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Exploring EU energy governance and policy under a demoi-cratic lens: citizen participation, output legitimacy and democratic interdependence
Abstract
This paper applies the demoi-cratic theory to EU energy governance and policy, and explores whether the demoi-cratic criteria of equal legislative powers between statespeople and citizens and the supremacy of multilateral law through participatory jurisprudence apply to EU energy affairs. More specifically, it zooms in on democratic pathogenies deriving from lack of citizen engagement in energy policy-making at national, transnational and supranational levels; the impact of the lack of citizen participation on the output legitimacy of energy decisions; and democratic externalities and their consequences in the energy realm. It concludes that energy policy-making fulfils neither of the demoi-cratic criteria. This is due to the top-down mode of EU energy policy, and the dual EU failure to benefit from citizen engagement in the design and implementation of energy policy, and to recognize and deal with the democratic externalities emanating from the heightened democratic interdependence within the EU.
... This perspective acknowledges that technology is a social phenomenon and that human knowledge and practices are embedded within technical systems, and circulate within social networks (Cherp et al., 2018). Energy transition policies not only involve choosing energy technologies, prices or emissions reduction targets, they also result in the transformation of our economic and social structures (Proedrou, 2022), as well as changes in consumption and social practices (Strand et al., 2021). This will result in significant social impacts, including impacts on citizen's rights, communities, and how energy systems will be governed. ...
... The EU Green Deal has stressed the need to involve people in deliberations around energy and climate issues both at national and transnational levels 7 . It does not, however, explain how these should inform formal legislative procedures, or how their outputs will impact energy policy (Proedrou, 2022). This should be clarified in formal guidelines for impact assessments to enhance procedural justice. ...
In order to achieve its ambitious policy goals such as using 40% renewable energy, cutting emissions by 55% or reducing energy consumption by 29% by 2030, the EU must undergo an energy transition which is also just and fair. This will require rapid and drastic changes to the energy system and to society, and holds the risk of potentially negative impacts or unforeseen injustices in society. Despite the persistent rallying call of a just and fair transition in EU policies, there is currently no policy assessment framework for energy justice in the EU. Current policy assessment approaches may fall short since they have been criticised for neglecting social aspects and different types of injustice that may occur as a result of the energy transition. Given that energy systems are socio-technical systems, assessments that take a socio-technical perspective may be more suitable, in particular those that assess policies through the lens of energy justice. Bottom-up and top-down assessment approaches each have particular advantages and disadvantages and can complement each other in order to provide a comprehensive assessment of energy policies. Complementing our recent work in which we developed a bottom-up energy justice framework, in this report, based on the literature, and taking account of current critiques of the EU impact assessment process, we propose a top-down energy justice framework that may be used as guidance for impact assessments on energy-related issues in the EU
... Policies that hope to be effective need to be regarded as legitimate, just, and genuinely participatory. These three conditions are frequently mentioned in the literature and reflect the findings of many empirical studies on how transformations towards sustainability can be achieved [2,[4][5][6][7][8]. Whatever governance principles are followed, they need to achieve democratic legitimacy, promote inclusion, and deliver energy justice. ...
Stakeholder and public participation in policymaking for energy transitions is one of the most promising approaches to fulfilling the promises of a democratic sustainability transition. Over the years, many studies have been published about concepts, methodologies, and empirical results of participatory approaches and implementations. In this paper, we focus on the compatibility of participatory processes with different policy styles of democratic governance. We conducted a systematic literature search comparing different concepts of democratic governance and applying them to public participation, in particular that associated with energy transitions. Our main objective in this paper is to link the requirements for a sustainable energy transition to governance processes and structures; we further aim to delineate suitable formats for stakeholder and public participation. Our analysis provides a basis for a wide-ranging and multi-perspective research agenda that promises to provide a deeper understanding and explanation of complex governance arrangements for energy transitions. The five democratic policy styles that we selected for this review are: autocratic, adversarial, collaborative, reflexive, and inclusive governance. We conclude that none are adequate on their own, and so we put forth a novel hybrid we call the "mediative approach." From this approach, we derive a new research framework for addressing the current challenges of democratic decision-making in energy transitions. Three pressing questions emerge, one relating to the interplay of top-down and bottom-up modes of governance; a second to the conditions for actor collaboration; and a third to the perception of democratic legitimacy by affected parties.
... On the one hand, integrating stakeholders' perspectives in environmental decision making may help to identify new solutions, improve legitimacy, and increase policy implementation effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. According to Proedrou [68]; considering the perceptions of the citizens in the energy policy-making process counterbalances the top-down approach of the EnU's governance. On the other hand, the inclusion of stakeholders may also slowdown the decision-making process and benefit more powerful actors [69]. ...
