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Integration Perspectives of Eurasian Land-Based Transport Corridors:
Empirical Evidence from the OBOR and Rail Baltica Initiatives
TalTech Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2674-4619), Vol. 10, No. 3 (32)
doi: 10.1515/bjes-2020-0019 TalTech Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2674-4619), Vol. 10, No. 3 (32)
Integration Perspectives of Eurasian Land-Based
Transport Corridors: Empirical Evidence
from the OBOR and Rail Baltica Initiatives
Anatoli Beifert
Wismar University of Applied Sciences
Wismar Business School
Philipp-Müller-Str. 14
Wismar 23966, Germany
Email: anatoli.beifert@hs-wismar.de
Gunnar Prause
Department of Business Administration
School of Business and Governance
Tallinn University of Technology
Ehitajate tee 5
Tallinn 19086, Estonia
Email: gunnar.prause@taltech.ee
Yury Shcherbanin
Institute of Economic Forecasting (IEF)
Russian Academy of Sciences
Nahimovskii prospekt 47
Moscow 117418, Russia
Email: shcherbaninya@mail.ru
Abstract: Land-based Trans-Eurasian transport corridors, their
current development and perspectives have been high on the
political agenda in the last two decades not only in Europe and
China but also in the transit countries such as Russia, Belarus
and Kazakhstan. A number of conceptual initiatives are already
being implemented. The Belt and Road or the One Belt, One Road
(OBOR) initiative on the Chinese side and the Rail Baltica project
from the European perspective have gained special attention.
Big-scale infrastructural projects are also being implemented by
transit countries, e.g., the construction of a motorway from China
to Europe—from Kazakhstan via Russia to Belarus—to facilitate
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Anatoli Beifert, Gunnar Prause, Yury Shcherbanin
TalTech Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2674-4619), Vol. 10, No. 3 (32)
the land-based shortcut for cargo transport within the Eurasian
transport corridor. This article investigates the general framework
conditions of infrastructural investments into projects related to
Eurasian logistics and discusses strategic areas of intersection
between the European activities and the New Silk Way. In the
framework of the OBOR initiative, this article also addresses the
interaction of the Chinese–Kazakh–Russian–Belarusian –Polish
railway transport, with a special focus on Belarusian–Polish cross-
border issues. The authors have participated in several projects
focusing on transport corridors and discuss the research question
of how different Eurasian land-based transport corridors can be
integrated and which strategic role can the Rail Baltica project
play in the context of the New Silk Route. The research is based
on surveys, expert interviews, secondary data research and case
studies.
Keywords: Eurasian land bridge, New Silk Road, Rail Baltica,
transport corridors
1. Introduction
Transport and logistics development is considered as one of the most
important growth criteria today. However, the construction and enlargement
of logistics infrastructure is very costly and requires large-scale investments,
which is why an in-depth analysis and a wider understanding of this issue is
of high importance. Transit logistics shall be viewed as a complex mechanism
considering not only economic variables but also a wide range of risks and
factors, such as environmental issues, politically loaded domestic risks in
transit countries, political risks imposed externally (e.g., US sanctions against
Russia involving gas pipelines, road and rail transit through Ukraine, EU
sanctions against Russian ports in Crimea), technical preconditions of hard-
based infrastructure (e.g., differences of the maximum allowed train’s length
in the EU Member States and in Russia or Belarus), etc.
The analysis published by the EU Commission in February 2019 shows that
political and economic factors have the greatest impact on cargo/container
transport within the Trans-Eurasian transport corridor (Pieriegud, 2019).
However, despite the abovementioned problems, during the last decades,
the socio-economic cooperation and bilateral investment climate in terms of
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Integration Perspectives of Eurasian Land-Based Transport Corridors:
Empirical Evidence from the OBOR and Rail Baltica Initiatives
TalTech Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2674-4619), Vol. 10, No. 3 (32)
Eurasian land-based transport corridors (TC) between the European Union
and China have been signicantly intensied. Important initiatives such
as the Rail Baltica project and One Belt, One Road (OBOR) are trying to
overcome shortcomings in the Eurasian land bridge and attract investments
mostly focusing on infrastructure development projects in Europe, China,
as well as in transit countries such as Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus
(Beifert, Shcherbanin & Vinokurov, 2018). Furthermore, due to the fact that
the OBOR countries will host most of the world’s new infrastructure-related
investments in the coming decades, it is also highly important that these
projects comply with current environmental regulations and requirements
(Beifert, Shcherbanin & Vinokurov, 2018). Therefore, future and current
investors, as well as users of OBOR or Rail Baltica related projects, shall pay
attention to environmental issues. Consequently, common actions aiming
to drive green investments in the Belt and Road should lead the way for
greening OBOR projects as well as inspire future investors and stakeholders
to green initiatives.
In a number of White Papers on transport, the European Commission
outlined a political framework for the EU transport policy highlighting a
common goal to shift signicant cargo volumes away from the dominant
road trafc towards greener transport modes. Special attention is paid
to supporting measures for the environmentally friendly transport sector
with safer and efcient transportation by reducing accidents, congestions
and negative impacts through emissions (White Papers COM(2001) 370
nal & COM(2011) 0144 nal). The concept of green transport corridors
(GTC) was introduced in 2006 as an initiative of the European Commission
in the Freight Transport Logistics Action Plan as the necessity for the
sustainable and environmentally friendly transport sector, providing safer
and efcient transportation by reducing accidents, congestions and negative
impacts through emissions like noise, light and pollution (BSR Transport,
2012; Prause & Hunke, 2014). The concept of GTC comprises an integrated
transport concept, whereas sea shipping, rail, inland waterways and road
transport modes complement each other in an efcient and environmentally
friendly way (Prause & Hunke, 2014; Lee, 2005; Hunke & Prause, 2013).
