Collective Narcissism and the Motivational Underpinnings of the Populist Backlash

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Collective Narcissism and the Motivational
Underpinnings of the Populist Backlash
Populist parties and politicians have become signifi cant political players in many
democracies worldwide ( Brubaker, 2017 ). The ultraconservative populist Law
and Justice has been in power in Poland since 2015. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán
and his Fidesz party have been elected to govern for the third consecutive time
in 2018 (see also Forgas & Lantos; Krekó, this volume). The Alternative for
Germany (AfD), the fi rst far-right party in the German Parliament since WWII,
has been gaining popularity since its founding in 2013. Donald Trump was elected
president of the United States in 2016. The same year the populist referendum
brought about the vote to leave the European Union in the United Kingdom.
The defi ning feature of populism is its anti-elitism, which contrasts the ‘demo-
cratic will of the people’ with the ‘self-interested will of the elites’. Any ideologi-
cal content can be used to clarify who the elites are and what makes their will less
valuable than that of ‘the people’. Thus, populism exists in di erent elaborated
variants integrating di erent ideological positions and leaderships ( Mudde, 2017 ).
The current wave of populism is predominantly inspired by ultraconservative,
right-wing ideology. In addition, despite regional di erences the common char-
acteristic of the contemporary populism in Europe and North America is its
narrow construal of national identity associated with open rejection of pluralistic
democracy, the rule of law, equal rights, diversity, and social progress ( Golec de
Zavala& Keenan, 2020 ; Mudde& Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017 ; Müller, 2016 ). The
rhetoric of contemporary populism often evokes the concept of national re-birth
(‘Make America great again’, ‘Take back control’ in the UK, ‘Stand up from one’s
knees’ in Poland); a collective nostalgia for idealized national past ( Mols& Jetten,
6
COLLECTIVE NARCISSISM
AND THE MOTIVATIONAL
UNDERPINNINGS OF THE
POPULIST BACKLASH
Agnieszka Golec de Zavala , Dorottya Lantos and
Oliver Keenan

106 Agnieszka Golec de Zavala et al.
2017 ; Wohl& Stefaniak, 2020 ; see also Bar-Tal& Magal; Marcus, this volume)
to justify the narrow inclusion criteria to the entitled group, ‘the people’. Those
criteria are based on the concepts of national purity ( Betz, 2018 ) and autoch-
thony, being born in and having ancestry within a nation ( Dunn, 2015 ). Current
populist rhetoric contrasts such narrowly defi ned ‘true’ nationals or ‘the people’
with liberal, internationally oriented ‘elites’ motivated by universal and human
rather than specifi c and national values.
In this chapter, we argue that national collective narcissism—a belief that the
nation is exceptional but not su ciently recognized by others ( Golec de Zav-
ala, Dyduch-Hazar,& Lantos, 2019 ; Golec de Zavala& Lantos, 2020 ; Golec de
Zavala& Keenan, 2020 )—defi nes a key feature of the contemporary populist
narrative about the national identity. Similarly, as populism can adopt any ideol-
ogy to justify the division between ‘the people’ and ‘the elites’, collective narcis-
sism may use any excuse to claim the nation’s uniqueness and entitlement to
special treatment ( Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson,& Jayawickreme, 2009 ).
As noted, the current populist narrative in many countries uses the exaggerated
importance of autochthony and ethnic purity to justify the narcissistic claims of
national exceptionality. Such claims provide a clumsy ideological justifi cation for
the attempts to sanction people’s sexuality and women’s reproductive rights char-
acteristic of the contemporary populism (see also Cooper& Avery, this volume).
Many anecdotal examples point to the associations among populism, sexism,
and sexual prejudice. In Poland, since the populist government came to power in
2015, women have faced the most restrictive anti-abortion laws in Europe and
homosexuality has been construed as ‘ideology’, ‘civilizational invasion’ antago-
nistic to traditional family values rooted in the teachings of the Catholic Church.
Supported by the Polish Catholic Church and the Pope’s declaration that educa-
tion on ‘gender ideology’ can be dangerous, the Polish government limits access
to sexual education and care and stigmatizes sexual minorities and feminists,
along with men and women who refuse to conform to traditional gender roles
( Ayoub, 2014 ; Korolczuk& Gra , 2018 ). In 2019, a Polish archbishop publicly
labelled the LGBT community a ‘rainbow plague’ ( Reuters, 2019 ), several Polish
cities declared themselves ‘LGBT free zones’ ( Noack, 2019 ), and a Polish news-
paper announced its intention to distribute ‘LGBT free zone’ stickers nationwide
( Giordano, 2019 ).
