China's Belt and Road Initiative in South Asia: Implications on India

Abstract

The consistent and spectacular rise of China in world politics as political, economic, and regional power is an important and defining event of 21 st century International Politics and has significant implications on both regional and world politics. Out of the seven South Asian states, China shares borders with four namely Bhutan, India, Pakistan, and Nepal. Much of the relations of China with South Asia have been shaped by the boundary disputes among the South Asian States. Barring its relationship with Pakistan, China until recently lagged far behind India in terms of economic and political engagements with South Asian countries. However in the Post-Cold war period, particularly over the past decade, China has expanded its political, economic, and security engagements with the South Asian region dramatically challenging India's position. Increasingly the governments in South Asia are becoming more accommodative of Beijing's interests. BRI is an initiative of huge magnitude and is bound to produce a significant geo-economic and geo-political impact. If implemented successfully, the BRI retains the promise of altering the existing structural arrangements in Asia and beyond.

Full text

SSRG International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Volume 7 Issue 6, 47-53, Nov-Dec 2020
ISSN: 2394 – 2703 /doi:10.14445/23942703/IJHSS-V7I6P108 © 2020 Seventh Sense Research Group®
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
China’s Belt and Road Initiative in South Asia:
Implications on India
Syed Sabreena Bukhari1
1Research Scholar, Department of Political Science,
University of Kashmir, Srinagar, India.
Abstract:
The consistent and spectacular rise of China in world
politics as political, economic, and regional power is an
important and defining event of 21st century International
Politics and has significant implications on both regional
and world politics. Out of the seven South Asian states,
China shares borders with four namely Bhutan, India,
Pakistan, and Nepal. Much of the relations of China with
South Asia have been shaped by the boundary disputes
among the South Asian States. Barring its relationship with
Pakistan, China until recently lagged far behind India in
terms of economic and political engagements with South
Asian countries. However in the Post-Cold war period,
particularly over the past decade, China has expanded its
political, economic, and security engagements with the South
Asian region dramatically challenging India’s position.
Increasingly the governments in South Asia are becoming
more accommodative of Beijing’s interests. BRI is an
initiative of huge magnitude and is bound to produce a
significant geo-economic and geo-political impact. If
implemented successfully, the BRI retains the promise of
altering the existing structural arrangements in Asia and
beyond.
Keywords: China, OBOR, India, Regional Power, etc.
Introduction
OBOR is a long term plan to construct the Silk Road
Economic Belt and the 21st century Maritime Silk Road. It is
the centerpiece of Xi Jinping’s pro-active foreign policy and
the most ambitious development plan conceived by any
country ever extending from China to Europe. Envisioned
on the ancient Silk Road, the Belt, and road project will
form a network of trading routes influenced by geographical
proximities, commerce, and geopolitics. OBOR is seen by
Chinese leaders as a way of achieving the dream of making
China great again. The underlying goals and motives behind
this grand initiative according to Tom Miller
1
are:
1. First, China wants to protect its national security.
Through a network of economic dependency,
China wants to secure its regional leadership
against the United States alliance structure in Asia.
2. The second driving force behind this initiative is
Economic motivation. Beijing calculates that
better connectivity will help its underdeveloped
border regions become viable trade zones.
China has traditionally been a passive player in global
diplomacy and global events, preferring to hide behind the
mantra of what Miller calls “Non-Interference in other
countries’ affairs”
2
. However in the last decade, particularly
after the Global Financial crises of 2008-2009, China has
emerged as a major economic global power. In the 1990s
Deng Xioping pronounced the doctrine of “Tau Guang Yang
Hui” meaning “lie low and work hard” to describe Chinese
foreign policy. He urged Chinese leaders to “observe calmly,
secure our position, cope with affairs calmly; hide our
capacities, and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low
profile and never claim leadership”.
3
Before Xi, China
concentrated on economic diplomacy, worked vigorously
with “Association of South East Asian Nations”(ASEAN),
provided them billions of dollars in the wake of the global
financial crises of 2008, which eventually helped to allay
fears that China was a competitive threat to its neighbors.
4
However, after the leadership transition in 2013, the old
doctrine of Foreign policy began to unravel. In October
2013, Xi Jinping in a speech at a party work conference
dedicated to regional diplomacy said that foreign relations
must secure “good external conditions for China’s reform,
development, and stability” and should foster a sense of
“common destiny in Asia”.