Despite the importance of achieving a functioning and decarbonised European Energy Union (EnU) research addressing the public acceptance of cross-border energy interconnections at a European-wide level based upon public opinion polls is limited. To try to fill this gap in the literature, this article relies on a poll with 4000 respondents from the four big EU energy markets: France, Germany, Italy and Spain, including as a new explanatory variable their proximity to an electrical cross-border substation. Overall, 57,4% respondents have not heard about energy interconnections, and 69,2% have not ever heard about the internal energy market. Approaching public acceptance from a procedural justice framework, the article considers procedural justice as a pre-condition? For a fair policy-making process. By addressing the public acceptance of cross-border energy interconnections, the article aims to contribute to the existing literature on their linkages of said interconnections with the European energy policy-making process, deriving specific policy implications to foster cross-border interconnections and energy integration within the EnU.
This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of EU agency in the global energy transition. It starts with mapping the defining features of EU actorness in the international stage, the pivotal interests and ideas driving EU grand strategy and the principal forms of power the EU operationalizes to achieve its foreign policy goals. It subsequently zooms in on EU climate policy. This involves an in-depth presentation of EU climate policy architecture and of the evolution of EU climate policy, and a critical assessment of the track record of EU divestment from oil and gas. The chapter also provides an account of the EU’s progress in embracing the clean energy economy across the dimensions of domestic clean energy capacity, mastery of green technology and clean energy trade, and of the EU’s approach to secure an adequate critical materials basis.
Energy democracy' has evolved from a slogan used by activists demanding a greater say in energy-related decision-making to a term used in policy documents and scholarly literature on energy governance and energy transitions. This article reviews the academic literature using a combination of three methodological elements: (1) keyword searches of major bibliographical databases for quantification purposes; (2) an innovative method referred to as 'circulation tracing' to assess impact; and (3) in-depth discussion of the theoretical underpinnings, implications and interconnections of different parts of the literature. A conceptual framework is developed around three divergent understandings of the term 'energy democracy': (1) a process driven forwards by a popular movement; (2) an outcome of decarbonisation; and (3) a goal or ideal to which stakeholders aspire. The review also highlights some weaknesses of the literature: fragmentation between its European and American branches, which barely relate to each other; implicit or absent linkages between 'energy democracy' and broader theories of democracy; a tendency to idealise societal grassroots; confusion about the roles of the state, private capital and communities; and lack of attention to the threat posed by energy populism. Proponents should not assume that more energy democracy will inherently mean faster decarbonisation, improved energy access or social wellbeing. Finally, more emphasis should be placed on the role of research in providing evidence to ground energy democracy-related analyses and discussions.
Background
Every energy transition has had its winners and its losers, both economically and in terms of social justice and community cohesion. The current transition is no different given the complex, intersecting matrices of power and experience that influence the key stakeholders and actors involved. Local oppositions to the deployment of renewable energy technologies have been significantly higher than expected. In numerous instances, these oppositions have been in reaction to the disempowerment of local rights and entitlements associated with specific developments. Consequently, there is a clear need for governance structures and organisational formats that are participatory, inclusive and mindful of the lived experiences of local people. Despite the knowledge gaps and financial constraints that continue to persist, how can local communities become empowered to drive project development and meaningfully engage in the low-carbon energy transition?
Methods
This paper presents a methodology for investigating citizen perceptions of the energy transition and the kinds of roles they see themselves having in its implementation. Working with six communities across five European countries (France, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and the UK), we conducted a series of iterative cross-sectional community engagements using a mixed methods approach. In addition, a number of innovative participatory action research tools were incorporated to engage citizens in co-designing their own energy transition pathways.
Results
Participants expressed having restricted agency as citizens participating in the energy system. They also felt locked in to a limiting set of false choices as ‘energy consumers’ that do not translate into real or meaningful power, despite popular narratives to the contrary. The research also resulted in a co-designed characterisation tool to help local communities assess the energy democracy and citizen participation potential of a number of participatory business models.
Conclusions
Citizens remain locked out of the decision-making processes of the energy transition. We outline a more integrated approach, using co-design and participatory action research, to incorporate citizen perspectives into the planning and implementation of more appropriate business configurations. This paper presents demonstrable examples of how extended stakeholder perspectives can improve procedural justice outcomes and ensure the rollout of more equitable energy configurations into the future.