The COVID-19 pandemic was used by many populist governments to con-
solidate their authoritarian power and intensify their attacks on dissenters to tra-
ditional sexual norms: non-traditional women and sexual minorities ( Golec de
Zavala, Bierwiaczonek, Baran, Keenan,& Hase, 2020 ). Viktor Orbán banned
gender studies from universities across Hungary ( Apperly, 2019 ), and during the
pandemic, he blocked access to legal gender recognition for transgender people
( Walker, 2020 ). Across Europe, countries with highly prevalent populist parties
and politicians noted decreases in pro-LGBT legislation but increases in cases
of hate speech against women and sexual minorities ( ILGA-Europe, 2020 ). In

Collective Narcissism& Populist Backlash 107
the USA, mass-shooting was perpetrated by an American ‘Incel’ (a misogynistic
online community of self-proclaimed ‘involuntary celibates’), who proclaimed
the act as vengeance on behalf of all sexually frustrated men, encouraged by
notable public expressions of sexism by populist politicians ( Beauchamp, 2019 ).
Several southern states in the USA used the COVID-19 pandemic to ban abor-
tion ( Hernandez& Barnes, 2020 ).
Such examples open the question as to why contemporary populism is so
obsessed with sexuality, and what its associations with sexism and sexual prejudice
tell us about its psychology. We argue that those associations reveal an important
motivation underlying populism: a desire to fortify those group hierarchies which
provide traditional criteria for some people to feel superior to others ( Golec de
Zavala& Keenan, 2020 ; see also Crano& Ga ney; Hogg& Gøetsche-Astrup;
Kruglanski etal., this volume). These group hierarchies have been increasingly
undermined since the war by processes of globalization, and the cultural shift
towards post-material values of self-expression, equality, and tolerance ( Ingle-
hart & Norris, 2017 ). Via propagating collective narcissism as a defi nition of
national identity, right-wing populism elevates frustrated expectations regarding
self-worth to a collective level. It makes deservingness and a desire to feel bet-
ter than others defi ning features of national identity. Its policies increase existing
inequalities, boost personal entitlement, and undermine solidarity among mem-
bers of a national community, also in times such as the outbreak of the pandemic
that particularly require national solidarity ( Federico, Golec de Zavala,& Baran,
2020 ). It is not a coincidence that the countries with the highest death-counts
due to the COVID pandemic are those governed by populist government, most
notably the USA and the UK. In order to support our argument that populism is
about individual deservingness and protection of traditional hierarchies, below we
review psychological research on populism and collective narcissism.
Collective Narcissism and Support for Populism
Supporting our claim that national collective narcissism may link self-centered
motivations to support for populism, research links national collective narcissism
to the support of populist parties and politicians in various countries around the
world. National narcissism is assessed by people’s agreement with items of a short
Collective Narcissism Scale ( Golec de Zavala etal., 2009 ). Those items pertain
to a belief that a national group deserves a special treatment, its true value is not
recognized by others, and group members need to fi ght for their group’s recogni-
tion as the world will be a better place when their group has a more important
say in it.
Studies indicate that American collective narcissism was the second strongest
predictor, after partisanship, of voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 US presi-
dential election. Its role was greater than other factors, such as economic dissatis-
faction, authoritarianism, sexism, and racial resentment, in explaining support for

108 Agnieszka Golec de Zavala et al.
Trump’s candidacy ( Federico& Golec de Zavala, 2018 ). In the UK, two studies
found collective narcissism to be associated with a self-reported voting to leave
the EU and positive emotions associated with the outcome of the Brexit vote.
The rejection of immigrants, perceived as a threat to economic superiority and
the British way of life, lay behind the association between collective narcissism
and the Brexit vote ( Golec de Zavala, Guerra,& Simão, 2017 ). In addition, col-
lective narcissism predicted support for the populist government and its policies in
Poland (for review, Golec de Zavala& Keenan, 2020 ) and in Hungary (Forgas&
Lantos, this volume).