5
He advocated that China’s
diplomacy should be “fenfa Youwei” meaning
“enthusiastic and proactive” suggesting a break from
Deng’s Lie low and work hard dictum a similar term used by
foreign minister Wang Yi in 2014.
6
But Under Xi Jinping,
China seems moving away from its traditional rhetoric and
embracing a much more assertive foreign policy to play an
active role in international affairs marking a fundamental
shift from the past.
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY:
This paper is an attempt to have a comprehensive assessment
of China’s One Belt One Road initiative and track its
strategic implications on India. The paper establishes that
China is expanding its wings in South Asia thereby
threatening the interests of India. The paper is organized in
the following manner: First, it will discuss China’s grand
initiative of OBOR. Second, it will explore the response of
Smaller South Asian nations to OBOR. Third, it will discuss
its strategic implications Vis-Vis India.

Syed Sabreena Bukhari / IJHSS, 7(6), 47-53, 2020
48
METHODS/THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:
Theoretically, this paper is rooted in John Mearsheimer’s
offensive realism which postulates that China is going to
Challenge the US in near future. He predicts that China will
try to become a regional hegemon in Asia as its economic
and military capabilities grow. For valid research, different
books, reports, journals, articles, speeches, and government
reports were consulted.
Unpacking the BRI:
Soon after Xi Jinping visited Astana and Jakarta in 2013, the
Silk Road and Maritime Silk Road were officially endorsed
7
.
However it was only in 2015 that the plan started to feature
in State Council’s reports and planning documents, and the
official plan was jointly published by National Development
and Reform Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Commerce
(MoCOM), and the Ministry of Foreign affairs, in March
2015
8
setting forth guidelines in vision and actions document
titled as “Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-
Century Maritime Silk Road”. The document laid down main
routes and projects for the Belt and Road Plan. Then in the
13th 5-year plan, a whole chapter was dedicated to the
initiative outlining the country’s key priorities for 2016-
2020
9
and was also included in the Communist party’s
constitution in 2017. The aim of the project according to the
Vision and Action document is “promoting the orderly and
free flow of economic factors, highly efficient allocation of
resources and deep integration of markets”.
The document describes BRI as a “systematic project which
should be jointly built through consultation to meet the
interests of all and effort should be made to integrate the
development strategies of the countries along the BRI.”
Supported by over 60 countries, BRI encompasses six major
corridors across Asia, Africa, and Europe covering an area
with 55 percent of world GDP, 70 percent of the global
population, and 75 percent of known global energy
reserves
10
. The rapid and spectacular development of the
Chinese economy in the last three decades has enhanced the
demand for more energy, raw materials, and markets for its
manufacturing sector. Thus OBOR is seen as a project to
help China to fill gaps in energy, raw materials, and
markets
11
. OBOR, a grand Geo-Economic plan is set to unite
Chinese neighboring countries and those along its periphery
into a common economic region. Soon after espousing the
plan, Chinese leaders began the political process of
implementing the BRI. The proposed title, “Major issues
concerning comprehensively deepening reforms” was
adopted in the third plenum of the Eighteenth Party
Congress held in Nov 2013
12
. China’s OBOR can also be
seen as a response to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in
Asia and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and investment
partnership (T-TIP) since both are led by the United States.
From the apparent Chinese announcements, it is clear that
China wants the initiative to project its geostrategic realm in
both continental and maritime dimensions having clear
political and security implications. The geographical scope of
BRI is not fixed, as it is an open-ended network system
13
.
China’s new peripheral diplomacy starting from 2013, also
reinforces the impression that primarily OBOR has
geostrategic aims. The concept is divided into two: the Land
and the Sea, then further into several corridors and countries
which are further divided into specific projects and locations.
On land there are three routes, located in three broad
geographical areas:-
(i) One extends from North-East China and
northwest China to Europe and the Baltic Sea Via
Central Asia and Russia,
(ii) One from North-East China to the Persian Gulf
and the Mediterranean Sea, via Central Asia and
West Asia,
(iii) One from southwest China to the Indian Ocean
through the Indo-China Peninsula
14
.
These three routes lead to six major corridors, the
infrastructure of which is provided by the network
connectivity consisting of Railways, Highways, Sea Routes,
oil and gas pipelines. Unlike the ancient Silk Road, BRI is
not only about transportation, but is predominantly about
bringing economic integration, with deliberately designed
and planned economic corridors rather than letting them
evolve naturally
15
.
