjustment in the ideological positions of traditional actors.
The declaration of unconstitutionality of the draft Statute of Autonomy of 2006 was
interpreted by broad sectors of Catalan society as a confirmation of the impossibility of
advancing self-government within a common Spanish state. The Procés, in this sense, can
hardly be interpreted as an extension of the Catalan nationalism of a romantic and bourgeois
court that originated in the nineteenth century around claims to identity in the defense of the
Catalan language and traditional ways of life. The rapid growth of the independence proposal
is more easily explained by its identification as a last resort against a state and an economic
context perceived as alien to any level of control by Catalan society.
The Catalan political forces stress that, at the time of issuing the judgement, up to one-third
of the members of the Constitutional Court were in an anomalous situation, as they
maintained their position of not having been released from office at the required time that
marked the Spanish legality. In the pro-independence discourse, this anomaly came to the
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fore as proof of the lack of democratic legitimacy of the Spanish institutions that prevented
the Catalans from developing their own laws (ElDiario.es, May 26, 2010). Further, it is no
coincidence that the development of the pro-independence Procés was framed in a context
that, beyond the institutional crisis around the draft Statute of Autonomy, was followed after
2008 by a strong economic and financial crisis that affected Catalonia as well as the rest of
Spain, and that is embodied in a feeling of a growing lack of protection against arbitrary
capital markets and international institutions, deaf to the specific problems of Catalan society.
This feeling of lack of political resources in the face of the scourge of the crisis was shared by
the majority of Spaniards, as demonstrated by the emergence of the 15-M Movement in the
spontaneous demonstrations that took place in May 2011. However, in Catalonia this change
in trend, which also translated into a growing politicization of citizens and the development
of direct political intervention formulas, was largely framed in the development of the pro-
independence Procés.
A first manifestation of this trend occurred just two weeks after the announcement by the
Constitutional Court of the judgement annulling the draft Statute of Autonomy. In response to
this ruling, the association Òmnium Cultural called for a demonstration in the city of
Barcelona with the slogan "Som una nació. Nosaltres decidim" ("We are a nation, we
decide") where, within the framework of a generic claim of the right to decide, we could
already see a growth of the options that favoured exercising that right in favour of
independence. This demonstration obtained strong support, which the urban guard of
Barcelona estimated to be around a million people, and was considered as the first great
mobilization for independence. The convening entity, Ómnium Cultural, was a cultural and
political organization with a long history, born in 1961 at the initiative of a group of people
from the world of culture in defense of the Catalan language and identity in a Francoist
context of homogenizing pressure as part of Spanish nationalism. The work of this
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organization mainly developed around the so-called "world of culture" in minority
environments of intellectual profile and bourgeois extraction. Only as a result of the ruling of
the Constitutional Court against the proposed Statute of Autonomy did the Òmnium Cultural
become actively involved in defending Catalonia's right to decide. In the act of publicly
announcing this great mobilization, the former president of Òmnium, Jordi Porta, stated that
after the ruling of the Constitutional Court, "more than defending a Statute that has already
been cut as it passes by the Spanish Courts, we [Òmnium] understand that we must defend
the will of the people of Catalonia”. (La Vanguardia, June 29, 2010) In a context of growing
tension, Òmnium was actively positioning itself in favor of independence, accompanying its
work in defense of the Catalan language and culture with calls for the tax resistance of
Catalonia and the organization of a binding referendum calling for independence.