As noted above, the exact reason for the narcissistic claim to the nation’s excep-
tionality and entitlement vary depending on the country and its particular history:
power and relative status, the group’s morality, cultural sophistication, God’s love,
even exceptional loss, su ering, and martyrdom or the in-group’s benevolence,
tolerance, or trustworthiness ( Golec de Zavala etal., 2019 ). Whatever the reason
to demand privileged status, a collective narcissistic belief expresses the desire for
one’s own group to be noticeably distinguished from other groups coupled with
the concern that fulfi lment of this desire is threatened ( Golec de Zavala& Lantos,
2020 ). Below we discuss how fi ndings regarding conditions of populism comply
with recent research on national collective narcissism to suggest that national col-
lective narcissism is used to justify the populist claims. Next, we discuss how our
fi ndings regarding motivational undermining of collective narcissism help explain
psychological motivations behind support for populism.
Conditions of Populism: Collective Narcissism and
‘Losers of Globalization’
The structural conditions facilitating support for populism have been grouped
into two categories: economic (‘losers of globalization’, Mudde& Rovira Kalt-
wasser, 2018) and cultural (‘cultural backlash’). The ‘economic anxiety’ or ‘losers
of globalization’ thesis argues that increasing economic inequalities push certain
social groups to feel betrayed and vulnerable, and susceptible to the populist rhet-
oric. However, evidence suggests it is not the actual worsening of economic
conditions or objective lack of economic means that crucially inspires populism.
It is the subjective perception of one’s own economic situation as threatened or
worsening relative to ‘the rest of society’: the perception of unfair disadvantage in
comparison to others (Crano& Ga ney; and Vallacher& Fennell, this volume;
Mudde& Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018) as well as ‘status anxiety’, i.e., fear of losing
one’s relative standing in a social hierarchy ( Jetten, 2019 ; Nolan& Weisstanner,
2020 ; Mols& Jetten, 2017 ) that motivate support for populism.
The interpretation of economic changes as a threat of losing established
grounds for favorable comparisons with others is produced by political leaders
who create and manage a sense of social identity around it (Crano& Ga ney;
Krekó, this volume; Mols& Jetten, 2017 ; Reicher& Haslam, 2017 ). Analyses

Collective Narcissism& Populist Backlash 109
suggest that populist leaders reinterpret even economic prosperity in a way that
inspires perception of unfair relative deprivation among the advantaged groups.
In populists’ speeches in economically prosperous countries, such as Australia or
Netherlands, the economic prosperity has been portrayed as not su ciently ben-
efi ting the ‘ordinary people’ (the in-group defi ned by populists), instead benefi t-
ing the minorities that ‘demand more than they deserve’, ‘corrupt elites’, ‘fortune
seeking’ immigrants, and liberals who ‘betray traditional moral values’ (and are
excluded from the national in-group defi ned by populists). Thus, the ‘true’ in-
group members, ‘the people’, are threatened to become ‘second-class citizens in
their own country’ ( Mols& Jetten, 2017 ).
Such fi ndings comply with results indicating that collective narcissism as a key
feature of populism is inspired by perceived intergroup threat ( Guerra etal., 2020 )
and our analysis suggesting that collective narcissism is motivated by frustrated
self-importance ( Golec de Zavala& Keenan, 2020 ). Also in line with those analy-
ses, recent results obtained from a national representative sample in Poland indi-
cate that perceived individual relative deprivation increases collective narcissism.
The data were collected in two waves with three weeks in between the waves.
The fi rst wave was collected online among 1060 Polish adults (568 women; 492
men) ranging in age from 18 to 94years old ( M =45.09; SD = 16.00). The
second wave collected responses from 932 of the same participants (500 women;
432 men) ranging in age from 18 to 93years old ( M =45.62; SD =15.79). The
data collection was supported by the Ariadna Research Panel (ariadna.pl). Rela-
tive deprivation was assessed by subtracting participants’ responses to the question
‘How do you evaluate the economic situation of your family?’ (responses ranged
from ‘1’ very bad; ‘2’ bad; ‘3’ rather bad; ‘4’ di cult to say, bad and good; ‘5’ rather
good; ‘6’ good; ‘7’ very good) from participants’ responses to the question ‘How
do you evaluate the economic situation in the country?’ (responses were provided
on the same scale; M
t1 =−0.56; SD
t1 =1.55 and M
t2 =−0.52; SD
t2 =1.54).
National collective narcissism was measured by the Collective Narcissism Scale
( Golec de Zavala etal., 2009 ).
The results presented in Figure6.1 come from the cross-lagged panel analysis
using the T1 and T2 measures of relative deprivation and collective narcissism
( Finkel, 1995 ). By controlling for lagged values of the outcome variable, this
approach provides estimates of the hypothesized predictor that corrects for feed-
back e ects and allows for drawing inferences about the causal order of the vari-
ables. We regressed the T2 score of each variable on its own lagged T1 value, as
well as the T1 value of the other variable. We allowed the disturbance terms for
the T2 measures to inter-correlate, and we did the same for the T1 exogenous
measures of the variables. The model is saturated (with zero degrees of freedom).