The GTC concept contributes to the attainment of the European 2050 targets
by becoming more independent of fossil fuel and by cutting carbon emissions
in transport by 60% until 2050. The GTC strives for establishing multimodal
trans-shipment routes with a concentration of freight trafc between major
hubs and by relatively long distances of transport, now being marked by
reduced environmental and climate impact while increasing safety and
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Anatoli Beifert, Gunnar Prause, Yury Shcherbanin
TalTech Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2674-4619), Vol. 10, No. 3 (32)
efciency with the application of sustainable logistics solutions (Hunke &
Prause, 2013; Schröder & Prause, 2015). In some EU-funded projects on
territorial cooperation, the GTC concept is being implemented in the Rail
Baltica Growth Corridor and the East–West Transport Corridor. Since the
ideas of the GTC concept comprise interdependency between the traditional
supply chain management and environmental issues, and also performance
management control systems are being utilized in European transport
corridors such as Rail Baltica (Lee, 2015; Sarkis, 2001), these experiences
might be transferred, integrated into and utilized by the OBOR projects.
Finally, the progress in new information technologies, comprising the
internet of things (IoT), Industry 4.0, blockchain technology and smart
contracts, enables new forms of communication and cooperation along the
transport corridors by offering new possibilities for enhanced efciency,
for sustainable entrepreneurial growth as well as for the implementation
of greener transportation (Philipp et al., 2019; Prause & Hoffmann, 2017;
Prause, 2014a; 2014b). Hence, the investigation of OBOR projects has also
come to include the consideration of growth perspectives in the context
of logistics service clusters and other business activities together with
facilitating new information technologies (Prause, 2014a; 2014b; Shef,
2012)
2. Eurasian investment perspectives in OBOR projects
The development of the OBOR initiative highly depends on investors’
readiness and willingness to participate in infrastructural projects along
the land-based Eurasian transport corridor (TC) (Beifert, Shcherbanin &
Vinokurov, 2018). Although ofcially started in 2009, the Eurasian land-
based part of the OBOR initiative, due to the lack of the critical mass of
needed infrastructural investments, especially in such transit countries like
Russia, has served rather as a transit route into the heart of Eurasia than
an efcient link between China and Western Europe.
According to the newest press reports (June–July 2019) all necessary
preparations to ll a missing link along the OBOR TC (here: a road-based
highway from the Russian border with Kazakhstan to the Russian border
with Belarus) are said to be completed. This project has already been named
“the construction of the century”. Once nished, this transport corridor shall
take one of the leading roles within OBOR, beginning at the Chinese port
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Integration Perspectives of Eurasian Land-Based Transport Corridors:
Empirical Evidence from the OBOR and Rail Baltica Initiatives
TalTech Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2674-4619), Vol. 10, No. 3 (32)
of Lianyungang on the Yellow Sea, stretching along China’s longest road,
the Lianhuo Expressway, moving through Kazakhstan’s dry port Khorgos
Gateway and nally going through Russia and Belarus to Western Europe.
This TC aims at the development of a practical multimodal ecosystem,
combining road, rail and air transport modes and hubs and even change
the current shipment map of goods between Europe and China. According
to plans, this highway might allow road-based container transport to move
between Europe and China in 11 days, compared to 24–36 days by sea, and
12–20 days by rail (Beifert, Shcherbanin & Vinokurov, 2018).
Figure 1. Estimation of container shipment from China
to Western Europe
Source: Beifert, Shcherbanin & Vinokurov, 2018
The above gure shows the current time-costs estimation of different
modes of transport (here: air, sea and rail) for a standard TEU container
from China to Western Europe made within IIASA study on Eurasian
transport corridors in 2018 (Beifert, Shcherbanin & Vinokurov, 2018).
The responders were divided into ‘expert or active users’ of OBOR such as
integrators, rail terminals operators, logistics service providers and ‘non-
expert or passive users’ such as, e.g., seaports operators, consignors, etc.
The results demonstrated that non-involved potential stakeholders evaluate
the capacity of OBOR overland transit route as cost-intensive and relatively
slow, thus according to non-experts’ evaluation, the rail mode shall not be
considered as an object for potential investments at all. Due to the fact that
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Anatoli Beifert, Gunnar Prause, Yury Shcherbanin
TalTech Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2674-4619), Vol. 10, No. 3 (32)
there is almost no road-based link within OBOR, it is of high importance to
increase awareness about the TC’s potential in order to attract and improve
the investment climate. Investments in the framework of this new Europe–
China highway are said to be ca. 8–9 billion euros, whereas most of the
nancing shall come from private investors with a nancial “backup” from
the Russian government, which is said to amount to ca. 500 million euros.
According to main investor’s statements, this highway is being developed
mainly for cargo transport with a road toll as a main source of revenue.
Estimated payback time is 12–14 years.