The impetus for this first large mobilization soon extended to the celebration of “la Diada,”
or Day of Catalonia, in 2012. This date had high political significance since its celebration,
on September 11, commemorates the fall of Barcelona into the hands of the Bourbon troops
during the War of the Spanish Succession. This military defeat ultimately led to the abolition
of Catalan political institutions after the promulgation of the Nueva Planta Decrees, in 1716,
in what has been historically interpreted by Catalans as a painful loss of political autonomy
vis-à-vis the modern Spanish state. The institutional celebration of this day was instituted at
the beginning of democracy after the end of the Franco regime, basically as a symbol of the
claim of Catalan cultural identity, and with a clearly minority following. Between 2008 and
2011, the Diadas were celebrated by between 10,000 and 15,000 people. On September 11,
2012, a Diada was organized with a strictly pro-independence profile with the slogan
"Catalunya, nou estat d'Europa" ("Catalonia, new state of Europe "). It was organized by the
Catalan National Assembly, a new citizens' association formally constituted just six months
earlier that defines itself as "a transversal and non-partisan entity" whose objective is "to
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unite independence from civil society" (https://assemblea.cat/). Among the people who
promote the Catalan National Assembly, a very prominent representation of writers, artists,
journalists and university professors stands out, reinforcing the importance of cultural elites
in articulating the political impulse toward independence. More than 600,000 people
participated in the mobilization for Diada 2012. It marked the beginning of a new series of
pro-independence Diadas that consolidated in the Catalan political imaginary the entry into a
new historical phase marked by the demand for independence and the predominance of civil
society in massive, peaceful actions and high media visibility. In the following years, the
Diadas served as scenarios for powerful independence mobilizations, with attendance rates
that, according to Barcelona's urban guard, oscillated around 1,500,000 in 2013, 1,800,000 in
2014 and 1,400,000 in 2015. It is interesting to note that, if in 2012 and 2013 this initiative
was called by the Catalan National Assembly alone, from 2014 on the organization was
shared with Òmnium Cultural. If the vertiginous growth of the Catalan National Assembly
reflects the appearance of new organizational proposals within the ideological spectrum of
the Catalan independence movement, the involvement of the Òmnium Cultural in the
celebration of the Diadas exemplifies the transition toward this new political space of entities
with a long historical trajectory. Having previously stood for the defense of Catalan cultural
identity, they now assumed a political role in the active defense of independence. This
ideological turn was observed in Catalan society as a whole, where support for independence
pointed to a growing trend in the same years. The following table indicates the growth of this
trend.
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Table 1. Evolution of support for Catalonian independence 2008-2014.
The political status of Catalonia should
be . Nov 2008 % Nov 2010 % Nov 2012 % Oct 2014 %
A Spanish region
A Spanish autonomous community
A state within a federal Spain
An independent state
Don’t know
No answer
7.1
38.3
31.8
17.4
4.2
1.2
5.9
34.7
30.9
25.2
2.7
0.7
4.0
19.1
25.5
44.3
4.9
2.2
1.8
23.4
22.2
45.3
6.5
0.9
Source: Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió (CEO)
The referendum on self-determination. Crisis of legitimacy and reconfiguration of the
political scene in Catalonia
The deep effects of the neoliberal economic crisis, together with a growing feeling of the
state’s lack of comprehension regarding Catalonia’s claims, boosted accelerated support
among Catalan citizens for independence. This process of citizen politicization operated in
the first phase in the grassroots and non-electoral associative fabric. More and more Catalans
responded to calls from nonpartisan entities that were shaping the independence claim, and
that actively involved large sectors of society in their initiatives. The Catalan political conflict
was thus becoming socialized around increasingly broad self-organizing networks without
direct dependence on traditional parties to make the independence option visible in specific
mobilizations and also in cultural events such as artistic recitals and football stadiums. The
massive celebrations of the Diada were soon accompanied by a plurality of mobilizations in
which a very high number of Catalans actively participated, within a model of activism that
gave absolute prominence to civil society and included demonstrations and human chains, but
also concerts, lipdubs, flashmobs, and other cultural events, achieving high visibility through
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web-sites, videos, books, and international publicity campaigns. At this point, as Crameri
(2015) has rightly pointed out, cultural elites assumed a crucial role in the dissemination of
the independence argument through both traditional and new media. This growing
penetration of the independence movement in the social fabric forced the political parties to
readjust their positions around a new scenario.
