Concern for a global future

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In Part I of this book, we discuss the nature (Chapter 1) and evolution (Chapter 2) of the
multidimensional concepts of sustainability and sustainable development.
Chapter 1 begins by exploring two central components of sustainable development –
meeting basic human needs and equality, which are discussed in the context of govern-
ance. We then consider the current economic growth model and the importance given
to technological innovation as the key to solving the sustainability challenge. The chapter
ends by highlighting several critical issues that we argue must be included in future devel-
opment strategies. A narrow focus on one issue, such as climate change, or even a small
group of concerns will limit options and ignore opportunities to develop cross-cutting
approaches to address unsustainable trends in a comprehensive manner.
Chapter 2 provides a brief historical context for the ideas and themes discussed in
Chapter 1. It identifies a number of important texts, national and international events, U.S.
regulations from 1951 to 2018, and Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) that
helped shape the current and continually evolving notion of sustainable development. It
also discusses the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and makes the argument
that employment is a critical and overlooked component of sustainable development.
Part I
The multidimensional concept
of sustainability

1 Concern for a global future
1.1 Human needs and sustainability 32
1.1.1 The measurement of (human) development 38
1.1.2 Consumption and well-being 50
1.1.3 Employment and well-being 54
1.2 Social justice, inequality, and the social contract between the governed and the government 57
1.2.1 The social contract and the theory of justice 58
1.2.2 Equality of what? 65
1.2.3 Rising inequality 71
1.3 Living beyond our ecological means: the technology debate 73
1.3.1 Growth, technology, and substitution versus a steady-state economy 73
1.3.2 The environment and affluence: the environmental Kuznets curve 78
1.3.3 Technological optimism 81
1.3.4 The reformulation of sustainable development in terms of tipping points 84
1.4 Rationalizing the competing pressures on sustainability 87
1.5 Additional readings 88
1.6 References 89
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the industrialized world might have been
described as one of significant technological progress, industrialization, and globaliza-
tion. In developed nations, energy systems supply power to our homes, places of work, and
general environment. When we become ill, we find an abundance of modern drugs that
can ease or cure our suffering, maintaining or improving our physical and emotional well-
being. Global financial and commodity markets provide trillions of dollars a day to supply
our investment and consumption needs. The agricultural sector, through mechanization
and other technological and biological advances, has been able to supply our growing
sustenance requirements. Telecommunications systems have enabled friends, families,
businesses, organizations, and governments to communicate verbally and visually across
thousands of miles. Combine these technologies with our modern transportation systems,
and we remove the notion of the frontier.
Having achieved such progress, why should we now be concerned about the future of
humankind on a global scale? Primarily, because this progress has not been equitable
or sustainable. In 2013, 766 million people lived in extreme poverty on less than $1.90 a
day (UNDP 2016). It is estimated that some 3 billion people live below the “ethical pov-
erty line,” which is defined as the income needed for someone to achieve a normal life
expectancy of 70 years (Edward 2006; Oxfam 2017). Thus, a majority of the 7.3 billion
people alive today may not have any meaningful access to the resources and quality of life
described above. Even within the developed countries, many people do not have access to
an adequate supply of essential goods, services, housing, health care, and other necessities
and, in a financial crisis like the one in 2008, are at risk of losing their homes and/or their

32 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
jobs. Furthermore, inequality is increasing, leading toward a world of growing disparity
both between industrialized and developing nations and among different segments of the
population within those countries. In effect, the communities of less-developed regions
and poor areas are held captive to the needs and wants of those who are well-off in indus-
trialized (and some in industrializing) nations, whose living and consuming habits are in
many ways condemning billions of people to a lower (material) quality of life. Put simply,
if each member of the global community were to live the lifestyle of the average U.S.
or UK citizen, holding technology constant, we would need the resources of somewhere
between 1.5 and 8 planet Earths (McLaren et al. 1997; Wilson 2002; WWF 2006, 2016;
McDonald 2015). It is clear that a global drive to reach the Westernized view of the good
life, without a drastic change in production processes and consumption patterns, will soon
bring us up against ecological and physical limits and force us to rethink what we mean by
a secure and fulfilling lifestyle.
These introductory paragraphs present a highly simplified view of the world, and there
is clearly a continuum of positions between those presented. The central argument of this
book is that if we are interested in the well-being of current and future generations, we not
only should be concerned for the future of the world but also should be actively search-
ing for new ways to enable individuals, communities, and nations to live a sustainable
life through sustainable livelihoods. If present trends continue and the structural forces
driving them remain substantially unchanged, there is a strong possibility that within a
few generations the world will be incapable of sustaining the human population at an ade-
quate level of material well-being and health, and that it will lack sufficient and equitable
opportunities for the realization of human potential. These trends include persistent (and
often growing) inequalities between and within nations (including the United States) and
persuasive evidence that we are living beyond our ecological and physical means.
Further, the social and political environment in which policy responses to these trends
must be made is a difficult one. It is defined by globalization and rapid technological
change, which are mutually reinforcing and create a set of conditions that shortens the
necessary response time for policy, restricts national policy options, and possibly exacer-
bates distributional inequality and ecological damage. This chapter lays out the challenge
of meeting human needs in a sustainable and equitable way, given these social and politi-
cal conditions.
1.1 Human needs and sustainability
Understanding the fundamental needs of humans is essential if we are to develop strate-
gies to transition society toward more sustainable forms of development. We define a
human need as any need, both physiological and psychological, that is inherently univer-
sal, across both space and time, for our species. What it is not is a want or desire, nor is it
the specific means with which we seek to fulfill a need. Furthermore, unlike Maslow’s hier-
archy of human need (1943), it is increasingly apparent that “human needs are irreduc-
ibly plural” and neither hierarchical nor substitutable (Gough 2015, p. 1201). Despite the
universality of fundamental human needs, any individual, group, or society will develop
actions and value systems in an effort to realize only their perceived needs, based on the
information and opportunity available. This is especially important when considering dif-
ferences in the needs of people in developed versus developing nations, where livelihoods
and opportunities vary significantly. It also means that the satisfiers of needs will change
over time and across cultures with socioeconomic change.
For example, if societal and cultural values perceive and nurture basic psychological
needs, it is likely that the social fabric of a community will strengthen, which in turn will
facilitate the well-being and integrity of individuals within that community (R. M. Ryan
1995). Not acknowledging or supporting basic psychological needs will likely result in the

Concern for a global future 33
opposite effect, as the underlying human need remains, whether perceived or not. Hence,
if we are concerned for humankind, then we need to understand the difference between
basic needs that are inherent in human nature and those that are a product of the sociali-
zation of humans. This understanding will optimize the economic, social, and political
decision-making process we must undertake in order to create a sustainable future.
While historically the purpose of development was to develop things (for example, to
transform resources into commodities/products), this was first rejected and redefined in
the 1970s, shifting the focus of development to satisfying the needs of humankind. This
process could be said to have begun with Schumacher’s 1973 publication Small Is Beauti-
ful, which challenged the prevailing patterns of development and approach to global eco-
nomics. Schumacher (1999, p. 139) rejected the idea that what “is best for the rich must
be best for the poor” and redirected the conventional view of development toward human
needs. “Development does not start with goods; it starts with people and their education,
organization, and discipline. Without these three, all resources remain latent, untapped,
potential” (ibid.).
A year later, the Cocoyoc Declaration built on the ideas of Schumacher and placed basic
human needs at the center of development efforts, stating that “any process of growth
that does not lead to their fulfillment – or, even worse, disrupts them – is a travesty of the
idea of development.”* The following year the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation (1975)
articulated a similar position on the objective of development in What Now: Another Devel-
opment. It called for the “development of every man and woman – of the whole man and
woman – and not just the growth of things, which are merely means” (ibid., p. 5). Further,
the report emphasized the importance of satisfying the basic needs of the poor, as well as
the universal “needs for expression, creativity, conviviality, and for deciding [ . . . one’s]
own destiny” (ibid.). It continues: “Development is a whole; it is an integral, value-loaded,
cultural process; it encompasses the natural environment, social relations, education, pro-
duction, consumption and well-being” (ibid.).
In 1987, over a decade later, the World Commission on Environment and Development
(WCED) published Our Common Future, which again placed “human needs” at the center
of concerns for “sustainable” development.
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains
within it two key concepts:
• The concept of “needs,” in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to
which overriding priority should be given; and
• The idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organiza-
tion on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs.
(WCED 1987, p. 43)
* The influence of Schumacher’s work is clearly evident throughout the Cocoyoc Declaration. Schumach-
er’s call for a “metaphysical reconstruction” (Schumacher 1999, p. xi) – the need to reconstruct the
meaning of ideas such as development, economics, knowledge, wealth, employment, and technology –
is present in the Cocoyoc Declaration’s redefinition of development in terms of self-reliance. Like
Schumacher, the declaration rejects economic development that maintains or increases the disparities
between and within countries and argues for economic growth that benefits the poorest sections of each
society. Further, the declaration also rejects what might be called the “developed-nation model” in favor
of development that supports a nation–state’s societal and cultural norms. In this sense, the declaration
asks the international community to respect the diversity of each country and to accept that there is
more than one type of development trajectory.

34 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
The WCED’s conceptualization of sustainable development, which built on the develop-
ment vision articulated in What Now: Another Development, made an influential case for “the
need to integrate economic and ecological considerations in decision making” (WCED
1987, p. 62). The basic notion was that social and economic development must not under-
mine the natural environment on which they are based. Hence, sustainable development
“requires views of human needs and well-being that incorporate such non-economic vari-
ables as education and health enjoyed for their own sake, clean air and water, and the
protection of natural beauty” (ibid., p. 53).
In concert with both the Cocoyoc Declaration and What Now: Another Development, the
WCED’s Our Common Future spoke to the different needs of developed and less developed
nations. For developing nations, the “principal development challenge is to meet the
needs and aspirations of an expanding [. . .] population. The most basic of all needs is for
a livelihood: that is, employment” (WCED 1987, p. 54). It follows that employment – “the
opportunity to satisfy [. . .] aspirations for a better life” (ibid., p. 44) – will lead to the satis-
faction of such basic human needs as food, clothing, and shelter. However, some observers
expressed concern that the needs of people in less developed nations are much broader
than employment and must “include the right to preserve their cultural identity, and their
right not to be alienated from their own society, and their own community” (ibid., p. 31).
For developed nations, the focus was not on meeting basic human needs for food, cloth-
ing, and shelter per se, but instead on the ecological consequences of an overindulgent
lifestyle.
Living standards that go beyond the basic minimum are sustainable only if consump-
tion standards everywhere have regard for long-term sustainability [. . .]. Perceived
needs are socially and culturally determined, and sustainable development requires
the promotion of values that encourage consumption standards that are within the
bounds of the ecologically possible and to which all can reasonably aspire.
(WCED 1987, p. 44)
Interestingly, both the Cocoyoc Declaration and What Now: Another Development expand
the WCED’s view of human needs (in relation to developed nations) to include the physi-
ological and psychological consequences of overconsumption.
Clearly, understanding the fundamental needs of humans, in the context of both what
is needed and what is not needed, is essential if we are to develop strategies to transition
toward more sustainable forms of development. As a consequence of influential publica-
tions such as Our Common Future, the current discourse on sustainable development tends
to center on trade-offs among economic development and environmental and social
goals. Areas of contention frequently arise during such discussions because the goals of
each nation, group, or individual – which are based on their needs – are often at odds with
one another. In order to resolve these situations optimally, we must clarify the difference
between basic needs inherent to human nature and those resulting from socialization.
A key argument of this book is that the satisfaction of essential needs should drive
economic and (democratic) political systems. In the language of modern economics, a
rational person will maximize his or her utility function when making a decision to buy a
product or service to satisfy a need. Societal demand is therefore the canonical ensemble
of everyone’s individual utility function.* Similarly, in the political system, we satisfy our
political needs by voting for the politician or political party that is most likely to support
our lifestyle and beliefs. When the votes are aggregated, we believe that the candidate
* In a developed country, a consumer is a very sophisticated concept, but in a developing nation where no
markets exist, people cannot be called consumers in an organizational sense.