Belt and Road initiative apart from catering to China’s
economic and security challenges, reflects China’s regional
and global ambitions as well. China’s ideas to acquire ports
across South East Asia and the Indian Ocean precedes the
initiation of BRI
16
. Some notable development strategies
and actions under BRI include port acquisitions, project
approvals, and new rail routes. The AIIB that was created in
2014, though has no official links with the BRI but is an
emerging source of funding for BRI
17
. BRI represents a
movement of ineluctable expansion of Chinese influence.
China had started the connectivity drive-in home in 2000
focusing to develop its western regions to reduce the
economic gap between its coastal areas and western areas. In
the Great western development strategy, connectivity,
transportation, and infrastructural development were the
driving force.
18
Then Beijing began to look beyond its
borders to increase the connectivity with its neighbors over
land and through the sea.
Corridors of BRI:
There are six corridors in the BRI connecting more than
sixty countries:
A. CPEC:
Belt and Road projects in Pakistan are having a significant
impact on the whole project of BRI and act as China’s
Gateways to the Indian Ocean much similarly as Kazakhstan

Syed Sabreena Bukhari / IJHSS, 7(6), 47-53, 2020
49
acts as a gateway for China to Europe. The forces to bring
the two economies together are already powerful due to their
decades back strategic ties, which makes the progress more
swift in developing the economic corridors from Kashgar to
Gwadar. Moreover, Pakistan is rich in resources, has a vast
market, thus becoming a valuable asset for BRI. CPEC
connects the Xinjiang province with the entire territory of
Pakistan. The Spatial layout is described as comprising one
Belt, three axes, and several passages. Connecting Kashgar,
Tumshuq city, Atushi City, and Aktu city in the autonomous
region of Xinjiang, with the Punjab, Sindh, Gilgit, Baltistan,
AJK, and Khybar Pakhtonkhaw in Pakistan. The most
important and central project within the CPEC is the
development of Gwadar city and its port. Gwadar, being
located in a strategic position, will play an important role in
linking China’s western Province with the Indian Ocean.
CPEC, which is set to be completed by 2030 with an
investment of $46 billion is regarded as a crown jewel of the
OBOR project
19
. It comprises of construction of Gwadar
port, multiple Economic Zones, highways, railways, and
many energy pipelines. CPEC will act as an alternative and
stable route for China to reach Malacca straits for importing
oil and other energy resources from West Asia acting as a
trade bridge between Asia, Africa, and Europe
20
. Moreover,
CPEC connects the Land route of OBOR in Eurasia with the
Sea Route in South East Asia thereby connecting more than
60 countries. Through the CPEC gas pipeline, it would take
only 6 days for energy supplies to reach China’s border than
earlier 32 days via the current marine route
21
. China fears the
Malacca blockade by the USA or India because of any
military confrontation, thus immensely increasing the
importance of CPEC for China. As China would use the self-
constructed Gwadar port to acquire strategic advantage.
Through CPEC China wants unhindered access to the Indian
Ocean. Since CPEC passes through the disputed territory of
the Gilgit-Baltistan region, India feels it is a violation of the
principle of sovereignty. Indian Spokesperson of Ministry of
External Affairs (MEA) stated, “connectivity projects must
be pursued in a manner that respects the sovereignty and
territorial integrity”
22
B. New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor:
It consists of a series of rail corridors running some 7500
miles (12000km) from Yiwu in Eastern China To western
European countries, passing through thirty countries linking
the Pacific to the Atlantic Ocean
23
. It could be a catalyst for
China’s “Go West policy” launched in 2001. Overland trade
between China and Russia dated back to two millennia.
Along the routes of Samarkand, Bukhara, Merv, etc. which
were some of the busiest and famous trade cities of the
world. However, the discovery of sea routes around 1500 by
the Portuguese navigators led to the destruction of land
routes
24
. For the next 500 years, the sea route was preferred
as the dominant mode of transport from Europe to Asia.
Although several rail tracks were also constructed in the 20th
century none of them was significant because of the low cost
along the sea route. In 1990, a new railway line was
constructed between Kazakhstan and China’s Xinjiang
region which served bilateral trade between China and
Kazakhstan
25
. The construction of several new international
rail routes has already been started, offering rail-to-rail
freight transfer, and a “one declaration, one inspection, one
cargo release” system for cargo moving across borders
26
.
