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Contested claims to social welfare: Basic income grants in Namibia

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In many parts of the world, income transfers to underprivileged groups have long been part of social welfare programmes. However, the conditionality of such grants has recently been challenged on a global scale, arguing that income grants should serve as a mechanism to redistribute national resources rather than filling the social gap, and be conceded to all members of the population. The only country that tested this kind of social policy is Namibia with its Basic Income Grant project (BIG). Ever since its launch in 2007, there has been a heated nation- and even worldwide debate concerning the pros and cons of an unconditional grant. This paper presents the results of an anthropological research, showing that in discussion on poverty reduction and the “rightful share” for the needy, the cultural factors governing decision making on the micro level have so far been neglected.
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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18753/2297-8224-93
Contested claims to social welfare: Basic income grants in Namibia1
Sabine KLOCKE-DAFFA
2
University of Tübingen
Abstract
In many parts of the world, income transfers to underprivileged groups have long
been part of social welfare programmes. However, the conditionality of such grants
has recently been challenged on a global scale, arguing that income grants should
serve as a mechanism to redistribute national resources rather than filling the social
gap, and be conceded to all members of the population. The only country that tested
this kind of social policy is Namibia with its Basic Income Grant project (BIG). Ever
since its launch in 2007, there has been a heated nation- and even worldwide debate
concerning the pros and cons of an unconditional grant. This paper presents the re-
sults of an anthropological research, showing that in discussion on poverty reduction
and the “rightful share” for the needy, the cultural factors governing decision ma-
king on the micro level have so far been neglected.
Keywords: anthropology, unconditional basic income grants, social welfare, giving
and sharing, gift economy, distributional model, poverty reduction, rightful share,
short-term exchanges, long-term exchanges, Namibia, Otjivero, Witvlei, ELCRN,
Basic Income Grant Namibia (BIG)
The Basic Income Grant (BIG) debate – some introductory remarks
In many parts of the world, income transfers to underprivileged groups have long been part of
social welfare regimes. In fact, many nation states and their governments derive part of their
legitimacy from the degree of security and support they manage to procure for their popu-
lations since social security was declared a human right in the Declaration of Human Rights
accepted by the United Nations in 1948 (Van Langendonck 2007). Citizens of ratifying states
can thus claim a legal right to be protected against the perils of social or economic hazards
brought about by their governments. On a global scale, the model of the welfare state became
1
I am grateful to the Fritz-Thyssen-Foundation for generously supporting my research project on “Basic income and so-
cial security in Namibia” in 2011 and to Manja Stutzriemer for her invaluable support conducting the questionnaire cam-
paign in Otjivero and Witvlei. Sincere gratitude is also expressed to the Collaborative Research Center SFB 1070 Re-
sourceCultures funded by the German Research Foundation sponsoring my participation in the Windhoek Summer School
2014 on Cultural Heritage at the University Center for Studies in Namibia which allowed for a re-visit to the site of the Na-
mibian Basic Income Project to update my data.
2
PD Dr. Sabine Klocke-Daffa, Anthropologist, Institute of Asian and Oriental Studies/Department of Social and Cultural
Anthropology, member of the Corporate Research Center ResourceCultures, University of Tuebingen/Germany.
sabine.klocke-daffa@ethno.uni-tuebingen.de
2 SABINE KLOCKE-DAFFA
a powerful instrument of political legitimacy even in problematic states with imperfect mar-
kets where most people have to rely on informal relationships and personal networks (for
comparison see Wood/Gough 2006). Income transfers are certainly not a marker of rich capi-
talist western countries. From anthropological studies we know that redistributive mecha-
nisms for the sake of security are an integral part of any social organisation (most notably in
Polynesia and Micronesia, see e.g. Petersen 1986; Robineau 1988). However, not even in gift
economies3 is individual neediness a general prerequisite for receiving social benefits nor are
one-way-transfers generally conceptualised as detrimental to economic prosperity (see contri-
butions by Patterson 2012; Yan 2012; Hunt 2012).
Yet, what does seem to be characteristic of capitalist western countries is the concept of
the self-referring individual trying to satisfy own needs if not otherwise satisfied. It is argued
that people would be discouraged from working if all the basics of life were provided for, and
lazy individuals would make a nation poor – so they should keep working (if not handi-
capped). The 18th century forefathers of classical economic theory like Adam Smith or David
Ricardo successfully promoted the idea that boosting incentives for individuals would increase
general productivity and national wellbeing in general – even though not necessarily for the
working classes at that time. But it became common knowledge that it should be the indivi-
dual – at best supported by close kin – who should be responsible for his or her own liveli-
hood and only in case of emergency should society represented by the nation state step in.
What did prevail was the idea that a materially wealthy nation must make continuous effort to
provide for ample work opportunities – for the benefit of the state as well as for the material
and social benefit of its citizens. Where work is not available or individuals fail to provide for
their own advancement, the state must support individuals through income transfers to bridge
temporary or permanent shortfalls. The decades-old discussion on the best solution to reduce
poverty revolves around two options: universalism versus targeting, with the entire population
being the beneficiary of social benefits or only the targeted “truly deserving”. Since the 1980s,
targeted social policies have been favoured for various reasons both in western countries and
in the Global South (van Oorschot 2002) which led to a “shift from welfare to workfare states”
(Mkandawire 2005: 1). Most of these benefits – whether in cash or in kind – are now means-
tested and granted to individuals in need, where the definition of “need” is following national
living standards. Welfare programmes in the Global North are generally based on well-
defined criteria as to what individuals may claim in order to have a decent quality of life,
whereas most welfare programmes in the Global South have benefits that are clearly below the
poverty line. Targeted social benefits are generally subject to rigid scrutiny to make sure reci-
3 The term ‘gift economy’ refers to economic systems or subsystems, which are not primarily based on the accumulation
of material wealth but of social wealth, on generosity and on reciprocity. David Cheal defines the gift economy as “a system of
redundant transactions within a moral economy, which makes possible the extended reproduction of social relations” (Cheal
1988:19). Goods for gifting (material items, knowledge, services) must have a use-value for consumers and must be produced
by those who provide them – hence the term ‘gift economy’. Gift economies are not only characteristic of many of small scale,
traditional societies or communities such as those participating in the famous North American potlatch or the Melanesian
kula. There is also a growing segment of modern, globalised economies where goods of use-value are distributed as free gifts
via universally accessible networks (a famous example is Wikipedia) by peer-to-peer processes. However, the notion of the
gift (to be reciprocated) has been contrasted with the concept of the righteous share (not to be reciprocated) so that Widlok
(2017) prefers the term “economy of sharing”.