Along with this, other EU funded projects are underway in other transit
countries. For example, two new contracts were signed in July 2019 by the
European Investment Bank (EIB) and the government of Belarus. European
investors and the EIB support transport services and infrastructural
projects in Belarus by lending commitment, supporting national nancial
institutions and improving connectivity and the attractiveness of Belarus as
a transit country in the total of 335 million euros. In 2019, the EIB also signed
agreements aiming at supporting the water sector and projects implemented
by logistics-related small and medium enterprises. However, despite these
newest developments described above, it might be stated that the investment
climate along the OBOR initiative is rather low. A survey of 30 European
companies, representing exporters, the transport and the logistics sector,
has been conducted in the framework of the study. Among other things, it
showed that among the main risk factors for potential investors from Europe
in the OBOR transport corridor are the different non-tariff barriers in China
and cumbersome regulations, which may prove extra challenging for the
European companies considering the utilization of Europe–China transport
corridors. In spite of the fact that European companies have frequently
mentioned such factors, including the low quality of logistics services, long-
drawn-out customs procedures, inspections, ofcial procedures of border
clearance of transported cargo, as well as rather poor logistics infrastructure
in the transit countries, all those criteria appeared to be insignicant. On
the other hand, it was noted that a potential will of European investors
considerably depends on “soft factors” such as the level of sustainability and
transparency in decisions regarding future investments, rather than on pure
economic indicators, e.g., payback or protability. While risk perception
in the long perspective increases and, correspondingly, the readiness to
invest decreases in China and the transit countries (here: mainly Russia,
Kazakhstan and Belarus) compared to the European countries, a negative
dynamics demonstrated a disproportionate decrease. Hence, a high level
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Integration Perspectives of Eurasian Land-Based Transport Corridors:
Empirical Evidence from the OBOR and Rail Baltica Initiatives
TalTech Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2674-4619), Vol. 10, No. 3 (32)
of political uncertainty and economic stability in China, and in the transit
countries, has been named as the main factors. Further options to increase
the attractiveness of OBOR for European investors mentioned was also
motivating Chinese companies for direct investments in infrastructural
projects instead of just lending nances or subsidies to the European
partners. The so-called sharing of direct investments and commercial risks
may improve the investment attractiveness for European stakeholders,
and it might be seen as a positive indicator of a favorable and sustainable
investment climate.
Linear regression analysis showed that Europe’s willingness to invest
depends mainly on the quality of institutions in China and in Europe, while
such issues as customs services and the quality of transport infrastructure
matter as well. Furthermore, it was stated that the investment climate
of European companies to contribute to the European part of the OBOR
infrastructure depends mainly on the quality of institutions in China,
e.g., decisions regarding making investments in the Lithuanian or Polish
infrastructure may be positive if the sustainability of Chinese institutions
and regulations is secured. On the other hand, the readiness to invest in
Chinese projects is highly related to the quality of Chinese infrastructure,
i.e., although potential European investors are not ready to invest in the
Chinese infrastructure projects from scratch, in the case of already ongoing
projects, the European investors positively consider sharing the commercial
and political risks.
The investment climate of stakeholders from the transit countries into OBOR
projects mainly depend on government regulations in the transit countries,
i.e., the investors’ readiness increases if the sustainability of governmental
regulations and their transparency in the transit countries remains stable
and predictable. To be noted that both of the abovementioned factors are
not infrastructural, but of so-called “soft” nature. Potential investors tend to
overestimate the risks unless the dynamics of institutions and government
regulation development in China or in the transit countries remains stable.
This fact keeps potential investors from actively participating in OBOR
projects until the risks are predictable and relevant policy regulations are
transparent or sustainable. In addition to that, expert interviews that were
executed in recent times by the authors in Russia revealed that the current
situation of COVID-19 has had a negative effect both on transported volumes
as well as on the investment climate. Thus, the impact of the ongoing
pandemic represents an important factor for the investment climate of the
OBOR projects with a negative consideration.
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Anatoli Beifert, Gunnar Prause, Yury Shcherbanin
TalTech Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2674-4619), Vol. 10, No. 3 (32)
Further qualitative data analysis of the investment climate in terms of
transportation corridors’ development along the OBOR corridor in Europe,
China and the transit countries demonstrated that the willingness to invest
into infrastructural projects in China, Europe or the transit countries as a
part of transportation corridors is mainly related to the quality of national
logistics infrastructure, the quality of institutions and logistic-related costs.
However, these factors were considered differently for different countries,
e.g., national logistics infrastructure and the quality of institutions were
signicant for China. Logistics-related costs were important factors for the
transit countries and such aspects as ‘green logistics’ or sustainability issues
were signicant for the European investors.
Gained results also revealed that European investors still perceive the
challenges and risks in the transit countries as being much higher than
in Europe or even in China. Criteria such as unsustainable transportation
tariffs and tariff policies were named as signicant challenges for China
and the transit countries. Additionally, the following measures were named
as important issues that might increase the investment attractiveness of
OBOR-related projects in the future:
a) Integration initiatives of hard components (e.g., rail gauges, terminals,
maximum allowed length of cargo trains, etc.) and soft components
(i.e., regulations, transport tariff system) in Europe, China and also
the transit countries;
b) International coordination of land-based transport corridors, including
the coordination of investment policies;
c) Development of new business models and integrative utilization of
available train capacity of different integrators, e.g., implementation of
integrative joint projects such as XL-train or enlargement of the length
of cargo trains, efcient utilization through tting platforms in cargo
trains, etc.;
d) Sustainable and transparent tariff system, e.g., a transparent tariff
system/formula for basic rail services for a period of at least three years;
e) Increasing awareness among potential stakeholders from China and
the transit countries of the green transport corridor concept;
(f) Raising awareness among potential investors in Eurasian land-based
transit projects, the OBOR initiative in general as well as real current
capabilities of the EU–China land-based (here: mainly rail) transit
routes and options.