The results indicate that perceiving one’s own economic situation as worse than
the economic situation in the country predicted an increase in collective narcis-
sism three weeks later. However, higher scores on collective narcissism did not
predict an increase in perceived relative deprivation. Thus, perceived economic

110 Agnieszka Golec de Zavala et al.
FIGURE 6.1 Across-lagged model of the relationship between perceived relative eco-
nomic deprivation and collective narcissism in T1 and T2, N =932.
deprivation with relation to others in the country increases collective narcissism
and complies with the fi ndings indicating that not an objective but perceived
economic and situation social status inspire support for populism.
Conditions of Populism: Collective Narcissism and
‘Cultural Backlash’
The ‘cultural backlash’ interpretation of the rise of contemporary populism claims
that the post-WWII economic prosperity in Western Europe brought about a
cultural shift towards post-material values of self-expression, equality, and toler-
ance. It allowed relative emancipation of previously disadvantaged social groups
such as women and ethnic, cultural, or sexual minorities, thus undermining the
traditional group hierarchies (see also Feldman; Huddie& Del Ponte, this vol-
ume). Along the traditional left- and right-wing parties concerned with eco-
nomic redistribution, Green parties started to appear across Western European
countries by the 1980s. Such parties were concerned with not only environmen-
tal conservation but also ethnic diversity and gender equality. Post-materialists
have supported cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, secularism, LGBT rights,
same-sex marriage, and greater gender fl uidity. They have supported suprana-
tional organizations like the UN and the EU with a view to international coop-
eration and humanitarianism. They have endorsed movements promoting peace,
environmental protection, and human rights ( Inglehart& Norris, 2017 ).
Under this cultural shift, traditional sex roles and marginalization of diverse
expressions of sexuality became less stable. Feminist ideologies started to emerge,
suggesting interchangeable sex roles at home and the workplace and arguing for
increases in women’s role in politics and wider society. Some opportunities for
self-advancement (such as a college education) proliferated, and globalization

Collective Narcissism& Populist Backlash 111
processes took hold (with concomitant increases in immigration, for instance).
Immigrants engaging in higher education had a chance of securing jobs with
higher income than less educated citizens. With this, traditionally privileged
groups, often from older generations, started to feel betrayed and perceive their
positions in society as being threatened. They reacted with anger, political dis-
satisfaction, and resentment towards those gaining more equal treatment, like
women and sexual minorities, perceiving them as jeopardizing their own previ-
ously secure status and cultural predominance. Contemporary populism is a reac-
tion to this shift, a ‘revolution in reverse’: a backlash against the changes towards
greater equality between social groups ( Inglehart& Norris, 2017 ). Similarly, our
fi ndings link national collective narcissism as a key feature of the current wave
of populism to sexism and homophobia. They align with our proposition that
national collective narcissism exemplifi es how the defi nition of national identity
is used to support the cultural backlash.
Collective Narcissism and Homophobia
Collective narcissism is robustly associated with intergroup hostility. It pre-
dicted support for terrorist violence in radicalized social networks inspired by
Islam ( Jasko etal., 2019 ) and support for American retaliatory war with Iraq
in 2003 ( Golec de Zavala etal., 2009 ). Poles who endorse collective narcis-
sism withdraw help from Syrian refugees because they perceived Syrian refu-
gees as hostile towards them ( Dyduch-Hazar, Mrozinski,& Golec de Zavala,
2019 ). Collective narcissists exaggerate intergroup threat and believe that their
in-group alone faces hostility from others ( Golec de Zavala, 2020 ). They retali-
ate with excessive hostility in situations they perceive as a threat or deliberate
provocation ( Golec de Zavala, Cichocka,& Iskra-Golec, 2013 ; Golec de Zavala,
Peker, Guerra,& Baran, 2016 ). Research indicates also that collective narcissism
is associated with prejudice towards in-group members. For example, Polish col-
lective narcissism predicts prejudice towards Poles of Jewish ethnic origin ( Golec
de Zavala& Cichocka, 2012 ). American collective narcissism predicts prejudice
towards American ethnic minorities ( Lyons, Kenworthy,& Popan, 2010 ). Recent
evidence also indicates that in Poland, national collective narcissism is associ-
ated with prejudice towards women and lesbians and gay men ( Mole, Golec de
Zavala,& Ardaq, 2020 ).