This article discusses EU energy and climate policy through the prism of multidimensional power. In so doing, it explores the forms of power EU policy draws from and employs. The article argues that through its gas first policy the EU misused its productive power and failed to shift structural power dynamics, while overplaying its institutional and compulsory power to fulfil its energy/climate goals despite the EU's obvious limitations in the former and impotence in the latter. This mismatch between means and goals points to the need for an alternative power toolbox. This consists in the exercise of productive power to signify clean energy as the new normal; the use of coercive structural and market power to shape and regulate clean energy markets and the increased use of institutional power deriving from a comprehensive energy transition. This power toolbox relaxes the shortcomings of the EU's gas first policy, cements EU energy security and supports the global uptake of transitions to renewable energy.
The development of the energy policy of the European Union (EU) has been accompanied by organizational reforms of the EU's energy bureaucracy. Much attention has been paid to Commission President Juncker's reorganization of the European Commission, including how this has influenced the Energy Union initiative. The establishment of EU agencies has also expanded the EU administration and the capacity for developing new initiatives and coordinating implementation of EU legislation. However, recent research has not been sufficiently connected to policy studies on energy, climate and environment. This article analyses the extent to which two EU agencies-the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, and the European Environmental Agency-augment the policymaking capacity of the Commission by providing information that aids its work. The article ends with a discussion of the potential implications of agencification.
EU scholars have long been divided on the main drivers of European integration. The original approaches were at odds on whether EU level intergovernmental actors or supranational actors were better able to exercise coercive or institutional power to pursue their interests, with Andrew Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism serving as a baseline for one side of those debates. Newer approaches are similarly divided, but see power in terms of ideational innovation and consensus‐focused deliberation. The one thing old and new approaches have in common is that they ignore the parliamentarists, new and old. What all sides to the debates have failed to recognize is the reality of a ‘new’ EU governance of more politically charged dynamics among all three main EU actors exercising different kinds of power. This has roots not only in the national level's increasing ‘politics against policy’ and its bottom up effects on the EU level. It also stems from EU institutional interactions at the top, and its ‘policy with politics’.
‘A very topical contribution that integrates mainstream energy and ecological economics literature to establish a novel energy policy framework. The author not only showcases the merits of a steady-state energy policy for climate change mitigation and energy security, but also masterfully navigates through the implications of such a shift for world politics and the global society in the 21st century. This book is invaluable for energy and International Relations scholars and policy-makers alike.
—Christos A. Frangonikolopoulos, Aristotle University, Greece
This book analyses the trilemma between growth, energy security and climate change mitigation and, breaking from scholarly orthodoxy, challenges the imperative that growth must always come first. It sets forth the argument that a steady-state approach is a more appropriate conceptual mindset to enable energy transition, sets out a steady-state energy policy, and assesses the projected outcomes of its implementation in the realms of energy security, geopolitics and development. By exploring in depth the implications of such a shift, the book aims to demonstrate its positive effects on sustainability, supply security and affordability; to showcase the more favorable geopolitics of renewable energy; and to unpack new pathways towards development. By bringing together ecological economics and mainstream energy politics, fresh insight to energy and climate policy is provided, alongside their broader geopolitical and developmental ramifications.
Filippos Proedrou is Research Fellow in Social Policy (International Affairs) at the University of South Wales, UK. His areas of expertise are energy policy and security, geopolitics, EU studies, Russian foreign policy and ecological economics. He has published extensively in these fields.
Inspired by the energy democracy movement, this conceptual review critically explores relationships between concentrated or distributed renewable energy and political power. Advocates assert that because the renewable energy transition is fundamentally a political struggle, efforts to shift from fossil fuels and decarbonize societies will not prove effective without confronting and destabilizing dominant systems of energy power. The objectives of this paper include: 1) theorizing and exploring the relationships between renewable energy and political power, 2) critically assessing tensions associated with an energy democracy agenda, and 3) drawing out the implications for democratizing renewable energy development in practice. Distributed energy-politics posits that distributed energy sources and technologies enable and organize distributed political power and vice versa. Efforts are underway to find ways to re-organize distributed energy flows into aggregated and concentrated stocks of energy and other forms of political power. More democratic renewable energy futures may benefit from strengthening democratic practices and outcomes, extending democratization of energy systems across all components, stages and end uses, and sharpening positions relative to dominant pressures of capitalism and market ideology, the ideology of unlimited growth, and the modernist/industrialist agenda. Renewable energy systems offer a possibility but not a certainty for more democratic energy futures.
