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174 Muslim Society, Politics and Islamic Education in the Former Russian Empire
CHAPTER NINE
THE DIMENSIONS OF ISLAM IN CONTEMPORARY KAZAKHSTAN
Yelena Muzykina
•
Introduction
The modern global landscape is experiencing a novel revival which
seeks to grow into a global trend. Brexit, the Trump administration, and
the leftist governments of Eastern Europe are just a few examples of
how countries have claimed their outstanding position and compete for
special status. Kazakhstan is not an exception, and while striving for its
“entry into the thirty most developed countries of the world”, it has
affirmed its unique nature through the renowned Strategy Kazakhstan-
2050. It focuses on a “new Kazakhstan patriotism”, and “Kazakhstan
democracy”, a unique economic course and principles of social life366
supported by official addresses and public declarations.367 For example,
in the field of state-religion relations, the authorities have boasted of
developing a specific synergy that will allow this Central Asian country
to position itself simultaneously as a secular entity and a presiding
power in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Due to
historical and cultural stereotypes, Kazakhstan is often ranked among
Muslim countries, with the majority of the population supposedly
professing Islam and adhering to an Islamic lifestyle. However, the
reality is not so simple that plain.
Therefore, the current chapter seeks to identify the place and role
of Islam in a modern Kazakhstani society while exploring its religiosity.
This topic has become popular in the growing body of literature on Islam
366 ‘Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy’, The official web-site, https://kazakhstan2050.com,
accessed 20 December 2019.
367 ‘Svoy Put' k Demokratii v Izlozhenii Nazarbayeva’ [Our Way to Democracy in
Nazarbaev's Interpretation], Radio Azattyq, 14 April 2019,
https://rus.azattyq.org/a/press-review-nazarbayev-democracy-
kazakhstan/29167224.html, accessed 20 December 2019.
PART II. Islamic Education and Recent Developments in the Post-Soviet Era 175
in Central Asia among foreign and Kazakhstani researchers in the last
few decades.368 Scholars have recognized that Islam does not have a
homogeneous nature in the region in general and in Kazakhstan in
particular. Some distinguish subcategories as ‘traditional Islam,’
‘government-sponsored Islam,’ and ‘radical Islam.’369 Others identify
such groups as ‘folklorized, cultural Islam’ or ‘national Islam.’370
However, such classifications and research focus primarily on the level of
‘Muslimness’ or rather the degrees of deviation of Kazakhstani Islam
from the mainstream one. They bring little to the understanding of what
role and place can be attributed to the religion now and whether
Kazakhstan can be called a ‘Muslim state.’ Therefore, the research steps
have included identification of the attitude of the population in
Kazakhstan to religion in general and Islam in particular; how
contemporary citizens of the state perceive this faith tradition; and what
parts of daily life they associate with it. The hypothesis provides an
assumption that the historical context might determine not a single but
multiple roles for Islam in Kazakhstani sociocultural reality today.
Building upon and complimenting previous research, the
present study also aims to expand the understanding of the role of
368 Pawel Jessa, ‘Aq Jol Soul Healers: Religious Pluralism and a Contemporary Muslim
Movement in Kazakhstan’, Central Asian Survey 25 (3) (2006), pp.359-371; J. Sahadeo
and G.Z. Russell, Everyday Life in Central Asia: Past and Present (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2007); Mariya Omelicheva, ‘Islam in Kazakhstan: a Survey of
Contemporary Trends and Sources of Securitization’, Central Asian Survey 30 (2)
(2011), pp.243-256; I. Himelfarb and N. Esipova, ‘Commitment to Islam in Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan: An Item Response Theory Analysis’, The International Journal for the
Psychology of Religion 26 (3) (2016), pp.252-267; Zaur Jalilov, Islam i Obshchestvo v
Sovremennom Kazakhstane [Islam and Society in Modern Kazakhstan] (Almaty: Daik-
Press, 2006); V. D. Kurganskaya and A. G. Kosichenko, Islam i Islamskiye Lidery v
Yuzhnom Kazakhstane : Nauchno-issledovatel'skiy Otchet [Islam and Islamic Leaders in
Southern Kazakhstan: A Research Report] (Almaty, n.p., 2005); and Yelena Burova
(ed.), Trendy Novoy Religioznosti v Sovremennom Kazakhastane [Trends of New
Religiosity in Modern Kazakhstan] (Almaty: Institute of Philosophy, Political Science
and Religious Studies, 2014).
369 Shirin Akiner, ‘Politisation of Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia’, Religion, State &
Society 31 (2) (2003), pp.96-122.
370 Ch. Hann, and M. Pelkmans, ‘Realigning Religion and Power in Central Asia: Islam,
Nation-state and (Post) Socialism’, Europe-Asia Studies 61 (9) (2009), pp.1517-1541.
