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Separation of Power and Expertise: Evidence of the Tyranny of Experts in Sweden’s COVID-19 Responses
... Conventionally, by this doctrine, the legislature is only mandated with the responsibility to make laws without any interference, the executive implements and enforces the laws enacted by the legislature in the state, while the judiciary has the exclusive reserve to interpret the laws and punish offenders in the state. However, in presidential systems of government, there is an apparent dominance of the executive arm over the legislature and judiciary, and this has the potential for executive tyranny and authoritarianism (Bylund & Packard, 2021). Thus, strict adherence to the principle of separation of power guarantees and safeguards the rights, liberty, and freedom of individuals in the state. ...
... However, the principle of checks and balances goes beyond the conventional understanding of the concept. While the boundaries may seem watertight in theory, they are porous in practice (Labuschagne, 2004;Bylund & Packard, 2021). The purpose of the principle is to diffuse any unduly concentrated power in one branch to prevent arbitrary government (Cranenburgh, 2009;Khare, 2017) and promote good governance, accountability, and transparency (Persson et al., 1997;Cranenburgh, 2009;Vyas-Doorgapersad & Aktan, 2017). ...
The notion of separation of power is a crucial prerequisite for both consolidated and emerging constitutional democracies. The functional and structural divisions between the three branches of government in every democratic state are embedded in the concept of separation of powers. South Africa having negotiated a new constitution that gave birth to a constitutional democracy in postapartheid, the idea of separation and balancing of power was ingrained into the laws enacted by the state. Despite the misgivings surrounding the practical application of the concept, the country has made some strides in defending the letter and spirit of the 1996 Constitution by upholding the doctrine of separation of power and rule of law through a functioning government, independent judiciary, and effective parliament. Thus, this chapter unpacked the commitment of South Africa toward the tenets of separation of power. The study highlighted that the institutional and procedural structures have inspired cooperative government and checks and balances among the branches of government. Moreover, the structural and procedural partitions of public powers coupled with oversight responsibilities and veto powers have increased the assurance of the public in the three branches of government. The study emphasized that the emerging democracy in South Africa could be further consolidated if the branches of government remain committed to the tenets of separation of power.
... In Sweden, similarly, polls suggest that the quasi-abdication of power to a public authority was accepted. 56 Germany drew on its experience from several crises including the reunification in 1990 and the 2008 financial crisis. 57 Communication and response have been described as cocreated allowing many actors to debate at national and local level. ...
The COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented global crisis in which governments had to act in a situation of rapid change and substantial uncertainty. The governments of Germany, Sweden and the UK have taken different paths allowing learning for future pandemic preparedness. To help inform discussions on preparedness, inspired by resilience frameworks, this paper reviews governance structures, and the role of science and the media in the COVID-19 response of Germany, Sweden and the UK in 2020. We mapped legitimacy, interdependence, knowledge generation and the capacity to deal with uncertainty.
Our analysis revealed stark differences which were linked to pre-existing governing structures, the traditional role of academia, experience of crisis management and the communication of uncertainty—all of which impacted on how much people trusted their government. Germany leveraged diversity and inclusiveness, a ‘patchwork quilt’, for which it was heavily criticised during the second wave. The Swedish approach avoided plurality and largely excluded academia, while in the UK’s academia played an important role in knowledge generation and in forcing the government to review its strategies. However, the vivant debate left the public with confusing and rapidly changing public health messages. Uncertainty and the lack of evidence on how best to manage the COVID-19 pandemic—the main feature during the first wave—was only communicated explicitly in Germany. All country governments lost trust of their populations during the epidemic due to a mix of communication and transparency failures, and increased questioning of government legitimacy and technical capacity by the public.
... Our paper contributes to three important literatures. First, it contributes to the new but growing literature on the policy approaches to the COVID-19 pandemic in federal systems (Boettke & Powell, 2021;Coyne et al., 2021); the effectiveness of India's countrywide lockdown in containing the pandemic (Beyer et al., 2020;Goswami et al., 2021); and the literature on lockdown measures in other countries (Bylund & Packard, 2021;McCannon & Hall, 2021;and Storr et al., 2021). Second, it adds to the literature on Indian federalism, in particular the literature that focuses on the centripetal and dysfunctional policies that are imposed on the states by the central government (Parikh & Weingast, 1997;Rajagopalan, 2017;Tripathi, 1974). ...