CONTESTED CLAIMS TO SOCIAL WELFARE 3
pients benefit only as long as necessary and leave the scheme as soon as possible. In current
discourses on the key allocation questions (who gets what and why), there is a striking com-
mon ground originating in the idea of the state being responsible towards its needy and de-
serving citizens who should be grateful and reciprocate generous gifts in appropriate ways.
Any conditional welfare programme thus does not aim at a permanent redistribution of
wealth nor is it conceptualised as a mechanism for the distribution of legitimate shares.
However, the conditionality of grants – and the targeting itself – has recently been chal-
lenged on a global scale by a number of national movements in Asia, Latin America, Africa
and Europe as well as Canada, Finland, Germany and Switzerland4. Proponents of an uncon-
ditional grant argue that income grants should not just fill the social gap between different
income groups but should serve as a mechanism to redistribute national resources and be
conceded to all members of a given population without being means-tested as an uncondi-
tional income grant and part of a fair share of national wealth. This is one of the reasons why
the Namibian Basic Income Grant (BIG) became so prominent, in particular in South Africa,
and even ahead of its launch (Agüero 2006; Barchiesi 2007; Nattrass/Seekings 2005; Stand-
ing/Samson 2003; for an overview see Seekings/Matisonn 2012). It continued to be widely
discussed though it officially ended in 2009 and the reduced bridging allowance paid thereaf-
ter stopped in 2014 (for a general overview of basic income initiatives on a global scale inclu-
ding the Namibian BIG see Murray/Pateman 2012; Niemann 2015; Van Parijs/Vanderborght
2017). In 2017, Finland became the first European country to launch a nationwide pilot
scheme paying an unconditional monthly allowance of 560 EUR to 2000 unemployed citizens
for a period of two years5. The Canadian province of Ontario has launched another Basic In-
come Pilot starting in spring 2017 that supplements the earnings of individuals whose in-
comes are below the poverty line (but only those)6. James Ferguson rightly pointed to the fact,
that the global basic income movement not only adds another aspect to the discussion on uni-
versalism versus targeting in welfare regimes, but is of quite a different order by making a
“claim for a due and proper share grounded in nothing more than membership in a national
collective”, and what he terms “the politics of the rightful share” (Ferguson 2015: 184).
The concepts for an unconditional basic income so far presented are following two differ-
ent models: the humanitarian model is based on the idea that every member of a nation state
should be granted a basic income serving as an instrument of social justice and “real freedom”
(van Parijs 1992; 1995, 2000; see also Van Der Veen 1998; Motte et al 2010; Wright 2000),
allowing for a life in dignity and social security as by equal access to national wealth. The eco-
nomic model claims that an unconditional income grant would have a positive impact on local
markets, reduce the administrative costs of existing social security systems and at the same
time reduce labour costs, freeing employers from having to pay social security benefits, thus
4 An overview of the global debate is provided by the Basic Income Earth Network, see Basic Income Earth Network:
http://www.basicincome.org/bien/; for Brazil see Suplici 2003; for German initiatives, see Blaschke 2012; Osterkamp 2017;
Basic Income initiative Germany, http://www.grundeinkommen.de; for the Basic income initiative Switzerland, see
http://www.grundeinkommen.ch/ .
5 For the Finnish pilot scheme, which started in 2017 see http://www.kela.fi/web/en/basic-income-experiment-2017-
2018; also Koistinen/Perkiö 2014.
6 For the Canadian basic income see Forget 2012, for the current pilot scheme, which started in 2017 see
http://basicincome.org/news/2017/03/ontario-canada-government-releases-results-consultations-basic-income-pilot/.
4 SABINE KLOCKE-DAFFA
resulting in the creation of more jobs (Straubhaar 2008). Both models neglect that cultural
norms might be significant in the distribution of income transfers as well.
It is not my purpose to assess the huge discussion on deservingness (for an overview see
Cavaillé 2015; van Oorschot/Roosma 2017). My intention rather is to suggest that we take
additional steps to define what policies of the rightful share must entail and find answers to
more detailed questions: How is our notion of social welfare challenged by social transfers
conceptualised as a share citizens must be guaranteed rather than a gift generously granted,
which then constitutes an obligation to reciprocate on the side of the beneficiary? Also, does
the claim to a righteous share comprise the right to use this share according to own prevalence
or will it be connected to expectations of the policy planners as to what seems to be a reasona-
ble use of the money (which makes is implicitly conditional)? I argue that beyond individual
preferences and negotiations, cultural norms play a decisive role in the appropriation of social
transfers, which makes the outcome highly contestable. I further argue that gifting and shar-
ing should nevertheless be placed on a continuum rather than to be defined in terms of a di-
chotomy as delineated by Thomas Widlok in his thought-provoking book on exchange and
the economy of sharing (Widlok 2017) refining Woodburn’s suggestion to re-conceptualise
reciprocity (1998). Whether this argument does point to a cultural model in the sense of a
specific distributional model of income transfers will be discussed later.
I will check my arguments looking from an anthropological point of view into the effects
of the much contested Basic Income Grant project in Namibia termed the “world’s first un-
conditional transfer programme” ever (Kaufmann 2010: 38) running from 2007–2009.
BIG in Namibia – an anthropological inquiry
Outline of the project
The Namibian Basic Income Grant (BIG) officially ended in 2009 but continued up to 2014
with a 20% reduced bridging allowance. It attracted worldwide attention and caused heated
debates inside and outside the country among economists, politicians, sociologists and church
representatives (for the history of the project and its result see Haarmann et al. 2008; Haar-
mann/Haarmann 2012; reports on the website bignam.org). At its launch, the Namibian BIG
was presented to the national and international media as an instrument to meet the pressing
social needs of the country by alleviating poverty, improve living conditions and reduce the
unequal distribution of wealth within the country, thus following the humanitarian model. In
fact, according to the international GINI Index Namibia – a vast country with many natural
resources such as diamonds, gold and uranium – shows one of the highest income disparities
in the world (Davies et al. 2009; UN Development Programme 2016a)7. More than 50% of a
7 The information on income and wealth distribution varies according to dedicated statistical database and imputation
procedures. The impact on the results might be quite substantial but does not modify them altogether. Thus, the Gini coeffi-
cient for Namibia changes from 0.61 (World Bank 2000) to 0,84 (Davies et al. 2009: 60) estimating income disparities in
Namibia for the year 2000 (a value of 0 indicates perfect equality, a value of 1.0 perfect inequality). In both cases, Namibia
ranged among the countries with the greatest income and wealth inequality in the world. The Gini coefficient for Namibia in
2016 is still ranging at 0.61 (UNDP 2016a).