176 Muslim Society, Politics and Islamic Education in the Former Russian Empire
Islam in the country today. The quantitative and qualitative data of
social studies gives a variety of up-to-date indicators that contribute to
the holistic picture. The chapter uses the results of two nation-wide
surveys conducted by different institutions. This first was conducted in
2017 by the Institute of Philosophy, Political Science, and Religious
Studies of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of
Kazakhstan (IPPR) on the population’s level of religiosity.371 The second
was a survey conducted by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation Central Asia
(FEFCA) nationwide in 2014. It included a section on religion and
religious values.372 These two sources complement each other providing
different perspectives – external and internal, independent, and
governmentally oriented – on the same matter.
The third source used in the chapter is a survey conducted by
the author at the Central Mosque of Almaty (Kazakhstan) among
attendees of religious courses in June 2019.373 This type of study is
scarce, leaving a significant gap in building an objective picture of
religiosity of the Kazakhstani population.
Though localized sociological studies are invaluable in revealing
meanings in a given setting, they cannot reach as deep to the historical
roots of phenomena as indigenous literary heritage can. Thus, the
novelty of the current study is in engaging narrative and ethnographic
writings of renowned Kazakh thinkers, scholars, and educators that
testify ‘from inside’ about the spiritual and religious conditions of their
people from the vicinity of the 19th century.
Combining historical testimonies and contemporary qualitative
and quantitative data, the conclusion gives a summary of the
dimensions that Islam claims in modern Kazakhstan.
371 Akhan Bizhanov (ed.), Religiozniye Konversii v Postsekulyarnom Obshchestve
(Opyt Fenomenologicheskoy Rekonstruktsii) [Religious Conversions in a Post-Secular
Society (Experience of Phenomenological Reconstruction)] (Almaty: Institute of
Philosophy, Political Science and Religious Studies of the Ministry of Education and
Science of the RK, 2017).
372 T. B. Umbetalieva, B. Rakisheva, P. Teschendorf, and K. Hurrelmann, Youth in
Central Asia: Kazakhstan: Based on Sociological Survey (Almaty: Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung, 2016).
373 Yelena Muzykina, Religious Education: A Mosque Madrasah’ Level (unpublished
survey: Almaty, June 2019).
PART II. Islamic Education and Recent Developments in the Post-Soviet Era 177
Methodological Notes
Two research projects, which results serve here as secondary sources,
have used conventional methods that include surveys, focus groups,
interviews, participant observation, and in-depth case studies at the
subnational level, in specific cities and institutions. The first one,
conducted in 2017 by IPPR, has a survey sample size of 2,500
respondents from 16 regions (14 regions, plus Astana and Almaty) who
range by the leading socio-demographic indicators such as gender, age,
and nationality.374 Also, 20 expert interviews took place among
representatives of state and public organizations, members of political
parties and NGOs, law enforcement officers, the faculty of secular and
religious educational organizations, and intellectuals from Astana and
Almaty. A public union, the Research Association ‘The Institute of
Democracy,’ carried out the quantitative research processing the
results in the SPSS program.
The research by FEFCA in 2014 based its methodology on the
well-known Shell Youth Study that Germany carries out every 3–4 years.
The FEFCA used a sample of 1,000 respondents aged from 14 to 29 from
14 regions and two principal cities of Kazakhstan (Almaty and
Astana).375 The sample is representative of Kazakhstan’s population in
terms of sex, ages between 14 to 29, ethnicity, level of education, and
place of residence. The respondents were selected by stratified address-
based sampling and quota-based selection. Since the dominant ethnic
group in Kazakhstan are the Kazakhs (63.1%),376 which primarily
consider themselves Muslims, the results of surveys and interviews on
religion and religious matters among them can be easily extrapolated to
Islam, even if it is not particularly specified.
The third research is original, as it served as a testing version for
a much smaller sample in contrast to the previous two examples.
374 Bizhanov, p.136.
375 T. B. Umbetalieva, B. Rakisheva, P. Teschendorf, and K. Hurrelmann, Youth in
Central Asia, pp.25-27.
376 ‘Ethnic Groups of Kazakhstan’, Worldatlas, 31 July 2019,
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/ethnic-groups-of-kazakhstan.html, accessed
25 December 2019.
178 Muslim Society, Politics and Islamic Education in the Former Russian Empire
However, its unique nature makes it eligible for this research. The
survey was conducted at the Central Mosque of Almaty (Kazakhstan) in
June 2019 and covered 42 participants of Russian-speaking groups
there, making up 81 % of total attendance in this category. Due to the
purpose of the current chapter, gender, age, education, and social
variables are omitted here, although the ethnic parameter is worth
mentioning (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Ethnic Representation of Attendees at the Central
Mosque Courses in Almaty
As we can see, the overwhelming majority in the research
sample belongs to the leading ethnic group; thus, the results that are
mentioned in the chapter reflect primarily Kazakh people’s opinions.