Previous reports indicated that national collective narcissism is associated with
homophobia ( Górska & Mikołajczak, 2015 ). More in-depth studies into this
association clarify that national collective narcissism is associated with homopho-
bia via the belief that people whose sexuality is not conventional threaten the
moral purity of the nation. This belief is derived from traditional gender beliefs
grounded in traditional Catholic religious teachings. Those who go beyond the
conventional defi nitions are a threat to religious values and the moral fi ber of
the national community. In other words, Catholic religious teachings bound to

112 Agnieszka Golec de Zavala et al.
the national identity justify the group-based hierarchy which allocates hetero-
sexuals and men to dominant positions ( Mole etal., 2020 ).
The association between national collective narcissism and homophobia exem-
plifi es the in-group over-exclusion e ect derived from social identity theory, a
process through which non-prototypical members of the in-group are targeted
and rejected. It predicts that group members categorize ambiguous or nega-
tively valued in-group members as an out-group to protect the in-group (and,
thus, their positive social identity) from undesirable outsiders ( Leyens& Yzerbyt,
1992 ). By doing so, they fortify the existing group hierarchies within the in-
group. People who reported that their social identity was important to them
( Leyens& Yzerbyt, 1992 ) and people who reported a desire for positive in-group
identity ( Rubin& Paolini, 2014 ) were more prone to exclude ambiguous group
members. Results of our research indicate that, for national collective narcissists,
lesbians and gay men are easier to categorize as an out-group, especially when
their non-normative sexuality can be attributed to their immorality ( Golec de
Zavala, Mole,& Lantos, 2020 ).
Importantly, sexual prejudice serves to justify the group-based hierarchy in
which heterosexual people see themselves as more representative of national
identity and therefore better than non-heterosexual people. Studies confi rm that
collective narcissism with reference to heterosexual in-group predicts lack of soli-
darity with the LGBT community’s collective actions against sexual prejudice
( Górska etal., 2019 ). Research on the association between collective narcissism
and sexism further supports the conclusion that collective narcissism is associated
with beliefs that justify traditional group-based hierarchies ( Golec de Zavala&
Bierwiaczonek, 2020 ).
Collective Narcissism and Sexism
In Poland, male, religious (Catholic) and national collective narcissism are associ-
ated with sexism, a prejudice towards women ( Golec de Zavala& Bierwiaczonek,
2020 ). Such fi ndings indicate that sexism can be seen both as an intergroup and
intragroup problem. Accordingly, in order to maintain their privileged position
in the traditional gender hierarchy, men narcissistic about their gender in-group
engage in discriminatory treatment of women, who they regard as an out-group.
Indeed, male collective narcissism is negatively related to solidarity with women’s
collective actions against gender inequality. This association is driven by men
perceiving women as a threatening out-group ( Górska etal., 2019 ). In addition,
the association between male collective narcissism and sexism is explained by col-
lective narcissistic men regarding the status of their masculinity as uncertain and
attempting to ground it in traditional gender beliefs that promote male domi-
nance over women ( Golec de Zavala& Bierwiaczonek, 2020 ).
However, sexism is not only a problem of collective narcissistic men. Among
men and women, Catholic collective narcissism predicts acceptance of domestic

Collective Narcissism& Populist Backlash 113
violence against women over and above religious fundamentalism (a belief that
religious teachings are infallible and the sole repository of fundamental truths that
must be obeyed in accordance with tradition; Altemeyer& Hunsberger, 1992 )
and in contrast to intrinsic religiosity (treating religious faith as an intrinsic end in
itself; Batson, Flink, Schoenrade, Fultz,& Pych, 1986 ). Catholic collective nar-
cissism also predicts a belief that proponents of ‘gender ideology’ conspire against
the traditional family values at the core of the national identity ( Marchlewska,
Cichocka, Lozowski, Górska,& Winiewski, 2019 ). In addition, national col-
lective narcissism in Poland is associated with benevolent sexism more strongly
among women than among men ( Golec de Zavala& Bierwiaczonek, 2020 ). As
sexism is an important feature of the current wave of right-wing populism, it is
important to understand how social sciences understand its forms and its appeal
among men and women.