C. China–Mongolia–Russia Economic Corridor:
This corridor involves both road and rail networks
connecting China, Mongolia, and Russia. It comprises of two
routes, one extends from Beijing to Russia vie Ulaanbaatar
(Mongolia); and the other from Dalian in China to Chita in
Russia, connecting the Russian Trans- Siberian Railway.
D. China–Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor:
CICPEC links China with the South East Asian countries
namely Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and
Malaysia via an extensive transportation network. Even
before BRI was introduced, South East Asian nations have
been important trading partners of China, however, CICPEC
is considered an economic game-changer in South East Asia.
E. China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic corridor:
CCWAEC links China and the Arabian Peninsula through
the ancient silk route originating from Xinjiang and reaches
the Persian Gulf via Central Asia, the Mediterranean, and the
Arab peninsula
27
. It connects 5 Central Asian Countries and
17 West Asian Countries. It involves an important Mineral
and energy source thereby becoming an important energy
source region for China.
F. Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic
Corridor:
BCIM, which was founded in 1999 was initially known as
the “Kunming Initiative” with the explicit rationale being
the development of China’s Landlocked Southwestern areas,
India’s North-Eastern areas, along with Myanmar and
Bangladesh, two adjoining Least Developed Countries
(LDC) through the promotion of trade, connectivity and
other forms of cooperation
28
, thus is aptly referred to as an
“international gateway to South Asia”. BCIM consists of an
expressway and a high-speed rail link connecting Kunming
in China to Kolkata in India Via Mandalay (Myanmar) and
Dhaka (Bangladesh). This corridor would also provide
China an outlet to the Bay of Bengal. Both Bangladesh and
Myanmar are rich in resources, thus increasing the
importance of this corridor for China
29
.
South Asian response:
Due to the absence of any governing agency at the
international level, competition among the major powers of
the world is natural in this anarchic world. And smaller
states face a dilemma in strategizing their foreign policy
30
.
According to realists, the primary interest of any state is to
ensure its survival and to maximize its security in an anarchic

Syed Sabreena Bukhari / IJHSS, 7(6), 47-53, 2020
50
world. In the South Asian region, the two emerging regional
powers are locked in a struggle for influence through
economic, political, security, and diplomatic initiatives in
these states. With the Launch of BRI, China has largely
invested in Asian Countries. In South Asia, China’s $ 62
billion CPEC is the largest economic package that China has
offered to any country under BRI and is a significant
example of China’s growing investments in the region.
China’s growing geopolitical and economic assertiveness in
the region under BRI has led to concerns in New Delhi
fearing it would drastically undercut Indian influence in the
region. To study the response of South Asian States, I have
taken the case study of Bangladesh and Sri-Lanka.
Bangladesh:
Bangladesh-India relationship dates back to Bangladesh’s
war of liberation in 1970 when India stood on the side of
Bangladesh
31
. In the early years of the Awami League
government in Bangladesh, a pleasant relationship developed
between the two countries however after only a few years of
Independence, an anti-Indian military regime took over in
Bangladesh which resulted in hostile relations against each
other 1975 to 1990.
32
During the military-led regimes,
Bangladesh India's relations didn’t improve. It was only after
the AL government came to power in 2009 that relations
started improving significantly. Bangladesh is bordered by
India on almost all sides except on the Bay of Bengal i.e. it is
landlocked by India. China is the closest neighbor of
Bangladesh with only 100 km of distance (Indian territory)
between their borders. Bangladesh is located in between the
Indian Mainland and its seven insurgencies rivaled
northeastern states, has a very crucial geostrategic
importance for India. Moreover, Bangladesh shares a 4000
km long border with India. Due to the very nature and
geographical proximity Bangladesh is significant to India in
a variety of ways among which three are specifically
mentioned:-
• First, an unfriendly government in Dhaka can pose
a considerable security risk for India, which we
witnessed during one and a half decades of the
military regime in Bangladesh, serving as a conduit
for arms transfer to India’s North Eastern
insurgents. Whenever the Awami League party
returned to power there was a lull in the arms
transfer which was subsequently reversed by the
unfriendly governments in Dhaka.