The research context was initially qualitative. The author
prepared all questions with particular attention to the context-specific
understanding, focusing foremost on how people who either consider
themselves diligently practicing Muslims or try to follow this path
understand the nature of Islam and its role in their lives. The author
has published the selective results in this chapter for the first time.
PART II. Islamic Education and Recent Developments in the Post-Soviet Era 179
Distinguishing Religious Identity in Kazakhstan
The role of religion in the worldview system and the daily life of
Kazakhstanis has fluctuated significantly in recent years. Experts have
described the dynamic growth of a population’s religiosity and the
influence of religion on the process of individuals’ socialization. One
reason may be the change in the ideological atmosphere that took place
during the years of independence, when the old values and norms had
failed. This situation inevitably made factors appealing in socio-
cultural life which proved their stability and survived the temporal test.
Unfortunately, researchers were not able to construct the overall
picture of the Kazakh mentality, its structure, and its distinctive
characteristics, including the role of the religious component. However,
the specific status of religion in society can be identified.
Let us begin with the overall picture, which remains patchwork
(Table 1):377
Table 1
The Experts’ Estimation of the Population Religiosity
Fanatical
Believers
True
Believers
Professed
Believers
Indifferent
to Religion
Religious
Antagonists
4%-9%
10%-16%
58%-62%
5%-6%
7%-11%
Unfortunately, it is difficult to identify what the experts meant
by the category of ‘Fanatical believers.’ However, this data allows us to
conclude that more than half of the population of Kazakhstan include
religion as a component of people's identification. At the same time, we
can assume that the high percentage of ‘Professed Believers’ reflects a
nominal affiliation to a particular denomination, rather than active
participation. The latter is a marker for the groups of ‘True Believers’
and ‘Fanatical Believers.’
The results of another survey have verified that this assumption
is correct (Table 2):378
377 Bizhanov, p.153.
378 Ibid., p.156.
180 Muslim Society, Politics and Islamic Education in the Former Russian Empire
Table 2
What is Your Current Attitude to Religion?
Answers
%
I believe, follow the religious rules, and I am a member
of a religious community
11.7
I believe but do not take part in religious life
58.2
I do not believe but respect believers
10.8
I do not believe but follow some rituals
8.1
I am indifferent to religion
5.1
Most probably, I am a religious antagonist
0.7
Not sure
5.4
Total
100
Research conducted by the Ebert Foundation about the religious
perceptions of the Kazakhstani youth nearly mirrors the mentioned
above results.379 Young people had to answer the question about their
attitude to religion (Table 3):
Table 3
What is Your Attitude to Religion?
Answers
%
I’m religious; I’m part of my religious community and
regularly go to church/mosque, observe religious
practices, precepts, and prohibitions, and promote my
religion's values
6.5
I’m religious, but I rarely take part in religious life, other
than festivals and certain important ceremonies
73.5
I’m not religious, but I take part in certain practices and
festivals according to the traditions of my nationality
and defend its religion
10.5
I’m not religious and take no part in religious life, but I
respect the religious feelings of those who are and do
not impede them
5.0
I have my own individual belief in various values (e.g., a
civil religion, personal respect for moral values, belief in
1.8
379 T. B. Umbetalieva, B. Rakisheva, P. Teschendorf, and K. Hurrelmann, Youth in
Central Asia, p. 110.
PART II. Islamic Education and Recent Developments in the Post-Soviet Era 181
a non-traditional god, etc.)
I’m not religious; I'm an atheist and opponent of
religion, and I believe that religion has done more harm
than good to mankind and that people should abandon
it
2.0
Don’t know
0.7
Total 100
This table presents a more detailed gradation of the attitudes
people have towards religion in Kazakhstan. Summarizing the data of
these two surveys, we can say that the vast majority of Kazakhstanis
consider themselves believers and do not openly deny religion.
However, most of the population position themselves as ‘religious’ in a
more abstract and metaphysical rather than practical way. Only a small
percentage (6-11%) believe that religious knowledge should find
regular expression in daily life according to internalized canons and
norms.
Among the standard trends that the young generation shares
with their elder compatriots, we can identify an unusual “weak
signal”.380 Less than 2% of Kazakhstanis between 14 and 29 perceive
faith beyond any generally accepted definition and give it a form of a
practical, anthropocentric interpretation. This sounds more humanistic
than religious indicating that something new is emerging that might
become a trend.
However, the overall picture is quite apparent. Even those
Kazakhstanis who confess their non-affiliation with any religion (8-
10%) are quite tolerant of the manifestation of other people’s religious
feelings. They are even ready to take part in certain religious rites since
they consider their manifestation to be a cultural component of the
ethnic group rather than a theologically determined action. Thus, the
first dimension of religion in general and Islam in particular we can
define as an ethnoconfessional bond.
