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The 2000 Algiers Agreement and the 2018 Asmara/Jeddah Peace Agreements Between Eritrea and Ethiopia: Continuity or a New Beginning?
Abstract
Following two decades of conflict between 1998–2018, Eritrea and Ethiopia have entered into a new phase of rapprochement and signed two peace agreements in Asmara (July 2018) and Jeddah (September 2018). The 1998–2000 border war between the two states and its consequences were expected to be fully resolved by the so-called Algiers Agreement of December 2000 which, inter alia, established three institutions: an organ that would investigate the origins of the conflict, a border commission, and a claims commission. The decisions and awards of the border and claims commissions have not been implemented and the investigating organ has not been established. The 2018 rapprochement was brought about following Ethiopia’s declaration in June 2018 to fully implement the Algiers Agreement and Eritrea’s acceptance of Ethiopia’s call. However, except for the broad reference made to be bound by the decision of the border commission, the 2018 Agreements make no textual reference to the two other organs established by the Algiers Agreement. This article argues that the 2000 and 2018 Agreements are not mutually exclusive and that they must, despite the difference in their respective scopes, be read together to restore peace and secure cooperation. Accordingly, full implementation of the Algiers Agreement and assumption of responsibility by both sides for their actions during the impasse between 2002 and 2018 should be the cornerstone of the new peace deal, if the ambitious objectives of the new engagement are to be realized.
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On 19 December 2005, in its partial award, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission found that Eritrea had acted in violation of the rules of international law on the use of force (jus ad bellum) in resorting to armed force to attack and occupy the disputed border town of Badme and surrounding areas, which were then under the administration of Ethiopia. In its award, the Claims Commission made a number of important findings which, taken with the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission’s 2002 decision on boundary delimitation, contribute towards informing and clarifying the substance of international law applicable to disputed territories and the legal obligations of states acting in those areas, especially where the use of force is engaged. This article examines the Claims Commission’s jus ad bellum award and concentrates on three key issues: (a) the legality in international law of the resort to force as a means of gaining control over territory to which a state has (or believes that it has) a valid sovereign title; (b) the specific contours of self-defence in relation to territorial sovereignty claims, and (c) the legitimacy of dealing with use of force issues by arbitral tribunals. In September 2018, the leaders of the two countries signed a peace and friendship agreement, thus, setting course for a new era of peace and cooperation. The lessons that ought to be learnt by these two neighbouring countries and other states have been articulated as concluding remarks.
In this article, the author analyses Eritrean state-making and its foreign policy as driven by the quest for territorial integrity. The article first demonstrates the importance of creating a territorial nation-state for Eritrean nationalism. It subsequently provides an interpretation of Eritrean foreign policy through the lens of the importance of territorial integrity. The article then reflects on how this has underpinned the recent rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia. It ends with some thoughts on what these developments might mean for the future of Eritrea and the wider geopolitical environment of the Horn.
The article highlights some of the embedded plausible causes of the war that are quite often glossed over. It argues that at the centre of the conflict stand different perceptions of history, identity, as well as claims and counterclaims of state rights, decolonisation process, and nation-state formation. Beyond the minor border skirmishes of May 1998, the contested interpretation of history and identity formation, and the concomitant search for a separate identity and sovereignty, on one hand, and denial of that separate identity and sovereignty, on the other, explain the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict. In that sense the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict will be found to revolve around the status of Eritrean independence. Moreover two sets of the conflict – Tigray-Eritrea and Ethiopia-Eritrea – have further complicated the search for settlement of the conflict. The first step towards finding a lasting solution that would normalise relations between the two countries would be Ethiopia's definitive and unconditional recognition and acceptance of separate Eritrean identity and sovereignty, including its colonial boundaries. Both the people of Tigray, and Ethiopia as a whole, need to accept this reality. Secondly, Ethiopia's legitimate interest should be addressed in a manner that will not undermine Eritrea's sovereignty. Only then will Ethiopia's need to have access to the sea find lasting and amicable solution acceptable to both sides.