CONTESTED CLAIMS TO SOCIAL WELFARE 5
population of only about 2 million is living below the international poverty line8. It is made up
of 12 ethnic groups, which is not much as compared to other African states. The organisers of
the BIG scheme also followed an economic model pointing to the expected impact on the local
markets and possible incentives for individuals allowing for economic initiatives. Despite the
fact that the Namibian proponents of the project put humanitarian arguments to the fore,
economic aspects dominated the discussion throughout the process, not least to calm down
critics addressing the presumed costs.
There are three specifics of the Namibian BIG which should be kept in mind:
It was based on a proposal by the Namibian Tax Commission (NAMAX) set up by the
Namibian government in 2001, not by a foreign development agency, an NGO or UN
organisations.
BIG was conceptualised as an unconditional grant given to every citizen in the country,
independent of age, gender, ethnic affiliation, income or other possessions, leaving out
only those who already received social welfare such as old age pensions or other social
benefits.
BIG was meant to be not more than a subsidy to the cost of living (as opposed to most
social welfare programmes): every beneficiary was to receive 100 N$ per month, the
equivalent of 10 EUR or 12 $ US at the time.
This was very little money which never did allow for a decent living nor was it meant to do so,
but was expected to make a difference nonetheless: in an average household with six to eight
children plus two adults, the monthly BIG allowance would total 1000 N$, the equivalent of
two salaries of a farm worker at the time BIG started.
However, the Namibian government did not follow the commission’s proposals (see Na-
mibian Tax Consortium 2002) and no consent was achieved in parliament. So the Evangelical-
Lutheran Church in the Republic of Namibia (ELCRN) spearheaded further steps and ini-
tiated through its Desk for Social Development (DfSD) an international conference which
suggested to establish a Coalition of independent institutions of civil society later to be called
the Basic Income Coalition (see figure 1) publically launched in 2005 (Haarmann/Haarmann
2012: 34). It was composed of delegates of the Council of Churches (CCN), the Namibian
trade unions (NUNW)9, the Namibian Non-Governmental Organizations Forum
(NANGOF), the Namibian Network of AIDS Service Organizations (NANASO), the National
Youth Service (NYC), the Church Alliance for Orphans (CAFO), the Legal Assistance Centre
(LAC) and the Labour Resource and Research Institute (LaRRI). Working in close coope-
ration with the Namibian government, the aim of the Basic Income Coalition was to promote
an unconditional basic income grant to all citizens of Namibia. Since the Namibian govern-
ment turned out to be rather reluctant, the idea of a pilot project was discussed in 2006 as “to
8 According to the United Nations Human Development Report of 2016, the percentage of the Namibian population liv-
ing in „multidimensional poverty” is indicated by 44.9% (UNDP 2016b). According to calculations of the Namibian Statistics
Agency dating back to the year 2009/2010, figures are substantially lower with not more than 28.7% of the entire population
below upper poverty line (Namibia Statistics Agency 2012)
9 In 2010, the trade unions temporarily left the coalition due to internal disputes among the members of the NUNW ex-
ecutive committee. Since 2011, NUNW is again a member of the BIG Coalition.
6 SABINE KLOCKE-DAFFA
concretely show that a BIG can work and will indeed have the predicted positive effects on po-
verty alleviation and economic development” (bignam.org).
Figure 1: Logo of the Basic Income Grant Coalition
Source: http://www.bignam.org/BIG_pictures.html
After long debates about where to initiate an ambitious project like BIG, with all eyes focused
on the outcome, and only a single location available in the entire country, it was eventually
agreed upon to launch BIG in the small village of Otjivero, east of Namibia´s capital Wind-
hoek on the road to Gobabis (figure 2). ELCRN agreed to be responsible for the administrative
and financial implementation of the project through its Desk for Social Development acting
on behalf of the BIG Coalition (Haarmann et al. 2009: 18-19). Otjivero was at that time a set-
tlement of about 900 inhabitants, most of them belonging to the Damara group, one of the 12
ethnic groups of the country and part of the Khoisan peoples of southern Africa. Initially,
Otjivero was a so-called “wild settlement” set up by former farm workers who had lost their
jobs and had no other place to go. They decided to settle on a strip of government owned land
next to a water dam. The occupation was illegal but since the former farm workers’ situation
was desperate and there was no alternative in sight they went to court and eventually won a
lawsuit which granted them the right to stay10.
However, besides the land (which they did not own) and the water there was not much
else: no decent houses, no jobs, and no income – a “living example of hell on earth” as one of
10 Seven commercial farmers of the Omitara area where Otjivero is situated approached the High Court to seek the squat-
ters' eviction accusing the squatters of trespassing on their land. When the eviction was granted in 2001, members of
SWAPO, the ruling party of Namibia, were publically threatening with “Zimbabwe-style land invasions” should the farmers
proceed and encouraged Otjivero families to ignore the High Court eviction order. See Moyo/Tabby 2001: Namibia threat-
ened with farm invasions. In: News Africa, 26.1.2001. online: https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/namibia-threatened-with-
farm-invasions-59347. Finally, the eviction order was stopped in 2001.
CONTESTED CLAIMS TO SOCIAL WELFARE 7
the church pastors in Namibia once described it (Klöpper 2011, front page). After the village
was officially recognised as a settlement, a school was established though facing high drop-out
rates and a small clinic took care of the many HIV/AIDS patients.
Figure 2: The settlement of Otjivero, site of the BIG model project, is situated between Namibia’s
capital Windhoek and the eastern city of Gobabis.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org
At the outset of BIG, the overall situation in Otjivero was even more desolate than in other
poor areas of the country: 76% of the population was found to live below the poverty line, 2/3
of all households did not have enough food and more than 40% of the children were mal-
nourished (Haarmann et al. 2009: 15). Almost all Otjiverans lived in cramped tin houses with
many children. An evaluation of the overall socio-economic situation was effected twice, once
before and then again towards the end of the project. Unfortunately, no contrast group was
included nor did cultural factors ever play a role in assessing the outcome of the model pro-
ject.
Ultimately, it could be demonstrated that, as anticipated, social conditions had changed
for the better: housing conditions had improved, people were better fed and in much better
health. School attendance increased from 60–70% to almost 100% and the previously alarming
crime rate dropped by 36.5% (Haarmann et al. 2009: 46, 68). Undoubtedly, these results were
much in favour of the project and might well have served to support the initial idea of a na-
tionwide expansion of the Basic Income Grant.
However, two aims of the project could not be realised:
8 SABINE KLOCKE-DAFFA
1. The income per head of household did not increase but dropped due to a population
gain of about 30% (mostly family members moving into Otjivero to stay with BIG re-
cipients) and many households were still found impoverished.
