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Unilateral secession, international recognition, and great power contestation
Abstract
Recognition of aspiring states from established countries is central to becoming a member state of the international system. Previous research suggests that great power recognition decisions regarding aspiring states rapidly converge toward either recognition or non-recognition, yet great power convergence has still not occurred in the case of Kosovo after more than ten years. Unilateral secessions typically remain wholly unrecognized, since they violate the norm of home state consent, yet Kosovo has now been recognized by more than 100 countries. Why do some countries extend recognition to unilateral secessions, and do so early, whereas others delay recognition or withhold it altogether? In the case of Kosovo, great power influence and contestation, rather than convergence, have played a key role in shaping recognition decisions. We argue that countries in the US sphere of influence, with strong economic and military ties, are more likely to recognize Kosovo and to do so relatively fast, whereas countries influenced by Russia are less likely to recognize Kosovo at all, or to do so only after an extended delay. However, great powers are not equal in influencing other states to adopt their preferred position, since the USA is more powerful than Russia and can benefit from working alongside allies within the Western-oriented world order. We estimate a non-proportional Cox model with new time-varying data on Kosovo recognition and provide evidence that US military ties influenced other countries in extending recognition to unilateral secession.
... Such crucial aid creates a paradoxical relationship of external dependence between both patron states and the contested entities they support (Caspersen, 2009 At any rate, one of the challenges for CPD in type 2 is that it must tackle not just the paradiplomacy of the de facto state but also the more traditional diplomacy carried out by patron states. Therefore, the struggle for recognition/de-recognition of contested states is not merely a local/national dispute but is very much related to systemic and geopolitical factors (Griffiths, 2014;Bakke et al., 2018;Siroky et al., 2021;Badarin, 2021). Moldova's approach towards Transnistria, which has been described as 'soft balancing' (Kennedy, 2016), for instance, can be explained by this logic. ...
... Similarly, economic leverage has also been a key instrument for the United States regarding Kosovo, where Washington has actively encouraged and lobbied for recognitions of this entity since its unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), in 2008. This is illustrated bySiroky et al. (2021), who have found a strong correlation between recipients from Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) from Washington and Kosovo recognitions. In other words, the larger the US FDI, the more likely for a country to recognise the US-supported Republic of Kosovo.Unsurprisingly, economic leverage is not exclusively used by patron states but is also an important CPD tool used by parent states to prevent and reverse recognitions. ...
While Paradiplomacy has received substantial scholarly attention in recent decades, less attention has been given to its antithetical dynamic: counter-paradiplomacy (CPD). This paper fills this gap by providing a comprehensive scrutiny of states' reactive policies against subnational diplomatic engagement. We use a typological analysis to differentiate between various forms of CPD, which is impacted by both the nature of the actors involved and the power asymmetries between them. Each typology is illustrated with contemporary cases that highlight these different forms of frictional interactions between states and subnational actors.
... Figure 2: hole-of-a-donut secession (149) The first challenge assumes that C forms a single nation in a multinational state. In this case, B could possibly secede in line with the positive impact of the geographic location, but C could not easily. ...
... Buchanan (ed) (n 39) 14149 Bossacoma Busquets (ed) (n 12) 85 ...
The concept of self-determination is the most powerful belief. It shall be represented into the constitution if it is a need for its people. No other concept is as strong, visceral, unruly, as steep in creating aspirations and hopes as the self-determination of peoples deserve to be protected. If "peoples" is the body, the self-determination is the spirit that makes it alive. Both form the scene of nations. Self-determination can expand as large as a nation. Self-determination inflates in situations of colonies and postcolonial revolutions, reforms or secession movements of the peoples. I claim that secession is a political option. Each situation requires a certain bond and scope of people. Self-determination by the whole nation leads to good governance while an immutable minority may be led to secession. A thesis presented on the interaction constitutional and international law field, it starts with the comprehensive analysis then test it in the practical example of Kurdistan and Catalonia.
... Moreover, Russia's veto power in the UN Security Council, which prevents Kosovo from gaining international subjectivity and joining the UN, has helped Kremlin's image as a defender of national interests among the Serbian ruling elite and the local population. From Belgrade's perspective, the difference in the Western approach toward Serbia and Ukraine with regard to the question of preservation of territorial integrity is best described as application of double standards, which is used to explain the Serbian leadership's adoption of a multi-vector policy in light of international pressures (Mehmeti & Radeljić, 2016;also Escudero Espinosa, 2017;Siroky et al., 2021). ...
This article examines the position of Serbia as a small state in the context of external pressures, largely reflecting an ambition to balance the East and the West. While clearly interested in offers and benefits from collaboration with both geostrategic realms, Serbia’s authorities have always left space for possible alternatives—a trend that is expected to serve power preservation or to inform external players to what extent Serbia is keen on balancing and juxtaposing great powers in the region. While analyzing the limited case of the Covid-19 pandemic and the never-ending case of Kosovo, additionally actualized by the Russo-Ukrainian war, the present study suggests that Serbia is at the crossroads between growing ambitions and the real limitations of what its smallness can achieve. The paper concludes that Serbian foreign policy contains all the prerogatives of movement without a goal, a search for strategic partnerships, but without a coherent political vision—an approach that generates suspicion of being labelled as distracted and unreliable.
... Other factors that can influence states' behaviour regarding their decision to recognize are related to the hierarchy mentioned above and competition among Great Powers. In their study on Kosovo, Siroky et al (2021) found that military and economic ties (arms sales and investments) from the US and Russia were good predictors of recognition (or non-recognition). ...