On 27 April 2007 Eritrea notified the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) of its decision to “temporarily suspend its membership” and “freeze its activities” in IGAD followed on 25 July 2011 by its decision to “reactivate its membership.” On 24 August 2011 Eritrea's representative to the IGAD Council of Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa was informed that he could not sit in the meeting and was escorted out. Eritrea's representatives have not attended IGAD meetings since. The incident raises the important question of what should be done in the absence of an IGAD rule regulating unilateral temporary suspension and reactivation of membership. The answer should be based on a clear understanding of the laws and practices of withdrawal, suspension, expulsion, membership reactivation and rejoining international / regional organizations. This article discusses how the stalemate regarding Eritrea's status in IGAD should be handled by reference to such laws and practices, and the rules in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties governing the interpretation of treaties.
The Ethiopia-Eritrea war of 1998-2000 stands apart from other contemporary conflicts in Africa in a number of critical ways. First, the multiplicity of its proximate and distant historical causes, coupled with its diverse forms of manifestation, renders fitting it into neat conventional categories a very challenging undertaking. Analysing and adopting policies and measures demands a prior ability to fit conflicts into known categories. Conflicts are commonly believed to fit into either the (1) inter-state (inter-national) or (2) the intra-state (domestic) categories. The latter is further divided into (a) inter-communal or inter-ethnic and (b) intra-communal or intra-ethnic. The main argument of this paper is that the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict defies attempts to fit it neatly into just one of these types.
The dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula is a unique case, reflecting both the colonial and the modern thirst for oil. The Bakassi Peninsula is a swampy, 600 square mile area that may contain more than 24B barrels of crude oil. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) was designated as the institution to play an important legal role in resolving border conflicts among UN member states. Legal doctrines are also established as prerequisites in determining the relative merits of claims and their final disposition. In this conflict, the ICJ issued a key ruling on the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. The court ordered Nigeria to pull its officials, troops, and police from the peninsula, bringing to an end the conflict that had enclosed the two countries for years. Also in the same ruling, the ICJ ordered Cameroon to swiftly withdraw its administration and military police forces from islands of Lake Chad. Both presidents of Cameroon and Nigeria agreed to respect and implement the decision of the ICJ and establish an implementation mechanisms with the help of UN. They also agreed to confidence-building measures including demilitarization of the peninsula and possible economic cooperations with joint ventures from the two countries.
The law of armed force is traditionally conceptualized in the categories of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. This dualist conception of armed force has its origin in the legal tradition of the inter-war period. This essay revisits
this approach. It argues that the increasing interweaving of the concepts of intervention, armed conflict and peace-making
in contemporary practice make it necessary to complement the classical rules of jus ad bellum and in jus in bello with a third branch of the law, namely rules and principles governing peace-making after conflict. The idea of a tripartite
conception of armed force, including the concept of justice after war (‘jus post bellum’) has a long-established tradition in moral philosophy and legal theory. This article argues that this historical concept
deserves fresh attention from a legal perspective at a time when the contemporary rules of jus ad bellum and jus in bello are increasingly shaped by a normative conception of law and justice and a broadening notion of human security. Moreover,
it identifies some of the legal rules and principles underlying a modern conception of ‘just post bellum’.
On 6 May 1998, a violent conflict erupted in the Ethiopian-Eritrean border area. This article contends that this border crisis is neither unexpected nor the result of a real border dispute. Rather, it is due to three factors: the particular history and relationship of the two insurgent movements turned national governments (the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, EPLF, and the Tigray People's Liberation Front, TPLF) in the two countries; the nature and heritage of neopatrimonial elite rule and the lack of democratic restructuring in the two countries; and the economic problems of Eritrea. The author first gives an overview of the outbreak of the conflict, its economic effects, and international mediation efforts. Then he analyses the background to the border dispute, arguing that it is a direct result of the unresolved and ambiguous political relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the national leaders' policy of making deals without securing a broad national consensus or legally clear formulas. Finally, he considers the prospects for a solution of the conflict and future relations between the two countries. Notes, ref
The Ethiopian-Eritrean 'border war' of 1998-2000 was about much more than a stretch of relatively useless borderland, but in the subsequent negotiations this issue has come to dominate the agenda. The focus of the controversy is the village of Badme. Despite the border decision prepared by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC) under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in 2002, no one knew for sure which country had been accorded Badme until the EEBC issued a statement on 21 March 2003, declaring that the place would be in Eritrea. However, with this statement the case is not yet closed. Ethiopia remains unconvinced and has called for a 'proper' interpretation of the issue in the spirit of the December 2000 Algiers agreement. This article discusses the background to the conflict and explains why Badme has become such a highly symbolic prize. Bibliogr., notes, ref. [ASC Leiden abstract]
An explanation of how Eritrea came to be such a totalitarian state, after fighting for its freedom from Ethiopia for thirty years. The History, Economy and Current Affairs of Eritrea.
