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A Universal Ethology Challenge to the Free Energy Principle: Species of Inference and Good Regulators

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Michael Kirchhoff at University of Wollongong
Michael Kirchhoff
Thomas van Es at University of Antwerp
Thomas van Es
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The free energy principle (FEP) portends to provide a unifying principle for the biological and cognitive sciences. It states that for a system to maintain non-equilibrium steady-state with its environment it must minimise its (information-theoretic) free energy. Under the FEP, to minimise free energy is equivalent to engaging in approximate Bayesian inference. According to the FEP, therefore, inference is at the explanatory base of biology and cognition. In this paper, we discuss a specific challenge to this inferential formulation of adaptive self-organisation. We call it the universal ethology challenge: it states that the FEP cannot unify biology and cognition, for life itself (or adaptive self-organisation) does not require inferential routines to select adaptive solutions to environmental pressures (as mandated by the FEP). We show that it is possible to overcome the universal ethology challenge by providing a cautious and exploratory treatment of inference under the FEP. We conclude that there are good reasons for thinking that the FEP can unify biology and cognition under the notion of approximate Bayesian inference, even if further challenges must be addressed to properly draw such a conclusion.
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Vol.:(0123456789)
Biology & Philosophy (2021) 36:8
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-021-09780-8
1 3
A universal ethology challenge tothefree energy principle:
species ofinference andgood regulators
MichaelD.Kirchho1· ThomasvanEs2
Received: 30 July 2020 / Accepted: 22 January 2021 / Published online: 18 February 2021
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. part of Springer Nature 2021
Abstract
The free energy principle (FEP) portends to provide a unifying principle for the bio-
logical and cognitive sciences. It states that for a system to maintain non-equilib-
rium steady-state with its environment it must minimise its (information-theoretic)
free energy. Under the FEP, to minimise free energy is equivalent to engaging in
approximate Bayesian inference. According to the FEP, therefore, inference is at the
explanatory base of biology and cognition. In this paper, we discuss a specific chal-
lenge to this inferential formulation of adaptive self-organisation. We call it the uni-
versal ethology challenge: it states that the FEP cannot unify biology and cognition,
for life itself (or adaptive self-organisation) does not require inferential routines to
select adaptive solutions to environmental pressures (as mandated by the FEP). We
show that it is possible to overcome the universal ethology challenge by providing
a cautious and exploratory treatment of inference under the FEP. We conclude that
there are good reasons for thinking that the FEP can unify biology and cognition
under the notion of approximate Bayesian inference, even if further challenges must
be addressed to properly draw such a conclusion.
Keywords Free energy principle· Biology· Cognition· The universal ethology
challenge· Unification· Inference· Models
* Michael D. Kirchhoff
kirchhof@uow.edu.au
1 School ofLiberal Arts, Faculty ofArts, Social Sciences andHumanities, University
ofWollongong, Wollongong, Australia
2 Centre forPhilosophical Psychology, Department ofPhilosophy, Universiteit Antwerpen,
Antwerp, Belgium
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
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