Does the Russian war in Ukraine presage a change in the rules of the game for secessionisms around the globe? In this article we explore how the Russian war in Ukraine and the contested international order from which it emerges can affect state contestation and secessionist movements through changing opportunities in the international order. International recognition plays a crucial role in state creation. The Great Powers of a given historical moment have the capacity to raise sovereignty expectations, since having "friends in high places" has been essential to obtaining statehood, alongside de facto control of the territory. However, the liberal international order in place since 1945 has given way to a more contested landscape that opens new opportunities for different recognition patterns, which change how secessionists evaluate their optimal strategy for state contestation. The effects have already been notable in conflicts such as Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia or Kosovo, and many other 1 marc.sanjaume@upf.edu 2 l.a.daniels@stv.uio.no, corresponding author 2 territorial disputes, even "frozen conflicts" over the globe from Western Sahara to Taiwan. We explore how Russia has created and exploited secessionist claims in eastern Ukraine to justify military aims in the Russian war in Ukraine. Based on a detailed review of the evolution of these claims, we draw different scenarios on the potential effects of a changing world order on state contestation. Our research suggests that the theoretical understanding of secession and secessionists' optimal strategies need to be reviewed taking into account the changing contested international order.
... Diplomatic pressures by Western forces under the auspices of USA A 2020 study revealed that there is a correlation between strong ties with the United States and the recognition of Kosovo. Conversely, states that have ties with Russia are more likely not to recognise Kosovo (Siroky, Popovic, & Mirilovic, 2020). Some scholars are of the view that the process of recognising Kosovo is in its entirety an ideological move by Western forces under the inspiration of USA. ...
Fourteen years after its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), Kosovo is not still an international legal personality. The major challenge that Kosovo has is neither recognition nor non-recognition but the withdrawal of recognition (WR) by countries that hitherto recognised it after the UDI. Evidently, the recognition of Kosovo has not only stagnated but it is retarding because of WR by some states. On 13 May 2022, Serbian Foreign Minister declared that there is WR by four additional countries bringing the total number of WR to twenty-two. The specific objective of the study is to evaluate the circumstances that precipitated the UDI of Kosovo and the reasons why its recognition is retarding. Accordingly, the study is guided by four research questions. The constitutive theory of statehood is the theoretical framework of the study. The study adopted the quality research methodology. The quagmire generated by the UDI of Kosovo compelled the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to seek the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). There are a couple of reasons why the recognition of Kosovo is stagnating. The most important reason is to forestall a dangerous precedent for other secessionist movements. Some states still hold tenaciously to the illegality of Kosovo's UDI despite the ICJ's ruling. On 30 July 2022, the Prime Minister of Spain declared that the UDI of Kosovo is a violation of international law. The study recommends that the United Nation should clearly spell out the conditions for secession and recognition of States.
... The only state to have unilaterally seceded (i.e. without acquiescence from the host state) and subsequently joined the United Nations was Bangladesh in 1979 (Siroky et al., 2020). Regions that attempt unilateral secession most commonly go unrecognized, even if they have established a proto-state, like ...
The majority of states in the world today were created via secession, but a majority of secessionist movements have failed to gain independence. Counter‐secession is not only more successful than secession; it is also more common. There are over 300 nations today that lack sovereign states, as well as untold thousands more groups whose identities never became nationalist or who were never able to create robust movements in the first place. Nonetheless, counter‐secession is comparatively understudied, and a small but growing number of excellent analyses often focus on a single state strategy. Independence is rarely won quickly or cheaply, as existing states fight to maintain their borders across four phases of secession: identity formation, group mobilisation, (un)armed struggle and international recognition. This article presents the repertoire of states' counter‐secession strategies throughout the secessionist struggle, including cultural assimilation, administrative organisation, civilian displacement, banning secessionist political activity, fragmenting the secessionist movement, economic coercion, violent repression and blocking international recognition. This collective analysis of the causal logic and illustrative historical examples of state counter‐secession strategies lays the foundation for a more comprehensive research programme on counter‐secession across time and space.
... Although this is far from a new phenomenon, the analysis here will explore if this conflict reflects the current changing balance of power between rivals and sometimes amongst allies. We observe that contemporary practices of state recognition expose the prevalence of pragmatic and realpolitik multipolarity in world politics (see also Siroky, Popovic and Mirilovic 2020). In particular, these practices demonstrate the weakening of Western great powers and the global rise of China along with the resurgence of Russia, and other regional powers. ...
This article explores how the geopolitical rivalries and tensions associated with multipolarity in a transitional international order, driven by shifts in great power influence, are shaping the international politics of state recognition. It considers the diplomatic discourse and practices of traditional great powers and resurgent states in relation to a number of controversial cases of territories seeking independent statehood and recognition. Although contested claims for sovereign statehood and recognition predate the current great power constellation, we find that contemporary state recognition practices offer dominant powers grounds for normative and geopolitical contestation with their rivals. Whilst this is a reflection of the historical continuities of great power politics, the article shows that the transitional international order, and the friction this generates, has further fragmented the norms and practices of state recognition. At the same time, there has not been a broad upheaval in the politics of state recognition because most states maintain a conservative attitude to state creation. The article contributes to contemporary debates on statehood and recognition by revealing how the political and normative friction associated with the changing international order make the possibility of a rigorous, rules-based regime for regulating international recognition more remote than ever.
... In order to avoid instability in the international system, great powers might adopt a convergent position towards the conflict, or, contrariwise, compete and fight over the legitimacy of secession (Coggins, 2014). Spheres of influence and regime type could potentially shapes recognition decisions, with western democracies often aligning with the US position in the last decades (Siroky et al., 2020). Democratic states are expected to respect a 'democratic peace' vis-à-vis their counterparts, and would thus generally refrain from intervening in conflicts of secession taking place among democratic allies (Bélanger et al., 2005). ...