“Jus Ad Bellum,” “Jus in Bello,” “Jus Post Bellum?” Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force - Volume 100 - Carsten Stahn
The multiplicity of its proximate and distant historical causes, coupled with its diverse forms of manifestation, makes fitting the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict into neat conventional categories a very challenging undertaking. Analyzing and adopting policies and measures that would achieve its resolution, however, demands a prior ability to fit the conflict into known categories. Conflicts are commonly believed to fit into either the interstate (international) or the intra-state (domestic) categories. The latter is further divided into intercommunal or interethnic and intra-communal or intra-ethnic. The main argument of this chapter is that the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict defies attempts to fit it neatly into just one of these types. Intervention by the UN and its allied regional bodies hence will succeed in achieving sustainable peace between and within these two entities only to the extent that all the diverse forms of manifestation of the conflict are understood and addressed.
Annexed to GA Resolution 56/83 of 2001, the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts put the international law of responsibility on a sound footing. As Special Rapporteur for the second reading, James Crawford helped steer it to a successful conclusion. With this book, he provides a detailed analysis of the general law of international responsibility and the place of state responsibility in particular within that framework. It serves as a companion to The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge University Press, 2002) and is essential reading for scholars and practitioners concerned with issues of international responsibility, whether they arise in interstate relations, in the context of arbitration or litigation, or in bringing international claims.
This article examines the problematic relationship between Eritrea and Tigray as represented by the Eritrean and Tigray Peoples’ Liberation Fronts. The EPLF won independence for Eritrea in 1991, at the same time as the TPLF seized power in Ethiopia; the two movements had had a difficult relationship, beginning in the mid-1970s, during their respective armed struggles, and the issues which had caused disagreement remained unresolved as the movements made the transition to government. This paper examines the nature of those issues and the degree to which the war of 1998-2000 between the two countries can be seen to have reflected much older tensions and indeed contradictions in the Eritrean–Tigrayan/Ethiopian relationship. Thus, the paper begins with an overview of Eritrean opinion, during the recent war, about the relationship in question, and then moves back in time to the era of the liberation struggle. Here, the author attempts to explain the complexities of the respective Eritrean and Tigrayan revolutions insofar as each impinged on and influenced the other, with particular reference to the issues of frontiers, nationality and ethnicity, and sovereignty. The paper, finally, considers the apparent paradoxes in the perceptions which Eritreans have of Tigray and Ethiopia, and suggests that changes in attitude are necessary on both sides of the Mereb river border if the relationship is not to be defined by perpetual confrontation.
On August 17, 2009, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission issued its Final Awards on the claims of the two sides for injury and loss suffered during their 1998-2000 conflict. These Awards dealt with a number of important issues concerning the responsibility of states in armed conflict and the method by which the resulting damages are to be evaluated and compensated. This article reviews the main elements of these Awards and compares them to the results of other international claims processes in modern armed conflicts.
The Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) has its roots in the Marxist-oriented Tigray university students' movement organized at Haile Selassie University in 1974 under the name Mahber Gesgesti Behere Tigray, generally known by its acronym, MAGEBT, which stands for Progressive [Tigray People's Movement].2 The founders claim that even though the movement was tactically designed to be nationalistic it was, strategically, pan-Ethiopian.3
The primary structural document that the movement produced in the late 1970s, however, shows it to be Tigrayan nationalist and not Ethiopian oriented in its content. It was also pro-Eritrean independence.4 The original manifesto was drafted clearly as referring to a Tigrayan ethnic struggle for independence, not as one seeking the political liberation of Ethiopia from the dictatorship of the Derg.5 In fact, this stand did not change until 1984.