• Secondly, India can be more vulnerable to terror
attacks if it doesn’t obtain Dhaka’s cooperation and
Vice Versa.
• Thirdly New Delhi considers Bangladesh as a part
of its security sphere viewed in terms of overall sub-
continental security i.e. any neighboring state under
threat is bound to ask India for Help otherwise it
would be viewed as anti-Indian.
33
Because of China’s BRI, the relations have seen further
deepening with China investing heavily in infrastructure
building and triggering Sino-Indian Competition in
Bangladesh. With its spectacular economic growth, China
has broadened its horizons externally by launching some
projects, the noted among them being the BRI and
Bangladesh’s importance to China need to be conceived in
terms of implementing the BRI since BRI is one of the key
pillars of China’s international politics. Bangladesh formally
joined the OBOR initiative in October 2016 following
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Bangladesh wherein
both the countries signed some bilateral deals worth $21.5
billion. A joint statement issued on 14 October 2016 by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dhaka stated :
“Bangladesh is appreciative of China’s initiative of the “Silk
Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk
Road” (the Belt and Road Initiative), believing it will bring
important opportunities for Bangladesh’s goal of becoming a
middle-income country by 2021 and a Developed Country by
2041. The two sides agreed to enhance the alignment of the
development strategies of the two countries, fully tap the
potentials of cooperation in various areas, work on “the Belt
and Road Initiative”, to realize sustainable development and
common prosperity of the two countries.”
34
Bangladesh being at the center of the Bangladesh-China-
India-Myanmar Economic corridor occupies a vital strategic
position along with the OBOR initiative. In an absolute
contradiction to India’s stand on OBOR, Bangladesh's
foreign secretary Shahidul Haque reaffirmed his country’s
desire to join OBOR, at the World Economic Forum in
October 2017 in New Delhi. Explaining the need to balance
“Sovereignty” and “economic integration” he stated that,
“We cannot remain link-less in the current situation. We
have to go beyond. And that's what we think would
eventually benefit us. We look at sovereignty and integration
rather from a different angle,"
35
Bangladesh is a part of the proposed Bangladesh-China-
India-Myanmar Economic corridor (BCIM), one of the six
corridors of OBOR. Also under the Maritime Silk Road,
China has shown interest to develop a deep seaport in
Chittagong, Bangladesh. Located on the strategic juncture
between the Indian Sub-Continent and South East Asia,
makes it an important player in inter-regional integration plus
its proximity to India, and most importantly the proximity to
the Bay of Bengal is severely important for China’s
geopolitical and geo-economic interests. China’s increasing
influence in Bangladesh following its investments in a large
number of the project under BRI has inevitably led to Sino-
Indian Competition in the country due to the Vital stakes of
India there. This has put India at a significant political,
economic as well as strategic disadvantage. As Bangladesh is
located at the tip of the Bay of Bengal, it holds importance to

Syed Sabreena Bukhari / IJHSS, 7(6), 47-53, 2020
51
China in terms of its Maritime silk route also as China
intends to build port facilities in Bangladesh.
To counter China’s growing footprints in
Bangladesh and to wean away from it from China’s
influence, India offered a $5 billion line of credit to
Bangladesh in 2017, its biggest loan offer to any single
country in addition to the assistance offered for building
power plants, ports, and nuclear power plants as well as
grants and loans for various medium and small-sized
projects. On a closer look at the various projects of BRI and
their implementation in Bangladesh, it reveals that
Bangladesh had to cancel some of the projects of BRI or
slow down their implementation due to growing pressures
from India. Bangladesh along with smaller south Asian
nations seem to be perplexed due to the growing competition
between the two powerful neighboring states.
Sri Lanka:
In the context of the regional security structure of South
Asia, Sino-Sri-Lankan relations have a special place and date
back to the Rubber-Rice Pact of 1952. The geographical
location of Sri-Lanka at the center of the Indian Ocean has
made it a central focus of all great powers over history
36
. It
has been an important sea-lane of Communication and was
colonized by British, Portuguese, and Dutch to be used as a
trading hub for transit goods. The ethnic issue in Sri-Lankan
politics remained a predominant one since its independence
in 1948 becoming complicated with each passing day. And
India’s policy towards Sri-Lanka was also by and large
guided by the Tamil Issue since the beginning. The
diplomatic relations between Sri-Lanka and China were
established in 1957 and the agreement on technical and
economic cooperation was signed in 1962, following Sri-
Lankan Prime Minister, Srimavo Bandaranaike's visit to
China. In 1963, the two countries signed an agreement on
commercial maritime relations, and the China-Sri-Lanka
joint trade agreement was signed in 1982 while an agreement
on economic and trade cooperation was signed in 1984. Later
on, both the agreements were merged to form Sri-Lanka joint
commission in 1991. Chinese massive investments in Sri-
Lanka during the Rajapakshe government garnered the
deepest debates among scholars.