Abstract: This research paper aims to shed light on the theoretical perspectives and operational approaches adopted by the Palestinian civil society organization in connection with the peace-building and reconciliation process in the Palestinian context. The research question is what are the different moves, debates, and initiatives taken by the Palestinian civil society organizations to put an end to the conflict? Why could not they succeed or produce tangible results in fulfilling this goal? The first part of the paper considers debates, contexts, and developments of civil society organizations, in general, and Palestine, in particular, as well as their roles on political, national, cultural, and developmental levels. Civil society deepens its peaceful intervention in many developed and developing countries to build domestic peace and achieve reconciliation, along with other tasks and duties. Palestine’s case is not an exception but a unique case since the independent sovereign state of Palestine does not exist on the ground. The second part aims to deeply analyze the roles of civil society in the reconciliation process and to assess why this process failed to produce fruitful results until now. To use narrative methodologies, the paper collects primary data through structured interviews and the focus group. Interviews were conducted with the cadres and activists in the Palestinian civil society and other professionals and experts in this field. The last part concludes that civil so-ciety, especially among the youth, is necessary for reconciliation not only between Israeli and Palestinians but also within the Palestinians as well.Keywords: Civil Society, Peacebuilding, Israel, Palestine, conflict.
Does the Russian war in Ukraine presage a change in the rules of the game for secessionisms around the globe? In this article, we explore how the Russian war in Ukraine and the contested international order from which it emerges can affect state contestation and secessionist movements through changing opportunities in the international order. International recognition plays a crucial role in state creation. The Great Powers of a given historical moment have the capacity to raise sovereignty expectations since having “friends in high places” has been essential to obtaining statehood, alongside de facto control of the territory. However, the liberal international order in place since 1945 has given way to a more contested landscape that opens new opportunities for different recognition patterns, which change how secessionists evaluate their optimal strategy for state contestation. The effects have already been notable in conflicts such as Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Kosovo, and many other territorial disputes, even “frozen conflicts” over the globe, from Western Sahara to Taiwan. We explore how Russia has created and exploited secessionist claims in eastern Ukraine to justify military aims in the Russian war in Ukraine. Based on a detailed review of the evolution of these claims, we draw different scenarios on the potential effects of a changing world order on state contestation. Our research suggests that the theoretical understanding of secession and secessionists’ optimal strategies need to be reviewed, taking into account the changing contested international order.
In this chapter, Valur Ingimundarson discusses the Russian arguments for secession, state creation, and/or annexation in post-Soviet states. Russia has sought to expand its power in Ukraine and Georgia by claiming that its actions are mirror images of the Western military intervention in Kosovo and recognition of its secession from Serbia. It is argued that by combining these separate, if interlinked, motives, the Russians have turned concepts such as “genocide,” “self-determination,” and “sovereignty” into signifiers without fixed legal or political meanings. Thus, even if Russia still refers to the Kosovo War as a breach of international law and opposes Kosovo’s independence, it relies on both examples to justify its own wars and territorial revisions.
Why does state violence sometimes fail to crush a secessionist movement and instead facilitate international support for the separatist cause? Based on the literature on the international recognition of secessionist entities and on the impact of state repression against social movements, this paper develops an argument according to which the timing of certain repressive events make them more likely to generate an international backlash and thus facilitate external support for secessionists. To backfire internationally, state violence must occur at the right time — that is, when the secessionists have gained sufficient media attention, put in place an appropriate organizational structure, and have abandoned violent tactics for a nonviolent campaign. Using the secession process of East Timor as a case study, this paper shows how the international moral outrage that followed the Dili massacre (1991), combined with a changing geopolitical context, have boosted the foreign support of the secessionist movement in East Timor and allowed it to obtain important concessions from Jakarta.
This new handbook provides a comprehensive and multidisciplinary overview of the theoretical and empirical aspects of state recognition in international politics.
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Although the recognition of states plays a central role in shaping global politics, it remains an under-researched and widely dispersed subject. Coherently and innovatively structured, the handbook brings together a group of international scholars who examine the most important theoretical and comparative perspectives on state recognition, including debates about pathways to secession and self-determination, the broad range of actors and strategies that shape the recognition of states and a significant number of contemporary case studies.
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The handbook is organised into four key sections:
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Theoretical and normative perspectives
Pathways to independent statehood
Actors, forms and the process of state recognition
Case studies of contemporary state recognition
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This handbook will be of great interest to students of foreign policy, international relations, international law, comparative politics and area studies.
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'The most comprehensive review of the highly relevant and contested doctrine and practice on recognition - a magnificent resource for years to come.'- Marc Weller, University of Cambridge, UK.
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'The Routledge Handbook of State Recognition offers a unique and valuable collection of contributions to the study of the theory and practice of state recognition that ventures far beyond the traditional concerns of international law. A truly interdisciplinary work that integrates a wide range of theoretical and empirical perspectives on recognition, this handbook should be of great value to scholars and advanced students of international relations, political theory and international law.' - Jens Bartelson, Lund University, Sweden
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'This handbook examines how and why the world's political map changes. Gathering experts from multiple fields, it is the best single collection on how certain new states get recognised and how other aspiring states exist in a grey zone, unrecognised on the map but unavoidable on the ground.' - Gerard Toal, Virginia Tech, Washington DC, USA
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'The politics of recognition form the core of the state-based international order and its evolution. In this volume, Visoka, Doyle and Newman assemble a top-notch group of scholars with diverse theoretical perspectives and expertise. The resulting conversation, and the handbook, is more than the sum of its parts. It is perhaps even more important, however, for its timeliness as conflicts on the mend are newly raw, cold conflicts are becoming more violent and ever more discontents consider demanding unilateral independence.' - Bridget Coggins, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA
There are few questions more interesting and more important for the international community than the issue of how new states are created and accepted into the wider global system through the process of recognition. While there are thousands of ethnic groups around the world, there are just 193 member states of the United Nations. And yet, for many years, the foreign policy aspects of secession and the recognition of seceding territories have received relatively little attention by scholars in the field of politics and international relations. This was largely because the subject was seen to be a marginal interest. Few territories managed to stage a credible attempt at secession. Almost none managed to gain widespread acceptance. However, over the past decade, there has been a significant growth in the attention given to secession and recognition in international relations. This has been particularly apparent since Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia, in 2008, and because of heightened secessionist tensions in the former Soviet Union.