Concern for a global future 35
or party whose views align more closely with the needs and wants of society should be
elected.* Indeed, for many, free markets and democracy are intertwined.†
This demand-side notion of how needs drive economic and political systems, however,
raises a number of concerns. First, if we make decisions on the basis of our individual
needs, then it can be argued that a society is likely to address unsustainable activities only
once the individual is negatively affected. Second, the assumption that individuals act
solely in self-interest does not account for the very human behavior of caring for others.‡
Third, neoclassical economics argues that each person should act in his or her own inter-
est and let the market allocate resources accordingly, but this assumes that each person is
receiving perfect or good information, is able to make informed, rational decisions, and is
not subject to manipulation and deception (Akerlof and Shiller 2016). It also assumes that
the “invisible hand” of the market will generate outcomes that maximize social welfare.§
Many have argued that reliance on the market is inherently likely to result in overcon-
sumption and environmental harm due to inadequate consumer information. Manno
(2002) argues that the industrial capitalist system of incentives and disincentives is invaria-
bly directed toward increasing levels of consumption. The environmental problems associ-
ated with increasing consumption are further compounded by the fact that as commodity
chains grow in length and become more complex and more international, the spatial and
social distances between production and consumption are widened (Conca 2002; Princen
2002). The result of this distancing effect is that consumers lack the information and incen-
tives to behave in a more sustainable manner even if they wish to do so.
These concerns are at the root of a growing perception in Western culture that our
concept of the good life has been affected (or put out of balance) by the forces of the
market economy (through advertising, as well as social competition for conspicuous con-
sumption). The result of this imbalance is that an individual’s behavior is being externally
regulated – that is, it is aimed at obtaining the approval of others. For example, we buy a
certain type of product or strive for a high income to ensure that we gain the approval of
our friends or maintain our perceived status in society. Such behavior is not likely to result
in our ability to satisfy our intrinsic needs for competence, autonomy, and connectedness.
* This statement assumes that there is sufficient diversity between the political candidates to present an
individual with a real choice. It also assumes that a large enough proportion of a society will vote so that
it is possible to gauge societal demand accurately.
† For critiques that challenge this notion, see Soros (1997), Ayres (2006), and Stiglitz (2016). Soros (1997,
p. 45) argues “the untrammeled intensification of laissez-faire capitalism and the spread of market values
into all areas of life is endangering our open and democratic society.” His main concern lies with the
assumption that individuals (or consumers) have “perfect knowledge” and that by acting in their own
self-interest, they will promote the common (or greater) good. Because our understanding of the world
is inherently imperfect, promoting laissez-faire capitalism at the expense of the values and institutions
that underlie an open and democratic society is what Soros refers to as the “capitalist threat.” His con-
cern is that the free market is changing society’s perception of what is right and wrong by, for example,
focusing on financial success and overlooking how that success was achieved. Soros (1997, 1998) argues
that a better approach would be to create an open society that accepts our fallibility – i.e., that we will
never have perfect information – and enables different ideological perspectives to inform and be rec-
onciled in the political and social arena. Thus, put simply, an open society is “a society open to improve-
ment” (Soros 1998, p. 24).
‡ A growing movement around the “Caring Economy” attempts to include this notion in economic
thought (Eisler and Speth 2016).
§ One criticism of a utility-oriented system is that it does not incorporate concern for others. People vote
their interests in the marketplace, but people do not express (in the market) their valuation of other
people, relationships, and global equity and security. The market exists to satisfy individual, not social,
wants.

36 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
Supporting this, the neoclassical assumption that each person is receiving good infor-
mation and is able to make informed, rational decisions does not appear to be the case for
consumers aged 45 and over in the United States, who are finding it increasingly difficult
to use their spending power effectively (AARP 2004).* In addition, today’s youth have
become the most targeted audience for advertising in history, primarily because of their
future spending power.† It is well established that alcohol (Center on Alcohol Marketing
and Youth 2002, 2005; Jones and Donovan 2001)‡ and tobacco (Cummings et al. 2002)
companies have targeted products at youth with the intention of creating lifelong con-
sumers. But beyond these arguably harmful products, encouraging youth to buy music,
sports equipment, automobiles, electronics, and other products is also considered a major
force for consumption. The “burgeoning youth marketing industry” not only is raising
important ethical questions (Kasser and Linn 2004, p. 1), but is also reinforcing producer-
created demand and the throughput economy. These two outcomes have the potential to
lead to significant negative psychological and environmental impacts, respectively. One
solution is the re-conceptualizing of advertising to provide (less intrusive) “information”
on products and services rather than messages designed to encourage lifestyles geared
to consumption (Victor 2008). Achieving such a shift in the approach of the advertising
industry would be no simple feat.
Imperfect information is not the only threat to the existing framework for the meeting of
human needs in a sustainable way. The industries that operate within the market economy
provide an essential and often overlooked function: the provision of employment. Holding a
well-paid and meaningful job not only enables an individual to purchase goods and services
but also provides opportunities to enhance psychological well-being. However, growing trends
of within-nation wage and income inequality in the United States and many other developed
nations, combined with low income mobility and job loss, are undermining the ability of
the poor to access important services, such as health care. Further, the changing nature of
work – for example, the growing number of contingent workers – is reducing the potential
value derived from employment. If these trends are left unchecked, they could lead to grow-
ing feelings of deprivation and a declining satisfaction with life among the workforce, as well
as declining access to meaningful employment. Many attribute the 2016 election of Donald
Trump to these types of trends (Winston 2017); although, fear among white Americans’ of
losing their dominant status may have played a more influential role (Mutz 2018).
Both regulation of advertising and the resolution of negative workforce trends bring
up the role of government in meeting basic human needs. Relying on the market (and
government solely to protect the market) to ensure that basic human needs are met is
clearly not a viable option if sustainability is to be achieved – who would provide educa-
tion and primary health care for the poor? Government has an essential role to play in
* A survey by the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP 2004) asked whether spending power is
all that an individual requires to achieve “consumer sovereignty” i.e., the successful selection of a prod-
uct or service. The survey concluded that consumers – aged 45 and over and who represent 52 percent
of consumer spending – were finding it increasingly difficult to use their spending power effectively
because of (1) “less time and more decisions”; (2) the “increasing complexity of products and services”;
and (3) “low levels of financial literacy” (ibid., pp. 2–3). Hence, many were unable to exercise consumer
sovereignty because they were not receiving good information and, therefore, could not make informed,
rational decisions. To solve this problem, the AARP called on business and government to improve the
quality of consumer information, to increase financial literacy, and to increase options for banking and
credit in segmented markets that often suffer from predatory financial practices. However, over a decade
later, many of these same challenges persist.
† Media Awareness Network, Marketing and Consumerism – Overview, http://mediasmarts.ca/marketing-
consumerism/marketing-and-consumerism-overview (accessed October 12, 2017).
‡ Center on Alcohol Marketing and Youth, http://camy.org/ (accessed October 12, 2017).

Concern for a global future 37
ensuring that markets function for the benefit of society and intervening where they fall
short. To enable an acceptable balance of responsibility to be achieved, there needs to
be a willingness on the part of governments, society, and industry to engage in discussion
and analysis of the connection between freedom, regulation, and control – and its rela-
tionship to overall societal good – if and when radical changes to our social and physical
systems become necessary (Haland 1999). Further, reliance on social influence (or good-
will) to initiate change ignores evidence that unless the right environment and resources
are made available, society will be asked to act beyond its capacity (Schmuck and Schultz
2002). In many ways, what is needed in order for human society to respond to the chal-
lenges of this century is a co-evolutionary approach to change, in which the values held
by government, society, and industry evolve to support human needs and the objectives of
sustainable development.
In order to create a more sustainable society, resolving the root causes of diverse
issues such as consumerism, growing inequalities, and changing employment opportu-
nities is extremely difficult. What is clear is that human needs and behavior are common
to all these issues. As Pol (2002, p. x) argues, “The sustainability problem is a result
of individual and collective human behaviour. It cannot be treated as an economic or
technical problem, without considering the mechanics that intervene on the behavioral
side of it.”
Placing human needs at the center of sustainable development strategies is therefore a
positive step forward. See Figure 1.1 for a representation of such an approach. Such strat-
egies would mean that government, society (that is, communities and individuals), and
industry would need to promote values that center on innate human needs. In the context
of employment, this is already recognized in the use of the term “anthropocentric produc-
tion” (Brödner 1990; Lehner 1992), which distinguishes people-centered employment
from the use of human resources in the most profitable or efficient production schemes,
to the detriment of workers. Equally important is the promotion of levels of consumption
and manufacturing processes that do not exceed ecological limits. Ultimately, turning our
focus to meeting human needs is likely to “make fewer demands on our environmental
resources, but much greater demands on our moral resources” (Brown 1981, p. 359).
A term such as “anthropocentric consumption” as an analogue to anthropocentric pro-
duction sounds inappropriate because almost all consumption is intended for human
consumption. “Sustainable consumption” is a better term.
Even with an engaged government and human needs at the center of sustainable devel-
opment strategies, a single-purpose policy design approach is unlikely to address these
multidimensional sustainable development problems adequately. Instead, it is likely that
fundamental human needs, which are by definition satiable, can best be met through poli-
cies that seek to co-optimize (or even better, integrate) multiple concerns. For example,
identifying ways to combine national competitiveness with employment opportunities –
for example, through the creation of intelligent production systems or new product–
services – is one approach that would not only strengthen the economy but also improve
the quality and (potentially) the availability of well-paid employment. Accepting the
complexity of sustainable development and focusing on the design of policies that bring
together competitiveness, employment, and environmental protection,* while meeting
human needs, further requires that we: measure our progress (Section 1.1.1), understand
the relationships between consumption and well-being (Section 1.1.2), and understand
the role of employment (Section 1.1.3) in this complex system.
* For example, enhancing purchasing power by increasing commercial activity may inadvertently create
environmental problems. Thus, in this situation a physical standard of living needs to be co-optimized
with environmental quality and employment.

38 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
1.1.1 The measurement of (human) development
What we choose to measure is both an expression of underlying societal values and a
driver of the evolving structure and values of our society, and as such requires careful
attention. As the use of information technology has expanded globally, there has been an
increased emphasis on the use and availability of data and statistical indicators to inform
decision-making, with mixed outcomes. Inadequate measurement can have wide conse-
quences, ranging from a public lack of confidence in government to the missing of indica-
tors signaling impending economic crisis (Stiglitz et al. 2009a; 2009b).
The first widely adopted measures, GNP (gross national product) and GDP (gross
domestic product), were developed in the 1940s, together with the Systems of National
Accounts (SNAs), to measure total economic output (Hodge 1997; Neumayer 2004; Vanoli
2004). GDP has since become the most widely used measure globally and, more recently,
the most widely criticized measure as well, partly as a result of overuse and inappropri-
ate use. Total economic output does not distinguish between “good” and “bad” forms of
spending, take forgone opportunities into account, consider non-market goods and ser-
vices, or account for unpaid work and leisure activities, and is therefore arguably not an
accurate measure of economic welfare (Glasser and Craig 1994). It is also not a measure-
ment of income or of well-being but has frequently been used as both.
Furthermore, Liagouras (2005) suggests that as developed nations transition to a
service economy, these measures of quantity must give way to measures of quality and
variety in order to capture real change. (See Section 3.3.1.2 in Chapter 3 for a more
HUMAN NEEDS
1 Safety, security, and sustenance
2Competence, efficacy, and self-esteem
3Autonomy and authenticity
4Connectedness
SOLUTIONS
Education and human resource
development
Industry initiatives
Government intervention/regulation
Stakeholder involvement
Financing sustainable development
ECONOMY
The satisfiers to our needs are
defined by history, culture,
and our economic, social, and
political systems.
Advertising
designed to
encourage the
sale of a firm’s
product/service
can influence
human
needs/wants.
Supply side
Agriculture
Manufacturing
Energy
Transportation
Extraction industries
Housing
Services
ICT
Demand side
Consumer,
commercial, and
government
consumption
CHALLENGES
Adequate goods and services
Biodiversity/Ecosystems
Resource depletion
Toxic pollution
Climate change
Environmental justice
Employment/Purchasing power
Economic inequality
Figure 1.1 Drivers, challenges, and solutions for globalization within a context of human needs

Concern for a global future 39
detailed discussion.) Government services are also an increasingly large portion of econo-
mies, yet government output is very poorly captured by the GDP approach (Stiglitz, Sen,
and Fitoussi 2009a, 2009b). Finally, our failure to charge for environmental degrada-
tion, including carbon emissions, cause market distortions, which result in false choices
between the promotion of GDP and the protection of the environment. Despite its contin-
ued use and global importance, GDP is widely accepted to be a limited metric of progress.*
See Table 1.1 for a more complete list of limitations and challenges.
Concerns about the consequences of GDP’s limitations led to the formation of the Com-
mission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (CMESPSP)
in 2008, commonly referred to as the Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi Commission. The commis-
sion’s initial report in 2009 encouraged a shift from production-oriented measurement
systems to a well-being–oriented measurement system (of current and future generations).
The report concludes that in order to evaluate material well-being, one should look at
income and consumption instead of production, consider income and consumption
jointly with wealth, and consider the distribution of each across different groups. It further
suggests a shift to focus on the household and to include non-market activities such as
household production.† The measurement of material well-being is only one of the eight
suggested dimensions of well-being to be assessed together with health, education, personal
activities/work, political voice/governance, social connections/relationships, environment
(past and future conditions), and insecurity (economic and physical). In assessment, both
objective and subjective measures and the interdependence and possible adverse syner-
gism between these eight dimensions are important (Stiglitz et al. 2009a; 2009b).
The commission, however, separates the measurement of sustainability from well-being
or economic performance. As they explain, if your car had a dial showing a number that
was the sum of your current speed and the remaining fuel, it would be no help at all. “Both
pieces of information are critical and need to be displayed in distinct, clearly visible areas
of the dashboard” (Stiglitz et al. 2009a; 2009b). Their recommended “dashboard of indi-
cators” separates environmental aspects of sustainability and includes clear indicators of
tipping points (see Section 1.3.4). Measurement of sustainability follows clearly from the
accurate measurement of current well-being, as whatever is necessary (human needs) for
current well-being must not be depleted over time in order for future generations to have
the same standard of well-being. If the stock is decreasing, then we must either reduce
consumption or well-being, unless consumption can be retained by changing the relation-
ship between consumption and stock through innovation (see Section 1.1.2).
The Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi report has fueled both new and ongoing efforts to seek
better metrics of well-being and to capture more accurately the forms of progress we col-
lectively value. All such efforts must grapple with the complex challenges involved either
by altering and amending the GDP/GNP and SNA system or by developing entirely new
indexes. Any new approach must be able to explain contrasts such as Ponting’s (2007,
p. 338) observations that “in the 1990s the GDP per head in the United States was 40 per-
cent higher than in Italy but life expectancy was lower by almost two years because of the
poor [U.S.] Health System” and that “the life expectancy of African Americans is lower
* GDP’s flaws are well captured by the example of commuting to work. A longer commute is lost time and
a cost to the environment, but an increase in driving and traffic jams leads to an increase in oil consump-
tion, so longer commutes are good for GDP. This is why we need to measure well-being instead – every-
one knows that more traffic is worse, but GDP as a measure fails to capture this reality.
† Households produce food, cook, and provide childcare and “insurance” services, and when these
unmeasured activities are monetized, they create a rise in economic activity that does not necessarily
correlate to an improvement in living standards. The non-measurement of household production also
affects women unequally, increasing gender inequality.