2. Only a small number of people started businesses on their own or invested in other
economic endeavours, and the reported savings rate of 37% appeared more than unre-
alistic. Some of the businesses which did open up while BIG was running belonged to
people who were not entitled to basic income grants, and some of the ventures present-
ed as successful outcomes of BIG were found to have existed before the project was
launched11.
The BIG was not connected to the aim of creating employment only and its success did not
entirely depend on economic factors. But economic aspects did play an important role right
from the start as they do in any kind of social welfare programme. Organisers, BIG assessors
and members of the BIG Coalition repeatedly pointed out to the social and economic success
of BIG (for an overview see the website of BIG Namibia and Basic Income Earth Network; see
also Haarmann et al. 2009; Haarmann/Haarmann 2012; Jauch 2015), while from a purely eco-
nomic point of view the project was considered to have failed (Osterkamp12 2008; 2011; 2012;
2013). After the launching of the 2009 report by Haarmann et al., those who had disapproved
from the very beginning – among them influential members of Parliament – insisted that
basic income grants were apparently not sustainable and wanted the project stopped. It is still
to be clarified whether it was for social or economic considerations, the influence of the
worldwide ideological debate over deservingness or for inner-Namibian disputes over political
authority that finally turned the balance: after the 2014 national elections the idea to expand
the Namibian BIG was dropped altogether, mostly for lack of political support and financial
resources.
At no point in the lengthy discussion over the Pros and Cons of the Namibian BIG project
has there been a reflection on the significance of cultural factors influencing the appropriation
and use of income grants. “We thought that culture is not so important”13 said a member of
the organising team. As could be shown later, it was exactly on these grounds that BIG did
prove to be sustainable.
When I talk about “culture” in this paper, I do not mean to use the term in an essentialist
way. As in any other society, there are striking differences between persons of different age,
gender and social class as well as between urban and rural population. It is a truism that life is
negotiated on a daily base influenced by power relations, gender disposition and individual
agency. There are nevertheless practices, activities and ways of viewing the world that are
shared and valued by members of social groups with more or less clear-cut group markers,
11 Considering the worldwide attention to the project, it certainly would have been more favourable had some of the ini-
tiators of BIG Namibia not been involved in the evaluations and publications of the results but instead leave the field to im-
partial scientist altogether. Also, the research design of the evaluation did not contain long-term participant observation.
Incorporating a cultural scientist into the international evaluation team and have that person stay for a while at the site of BIG
would have added another perspective as well methodology and might have helped questioning some of the result.
12 On behalf of the German Centre for International Migration and Development (CIM), Rigmar Osterkamp has been
working as an external economist at the Namibian Economic Policy Unit (NEPRU) and the University of Namibia (UNAM)
between 2007 and 2011.
13 Interview with P.K., Windhoek, 8.8.2011.
CONTESTED CLAIMS TO SOCIAL WELFARE 9
such as language, religion and common value. I will therefore use “culture” in the sense of a
template providing codes of meaning that guide people’s life and regulate their world. This
neither means that everyone behaves, thinks and acts in a predictable way based on exactly the
same knowledge nor would people always admit (or even know) how much their cultural base
conditions behaviour. In the broadest sense, culture then refers “to the acquired, cognitive and
symbolic aspects of existence” (Eriksen 2001: 4). Using the concept of culture in this way, it
leaves ample space for individual differences and social diversity but does point to the fact that
people have common foundations, which, if we manage to grasp them, give us a key to under-
standing.
Research question, definitions, methods and theoretical approach
Locations: When the anthropological fieldwork started in 2011, it was decided to do a parallel
research project in the nearby settlement of Witvlei which did not receive BIG, thus serving as
the contrast group. This approach promised to be fruitful for reasons of comparison and had
been omitted in the first evaluation even though the ELCRN Desk for Social Development had
strongly recommended it.14 The Desk was therefore only too happy to support my research.
In my view, Witvlei was most suitable as a contrast group: it is situated at a distance of ap-
proximately 50km to Otjivero, far enough to impede daily contact between the inhabitants of
the two settlements, which would have blurred income differences. Both settlements are situ-
ated in a rural set-up and are surrounded by mostly white-owned farmland. Even though
Witvlei is a long-established village, it kept its former spatial structures. Witvlei’s former black
settlement (still named “the location”) up to this day is inhabited by mostly poor black people.
As far as the socio-economic conditions are concerned, the Witvlei location is not much dif-
ferent from Otjivero. The better-off part of the population lives outside the location.
The third aspect in favour of Witvlei was its cultural diversity: just as Otjivero, Witvlei lo-
cation is inhabited by people of different cultural groups but with predominantly Damara
background. This is exceptional to the Omaheke region where Herero speaking groups are
more numerous (43%) versus 24% Nama/Damara speakers15 (see Suzman 1995: 4). Suzman
identified the Omaheke Damara to be “the backbone of the commercial farming workforce”
(1995: 4). To make comparisons easier, only persons who referred to themselves as Damara
were chosen as interview partners in both places.
The reason why Witvlei had been omitted from previous research and evaluations –
though being the only available settlement which might have possibly served the purpose (the
capital Windhoek to the west and the town of Gobabis to the east are both too large) – was the
Witvlei abattoir Witvlei Meat as the then main employer (closed in 2014). The investigators
regarded this source of income too significant as to leave it unconsidered and therefore
claimed the Witvlei settlement was not comparable with Otjivero.16 However, a closer look at
the local conditions and interviews with the management17 revealed that not all of the then
14 Personal communication, Windhoek 9.8.2011.
15 Since the langue of Nama and Damara shows many similarities, it is generally called “Nama/Damara”.
16 Personal communication.
17 Interview with M. B., Witvlei, 27.9.2011.
10 SABINE KLOCKE-DAFFA
154 abattoir workers, though mostly from Witvlei and the Omaheke area, were working for
Witvlei Meat on a permanent base since many of them frequently left their work place after
only a few days.18 Also, none of my interview partners was working at the abattoir on a regular
base. It turned out that many of the Witvlei location inhabitants had more in common with
the Otjiverans than I expected: due to the very low income rates, many lived off their relatives
working as farm workers on surrounding farms or as domestic workers in Windhoek who
regularly provisioned their rural relatives with meat or sent money. Giving and receiving gifts
turned out to be an essential part of life in both communities. Whether it was a gift from re-
latives or the demanded share of old peoples’ pensions, a free supply of drought food (maize
meal) provided by government or the remittance of a relative from outside the settlement,
gifts constituted an essential part of all household incomes in both communities. Even the
abattoir fitted into this pattern: on account of the abattoir management the left over and un-
salable entrails such as the guts of slaughtered cattle were distributed to the inhabitants of the
location on a fairly regular base. These free gifts used to be unloaded by cruising vans within
the location at irregular intervals and were highly appreciated.