MAGEBT as a movement was based on the Leninist principle of democratic centralism. Politburo and Central Committee members were elected by a majority of the leadership, whose legality was watched by an auditing commission. As Lenin dictated in What Is to Be Done, factionalism was strictly prohibited.6 Ideas would filter upward but once policies were adopted, power was intended to flow only downward. Breaking this rule was punishable by severe penalties including death. As the struggle progressed in the countryside, the name of the movement was changed to Tegadlo Harnet Hizbi Tigray, the Tigray People's Revolutionary Movement.7 Later, it was renamed the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF).
In the 1980s, the TPLF received backing almost exclusively from among the Tigrayan population of northern Ethiopia. Nevertheless, it was said to be devoted to the structuring of one united national front standing for all classes and ethnic groups struggling against the Mengistu dictatorship. A proposal suggesting the formation of a united front grounded on a "minimum program" with the single purpose of smashing Mengistu's dictatorship was released on 8 May 1984. By this time, the TPLF had extended its reach into most of Tigray and adjacent parts of Wallo, Gondar, and Gojam. The guerrilla movement was very clear about the ideology it intended to implement in Tigray and Ethiopia: it was none other than the tenets of the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray based on the Albanian model.
During the two months following the 1988 New Year, the TPLF was engaged in a life and death struggle against the central government army. By 1989, the Ethiopian army had withdrawn completely from the province and the TPLF had seized the entire territory of Tigray, including major towns such as Makale, Aksum, and Endaselassie.
When, in 1989, Mengistu Haile Mariam slaughtered more than 200 officers on the battlefield, including the well-trained and most experienced generals that Emperor Haile Selassie's government had carefully trained in military academies, the TPLF moved quickly to develop a united front. In January 1989, it entered into an alliance with the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM), a breakaway organization from the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) constituted mainly of Amharas from Gondar, Wallo, and Northern Showa. The EPDM military claimed to be in control of some 2.5 million people by the fall of 1989.
The EPDM and the TPLF had coordinated their military activities during the previous decade, but they had not formed a political unit. The EPDM's agenda, like that of the TPLF, recognized the right of all nationalities to self-determination, up to and including secession, and the establishment of a democratic Ethiopia once Mengistu had been defeated.
The TPLF also brought together military captives of Oromo lineage from the war with the Derg, and, together with defectors from the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), created the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO) to claim legitimacy in Oromia. Later, the Southern Ethiopia People's Democratic Front (SEPDF) was added to the group in order to expand into southern Ethiopian territories that are not populated by Oromos or Somalis.
The overall political party was named the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF's charter, which borrowed its governing ideas almost exclusively from the TPLF manifesto, called for the elimination of the relics of feudalism and imperialism...
This article examines the establishment and work of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission with regard to its decision of 13 April 2002 concerning the delimitation of the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia and subsequent events. Apart from an examination of the substantive decision of the Commission in the light of the law relating to territory, the article will discuss certain unusual features of the process, including mandating the Commission both to delimit and demarcate the boundary and the involvement of third parties. The delimitation decision is significant in a number of ways, including its views as to the applicable law, treaty interpretation and the subsequent conduct of the parties in relation to title. The long-running and difficult process of demarcation is noted, together with the important role played by the UN and other international actors.
The Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), and by extension the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the multi-ethnic coalition that it established and still dominates, is frequently considered to be a creation of, and beholden to, the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF). From this perspective the foreign loyalties of the TPLF made it an unsuitable, if not illegitimate, movement to lead the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) in 1991, and since 1995, the newly created Federal Democratic Republic. By way of contrast, this article attempts to demonstrate that the developing relationship between the TPLF and the EPLF during the course of their respective revolutionary struggles has been far more problematic and beset with tensions than critics are either aware of, or acknowledge, and that an understanding of their nature casts light on present and possible future differences between the respective regimes of Ethiopia and Eritrea.
This article examines the new norms in bilateral, regional and international
relations that evolved in the wake of the emergence of the Eritrean state
which had successfully challenged the hegemonic claims of both the imperial
and Afro-Marxist Ethiopian state. The analysis proceeds from a retelling of
the events in 1998 which precipitated the break between the Ethiopian and
Eritrean partners of the old alliance against the Mengistu regime, then examines
the structural anomalies in the alliance and their consequences. The
evidence examined here suggests that two inter-related phenomena help to
shed light on the structural, historical and philosophical underpinnings of the
1998–2000 Ethio–Eritrean conflict: (1) the asymmetry of vision between diasporic
and hegemonic states, leading to a clash of interests; (2) the failure
of both post-war regimes to formalise their ‘understandings’ into formal
treaties based on international law.