An important issue that is currently often hidden in infrastructural and
technical discussions is the related economic growth potential along the
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Integration Perspectives of Eurasian Land-Based Transport Corridors:
Empirical Evidence from the OBOR and Rail Baltica Initiatives
TalTech Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2674-4619), Vol. 10, No. 3 (32)
OBOR corridors. Transport corridors offer the opportunity of entrepreneurial
growth in the form of logistics service clusters but also for complementing
business activities (Prause & Hunke, 2014; Prause, 2014a; 2014b; Shef,
2012). These growth potentials have already been a study point in EU-
funded GTC projects, and they may be applied in a form analogous to the
OBOR corridors. New technical developments such as the IoT, Industry
4.0, the blockchain technology and smart contracts further spur the growth
processes since communication and cooperation intensity and quality within
supply chains represent strategic factors that enhance supply chain efciency
and that are facilitating transparency and trust, which fuel entrepreneurial
activities and cooperation (Philipp et al., 2019; Prause, 2014a; 2014b;
Prause et al., 2013). New research results point out that especially the use
of blockchain and smart contract technologies help foster entrepreneurial
cooperation, streamline supply chain processes, reduce transaction costs
and handle legal processes (Philipp et al., 2019). Thus, the use of these new
technologies in the frame of the OBOR activities bears a huge potential for
improvement.
3. The challenges of Eurasian land-based transport
corridors
A general consideration of transport modes shows that maritime transport
denitely dominates in the Europe–China trade, accounting around 98% of
all cargo transported between China and Europe; air transport contributes
to approx. 1.5–2%, and railway transport 0.5–1% (Pieriegud, 2019; Beifert,
Shcherbanin & Vinokurov, 2018). Approximately 80% of Europe–China
trade is carried in containers, ca. 90% of European imports from China
and 70–75% of European exports to China. At the same time, over the last
four years, cargo ows from China to Europe by rail through the EAEU
have doubled every year (although from a low base). In 2018, the volume
of transported cargo from China to EU by rail amounted to 816 thousand
tons (ca. 1.4% of the total transported volume), with the total value of
8.9 billion euros (2.5% of the total exports of China to EU); and ca. 562
thousand tons (ca. 1% of the total transported volume) from the EU to
China, which values to ca. 6 billion euros or 3.2% of the total traded value.
From the perspective of the transit countries as well as on the EU side,
Chinese subsidies are seen not only in positive terms but also as a systemic
risk to the trans-Eurasian container cargo ow. For example, a number of
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Anatoli Beifert, Gunnar Prause, Yury Shcherbanin
TalTech Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2674-4619), Vol. 10, No. 3 (32)
central Chinese provinces subsidize exports to the average sum of 2,500
US dollars per 40-feet container (FEU) that may account approximately
0.3–0.4% of the export costs (Beifert, Shcherbanin & Vinokurov, 2018). On
the other hand, it should be mentioned that these subsidies on the Chinese
side have positively inuenced the transit volumes of cargo ows within
the Trans-Eurasian transport corridor. To attract additional cargo ows in
all countries along the China–EAEU–EU axis, both coordinated investment
policies and the removal of trade barriers should be implemented. Based
on the analysis of trade ows and tariff structure, further growth in EU–
China railway cargo turnover through the EAEU countries may be clearly
forecasted (Pieriegud, 2019; Beifert, Shcherbanin & Vinokurov, 2018). For
the transit countries, a key advantage of continental cooperation within
the OBOR area is the promise of increased transport capacity that might
generate a number of positive effects for economic development. Utilization
of transport networks in a more efcient manner may lead to better internal
connectivity between inner-Eurasian regions, i.e., Central Asia, Siberia,
the Urals, and the Caucasus). It is particularly important for the transit
countries to promote the development of transport infrastructure, especially
in landlocked countries.
Figure 2. The main OBOR routes
Source: Beifert, Shcherbanin & Vinokurov, 2018
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Integration Perspectives of Eurasian Land-Based Transport Corridors:
Empirical Evidence from the OBOR and Rail Baltica Initiatives
TalTech Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2674-4619), Vol. 10, No. 3 (32)
As indicated in the gure, the main land-based OBOR routes are the
following:
• Northern Eurasian corridor, i.e., China–Russia–Europe via the
Far East and Eastern Siberia in Russian Federation, including the
First Transport Belt: Tyumen–Omsk–Novosibirsk–Krasnoyarsk–
Irkutsk; and the Second Transport Belt: Irkutsk–Chita–Khabarovsk–
Vladivostok.
• Central Eurasian corridor, i.e., China–Kazakhstan–Russia–Europe,
through Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation
• Trans-Asian corridors, i.e., utilizing transport corridors of southern
Russia, which include: Western China–Kazakhstan–Azerbaijan–
Georgia–Turkey–EU; Western China–Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–
Iran; and Urumqi–Aktau–Baku–Poti–Port of Constanța, Burgas.
• North–South transport corridor, including the Eastern Route, Western
Route, and the Central Trans-Caspian Route.
In terms of EU–China rail-based cargo transport, Belarusian–Polish cross-
border is of special importance. Approximately 88% of all tonnage cargo
passing through the Belarusian–Polish border goes westwards. Container
freight is more balanced—the number of trains from China to the EU Member
States is only 5% higher than the number of trains in the opposite direction.