380 In futures studies “weak signals” indicate potential events or changes in the
future (See Pierre Rossel, ‘Beyond the Obvious: Examining Ways of Consolidating
Early Detection Schemes’, Technological Forecasting and Social Change 78 (2011), pp.
375-385).
182 Muslim Society, Politics and Islamic Education in the Former Russian Empire
‘Ethnically Religious’
Often in everyday life, ethnic and religious affiliations are identical in
ordinary people's understanding. Therefore, all Turkic peoples are
automatically ranked as followers of Islam, while all Slavic peoples are
Orthodox Christians. In the public consciousness, such equalization
considers being true, complying with an understanding of fidelity to the
faith of ancestors or faith by birth. Such ideas can also include the
history of the group religiosity development because often, the ethnic
community establishes a religion as the foundation of its traditional
culture.381 Therefore, ordinary people (including some scholars and
politicians primarily) determine ‘traditionality’ of religion not by the
time span it functions among people or its history in general, but by its
degree of rootedness in the national tradition.
Thereby, we can say that in Kazakhstan, religion in general and
Islam in particular have an ethnocultural status. This is demonstrated
by the research results of the F. Ebert Foundation (Table 4):382
Table 4
What is Your Religion? (by ethnicity)
Kazakhs
Russians
Islam
96.9
2.3
Orthodox Christianity
1.1
92.9
Catholicism
-
0.6
I'm an atheist
1.1
3.2
No response 0.2 0.3
Don’t know
0.8
0.6
As we can see, the overwhelming majority of the Kazakhs affiliate
themselves with Islam, with a tiny proportion ascribed to any other
option. The ethnocultural status of this monotheistic tradition indicates
that its adherents draw a close connection between religious affiliation
and ethnicity. Often, Kazakhs are ready to recognize faith in God as the
381 Bizhanov, p.101.
382 T. B. Umbetalieva, B. Rakisheva, P. Teschendorf, and K. Hurrelmann, Youth of
Central Asia, p.114.
PART II. Islamic Education and Recent Developments in the Post-Soviet Era 183
tradition of their ancestors, reflecting the historical path of development
of their ethnos. However, they do not show a particular desire to
internalize religious norms and practices in their everyday lives. This
trend becomes even more apparent when surveying those who attend
religious courses in local mosques. Answering the survey question, “How
long have you identified your religious affiliation?” the majority traces
that moment back to their birth and childhood (Table 5):383
Table 5
How long have you identified your religious affiliation?
Answer
%
From birth
24.4
From childhood (up to 16)
36.5
Recently (less than five years ago)
24.4
Fairly recently (less than ten years ago) 4.9
More than ten years ago 4.9
In the 1990s
4.9
Total:
100
Some personal answers quite vividly illustrate the ethnocultural
status that Islam has among the respondents. For example,
“We have believed since childhood, but performing namaz has
started since retirement”.
"Since childhood, I have known that I am a Muslim, but I started
practicing two years ago”.
"I am in Islam since my birth, but I have followed the rules for six
months only."
At the same time, considering the historical background of
Islam in Kazakhstan, the validity of the ethnocultural bond might be
questioned. For example, the nomadic culture of the Kazakhs barely
contributed to the spread of Islam that was introduced to the southern
regions of Kazakhstani territories in the late eighth and early ninth
centuries.384 Before that, the local traditions were steeped in animism,
383 Muzykina, Religious Education.
384 John L. Esposito (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2009), vol. 3, p.304.
184 Muslim Society, Politics and Islamic Education in the Former Russian Empire
shamanism, and the cult of ancestors385 that suited the migratory
lifestyle of the Turkic tribes much better than the highly regulated
sedentary reality of Islam. In the 12th century, the peripatetic Sufi order
established by Ahmed ibn Ibrahim al-Yasavi (1106-1166) made
significant efforts in the Islamization of Turkic tribes. It introduced a
syncretistic version of Islam mixed with the local beliefs. However, “the
grip of Islam on nomadic Kazakhs remained weak, – notices Martha
Olcott, a prominent researcher of Central Asia – so much that in the
sixteenth century the ‘ulama’ of Bukhara condemned them as
idolaters”.386
The aspiration to unite and contribute from all accessible
spiritualities that marks a pivotal philosophical point of nomadic life is
well illustrated by the art of zhyrau, the traditional steppe narrators-
poets.387 This type of folk art occupies a particular niche in the culture
of nomads. According to Chokan Valikhanov (1835-1865), the first
national researcher of the Kazakh culture, it was they who stand out
from all Turkic peoples by their unusual talent in poetic creativity. The
scholar identifies the primary attention of the Kazakhs to the objects
that were observable, not hypothetic, like the boundless nature of the
Central Asian steppe. The legends-reflections (tolgau) of the
‘philosophers of the steppe,’ as Valikhanov called zhyrau, represent a
unique form of understanding the unified and universal way of
improving the spiritual image of a person. The poetic stanzas of a zhyr
(a legend) in the oral tradition of the Kazakhs were a ‘depository’ of
principles developed by multiple generations throughout their history
for a careful transition to regulate everyday life. Egalitarianism marked
385 See Mukhanmadiyar Orynbekov, Genezis Religioznosti v Kazakhstane [The
Genesis of Religiosity in Kazakhstan] (Almaty: Institute of Philosophy, Political
Science and Religious Studies, 2013); Serik Akatayev, Kul't Predkov u Kazakhov i
Yego Etnogeneticheskiye i Istoriko-Kul'turniye Istoki [The Cult of the Ancestors of the
Kazakhs and Its Ethnogenetic, Historical, and Cultural Sources] (Alma-Ata: n.p.,
1973); and Viktor Timoshinov, ‘Aruakh – Kul't Predkov u Kazakhov’ [Aruah – the Cult
of the Ancestors of the Kazakhs], Mysl': Socio-Political Journal 8 (1995), pp.85-87.