This article contrasts the lawmaking process in the Eritrean transitional legal framework with experience in South Africa, which offers insightful lessons for future improvement in Eritrea. Indeed, the Eritrean lawmaking process retains many imperfections in terms of the design of the interim constitution and ensuing practice. On paper, the competence of the executive and the legislature is not clearly demarcated.
Rather, it is nebulously shared between both branches, resulting inevitably in competing interests. The lawmaking process lacks democratic characteristics and defies the requirements of accountability and good governance. The practice that has followed is worse. In a country with a protracted history of executive dominance, the lawmaking competence conferred upon the executive has inexorably
contributed to entrenched dictatorship. The article offers suggestions for improvement.
Violations of international humanitarian law are compensable by a state causing the violations. The roots of this obligation can be traced to Article 3 of Hague Convention IV, which states that a party to the conflict which violates the provisions of [international humanitarian law] shall . . . be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces. A similar rule is also contained in Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. In practice, the enforcement of this important provision of international humanitarian law has remained a matter of rarity, particularly in terms of civil - rather than criminal - liability. However, a recent exception is the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission in The Hague (the Claims Commission or the Commission). The Claims Commission was established pursuant to a peace agreement signed by Eritrea and Ethiopia in Algiers, Algeria, on December 12, 2000, ending a devastating war fought between the two countries from May 1998 to December 2000. The Commission was charged with the duty of deciding, through binding arbitration, all claims by one party or citizens of that party against the other party for loss, damage, or injury resulting from violations of international law (mainly violations of international humanitarian law that occurred during the war). The Commission commenced its work in March 2001 and decided to consider the claims of the parties in two different phases of the proceedings: a liability phase and a damages phase. The Commissions rendered the final decisions of the liability phase on December 19, 2005. The damages phase is still being conducted, although no decisions have been rendered by the Commission to date as part of that phase. Thus, this Article exclusively focuses on the Commission's work as it relates to the completed liability phase.
The recent decision by the Eritrea/Ethiopia Claims Commission on the ius ad bellum claims of Ethiopia – that Eritrea had violated the law on the use of force in starting the 1998–2000 war between the two states – is a troubling one. It raises questions about the proper role of arbitral tribunals in such cases. There were many factors which suggested that the Commission should have abstained from giving judgment. There was no unequivocal agreement between the parties that the Commission’s jurisdiction extended beyond claims for violations of humanitarian and other international law during the conflict to an examination of responsibility for the start of the war. Moreover, the award is extremely brief, and consequently it deals with controversial issues of the law of self-defence, such as the meaning of armed attack and the duty to report to the Security Council, in a rather limited way. The award also raises important questions about the relationship of an arbitral tribunal to other bodies. In this case, the award of the Claims Commission undermined the Eritrea/Ethiopia Boundary Commission’s 2002 Delimitation Decision, already under challenge by Ethiopia, at a time of increasing tension along the border.
The present article identifies the tests that make it possible to determine whether a breach of obligations under the WTO agreements is a conduct of the Member and therefore entails its responsibility under international law. It examines the relevant provisions of the WTO agreements and the case law of the dispute settlement bodies in light of the principles of the law of State responsibility codified by the UN International Law Commission. Special consideration is given to the issues related to the conduct of organs of the State, territorial units, para-statal entities (including State trading enterprises) and individuals or private corporations. Copyright Oxford University Press 2002, Oxford University Press.
The Ethiopia-Eritrea Rapprochement: peace and stability in the Horn of Africa
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Claims Commission, Decision No. 8 (Relief to War Victims
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Full English transcript of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s inaugural address
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Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship between Eritrea and Ethiopia
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Claims Commission, Final Award, Eritrea’s Damages Claims
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Ethiopia: the last two frontiers
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How does law protect in war? Cases, documents and teaching materials on contemporary practice in international humanitarian law
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- A A Boivier
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Ethiopian yearbook of international law 2018: in pursuit of peace and prosperity
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Letter dated 13 February 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
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Chronology of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict and basic documents
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Eritrea at a crossroads: a narrative of triumph, betrayal and hope
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International boundary making - three case studies
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Ethiopia: end game? Atlantic Council
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