Hambantota is situated at the southern extremity of Sri-
Lanka, overlooking South Asia’s vital sea lanes of
communication, making it an important commercial and
strategic asset for China. It provides a strategic pivot to
China in India’s underbelly. For now, China might conform
only to commercial templates avoiding any naval
deployments there but whenever the need arises Chinese
leadership would not hesitate to leverage its possession for
strategic gains, expanding the enterprise into intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance outpost. Indian analysts
seem to be convinced that Hambantota will be a crown jewel
in China’s “String of Pearls” strategy. India’s political and
economic influence in Sri-Lanka is gradually decreasing and
India is worried about Sri-Lanka being sucked into China’s
orbit. After 2009, the India factor in Sino Sri-Lankan ties
became more visible. With the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi
at the hands of LTTE. India restricted itself to an approach of
non-interference and excessive caution. The Sino-Indian
Competition for the influence that plays out in Sri-Lanka is
evident. The growing transfer of arms and ammunition
between Sri-Lanka and China is a cause of concern for India.
In 2014, Sri-Lanka allowed two submarines and a warship to
dock at the Colombo port. Which until recently was an
uncommon occurrence. This can be seen as a sign of
diminishing Indian influence in the Island nation. While
Chinese imports to Sri-Lanka have grown considerably,
Indian imports have remained stagnant over the years, a sign
of India’s failure to strengthen trade relations with the South
Asian region. During a meeting between Chinese Premier Li
and Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena in May 2019,
the two leaders expressed an interest in progressing with BRI
projects, consistent with the last joint statement issued in
2016.
37
India’s concerns about OBOR:
Unable to shun away the historical baggage of geopolitical
rivalry, Sino-Indian rivalry has intensified in recent years
with the launching of China’s OBOR. Among the six
corridors in OBOR, four-run through the South Asian
neighborhood. Through the OBOR Beijing has shown a
renewed vigor to carry regional connectivity in its India’s
Neighborhood thereby changing the security environment
and power dynamics in India’s Backyard. India has shown
serious apprehensions about the OBOR due to its certain
projects in the disputed territories particularly the China-
Pakistan-Economic-Corridor
38
. This new economic, as well
as political collaboration with India’s immediate neighbors,
has created a sense of unease in India as India is faced with
the twin challenge of maintaining its pre-eminence in its
backyard and also to maintain its relationship with China, its
biggest neighbor. India is viewing these moves by China as
threatening and non-conducive to its interests. Former Indian
foreign secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar noted in 2016
that the “interactive dynamic between strategic interests and
connectivity initiatives – a universal proposition – is on
particular display in our continent.”
39
These regional
connectivity initiatives by China are viewed as tools to
influence the foreign policy of other countries. In the South
Asian subcontinent, BRI underscores the growing Sino-
Indian Competition in South Asia and also in the Indian
Ocean region. In protest against the crafting of BRI, India
didn’t attend the 2017 Belt and Road Forum hosted by
China. Since both the countries are rising simultaneously, in
the same geographical area, both are competing for the
untapped resources and minerals in the region. Due to the
changing geopolitical realities, both the countries are trying
to invest in regional infrastructure investments. Due to the
coming of the theory of Strategic encirclement, the tensions
between the two countries have escalated. India fears

Syed Sabreena Bukhari / IJHSS, 7(6), 47-53, 2020
52
encirclement by China while Pakistan fears encirclement by
India and in the meanwhile, China fears encirclement by the
United States due to its close relationship with India, Japan,
and South Korea in addition to the US troops stationed in
Afghanistan
40
. These fears have spurred greater
infrastructure growth in all surrounding countries, as the
potentially encircled look to set up alternate transit routes
and project military power outside their own borders. The
mistrust ever since the 1962 war, unresolved border dispute,
Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin and frequent border
incursions, (2013, 2017, 2019, the latest being the Galwan
valley clash in June, 2020 in which 20 Indian Soldiers were
killed), and China’s claim on Arunachal Pradesh, has led to
escalated tensions between the two countries. Amongst this
China’s investments and Military co-operation with South
Asian Nations in India’s immediate neighborhood has led to
worries in India. India fears that ports in Myanmar,
Bangladesh, Sri-Lanka, Pakistan by China is in consonance
with China’s policy of India’s encirclement. There are some
other issues that have led to trust deficit among the two
countries that include China’s consistent opposition to
India’s membership in NSG, frequent technical hold to
save Jaish-e-Muhammad Chief Masood Azhar, from being
declared a global terrorist by United Nations and increasing
China’s presence in the Indian Ocean in recent years. On the
other hand India’s shelter to Dalai Lama has been a major
cause of irritation for China leading to troubled relationship
with India The recent month’s long military stand-off
between the two countries at Galwan Valley, an earlier
undisputed area in which 20 Indian Soldiers were killed, has
led to the lowest ebb of bi-lateral relations since 1962.