Taking the role of the abattoir as an economic factor into consideration, this employer on
the whole was as relevant for the overall economic condition of the location’s population as
were the few village jobs and the Omitara farmers to the Otjivero population. It should be
remembered that these farmers who caused many of the problems of the Otjivero squatters in
the first place nevertheless continued to be employers offering jobs to many of them, espe-
cially those of the younger generation who regularly visited their Otjivero relatives providing
meat and fat received on the farms. As opposed to the often depressing picture of helpless
victims, the Otjivero inhabitants are still agents of their lives. Though living in great poverty
before (and after) BIG they do know how to manage their daily survival even without a regu-
lar income just as poor people in Witvlei do. So in all respects, Witvlei did prove to be a valid
contrast group and it certainly would have been benefiting had this settlement been included
into the BIG project and evaluations before.
Study group: In both settlements, there are people of different ethnic affiliations such as
Herero and Ovambo, few Himba and San and some of mixed ethnicity. In Otjivero, all of
them qualified for the BIG independent of their cultural background. However, for the pur-
pose of this research it looked promising to focus on just one group representing the majority
of the population in both locations (Damara) for the sake of obtaining comparable data. In
order to detect differences and accordance within a culturally diverse study group, a much
larger research set-up would have been necessary which was not possible at that time since the
BIG was already announced to be running out in 2011/2012.19
Research question: My argument was that culture has an impact on the use of income
transfers as indeed on any other kind of resource. Deriving from this argument the research
18 It was not evident whether the high fluctuation of workers was due to the work conditions at Witvlei Meat, the low pay
of only 639 NAM /month (Sept. 2011) or to other factors that caused people quitting their jobs after a relatively short period
of time.
19 Had additional BIG projects been realised in other parts of the country as was discussed among ELCRN and DfSD rep-
resentatives in 2011 and 2012, chances would have been good to further elaborate on this kind of multi-sited research.
CONTESTED CLAIMS TO SOCIAL WELFARE 11
question was formulated: What influence do cultural patterns have on the appropriation and
handling of income grants? The aim was to investigate the output and sustainability of BIG.
Definitions: I use the term appropriation in the sense of Hahn as an integration of an ex-
ternal item or idea into one’s own cultural system (Hahn 2005: 102). This implies that identi-
cal items may be received, incorporated and used differently. Following current research on
the cultural dynamics of resources the term resource is applied in the sense of a “basis for or a
means to create, sustain and alter social relations, units and identities within the framework of
culturally affected beliefs and practices” (Bartelheim et al. 2015: 39).
Methods applied: To choose the appropriate methods for conducting the intended re-
search, I draw on my research experience among Khoisan peoples prior to this (Klocke-Daffa
2001; 2003; 2005; 2008). Even though Damara history (still mostly unknown) is different from
the history of other groups there are a number of common cultural traits all Khoisan share –
in particular Damara and Nama – such as language, religion, social organisation, and kinship
terminology which is almost identical to that of the Nama (Barnard 1992: 206, for overview
see 176–213). Many Damara today are cattle and sheep herders as the Nama are, or work in
different jobs in urban and rural areas. The most striking feature shared with other Khoisan
groups are closely knit social networks comprising an ongoing exchange of goods, services
and persons. Being a good giver is highly estimated and increases reputation (or social capital)
as well as self-esteem. Economic success is well appreciated but often neglected because social
obligations come first, up to the point that the individual stands back and comes out on the
short end.
Knowing that “giving” is a culturally highly appreciated value, which motivates the indi-
vidual to continuously prove being a responsible social partner, I wanted to find out how the
Otjivero Damara cope with an extra income grant such as the BIG which was connected to
expectations (though not explicitly attached to it since BIG was supposed to be unconditional)
of providing incentives to individual economic progress. The only way to get valid empirical
data was to assess daily transactions over the period of at least one BIG cycle (one month) to
document the process of transfers rather than catching one moment in time. Therefore, it was
decided to apply a mix of anthropological methods – quantitative as well as qualitative – over
a period of three months for the entire fieldwork.
a) Interview partners/survey: Within the two communities 30 households (15 in each set-
tlement) volunteered for interviews, comprising about 350 members in total. Volunteers were
chosen on a random base – in the ethnological and not statistical sense of the term – with the
only two conditions that the participants should refer to themselves as heads of their house-
holds and Damara-speaking to make the results comparable. With the help of a research assis-
tant, 29 interview partners out of 29 households (initially, 15 in each site but one later
dropped out) were interviewed on a daily basis over a period of four weeks focusing on in-
come and expenditure transfers. To find volunteers, several preliminary discussions with re-
presentatives of the two communities, church congregations and the village BIG committee
(in Otjivero) were held in order to explain the research in detail. For Otjivero, there was also a
member of the Desk for Social Development who at the time was monitoring the BIG payout
who served as a gatekeeper and opened many doors for me.
12 SABINE KLOCKE-DAFFA
b) Questionnaire: As I expected, it was not feasible to calculate the exact value of each and
every transferred item on an adult-equivalent basis or per capita. This was due to the ongoing
exchange of items, which basically continued all day with people going in and out, asking,
buying, selling, borrowing or bringing items without having been asked for. It was also owed
to the fact that some items were given away where the “ownership” was not individually
marked, such as maize flour pertaining to the household but freely given away by the head of
the household. After intense discussions with some of my interview partners, a questionnaire
was worked out which took cultural specifics into account. Rather than asking for the exact
cash equivalent of daily income and expenditures, the interviewee was asked to recall the
number of in- and out-transfers. They were distinguished into three categories (things given
as gifts, borrowed, bought with cash; things received as gifts, borrowed things given back, and
incoming cash transfers). It took three tests to have all interview partners approve the outline
of the questionnaire, which then started on the day of BIG payout on 1 September 2011.
c) In-depth interviews and focus group discussions: Since the questionnaire was presented
with the same questions to the same persons every day, it took less and less time for filling out.