Table 1.1 Limitations of GDP as a measure of (human) development
GDP = C + I + G + (X − M) or consumption + investment + government expenditure + (exports − imports)
GDP is the total annual value of all goods and services produced within a nation’s borders, whereas GNP is the total annual value of all goods and services produced by a
nation’s residents (or firms), wherever they are located. A third related measure, gross national income or GNI, adds income received from other countries such as dividends
and interest payments less similar transfers to other countries.
LIMITATION WHY? EXAMPLE EFFECT
Transfer payments
are not included
in calculations
of government
expenditure
Not considered “output producing”
because “no direct production
takes place in exchange for a
transfer payment” (Heilbroner and
Thurow 1998, p. 75).
In the U.S., this means that Social
Security payments are not included
in government expenditure.
Transfer payments increasingly augment
the quality of life of the citizenry, yet
excluding them from a measure of
progress/development incentivizes a
reduction in this kind of progress.
GDP does not capture
wealth distribution GDP is a straight total. When
evaluated at the per capita level,
GDP is simply divided by the
population of a country.
Saudi Arabia and South Korea have
similar GDPs per capita. However,
Saudi Arabia has widely disparate
personal incomes (fueled by oil
reserve–based growth) while
South Korea has significantly
lower income disparity (driven by
growth based on technological
innovation).
A reduction in inequality is essential
for human development, health, and
economic growth (Stiglitz 2016), yet
GDP neither measures nor values
advances in inequality.
Environmental quality
is not a product in the
GDP equation
Neoclassical economics fails to
account for environmental
“externalities” – put differently,
the environment (air, water,
land, climate, etc.) is typically not
considered as a limited resource.
Without appropriate environmental
regulations or their enforcement,
firms are able to emit pollution
into the environment without
needing to consider the costs of
that pollution.
Without considering the environment,
a product which destroys a drinking
water supply of 10 million people is
measured as equal to one that does not,
creating an incentive for neglect of the
environmental commons in the pursuit
of measurable product.
GDP does not include
“underground”
economic activity
Hard to measure. Profits from the illegal drug trade
are not considered as part of GDP. Underground economic transactions
significantly affect the quality of life of
the citizens of a country, both positively
and negatively.
GDP does not capture
non-monetary
activities, including
unpaid and volunteer
work
Hard to measure and value not fully
understood. The value of time invested by family
members in caring for children
and/or the elderly.
Social capital is central to development
and economic success (Putnam et al.
1993) and its neglect disadvantages
those groups engaged in it, including
women.

Many economic activities
captured by GDP are
not “real” economic
development
There is no categorization of
expenditures – all are lumped
together.
An oil spill can increase GDP
because the enormous cleanup
costs are included in GDP
metrics. Yet an oil spill diminishes
well-being and GDP-enhancing
activities such as fishing.
Costanza et al. (2009) point out that
increased crime, sickness, war, pollution,
fires, storms, and pestilence are all
positive for GDP, yet are not progress or
human development.
GDP fails to capture/
measure/distinguish
the quality of the
goods sold
The quality of a good/service is not
important when measuring GDP;
the only metric that matters is the
final price of a good/service.
To GDP, there is no difference
between producing disposable
pens and producing pens that
will last a lifetime – in fact, the
disposable pens create more
continuing need for the product,
increasing GDP.
This dynamic incentivizes a reduction in
quality, increasing waste, inefficiency,
and environmental impact and results
in corporate strategies like “planned
obsolescence.”
GDP does not question
whether the source of
growth is sustainable
GDP does not consider whether
an economic activity is enabled
by, for example, renewable or
nonrenewable resources. It is
concerned only with measuring
the scale of economic activity.
Russia’s growth model in 2009
required a $70/barrel price to
balance the budget.
Since growth in GDP is not adjusted
to take unsustainable activities into
account, it does not provide any
information about whether a nation’s
development is sustainable or not.
GDP includes no
measure of societal
opportunity costs
GDP does not take into account the
future value of a foregone option. Costs associated with remediation of
harm (i.e., natural disasters) divert
funding from wealth-generating
activities and investments.
Without considering societal opportunity
costs, GDP provides no indication of
whether current growth could actually
be undermining future growth.
GDP does not capture
the essence of product
(and possibly process)
innovation
GDP measures the price of the final
good/service, which could decline
as a result of a product or process
innovation.
Pharmaceutical and technological
innovations have increased
the quality – and life – of
goods dramatical, but are not
counted any differently than
the production of oil from a
disappearing reserve.
A desire to simply grow GDP (via sales
of a product/service) may incentivize
firms to focus on cutting costs rather
than innovation-led growth strategies.
The latter is likely to be far more
important from a sustainability
perspective, providing that appropriate
environmental and worker health and
safety standards are in place to frame
the “design space.”

42 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
than the average in China and infant mortality rates in cities such as Washington, DC,
Baltimore, and St. Louis is higher than in cities such as Bangkok and Cairo.” See Table 1.2
for a list of some prominent approaches to measuring (human) development. Whether
the new approaches provide utility is of some debate. One analysis found that despite dif-
ferent measurement approaches the Human Development Index (HDI) and Ecological
Footprint (EF) correlated with GDP (Szigeti et al. 2013), raising questions as to whether
the effort to substitute them has utility. The same analysis showed that the Happy Planet
Index (HPI) and Environmental Performance Index (EPI) were independent of GDP,
increasing their potential value as a substitute for GDP.
Each of the measurement approaches can be evaluated in detail as well as compared
and contrasted with each other, and it is possible to find both supporting and discredit-
ing arguments for each measure or index presented in Table 1.2.* Opponents of indexes
argue that the subjective selection of indicators (from one or more domains of sustainable
development) that are adjusted and aggregated into a single value makes the final output
difficult to use in a meaningful way (Becker 1997). Further, combining indicators that
measure both short and long-term concerns and processes hides difficult decisions associ-
ated with intergenerational equity (Hueting and Reijnders 2004).
The above concern was addressed in the OECD Better Life Index, which was a direct
result of the Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi Commission. The Better Life Index chose not to
aggregate the components into a single index. However, a subsequent effort by Nikolo-
poulos (2014) did represent the different measures multidimensionally (Figure 1.2).
Further development of this kind of multidimensional measurement and visualization is
likely to improve our capacity to assess and design sustainable development.
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UN 2015) also aimed to improve our
capacity to assess and design a sustainable future (see Section 2.3 in Chapter 2). By articu-
lating goals first, then creating indicators and measuring progress towards those goals,
the approach focuses on assessing the multidimensional nature of human progress while
motivating socio-political change. This approach was demonstrated with the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), the predecessor of the SDGs. The SDGs consist of seventeen
interconnected goals (see Table 2.4 in Chapter 2), including climate change, economic
inequality, sustainable consumption, and peace and justice, all with targets to be met by
2030. The goals assume that what is desired is to advance a technologically optimistic
and growth-oriented system and state clearly the need for a decoupling of growth from
environmental damage. In Section 1.3.1, we question whether it is possible for a growth-
oriented society to achieve sustainability, but regardless of feasibility, the success of the
SDGs as measures and policy drivers will rely on their implementation.
While all approaches to measuring human progress have some form of shortcoming,
they serve an essential role in guiding our economies and policy making, raising awareness
* As an example, using HDI 2010, the best place to live from a human development perspective would
appear to be Norway, and the worst place would appear to be Zimbabwe. The HDI addresses the com-
plexity of human development by including a suite of supplementary indicators covering areas such as
infrastructure, energy usage, ecological footprint, subjective well-being and happiness, employment,
empowerment, freedom, community safety, and financial flows. Furthermore, the IHDI adjusts the three
dimensions of HDI for the extent of inequality experienced in a dimension – thus, a nation without
inequality would have an HDI = IHDI. (The U.S. HDI rank falls by nine positions once adjusted for
inequalities, reducing the income index by 24 percent.) Yet despite all this careful valuation, the HPI,
which also considers many of the same indicators, places Costa Rica as the best place to live, with no
industrialized nations, including Norway, in the top ten. Which should you move to, Norway or Costa
Rica? That depends on, for example, how much you value the intergenerational sustainability of human
development achievements. See Section 3.4.2 in Chapter 3 for a discussion of Costa Rica’s approach to
development.

Table 1.2 Alternatives to GDP as a measure of (human) development
NAME CONTEXT & USE ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
Approaches based on System of National Accounts:
ISEW – Index of Sustainable
Economic Welfare (Daly and
Cobb 1994)
GPI – Genuine Progress Indicator
(Talberth et al. 2006; Venetoulis
and Cobb 2004)
Both use the principle of weak
sustainability and make
adjustments to GDP/GNP
accounting for unequal income
distribution using the Gini
coefficient and adding and
subtracting elements to account
for ecological and social benefits
and costs.
Works with GDP but adds a
measure of inequality and
begins to consider other human
development factors as well.
Can be seen as valuable tools
to broaden policy prescriptions
beyond a reliance on economic
growth (Clarke 2004; Hamilton
1999; Lawn 2003; Patterson and
Jollands 2004).
Levett (1998, p. 297) argues that
“as soon as we try to modify
GDP to bring it closer to some
conception of welfare [. . .]
we are back to subjectivity in
deciding which things need to
be added to and subtracted from
GDP.” These types of measures
also assume that the total stock
of natural, human, and social
capital remains constant over
time.
GS – Genuine Savings, also
referred to as Adjusted Net
Savings (K. Hamilton 1994,
2000)
Developed in the World Bank’s
Environment Department and
is an annual measurement of
changes in national wealth,
where “national wealth” is
defined as the total amount
of natural, human-made, and
human capital (Bolt et al. 2002).
Neoclassical economists are more
comfortable with the approach
and the GS formula is relatively
straightforward:
GS = net investment in produced
capital − net depreciation in natural
capital + investment in human
capital
Does not account for Social
Capital and, like ISEW and GPI,
uses the Hartwick–Solow weak
sustainability principle.
SEEA – System of Integrated
Environmental and Economic
Accounting (UN et al. 2003)
Developed by the UN Statistical
Commission with support from
IMF, World Bank, EC, and
OECD.
Provides a platform to combine
economic and environmental
data using consistent
classifications and definitions.
SEEA is based on the System
of National Accounts (SNA)
and theoretically can be used
with either weak or strong
sustainability principles.
Cannot account for social and
institutional dimensions of
sustainability (UNDESA 2007).
(Continued)

NAME CONTEXT & USE ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
Approaches to measure the condition of the environment:
LPI – Living Planet Index (WWF
2016) Measures biodiversity by gathering
data from 14,152 monitored
populations of 3,706 vertebrate
species (mammals, birds, fishes,
amphibians, reptiles) from
around the world to indicate
the impact of human activity on
habitats.
Provides a way to monitor the state
of nature. Does not account for social
or economic factors and
the distribution of locations
represented by the data is
currently uneven, which means
that not all species groups and
regions are covered.
EPI – Environmental Performance
Index (Yale Center for
Environmental Policy and Law
et al. 2018)
The EPI ranks 180 countries on
24 performance indicators
across ten issue categories
covering environmental health
and ecosystem vitality. This
approach enables countries to
compare their environmental
performance and identify
best practices. The metrics
also provide countries with a
way to identify environmental
policies that could move them
towards greater environmental
sustainability.
The EPI offers an empirical
approach to tracking
environmental problems, which
enables countries to identify and
track problems, and develop and
evaluate policy responses.
Does not account for social or
economic factors and currently
has data gaps relating to
sustainable agriculture, water
resources, waste management,
and threats to biodiversity.
EF – Ecological Footprint
(Wackernagel and Rees 1995a,
1997; Collins and Flynn 2015)
Translates human activity
(demand) into corresponding
ecological area (supply) – or
the environmental carrying
capacity – required to sustain
that activity. The EF is typically
based on six categories of
productive surface areas:
cropland, grazing land, fishing
grounds, built-up land, forest
area, and carbon demand on
land.
EF provides a simple measure (in
global hectares) that can be
used to assess whether a city,
region, or nation is living within
its biocapacity (i.e., whether
it has an ecological reserve or
deficit). This information can
then inform practices and policy
designed to reduce the EF of a
target region.
Does not consider interactions
between system components
and ignores processes that can
dramatically affect carrying
capacity (Becker 1997; Hueting
and Reijnders 2004). EF also
fails to reveal underlying causes
of overshoot (van den Bergh
and Verbruggen 1999) and does
not consider the impacts of
international and regional trade,
making an implicit assumption
that living within a nation’s
available biocapacity is the
desired objective.
Table 1.2 (Continued)