Almost 95% of the cargo ows pass through the Brest–Małaszewicze–
Terespol cross-border point. If the container trains travel through the
territory of the EAEU countries at high speed (at an average speed of 45
km/h), in Poland they slow down dramatically to 18–20 km/h. Due to regular
delays at the Małaszewicze border crossing in 2017, logistics operators and
forwarders began to look for alternative ways. As a consequence, in 2018,
59 trains (55 more trains than in 2017) crossed Bruzgi (Belarus)–Kuznitsa
(Poland); two went to the crossing point Semyanivka–Svisloch (Grodno
region), and 98 trains crossed the border with Poland through Kaliningrad,
Russia (Shcherbanin, 2019).
On the other hand, it should be mentioned that Poland is now investing
heavily in improving rail infrastructure especially on cross-border points,
e.g., the modernization of the Terespol, Małaszewicze and Biala Podlask
stations in 2020 (approximately 140 million US dollars); the Kobylian station
expansion by 2023 (57 million US dollars); and the construction of a two-way
bridge across the river Bug on the Terespol–Brest stretch (35 million US
dollars). According to Polish experts, after completing the planned work,
the border crossing capacity might increase up to 55 trains per day on both
tracks (Shcherbanin, 2019).
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Anatoli Beifert, Gunnar Prause, Yury Shcherbanin
TalTech Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2674-4619), Vol. 10, No. 3 (32)
Figure 3. Rail directions of cargo transport through Belarus to the
EU Member States in 2017
Source: Shcherbanin, 2019
A further challenge of OBOR may be the different standards of electrication
network between Belarus and Poland and other EU Member States, which
negatively inuences the uent transition of cargo on cross-border points.
For example, in Poland, the voltage of contact rail network is 3kV of direct
currency, and in the transit countries such as Kazakhstan, Russia or
Belarus, the electrication network has a voltage of 25kV/AC that allows
transporting large-scale cargo trains (a hard factor based problem). Train’s
length regulation requirements were also named as the main barrier within
land-based OBOR corridors between Western Europe and China. The
train length xed by different rail operators (e.g., Deutsche Bahn, Polish
Railways, Russian Railways, the Belarusian Railway) depends on the length
of the railway track at the station, train weight, traction capacity, route
conguration prole, technical capabilities of stages of the railway (e.g., rail
sidings and stations, overpasses and control posts, automatic blockages),
shunting conditions at stations, technical and technological conditions at
intermediate and local stations, sorting, etc. Transit operations within the
OBOR corridor are also hindered by the difference in railway track gauges
(e.g., 1,435 mm in China and the EU; 1,520 mm in Russia, Belarus and
Kazakhstan). This results in additional expenses during cargo transport
as wheel pairs need to be changed at border crossings, which is also time-
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Integration Perspectives of Eurasian Land-Based Transport Corridors:
Empirical Evidence from the OBOR and Rail Baltica Initiatives
TalTech Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2674-4619), Vol. 10, No. 3 (32)
consuming, especially for large cargo trains. The insufcient level of
procedural harmonization was named as one of the important barriers to
freight turnover along the OBOR land-based corridor. In most European
countries, railway transport is regulated according to the Convention
concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF). At the same time, railway
administrations in the CIS countries, the Baltic States, Iran, China, and
Mongolia are regulated by the Agreement on International Goods Transport
by Rail (SMGS). The differences in the legal environment of transport also
lead to insufciently harmonized procedures at cross-border points. Also,
clear customs and cross-border procedures are very time-consuming. In
addition to the abovementioned problems, the interviewed experts noted
that in the context of a high need of improvement of hard and soft based
infrastructure, environmental issues within the OBOR corridor in China
as well as in the transit countries are partly neglected or in the best case
remain as a secondary factor.
4. Rail Baltica
The Rail Baltica project aims for the construction of a European railway link
from Tallinn via Riga and Kaunas to Warsaw in order to connect the Baltic
States to the European railway system. In 2017, the EU provided nances
for the rst investments and construction work and the company RB Rail
AS is responsible for the coordination in the Baltic States. Usually, the Rail
Baltica project is discussed in the context of green transport corridors (GTC)
or growth corridors. However, recently, the discussions around the Rail
Baltica project are held in the enlarged context of the New Silk Route. Some
researchers have highlighted a tentative role for the Rail Baltica initiative
in the context of the Northern Sea Route concept, i.e., maritime cargo
transport between the Yellow Sea and Northern Europe via the Russian
seaway. However, such an approach requires a connection between Estonia
and Finland, such as the discussed Helsinki–Tallinn tunnel, which is still a
plan for the future (Prause, 2019).
An important milestone in the development of the Rail Baltica concept dates
back to 2010 when the EU approved the BSR Interreg project ‘Rail Baltica
Growth Corridor’ under the lead of City of Helsinki 21 partners. Meanwhile,
the Rail Baltica enjoys high priority within European TEN-T program to
promote the multimodal integration and interoperability between the EU’s
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Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2674-4619), Vol. 10, No. 3 (32)
North Sea and the Baltic TEN-T Core Network Corridor ensuring full
integration of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into a single European railway
area (Prause & Hunke, 2014). The length of the railway between Tallinn and
Warsaw will be at least 950 km, and the rst construction works started in
2018. The Tallinn–Riga–Kaunas standard-gauge route should be nished in
2026 with a connection to Warsaw in 2030.