Interview partners would already be awaiting us, sitting in front of their houses inviting visi-
tors to join in. The redundant questions facilitated the interviews and provided time for addi-
tional qualitative interviews. Also, whenever visitors were participating, listening to the ques-
tions to be answered or giving comments on how much was to be given to whom, there was a
chance for a focus group discussion on general topics of my research. As most of my interview
partners did not have a regular job, there was ample space for talking and gossiping. After a
month of intensive interviewing, considerably more information on the general situation of
each community could be obtained than would have been possible by a single inquiry. This
way about 50 qualitative interviews were conducted to back up the results of the questionnaire
plus some network analysis (not explicitly presented here). At the end of the field work per-
iod, roughly 700 interviews with 5000 datasets were to be evaluated (Klocke-Daffa 2012).
d) Participant observation: For the entire period of field word (three months), the re-
searchers stayed close to the two communities. However, in Otjivero it turned out that there
was no place to stay other than in one of the houses already overcrowded. The housing situa-
tion in Witvlei is slightly better and the school offered one of the guest rooms but shortly be-
fore the beginning of field work the school head decided to offer the room to one of their stu-
dent interns. Following the advice of one of the BIG committee members, it was decided to
rent a room on one of the surrounding farms where Otjivero people work as labourers. The
farm was situated between the two communities under study, which enabled us to stay in both
of them for half a day each day of field work and for special occasions on weekends like the
Holy Communion. Participant observation is one of the classical anthropological methods. It
is indispensable to establish a rapport with the local partners, “talking the talk” of people
(DeWalt/DeWalt 2011: 41–58) and comprehend the emic point of view.
e) Critical reflection of methods used: As compared to quantitative methods used in many
sociological empirical enquiries, anthropological methods have many advantages to offer as
well as a few shortcomings. Stationary fieldwork, language skills and in-depth-interviews al-
low for a holistic perspective on cultural coherences, power relations and individual agency.
This takes time. Analysis is based on long-term research findings and usually does not allow
CONTESTED CLAIMS TO SOCIAL WELFARE 13
for big data given the fact that only relatively small samples will be selected. However, anthro-
pologists are reluctant to confine themselves to quantitative enquiries only, which is the cur-
rent method in the social sciences – even though they allow for a sophisticated set-up, selec-
tion of much larger samples, data cleaning and (quantitative) data analysis – but do not per-
mit to answer all the questions anthropologists usually ask. Knowing how many persons do
what and how they do it according to their own explanations is important and helpful in order
to get the hard facts when documenting the initial situation, processes of change and the out-
come of any kind of project or event as was the case in evaluating the BIG (Haarmann et al.
2009). However, mere quantitative data do not answer the question why people act and react
the way they do. Also, they do not allow for explaining the cultural codes underlying indivi-
dual actions, the intersections of social, religious and economic fields and particular local ap-
propriations.
To answer these questions, a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods therefore seemed
necessary and I must admit that my initial scepticism towards qualitative interviews mitigated
in the course of the research. Of course, it might have been advantageous to select a bigger
sample in the two study groups but it is doubtful whether the outcome would have altered the
results. This research was meant to only supplement the valuable research already completed
and add an additional perspective.20 Three months were considered sufficient to provide for
additional insights. In any case, doing this research was only possible because of my pre-
cursory long-term experiences with Khoisan people as well as proficient language skills (Afri-
kaans, since most Damara are bi-lingual) to allow for interviews and group discussions with-
out the filtering of answers by interpreters. For a profound inter- and intra-household analysis
a research over a period of about one year would have been necessary, which would also have
allowed considering seasonal variations, such as school vacations or Christmas, when the size
of households and income/expenditure patterns might vary substantially as compared to
normal months due to outgoing children visiting their parents or incoming visitors bringing
extra gifts and money for the holidays. However, this would have been a different research
and was not intended to be realised in the first place.
Theoretical base: Apart from the methodological foundations of anthropological research,
a careful selection of theoretical approaches to analyse field data is essential to any kind of
anthropological research. Only then can we hope to find a clue to understand what we observe
and what is told to us. I decided to choose a theoretical approach from economic anthropolo-
gy: Jonathan Parry and Maurice Bloch (1989: 23–28) elaborated the model of transactional
orders postulating that in many societies two totally different orders may exist side by side: a
short term cycle of transactions dominated by commodity exchange and individual economic
competition, and a long-term cycle, which serves the social and cosmological reproduction of
society. Analysing cash transfers thus not only requires looking into the exchange of material
20 A comparison of research output in absolute numbers would have been impossible at this point of time since the
monthly BIG payouts had been reduced from 100 Nam to 80 NAM which was not only lower in terms of real value but had
also not been inflation adjusted. In addition, the size of households had changed due to the extra income which was one of
the reasons why earlier data collection of the BIG pilot mandated by the BIG Coalition was stopped after one year – not con-
sidering the fact that the admission of extra household was precisely one of the results of BIG in view of cultural factors.
14 SABINE KLOCKE-DAFFA
items but has to consider the importance of social relationships and moral values as well. Ste-
phen Gudemann (2005) calls it the “base” of a community.
The Cultural Appropriation of BIG
If we want to understand how the monthly allowances are handled, we have to look into some
of the cultural foundations of Damara society as part of this “base”. Like among other Khoisan
peoples there is an elaborate exchange system, which is more than an emergency system in
times of need. In Damara belief life is only possible and livable as life in exchange. So, basically
anything they possess is given to and shared with others. There are few justifications for refu-
sing to share as the norm stipulates: “You must give if you have something and somebody
comes and asks you for it.” Basically anything might be asked for: money and food, transport
and housing, the electricity bill or a pre-paid mobile phone, childcare and personal services of
almost any kind. Where people live on very scarce resources there will always be a demand for
something, resulting in a continuous exchange of things, services and persons between fami-
lies, households and social network partners.
Obviously, there are people who have to seek support out of sheer deprivation but there
are many who ask to be given even though they are not in burning need, some send items
without prior request and again others might send a gift just to return the next day and de-
mand exactly the same back as a counter-gift. These social exchanges are highly valued and
bring great respect and social reputation to any generous person. Retaining goods for indivi-
dual purposes even though practiced openly as well as clandestinely is generally disapproved
of if social obligations are ignored for the sake of personal interests. Those who apparently
keep their possessions for themselves, who live in nicer houses, hold expensive technical
equipment and private cars and refuse demands for sharing are running the risk of being
called stingy. Social surveillance and gossip are powerful means of social control to ensure
smooth cooperation.
However, there is more to keep individuals in line. Asked why people give so much, they
answer: “I do it for the LORD”. Damara have a strong belief that the LORD is the ultimate
giver of anything good in life. But HE demands something back: a reciprocal gift that should
be given to a third person. Refusing to share and give thus comes close to ingratitude, which
might cause incalculable harm, much greater than mere damage to social reputation. Potential
givers seldom appear to be annoyed (at least not openly) when asked to share even if besieged
by many. Equally the beneficiaries never seem to have too much of a bad conscience when
asking to share as it is them allowing the givers to be grateful towards the LORD (Klocke-
Daffa 2001; 2003). At the end of the day, it all pays out, because the LORD “loves the givers
and gives you back double”. Wealth derives from giving not keeping. Asking another person
to share is therefore not at all considered to be humiliating and will even be encouraged. It
keeps the system going even though not all are always willing to cooperate, some opt out and
others might negotiate the price of sharing and belonging.