NAME CONTEXT & USE ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
Novel approaches to measure human development:
HDI – Human Development Index
(UNDP 1990)
Sister indexes – Inequality adjusted
HDI, Gender Development
Index (GDI), Gender Inequality
Index (GII), Multidimensional
Poverty Index (MPI) (UNDP
2016)
Developed in 1975 by the UNDP,
the HDI has three components
in all of its iterations: (1)
life expectancy at birth; (2)
educational attainment; and (3)
income (UNDP 1995, 2016).
The latest improvements allow
comparison over time, improved
“sister indexes,” and a shift
to calculating the HDI using
geometric mean rather than
simple averages.
Serves as important complement
to GDP/GNP by placing health
and education alongside income
for a more complete measure
of development. As the UNDP
(2016, p. 25) argues, “Economic
growth and income are means
to human development but not
ends in themselves – because it is
the richness of people’s lives, not
the richness of economies, that
ultimately is valuable to people.”
The HDI is not a comprehensive
measure of human development
and its focus on longer-term
measures means it does
not measure short-term
improvements. However, when
combined with its sister indexes,
a more complete view of human
development can be obtained.
HPI – Happy Planet Index Combines four elements – well-
being, life expectancy, inequality
of outcomes, and ecological
footprint – to provide a measure
of the ecological efficiency of
delivering human well-being
(Jeffrey et al. 2016).
Rejects GDP/GNI and leverages
EF to reveal the poor
environmental performance of
industrialized nations – exposing
the unsustainable nature of the
long and happy lives many have
achieved.
The HPI does not take a nation’s
political situation or stability/
fragility into account. Thus, an
unstable/fragile developing
country (with a small EF) could
rank higher than a developed
nation (with a large EF).
Thus, while the HPI presents
an interesting measure of
environmental impact and
well-being, translating the
results in practice/policy can be
challenging.
(Continued)

NAME CONTEXT & USE ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
SEDA – Boston Consulting
Group’s Sustainable Economic
Development Assessment (Beal
et al. 2015)
SEDA is based on three
elements – economics (including
income, economic stability,
and employment creation),
investments (health, education,
and infrastructure), and
sustainability (focusing on social
inclusion and the environment).
SEDA uses 43 indicators across
these three elements to develop
a relative well-being score for
149 countries.
When combined with a country’s
per capita income, SEDA
highlights how a country is
translating – over time – its
wealth into well-being for their
citizens.
When compared to other indexes,
there is less emphasis on
environment, and metrics such
as resource depletion are not
included.
SA-GCI – Sustainability Adjusted
Global Competitiveness Index
(World Economic Forum 2014b)
SA-GCI was developed from
the World Economic Forum’s
(2014b, p. 55) notion of
sustainable competitiveness,
defined as “the set of
institutions, policies, and
factors that make a nation
productive over the longer
term while ensuring social and
environmental sustainability.”
SA-GCI is based on the Global
Competitiveness Index, which
is adjusted to take social and
environmental sustainability
factors into account. SA-GCI
has been calculated for 113
economies.
SA-GCI provides a way to assess the
connection between productivity
and social and environmental
sustainability. The index
allows a nation to consider
how to promote social and
environmental sustainability in a
way that does not undermine its
competitiveness.
Since SA-GCI is an adjustment
of the GCI, it does not weight
competitiveness, social, and
environmental pillars equally, so
favors countries that score high
in competitiveness.
Table 1.2 (Continued)

NAME CONTEXT & USE ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
OECD Better Life Index Tool
(OECD 2017) The Better Life Index is an
online interactive tool with 11
dimensions (each based on
four indicators) that covers 38
countries. It has no aggregate
index.
The online tool allows users
to interact with the data,
which is disaggregated by
gender. By adjusting the
relative importance of each
dimension, users can see how
their preferences impact the
performance of each country
and how this may change by
gender. The jobs dimension
is based on four separate
measures – the employment
rate; personal earnings; the
long-term unemployment rate;
and job security – making it one
of the more robust treatments of
employment in these indexes.
The environment dimension is
not assessed thoroughly, and
primarily measures air pollution
and water quality indicators.
The tool does not provide one
overall ranking of a country’s
performance, but instead aims
to inform citizens so that they
can become more engaged
in the policy-making process
related to their lives.
Social Progress Index (Porter et al.
2017; Stern et al. 2017) The Social Progress Index is an
aggregate index of social and
environmental indicators that
focuses on three dimensions
of social progress – basic
human needs, foundations of
well-being, and opportunity.
Under each dimension are a
range of components that are
each supported by indicators
considered to matter for the
lives of real people. The index
uses free, publicly available data
to preserve transparency. It
covers 128 countries.
The index is thorough and
innovative. It measures country
performance on a wide range
of indicators and can be used
by governments to design policy
and target investments to turn
economic gains into social and
environmental progress.
Does not include elements of
equality, employment, and
innovation.
(Continued)

NAME CONTEXT & USE ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
FEEM SI – Fondazione Eni Enrico
Mattei Sustainability Index FEEM SI is calculated using a
recursive–dynamic computable
general equilibrium model. The
model uses 23 indicators that are
related to economic, social, and
environmental dimensions. The
weights for each indicator are
derived from a survey of experts
that reveals how the different
components of sustainability
relate to one another. This
approach enables the index
to capture the synergies or
conflicts that accompany the
multidimensional concept of
sustainable development.
The modeling approach means
that the index can be calculated
for a nation in a specific year,
in relation to specific policy
scenarios. This dynamic feature
of the index differentiates it
from the more static indexes.
The modeling approach does not
provide a single outcome, but
rather a set of projections that
can inform decision-makers.
However, the reliance on
experts to provide objective and
unbiased weightings may raise
concerns about the validity of
the results.
SSI – Sustainable Society Index SSI is based on 21 indicators that
form seven categories across
three economic, environmental,
and social well-being
dimensions. Since 2006, SSI has
been calculated every two years
for 154 countries, which reveals
where nations are making
progress towards sustainable
development.
The three well-being dimensions
provide a unique way to track
economic, environmental, and
social progress over time.
While SSI covers a wide range
of indicators, it does not
include measures of rights
and (environmental) justice,
peace and security, and
competitiveness.
Table 1.2 (Continued)

0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
10.00
Resource depleon
Biodiversity/Ecosystems
Toxic polluon
Climate change
Environmental
jusce
Rights and jusce
Peace and security
Health
Educaon
Employment
Economic equality and
purchasing power
Compeveness
Ethical concerns and
governance
Potenal for innovaon
USA
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
10.00
Resource depleon
Biodiversity/Ecosystems
Toxic polluon
Climate change
Environmental
jusce
Rights and jusce
Peace and security
Health
Educaon
Employment
Economic equality and
purchasing power
Compeveness
Ethical concerns and
governance
Potenal for innovaon
Russia
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
10.00
Resource depleon
Biodiversity/Ecosystems
Toxic polluon
Climate change
Environmental
jusce
Rights and jusce
Peace and security
Health
Educaon
Employment
Economic equality and
purchasing power
Compeveness
Ethical concerns and
governance
Potenal for innovaon
Germany
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
10.00
Resource depleon
Biodiversity/Ecosystems
Toxic polluon
Climate change
Environmental
jusce
Rights and jusce
Peace and security
Health
Educaon
Employment
Economic equality and
purchasing power
Compeveness
Ethical concerns and
governance
Potenal for innovaon
South Korea
Figure 1.2 A multidimensional representation of sustainable development in four countries
Source: Adapted from Nikolopoulos (2014, pp. 71–19).

50 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
about unsustainable development patterns. Indexes, however, do not reveal the processes
that are driving these unsustainable trends; therefore, it is clearly unwise to base decision-
making solely on any numerical index regardless of its strengths or complexity. Having
introduced several indexes of human development and other measures of progress and
reviewed their utility, we now turn to the challenges raised by the predominant laissez-
faire (market-oriented) approach to development and its effect on human well-being.
1.1.2 Consumption and well-being
As globalization proceeds, it could be argued that increasing knowledge of the lifestyles of
others around the world is motivating material standards of living. Until we reached the era
of global media, people did not feel deprived in relation to other nations. Now that the dif-
ferences in consumption are conspicuously visible, poverty and its effect on culture become
important issues – that is, people “feel” economically and materially poor. If we assume that
the satisfaction of needs drives economic and political systems, one quickly realizes that if
basic human needs become confused with materialistic wants on a global scale, the rapid
expansion of the throughput society could lead to serious environmental consequences.
A throughput (or high-waste) society, by definition, depends on increasing rates of con-
sumption (or throughput) (Daly 1996; Princen et al. 2002). To the extent to that we are
losing jobs as a result of production efficiencies (or innovation), one way to create more
jobs is to expand the economy and increase throughput. A critical question, therefore, is
whether basic human needs drive our throughput society or whether this drive stems from
a conditioned response.
In neoclassical economics, human needs/wants drive systems of exchange and mar-
kets. Although many economists might argue that consumer demand – derived from the
purchasing habits of consumers – is an accurate representation of what people desire,
they often forget to mention the $589 billion worldwide that corporations spend annu-
ally on advertising with the sole purpose of creating demand (eMarketer 2017). Hence,
a concern is that the world of industrialization and commerce has made the distinction
between basic human needs and wants unclear (Michaelis 2000). Indeed, one could
argue, as Galbraith (1958) did, that if a want is to be urgent, it should be the result of a
need that originates within the individual. This position was later supported by economist
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1971, p. 324; 1993), who argued that “only those goods and
services an individual can enjoy personally influences his satisfaction.” If a want is exter-
nally contrived, it cannot be an urgent (or basic) need. Hence, satisfying that want will
occur only through behavior that is led by extrinsic motivation, which is not likely to result
in the enhancement of an individual’s well-being.* See Tatzel (2014) for an extensive treat-
ment of consumption and well-being.
The inference from these remarks is that in promoting economic growth, companies
entice people to buy their services or products. The primary way for the value or benefit
of a product or service to be conveyed to the consumer is through advertising. M. R. Smith
(1994, p. 13) describes how American advertising “became the instrument by which big
business, in need of ever-expanding markets for its mass produced products, imprinted
instrumental values – and with them, the ethos of mass consumption – on the populace.”
Hence, it can be argued that advertising leads to producer-created demand – that is, what we
* The idea that capitalist economies have been successful in achieving intermediate goals of increasing
material wealth, but that this has been accomplished at the expense of underlying human values (and
the environment), is becoming more widely accepted by economists (Ackerman et al. 1997). Indeed, the
field of ecological economics is a good example of a branch of economics that is attempting to integrate
human values into economic analysis (Krishnan, Harris, and Goodwin 1995).

Concern for a global future 51
need/want is conditioned by advertising. Galbraith (1967, p. 207) provides a succinct
example of this idea:
Were there but one manufacturer of automobiles in the United States, it would still
be essential that it enter extensively on the management of its demand. Otherwise
consumers, exercising the sovereignty that would be inconsistent with the company’s
planning, might resort to other forms of transportation and other ways of spending
their income.
Further, Soros (1997, p. 52, emphasis added) argues that the notion of producer-created
demand has established money as the measure that identifies a product or an individual’s
value:
Advertising, marketing, even packaging aim at shaping people’s preferences rather
than, as laissez-faire theory holds, merely responding to them. Unsure of what they
stand for, people increasingly rely on money as the criterion of value. What is more
expensive is considered better. The value of a work of art can be judged by the price
it fetches. People may believe that they deserve respect and admiration because they
are rich. What used to be a medium of exchange has usurped the place of the funda-
mental values, revising the relationship postulated by economic theory.
Michaelis (2000) takes the concept of producer-created demand one step further by
extrapolating it to other areas. In particular, she asks whether a government’s failure to
regulate advertising may inhibit our ability to satisfy our intrinsic need for autonomy.
The market economy contains structural incentives for businesses to market concep-
tions of the good life that support sales of their own products. Many other circum-
stances, including social norms, work culture, and infrastructure constraints, provide
strong pressures for individuals to adopt particular conceptions of the good life.
Hence, by adopting a hands-off approach, governments may actually be failing to
protect an important freedom. (Michaelis 2000, p. 26)
A major problem with the current form of advertising is that people start to live their lives
believing that a high level of income and material wealth are essential to their happiness
( Jacobson and Mazur 1995; Klein 1999).
Similarly, Sanne (2002) argues that a focus on the social and psychological factors of
consumer behavior neglects to consider how producers and businesses create consump-
tion to satisfy their own interests.* It also neglects the role of the state and how business has
a tendency to co-opt or lobby government for market conditions that favor consumption.
This latter issue creates what Sanne (2002, p. 282) calls “structural lock-in effects.” These
effects are the following (in order of impact):
• The pattern of work-and-spend promoted by naturalizing paid work as “full time” with
continuous, lifelong occupation supported by a legal structure of social insurance,
eligibility to social benefits, etc.;
* For an insightful discussion of the historical and theoretical foundations of the consumer society and
consumerism, see Firat and Dholakia (1998); Krishnan et al. (1995); Miles (1998); Miles et al. (2002);
and Stearns (2001).