To date, the question of de facto states—territories that are unrecognized or partially recognized—has been at the heart of studies into secession and recognition in the field of politics and international relations. Attention in this area has tended to focus on the nature, structure, and international interaction of unrecognized territories. However, the scope of research is now widening. As well as interest in the historical development of attitudes towards secession and recognition practices, scholars are now looking at the way in which parent states—as the territories they have broken away from are generally known—attempt to prevent de facto states from being recognized or otherwise legitimized by the international community. Meanwhile, increasing attention is also being given to the role of external parties, such as great powers, as well as to the efforts of secessionist territories themselves to find ways to encourage recognition, or at least to participate more widely in the international system. Therefore, while the community of scholars working in the field of secession and recognition is still relatively small, the subject itself is undergoing rapid growth.
Historically, recognition of new states is widely acknowledged to have been a function of the society of states’ normative judgement about sovereignty during different historical periods. Despite recognition being an individual practice of each state, ‘Great Powers’ have often preferred to take a coordinated action amongst themselves when recognizing new states, setting thus a normative standard for smaller states to follow. This article sets to examine how small states coordinate recognition when ‘Great Powers’ fail to do so. By adopting an analytical framework which enmeshes the domains and conditions in which foreign policy change and international norms interact, this article examines the cases of Macedonia’s and Montenegro’s coordinated foreign policy change vis-à-vis Kosovo’s independence. The article finds that Macedonia’s and Montenegro’s coordinated foreign policy change was enabled only after the conditions primarily in the domain of politics and polity at the international level changed, enabling coordination to take place. Unlike the dominant claims in Foreign Policy literature that conceive of the ‘window of opportunity’ as exogenously given to actors, this article introduces the notion of foreign policy coordination arguing that actors can in fact be actively engaged in creating a ‘window of opportunity’ to materialise their desired foreign policy change.
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-017-0061-9
This book has several main themes and arguments. International Relations has been westerncentric, which has contributed to its ignoring religion; while religion is not the main driving force behind IR, international politics cannot be understood without taking religion into account; the role of religion is related to the fact that IR has evolved to become more than just interstate relations and now included elements of domestic politics. The book proceeds in three stages. First, it looks at why religion was ignored by IR theory and theorists. Second, it examines the multiple ways religion influences IR, including through religious legitimacy and the many ways domestic religious issues can cross borders. In this discussion a number of topics including but not limited to international intervention, international organizations, religious fundamentalism, political Islam, Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' theory, and terrorism are addressed. Third, these factors are examined empirically using both quantitative and case study methodology.
Advances in our understanding of the concept of power in international relations have been distant from the concerns of practically-minded researchers, especially those working on issues of traditional realist high politics. The study of how arms transfer relationships are used as a tool of statecraft is an example. Examining American and Soviet relations with arms transfer clients, one can distinguish three different dimensions of influence sought by patron states: bargaining power, structural power, and hegemonic power. The existing literature deals inadequately with these analytic distinctions. Since the goals pursued by states through arms transfer relationships cover all three types of influence, a more nuanced understanding of influence will advance the arms transfers literature.
Why do groups want to secede and where is demand for self-determination most likely to arise? We argue self-determination demand is moderated by the projected economic costs of policy autonomy. The trade-off between income and sovereignty implies that, other things being equal, richer regions are more likely to demand more autonomy. This trade-off suggests that relative regional income is a key predictor of autonomy demands. We show evidence of this using new data collected at the level of second-tier administrative sub-divisions in 48 decentralized countries. Consistent with a demand-and-supply model of self-determination, we find that levels of policy autonomy are positively correlated with relative regional income, regional population share, natural resource endowment, and regional inter-personal inequality. Ethnically distinct regions have lower sovereignty, which could explain higher levels of conflict in these regions, but this association is conditional on controlling for the interactive effects between ethnic distinctiveness and regional inter-personal inequality.
What drives a state's choice to assimilate, accommodate, or exclude ethnic groups within its territory? In this pathbreaking work on the international politics of nation-building, Harris Mylonas argues that a state's nation-building policies toward non-core groups - any aggregation of individuals perceived as an unassimilated ethnic group by the ruling elite of a state - are influenced by both its foreign policy goals and its relations with the external patrons of these groups. Through a detailed study of the Balkans, Mylonas shows that the way a state treats a non-core group within its own borders is determined largely by whether the state's foreign policy is revisionist or cleaves to the international status quo, and whether it is allied or in rivalry with that group's external patrons. Mylonas explores the effects of external involvement on the salience of cultural differences and the planning of nation-building policies. The Politics of Nation-Building injects international politics into the study of nation-building, building a bridge between international relations and the comparative politics of ethnicity and nationalism. This is the first book to explain systematically how the politics of ethnicity in the international arena determine which groups are assimilated, accommodated, or annihilated by their host states.
Autocratization is expected to worsen human rights conditions; democratization is frequently heralded as a means for improving them. Unfortunately, neither relationship has been subjected to empirical investigation. The causal linkage between regime change and state repression is examined in the current study with a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis of 137 countries from 1950 to 1982 (N=4,521). Four aspects of change are considered: (1) direction, (2) magnitude, (3) “smoothness” of the transition, and (4) duration of time at particular regime types. The results support the anticipated escalatory effect of autocratization for the magnitude variable, revealing influences that persist for 4 years. Additionally, there is support for the pacifying effect of democratization with regard to magnitude for the same 4-year time period. Direction, smoothness, and duration are found to be unimportant, but regime change does matter.