The Indian federation is highly centripetal, and historically, this has left states without the requisite legislative and fiscal authority to take independent action and initiate policies of significance. Consequently, India's response to the global COVID‐19 pandemic was to impose a very severe countrywide lockdown using the mandate of the Union (federal) government. This centralized one‐size‐fits‐all diktat was imposed despite high variations across states in resources, healthcare capacity, and incidence of COVID‐19 cases. We argue that India's dysfunctional federalism is the reason for the centralized lockdown, preventing state and local governments from tailoring a policy response to suit local needs. Using mobility data, we demonstrate the high variation in curtailing mobility in different states through the centralized lockdown. We find that India's centralized lockdown was at best a partial success in a handful of states, while imposing enormous economic costs even in areas where few were affected by the pandemic.
... Moreover, although the papers in this symposium take the existence of an externality seriously, they also seriously consider public choice concerns about how the political process works and Austrian concerns about the limits of knowledge in the absence of market signals from a conceptual level to empirical analysis. 17 The papers explore the nature of the Covid-19 externality (Leeson and Rouanet, 2021) the conceptual foundations of public health policy (Coyne et al., 2021), the history of public health measures (Candela and Geloso, 2021), the impact of the prior policy environment on the policy choices made during a pandemic (McCannon and Hall, 2021), international comparisons of policy responses (Bylund and Packard, 2021;Choutagunta et al., 2021), the macroeconomics of a public health crisis (Cachanosky et al., 2021), the impact of the regulatory regime on pharmaceutical innovation (March, 2021), the determinants of pandemic reforms of drug and alcohol regulation (Redford and Dills, 2021) and the role of civil society and entrepreneurial innovation in response to the public health crisis in determining what activities are essential (Storr et al., 2021). ...
We argue that the policy response to the COVID‐19 pandemic by all levels of government around the world is not consistent with recommendations from standard welfare economics. Thus, it is important to ask why such policies have been adopted. That opens the door to examining the political economy of the COVID‐19 pandemic. This requires examining the incentives and information that confront policymakers and voters and the institutional environments that shape their incentives and information. This lead article frames questions addressed in the remainder of the symposium.
Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, public officials in the United States – from the President to governors, mayors, lawmakers, and even school district commissioners – touted unproven treatments for COVID-19 alongside, and sometimes as opposed to, mask and vaccine mandates. Utilising the framework of ‘pharmaceutical messianism’, our article focuses on three such cures – hydroxychloroquine, ivermectin, and monoclonal antibodies – to explore how pharmaceuticals were mobilised within politicised pandemic discourses. Using the states of Utah, Texas, and Florida as illustrative examples, we make the case for paying attention to pharmaceutical messianism at the subnational and local levels, which can very well determine pandemic responses and outcomes in contexts such as the US where subnational governments have wide autonomy. Moreover, we argue that aside from the affordability of the treatments being studied and the heterodox knowledge claiming their efficacy, the widespread uptake of these cures was also informed by popular medical (including immunological) knowledge, pre-existing attitudes toward ‘orthodox’ measures like vaccines and masks, and mistrust toward authorities and institutions identified with the ‘medical establishment’. Taken together, our case studies affirm the recurrent nature of pharmaceutical messianism in times of health crises – while also refining the concept and exposing its limitations.
In The Pox of Liberty, Werner Troesken details the tradeoff between liberal institutions and communicable disease. According to Troesken, individual freedom presents a danger to the public health in the face of infectious disease, while constitutional constraints restrict the government’s ability to implement effective policy. Contra Troesken, I argue that decision-makers, amidst a crisis of contagion, neglect intertemporal tradeoffs, thereby discounting long run costs while favoring short run policies. These policies, once implemented, are difficult to reverse due to the path dependent nature of political institutions. Irreversible and self-reinforcing growth in political institutions established to enhance health can have an unintended negative impact on health during future crises, where political agents must operate in a more cumbersome and error-prone institutional environment. Using events from the history of public health in the U.S. as support for my theory, I conclude that Troesken’s alleged tradeoff ought to be met with greater skepticism.