386 Esposito, p.304.
387 Quanysh Alzhan, ‘Etiko-Ontologicheskiye Aspekty Mirozdaniya i Cheloveka v
Tvorchestve Zhyrau’ [Ethical and Ontological Aspects of the Universe and Man in
the Works of Zhyrau], Adam Alem 4 (58) (December 2013), pp.57-64.
PART II. Islamic Education and Recent Developments in the Post-Soviet Era 185
the zhyrau tradition, contrasting exclusivism so typical for any
monotheistic belief system. It was a normative principle for organizing
Kazakh society.
Moreover, Chokan Valikhanov notes in his works, such as On
Islam in the Steppe or Traces of Shamanism among the Kyrgyz that
Islamic beliefs were not an integral part of Kazakhs’ life even in the
middle of the 19th century. Since Islam did not take deep roots in the
steppe, it was under dual power when traditional folk religious beliefs,
the cult of Tengry in particular, were widely spread along with Islamic
doctrines.
At the same time, antagonism between folk beliefs and Islam
was alien to the steppe, and they peacefully coexisted. Very often, the
old forms were substituted with the new ones keeping their original
essence. As Valikhanov mentions, “names and words have got changed,
but not thoughts”.388 Perhaps that is why the names ‘Allah’ and ‘Tengri’
are used on equal terms in zhyraus’ poems, reflecting the syncretic
nature of Kazakh culture. The steppe storytellers rarely connected the
beginning of personal and public morality with adherence to any
confessional dogma or creed. However, the ethical component was a
frequent keynote in zhyraus’ teachings that proclaimed its practical,
demonstrative, and day-to-day nature. "Good is good thoughts and
actions of a person, good is honesty, truthfulness, justice, wisdom,
generosity, courage, and other things manifested in the real deeds of
people”.389 Acknowledging the existence of the Superpower or the
Originator, the ancient Turkic thinkers did not undermine personal
participation and reflections, thus promoting an active and not
nominal position in one’s belief system. For them, a personal rational
approach was strongly required, and no ideological or political goal
should have hindered it.
Unfortunately, for modern Kazakhstan, freedom of choice in the
spiritual field is almost annulled. Even though the country ‘officially’
388 Chokan Valikhanov, ‘Sledy Shamanstva u Kirgizov’ [Traces of Shamanism among
the Kyrgyzs], in Chokan Valikhanov, Sobraniye Sochineniy v Pyati Tomakh [Collected
Works in Five Volumes] (Alma-Ata: The Main Edition of the Kazakh Soviet
Encyclopedia 4, 1985), p.49.
389 Alzhan, p.59.
186 Muslim Society, Politics and Islamic Education in the Former Russian Empire
abandoned the ideology of Communistic atheism, the authorities have
preserved and still actively promote its methodologies and tools. The
state still issues the legislation that sets the boundaries between
‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ religions, forms the governing policy
regarding the religious life of its citizens, and heavily controls activities
of all religious organizations in the republic, including the Spiritual
Administration of Muslims in Kazakhstan.390 Any public manifestation
of one’s religious beliefs can be stigmatized as fanaticism that runs
contradictory to the secular nature of the Kazakhstani state.
Compartmentalizing Religion to Identity Marker
The state-religion policy nurtured in Kazakhstan has borne fruit by
assigning to religion a secondary status well-known in modern post-
secular society as a component of personal identity. In Kazakhstani
reality, it means the increase of interest among the youth to religion as
a part of local culture. They attempt to align their behavior with
‘religious’ norms and regulations.391 However, young people perceive
religious life as an intimate sphere when true faith is set deep in one’s
heart. The conviction of the younger generation is that sincere
religiosity should not be demonstrated in the public sphere. This is why
young people act more like observers than participants in religious life.
They partake only episodically and sporadically.
The older generation does not differ much from the youth in
this regard. During the monitoring conducted by the IPPR in 2014,
every second respondent answering the question, "What is the role of
390 See ‘International Religious Freedom Releases’, The Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor, www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/index.htm, accessed 25 March
2020; ‘Report of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’, U.S.