There are both military and political dimensions to arms transfers, and their effects on state behavior may not be the same. In this article I examine the degree to which arms transfers and arms transfer dependence interact to affect foreign policy conflict. I hypothesize that, as a transfer of military capability, weapons shipments increase the tendency of the recipient to strike a conflictual posture in its foreign policy, while arms transfer dependence restrains that tendency. An arms recipient faces the possibility that weapons shipments will be curtailed during periods of regional crisis and hostility, and when a state is dependent on one or a few major suppliers for the bulk of its imported weaponry, the costs associated with supply restrictions increases. This should encourage restraint on the part of states otherwise emboldened by arms acquisitions. My analysis treats conflictual behavior as a multiplicative function of arms transfers and arms transfer dependence. Parameter estimates are derived from time series data for nine states engaged in enduring rivalries during the Cold War. For some of these states, there is evidence that arms shipments encouraged more conflictual foreign policies; but there is also evidence that this propensity was tempered by the degree of arms transfer dependence. The model is non-linear, so the precise effects of dependence vary depending on context - i.e. the state's current level of arms importation and dependence - but realistic predictions involve changes in foreign policy conflict equal to 5-25% of their mean levels during the period.
Thomas D. Grant examines the Great Debate over state recognition, tracing its eclipse, and identifying trends in contemporary international law that may explain the lingering persistence of the terms of that debate. Although writers have generally accepted the declaratory view as more accurate than its old rival, the judicial sources often cited to support the declaratory view do not on scrutiny do so as decisively as commonly assumed. Contemporary doctrinal preference requires explanation. Declaratory doctrine, in its apparent diminution of the role state discretion plays in recognition, is in harmony, Grant asserts, with contemporary aspirations for international law. It may seem to many writers, he believes, that international governance functions better in a conceptual framework that reduces the power of states to legislate what entities are states.
How do countries decide whether or not to recognize an aspiring state? We examine such decisions in the context of contested recognition, which we define as a claim to statehood that is recognized by a large number of countries, but remains unrecognized by many others. We suggest that religion—both at the domestic level via religious regulation and discrimination against minority religions and at the international level via transnational religious ties—shapes recognition decisions. In cases where the two parties to a recognition dispute share the same dominant religious tradition (as in Western Sahara), transnational religious ties are expected to lead to external support for the side that emphasizes its religious identity and that has access to more resources. Moreover, we show that countries with higher levels of religious regulation are less likely to extend recognition. We assess these two conjectures for why some countries—but not others—have recognized the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic as an independent state using data on the recognition decisions of all 192 United Nations member states.
Cambridge Core - Russian and East European Government, Politics and Policy - Extreme Reactions - by Lenka Bustikova
UN member states recognizes unilaterally seceded states relatively rarely: in contrast agreed or consensual secession is universally recognized and leads to UN membership. The chapter outlines four unilateral secessions resulting from outside military interventions which first gained recognition from the intervening states; several unilateral secessions which were effected without outside military intervention (and did not get outside recognition). A number of unilateral secessions were also transformed into consensual secessions and thus gained international recognition. Although this is the safest way of gaining international recognition, non-recongition of unilateral secession is not an effective deterrent to unilateral secession.
The United Kingdom was at the forefront of efforts to support Kosovo’s quest for independence. As well as being one of the first countries to recognize Kosovo, in 2008, it also led efforts to secure Kosovo’s acceptance on the international stage. However, while it still remains committed to an independent Kosovo, its lobbying efforts have declined in recent years. This has been due to growing frustration over the pace of recognitions, concern about political instability in Kosovo, changes to the internal environment and its focus on Brexit.
Germany has become a key European Union member state supporting Kosovo’s statehood and European Union accession process. However, prior to 2008, Germany was careful about supporting a unilateral declaration of independence. This was due to the backlash over its controversial recognition policy in the Balkans in the 1990s and due to its relationship to Serbia and Russia. This chapter traces Germany’s journey to its new role on Kosovo’s status and explains how its support for the new state is deeply embedded in the idea of European integration.
When rebel groups engage incumbent governments in war for control of the state, questions of international recognition arise. International recognition determines which combatants can draw on state assets, receive overt military aid, and borrow as sovereigns—all of which can have profound consequences for the military balance during civil war. How do third-party states and international organizations determine whom to treat as a state's official government during civil war? Data from the sixty-one center-seeking wars initiated from 1945 to 2014 indicate that military victory is not a prerequisite for recognition. Instead, states generally rely on a simple test: control of the capital city. Seizing the capital does not foreshadow military victory. Civil wars often continue for many years after rebels take control and receive recognition. While geopolitical and economic motives outweigh the capital control test in a small number of important cases, combatants appear to anticipate that holding the capital will be sufficient for recognition. This expectation generates perverse incentives. In effect, the international community rewards combatants for capturing or holding, by any means necessary, an area with high concentrations of critical infrastructure and civilians. In the majority of cases where rebels contest the capital, more than half of its infrastructure is damaged or the majority of civilians are displaced (or both), likely fueling long-term state weakness.
"The wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in neighboring Croatia and Kosovo grabbed the attention of the western world not only because of their ferocity and their geographic location, but also because of their timing. This violence erupted at the exact moment when the cold war confrontation was drawing to a close, when westerners were claiming their liberal values as triumphant, in a country that had only a few years earlier been seen as very well placed to join the west. In trying to account for this outburst, most western journalists, academics, and policymakers have resorted to the language of the premodern: tribalism, ethnic hatreds, cultural inadequacy, irrationality; in short, the Balkans as the antithesis of the modern west. Yet one of the most striking aspects of the wars in Yugoslavia is the extent to which the images purveyed in the western press and in much of the academic literature are so at odds with evidence from on the ground."-from The Myth of Ethnic War V. P. Gagnon Jr. believes that the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s were reactionary moves designed to thwart populations that were threatening the existing structures of political and economic power. He begins with facts at odds with the essentialist view of ethnic identity, such as high intermarriage rates and the very high percentage of draft-resisters. These statistics do not comport comfortably with the notion that these wars were the result of ancient blood hatreds or of nationalist leaders using ethnicity to mobilize people into conflict. Yugoslavia in the late 1980s was, in Gagnon's view, on the verge of large-scale sociopolitical and economic change. He shows that political and economic elites in Belgrade and Zagreb first created and then manipulated violent conflict along ethnic lines as a way to short-circuit the dynamics of political change. This strategy of violence was thus a means for these threatened elites to demobilize the population. Gagnon's noteworthy and rather controversial argument provides us with a substantially new way of understanding the politics of ethnicity.