As defi ned by Glick and Fiske (2001 ), benevolent sexism encompasses protec-
tive paternalism (the belief that women should be protected by men), comple-
mentary gender di erentiation (the belief that women, rather than men, have
empathetic and domestic qualities), and heterosexual intimacy (the belief that
women should fulfi l men’s romantic needs). Although positive in tone, benevo-
lent sexism is positively associated with hostile sexism (overtly derogatory and
antagonistic treatment of women; Glick & Fiske, 2001 ), acceptance of sexual
harassment ( Fiske & Glick, 1995 ), negative evaluation of female rape victims
( Abrams, Viki, Masser,& Bohner, 2003 ), and acceptance of domestic violence
against women ( Glick, Sakalli-Ugurlu, Ferreira,& Souza, 2002 ). Endorsement
of the beliefs defi ned by Glick and Fiske (2001 ) as benevolent sexism by women
is associated with their lower resistance to gender inequality ( Jost& Kay, 2005 )
and their lower aspirations for independence in education and career ( Barreto&
Ellemers, 2005 ). This opens a question why do women endorse sexism and sup-
port the social hierarchy that disadvantages them?
Like any prejudice, sexism is a function of normative beliefs held in a
society ( Crandall, Eshleman,& O’Brien, 2002 ). Thus, men and women are
likely to endorse sexism when they perceive it as normative and desirable
according to dominant societal norms ( Sibley, Overall,& Duckitt, 2007 ). In
Poland, the claim to national uniqueness that inspires the support for the
populist government is based on Poland’s attachment to traditional Catholi-
cism. As a consequence, the current o cial narrative about national identity
attributes national prototypically to Catholic, heterosexual men ( Gra , 2010 ).
This creates a normative climate in which traditional gender hierarchy seems
appropriate, and sexism (especially benevolent due to it superfi cial positiv-
ity) is used to justify this hierarchy ( Jost & Kay, 2005 ; Sibley, 2007 ). The
more people identify with their nation, the more they are likely to adhere to
its norms as expressing their national identity ( Ellemers, Pagliaro& Barreto,
2013 ). Positive identifi cation with a superordinate identity is associated with
acceptance of intergroup inequality by members of the dominant ( Lowery,

114 Agnieszka Golec de Zavala et al.
Unzueta, Knowles,& Go , 2006 ) and the disadvantaged groups within the
superordinate group ( Dovidio, Gaertner,& Saguy, 2009 ).
However, the results from Poland indicate that only national collective narcis-
sism is associated with sexism among women. Polish women, who are satisfi ed
with (but not narcissistic about) being Polish reject sexism as ideology justifying
gender inequality ( Golec de Zavala& Bierwiaczonek, 2020 ). Indeed, women
who sympathize with the Polish populist government actively support its oppres-
sive policies regarding women rights. For example, the women representing the
Life and Family Foundation proposed the ‘Stop abortion’ bill ( Shukla& Klosok,
2020 —the most restrictive abortion law penalizing any case of abortion—and
publicly undermined proponents of reproductive women’s rights as ‘fans of kill-
ing babies’ ( Davies, 2016 ). On the other hand, women activists associated with
opposition to the current government self-organize to protect women’s rights and
act towards gender equality. For example, the famous Black Friday nationwide
protests that forced the government to retract the proposed total abortion ban was
organized by activists by the Ogólnopolski Strajk Kobiet (Nationwide Women’s
Strike). Again, this brings about the question: why do some women (and men)
endorse national collective narcissism, the key component of populist politics in
Poland? The response to this question has implications for our understanding of
the motivational underpinnings of national collective narcissism as a key feature
of the current wave of populism.
Motivational Underpinnings of Collective Narcissism
The fi ndings we reviewed above, especially those indicating that male collective
narcissists endorse sexism because they feel men are threatened by women, align
with research suggesting that collective narcissistic intergroup hostility is subjec-
tively defensive. It is a response to perceiving the in-group as constantly threatened
and most of the out-groups as hostile and threatening ( Golec de Zavala, 2011 ;
Golec de Zavala& Lantos, 2020 ). Those fi ndings support our understanding of
collective narcissism as a compensation for the frustrated sense of self-importance
elevated to a collective level ( Golec de Zavala& Keenan, 2020 ).