‘Energy democracy’ epitomizes hopes in energy transformation, but remains under-defined, a political buzzword rather than a real concept. After presenting its activist roots and mapping its usage, ‘energy democracy’ is positioned in relation to similar normatively derived concepts: environmental, climate, and energy justice, and environmental democracy. Drawing on insights from political theory and political sociology, it is shown what is democratic in energy democracy. Referencing the question of experts and democratic publics in complex technological areas, the paper explains why it is desirable for energy governance to be more democratic. To show what is unique in ‘energy democracy’ beyond increased participation in energy policy, the prosumer is introduced as the ideal-typical citizen, highlighting the importance of the energy transition, the agency of material structures and a new emergent governmentality. ‘Energy democracy’ is conceptualized as an analytical and decision-making tool, defined along three dimensions: popular sovereignty, participatory governance and civic ownership, and operationalized with relevant indicators.
EU institutions are best conceived as representing the peoples of Europe - a contention set out in the first, introductory, section and developed over the next five sections. The second section establishes how democratic legitimacy involves governments being representative of a people and specifies the characteristics a people need to possess for such representation to be possible. Though no EU demos exists with these features, the third section shows how in an increasingly interconnected world, governments have incentives to form associations of democratic peoples via a process of republican intergovernmentalism. Such associations guard against the domination of one people by another by preserving the capacity of the associated peoples for representative democracy. They constitute a form of demoi-cracy. The fourth section describes how the EU’s system of representation corresponds to such an association and facilitates mutual respect and fair terms of cooperation between the peoples of Europe. However, as the fifth section indicates, moves away from such a union of peoples towards greater political unity involve an inevitable loss of representativeness and democratic legitimacy. The sixth and concluding section argues the euro crisis results from attempting such a move. Current efforts to resolve the crisis through yet further integration compound economic with political failure by circumventing the EU’s associational decision-making mechanisms. The only democratically legitimate and non-dominating solutions will be those that respect the EU’s fundamentally demoi-cratic character.
Small-scale, decentralized and community-owned renewable energy is widely acknowledged to be a desirable feature of low carbon futures, but faces a range of challenges in the context of conventional, centralized energy systems. This paper draws on transition frameworks to investigate why the UK has been an inhospitable context for community-owned renewables and assesses whether anything fundamental is changing in this regard. We give particular attention to whether political devolution, the creation of elected governments for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, has affected the trajectory of community renewables. Our analysis notes that devolution has increased political attention to community renewables, including new policy targets and support schemes. However, these initiatives are arguably less important than the persistence of key features of socio-technical regimes: market support systems for renewable energy and land-use planning arrangements that systemically favour major projects and large corporations, and keep community renewables to the margins. There is scope for rolling out hybrid pathways to community renewables, via joint ownership or through community benefit funds, but this still positions community energy as an adjunct to energy pathways dominated by large, corporate generation facilities. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
Development of renewable sources of energy has not only a significant impact on the power system but also on society. It has the potential to replace the existing conventional sources of energy with never-ending renewable sources, while at the same time empowering the consumers of electricity and leading to the democratization of the power system. What are the impacts of energy transformation on the society and on the political system, and what are the socio-political impediments for an energy transformation to take place? Finally, what kind of energy/society relations do we want to achieve as a result? Tapping into the ongoing policy debate on “energy democracy”, we try to conceptualize the societal aspects of energy transformation and renewable energy expansion. Departing from a conceptualization of energy policy that treats society not as the object but its subject, we put forth five levels of RES influence on society.
In a ‘demoi-cracy’, separate statespeoples enter into a political arrangement and jointly exercise political authority. Its proper domain is a polity of democratic states with hierarchical, majoritarian features of policy-making, especially in value-laden redistributive and coercive policy areas, but without a unified political community (demos). In its vertical dimension, demoi-cracy is based on the equality and interaction of citizens' and statespeoples' representatives in the making of common policies. Horizontally, it seeks to balance equal transnational rights of citizens with national policy-making autonomy. The EU belongs to the domain of demoi-cracy and has established many of its features. We argue that both vertical and horizontal Demoi-cratization have been triggered by processes of supranational integration in the European Union (EU). They differ, however, in the origins and the outcomes. Vertical Demoi-cratization has initially been a reaction of parliamentary institutional actors to majoritarian decision-making in regulatory policy-areas, resulting in the empowerment of the European Parliament (EP) and the strengthening of parliamentary oversight at the national level. By contrast, horizontal Demoi-cratization has been promoted by governments as an alternative to majoritarian and legally binding policy-making in core areas of statehood, as well as coercive and redistributive policy-areas; it has resulted in soft, co-ordinative forms of policy-making, seeking to protect national autonomy. The extent to which these developments actually meet the normative standards of Demoi-cracy in practice, however, is mixed.