What are the factors that determine how central governments respond to demands for independence? Secessionist movements are numerous and quite varied in form, but the chief obstacle to their ambitions is the state itself, which can deny independence demands, deploy force if need be, and request that the international community respect its territorial integrity by not recognizing the breakaway region. Age of Secession focuses on this crucial but neglected moment in the life of a secessionist movement. Griffiths offers a novel theory using original data on secessionist movements between 1816 and 2011. He explains how state response is shaped by international and domestic factors, when conflict is likely, and why states have proliferated since 1945. He mixes quantitative methods with case studies of secessionist movements in the United Kingdom, Russia/Soviet Union, and India. This is an important book for anyone who wants to understand the phenomenon of secession.
Although many countries have ethnic kin on the “wrong side” of their borders, few seek to annex foreign territories on the basis of ethnicity. This article examines why some states pursue irredentism, whereas others exhibit restraint. It focuses on the triadic structure of the kin group in the irredentist state, its coethnic enclave, and the host state, and provides new data on all actual and potential irredentist cases from 1946 to 2014. The results indicate that irredentism is more likely when the kin group is near economic parity with other groups in its own state, which results in status inconsistency and engenders grievances. It is also more likely in more ethnically homogeneous countries with winner-take-all majoritarian systems where the kin group does not need to moderate its policy to win elections by attracting other groups. These conditions generate both the grievance and opportunity for kin groups to pursue irredentism.
Recognition from other recognized states is the key to becoming a fully-fledged member state of the international system. Although many new states are quickly and universally recognized, the recognition of other aspiring states remains highly contested. In these cases of contested sovereignty, some countries but not others extend recognition. However, research on what shapes a country’s decision to recognize a claim to sovereign statehood remains relatively sparse. This article focuses on how religion shapes the incentives of states to extend or withhold recognition to aspiring states in cases of contested sovereignty. It posits two mechanisms, one at the domestic level through religious institutions and one at the international level through transnational religious affinities. The article uses new data on all state decisions regarding the international recognition of Kosovo to test these propositions. The results provide strong support for these two pathways through which religion shapes state decisions regarding international recognition.
This article explores the policies and activities undertaken by Kosovo as it seeks diplomatic recognition under conditions of contested statehood and transitional international order. Existing debates about diplomatic recognition—in particular, how independent sovereign statehood is achieved—generally rest upon systemic factors, normative institutions, and the preferences of great powers. In contrast, we argue that the experience of Kosovo presents a more complex and less predetermined process of international recognition, in which the agency of fledgling states, diplomatic skill, timing, and even chance may play a far more important role in mobilizing international support for recognition than is generally acknowledged. In building this argument, we explore Kosovo’s path to contested independence and examine the complex process of diplomatic recognition, as well as highlight the hybrid justifications for recognizing Kosovo’s statehood and independence. Without downplaying the importance of systemic factors, this article contributes to a critical rethinking of norms and processes related to state recognition in international affairs, which has implications for a broad range of cases.
This article focuses on how unrecognised states have tried to establish themselves domestically and internationally, and on the efforts of base states designed to counter these initiatives. Having provided an overview of the main features of post-Soviet unrecognised states, we examine the political systems found in these territories, focusing on their presidents, parliaments, and elections. We then focus on how unrecognised states strive to strengthen themselves through support from abroad, in spite of international isolation. Finally, we debate the strategies enacted by base states to counter such efforts and deny international legitimacy and recognition to these entities.
This book proposes a novel theory of self-determination; the Rule of the Great Powers. This book argues that traditional legal norms on self-determination have failed to explain and account for recent results of secessionist self-determination struggles. While secessionist groups like the East Timorese, the Kosovar Albanians and the South Sudanese have been successful in their quests for independent statehood, other similarly situated groups have been relegated to an at times violent existence within their mother states. Thus, Chechens still live without significant autonomy within Russia, and the South Ossetians and the Abkhaz have seen their conflicts frozen because of the peculiar geo-political equilibrium of power within the Caucuses region.
How do states prevent the recognition of territories that have unilaterally declared independence? At a time when the issue of secession is becoming increasingly significant on the world stage, this is the first book to consider this crucial question. Analysing the efforts of the governments of Serbia, Georgia, and Cyprus to prevent the international recognition of Kosovo, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and northern Cyprus, the work draws on in depth interviews with a number of leading policy makers to explain how each of the countries has designed, developed, and implemented its counter secession strategies. After explaining how the principle of the territorial integrity of states has tended to take precedence over the right of self-determination, it examines the range of ways countries facing a separatist threat can prevent recognition by other states and considers the increasingly important role played by international and regional organisations, especially the United Nations, in the recognition process. Additionally, it shows how forms of legitimisation or acknowledgement are also central elements of any counter-recognition process, and why steps to prevent secessionist entities from participating in major sporting and cultural bodies are given so much attention. Finally, it questions the effects of these counter recognition efforts on attempts to solve these territorial conflicts. Drawing on history, politics, and international law this book is the first and only comprehensive account of this increasingly important field of foreign policy.