If we now look at the results of the research, we find that they only partially fulfilled the
BIG organisers’ expectations on the economic and social effects but are perfectly in line with
the cultural norms and deep values of Damara society. Contrary to what was desired, people
CONTESTED CLAIMS TO SOCIAL WELFARE 15
did not stop gift transfers. The (statistically not representative) results for the BIG-receiving
settlement of Otjivero demonstrate that more than 50% of all expenditure transfers were still
conceptualised as gifts (figure 3) without stringent necessity due to the incoming extra mone-
tary resources. Most of all transfers were given in the form of food (figure 4). It is important to
bear in mind that these numbers refer to the number of transactions, not their value.
Also, an increase in gift transfers for special occasions such as rituals (confirmations, wed-
dings and funerals) could be noted as compared to Witvlei, the settlement without BIG (figure
5).
Figure 3: Percentage of expenditure transfers according to dominant categories (gifts, loans, re-
funds, purchases, expenditures on special occasions).
Source: S. Klocke-Daffa, evalutation by Bildungsonline 24/ M. Schlattmann
Figure 4: Percentage of expenditure transfers according to dominant type of items
Source: S. Klocke-Daffa, evalutation by Bildungsonline 24/ M. Schlattmann
16 SABINE KLOCKE-DAFFA
Figure 5: Comparing number of expenditure transfers of Otjivero (with BIG) and Witvlei
(without BIG)
Source: S. Klocke-Daffa, evalutation by Bildungsonline 24/ M. Schlattmann
Getting back to the theoretical foundations mentioned in the beginning, we clearly see what
BIG money is used for and how it is handled (figure 6):
In a short-term cycle, BIG money is spent for commodities on the market and used for
individual needs,
but in a long-term cycle, a large part of the money and purchased commodities are fed
into the existing social networks in order to guarantee the social and cosmological re-
production of society as e.g. accepting family members into the household, sharing
cash income with non-beneficiaries of income grants, and donating to ritual events as a
sign of gratitude towards the LORD. Concomitantly, these transfers secured the repu-
tation of individuals as generous givers as well as the cohesion of social units.
Much to the displeasure of the project organisers and the global Pro-BIG audience, monthly
grants were not used predominantly for economic entrepreneurship or for self-benefiting
consumer goods but instead were fed into the more highly valued social relations whenever
possible. Where BIG money did serve individual or household priorities such as buying food-
stuff at the local grocery stores the beneficiaries made sure that the budget provided for
enough food to be sent as a gift to needy neighbours or passing visitors.
CONTESTED CLAIMS TO SOCIAL WELFARE 17
Figure 6: Short-term and long-term exchanges
Source: S. Klocke-Daffa
Whenever resources allowed to be distributed beyond the immediate satisfaction of needs
within the own household, they would be given away as becomes evident comparing the two
groups (figure 7 and figure 8). In Otjivero, the pattern of transfer is almost reversed as to the
one in Witvlei. The number of out-transfers in Otjivero has been consistently higher and they
were more regular as compared to the relatively erratic expenditure transfers in Witvlei. The
BIG payout apparently did not influence the number of income transfers in that location.
What is striking is the obvious effect of old age pension payout in both settlements followed
by an immediate increase in the number of transfers.
To put it in other words: cash transfers were invested in social capital and not as economic
capital. From the anthropological point of view, it was interesting to find that BIG transfers
were indeed conceptualised by the local population both as a kind of righteous share of the
national wealth and as a gift. There was no talking about being obligated to reciprocate in pre-
conceived ways as a kind of counter gift to a generously provided welfare gift. Quite on the
contrary, beneficiaries acted much like in economies of sharing where the claim to a share of
the common good neither necessitates an act of gratefulness nor does it need to be reciproca-
ted. Representatives of the local BIG committee as well as many of my interview partners
proudly presented what they had or were planning to do but never in connection with the
notion of an obligation to be fulfilled towards the givers. In Witvlei, an initiative of local rep-
resentatives of the Catholic Church in October 2011 was planning to send a letter to the town
council demanding their share of BIG money and another letter of the bishop of the Lutheran
Church to warrant their support of the BIG campaign.
18 SABINE KLOCKE-DAFFA
Figure 7: Expenditure transfers (blue) and incoming transfers (red) in Otjivero
Source: S. Klocke-Daffa, evalutation by Bildungsonline 24/ M. Schlattmann
Figure 8: Expenditure transfers (blue) and incoming transfers (red) in Witvlei
Source: S. Klocke-Daffa, evalutation by Bildungsonline 24/ M. Schlattmann
CONTESTED CLAIMS TO SOCIAL WELFARE 19
However, in neither community was the bishop conceived of as the leading force behind the
BIG nor was the Namibian government conceptualised as the big spender, donator and “giv-
er” of money. Again and again, I was told that the bishop would only be a mediator because
BIG was originally given by God who cared for the needy (and apparently also for the not so
needy). Only in this respect were social benefits to be reciprocated – by giving to others. It is
here where the categories of sharing and gifting are becoming blurred. Apart from the fact
that we find a triadic structure of gift exchange, which might be more interesting to anthro-
pologists than to social policy makers, it is obvious that the sustainability of unconditional
basic income transfers is to be found mainly in the social sphere. Social networks not only
symbolise an important part of community life but also provide a valuable asset which literally
serves as a cultural resource sustaining and reproducing communities. This kind of “capital”
can be referred to in times of need. Indeed, people lived off their networks every time BIG
transfers were interrupted – as I could clearly detect in 2012 and 2014 when BIG was paid out
only intermittently and finally stopped.
Addendum: When I revisited both communities in the summer of 2017, I expected the
overall condition in Otjivero to be deteriorated due to the final stop of BIG in 2014. However,
it showed that many of the school kids of the years of the BIG campaign 2007–2009 – own
children or external ones who had been accepted into the households and could be sent to
school on a regular base – are now working in Windhoek, Gobabis and on nearby farms, regu-
larly sending money and food – may it be called a “gift” or a “share”.