In the response to COVID-19, countries have implemented response strategies along a continuum of population- and venue-level specificity ranging from suppression to mitigation strategies. Suppression strategies generally include population-wide shelter-in-place mandates or lockdowns, closure of nonessential physical venues, travel bans, testing and contact tracing, and quarantines. Sweden followed a mitigation strategy focused on risk-tailored approaches to mitigate specific acquisition risks among the elderly, minimizing the disruption to education and the delivery of other health care services, and recommendations for social distancing to minimize the disease burden. To date, Sweden has reported higher case counts and attributable mortality than other Scandinavian countries and lower than other Northern European countries. However, there are several limitations with comparison given heterogeneity in testing strategies, suspected and confirmed case definitions, and assessment of attributable mortality. The decisions in Sweden also reflect social priorities such as equity being a foundational principle of Swedish social systems. Consistently, in-person education for those aged less than 16 years continued throughout. Notably, the mitigation strategy did not eliminate the inequitable impacts of COVID-19 cases and mortality in Sweden with higher-exposure and generally lower-income occupations being associated with higher risks intersecting with these communities often residing in more dense multigenerational households. From January 1 to November 15, there has been a 1.8% increase in all-cause mortality in 2020 compared with the average of 2015-2019, representing an excess of 14.3 deaths per 100,000 population. However, the final assessment of excess deaths in Sweden in 2020 including stratification by age and integration of secular trends can only be calculated in the coming years. In response to increasing cases in the fall of 2020, Sweden has continued to leverage business-oriented regulations and public-oriented guidelines for social distancing rather than police-enforced mandates. Ultimately, pandemics present no winners. Countries have implemented a range of different COVID-19 prevention and mitigation strategies responsive to their own priorities and legal systems including equity and the balancing of competing health priorities. Given these varied approaches, countries that pursued elimination, suppression, or mitigation strategies can collaboratively learn from both successes and challenges of the different strategies to inform COVID-19 and future pandemic responses.
As global deaths from COVID-19 continue to rise, the world’s governments, institutions, and agencies are still working toward an understanding of who is most at risk of death. In this study, data on all recorded COVID-19 deaths in Sweden up to May 7, 2020 are linked to high-quality and accurate individual-level background data from administrative registers of the total population. By means of individual-level survival analysis we demonstrate that being male, having less individual income, lower education, not being married all independently predict a higher risk of death from COVID-19 and from all other causes of death. Being an immigrant from a low- or middle-income country predicts higher risk of death from COVID-19 but not for all other causes of death. The main message of this work is that the interaction of the virus causing COVID-19 and its social environment exerts an unequal burden on the most disadvantaged members of society.
Significance
We investigate what drives OECD countries to adopt COVID-19 restrictive policies such as lockdowns and school closures, and find that government policies are strongly driven by the policies initiated in other countries. The level of democracy also matters: While strong democracies are slower to initiate restrictive policies, they are more likely to follow the policies of nearby countries. Following the lead of others rather than making decisions based on the specific situation of the country may have led to countries locking down either too early or too late. Conversely, if countries follow each other when easing restrictive policies or reinitiate such policies, there may be a situation where countries adopt epidemiologically suboptimal policies.
Upwards of 70% of the Covid19 death toll in Sweden has been people in elderly care services (as of mid-May 2020). We summarize the Covid19 tragedy in elderly care in Sweden, particularly in the City of Stockholm. We explain the institutional structure of elderly care administration and service provision. Those who died of Covid19 in Stockholm’s nursing homes had a life-remaining median somewhere in the range of 5 to 9 months. Having contextualized the Covid19 problem in City of Stockholm, we present an interview of Barbro Karlsson, who works at the administrative heart of the Stockholm elderly care system. Her institutional knowledge and sentiment offer great insight into the concrete problems and challenges. There are really two sides to the elderly care Covid19 challenge: The vulnerability and frailty of those in nursing homes and the problem of nosocomial infection—that is, infection caused by contact with others involved in the elderly care experience. The problem calls for targeted solutions by those close to the vulnerable individuals.
Anders Tegnell talks to Nature about the nation’s ‘trust-based’ approach to tackling the pandemic. Anders Tegnell talks to Nature about the nation’s ‘trust-based’ approach to tackling the pandemic. Anders Tegnell attends a press conference in Solna, Sweden
This paper discusses internal dynamics of the firm that contribute to the failure of knowledge conditions, using the Enron scandal as a case study. Ability of the board to effectively monitor conduct at operational levels includes various dynamics: senior management being isolated from those at operational levels; individuals pursuing subgoals that are contrary to overall corporate goals; information flow along a narrow linear channel that effectively forecloses adverse information from getting to senior management; a corporate culture of intimidation, discouraging open expressions of doubt or skepticism, resulting in reluctance to challenge senior officials, and pushing the limits of ethics and the law.
Elements of information blockage in the corporation include: the "law of diminishing control"; deliberate concealment of information by officers; motivation to report to the boss what one perceives the boss wants to hear; theory of "bounded rationality" that explains surprising role of irrationality in decisionmaking – unconscious emotions and motivations. Discussion of behavioralist studies of cognitive dissonance, belief perseverance, confirmatory bias, entity effect, motivated reasoning, group cohesion or "groupthink," and the false consensus effect. Problem of overoptimism – tendency of many people to overrate their own abilities, contributions and talents – and tendency toward puffery and dismissal of risks in formulating disclosures and press releases.