This paper makes a case for examining energy transition as a geographical process, involving the reconfiguration of current patterns and scales of economic and social activity. The paper draws on a seminar series on the ‘Geographies of Energy Transition: security, climate, governance' hosted by the authors between 2009 and 2011, which initiated a dialogue between energy studies and the discipline of human geography. Focussing on the UK Government's policy for a low carbon transition, the paper provides a conceptual language with which to describe and assess the geographical implications of a transition towards low carbon energy. Six concepts are introduced and explained: location, landscape, territoriality, spatial differentiation, scaling, and spatial embeddedness. Examples illustrate how the geographies of a future low-carbon economy are not yet determined and that a range of divergent – and contending – potential geographical futures are in play. More attention to the spaces and places that transition to a low-carbon economy will produce can help better understand what living in a low-carbon economy will be like. It also provides a way to help evaluate the choices and pathways available.
The debate on the European Union's democratic deficit usually operates within a national‐democratic framework of analysis. This article argues for a change in methodology. It follows the thesis that the EU is a ‘demoicracy’– a polity of multiple demoi– and has to be evaluated as such. Core principles of demoicracy are developed and the EU is assessed accordingly. Such an evaluation is not only more adequate, but also provides original insights: it is found that, whereas the constitutional development of the EU has approached demoicratic standards in general, major deficits remain at the national level.
Discursive deference in the governance of science and technology is rebalancing from expert analysis toward participatory deliberation. Linear, scientistic conceptions of innovation are giving ground to more plural, socially situated understandings. Yet, growing recognition of social agency in technology choice is countered by persistently deterministic notions of technological progress. This article addresses this increasingly stark disjuncture. Distinguishing between "appraisal" and "commitment" in technology choice, it highlights contrasting implications of normative, instrumental, and substantive imperatives in appraisal. Focusing on the role of power, it identifies key commonalities transcending the analysis/participation dichotomy. Each is equally susceptible to instrumental framing for variously weak and strong forms of justification. To address the disjuncture, it is concluded that greater appreciation is required-in both analytic and participatory appraisal-to facilitating the opening up (rather than the closing down) of governance commitments on science and technology.
Whether their analytic frameworks focus on the EU's institutional form and practices or on its interactive construction, scholars have analyzed the EU's democratic legitimacy mainly in terms of the trade-offs between the output effectiveness of EU's policies outcomes for the people and the input participation by the people. Missing is theorization of the "throughput" efficiency, accountability, transparency, and openness to consultation with the people of the EU's internal governance processes. The paper argues that adding this analytic category facilitates assessment of these legitimizing mechanisms' interdependencies as well as consideration of reforms that could turn this democratic trilemma into a "virtuous circle". Paper prepared for delivery to the European Union Studies Association's biannual meetings, Boston, MA, March 3-6, 2010.
Preferences over jurisdictional architecture are the product of three irreducible
logics: efficiency, distribution and identity. This article substantiates the
following claims: (a) European integration has become politicized in elections
and referendums; (b) as a result, the preferences of the general public and of
national political parties have become decisive for jurisdictional outcomes; (c)
identity is critical in shaping contestation on Europe.
Proposals to alter large-scale socio-technical systems through government actions in order to promote goals such as sustainability
are highly uncertain policy projects. What is being proposed is the replacement of specific elements of existing policy ‘mixes’—the
goals and means—by others, in the expectation of avoiding counterproductive or sub-optimal policy outcomes. While laudable,
such efforts are fraught with risks; including the possibility of the creation of sub-optimal policy mixes or of failed reform
efforts with resulting poor outcomes. This article develops a model and typology of policy regime change processes and outcomes
following Thelen and others in arguing that complex policy mixes typically emerge through one or more of four processes, ‘drift’,
‘conversion’, ‘layering’ and ‘replacement’, and that the expected outcomes of these different processes in terms of their
ability to meet initial expectations are linked to the manner in which policy goals and means are (or are not) combined in
a consistent, coherent and congruent fashion. This propensity is illustrated through examination of the case of energy transition
management as practiced in the Netherlands.
Giandomenico Majone and Andrew Moravcsik have argued that the EU does not suffer a 'democratic deficit'. We disagree about one key element: whether a democratic polity requires contestation for political leadership and over policy. This aspect is an essential element of even the 'thinnest' theories of democracy, yet is conspicuously absent in the EU. Copyright 2006 The Author(s).
We investigate private authority in European Union (EU) energy governance in order to address two research questions: First, how has authority been conferred on, and acquired by private actors? Second, to what extent has this lateral shift of authority been contested and on which grounds? The paper links the literatures on regulatory governance and private authority. This allows us to shed light on an issue that tends to be neglected in the discussion about the transfer of competencies in the energy field: the horizontal transfer of authority. In our case study about the role of transmission system operators (TSOs) in the creation of an internal electricity market, we identify three distinct settings where both the level of sovereignty-based contestation and the shift towards private authority vary. We find that private rulemaking has gained in importance due to functional expertise requirements, but also because it provides an escape route in a context of political contestation.