In this context, the non-partisan entities intensified their relations with Catalan political
parties. The presidents of the Catalan National Assembly and Òmnium Cultural, Carme
Forcadell and Muriel Casals, even took part in the electoral lists of a pro-independence
candidacy in September 2015. But this participation was presented in the nationalist speech
as an extraordinary endorsement from the civil society to a specific candidacy that exceeded
the framework of party representation, and was justified by the exceptional nature of the
historic moment. The very presence of the leaders of the Catalan National Assembly and
Òmnium reinforced this candidacy with a broad and non-electoral image of Catalan public
life. This cooperation of non-partisan entities with parties was interpreted as a unique
convergence in the strategy for independence, and not as a cession of civil society to the
electoral strategy of the parties (El Mundo, September 25, 2015).
In a movement similar to the one we have described for nonpartisan entities such as Òmnium
Cultural, the Catalan nationalist parties were leading a progressive shift toward the
independence movement. For Convergence and Union (CIU), a conservative and non-
independentist coalition that for 30 years had hegemonized the Catalanist camp, this process
translated into a traumatic rupture. The need to respond to the growing demand for
independence caused this coalition to break when a part of it decided to occupy this new
space and another opted to remain in a position of autonomy. For its part, ERC, a left-wing
party traditionally linked to the independence movement, unequivocally joined the demand
for a referendum on self-determination for Catalonia, and openly supported the construction
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of a proper state for Catalans. This position was further stimulated by the growth to its left of
the Popular Unity Candidates (CUP), an anti-capitalist and strictly pro-independence political
organization that, starting as a very minority representation, experienced strong growth
beginning in 2007 in the heat of the development of Procés.
The Spanish political organizations were equally motivated to emphasize in their speeches an
attitude of explicit opposition to independence. The hegemonic organizations in this field,
Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) and PP, were overtaken by an emerging force, Citizens,
which based a good part of its rapid growth on an attitude of strong belligerence toward
Catalonian independence. The organization took the initiative in the construction of a
discourse that faithfully reproduced the dichotomous logic between cultural nationalism and
civic nationalism. Presenting themselves as critical citizens, cosmopolitan and oblivious to
the identity obsession that they identified with Catalanism, Citizens developed a proposal in
Catalonia that emphasized the values of modernity and Europeanism in the face of a
separatism associated with cultural essentialism and identity closure. In the Citizens
discourse, Catalan nationalism is represented as an essentialist and xenophobic political
proposal, pursuing objectives such as the linguistic unification of Catalonia and posing a
danger to its internal cultural diversity (Robles 2006). Other Spanish organizations moved
toward this discourse with the aim of presenting the independence movement as an
anachronistic and irrational political option in contrast to a Spanish nationalism that was
presented as a non-nationalist nationalism: as an obvious or natural product of historical
evolution and as the only way of fitting into the European Union. However, Citizens
separated itself from the other Spanish forces, recognizing the existence of a strong
democratic deficit in Spain and emphasizing the importance of correcting this deficit with
reforms that would prevent the rise of independence movements (RTVE, November 6, 2012).
17
The evolution of events did not favour the debate on independence framed by the political
keys that interested Spanish nationalism. First, its main representative forces were gradually
involved in a series of corruption scandals that deeply undermined the credibility of their
proposals. While the PSOE was suffering from a judicial scandal of corrupt management in
the Andalusian regional government (EREs case), in November 2007 the Anti-Corruption
Prosecutor formally began an investigation of the Gürtel Case, an extensive plot of political
corruption linked to the Popular Party that was going to make this party the first convicted of
political corruption in the history of Spain. And secondly, the pro-independence parties
concentrated their demands on holding a referendum of self-determination that put Spanish
nationalism in an extremely uncomfortable position. In fact, the electoral bases that sustained
the Spanish parties in the rest of the state forced them to directly oppose the holding of a
referendum on self-determination in Catalonia. In the Spanish discourse, it was not possible
for the Catalans to decide their destiny apart from the rest of the Spaniards since this option
was not contemplated in the then-current constitutional text. The problem is that this strategy
locked them up in Catalonia in an attitude of denial of dialogue. In the Spanish nationalist
discourse, the referendum on self-determination was presented as an attempt by the Catalan
parties to cover up their problems and distract the population from their "real problems":
economic crisis, unemployment, etc. In the pro-independence discourse, in contrast, the
referendum appeared as a democratic measure that offered equal opportunities to both the
defenders of independence and those who favoured the unity of Spain. Here a gap opened
that conditioned the development of events from the second half of 2017.