It is not a coincidence that the phenomenon of collective (or group) narcis-
sism was fi rst described by scholars of the Frankfurt School, who analyzed the
conditions and beliefs that gave rise to another wave of right-wing populism
over 80years ago. Those authors suggested that changes in economic and social
conditions undermined the traditional criteria according to which people evalu-
ated themselves, resulting in an increase in national collective narcissism, which
ultimately gave rise to the Nazi regime in Germany in the 1930s ( Adorno, 1997 ;
Fromm, 1973 ; but see also Vallacher& Fennell; Gelfand& Lorente; Kruglanski
etal., this volume). Along with Theodor Adorno’s (1997 ) and Erich Fromm’s
(1973 ) claims that collective narcissism is a response to conditions that increase
‘ego fragility’, evidence indicates that collective narcissism is motivated by a

Collective Narcissism& Populist Backlash 115
combination of low self-worth and narcissistic self-importance ( Golec de Zavala
etal., 2019 ; Golec de Zavala& Keenan, 2020 ).
Studies show that low self-esteem reliably predicts collective narcissism. In
two longitudinal studies, low self-esteem resulted in higher collective narcissism
several weeks later, but collective narcissism did not improve self-esteem several
weeks later. In an experiment, self-esteem was lowered experimentally by asking
participants to watch their in-group being excluded from a social interaction.
Analyses indicated that the decrease in self-esteem, not any other of the psycho-
logical needs threatened by exclusion (personal control, meaningful existence, or
belonging), was responsible for the increase in collective narcissism following the
experimental manipulation of exclusion. Low self-esteem was related to various
forms of derogation of out-groups (including social distance, hostile behavioral
intentions, and symbolic aggression) via collective narcissism ( Golec de Zavala
etal., 2020 ).
The results reported by Golec de Zavala and colleagues ( 2020 ) indicated that
personal control, the belief in one’s ability to infl uence the course of one’s own
life, was not uniquely associated with collective narcissism after self-esteem was
also taken into account. Further evidence suggests that collective narcissism is
associated with support for the use of violence and terrorism as a means to assert
personal signifi cance (i.e., the desire to matter, to ‘be someone’, in the eyes of
others) elevated to a collective level. The ‘quest for signifi cance’ can be seen as a
form of self-love contingent on social recognition as it is seen as stemming from
a perceived discrepancy between expected and experienced levels of positive self-
evaluation ( Jasko etal., 2019 ). This complies with the defi nition of individual
narcissism as exaggerated sense of self-worth contingent on external validation
( Crocker& Park, 2004 ; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001 ). Indeed, further evidence
indicates that individual narcissism predicts collective narcissism ( Golec de Zavala,
2018 ; Golec de Zavala etal., 2019 ; Golec de Zavala& Keenan, 2020 ).
Collective narcissism is associated with both presentations of individual nar-
cissism currently di erentiated by personality science: vulnerable and grandiose.
They di er with respect to how narcissistic self-importance, antagonism, and
entitlement are expressed ( Krizan & Herlache, 2018 ). Vulnerable narcissism is
defi ned by frustration, and passive resentment in face of the lack of confi rmation
of perceived self-importance ( Krizan & Herlache, 2018 ). Grandiose narcissism
is associated with self-enhancement, self-confi dence, forceful assertion of self-
worth, and exploitation of others. Vulnerable narcissism becomes salient when the
grandiose expectations regarding the self are not confi rmed by external factors.
The association between vulnerable and collective narcissism is more robust
than the association between grandiose narcissism ( Golec de Zavala, 2018 ;
Golec de Zavala etal., 2019 ). Longitudinal and experimental studies clarify that
grandiose narcissism predicts collective narcissism but collective narcissism pre-
dicts vulnerable narcissism. Instead of fortifying the undermined sense of self-
worth, endorsing collective narcissism increases a sense of frustrated individual

116 Agnieszka Golec de Zavala et al.
entitlement. Such fi ndings clarify the misunderstandings surrounding motiva-
tional underpinnings of collective narcissism, as some authors still seem to claim
that collective narcissism is motivated by undermined sense of personal control
and autonomy (cf. Cichocka& Cislak, 2020 ). We disagree and argue that it is
very important to precisely characterize underpinnings of collective narcissism in
order to be able to di erentiate the psychological needs and desires that inspire
people to act collectively for greater equality and social justice (like need for
autonomy and dignity) from motivations that inspire people to support policies
and politicians that are protecting established group hierarchies and existing social
inequalities (like self-importance and a need to feel better than others; see also
Bar-Tal& Magal, this volume).
Such fi ndings also suggest that investing undermined self-esteem and self-
importance in collective narcissism is futile and, indeed, damaging. Instead of
providing relief and improvement, it fuels a self-reinforcing mechanism via which
deservingness at the individual level of the self becomes implicated in the defi ni-
tion of social identity and, thus, in intergroup relations. Addressing expectations
regarding self-worth by endorsing collective narcissism perpetuates rather than
alleviates the aggravation for frustrated self-importance.