This paper investigates contestation of authority in EU energy policy, with a focus on natural gas. It argues that the main challenge centers on the EU’s goals and means of energy security policy, not the location and scope of authority. The contested choice is between an across-the-board approach to regulation (Regulatory Power)- and a strategy that opens for the use of regulatory tools for geo-political purposes (Market Power). Competing claims of authority and competing views on how the European Commission should wield its regulatory power reflect both geography (North-Western versus (South-Eastern Europe) and the policy paradigm (market versus geo-politics). The Commission’s traditional strategy in energy policy – power-sharing and compromise – only works if there exists a consensus on the ultimate purpose of regulation. However, when the contested issue is whether the Commission should use is regulatory power to pursue market integration or geo-political goals, this presents a genuine policy dilemma.
In a context of multiple crises, European Union (EU) energy policy is often identified as one of the few areas still exhibiting strong integration dynamics. However, this policy domain is not exempt from contestation and re-nationalization pressures. This collection seeks to understand better the contradictory integration and fragmentation tendencies by problematizing the notion of authority. While authority lies at the heart of European integration theory, less attention has been given to explaining when and why previously conferred authority becomes contested and how authority conflicts are addressed. In framing this collection, we build on sociological approaches to examine systematically the conferral of authority (what counts as authority and how it comes to be recognized) and its contestation (the types of contestation and strategies for managing authority conflicts). We focus this analytical discussion on the Energy Union, being an example of ‘hybrid area’, which sits uncomfortably at the nexus of different policy areas.
This article addresses a neglected question about the effects of dispersed authority in the European Union (EU) on the EU’s ability to manage external contestations. It investigates authority challenges from two major external actors in the energy, and specifically the gas sector, and scrutinizes the management of authority conflicts at local sites in different EU states in the Baltic Sea region. The second Russian transboundary submarine gas infrastructure project Nord Stream 2 (NS2), owned and managed by a whole-owned subsidiary of the Russian state-controlled energy giant Gazprom, serves as an illustrative case study. It reveals how multiple authority conflicts at different sites and levels, and the challenges from both the Russian Federation (Russia) and the United States of America (USA), played out, and why formal adjudication has been a primary tool for the EU and several of its member states to assert their authority and manage contestations at the local, national and EU level.
We analyse data from the 2018 Eurobarometer survey to provide a debate on EU authority in the field of energy policy beyond the member states' preferences. More specifically, we look at why citizens are willing to confer authority to the EU in making energy policy and which policy priorities they indicate. Focusing on public opinion appears promising as the data reveals that European citizens have a more positive stance on allocating policy competences to the EU than the member states' governments. The descriptive analysis shows that most citizens prefer the Energy Union to prior-itise the promotion of renewable energy. This holds particularly true for citizens living in Western Europe that have a left-leaning ideology and who perceive climate change as an issue. For Central-East European citizens, especially those who are right-leaning and perceive energy security as a problem, the Energy Union should give priority to increasing energy security.
The launch of the 'Energy Union' in 2014, represented a major step to deepen EU cooperation in energy and climate policies. Yet, in energy, member states have remained particularly jealous of their sovereignty, limiting the pace and scope of integration. EU energy policy appears to fit the specifications of 'new intergovernmentalism' (NI). Member states have been keen on reinforcing cooperation in the area but have refrained from delegating further authority to supranational institutions, preferring to maintain a high level of control within the Council and European Council. However, focusing on the Energy Union Governance Regulation adopted in 2018, we argue that the sector does not fit neatly within this NI account. Although governments remain central to the process, they operate within a hybrid institutional framework combining supranational and intergovernmental elements, in which formal and informal authority distribution is unstable and contested. We suggest that this form of governance is better described as 'embedded intergovernmentalism'.