Once approved by the Catalan Parliament and fixed in time as the referendum of self-
determination of October 1, 2017, the independence movement focused its speech on
defending the right of the Catalans to decide, focusing on the opportunity that the referendum
provided for the Spanish nationalists to demonstrate in the polls their numerical superiority.
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The pro-independence discourse thus left the argument about independence in the
background and gave absolute priority to the right to decide the future status of all Catalans.
Lluis Llach, a famous pro-independence artist, summed up this turn a few weeks before the
2017 self-determination referendum, stressing that paradoxically, only the pro-independence
activists defined the right of the Catalans to vote “no” for independence (La Vanguardia, July
8, 2017). The Spanish discourse, however, concentrated its efforts on disavowing the
referendum and on threatening reprisals against the elected representatives of the Catalan
government for authorizing this consultation. The effect of this unequal strategy was doubly
favourable to the independence movement. The first favourable effect was manifested on the
day of the referendum, when the Spaniards’ refusal to participate favoured an
overrepresentation of the independence movement in the results of the referendum, which
won overwhelmingly with 90.18% of the votes. The second effect, more diffuse but equally
important, pointed to an increasing linkage of the independence movement with the ideas of
democratic participation and the right to decide, against Spanish nationalist options that were
increasingly associated with repressive threats and negative attitudes toward dialogue. In this
sense, the actual celebration of the referendum operated as a ritual that contributed to
visualizing these two positions graphically. During the days prior to October 1, and especially
during the day of the referendum, the independence movement led a massive mobilization in
which around two million people showed a happy and peaceful attitude on the day of voting.
On the contrary, the Spanish options, which favoured abstention, were invisible in those days,
and were identified with the intervention of police to stop the referendum, which resulted in
heavy charges and violent attacks against the voters. This police action caused a unanimous
condemnation by all political parties, with the sole exception of the PP. The day of the
referendum thus set the beginning of a third phase, marked by the entry on the scene of a
battery of repressive measures that represented a new twist in the Catalan political scene.
19
Catalonia after the referendum. Disobedience and law in a crisis of legitimacy scenario
The results of the referendum of October 1 opened a period of worsening political conflict in
Catalonia and a rush of political and judicial events. Just two days after the vote, the
independence movement called for a general strike in Catalonia, while the president of the
autonomous government, Carles Puigdemont, announced his will to proclaim independence
in the following days. The King of Spain, Felipe VI, made a harsh televised speech
disavowing this possibility, accusing “certain authorities in Catalonia” of violating legal
norms, violating the democratic principles of the rule of law, and undermining harmony and
coexistence in Catalonia, thus positioning itself “totally outside the law and democracy”. On
October 10 Carles Puigdemont intervened in the Parliament of Catalonia in order to propose a
declaration of independence following the result of the referendum, although immediately
afterwards he proposed its temporary suspension to open a period of negotiation with the
Spanish state. On the streets, the social movements linked to the independence movement
celebrated the outcome of the referendum and pressed for its effective implementation.
The Spanish institutions, however, refused to recognize the validity of the referendum and
chose to promote measures to deactivate the Procés. On October 16, Judge Carmen Lamela
ordered Jordi Sánchez and Jordi Cuixart, presidents of the Catalan National Assembly and of
Cultural Omnium, respectively, to be remanded in custody.