Implications for Understanding of the Motivational
Underpinnings of Populism
As argued above, there is now a substantial body of evidence indicating that
collective narcissism does not express a need to regain collective autonomy and
control; nor does it express a desire for dignity, social justice, and equality, where
all individuals have equal chances to exercise their freedom and feel valued. Frus-
tration of those needs could stimulate collective actions of disadvantaged groups
for recognition of their identity and equal rights (e.g., Fritsche et al., 2017 ).
Instead, collective narcissism is a belief that expresses a desire for the in-group’s
dominant position that can be used as basis to feel better than others. We believe
fi ndings regarding the conditions of populism and the results regarding motiva-
tional underpinnings of collective narcissism similarly indicate that the support for
populist parties, politicians, and populists, despite often using justice and equality
for self-presentation purposes, has in fact been driven by a motivation to protect
the established group hierarchies.
Despite its overt claims, populism does not express a desire for social justice
for those ‘forgotten’ by globalization and growing prosperity. It rather expresses
a demand for protection or restoration of the traditional group-based hierarchies
and a right to openly express prejudice towards lower status groups (see Crano&
Ga ney, this volume). The emerging conclusion from our analyses is that sup-
port for populism is motivated by a perceived threat to established grounds that
bolstered people’s sense of importance and entitlement. Populist leaders instigate
and take advantage of such threat. They formulate and propagate a narcissistic

Collective Narcissism& Populist Backlash 117
vision of national identity that validates those whose self-worth and sense of
self-importance has been threatened by external conditions undergoing (actual
or perceived) changes. This new social identity is organized around shared resent-
ment for those changes that question old dimensions on which people could
compare themselves to others and feel superior. Populist rhetoric suggests that
those who feel wronged and resentful are ‘the people’; the ‘righteous and true’
representatives of the nation. This rhetoric provides a coherent and appealing
narrative explaining why their privileged status is being undermined and how it
should be restored. Thus, it o ers new dimensions for positive comparisons to
others and the promise of restoring the sense of self-importance. This promise is
likely to produce engaged followership ( Reicher& Haslam, 2017 ).
National collective narcissism provides the essence of the populist defi nition
of national identity. It defi nes the central feature of the group-based entitlement
underlying the current rise of right-wing populism worldwide. It is associated
with hostility towards emancipating minorities that threaten the traditional,
group-based hierarchies ( Golec de Zavala& Keenan, 2020 ). The robust asso-
ciation between collective narcissism and prejudice towards traditionally disad-
vantaged groups like women and sexual minorities clearly shows that populism
is about providing new justifi cation for the established group-based hierarchies
traditionally providing claims to self-importance. Psychological research indicates
that undermined self-esteem and a sense of personal entitlement motivate col-
lective narcissism (encompassing the concepts of ‘ego fragility’ in the classic work
on collective narcissism, Adorno, 1997 ; Fromm, 1973 , or ‘quest for personal sig-
nifi cance’ in more recent work using the present conceptualization of collective
narcissism ( Jasko etal., 2019 ; Kruglanski etal., this volume). We argue that such
fi ndings provide a theoretical framework to explain psychological motivations
behind support for populist parties, politicians, and policies. This framework
examines conditions of populism around the concept of expectations regarding
self-importance.
Collective narcissism is associated with escalation of internal tensions, inter-
group hostility, and a lack of solidarity with those who are disadvantaged by
group-based hierarchies within national identities. Instead of satisfying personal
entitlement, endorsing collective narcissism intensifi es the sense of its frustration.
We argue that collective narcissism is propagated by populists as it justifi es why
dominant groups in a group-based hierarchy should keep those positions. Those
inclined to protect the dominant positions of their groups gravitate towards this
defi nition of national identity as a means to boost their personal sense of self-
worth. Thus, the concept of collective narcissism elucidates how psychological
processes from individual levels of striving for individual signifi cance (Kruglanski
etal., this volume), positive self-esteem (Golec de Zavala etal., 2020), and per-
sonal entitlement ( Golec de Zavala& Keenan, 2020 ) are involved in intergroup
processes such as intergroup struggle to protect versus attenuate group-based
hierarchies (see also Hogg& Gøetsche-Astrup, this volume).

118 Agnieszka Golec de Zavala et al.
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