The section between Helsinki and Tallinn is currently operated by ferries,
and the future construction of the Helsinki–Tallinn tunnel is discussed to
provide a rail link between the two cities. The whole planning process for
the Rail Baltica was accompanied by ongoing discussions about ecological,
nancial and utilization issues that alleviated until the national elections in
2019 but have restarted in recent times (Tambur, 2018). The main issue of
the discussions is the question of utilization of the Rail Baltica investments
due to low population density and low north–south cargo streams in the
Baltic States. Hence, the main issue concerns the justication of the high
investment and operation costs, together with the ecological impact of
railway constructions. Consequently, the supporters of the Rail Baltica
initiative have to nd additional arguments to ensure continuing political
support for the project. The starting point of the Rail Baltica idea was
mainly related to passenger trafc to offer a safe, environmentally friendly
and fast link through the Baltic States with the possibility to connect to the
Central European high-speed train network. However, this idea turned out
to be unrealistic since the full distance of 1,500 km from Tallinn to Berlin
was planned with a maximum speed of 120 km/h and a total travel time of
15h. This is not any longer feasible, since after the start of the Rail Baltica
project the maximum speed in the northern parts of Poland was reduced to
100 km/h (Prause, 2019). The reduced speed of the nal Rail Baltica will
make the train use for passengers less attractive compared to a plane trip
so that the estimated utilization of the train link might drop even further.
As a result, the Rail Baltica concept was modied towards a consideration of
complementing rail cargo transport to increase the utilization rate. However,
a closer look at the statistics shows that the largest part of the cargo volume
inside the Baltic States is transported by truck and it alone is too small
to ll the railway (Prause, 2019). Thus, additional rail transit trafc from
Finland and Russia to Central Europe has to be taken under account for
transportation. Both countries, Finland as well as Russia, have higher cargo
transport volumes than the Baltic States but the cargo ows of both countries
are mainly transported via truck or sea so that a potential utilization of Rail
Baltica is linked with the need of a modal shift to rail. Hence, a prominent
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idea to open up the Rail Baltica for Finnish and Western Russian cargo
to Central Europe is the development of Tallinn into a railway hub. This
means strengthening of the Tallinn–St. Petersburg railway link and the
construction of the Helsinki–Tallinn tunnel. Both measures are still in the
planning phase, but the fantasy concerning the Helsinki–Tallinn tunnel
grew with Finland’s plans to establish the Arctic railroad from Rovaniemi
to Kirkenes to link the Port of Kirkenes in Norway via a 1,400 km railway
link with Helsinki. The existence of a tunnel between Tallinn and Helsinki
would allow sending Chinese cargo via the Northern Sea Route around
Russia, Kirkenes, the Arctic railroad, Helsinki and Tallinn and nally the
Rail Baltica directly to Central Europe (Prause, 2019). Calculations reveal
that the total travel time from Kirkenes to Berlin via the Arctic railroad and
Rail Baltica sums up to ca. 32h. A comparison reveals the following total
travel times between Shanghai and Hamburg (Prause, 2019):
• Shanghai – Hamburg via classical seaway: 28 days
• Shanghai – Hamburg via Northern seaway: 21 days
• Shanghai – Hamburg via Kirkenes & railroads: 17.5 days
• Shanghai – Hamburg via Trans-Siberian railroad: 14 days
The above comparison points out that the multimodal cargo transport
Shanghai–Hamburg via Northern Sea Route till Kirkenes and then using
the Arctic railway and Rail Baltica represents a logistics solution that ranges
in a comparable travel time like a Trans-Siberian transport. This short
reection highlights the already close relationship between the Rail Baltica
and the OBOR projects, and since Russia is in all these considerations in the
crossroads for the cargo transport, it is necessary to take the complementing
initiatives into consideration.
An ambitious target of Rail Baltica is the New Silk Route interaction, which
emerged with the start of the Russian Trans-Eurasian ‘Meridian street’
project. This infrastructural project tries to establish a land bridge between
Kazakhstan via Moscow to Belarus to facilitate cargo transport all over
Eurasia. The project comprises the strategic target to include the Kaliningrad
region into all Eurasian transport corridors, i.e., the intersection of Rail Baltica
and the Meridian project will be located in Lithuania, making Lithuania an
outstanding strategic area for the interface between Eurasian transport
corridors and, thus, for the development of logistics. Already now, Lithuania
enjoys a prominent role in multimodal transport as one of the key areas for
the East–West Transport Corridor (EWTC) linking the southern Baltic Sea
and the Black Sea (Shcherbanin, 2018). The EWTC concept represents one of
the most performant realizations of the green transport corridor concept of
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the European Union (Hunke & Prause, 2013). Extensions of the GTC concept
to all transport modes has been discussed already (Kusch et al., 2011) as well
as the tentative role of GTC for economic growth and as a starting point for
logistics service clusters. All these factors require high investment volumes
and, according to the results of the investment survey, also here Lithuania
enjoys all advantages due to its membership in the European Union, the
foundation in the Eurozone and its stable frame conditions.
5. Case studies, discussions and implications
The study results, among other things, showed that cargo ow perspectives
depend heavily also on the development of the European railway
infrastructure, for example, cross-border points between Belarus and
Poland, i.e., at the Brest–Małaszewicze border crossing, have been named
as very limited. Moreover, the technical parameters of European railway
infrastructure (i.e., the length of freight trains, types of platforms needed for
the transport of containers, maximum allowed weight per axle, maximum
allowed speed of freight trains) do not allow large container trains to be
processed. While the length of freight trains in transit countries such as
Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus can reach 1,050 m, those cargo trains shall
split into two parts with the maximum length of 600 m in length each at
Małaszewicze in Poland. Accordingly, trains crossing the European border
in Poland can have a maximum of 43 wagons carrying 86 TEU. As a result,
if a normal 65-wagon container train from China via Belarus arrives at
the Polish border, train wagons have to be split up: e.g., a 43-car train is
composed as the containers are transshipped in Brest, while the remaining
22 cars have to wait at the marshalling station for the next train to be
made up. This leads to high time and unit costs. Consequently, the Belarus–
Poland rail cross-border (e.g., Brest–Małaszewicze–Terespol) represents
an important bottleneck so that some rail operators, including Russian
Railways, redirect the westbound cargo trafc to Europe through other
routes, especially through the Kaliningrad Oblast. According to experts’
views, despite ongoing infrastructure improvements, those cross-border
points will still remain bottlenecks in the near future.