Energy diplomacy, regulation of the single energy market and the export of this regulatory model to EU’s vicinity govern EU energy affairs. This governance nexus, however, suffers from three distinct shortcomings. This paper addresses these in the context of EU external energy governance vis-à-vis Egypt. Firstly, it highlights how geopolitical rationales blur the commercial logic in pipeline politics, derail gas schemes, and marginalize Egypt despite its pivotal energy role. Secondly, it showcases how the three governance modes contradict each other and add layers of contingencies in EU-Egypt gas trade. Thirdly, it questions EU’s hierarchal approach to Egypt, demonstrating how the EU suffers from a clear misconception of Egypt’s role and interests, and hence fails to tap into Egypt’s gas assets. To download, press https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/QtmTrwY8gSb7kySCv7YB/full?target=10.1080/14782804.2019.1597688
This article reflects on the diagnosis proposed in 1998 by Moravcsik and Nicolaidis that the EU had reached an incipient constitutional settlement and makes two connected arguments. First, analytically, that contrary to the prevailing view, the EU's constitutional settlement is holding, although it has come under assault from federalists and sovereignists alike. The bicycle theory nevertheless continues to hold sway perhaps because paradigm shifts always exhibit significant lags. Second, normatively, to defend ‘the equilibrium’ does not amount to a defense of the status quo. On the contrary, and especially in the context of the eurozone crisis, we must reflect on the social foundations of the European project, of which intermittent democratic discontent is only one expression. The argument unfolds through four European cities, each regarding a different moment in the Constitutional saga of the last two decades, to conclude on the relationship between LI and demoicratic theory, as well as the promise of sustainable integration.
After twenty‐five years, few scholars still dispute the leading role of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) in theorizing EU history. Yet some question whether it can explain Europe's recent evolution. This article argues that LI retains its place as a ‘baseline’ integration theory. It is uniquely able to provide credible micro‐foundations of EU decision‐making, which even theories ostensibly critical of LI borrow. It offers a richer set of innovative opportunities for forward‐looking extension than is often thought. Compared to competitors such as Post‐Functionalism and Historical Institutionalism, LI generates more consistently satisfying empirical accounts of recent EU policy‐making, particularly with regard to the outcomes that ultimately matter most, namely substantive policies. And it remains a trustworthy guide to normative evaluation, for example on the issue of democratic legitimacy. The future of integration theory lies in creatively elaborating LI and, where possible, crafting more rigorous syntheses with alternative accounts.
Liberal Intergovernmentalism has a particular set of assumptions about the relationship between voters and governments. Either voters are content to trust their governments, because issues have low salience, or governments react to voters’ preferences. How far is this ‘supply side’ of the theory still valid in the newly politicized world of EU politics? This article discusses the assumptions about representation in the theory, and looks at the conditions under which the assumptions might still hold and what this means for EU politics today. If the representational assumptions still hold in this highly politicized EU world, then the theory would predict policy gridlock. On the other hand, if there is a growing gap between publics and elites, then the assumptions, and the related propositions about the democratic deficit, no‐longer hold. Either way, the inherent optimism of the theory is undermined.
Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism irrevocably upgraded the rigour of European Union scholarship by categorizing the EU as an international organization, and analyzing it in terms of general theories of international relations. The deepening of European governance has meant, however, that the EU today is better understood as a polity in formation, generalizable through the lens of comparative politics instead of international relations. Alongside the burgeoning literature on the EU's politicization, I advocate for comparisons to historical episodes of state‐building and nationalism, with particular attention to the role of culture and identity in shoring up, or contesting, political authority. Doing so allows us to better delineate the challenges presented by European citizens’ lack of impassioned attachment to the EU, while also informing a broader understanding of the populist backlashes occurring in the context of more global trends of transnational authority construction.
Should the EU be a federal union or an intergovernmental forum? Recently, demoicrats have been arguing that there exists a third alternative. The EU should be conceived as a demoicracy, namely a ‘Union of peoples who govern together, but not as one’ (Nicolaïdis). The demoi of Europe recognise that they affect one another’s democratic health, and hence establish a union to guarantee their freedom qua demoi – which most demoicrats cash out as non-domination. This is more than intergovernmentalism, because the demoi govern together on these matters. However, if the union aims at protecting the freedom of the different European demoi, it cannot do so by replacing them with a ‘superdemos’, as federalists want. This paper argues that demoicracy does possess distinctive normative features; it claims, however, that an institutional choice between intergovernmentalism and federalism is necessary. Depending on how we interpret what the non-domination of demoi requires, demoicracy will either ground a specific way of practicing intergovernmentalism or a specific form of federalism. It cannot, however, ground an institutional model which is genuinely alternative to both.
A truly democratic European Union seems to have become the graal of European politics, the project's redemptive promise and unreachable horizon. Much has been written about the gap between promise and performance and about the obstacles to EU democratization. Here, we suggest that one way to apprehend the ‘democratic deficit’ debate as it has evolved in the wake of the euro crisis is to think of it as a ‘democratic trilemma’. We argue that European legitimacy requires responses in different realms: first, an acknowledgement of Europe's ‘transnational democratic interdependence’; second, an anchoring of the functionalist European superstructure in ‘national democratic legitimacy’; and third, a grounding of both European and national power in ‘local democratic legitimacy’. While the very notion of trilemma points to the tensions that arise in trying to satisfy these requisites simultaneously, we nevertheless need to look for ways of alleviating the trilemma rather than coming up with democratic magic bullets in a single one of these realms. While our main goal is to reframe and open up the debate around the key concepts of empowerment, mutual recognition and flexibility, we also provide examples of what this may mean.