Department of State, www//1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/
irf/irf_rpt/irf_kazakhst.html, accessed 27 March 2020; and N. Karimov, ‘A Contested
Muslim Identity in Kazakhstan: Between Liberal Islam and the Hanafi Project’,
Cultural and Religious Studies 6 (5) (2018), pp.300-312.
391 T. B. Umbetalieva, B. Rakisheva, P. Teschendorf, and K. Hurrelmann, Youth in
Central Asia, pp.121-122.
PART II. Islamic Education and Recent Developments in the Post-Soviet Era 187
religion in private and political life?" indicated that religion is a private
business of an individual (Table 6):392
Table 6
Is Religion a Private Matter of an Individual, and Should It
Influence Public and Political Life?
Answers %
Religion is a private matter, an individual internal world 51
Religion can positively influence the public spiritual and
moral atmosphere
20.4
Religion can contribute to political problem solving due to
its peace-making function
8.2
Religion divides people and serves as a source of conflicts 5.0
In modern secular societies, religion does not play an
important role
5.7
Religion can be used as a conflict triggering political
resource
5.4
Not sure 4.3
The above results indicate an absolute socio-cultural role
assigned to religion as an institution.
In the value matrix of the Kazakhstani population, religious
faith does not occupy a top position. It is on the border between
personal space and the state.393 However, both the respondents and
experts consider participation in religious life an essential factor
because it largely shapes one’s moral personality. Thus, the experts
listed the following norms and values that are reanimated when people
are getting familiar with religion (a selection from the inventory):394
392 Yelena Burova, (ed.), Trendy Novoy Religioznosti v Sovremennom Kazakhstane
(Opyt Sotsiogumanitarnogo Izmereniya) [The Trends of a New Religiosity in Modern
Kazakhstan: The Socio-Humanitarian Dimension Experience] (Almaty: Institute of
Philosophy, Political Science and Religious Studies of the CS of the MES of the RK,
2014), pp.46-47.
393 Ibid.
394 Ibid., p.50.
188 Muslim Society, Politics and Islamic Education in the Former Russian Empire
- respect for elders, their veneration (20),
- a desire for good, kindness (13),
- unconditional help to large families, the needy, disabled
people, compassion (9)
- law-abiding (8), introducing youth to values through
religion (8),
- love to the neighbor (7), spirituality (7), a more attentive
attitude (2) and love to children (5), patience (6),
- intolerance to antisocial phenomena, overcoming social
vices (6), mercy (6), philanthropy (6),
- tolerance (5) to mates, neighbors, people of other faith
traditions, nobility (4), morality (4), compassion (4),
patriotism (4),
- peacefulness (3), friendliness (3), interethnic harmony (3),
understanding (3), interiorizing honesty by citizens (3),
respect and love for people (3), honesty (3).
The majority of Kazakhstani respondents are confident that
religious faith can positively affect the personality and lifestyle of
people who professes it, since beneficial changes may take place and
believers are seen as kinder, fairer, and more merciful (Table 7):395
Table 7
How Can Religious Faith Influence an Individual’s Personality
and Lifestyle?
Answers
%
Faith beneficially influences one’s character changing it for
the better Believers are kinder, fairer, and more merciful
52.9
Faith does not change one’s character to the better because
there is too much negativity around
23.3
Faith contributes to the rise of intolerance, fanaticism,
rejection of other points of view in one’s character
8.9
Not sure
14.1
These results indicate the steady status of religion as a source of
ethical values that distinguish the life of believers, highlighting the
third, axiological dimension of religion in modern Kazakhstani society.
395 Ibid., p.53.
PART II. Islamic Education and Recent Developments in the Post-Soviet Era 189
Being Religious, Being Moral
The ethical paradigm is widely present in the national spiritual heritage
of the Kazakhs, where is more practical than theoretical. It is aimed at
positive changes in the life of an individual and society as a whole. Such
a perspective is easily traced in the works of Abay Kunanbaev (1845-
1904), a famous educator and a ‘spiritual mentor’ of Kazakh people. He
sought to reveal to his fellow tribesmen the essence of faith through
rationalism so typical for classical Islam as well as through deep
introspection, consideration of his thoughts and feelings. Such a
methodology is a hallmark of the creativity of the Turkic peoples.
Reflecting on faith, Abay considers it inextricably linked with
the daily life of people; for him, religion is not something
supplementary to the daily routine.396 Remarkably, Abay separates
‘faith’ from ‘religion,’ not equating them. For him, religion is the result
of clergies’ actions that take advantage of ordinary people's ignorance.
Such a situation inevitably leads to fanaticism because it is based on
‘blind’ beliefs in everything that people hear.
In contrast to religion, there is ‘true faith,’ which is a rational
action based on a person’s ability to understand the true nature of God.