Due to the current limited transit cross-border potential in some directions
in Europe, increasing transit potential through the development of new
routes, e.g., via Lithuania to Kaliningrad, may be considered (Beifert,
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Shcherbanin & Vinokurov, 2018). In fact, in the framework of EWTC, joint
efforts are being made focusing on the development of smooth, efcient and
secure transport and logistics networks connecting China with Europe (via
the Baltics). EWTC, among other things, promotes better connectivity of
the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) with the networks of the
neighboring countries (here: Belarus, Russia and Ukraine) that at the same
time belong to the main transit countries within the Eurasian land-based
transport corridor. Thus, those initiatives may gain considerable attention,
especially in the context of the possible integration opportunities of Rail
Baltica and the OBOR transport corridors. In this context, a transport
scheme of crossing the EU–CIS border has to be mentioned—the intermodal
shuttle train VIKING, which has been operating since 2003 and has been
developed within the EU funded project EWTC-II. The VIKING train moves
from Klaipeda to Odesa ports via Minsk and Kyiv, the train departs 6 times
per week and covers the distance of 1,734 km within 55 hours. In the context
of EWTC, this train may also contribute to the sustainable connection of
ports and hubs in the southern part of the Baltic Sea region, Karlshamn in
Sweden, Klaipeda in Lithuania and Sassnitz port in Germany. Furthermore,
there are practical plans to launch new container shuttle trains that might
link Klaipeda and Kaliningrad ports, transport hubs in Moscow and
Kazakhstan with China. Other cargo-shuttle trains associated with EWTC
and Rail Baltica are in operation:
(1) The cargo/container train MERCURY, with a one-way distance of
1,342 km, links the Klaipeda port with Moscow within 54 hours. This
train has been in operation since 2011 and departs three times per week.
(2) The container train SAULE (Sun) operates on the so-called ad hoc basis.
Linking itinerary Klaipeda hubs in Vilnius and Dostyk from Kazakhstan
with Chongqing in China, it covers the distance of 10,929 km in 13
days. It has to be mentioned that “soft” challenges that enable to apply
efciently the same principles and regulations for improving cross-
border procedures of cargo trains along the EWTC route were solved
by signing an agreement by railway companies in Lithuania, Belarus
and Ukraine. The favorable location of Lithuania on the intersection
positions of Rail Baltica and the OBOR transport corridors as well as a
EWTC hub provide a considerable competitive advantage for the cities of
Vilnius and Kaunas in particular, which infrastructure may fully meet
the market demands by establishing efcient links between transport
hubs and terminals, enhancing transportation solutions not only within
the EWTC, but also with Rail Baltica and OBOR.
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The ACC3 regulations, introduced in 2015, provide another opportunity for
the perspectives of OBOR integration with Rail Baltica for Air Cargo or Mail
Carrier operating into the Union from a Third Country Airport. Logistics
hubs near the European border may be used as a pre-nal receiving point to
Europe of air cargo goods coming from non-certied airports—for example,
to Grodno Airport in Belarus. Thus, for those air cargo destinations outside
the EU without the ACC3 certication, Grodno Airport can be developed
to a long-haul air cargo base due to its proximity to the European green
transport corridors. A possible business model for Grodno Airport might be
operational air cargo link to Europe from non-ACC3 certied destinations,
whereas incoming and outgoing cargo is forwarded by normal truck or rail,
for example, between Rail Baltica and EWTC and Grodno via the Belarus
border (Beifert & Prause, 2018; Beifert, Gerlitz & Prause, 2018). This may
offer a cost-efcient air cargo connection link between the EU and long-haul
destinations that do not comply with the ACC3 regulations. Those plans
require harmonization of policy regulations for the air-trucking services,
which shall enable border-crossing procedures between the EU and Belarus
as it is foreseen by the Road Feeder Services regulations, meaning that
customs clearance for RFS-truck takes place in the respective customs area
of the designated airports and not on road boarder crossing points (e.g.,
Belarus–Poland or Belarus–Lithuania).
Consequently, the Kaunas–Vilnius–Grodno triangle enjoys the perspective
development towards a tri-modal logistics area, combining road, train and
air transportation at the crossroads between north–south and east–west
transport streams linking European corridors with OBOR projects. Hence,
the already started cluster growth of logistics service in the Kaunas–
Vilnius range includes the option to be extended into the Grodno region.