Such measures, as well as the fact that Sánchez and Cuixart had recently integrated pro-
independence electoral lists, demonstrate the political protagonism of these non-partisan
entities in the development of the pro-independence Procés. Meanwhile, the Spanish
government advanced the application of Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution, an
exceptional measure of de facto suspension of Catalan autonomy that included the cessation
20
of the entire autonomic government, the assumption of their roles by the ministers of the
central government, and the intervention in the Catalan parliament. On October 27, the same
Parliament of Catalonia assumed the mandate of the referendum of self-determination and
approved a resolution of independence as well as the opening of a constitutional process that
"ends the drafting and approval of the constitution of the republic." The same day, the Senate
of Spain approved the application of Article 155, and the president of the Spanish
government, Mariano Rajoy, ended the Catalan government, dissolved the Catalan
parliament, and called for autonomic elections on December 21. Three days later, Carles
Puigdemont left for Belgium, and on November 2 the National Court ordered the
imprisonment of Oriol Junqueras, vice president of the dismissed regional government, and
seven other former councillors of that government. The elections of December 21 were held
in an environment of high tension, granting a tight victory to the pro-independence lists.
Since then, the evolution of political life in Catalonia has been marked by the effective
impossibility of each block, independentist and Spanish nationalist imposing itself, and the
obvious need to find ways to have dialogue and negotiation. Parliamentary activity developed
with difficulty and the political scenario seemed frozen in a situation marked by the
imprisoned political representatives and the prolongation of Carles Puigmenont’s exile. In
this context, the recent formation of a new government in Spain led by the PSOE is the latest
development and promises a timid hope that the two positions will come closer. Meanwhile,
however, social movements in Catalonia continued developing their own strategies, adopting
forms and patterns of action that took on renewed prominence in this context.
Table 2. Evolution of support for Catalonian independence 2017-2019.
The political status of Catalonia should be Oct 2017 % Nov 2018 % Dec 2019 %
21
A Spanish region
A Spanish autonomous community
A state within a federal Spain
An independent state
Don’t know
No answer
4.6
27.4
21.9
40.2
4.7
1.2
5.9
24.0
22.1
38.9
6.6
2.6
5.9
28.0
21.7
36.7
5.8
1.8
Source: Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió (CEO)
When the judicialization of a policy does not work: The CDRs as examples of an
‘opposition movement’
The organization of the referendum and its subsequent development in a context of
prohibition and extraordinary deployment of police force was made possible by the
organization on a national scale of a large contingent of people. The fathers and mothers of
the schools designated as electoral centers deployed a large number of activities in them with
the objective of keeping them open so that voting was possible. The Defense Committees of
the Referendum were born at this time, and later, as a result of the events described in the
previous section, they were transformed into Committees for the Defense of the Republic
(CDR), which played a decisive role in the general strikes of October and November 8, when
the name change occurred. Its importance is greater because the leaders of the Catalan
National Assembly and Òmnium Cultural remained in prison. Although the strike did not
have much importance in the labour sphere, the social mobilizations that accompanied it
throughout the Catalan territory achieved the goal of paralyzing traffic.
The composition of the CDRs was very diverse. Its nucleus was composed of people
belonging to the Catalan social movements who on many occasions were not linked to the
22
pro-independence left, but who clustered around rejecting the repression of the state against
Catalan sovereignty. In the CDR people came from the Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP),
from the ERC, from the Catalan National Assembly (ANC), but also from the Catalan
European Democratic Party (PDeCat). In short, people who on certain occasions had been
ideological opponents, but who now joined in the rejection of the repression by practicing
disobedience as a form of expression. The effective organization of the CDRs relied largely
on Web 2.0 technologies, which simultaneously allowed the massive and decentralized
participation of broad sectors of Catalan society, a high capacity to bring pro-independence
discourse to huge audiences via large media through alternative routes, and an opportunity for
citizens to participate in a new way, marked by intermittency, autonomy, and the lack of a
need to join any particular organization. Furthermore, these new forms of active participation
were reinforced by the dynamism of Catalan civil society, which has traditionally been noted
by Catalanism discourse as one of the distinctive features of the Catalan nation (Crameri
2015).