52 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
• The making of a consumer culture where marketable goods are forwarded as the
means to satisfy not only material needs but also needs of social stratification* and
cultural identification;†
• The promotion of individual means of transport, in particular cars, which presuppose
heavy investments in road infrastructure, a classical aim of much business lobbying;
• New communication infrastructures which force a technology shift on consumers
(Sanne 2002, p. 282).
Sanne (2002) argues that governments and businesses tend to counter incentives to curb
consumption with deference to consumer sovereignty. This position passes the responsi-
bility to the consumer, whose purchasing behavior then becomes subject to moral inquiry.
The basic argument is that firms would provide environmentally friendly products if con-
sumers demanded them. Hence, we must first address the values that support present
lifestyles by educating consumers about the effects of their behavior. The problem is that
there is a fine line between education and persuasion or coercion; the latter is an infringe-
ment on an individual’s freedom to choose ( Akerlof and Shiller 2016). But one could
argue that an individual’s freedom to choose is affected by advertising targeted directly
at our insecurities. A reliance on consumer sovereignty is further complicated by the fact
that a growing number of consumers in America seem paralyzed by an inability to speak
out against materialistic tendencies because this would go against our core belief that peo-
ple should have the freedom to make their own decisions (Harwood Group 1995). Hence,
people turn away from questioning their behavior and that of others, undermining any
argument that society will act responsibly if it is provided with sufficient information about
the problems associated with its consumption. Thus, one pathway to a sustainable future
may be to counter the pattern of work-and-spend by establishing shorter working hours
or building in work arrangements that anticipate more holidays and leisure time (Kenny
1999; Sanne 2002; Hayden and Shandra 2009; Hayden 2013).‡ The notion here is that
* The differentialist view of consumption is that of social stratification, i.e., the use of wealth to con-
spicuously consume, to display artifacts of taste or expense commensurate with one’s position in society
(Sanne 2002). See also Thorstein Veblen’s (1994 [1902]) classic work The Theory of the Leisure Class, which
introduced the phrase “conspicuous consumption.”
† The culturalist view of consumption connects the individual to his/her own self-understanding (Sanne
2002). Consumption is seen as a reflection of the self; what you buy supports your understanding of
who you are. Both differentialist and culturalist views are part of utilitarianism because in both cases the
objective is to increase overall well-being.
‡ In 1998, France’s ruling left-wing coalition introduced a law to reduce the legal workweek from thirty-
nine to thirty-five hours for most employees, effective January 1, 2000. The objectives of the law were
to create jobs, enhance competitiveness, and establish a better balance between work and personal life
(Ministère de l’emploi, de la cohésion sociale et du logement 2002). The basic idea was that capping
working hours would force employers to hire more workers to cover any loss in productivity. However,
since the law was enacted, it has failed to deliver on its promises: unemployment remains high and pro-
ductivity has declined. A study by Estevão and Sá (2006) concluded that the law also caused an overall
decline in welfare. Their conclusion was based on subjective measures of satisfaction with work hours, an
increase in the number of workers holding two jobs, and data indicating that workers tried to circumvent
the law by transitioning from large to small firms with fewer than twenty people. These small firms were
required to implement the thirty-five–hour week by January 1, 2002. There was also concern that the law
would reduce working conditions by, for example, increasing the amount of staggered hours worked,
with a corresponding increase in task splitting and hand-over procedures (Bulard 1999). Given con-
cerns such as those mentioned here, the current French administration is reconsidering the regulations
affecting the length of the workweek under French labor law. For a brief discussion of the global history
and arguments for and against a shorter work week, see www.shorterworkweek.com/history&arguments.
html. For a more extensive discussion, see Hayden (2013) and Coote and Franklin (2013).

Concern for a global future 53
with less income and fewer working hours, we will consume less and be able to enjoy more
leisure time (see Ashford and Kallis 2015 for arguments for and against that notion).
However, there are those who question whether more leisure time would lead to a better
quality of life:
The psychological underpinnings of capitalism have enabled the leisure time which
technology affords us to be converted into yet another opportunity for the consump-
tion of unnecessary goods. Inasmuch as capitalism has “freed” the worker from the
worst excesses of the labor process, it has sought to occupy his free time with “com-
pensatory needs” that bring neither happiness nor personal fulfillment.
(M. Redclift 1984, p. 53)
The psychological and environmental problems associated with advertising and the
throughput (or consumer) society have been well documented (Brown 1981; de Graaf
et al. 2002; Diener and Suh 2000; Durning 1992, 1994; Goodwin et al. 1997; Kasser 2002;
Layard 2005; Princen et al. 2002; J. C. Ryan and Durning 1997; Schlosser 2002; P. C. Stern
et al. 1997). However, calls for public recognition of the potential problems with a market
economy, such as the PBS series and subsequent book Affluenza: The All-Consuming Epi-
demic (De Graaf et al. 2002), have failed to drive significant change. One possible reason
for this is that we are so entrenched in the current economic paradigm that we are unable
to recognize that we are in some way addicted to consuming (Ehrenfeld 2004). Although
the consumption of products and services clearly improves our quality of life, we should
be aware that our perception of the good life has been and is being manipulated by mar-
ket actors whose primary incentive is profit. Hence, the line between consumption that
satisfies intrinsic, and extrinsic needs, is becoming blurred.
The causal connection between unsustainable consumption and the global environ-
mental crisis is becoming increasingly clear. The outcome document of Rio+20 in 2012,
The Future We Want, declares the promotion of Sustainable Consumption and Production
(SCP) as one of three critical overarching and essential objectives. In 2014, the Sustain-
able Development Goals included SCP as the twelfth goal, spurring an effort to create
indicators to measure efforts to address the goal (UNEP 2015). SCP is seen as an effort
to “decouple” economic growth and environmental degradation by increasing the
efficiency of resource use in the production, distribution and use of products, aiming
to keep the energy, material and pollution intensity of all production and consump-
tion functions within the carrying capacities of natural ecosystems.
(Voigt 2015, p. 246)
At the same time, a group of activists, scholars, and others, increasingly concerned
with the effects of material consumption on the global environment, have catalyzed
around a vocal group known as SCORAI (Sustainable Consumption Research and Action
Initiative),* resulting in new activities and writings focusing on sustainable consumption
(Cohen 2005; Cohen et al. 2010; Vergragt 2017). Parallel to this, there is an emerging dis-
cussion of “sufficiency,” of both materials goods and energy, as a societal norm (Schneide-
wind and Zahrnt 2014). These activities identify with the “degrowth” movement (see the
discussion in Section 3.7 in Chapter 3) and take on a distinctive anti-capitalism posture
(Ashford 2017). These “bottom up” approaches, without government intervention and
support, might not be strong enough on their own to cause a major shift in unsustain-
able consumption (Vergragt 2017), but some commentators are more optimistic, seeing a
* SCORAI has international participation and conferences (www.scorai.org), which fuel this discussion.

54 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
positive trend in the buying patterns of millennials, who are attracted to living in the cities
rather than the suburbs, and who are somewhat constrained both in their living spaces
and by not having large disposable incomes (Brown and Vergragt 2016). That there is
movement to address the consumption issue at both the intergovernmental level with the
SDGs (Bengtsson et al. 2018), and at the grassroots level with SCORAI, is encouraging.
This section began by asking whether focusing on industrialization and commerce is
likely to enhance overall human well-being. While it seems clear that relying solely on
economic growth (and consumption) to advance human well-being is too simplistic, and
that there is an emerging understanding of this at the grassroots level, it is also clear that
government has an important, if not critical, role to play in shaping the institutional struc-
ture of the economy to better accommodate non-consumption solutions to human needs
(Kenny 1999; Manno 2002; Michaelis 2000; Sanne 2002). Thus, there is a need to consider
innovative public policies to ensure that noncommercial values – such as the benefits
received from family and community life – form an integral part of modern society and
that the unintended consequences of unsustainable consumption do not limit society’s
capacity to ensure human well-being.
1.1.3 Employment and well-being
The income and wage aspects of employment and the factors behind growing trends in
inequality in the United States and other developed nations will be addressed in Sec-
tion 5.2 in Chapter 5. However, income and wages are only part of the overall benefit
or satisfaction derived from employment. Beyond the creation of purchasing power and
economic status, meaningful employment can provide social contacts/inclusion, enhance
self-esteem, and lead to a better quality of life (Eurofound 2016). Further, our occupa-
tions and professions inform “our conception of self” and play an important role in shap-
ing human character (Bertram and Sharpe 2000, p. 44).
European studies of living and working conditions consistently point to the critical
importance of income and employment in life satisfaction (Eurofound 2002, 2004, 2005a,
2010, 2016). These studies also stress that life satisfaction improves when high levels of
employment coexist with high-quality jobs. A number of factors combine to influence
the quality of jobs and employment. These include career and employment security,
skills development, issues relating to work–life balance, and worker health and safety (see
Figure 1.3). In addition, increasing attention is being paid to the influence of work inten-
sity and duration of job quality (Eurofound 2016) as well as the connection between occu-
pations and wage inequality (Eurofound 2017).
During the turbulent period of social unrest in the 1960s, more highly educated indus-
trial workers began to reject the routinization of jobs and the lack of creativity they rep-
resented and to call for more humane working conditions (Ashford 1976; Ashford and
Caldart 1996; HEW 1973).* At the center of their concerns lay the need for more autono-
mous and engaging work that enables the potential and capabilities of workers to flourish
(Green 1980; Heckscher 1996; Walton 1985). Today, concerns about worker autonomy,
working hours, the intensification of work, physical and psychological working conditions,
employment equity, and the growth in contingent/temporary workers are important fac-
tors in the debate on life satisfaction. For example, a survey of workers in twenty-eight
European countries, including the acceding and candidate countries as well as the cur-
rent member states of the European Union, found that individuals with low levels of work
autonomy are less satisfied with their lives than those with high levels of work autonomy
(Eurofound 2005b).
* For critiques of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s (HEW) influential report Work in
America, see Koo (1973) and Karsh (1974).

Concern for a global future 55
In both Hochschild’s The Second Shift (2012) and Schor’s The Overworked American (2008),
analysis of work patterns in America point to the negative impacts that the increase in daily
working hours since the 1970s has had on many working families, especially on neglected
children. Further, Boisard et al. (2003a) find that increased working time is clearly linked,
by employees, to increasing health and safety risks. The perception of these employees is
reinforced by the empirical evidence that links growing incidences of headaches, muscu-
lar pains, fatigue, anxiety, and insomnia to increasing daily working hours (ibid.).
Although policies designed to reduce daily hours worked might appear to be the logi-
cal way to enhance well-being – such as the French thirty-five–hour week – the European
survey mentioned above (preliminarily) concluded that “reduced working time only has
a minor impact on overall life satisfaction” (Eurofound 2005b, p. 54). This finding high-
lights the need to identify those factors that play a more significant role in enhancing the
benefits of employment. The same European study found that long-term unemployment
was the most significant factor affecting subjective quality of life, followed by adverse physi-
cal and psychological working conditions and low work autonomy. The number of hours
worked and the intensification of work – that is, work carried out at a faster pace (see
Boisard et al. 2003b) – were statistically significant but had a lower relative impact.* Stud-
ies of shorter work weeks must be reconciled with the salaries received by those workers
that allow sufficient purchasing power of essential goods. In some cases, workers would
gladly work less with or without the same take-home pay; in other cases, workers who are
already hard-pressed to acquire necessities may balk at the prospect of a shorter week or
even take on second jobs. Ashford and Kallis (2015) review the complexity of Europe
* Although these two last factors are found to be relatively less important, work intensity has been linked
to stress (Dhondt 1997; Kompier and Levy 1994) and musculoskeletal disorders (Eurofound 2002), and
the growing number of hours worked is commonly associated with the breakdown of family life (Hochs-
child 1997; Schor 1991).
Career and employment security
● Employment status
● Income
● Social protection
● Workers’ rights
Skills development
● Qualifications
● Training
● Learning organization
● Career development
Reconciliation of working and
nonworking life
(i.e., work–life balance)
● Working/nonworking time
● Social infrastructures
Health and well-being
● Health problems
● Risk exposure
● Work organization
Job and
employment
quality
Figure 1.3 Factors that influence job and employment quality

56 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
adopting a shorter work week – see also Kallis et al. (2016), Hayden (2013), and Hayden
and Shandra (2009).
It should be no surprise that long-term unemployment is the most important work-
related factor affecting an individual’s overall well-being. In addition to the obvious finan-
cial implications, extended periods of unemployment can damage self-esteem (Goldsmith
et al. 1997), worsen symptoms of somatization, depression, and anxiety (Linn et al. 1985),
and lead to social exclusion (Eurofound 2005a). More generally, people who have been
unemployed for prolonged periods report lower levels of satisfaction with family life, social
life, and health than those who have had continuous employment (Eurofound 2004). All
these findings reinforce the view of many sociologists that work is an anchor point in
life (between learning and retirement), and involuntary unemployment is detrimental to
individual and family well-being. The negative impacts of unemployment also highlight
the important benefits that meaningful employment can provide. In today’s economic
climate, these are particularly important observations.
Although the significance of unemployment points to the dilemma that a “bad” job
is better than no access to a job over a prolonged period (Eurofound 2005a), adopting
policies simply to create jobs with little concern for the value they provide workers seems
unwise (Economist 2013). The idea of designing meaningful jobs that enrich lives is not
new. For example, in Design of Jobs, L. E. Davis and Taylor (1972, p. 9) recognize that
we are faced with a new and serious responsibility for appropriately developing jobs
and organizations, and linking them to the larger society. The requirement now is to
design jobs and roles in a context having few external referents and in which all must
be designed: the jobs, roles, and the technological and social systems that will provide
meaning for individuals and institutions in the larger society.
With the nature of work continually changing, primarily in response to global competi-
tion (Ackerman et al. 1998; Carr and Chen 2004; Dougherty 1998; ILO 2015), creating
jobs that provide workers with value beyond income becomes increasingly challenging.
In the continual drive for competitive advantage, firms can search for improved perfor-
mance by enhancing the skills and ability of their internal workforce to respond to rapid
change or search for ways to cut costs by reducing their commitment to the workforce in
favor of contingent workers who can be hired as needed (Cappelli 1998). These two strate-
gies for competitiveness lie at opposite ends of a continuum, where the former approach
tends to reinforce job security and meaningful employment and the latter approach tends
to undermine it.
The recent growth in the number of contingent workers (ILO 2015), and in the rate at
which workers move between firms (reducing job tenure), creates a number of problems.
First, temporary workers are unlikely to form bonds of friendship, trust, and commit-
ment if they are employed for a short period of time (Bertram and Sharpe 2000). This
situation not only undermines these key elements of human character (Sennett 1998),
but also reduces opportunities for social inclusion. Second, the growing mobility of work-
ers and the transferability of skills discourage firms from investing in training because
they may not see a return on their investment. If a large proportion of firms adopted a
poaching rather than a nurturing approach to the acquisition of worker skills, workers
would become more responsible for their own training and career development (Cappelli
1998). This development might also raise distributive justice concerns, because firms (that
is, executives and shareholders) would reap the benefits of the additional educational bur-
den put on society as a whole (ibid.). Further, those workers who might not see the value
of education and skill development would face increased social exclusion due to reduced
ability for participation.