Contested claims to basic income as a mechanism of social security
If we look at the outcome of the Namibian income scheme it becomes clear that many con-
tested claims were at stake with different political, economic and moral fields affected
(Klocke-Daffa 2012). Long before the political future of BIG in Namibia was decided upon,
public discourse had turned into an ideological debate with many more facets than just the
unsolved problem of social justice. In fact, the ideal of justice for the poor which highlighted
the early discussions on the introduction of a basic income was relegated to an issue of almost
secondary importance overshadowed by the bitter competition for political authority and the
best way to social welfare. Considering the public debates on basic income grants, the state-
ments of politicians, economists and church representatives as well as the results of this re-
search, four separate fields of contested claims can be detected. There are
1. different models of social welfare and alternate forms of social support – with the BIG
competing with other social benefit schemes already in existence all based on the no-
tion of targeting the “needy” and the “deserving” – where the social pensions for all
Namibians beyond the age of 60 coming closest to a basic income scheme,
2. competing models of unconditional income grants – one being a humanitarian model
based on the idea of dignity and quality of life for all versus an economic model of in-
come grants favouring the reduction of labour costs,
20 SABINE KLOCKE-DAFFA
3. opposing political concepts – one being in favour of the dominant state with its ruling
elite governing top-down versus a model of democratic participation of civil society in-
fluencing politics bottom-up, and
4. different notions of authority and legitimacy – one being in favour of political leaders
determining what needs to be done versus the moral authority of local church leaders.
After all, the Namibian Basic income project turned out to be quite successful and could have
been further expanded. The means to finance a nationwide social scheme were there as well as
the organisational infrastructure. So why was it dropped? In the end, it might have all boiled
down to the question of power and authority – with the Otjivero poor left to their fate. What
turned the balance was the controversy between the elected representatives of the nation state
and church representatives on the local and national level. When the President of State openly
declared that in his view BIG would make people lazy and that it would be against the com-
mon good to expand BIG to the national level, his statement urged his followers within and
outside government as well as the trade unions (also dependent on the ruling party) to abstain
from supporting the scheme. Whether this was also a clash of moral and performative legiti-
macy as Michael Williams elaborated on contested political claims in South Africa21 (Williams
2010) would require further research. In any case, as regards the Namibian Basic Income
scheme, the clash of authorities eventually sealed its fate.
Conclusion: Basic Income Transfers and the quest for a rightful share
But what does this teach us in regard to social welfare regimes in general and models of basic
income in particular? When research findings of the anthropological investigation were pre-
sented to different people involved in the process of organising, monitoring or evaluating the
Namibian BIG project, the responses were unexpectedly negative even though pointing to the
success of BIG: most of them didn’t want to hear about it. Politicians insisted that the project
had failed because their concept of job creation had not been realised; economists claimed that
BIG had failed because of a lack of economic stimulus; some church representatives consi-
dered BIG to be too badly equipped because it did not alleviate material poverty. From the
perspective of social sciences – other than anthropology – my pointing at the cultural implica-
tions was equally met with scepticism and even charges of neo-colonialism. The only people
who did accept the research findings had a Khoisan background themselves. They in turn ac-
tivated their own social networks within the German Lutheran Church, which helped to con-
tinue the programme temporarily22 but could not prevent it from being stopped. Once more it
became evident what Thandika Mkandawire wrote more than 10 years ago: “Ideologies play
an important role in the choice of instruments used to address problems of poverty, inequality
and insecurity. Each of the core concerns of policy – need, deserts and citizenship – are social
21 Moral legitimacy includes the norms, values and symbols of a society defining what “adequate” political acting is. Per-
formative legitimacy is revealed in the way how power is performed and whether power holders and citizens accord that the
political system is serving the common good (Williams 2010: 20).
22 After the project officially ended in 2009 and donations from international donors became more and more scarce, the
German Evangelical Church in Westphalia supported BIG temporarily. http://www.moewe-westfalen.de/eine_welt_und_
entwicklungspolitik/gesundheit_und_soziale_sicherung/basic_income_grant/
CONTESTED CLAIMS TO SOCIAL WELFARE 21
constructs that derive full meaning from the cultural and ideological definition of ‘deserving
poor, entitlement and citizens’ rights” (Mkandawire 2005: 2).
What this case study clearly reveals is that concepts of basic income grants are highly con-
tested. It is obvious that there will be no final solution for the question of targeting versus uni-
versalism in poverty reduction – any regime of welfare or social transfers will have to be
adapted to local and national conditions just as the views and demands of those primarily af-
fected need to be taken into account. It also became clear that social welfare is more than a
problem of political implementation and financial feasibility. For the acceptability and success
of social welfare schemes, cultural factors at local levels may be equally significant as claims of
legitimacy and authority at the national level.
Coming back to my arguments presented in the introduction of this paper, it proved to be
indispensable to take cultural aspects of individual and collective appropriations of income
transfers into consideration if we want to understand how social benefits are utilised by the
beneficiaries. However, from the standpoint of the nation state, there can be no differentiation
between ethnic groups, rural and urban populations and social classes in order to guarantee
political equality for all its citizens. So allowing for cultural diversity in regard to the appropri-
ation of social benefits necessitates the political intention to respect cultural diversity and in-
dividual agency even if not appreciated in all its forms. As I argued elsewhere (Klocke-Daffa
2012: 22) today’s income differences may then persist, hopefully then on a higher economic
level. But this argument tackles only the organisational part. The question whether an addi-
tional cultural model should be introduced into the discussion on unconditional income
transfers goes deeper touching the base of our understanding of “the social”. If we conceptua-
lise social benefits not as grants and means of aid to help the needy provided by benevolent
states or generous individuals but as rightful claims to the common good then the idea of
what the obligations of the state are needs to be reconsidered. If anyone would be entitled to
get his due share of the national wealth – whether by virtue of being a citizen or just for “being
there” – we would have to get away from the idea of a gift to the “deserving” towards the idea
of a “share” for everyone, get away from “help for the needy” to “making a claim to owner-
ship”. A range of societies and social groups would have no problem with changing the per-
spective, oscillating between gifting and sharing as demonstrated in the Namibian case. How-
ever, the existing economic model seems be only partially applicable with its narrow focus on
the economic effects of basic income grants, given the cultural diversity of patterns of distri-
bution. The humanitarian model does capture the main ideas of sharing but heavily draws on
ethical principles of justice, equality, righteousness and fairness. Convincing as they are, they
may still be too narrowly focusing on ethical values and there might be many who would not
agree (e.g. most of my Namibian interview partners declared a basic income totally unfair if
guaranteed to all but to the needy). For this reason, I still plead for the elaboration of an addi-
tional third model – be it named the cultural model or the distributional model or yet another
label to be found – broad enough to incorporate emic categories of sharing and equality.
The discussion on comprehensive forms of redistribution with free, state-provided basic
income transfers allowing for cultural diversity with regard to the utilisation of transfers (thus
being truly unconditional on all grounds) have only just started. As James Ferguson rightly
noted, “the intersection of new kinds of welfare states with new kinds of thinking about distri-
22 SABINE KLOCKE-DAFFA
bution has created a powerful conjunctural moment” (Ferguson 2015: 188). This will urge us
to re-define and reconstruct our concepts of social welfare. In this respect, anthropological
findings might provide for some helpful insights.
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