Imposing liability on directors for failure of oversight is extremely difficult to sustain in a court of law. Directors are likely to face much greater demands of accountability in the wake of Enron. Solutions to enhance flow of information include programs to encourage employees to expose wrongdoing without fear of retribution; devising of communication system that enables important information to move upward to the proper decisionmaker without getting distorted; restructuring of audit committees, providing adequate training for new directors, expanding the number of independent directors on the board. In the wake of Enron, corporations may simply have no choice but to meet increased demands by workers, shareholders, customers and the government for greater accountability.
Appendix to paper discusses the history of the corporation, moral dilemmas of the shareholder-centric model, and whether important social goods sometimes trump the notion of profit-maximization.
During the past decade the world experienced two simultaneous revolutions. First, a wave of democratization either replaced or challenged authoritarian regimes, beginning in Latin America in the early 1980s, and later in Eastern Europe and the Asian Pacific Rim. Second, there was a move away from state involvement in the economy and a shift toward market economics and the establishment of what some have called neo-liberal policymaking. How are these dual revolutions linked? Do they complement each other, or do they involve inherently conflicting principles? There has been a great deal of debate regarding the simultaneous transition toward democracy and the market? Practically all students of these phenomena contend that conflict between these two trends is inevitable. The first requires the representation of particular interests; the second often involves the distribution of social costs among these same interests. That is, glasnost gives those who may lose through perestroika the opportunity to challenge structural adjustments and to frustrate attempts to change the economic and social status quo. The experience of new regimes in Latin America and Eastern Europe, and the subsequent conflicts between the need to enlist political support and the necessity to enforce new economic policies suggest a potential contradiction, at least in the short term, between democratic norms and the imposition of market mechanisms. In the early stages of transition, therefore, a state must chose which reform agenda will take precedence. What will determine this policy preference? To answer these questions, we might begin with an analysis of the newly empowered elites and the policymaking process within these new regimes. One outstanding and apparently universal characteristic of the new administrations is the very high number of personnel who are
Using the Public Choice approach, this paper gives an explanation as to why in representative democracies, in which political entrepreneurs attempt to maximize utility, an incentive-oriented environmental policy has hardly any chance of being implemented. We discuss two main aspects: first, the reasons which make it difficult to enforce any kind of environmental policy in the competitive political environment. And second, why such a policy—if it can be implemented at all—is very often enacted with inefficient instruments. In order to give a satisfactory explanation of these ‘execution deficits’, we differentiate between voters’, politicians’, interest groups’, and bureaucracies’ behavior to show that there are conflicts with other policies, and that individual rationality may be the greatest obstacle in implementing most incentive-oriented environmental policies. In the final section we provide five suggestions for overcoming these difficulties.
We study people's willingness to trade off civil liberties for increased health security in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic by deploying representative surveys involving around 550,000 responses across 15 countries. We document significant heterogeneity across groups in willingness to sacrifice rights: citizens disadvantaged by income, education, or race are less willing to sacrifice rights than their more advantaged peers in every country. Leveraging naturally occurring variation and experimental approaches, we estimate a one standard deviation increase in health insecurity increases willingness to sacrifice civil liberties by 68–83 percent of the difference between the average Chinese and US citizen. (JEL D12, D91, I12, I18, K38, O17, P36)
The Indian federation is highly centripetal, and historically, this has left states without the requisite legislative and fiscal authority to take independent action and initiate policies of significance. Consequently, India's response to the global COVID‐19 pandemic was to impose a very severe countrywide lockdown using the mandate of the Union (federal) government. This centralized one‐size‐fits‐all diktat was imposed despite high variations across states in resources, healthcare capacity, and incidence of COVID‐19 cases. We argue that India's dysfunctional federalism is the reason for the centralized lockdown, preventing state and local governments from tailoring a policy response to suit local needs. Using mobility data, we demonstrate the high variation in curtailing mobility in different states through the centralized lockdown. We find that India's centralized lockdown was at best a partial success in a handful of states, while imposing enormous economic costs even in areas where few were affected by the pandemic.
Stay‐at‐home orders curtailed the individual liberty of those across the United States. Governors of some states moved swiftly to impose the lockdowns. Others delayed and a few even refused to implement these policies. We explore common narratives of what determines the speed of implementation, namely partisanship and virus exposure. While correlation exists, we show that the most consistent explanation for the speed of the implementation of these orders is the state's economic freedom. It was the economically unfree states that issued stay‐at‐home orders earlier.