The mentioned challenges of soft and hard infrastructure can be further
facilitated by the use of new technologies including the IoT, smart production
and logistics as well as blockchain technology. The important consequence
for the other two Baltic States might be that they can best participate from
this development by further supporting Rail Baltica in their countries
because, without this direct access to the Kaunas–Vilnius–Grodno area,
the biggest parts of the logistics streams as well as the related economic
growth potential might bypass the two countries. This threat is becoming a
reality because Russia is already developing and promoting its own north–
south transport corridor. This new Russian North–South transport corridor
(Buslovskaya–St. Petersburg–Moscow–Ryazan–Kochetovka–Rtishchevo–
Saratov–Volgograd–Astrakhan) has a total distance of 2,513 km and is
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divided into three branches: Trans-Caspian: through the ports of Astrakhan,
Olya, Makhachkala; Eastern: through the railway network of Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan with access to Iran at the Tedzhen–Sarakhs
border crossing; and Western: Astrakhan–Makhachkala–Samur direction,
Azerbaijan and access to Iran through Astara. The North–South Transport
Corridor may also provide transport links between the Baltic countries and
India through Iran. The main advantages of this corridor compared to other
routes (e.g., seaway via the Suez Canal) consists in a reduction of distance and
costs. However, one of the current problems of this North–South Transport
Corridor is heavy trafc due to double cargo transhipment, which causes a
considerable decrease in its competitiveness. In this regard, the creation of
a direct railway line in the western direction of the transport corridor may
be considered (Beifert, Shcherbanin & Vinokurov, 2018). For this purpose,
the construction of a new railway line linking with Iran, which, as the
shortest route, may solve the transportation problem of goods between the
ports of the Persian Gulf and the Baltic Sea and provide further cargo rail
connection directly to India and Pakistan. Railway transport plays a key role
in the formation of the entire integrated transport product of cargo delivery
through an international transport corridor, and it might be necessary to
ensure integrating a balanced development of some links of the entire chain
of international transport, for example, by including the management of the
largest seaports, land terminals of the organization of railway transport
(Beifert, Shcherbanin & Vinokurov, 2018). This is to ensure a balanced and
effective pricing policy and to make all action for planning and dispatching
the transportation process consistent.
6. Conclusions
The fast growth of Europe–China container trafc provides huge
opportunities for the further development of an alternative to traditional sea
mode routes. In this context, land-based Eurasian transport corridors gain
special attention and importance. China’s investments in the framework of
the OBOR initiative are seen by stakeholders from the EU and from transit
countries both as an opportunity (economic growth perspectives) and as a
threat due to indirect subsidies of the Chinese government for cargo ows
of a Chinese origin that may negatively inuence the development of local
economic structures in the transit countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan
and Belarus. On the other hand, despite the strong political interest in Rail
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Baltica, a critical mass of potential investors, especially from Europe, is still
missing. Compared to the OBOR initiative with real Chinese investments
and functional operational capacities, at the moment the Rail Baltica
initiative may hardly be viewed as a project having the required nancial
resources to start real infrastructural investments as well as functional
operability. Potential investors of Rail Baltica are also hesitant due to
lack of information, or example, on technical data concerning its railway
maintenance costs, including transparent evaluation of maintenance cost
of two different rail systems, evaluation of cargo and passenger capacities,
utilization rate, etc. Moreover, the current situation of COVID-19 has had
a negative effect both on transported volumes as well as on the investment
climate.
On the other hand, Rail Baltica benets from a number of advantages such
as efcient concepts like the green transport corridor, transparent tariff
policy, the stability of relevant national institutions in transit areas, etc.
Thus, to make the OBOR project more viable and attractive also for potential
investors from Europe, along with improving such global issues as the
stability of institutions in China or the transparent transport tariff policy in
the transit countries, integrative opportunities with EU supported projects
like Rail Baltica or East–West Transport Corridor may be considered. Since
the Belarus–Poland rail cross-border (e.g., Brest–Małaszewicze–Terespol)
represents a bottleneck in the context of the OBOR initiative, some rail
operators (e.g., Russian Railways) redirect westbound cargo ows to Europe
through other routes, for example, via the Kaliningrad oblast. Thus, an
opportunity for Rail Baltica may be in this context to catch “redirected”
cargo ows, new “hotspot logistics areas” such as developing the Kaunas–
Vilnius–Grodno triangle linking the EU and OBOR.
Furthermore, the integration and close collaboration of OBOR and Rail
Baltica might improve the interoperability of logistics centres, involve
relative stakeholders as well as promote the environmentally friendly
concept of green transport corridors and development of sustainable logistics
clusters along the Eurasian transport routes via the Baltics. Such new
technologies as the IoT, Industry 4.0, blockchain, smart contracts that are
already being tested and implemented in Rail Baltica facilitate supply chain
communication, entrepreneurial cooperation, enhance efciency and reduce
transaction costs. Since economic growth potential along the transport
corridors is of high importance for the participating regions, by improving
transparency and trust that is partly missing in the OBOR projects those
integration components may boost entrepreneurial activities and general
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economic growth in all areas of proximity. Finally, in a long-term perspective,
the integration of OBOR and Rail Baltica may provide a unique opportunity
of a joint improvement of soft-based infrastructure such as regulations and
requirements in participating regions.
Anatoli Beifert is the head of the EU Programme ‘MOST’, and works
as an associate professor in Wismar University of Applied Sciences,
Germany. His research focus is on transport and logistics, shipbuilding
sector and regional development.
Gunnar Prause is a professor at the School of Business Administration
and Governance of Tallinn University of Technology in Estonia and
Wismar Business School in Germany. He is the board member of the
Institute of Cooperative Studies at Humboldt University Berlin and he
enjoys a long experience in national and European projects. His research
focus is business development, innovation and sustainable supply chain
management.
Yuri Shcherbanin is director of the Centre for Integration Studies,
Eurasian Development Bank, and a professor of the Russian Academy
of Sciences. His research focus is on transport and logistics, especially
rail-based transport corridors.
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