Concern for a global future 57
The strain that the changing nature of work has placed on employees and their families
and friends has elevated the debate on work–life balance (Woolley 2006). For example,
improving living and working conditions in Europe is the primary mission of the European
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound).* Euro-
found (2006b, p. 110) argues that employment “issues of flexitime and flexicurity should be
systematically integrated with those of equal opportunity, and with those of good quality and
affordable child and frail elderly care” and that “family-friendly employment policies might
be defined as the basis for a new family policy, in which not only income, but time (time to
care, to develop relationships) is conceptualized as a crucial resource” (ibid.).
In the United States, the concept of work–life balance has been adopted by many firms,
keen to create a working environment more conducive to family life. For example, Work-
ing Mother magazine annually compiles a list of the top one hundred companies in Amer-
ica that offer the best work–life-balance programs.†
In summary, although paid employment provides an essential resource to help sat-
isfy basic human needs for safety, security, and sustenance, employment (both paid and
unpaid) is also a critical factor in the satisfaction of our human needs relating to com-
petence, efficacy, and self-esteem; autonomy and authenticity; and connectedness. This
section emphasizes the importance of thinking beyond policies that focus only on job cre-
ation to strategies that encourage the creation of meaningful jobs that ultimately enhance
our general well-being and satisfaction with life. The growing interest in work–life balance
in many firms and institutions across the world is encouraging, but the real challenge lies
in developing jobs that enhance competitiveness without undermining the value employ-
ees derive from workforce participation (see Section 7.7 in Chapter 7 for a related discus-
sion of values for sustainable employment).
Even if gainful and fulfilling employment is achieved, it may still not provide sufficient
purchasing power for the employed. Expansion of capital ownership options for peo-
ple through binary economics and other ownership vehicles may be necessary (see Sec-
tion 3.6.1 in Chapter 3) to ensure that employment maximizes well-being. The provision
of a universal basic income or UBI (see Section 3.7 in Chapter 3) is also increasingly being
discussed (Van Parijs 1995, 2000; Colson, 2017) and small pilot programs have begun in
2017 in California, Canada, and elsewhere (Weller 2017). However, any approach that
potentially reduces the number of people employed must not just provide an income
sufficient to meet material needs, but must also consider how to replace the less-tangible
benefits of employment to an individual’s well-being.
1.2 Social justice, inequality, and the social contract between the
governed and the government
The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have much; it is
whether we provide enough for those who have too little.
– Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Second Inaugural Address, January 20, 1937
An important conclusion drawn previously is that government should act as a trustee
to ensure that basic human needs are met in an equitable and just manner. However,
* For more information, see the website for the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions (Eurofound), www.eurofound.europa.eu/ (accessed October 16, 2017).
† See Working Mother Media (2017), Working Mothers 100 Best Companies, www.workingmother.com/best-
companies-for-women (accessed October 16, 2017).

58 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
governments cannot provide the whole answer; competitive markets will also continue
to play a vital role in meeting human needs. The challenge is to find a tolerable balance
between government regulation and economic (and other forms of) freedom.*
Historically, economists have rejected the notion that the government should interfere
with the market and argued that we should let people express their utility in the market-
place. However, as discussed in the previous section, consumers are finding it increasingly
difficult to use their spending power effectively, let alone sustainably. Hence, it appears
that there are two predominant views:
1 There are basic needs, and that is why we need markets; and
2 There are basic needs, and that is why we need government.
The focus of this section will be on the problems of equity within a country or region,
equity between developed and developing nations, and intergenerational equity. The
critical questions addressed here are what is fair within society and what role govern-
ment should play. If the state is to play a role in needs satisfaction, we should have some
understanding of the relative roles of the governed and the government. In this regard,
we begin this section with a look at the social contract.
1.2.1 The social contract and the theory of justice
Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. One thinks himself the master of others, and still
remains a greater slave than they.
– Jean-Jacques Rousseau 1762
The modern notion of the social contract can be traced back to the political and moral
theories of Thomas Hobbes (1985 [1651]), John Locke (1988 [1690]), Jean-Jacques Rous-
seau (1968 [1762]), and Immanuel Kant (1989 [1785]), but the present-day interpreta-
tion rests most heavily on the work of John Rawls (1971).
The basic premise of the social contract is that an individual, in accepting that the pur-
suit of self-interest is ultimately self-defeating, relinquishes certain freedoms and rights to
a system of collectively enforced social arrangements in exchange for peace and security
(Friend 2004). Hence, he or she agrees to follow the “general will” of society and be
held accountable if his or her “individual will” motivates behavior that breaks the social
contract – that is, the law of the land (Rousseau 1968 [1762]). Whatever freedoms an
individual loses in the transition from the state of nature† to the civil state are more than
* A reliance on markets is not likely to be sufficient, because if there is producer-created demand, then busi-
nesses influence both the supply and the demand side of the economy. Although such influence may
not result in monopoly prices, it has the potential to reduce our ability to fulfill our basic human needs.
Hence, government has a role to play in ensuring that a full range of products and services is provided
for society.
† The “state of nature” refers to a hypothetical state of living that occurred before the establishment of
society and the introduction of any form of government or social arrangements. Hence, in the state of
nature, there are no restraints on how one can behave. The manner in which one defines the state of
nature has implications for how the social contract is subsequently envisioned. For example, Hobbes’s
(1985 [1651]) political philosophy was based on the idea that men in a state of nature (i.e., in a state
without civil government) are in a state of constant war, which any rational and self-motivated individual
would want to end. Hence, the solution is to establish a social contract to ensure peace and order and to
enable individuals to live in a civil society, which suits their own interest. Hobbes’s hypothetical view of

Concern for a global future 59
compensated for by belonging to a civil society that ensures safety, liberties, and property
rights. Hence, the social contract tries to balance individual freedom with being a mem-
ber of a civil society that limits freedoms for the greater good.
During the nineteenth century, interest in the social contract declined as the utilitarian
movement took hold (Rawls 1971). Utilitarianism argues that all moral judgments should
aim to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number (Bentham 1970 [1781]; Mill
2002 [1863]). Hence, the objective of social institutions and human actions under a utili-
tarian framework is to develop and enforce laws that maximize the well-being and hap-
piness of society. But utilitarianism suffers from two major problems (Brock 1973). First,
the theory raises moral conflicts, particularly in regard to justice. For example, although
reducing taxes might maximize the happiness (or material well-being) of society, it might
also have the effect of reducing the availability of basic health or educational services for
the disadvantaged. The aggregative character of utilitarianism means that it is not con-
cerned about the pattern of distribution of welfare,* and therefore it provides no justifica-
tion for inequality in its distribution (Cohen 1993). Further,
it would not only be morally right to sacrifice the interests of individuals or minority
groups if this would serve to maximize common utility, but those who are sacrificed
would even have a moral duty of benevolence to let this happen.
(Wetlesen 1999, p. 42)
Second, utilitarianism fails to support the more liberal nature of Western societies that
emphasize liberty and individual rights. For example, slavery was a useful institution in
the United States for promoting the success of agricultural advance, but it was ultimately
rejected on moral and socio-political grounds. Similar arguments apply to the elimination
of child labor in industrialization.
In an effort to address the shortcomings of utilitarianism, as well as those of intuition-
ism (that is, systems of philosophy that consider intuition the fundamental process of
our knowledge), John Rawls published his seminal work in 1971, A Theory of Justice, which
renewed the notion of the social contract by arguing that political and moral positions can
be determined by using impartiality.
the state of nature was extreme in that he envisioned a world in which man would constantly fear for his
life. Locke (1988 [1690]) built on Hobbes’s notion of the social contract but constructed his theories on
a different view of the state of nature. Locke (1988 [1690]) argued that without government to enforce
social arrangements and laws, man is not free to do anything he pleases because he is constrained by a
sense of morality. In this regard, the “state of Nature is pre- political, but it is not pre-moral. [. . .] It is
therefore both the view of human nature, and the nature of morality itself, which account for the dif-
ferences between Hobbes’ and Locke’s views of the social contract” (C. Friend [2004], “The Social Con-
tract,” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/ [accessed October 16, 2017]).
* The Brundtland report, Our Common Future, interprets “welfare” as the “satisfaction of human needs and
aspirations” (WCED 1987, p. 43). This interpretation rests on fundamental human needs for “primary
goods,” such as food, shelter, clothing, and employment, and the legitimate expectations for a better life.
Wetlesen (1999) argues that we can reasonably interpret the Brundtland Commission’s view of welfare
in an objective and a subjective sense. The former is concerned with conditions and standards of living, and
the latter with the perceived quality of life that an individual is able to achieve. The Brundtland report is
also concerned about the equitable distribution of welfare. “The essential needs of vast numbers of peo-
ple in developing countries – for food, clothing, shelter, jobs – are not being met, and beyond their basic
needs these people have legitimate aspirations for an improved quality of life. A world in which poverty
and inequality are endemic will always be prone to ecological and other crises. Sustainable development
requires meeting the basic needs of all and extending to all the opportunity to satisfy their aspirations
for a better life” (WCED 1987, pp. 43–44).

60 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
The traditional social contract (envisioned in its various forms by Hobbes, Locke, Rous-
seau, and Kant) revolved around the agreement of people in a state of nature to form a
society and government that they will be obligated to obey (Brock 1973). In this regard,
the social contract is “primarily a theory of political obligation” (ibid., p. 488). In con-
trast, Rawls developed a version of the contract in which the relevant agreement revolves
around moral principles, the principles of justice (ibid.). These principles can be consid-
ered a set of game rules that must be followed in designing new social arrangements, such
as policies and programs. Central to Rawls’s theory is the hypothetical situation, the “origi-
nal position,” in which an individual’s knowledge is constrained by a “veil of ignorance.”
Behind the veil of ignorance,
no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know
his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and
strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his conception of the good, the
particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the special features of his psychology
such as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism. [. . .] The parties
do not know the particular circumstances of their own society, [. . .] its economic or
political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been able to achieve.
(Rawls 1971, p. 137)
Rawls argues that decisions made for society should be made as if the participants do not
know in advance what their lot in life will be.
In essence, Rawls’s original position is an abstract version of the state of nature. It fol-
lows that from the original position people are able to identify what they must do indi-
vidually and collectively (through social institutions) to realize the nature of justice. The
simplicity of the veil of ignorance is its strength. By denying contracting parties the knowl-
edge of their own characteristics or circumstances, they are forced to adopt the moral
point of view and are unable to develop principles or policies that favor themselves. Rawls
also states that contracting parties are assumed to be “rational and mutually disinterested”
(Rawls 1971, p. 13): “rational” in the sense that the contracting party makes the most
effective decision to reach a given end, and “mutually disinterested” in the sense that each
person does not take “an interest in one another’s interests” (ibid.). Thus, the “rational”
choice is to develop principles and strategies for a just society from initial conditions that
are inherently fair. Justice, therefore, proceeds out of fairness, giving rise to Rawls’s for-
mulation of “justice as fairness” (ibid., p. 17). Further, as Brock (1973, p. 489) notes, in
Rawls’s theory there is no historical agreement, which means that contracting parties are
able to adopt “the standpoint of someone in the original position, and so the moral point
of view, at any time.” In theory, an individual in the original position is likely to adopt the
same principles for justice as any other person, thereby establishing a robust set of princi-
ples and arrangements to regulate a just society.
A problem identified by Rawls when he is considering the design of the social institu-
tions that form the basic structure of society is that individuals are born into the world with
a wide range of circumstances and characteristics. Although it is not possible to alter many
of the human characteristics that form our personalities and physical ability, Rawls argues
that it is possible to adjust the social institutions to favor those who are disadvantaged.
Hence, Rawls develops two principles of justice that he argues contracting parties would
select in the original position – behind the veil of ignorance – to establish a just society:
First Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system
of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both