Only such faith can help a person answer the critical question of how
and why he should live. By true faith, Abay means iman enlightened by
reason. The Kazakh philosopher notices, “There is a double path of
believing. Some people accept faith while convinced of its necessity and
justice; they strengthen it in themselves with reasonable arguments.
We call this faith iman”.397 This kind of faith, according to Abay, is a
profound conscious need of the soul which has nothing to do with
ritualistic worship, because it is accompanied by understanding that
this state is necessary for the person and not for God. Deep wisdom fills
the following words of the thinker, “Allah is great, and He will not
suffer from your unbelief. If you claim that your faith is necessary for
you, well, then you believe. But if it is faith for the sake of faith, you
will not benefit from it”.398
396 Abay, Qara Sözder [The Book of Words] (Alma-Ata, n.p., 1992).
397 Ibid., p.26.
398 Ibid., p.62.
190 Muslim Society, Politics and Islamic Education in the Former Russian Empire
For Abay, the affirmation of goodness, mercy, and justice in
relations between people mark true faith, i.e. it is expressed in
appropriate ethical behavior, and not just in theoretical knowledge.
True faith is the foundation of a virtuous life because only faith can
make people act morally and oppose their natural interests and desires.
Therefore, belief in the absolute value of the good is the basis of a
virtuous life. The absence of this understanding or its distortion
becomes the primary source of evil and suffering. Abay emphasizes, "A
rational person must know that it is a believer’s duty to do good. ...
There is no value of good if it is done without faith”.399 Faith in Allah
brings humanness and humanity into one’s daily life, and these
qualities have to serve as the norm of human relations. Abay writes,
“The beginning of humanness is love and justice. They are present in
everything and solve everything”.400 Faith has a practical and
demonstrative (not a ritualistic) nature that must be realized for the
wellbeing of society.
Following this route, the Kazakh thinker formulated his brilliant
concept tolyq adam or true believer/perfect person. Such an individual
seeks knowledge and realizes the need to reflect in their life the
attributes of Allah expressed in His names. Among them is mercy,
justice, kindness, and love occupy a special place. Imitating Allah, tolyq
adam is capable of benefiting their neighbors and the whole of
humanity, which means making one’s life useful.
Unfortunately, these profound edifications stay typically
disregarded even among the so-called ‘practicing Muslims’ in modern
Kazakhstan. They rarely take heed of the transformative function of
Islam, equating it primarily to religion in its ritualistic expression. The
results of the survey among attendees of religious courses at the
Central Mosque are very demonstrative. Answering the question, “Why
did you decide to attend the course?” the overwhelming majority (that
has been coming and getting knowledge for some time already)
identifies typical reasons that limit Islam to its ‘correct’ rites and the
original text (Table 8):401
399 Ibid., p.47.
400 Ibid., p.68.
401 Muzykina, Religious Education.
PART II. Islamic Education and Recent Developments in the Post-Soviet Era 191
Table 8
Why Did You Decide to Attend the Course?
(free multiple answers)
Answers
Q-ty
Attend free Arabic classes (to read the Qur'an)
36
Get new knowledge (about the Qur'an and Islam) to
strengthen my faith
21
Be closer to people with religious values 3
Perform namaz (prayer) correctly
1
Attend courses in Russian
1
Enter the paradise
1
Have a teacher
1
Where else should I go?
1
Edify myself and the family
1
Attendance is accessible, and Islam here (in the mosque) is
correct
1
Dad got me into the courses, but I liked them
1
The secular paradigm cannot but have a profound impact on such a
petty perception of religion, stripping it out of its holistic nature and
assigning functional boundaries. Most often, these boundaries are
associated with a fence that different people perceive differently –
sometimes as a security force, sometimes as police violence. However,
Kazakhstani respondents have recognized the presence in the modern
world of non-religious ethics or moral principles that do not affiliate
with a particular religious tradition. At the same time, when assessing
the sociocultural influence and functional capabilities of religion, the
majority of the Kazakhstani respondents adhere to the view that
religion fosters morality, restraint from immoral acts, and
contributions to spiritual education which aligns with the national
tradition (Table 9):402
402 Bizhanov, p.52.
192 Muslim Society, Politics and Islamic Education in the Former Russian Empire
Table 9
What Does Religion Contribute to in Modern Society? (%)
Statement Agree Mostl
y
agree
Mostl
y
disag
ree
Do
not
agree
Not
sure
Religion helps preserve
national culture and
traditions
23 48 11.3 6.6 11.1
Religion nurtures morality,
keeps away from immoral
acts
26.7 42.1 13.2 6 12
An atheist or the one who
does not believe in God can
be a moral person
20.3 25.6 21.4 19.9 12.8
Religion does not give
anything substantial, and
there is no particular harm
from it
9.8 21.2 28.9 24.1 16
One respondent expressed the following opinion, “If the
majority of Kazakhstani population avoids religious extremes by
agreeing to live in a secular state, religion will perpetuate the moral
and ethical guidelines for people’s everyday behavior”.403
Changing Dimensions
The issues discussed above indicate that the modern Kazakhstani
context refers to religion primarily as a manual for worldview
development. It must be primarily responsible for the formation of the
basics of one’s value system. These functions affect a person at an in-
depth and personal level. Therefore, the declared ‘religiosity’ of the
Kazakhstani society does not go into the public sphere and stays on the
individual level. Only an individual can decide to follow or not religious
norms and regulations with all possible implications.