How can public policy best deal with infectious disease? In answering this question, scholarship on the optimal control of infectious disease adopts the model of a benevolent social planner who maximizes social welfare. This approach, which treats the social health planner as a unitary “public health brain” standing outside of society, removes the policymaking process from economic analysis. This paper opens the black box of the social health planner by extending the tools of economics to the policymaking process itself. We explore the nature of the economic problem facing policymakers and the epistemic constraints they face in trying to solve that problem. Additionally, we analyze the incentives facing policymakers in their efforts to address infectious diseases and consider how they affect the design and implementation of public health policy. Finally, we consider how unanticipated system effects emerge due to interventions in complex systems, and how these effects can undermine well‐intentioned efforts to improve human welfare. We illustrate the various dynamics of the political economy of state responses to infectious disease by drawing on a range of examples from the COVID‐19 pandemic.
In response to the COVID‐19 pandemic, governments around the world issued stay‐at‐home orders, which required that individuals stay at home unless they were engaging in certain activities. Often these orders would designate certain goods and services as “essential” and would permit individuals engaged in the production, delivery, and purchase of those goods and services to leave their homes to do so. Implicit in these policies, of course, is the assumption that policymakers can know ex ante which goods and services are essential. As proved true while these stay‐at‐home orders were in effect, essentialness is necessarily subjective and depends on knowledge that is often dispersed, inarticulate, and changes over time. Policymakers, however, do not and often cannot have access to the local knowledge needed to determine ex ante which goods and services are essential, and they lack the feedback mechanisms they would need to adroitly adapt when circumstances change. This paper examines these knowledge problems associated with designating certain goods and services as “essential” when crafting and implementing stay‐at‐home orders.
To gain insight into how Chinese state media is communicating about the coronavirus pandemic to the outside world, we analyzed a collection of posts from their English-language presence on Facebook. We observed three recurring behaviors: sharing positive stories and promoting the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) pandemic response, rewriting recent history in a manner favorable to the CCP as the coronavirus pandemic evolved, and using targeted ads to spread preferred messages. Although spin is not unique to state actors, paid ad campaigns to promote government-run state media pages containing misinformation and conspiracies are problematic. Our findings suggest that platforms should implement clearer disclosure of state-sponsored communications at a minimum, and consider refusing paid posts from such entities.
The evolving coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) epidemic1 is certainly cause for concern. Proper communication and optimal decision‐making is an ongoing challenge, as data evolve. The challenge is compounded, however, by exaggerated information. This can lead to inappropriate actions. It is important to differentiate promptly the true epidemic from an epidemic of false claims and potentially harmful actions.
When the history of the financial crisis, stock market crash, and ensuing recession of 2007-2009 is written, the appropriate focus would be on the role that "expertise" played in almost every chapter of the story. From the expertise of the mathematicians who guided the models used by financial institutions, to the expertise of those who developed new kinds of mortgage instruments that required very low down payments, to the expertise of US policymakers who told us that new regulations to encourage more widespread homeownership would be an engine of economic growth and prosperity, the actions of those who knew better eventually littered the financial landscape with their errors. In addition to the prior list, which is hardly exhaustive, perhaps the most central set of experts in the story were those associated with the Federal Reserve System, the US central bank. The Fed rarely shies away from using its expertise to cloak its choices in a cloud of jargon and technicalities, even as its every move has significant effects across the US economy and the whole globe. The Fed's decisions to keep interest rates so low after 9/11 and to seize unprecedented powers in the wake of the recession that inevitably followed that earlier policy were both the latest examples of the history of the Fed's ever-increasing claims to expertise that have led to expanding powers and new and more damaging mistakes.
appreciate the critique ofthe possibility ofrational economiccalcu- lationunder central planning—a critique stated most forcefullyand clearly by Mises, and further developed by Hayek himself. As has been demonstrated by Professor Lavoie (1985), the true import and significance ofthe Hayekian lesson was simply not graspedbysub- sequentwelfareeconomists writingon thesocialistcalculation debate, even though Hayek's work was widely cited. In this paper we attempt both to restate and to extend Hayek's insightconcerning the "knowledge problem" and its implications furcentral economicplanning, whether comprehensive in scope or otherwise. In the following paragraphs wecite Hayek'sown formu- lation ofhis Insight,and make certain observations concernIngIt In subsequent sections of the paper we start from a rather different point of departure, and in this way eventually arrive at our restate- ment and extension of the Hayekian position—spelling out some rather radical Implications ofourrestatement, According to Hayek (1945, pp.71—78):
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