Europe's recognition of new states in Yugoslavia remains one of the most controversial episodes in the Yugoslav crisis. Richard Caplan offers a detailed narrative of events, exploring the highly assertive role that Germany played in the episode, the reputedly catastrophic consequences of recognition (for Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular) and the radical departure from customary state practice represented by the EC's use of political criteria as the basis of recognition. The book examines the strategic logic and consequences of the EC's actions but also explores the wider implications, offering insights into European security policy at the end of the Cold War, the relationship of international law to international relations and the management of ethnic conflict. The significance of this book extends well beyond Yugoslavia as policymakers continue to wrestle with the challenges posed by violent conflict associated with state fragmentation.
Does international recognition of statehood affect support for territorial compromise among groups engaged in struggles for self-determination? We show that, contrary to skepticism about the impact of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), international recognition of statehood by the UNGA shapes mass attitudes toward territorial compromise. The impact of international recognition, however, is two-pronged. International recognition simultaneously increases support for partition as a strategy of conflict resolution and decreases support for compromise on the territorial terms of partition. We also suggest a logic to explain these impacts of international recognition based on the intuition that international recognition should improve the bargaining position of the newly recognized group. We demonstrate that international recognition has an impact on mass attitudes of groups in conflict using a combination of a panel survey and survey experiment assessing the impact of the 2012 UNGA recognition of Palestine. This study is the first to show that international recognition can shape mass attitudes toward conflict.
From Kurdistan to Somaliland, Xinjiang to South Yemen, all secessionist movements hope to secure newly independent states of their own. Most will not prevail. The existing scholarly wisdom provides one explanation for success, based on authority and control within the nascent states. With the aid of an expansive new dataset and detailed case studies, this book provides an alternative account. It argues that the strongest members of the international community have a decisive influence over whether today's secessionists become countries tomorrow and that, most often, their support is conditioned on parochial political considerations.
Evidence suggests that leaders of democratic states experience high costs from violating past commitments. We argue that because democratic leaders foresee the costs of violation, they are careful to design agreements they expect to have a high probability of fulfilling. This may cause democratic leaders to prefer flexible or limited commitments. We evaluate our argument by analyzing the design of alliance treaties signed by countries of the world between 1815 and 2003. We find that alliances formed among democratic states are more likely to include obligations for future consultation rather than precommitting leaders to active conflict, and defense pacts formed among democratic states are more likely to specify limits to the conditions under which member states must join their partners in conflict. This research suggests that separating screening effects and constraining effects of international agreements is even more difficult than previously believed. States with the greatest likelihood of being constrained are more carefully screened.
Here is an accessible, up-to-date guide to event history analysis for researchers and advanced students in the social sciences. The foundational principles of event history analysis are discussed and ample examples are estimated and interpreted using standard statistical packages, such as STATA and S-Plus. Recent and critical innovations in diagnostics are discussed, including testing the proportional hazards assumption, identifying outliers, and assessing model fit. The treatment of complicated events includes coverage of unobserved heterogeneity, repeated events, and competing risks models. The authors point out common problems in the analysis of time-to-event data in the social sciences and make recommendations regarding the implementation of duration modeling methods.
Case studies suggest that ethnic groups with autonomous institutional arrangements are more prone to secede, but other evidence indicates that autonomy reduces the likelihood of secession. To address this debate, we disaggregate their autonomy status into three categoriescurrently autonomous, never autonomous, and lost autonomyand then unpack how each shapes the logic of collective action. We argue groups that were never autonomous are unlikely to mobilize due to a lack of collective action capacity, whereas currently autonomous groups may have the capacity but often lack the motivation. Most important, groups that have lost autonomy often possess both strong incentives and the capacity to pursue secession, which facilitates collective action. Moreover, autonomy retraction weakens the government's ability to make future credible commitments to redress grievances. We test these conjectures with data on the autonomous status and separatist behavior of 324 groups in more than 100 countries from 1960 to 2000. Our analysis shows clear empirical results regarding the relationship between autonomy status and separatism. Most notably, we find that formerly autonomous groups are the most likely to secede, and that both currently autonomous and never autonomous groups are much less likely.
How do states decide to extend or withhold international recognition in cases of contested sovereignty? We focus on how religion shapes the incentives of states in making this decision, both at the domestic level through religious institutions and at the international level through religious affinities. States with transnational religious ties to the contested territory are more likely to extend recognition. At the domestic level, states that heavily regulate religion are less likely to extend international recognition. We test these conjectures, and examine others in the literature, with two new data sets on the international recognition of both Palestine and Israel and voting on the United Nations resolution to admit Palestine as a non-member state observer, combined with global data on religious regulation and religious affinities. In cases of contested sovereignty, the results provide support for these two mechanisms through which religion shapes foreign policy decisions about international recognition.
The UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) represented an interim settlement that permitted conflict de-escalation while postponing the search for a lasting political solution. The final settlement should have been reached through negotiations between Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanians, and then endorsed by the UN Security Council, in accordance with the UN Resolution 1244 (1999). However, citing the ambiguity of the interim agreement and a deadlock in the negotiations, the United States and its allies recognized Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008, thereby allowing the Kosovo Albanians to defect from the peace process. Therefore, instead of an internationally endorsed negotiated outcome, there has been an attempt at a unilaterally enforced political settlement, in disregard for the authority of the UN Security Council, which had placed Kosovo under international administration. The subsequent involvement of the International Court of Justice has failed to resolve the contentious issues between Belgrade and Prishtina or bridge the international divide over Kosovo. Besides creating a troublesome legal precedent, the recognition of Kosovo represents a bad model for international conflict management. The issues of concern are the viability of future interim settlements, good faith negotiations and the legitimacy and guarantees provided by the international involvement, including the authority of the UN Security Council. Some parallels are drawn between Kosovo and other territorial disputes, particularly in the Caucasus, indicating how the Kosovo case could influence other conflicts.