403 Burova, p.50.
PART II. Islamic Education and Recent Developments in the Post-Soviet Era 193
Nevertheless, researchers have noted in recent years a
significant increase in the number of respondents who would like to see
the growing role of religion in public space, projecting the future of
Kazakhstan as a state with religious status. Thus, at the beginning of
2000, the percentage of such citizens was 4.1%, reaching 7.8% by 2005
and 13.6% by 2014.404 This data directly indicates both the expansion of
the religious influence and the manifestation of strengthening its
authority in the mass consciousness. Particularly illustrative is the
younger generation’s position, as 96.9% of them seriously consider the
need to strengthen the role of religion in society (Table 10):405
Table 10
How Great a Role Should Religion Play in Public Life?
(on a scale 1 to 7, with 1 as ‘Should play a lesser role’
and 7 as ‘Should play a greater role’)
Answers
%
1
4.7
2
9.3
3
10.9
4
17.9
5
22.7
6
15.7
7
17.4
Don't know
1.3
Total
100
Weighted mean: 4.6
At the same time, the 2014 mass survey under the IPPR
sociological study showed the ambivalence of the respondents’ attitude
to the manifestation of religion in public space. Answering the question
about what actions modern Kazakhstani society should take regarding
404 Z.K. Shaukenova, Y.Y. Burova, and M.K. Bektenova, ‘Fenomen Religioznosti v
Sovremennom Kazakhstane' [The Phenomenon of Religiosity in Modern Kazakhstan],
Vestnik KazNU. Religious Studies 1 (1) (2015), p.11.
405 T. B. Umbetalieva, B. Rakisheva, P. Teschendorf, and K. Hurrelmann, Youth in
Central Asia, p.113.
194 Muslim Society, Politics and Islamic Education in the Former Russian Empire
religion, the participants noted the following:406
• “The importance of religion and its promotion should not be
emphasized in Kazakhstani society” (39.9%);
• “It is necessary to expand the influence of religion in culture”
(21.8%);
• “It is necessary to expand the influence of religion in
politics” (15%);
• “It is necessary to teach the basics of religious knowledge in
schools, colleges, universities” (13.1%);
• “Some quotas must be set aside for religious figures in the
Parliament” (8.2%).
Analyzing the above results, we can conclude that the number
of citizens who advocate the expansion of religious influence in the
cultural and political spheres exceeds the number of those who are for
restricting the role of the religious factor in society.
Conclusions
In summary, context largely shapes the status of religion in
Kazakhstani society and its dimensions. Here we have identified and
examined the following: ethnocultural, identity-forming, and
axiological. Many respondents choose primarily the latter category for
describing the role and significance of religion in the life of individuals
and society in general. Different surveys demonstrate a widespread
opinion about the positive influence of religion on high moral
standards in the life of believers. Therefore, modern Muslim ethical
discourse will best attract enough followers to remain pertinent from
both the Islamic and secular perspectives.
The relevance of the ethical paradigm of Islam finds its
historical reflection in the spiritual heritage expressed in the works of
famous Kazakh thinkers. For them, ethics is not so much a theoretical
but practical matter that starts with goal setting. What should be the
result? What will we get at the end? Trying to solve current problems by
all means, how moral is it? What is the role of the person in this
process? These questions are especially relevant today, as people face
406 Shaukenova et al., p.12.
PART II. Islamic Education and Recent Developments in the Post-Soviet Era 195
the issue of goals that someone pursues in political, economic, or any
other sphere of the modern world.
Therefore, values that Islam refers to as
ḍ
aruriyāt, thus
determining the core of common universals for all human beings, i.e.,
religion, life, family relations, property, and intellect, remain active at
all times and among all peoples. Islam serves as a reflection of these
values. In determining the role and the place of Islam in the
contemporary Kazakhstani society, focused attention on
ḍ
aruriyāt
might serve as a welcoming platform that can give birth to a new
religious or better to say a spiritual revival in the country. Tackling
practical issue, e.g., whether religion makes someone a better person in
character and actions, whether human life and family relations are
adequately protected and respected; whether property is earned and
used in a halal way; and whether intellect gets all permissible
possibilities for its development and application, Islamic can contribute
substantially to the wellbeing of Kazakhstan, taking its place in modern
society.
•