In the words of the CDR activists, there is no hierarchical principle or formal structure in
their organization. In line with the movements of 15M, they are assemblyist, horizontal and
autonomous organizations, and work in a network with social movements. The organ is the
local or neighborhood assembly, and information circulates through coordinators with
rotating spokespersons. Faced with the reports of the Civil Guard, which presented the CDR
as a structured, hierarchical, and led organization, the committees themselves as well as
NGOs such as Novact or the Delàs Center for Peace Studies, considered this report to be
arbitrary and also assumed a new turn of the screw in the process of criminalization of a
movement inspired by nonviolent civil disobedience. It is interesting to note how the
occasional episodes of violence in demonstrations and protest actions received great coverage
in the Spanish media, while, in contrast, the violence exerted by the security bodies of the
23
state was minimized and, at the same time, presented as a response to the provocation of the
constitutional challenge, making the pro-independence movement responsible for this
violence. Faced with these discourses, CDRs were defined as a movement that was activated
or deactivated by parties and institutions. In the words of a CDR activist,
"The CDRs are a school of struggle, in the key of empowerment, disobedience
and social struggle ... the mobilization has been maintained when forces were
weakening and repression became more acute, the CDRs have been a sign of
rebellious dignity and act as a counter-power, both for the hegemonic
independence movement as, of course, against Spanish power" (Díaz 2018).
Conclusions
In this article, we have analysed how the globalization process and the advance of neoliberal
policies of deregulation, privatization and commercialization are transforming nationalist
movements. We have focused on the study of the discourses and collective action related to
“El Procés.” From our point of view, the self-determination movements in Catalonia were the
result of a reflexivity process responding to the transformations and crisis of the nation-state
in the current globalization context. These movements coincided with the model of project
identity proposed by Manuel Castells, which responded not only to a political crisis of the
state, but also to the economic and financial crisis of 2008. In order to understand the new
self-determination movements in the globalization context we have proposed an approach
that connects micro-processes (emotional, cognitive, discursive) and macrosociological
dynamics (political opportunities, economic cycles).
From the Catalonian case analyzed here, we can draw several conclusions that can contribute
to explaining the development of new nationalisms. Firstly, the nationalist feelings and
movements have intensified due to the current economic crisis and the general social unrest
24
generated by austerity public policies. Secondly, identitary references lose weight in these
movements in relation to the aspiration of constructing, from self-determination, a new
economic model that overcomes the contradictions sharpened by the neoliberal policies of the
nation-state. This explains why, in the Catalonian case, numerous people from new social
movements initially not sensitive to the pro-independence project ended up joining the self-
determination project. In the words of Crameri, “Whatever the end result, it is clear that the
new situation will have been co-constructed by political and civil forces that have both elite
as well as more grassroots elements, and idealized notions that the process represents a
triumph of civil society over political institutions should therefore be avoided” (2015, 108).
In conclusion, self-determination movements in Catalonia reflect a significant discursive and
programmatical shift in ethnonationalism. The new nationalist projects appear as a solution to
the social problems generated by a nation-state that has lost competence in the framework of
the European Union and the globalization processes, and also due to anti-social cutback
measures. Thus, our initial hypothesis about the blurring of the borders between civic and
ethnic nationalism can be confirmed. There is no doubt that these episodes were a milestone
in the history of Catalonia, in which the population has started a powerful mobilization
process with the aim of responding to the challenges of globalization. Following Guibernau
(2013, 2014a, 2014b), we call this process emancipatory nationalism.
We agree with Guibernau when she states that the greatest challenge facing this movement is
to achieve international recognition, taking into account that the official view is that
“national minority issues” are a “state’s internal affair” (Guibernau 2014a, 8). In this sense, it
would be interesting to explore the contrast between the quest for independence within the
European Union that the author sees as one of its novel and distinctive features of the
emancipatory nationalism and the anti-European sentiments and discourses that have
characterized the resurgence of state nationalism all over Europe.
25
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Beltrán Roca and Yolanda Aixelà for their insightful
comments on earlier versions of this article. We are also grateful to the anonymous
Interventions reviewers for their comments.
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