From Foreign Affairs , January/February 2008 Summary: China's rise will inevitably bring the United States' unipolar moment to an end. But that does not necessarily mean a violent power struggle or the overthrow of the Western system. The U.S.-led international order can remain dominant even while integrating a more powerful China --but only if Washington sets about strengthening that liberal order now. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and the author of After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars. The rise of China will undoubtedly be one of the great dramas of the twenty-first century. China's extraordinary economic growth and active diplomacy are already transforming East Asia, and future decades will see even greater increases in Chinese power and influence. But exactly how this drama will play out is an open question. Will China overthrow the existing order or become a part of it? And what, if anything, can the United States do to maintain its position as China rises? Some observers believe that the American era is coming to an end, as the Western-oriented world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists go on to note that as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system --especially the declining hegemon --will start to see China as a growing security threat. The result of these developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. In this view, the drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established post-World War II international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order.
State institutions and organizations in Black Africa are less developed than almost anywhere else, and political instability has been prevalent. Yet, these serious empirical weaknesses have not led to enforced jurisdictional change. In order to explain the persistence of some of the weakest states in the world, the authors argue that state jurisdictions in Black Africa have been maintained primarily by the international society of states. Unlike the states that formed in Europe at an earlier period, many Black African states evolved—and survived—in the absence of effective national governments. Whereas state jurisdictions and international society once were consequences of the success and survival of states, today in Black Africa—and perhaps elsewhere, especially in the Third World—they are more likely to be conditions.
While some groups work hard to foster collaborative ties with civilians, others engage in egregious abuses and war crimes. We argue that foreign state funding for rebel organizations greatly reduces the incentives of militant groups to the ‘win the hearts and minds’ of civilians because it diminishes the need to collect resources from the population. However, unlike other lucrative resources, foreign funding of rebel groups must be understood in principal-agent terms. Some external principals — namely, democracies and states with strong human rights lobbies — are more concerned with atrocities in the conflict zone than others. Multiple state principals also lead to abuse as no single state can effectively restrain the organization. We test these conjectures with new data on foreign support for rebel groups and data on one-sided violence against civilians. Our results provide support for these hypotheses. Most notably, we find strong evidence that principal characteristics help influence agent actions.
One justification for U.S. arms transfers is that the United States can manipulate its arms exports to make the recipients of American aid comply with American wishes. This article explores the conditions under which such arms influence attempts succeed. Sixteen potential determinants are discussed, drawn from the attributes of the influence attempt, the recipient, the interaction of the recipient and supplier, the supplier, and the systemic environment. A data set of 191 American arms influence attempts from 1950 to 1992 is presented. Using logit analysis, the variables are tested against the outcome—success or failure—of the influence attempt. Successful influence attempts are more likely when the United States used promises or rewards, focused on altering the recipient's foreign policy, made the attempt on civilian regimes, supplied more of the recipient's arms, and made attempts in the first half of the cold war era, when the United States was generally more powerful.
This article explores the impact of political regime type on the decision of third states to support secessionist movements abroad. It suggests that democracies share political values, which lead them to oppose their mutual secessionist claims, while autocracies are not bound by this normative consideration. The statistical analysis supports the effect of the democratic factor: democracies rarely support secessionist groups emerging from democratic states. Moreover, it shows that there is no autocratic counterpart to this argument. This research also casts some serious doubts on the ability of conventional explanations—namely vulnerability and ethnic affinities—to explain external support to secessionist movements.
Résumé. Cet article analyse l'impact du type de régime politique sur la décision des États tiers d'appuyer des mouvements sécessionnistes à l'étranger. L'étude soutient que les démocraties partagent des valeurs politiques communes qui les mènent à s'opposer aux mouvements indépendantistes qui se manifestent parmi elles, alors que les régimes autocratiques ne sont pas liés par cette considération normative. L'analyse statistique valide l'effet du facteur démocratique : les démocraties appuient rarement les groupes sécessionnistes qui émergent au sein d'autres États démocratiques. Les données démontrent également qu'il n'y a pas d'équivalent autocratique faisant écho au facteur démocratique. L'étude indique en outre que les thèses courantes de la vulnérabilité et du lien ethnique expliquent mal l'appui des États tiers aux groupes sécessionnistes.
Many sources of economic data cover only a limited set of states at any given point in time. Data are often systematically missing for some states over certain time periods. In the context of conflict studies, economic data are frequently unavailable for states involved in conflicts, undermining the ability to draw inferences of linkages between economic and political interactions. For example, simply using available data in a study of trade and conflict and disregarding observations with missing data on economic variables excludes key conflicts such as the Berlin crisis, the Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Gulf War from the sample. A set of procedures are presented to create additional estimates to remedy some of the coverage problems for data on gross domestic product, population, and bilateral trade flows.
We describe CShapes, a new dataset that provides historical maps of state boundaries and capitals in the post-World War II period. The dataset is coded according to both the Correlates of War and the Gleditsch and Ward (1999)13.
Gleditsch , Kristian Skrede and
Ward , Michael D. 1999. Interstate System Membership: A Revised List of the Independent States since 1816. International Interactions, 25: 393–413. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®]View all references state lists, and is therefore compatible with a great number of existing databases in the discipline. Provided in a geographic data format, CShapes can be used directly with standard GIS software, allowing a wide range of spatial computations. In addition, we supply a CShapes package for the R statistical toolkit. This package enables researchers without GIS skills to perform various useful operations on the GIS maps. The paper introduces the CShapes dataset and structure and gives three examples of how to use CShapes in political science research. First, we show how results from quantitative analysis can be depicted intuitively as a map. The second application gives an example of computing indicators on the CShapes maps, which can then be used in statistical tests. Third, we illustrate the use of CShapes for generating different weights matrices in spatial statistical applications. All the examples can be replicated using the freely available R package and do not require specialized GIS skills. The dataset is available for download from the CShapes website (http://nils.weidmann.ws/projects/cshapes).