Concern for a global future 61
a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings
principle
b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality
of opportunities. (Rawls 1971, p. 302)
The first principle determines the distribution of civil liberties. It states that each member
of a society is to receive as much liberty (or personal freedom) as possible, as long as
every other member of society receives the same. The principle “implies that one person’s
good can never be considered a good if it constitutes an obstacle to someone else’s pursuit
of their good, even if that someone else comes a generation or two later” (Voorthuis and
Gijbels 2010, p. 376). The second principle states that social and economic inequalities
are justified only if the most disadvantaged members of society are made relatively better
off under new arrangements. As Friend (2004, Section 3a) notes, “only if a rising tide truly
does carry all boats upward, can economic inequalities be allowed for in a just society.”
Rawls (1971) developed the second principle (known as the difference principle) using
the maximin rule – that is, the best outcome is one that minimizes the maximum loss. He
argued that since people do not know their position in society when they are behind the
veil of ignorance, they will select the difference principle because it will be to their benefit
if it is possible that they end up in the most disadvantaged section of society.
In the latter part of principle 2(a), Rawls introduces the notion of “just savings,” which
is the first comprehensive treatment of intergenerational equity (or justice). The basic
idea is that when individuals are in the original position, behind the veil of ignorance,
they do not know which generation or in what stage of socioeconomic development they
might live and must, therefore, select “savings” principles that do not favor earlier genera-
tions over later ones.* In A Theory of Justice, Rawls’s formulation of the just savings principle
was based on a “motivational assumption” that contracting parties would want to save for
their successors, regardless of whether their ancestors saved for them.† This formulation
runs counter to the notion of “mutually disinterested” contracting parties and has been
criticized as being sexist and arbitrary (Barry 1978; Okin 1989).
In Political Liberalism, Rawls (1993) revised his notion of the just savings principle to
address these inconsistencies. His revised assumption is that generations are mutually disin-
terested. Therefore, contracting parties in the original position, behind the veil of igno-
rance, should
agree to a savings principle subject to the further condition that they must want all
previous generations to have followed it. Thus, the correct principle is that which the
members of any generation (and so all generations) would adopt as the one their
generation is to follow and as the principle they would want preceding generations to
* In the words of Rawls (1971, p. 287): “The parties do not know to which generation they belong or, what
comes to the same thing, the stage of civilization of their society. They have no way of telling whether it is
poor or relatively wealthy, largely agricultural or already industrialized, and so on. The veil of ignorance
is complete in these respects. Thus, the persons in the original position are to ask themselves how much
they would be willing to save at each stage on the assumption that all other generations are to save at the
same rates. That is, they are to consider their willingness to save at any given phase of civilization with
the understanding that the rates they propose are to regulate the whole span of accumulation. In effect,
then, they must choose a just savings principle that assigns an appropriate rate of accumulation to each
level of advance.”
† Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Intergenerational Justice, Rawls’s Just Savings Principle,” http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-intergenerational/#RawJusSavPri (accessed October 16, 2017).

62 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
have followed (and later generations to follow), no matter how far back (or forward)
in time. (ibid., p. 274)
In this formulation, the principle of just savings is considered as binding for all previous
and future generations. A problem, however, with Rawls’s restatement is that he does not
consider the implications of an increasing number of people in the future,* or that the
current generation has a larger population than the previous generation – a fact that
will clearly change how much society should save (Barry 1999; Casal and Williams 1995;
P. Dasgupta 1994; Heyd 1992). Nevertheless, Rawls’s ideas provide a useful starting point
for discussions about intergenerational equity.
The two principles of justice are to be considered in a specific order. The first principle
must be considered before the second principle because “liberty can only be restricted for
the sake of liberty, not for other social and economic advantages” (Brock 1973, p. 490).†
This ranking implies that society would rank the determination of civil liberties above that
of economic advantage. Also, within the second principle, equality of opportunity (2b) is
to be considered before the difference principle (2a), using the same rationale.
Before we progress further, it is worth mentioning that there are those who question
these basic principles of justice. For example, Brock (1973) argues that people in the orig-
inal position are likely to tolerate minor sacrifices in liberty for substantial economic gain,
especially in situations of severe economic underdevelopment. Further, the difference
principle assumes that all risk taking in the original position is irrational: “It allows no pos-
sible gain in one’s life prospects, should one turn out to be among the better off members
of society” (ibid., p. 491). This latter point reflects a common criticism of Rawls’s decision
to use a maximin rule (Harsanyi 1975). Rawls (1974) counters such arguments by stating
that the original position masks the probabilities of outcomes, making alternative decision
rules too risky. In addition, the difference principle acknowledges the fact that any good
circumstances into which a person is born are “unearned and undeserved” (Brock 1973,
p. 491). The benefits that are derived from these circumstances should therefore benefit
all of society. Thus, whether a person is for or against Rawls’s theory of justice will depend,
to a certain extent, on that person’s perceived position in society.
Rawls argues that his notion of justice as fairness begins with the adoption of the prin-
ciples of a just society, which will guide all subsequent actions, including the reform of
institutions.
Having chosen a conception of justice, we can suppose that [ . . . the contracting
parties] are to choose a constitution and a legislature to enact laws, and so on, all in
accordance with the principles of justice initially agreed upon. [. . .] Moreover, assum-
ing that the original position does determine a set of principles (that is, that a particu-
lar conception of justice would be chosen), it will then be true that whenever social
institutions satisfy these principles those engaged in them can say to one another that
they are cooperating on terms to which they would agree if they were free and equal
persons whose relations with respect to one another were fair. (Rawls 1971, p. 13)
* In contrast, in Northern industrialized societies there are implications of decreasing populations that
cannot provide sufficient amenities for those retiring.
† It is possible to envisage a situation where liberty is constrained to protect liberty – i.e., “ restrictions to
individual freedoms are justified when the unfettered exercise of these freedoms conflicts with other
freedoms” (Beatley 1994, p. 156). For example, the speed at which vehicles are allowed to drive is con-
strained to protect broader public freedoms such as individual safety.

Concern for a global future 63
Rawls argues that the challenge raised by the difference principle is how to choose a
social system (that is, a basic structure of government) that will ensure distributive justice
in a capitalist market economy. From the premise that the basic structure of government
and its actions are regulated by a constitution protecting the liberties of equal citizenship,
Rawls outlines four branches of government (Rawls 1971, pp. 274–284). The first is the
allocation branch, required to keep markets competitive, prevent the formation of unrea-
sonable market power, and correct for externalities. The second is the stabilization branch,
needed to bring about strong effective demand (through the deployment of finance) and
to maintain full employment and choice of occupation (that is, those who desire work
can find it). The third is the transfer branch, essential to the formation and maintenance
of a social minimum. By considering basic human needs, this branch determines the level
of guaranteed minimum income that maximizes the long-term expectations of the least
advantaged. Finally, there is the distribution branch, needed to enforce inheritance and gift
taxes, in addition to general income or expenditure taxes. It follows that the allocation
and stabilization branches are required to maintain an efficient economy; the transfer
branch is designed to ensure that basic human needs are identified and met; and the dis-
tribution branch is needed to prevent the concentration of economic power.
As stated in the introduction to Section 9.7.2.1 in Chapter 9, we argue that government
has an important role as a trustee to ensure that basic human needs are met in an equita-
ble and just manner. The preceding discussion of the social contract and Rawls’s theory
of justice indicates how government could be structured to enable it to achieve this goal.
But establishing a philosophy of government that ensures that basic human needs are met
is a complex task.
Basic human needs can be categorized under the headings of sustenance, competence, auton-
omy, and connectedness (Kasser 2002). However, this formulation does not provide govern-
ment with a clear directive on what actions are required to satisfy our basic needs. In this
regard, Max-Neef et al.’s (1989) theory of human needs and satisfiers is of value in that it
identifies the qualities, things, actions, and settings that are associated with fundamental needs
such as protection, participation, and freedom. Further, because satisfiers are ultimately
defined by society – an essential characteristic of the social contract – an interesting experi-
ment would be for a representative group of contracting parties to complete Max-Neef et
al.’s (1989) matrix of needs and satisfiers while behind the veil of ignorance. In theory, this
action would develop the satisfiers of human needs that are culturally defined and impartial.
Once the basic human needs of a society are agreed on, the role of government (in
a Rawlsian sense) is to develop laws, policies, and programs to assist those members of
society who are unable to satisfy their basic needs. Opponents to the formation of such a
welfare state argue that the only way to meet the needs of the disadvantaged is through
economic regulation and taxation, which results in a loss of civil liberties (Nozick 1974).*
Hence, civil liberty and social welfare stand in constant tension with each other.†
* In 1974 the late Robert Nozick – a professor of philosophy at Harvard and a colleague of John Rawls –
published Anarchy, State, and Utopia in opposition to the nonminimal welfare state proposed in A Theory of
Justice. Nozick (1974, p. ix) defined the minimal state as follows: “Our main conclusions about the state
are that a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforce-
ment of contracts, and so on, is justified; that any more extensive state will violate persons’ rights not to be
forced to do certain things, and is unjustified; and that the minimal state is inspiring as well as right. Two
noteworthy implications are that the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting
some citizens to aid others, or in order to prohibit activities to people for their own good or protection.”
Interestingly, although Nozick’s and Rawls’s philosophies of government were opposed, they both agreed
that individual rights are more important than utilitarian considerations and that government should be
neutral in respect to people’s right to choose and pursue their own vision of a good life (Sandel 1996).
† “The extent to which the needs theory dominates the philosophy of government [. . .] can be measured
by the levels of taxation and regulation of economic activity. Government takes money out of the hands

64 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
One might question, however, whether a laissez-faire market is able to operate free from
government intervention and supply the products and services that society needs. (See
the discussion of Stiglitz in his Rewriting the Rules 2015 in Chapters 3 and 13.) In particular,
Brulle (2000, p. 37) expresses concern that government is not able to operationalize the
social contract, arguing “there is little public policy about policy.”
Brulle (2000) describes how since the Great Depression, the U.S. government has
become an active participant in economic activity, primarily to stabilize the economic sys-
tem and to compensate for the adverse effects of capital accumulation. This involvement
in the economy means that the government assumes a level of responsibility to ensure the
legitimacy of the market. Because economic growth is based on investment and consump-
tion, the government plays an important role in furthering these two drivers of economic
development. Brulle (2000, pp. 34–35) argues that the
inability of the market to maintain itself creates a politically maintained private mar-
ket in which socialized production and private appropriation of production exist in
a system legitimized by formal democratic rules. This creates a conflict between the
normative justifications for collective decisions. Market outcomes are legitimized as
the outcomes of democratic will formation. This leads to a series of contradictions
and crises in Western society.
Brulle’s (2000) major concern is that the public sphere – “an arena in which the common
good was debated and a democratic consensus was reached” (p. 37) – has been under-
mined by the insulation of government action from public input. This situation has had
the effect of exposing the public sphere to “the manipulative deployment of media power
to procure mass loyalty, consumer demand, and compliance with systemic imperatives”
(Habermas 1992, p. 452, quoted in Brulle 2000, p. 37). In such an environment, it is diffi-
cult to envision how society can be an effective part of the decision-making process. Thus,
the social contract between the governed and the government is undermined, thwarting
efforts to establish a social order that enables “the communicative generation of legiti-
mate power” (ibid.).*
Having outlined the notion of the social contract in this section, in Section 9.7.2.1 in
Chapter 9 we attempt to operationalize the social contract by crafting a decision-making
philosophy that can be applied within a trade-off analysis framework. Put differently, we
have developed a revised Rawlsian decision-making philosophy to advance sustainable
development. Our revision is the creation of a third principle of justice – the environmental
principle – that seeks to connect the social and natural realms in a decision-making philoso-
phy focus on sustainable development.
of individuals and spends it on what it considers are the needs priorities of the people. The more an
individual is taxed, the greater the loss of his freedom to determine his own priorities and to satisfy his
individual needs. In short, through taxation and regulation, government decides how a person should
spend his money. Rather than leave a person’s resources to himself and permit him to make his own
arrangements for the satisfaction of his needs, the government expropriates his wealth and in return
seeks to provide him the necessities of life as determined by government. [. . .] It is clear that a needs
based theory of human rights can be pursued only at the expense of the gradual loss of freedom and a
gradual movement towards totalitarianism” (M. Cooray [1985], “Human Rights in Australia,” The Basic
Human Rights and the Needs Based Human Rights, www.ourcivilisation.com/cooray/rights/chap5.htm
[accessed February 1, 2018]).
* For the implications on the nature of jobs, see London (2013).

Concern for a global future 65
1.2.2 Equality of what?
The manner in which equality is defined and evaluated is directly linked to the types of
inequalities one is trying to right. This section takes a brief look at the various ways in
which equality is considered and how these considerations relate to the broader picture
of sustainable development.
The major philosophies of government (or social arrangements), some of which are
discussed in the previous section, all support the notion of equality in terms of a “focal
variable” such as income, wealth, happiness, opportunities, rights, or needs fulfillment
(Sen 1992, p. 2). The basic premise of these theories is that each individual should have
equality of opportunities in regard to the variable(s) selected (see Rawls’s second principle
of justice). For example, everyone should have an equal opportunity to gain employment
or to have an education. In a world in which everyone’s circumstances and abilities are
the same, focusing on equality of opportunity would suffice. But this is not the world in
which we live, and adopting such a posture in decision-making often results in unequal
treatment of the disadvantaged.
In the book Inequality Reexamined, Nobel Prize–winning economist Amartya Sen (1992)
raises the question “equality of what?” and links it directly to the consideration of human
diversity. In particular, he argues that social arrangements (for example, government poli-
cies and laws) should be assessed in relation to a person’s capability to achieve functionings.
Sen’s (1992) idea of functionings is Aristotelian in origin.* He defines functionings as the
various things that a person has “reason to value,” from being well nourished or avoiding
escapable morbidity to more complex realizations, such as having self-respect or being a
valued member of a community (ibid., p. 5). Alkire (2003, p. 5) describes Sen’s idea of
functionings as
an umbrella term for the resources and activities and attitudes people spontaneously
recognize to be important – such as poise, knowledge, a warm friendship, an edu-
cated mind, a good job. What is centrally important varies in different places, which is
why there is no rigid and inflexible set of specific capabilities – the priorities will have
to be set and reset again and again in different ways.
It follows that an individual’s achieved functionings are those that the individual has
successfully pursued and realized. However, Sen (1992) argues that focusing on achieved
functionings (or focal variables) alone is not sufficient. The inherent diversity of external
circumstances and psychological and physiological makeup among individuals means that
the characteristics of inequality tend to diverge within the variable under analysis. In other
words, differences in the circumstances and abilities of people mean that equality of oppor-
tunity will not lead to equal wealth or happiness, for example. In addition,
equality in terms of one variable may not coincide with equality in the scale of another.
Equal opportunities can lead to very unequal incomes. Equal incomes can go with sig-
nificant differences in wealth. Equal wealth can coexist with very unequal happiness.
Equal happiness can go with widely divergent fulfillment of needs. Equal fulfillment
of needs can be associated with very different freedoms of choice. And so on.
(ibid., p. 2)
* Aristotle believed that the attainment of the good life or happiness was the result of self-realizationism –
i.e., the ability to realize one’s potentialities, character, or personality. To Aristotle, the person who has
the greatest potentialities and is able to actualize this potential has the brightest prospect of happiness.
Conversely, the person whose potential remains unfulfilled will ultimately be frustrated and unhappy.