India has issues with the four specific corridors of
OBOR that run through South Asian neighborhood and
constitute the important components of BRI: the CPEC,
BCIM Corridor, the Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridor
and the MSR. Running close to India’s continental and
Maritime borders, these corridors have a direct strategic
bearing on India as it fears that China will use its presence in
the region to advance its strategic interests. The Maritime
Silk Road (MSR) that aims to create a sea corridor between
China and the Europe via Indian Ocean is specifically an
issue of concern for India as Indian Ocean has remained the
primary interest of India and is directly linked to India’s
strategic, security, and Maritime interest. Due to the absence
of any other alternative, China’s capital has been a welcome
addition for needed infrastructure developments in South
Asian Smaller countries. The growing Competition between
India and China has raised the Stakes in South Asia. China’s
rise in the region has led to increasing wariness that Beijing’s
increased presence in the region is threatening to India’s
standing as a leader. China through its diplomatic outreach
seems to create a system more favorable to its own interests
in the region profoundly affecting New Delhi’s strategic and
national interests. Malik argues that India’s apprehensions
are founded on PLA’s “strategic plans to enhance control
over Pacific and the Indian Ocean in accordance with the
‘high-sea defence’ policy by pursuing its ‘string of pearl
strategy’
41
.
The project has the potential of altering the economic
as well as the geopolitical landscape of Asia in a fundamental
way. The relations between the two countries are largely
defined by their engagement in Asia, Africa and the Indian
Ocean region. For India OBOR is not only an economic
initiative but an attempt to advance China’s geopolitical
Objectives (Chakma. B, 2019). Since OBOR vehemently
encloses all of South Asia, Sino-Indian rivalry and
competition is bound to happen in the region which New
Delhi perceives as its sphere of influence. Having both
economic as well as geopolitical implications, these
connectivity initiatives across Asia and Indian Ocean region
in the form of infrastructure building, inter-linkages, roads
and railways will arguably redraw the map of continent
42
.
More than 50 countries, mostly Indian Neighbors have
accepted and endorsed China’s OBOR project presenting a
major diplomatic challenge to India. In September 2018,
Myanmar facing the international criticism for its Human
rights violations against Rohingya Muslims, signed
agreement with Beijing to establish the CMEC, providing
China with another node to the Indian Ocean, which will
help China to reduce trade and energy reliance on Malacca
straits.
Conclusion
Because India perceives South Asia as its own
responsibility, it is clearly alarmed by the China’s growing g
investments in South Asia. Belt and road isn’t one thing, one
activity or one project, it is a cluster of activities, and a very
ambitious and expensive undertaking. Since, BRI also
includes building of ports all across South Asia and the
Indian Ocean region, there is a growing fear of strategic
encirclement by China in New Delhi. The growing
collaboration with India’s neighbors through different
infrastructural projects is creating a sense of unease in New
Delhi. In order to provide an alternative to Chinese-led
connectivity initiatives to protect its strategic goals and
remain a dominant power in South Asia and the Indian
Ocean region, India will have to work with its partners in
the region to offer alternative connectivity arrangements to
its neighbors. To date, New Delhi has been slow in
identifying, initiating, and implementing a coherent approach
to connectivity in the region.
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