Reforming democratic political systems to handle environmental problems is one of the key political challenges of our time. Here, I analyse how local environmental officials in Sweden perceive the shortcomings of the current political system and what reforms they deem necessary to handle key environmental problems. While green political theory tends to focus on the need to deepen democracy through increased citizen participation, analysis of survey data shows that environmental officials, even though their perceptions of the current system's shortcomings are similar to those presented in the theoretical literature, are more likely to argue for increased expert influence than for direct citizen participation. This result is not easily explained as officials seeking to expand their power, as environmental officials have more complex perceptions of their roles in democracy. The different visions of green professionals and green theory highlight the importance of deliberation on green democratic reforms, including the potentially undemocratic consequences of empowering experts.
Energy is central to the survival and prosperity of human society, which explains the social sciences’ interest in energy production, consumption and distribution. The emergence of the global environmental agenda in the second half of the 20th century gave rise to a distinctive research literature on how energy systems and global environmental protection are interconnected. The threat of disruptive climate change, in particular, has thrown the spotlight on the central role that energy plays in shaping the future relationship between human society and its natural environment. This article provides an overview of how the study of global environmental politics (GEP) has shaped energy research in the past and how it contributes to defining the future energy research agenda. It provides a brief review of the emergence of GEP within the discipline of International Relations. It identifies three core conceptual lenses that are central to the GEP research agenda: (i) the study of environmental impacts and ecological limits; (ii) the notions of sustainability and sustainable development; and (iii) the concept of global environmental governance. The article then maps the emerging energy research agenda from a GEP perspective, focused on climate change as the predominant concern and framing of contemporary GEP scholarship.
Deliberative democracy now dominates the theory, reform, and study of democracy. Working at its cutting edges, this book reaches from conceptual underpinnings to the key challenges faced in applications to ever-increasing ranges of problems and issues. Following a survey of the life and times of deliberative democracy, the turns it has taken, and the logic of deliberative systems, contentious foundational issues receive attention. How can deliberative legitimacy be achieved in large-scale societies where face-to-face deliberation is implausible? What can and should representation mean in such systems? What kinds of communication should be valued, and why? How can competing appeals of pluralism and consensus in democratic politics be reconciled? New concepts are developed along the way: discursive legitimacy, discursive representation, systemic tests for rhetoric in democratic communication, and several forms of meta-consensus. Particular forums (be they legislative assemblies or designed mini-publics) have an important place in deliberative democracy, but more important are macro-level deliberative systems that encompass the engagement of discourses in the public sphere, as well as formal and informal institutions of governance. Deliberative democracy can be applied fruitfully in areas previously off-limits to democratic theory: networked governance, the democratization of authoritarian states, and global democracy, as well as in new ways to invigorate citizen participation. In these areas and more, deliberative democracy outperforms its competitors. © John Dryzek 2010, except chapters 3 and 5, both: John Dryzek, and Simon Niemeyer. All rights reserved.
This article offers an overview and reconsideration of the idea of European demoicracy in the context of the current crisis. It defines ‘demoicracy’ as ‘a Union of peoples, understood both as states and as citizens, who govern together but not as one’, and argues that the concept is best understood as a third way, distinct from both national and supranational versions of single demos polities. The concept of ‘demoicracy’ can serve both as an analytical lens for the European Union‐as‐is and as a normative benchmark, but one which cannot simply be inferred from its praxis. Instead, the article deploys a ‘normative‐inductive’ approach according to which the EU's normative core – transnational non‐domination and transnational mutual recognition – is grounded on what the EU still seeks to escape. Such norms need to be protected and perfected if the EU is to live up to its demoicratic nature. The article suggests ten tentative guiding principles for the EU to continue turning these norms into practice.
Green chemistry promises to make the global chemical industry more sustainable through redesigning chemical production. Nonetheless, many green chemists in the US have focused on persuading other chemists and industrial corporations to change through education and voluntary industry action. Green chemistry in the US may have stagnated relatively because of missing societal input and public scrutiny of chemistry choices. Using recent green chemistry policy experiments in California and the US, I explore how new epistemic political tensions over the roles of expertise, societal participation, and regulation may be creating new societal input and, perhaps, greater industry take-up. I consider whether the concept of socially robust knowledge can help illuminate California's experiments more broadly, and find that this concept needs to be expanded to include the politics of expertise and institutional innovations for increasing information flows between experts and societal actors.
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