66 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
Hence, Sen’s core argument is that “the basic heterogeneity of human beings” and “the
multiplicity of variables in terms of which equality can be judged” are two factors that com-
plicate the idea of equality (ibid., p. 1). This means that a focus on individual functionings
(or focal variables) does not necessarily incorporate an individual’s freedom* to achieve.
Hence, Sen introduces the concept of capability to describe an individual’s freedom to
achieve “valuable” functionings.
It represents the various combinations of functionings (beings and doings) that the
person can achieve. Capability is, thus, a set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the
person’s freedom to lead one type of life or another [. . .] to choose from possible
livings. (ibid., p. 40)†
Sen’s focus on functionings and on the capability to achieve functionings differs from
the traditional views of equality that tend to focus on variables such as income, wealth,
or happiness (1992, p. 7). Instead of measuring equality using such focal variables, Sen
argues that a “more adequate way of considering ‘real’ equality of opportunities must be
through equality of capabilities (or through the elimination of unambiguous inequalities
in capabilities, since capability comparisons are typically incomplete)” (ibid.).
A major difference between Sen’s capabilities-based assessment of equality and Rawls’s
theory of “justice as fairness” lies in their assessment of the holdings of “primary goods” –
that is, goods that are considered essential for the survival and self-respect of individuals
(Rawls 1971).
Rawls’s theory is that in the original position – behind the veil of ignorance – most peo-
ple will be able to agree on a set of primary goods that are considered important regard-
less of an individual’s circumstances. Rawls argues that social primary goods are “things
that every rational man is presumed to want,” such as “rights and liberties, powers and
* The freedom Sen (1992, p. 31) refers to is “the real opportunity that we have to accomplish what we
value.” Sen (1999, p. 36) also described development as the “process of expanding real freedoms.”
Sen views the expansion of freedom as both “(1) the primary end and (2) the principal means of develop-
ment” (ibid.). The former is referred to as the “constitutive role” and the latter as the “instrumental
role.” The “constitutive role” refers to the basic premise that freedom must be regarded as a primary
objective of the development process. The “instrumental role” refers to the various ways in which
freedom can act as an “instrument” of development. Sen identifies five types of instrumental freedoms
that tend to enhance the capability of an individual to live more freely (ibid., pp. 38–40): (1) political
freedoms (the opportunities that individuals have to be a part of democratic processes); (2) economic
facilities (the opportunities that individuals have to “utilize economic resources for the purposes of
consumption, or production, or exchange”); (3) social opportunities (the access that individuals have to
facilities such as basic education and health care, which are essential if a person is to have an effective
role in economic and political activities); (4) transparency guarantees (“the freedom to deal with one
another under guarantees of disclosure and lucidity”); and (5) protective security (the need to provide
a social safety net to assist those individuals who face abject misery and possibly even starvation and
death).
† Although Sen does not formally list capabilities, this has not prevented others from doing so. The most
comprehensive attempt is presented by Nussbaum (2000), who developed a set of “central human
functional capabilities.” The major headings of Nussbaum’s list of capabilities include the following:
life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation;
other species; and control over one’s environment (ibid., pp. 78–80). Under each heading, Nussbaum
defines the “combined” capabilities that a person should be able to achieve. For example, the capabili-
ties for bodily health are defined as “being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to
be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter” (ibid., p. 78).

Concern for a global future 67
opportunities, income and wealth, [and] [. . .] self-respect” (Rawls 1971, p. 62).* Hence,
Rawls’s general conception is that “all social primary goods [. . .] are to be distributed
equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of
the least favored” (ibid., p. 303). The focus of Rawls’s formulation is “equality of opportu-
nity,” which is captured within the difference principle (see Section 1.2.1).
Sen identified a fundamental problem with Rawls’s formulation of the difference
principle:
Two persons holding the same bundle of primary goods can have very different free-
doms to pursue their respective conceptions of the [greater] good (whether or not
these conceptions coincide). To judge equality – or for that matter efficiency – in the
space of primary goods amounts to giving priority to the means of freedom over any
assessment of the extents of freedom, and this can be a drawback in many contexts.
(Sen 1992, pp. 8–9)
Thus, Sen argues that equality in the holdings of primary goods or resources ignores the
fact that disadvantaged members of society may not have the capability or freedom to
convert these goods/resources into the things that they value. Therefore, if a government
were to use primary goods as a measure of well-being for purposes of justice, there is a con-
cern that disadvantaged members of society might suffer from unjust (or unequal) treat-
ment. To put it another way, these people are likely to have an unfair share of opportunity.
Thus, Sen’s capability-based assessment of equality forms the foundation for affirmative
action, for empowering the powerless, and for positive discrimination (Bidwai 1998).
Sen’s theories of capabilities and functionings and Rawls’s theory of “justice as fairness”
have had a significant impact on how governments have shaped social arrangements to
establish equitable and just societies.† Sen’s theories have also provided a strong concep-
tual foundation for the UN’s work on human development (Fukuda-Parr 2002, 2003). In
particular, his ideas shaped the UN Human Development Reports (HDRs) and the Human
Development Index (HDI), including its extensions. More recently the Stiglitz, Sen, and
Fitoussi Commission (2009), discussed in Section 1.1.1, has integrated Sen’s ethics into
the measurement of human progress and this has led directly to the creation of the OECD
Better Life Index as well as influencing the Sustainable Development Goals.
The essence of Sen’s conception of equality is that “a person’s capability to achieve
does indeed stand for the opportunity to pursue his or her objectives” (Sen 1992,
p. 7). From this premise, the UN defined human development as the “process of
enlarging people’s choices” (UNDP 1995, p. 11) and sought the removal of obstacles –
“such as illiteracy, ill health, lack of access to resources, or lack of civil and political free-
doms” (Fukuda-Parr 2003, p. 303) – that prevent an individual from achieving his or her
valued objectives in life. Thus, the intention of the UN HDI was to shift international atten-
tion to the expansion of basic human capabilities, especially the capability to (1) have a
healthy life, (2) acquire knowledge, and (3) reach a decent standard of living.‡ Because
the purpose of the HDRs is the “global evaluation of development,” these three indexes
* Rawls (1971, p. 62) states that other primary goods, such as health and vigor or intelligence and imagina-
tion, are “natural” primary goods. Although natural primary goods can be influenced by social arrange-
ments, they are not directly under their control.
† Incidentally, it was Sen (1993, p. 43) who once said “it is significant that no democratic country with a
relatively free press has ever experienced a major famine.” That is, there are no famines in democracies.
‡ Although the HDI’s focus is on “evaluating” human development, Sen (2003) argues that the human
development perspective also contains an “agency perspective” that is often overlooked. When one has
identified where improvement to human lives can be made through the HDI, it is necessary to turn to
the agency perspective to develop policy and political strategies to realize the necessary changes.

68 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
were selected for their universal value since they form the basis on which many choices
in life depend (Fukuda-Parr 2002, p. 6). The notion of investing in health and education
in particular maps closely with physical health and learning, two essential attributes an indi-
vidual requires to attain a high level of well-being.
To provide a context for the preceding discussion, Table 1.3 compares and contrasts
the human development approach with the neoliberal (utilitarian) alternative and its
precursor, the basic-needs approach (first espoused by Paul Streeten [1982] and Frances
Stewart [1985]).* Table 1.3 also presents an idealized framework from which public policy
formulation can be considered. For example, by looking at the “evaluative” and “agency”
aspects of a set of policies, it should be possible to determine whether the government
supports a human development approach (that is, its policies are just and fair and consider
human capabilities) or a neoliberal approach (that is, its policies are utilitarian in nature)
to the process of development. It is interesting to note that none of the approaches con-
tain an explicit concern for the environment, on which human activity and development
depend.† It is clear that if we are to transition toward sustainable development, the need
to protect the environment must be added to the need to ensure that we live in an equi-
table and just society that recognizes human capabilities (see the related discussion in
Section 9.7.2.1 in Chapter 9).
Sen’s work has also had an important influence on the formulation of the concept
of sustainable development, which he defines as “development that promotes the capa-
bilities of present people without compromising capabilities of future generations” (Sen
2000, p. 5). Sen believes that the Brundtland (need-centered) view of development is
“illuminating” but “incomplete” (ibid., p. 2). He argues that individuals must be seen
as “agents who can think and act, not just as patients who have needs that require cater-
ing” (ibid.). His basic premise is that by treating people as agents, they will – given the
opportunity – be able to “think, assess, evaluate, resolve, inspire, agitate, and through
these means, reshape the world” (ibid., p. 1). Hence, Sen advocates a capability-centered
approach to sustainable development. The objective of Sen’s ideas is to “integrate the idea
of sustainability with the perspective of freedom, so that we see human beings not merely
as creatures who have needs but primarily as people whose freedoms really matter” (ibid.,
p. 6). (See Section 9.7.2.1 in Chapter 9 for a discussion of how Rawls’s theory of justice
could advance individual freedom and sustainable development.) Sen’s contribution to
our understanding of equality and his notion of development as “a momentous engage-
ment with freedom’s possibilities” (Sen 1999, p. 298) provided one of the few credible
challenges to the neoliberal (or utilitarian) orthodoxy that guided development efforts
since the 1980s (Saha 2002). If neoliberalism is “dead,” as Stiglitz declared in 2016, then
it is in part thanks to Sen’s contributions.‡
As mentioned earlier, one of Sen’s major contributions to sustainable development
is his influence on the UN’s conceptualization of human development that formed the
basis for the HDRs and the HDI. Fukuda-Parr (2002), the director of the HDRs from
* It is worth noting that Sen’s theories on capabilities and functionings grew from the basic-needs
approach to international development (Alkire 2005). Sen’s main reason for rethinking the
basic-needs approach was to introduce a greater role for individual freedom. His concern was that the
basic-needs approach tended to focus on commodities, as opposed to human beings and their func-
tionings. See Section 1.1 for a discussion of human needs and sustainability.
† However, they do implicitly incorporate employment and purchasing power. This highlights the two dif-
ferent strands of sustainability scholarship, one focusing on the environment and the other on economic
empowerment.
‡ While there are still many proponents of neoliberalism, the combination of low growth and rising
inequality since the 2008 financial crisis has given an increasing relevance to the arguments against
neoliberalism.

Table 1.3 Comparison of key features of the human development approach with the neoliberal alternative and the basic-needs antecedent
Human developmentaNeoliberalism Basic needs
Philosophical underpinnings
Normative assumptions Explicit Implicit Not fully specified
Concept of well-being Functionings and capabilities Utility Meeting basic needs
Evaluative aspect
Leading criterion for evaluating
development progress Human capabilities; equality of
outcomes; fairness and justice in
institutional arrangements
Economic well-being; economic
growth; efficiency Poverty reduction in terms of
income; access to basic social
services
Measurement tools favored Human outcomes, deprivational and
distributional measures Economic activity and conditions,
averages and aggregate measures Access to material means;
deprivational measures
Agency aspect
People in development as ends
and/or means Ends and means: beneficiaries and
agents Means: human resources for
economic activity Ends: beneficiaries
Mobilizing agency Individual action and collective action Individual action Concern with political will and
political base
Development strategy
Key operational goals Expanding people’s choices (social,
economic, and political) Economic growth Expanding basic social services
Policy concerns
Distribution of benefits and costs Emphasis on equality and human rights
of all individuals Concern with poverty Concern with poverty
Links between development and
human rights and freedoms Human rights and freedoms have
intrinsic value and are development
objectives; current research on their
instrumental role through links to
economic and social progress
No explicit connection; current
search for link between political
and civil freedoms and economic
growth
No explicit connection
Source: Adapted from Fukuda-Parr (2002, 2003).
a This perspective is specifically and especially concerned with distributional equity. Neoliberalism and basic needs are not. For example, a neoliberal approach might
focus on raising people above a poverty level, but it will still tolerate enormous levels of disparity.

70 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
1995 to 2006, argued that it is possible to describe the UN’s general human development
agenda using five core elements. Fukuda-Parr called these five elements the “New York
Consensus”* because they are reflected in many of the UN agreements. It is interesting to
note the similarities between Sen’s ideas on human development and the ideas presented
in the New York Consensus. The five elements of the UN’s general human development
agenda (or the New York Consensus) are as follows:
• Priority to “social development” with the goals of expansion of education and health
opportunities;
• Economic growth that generates resources for human development in its many
dimensions;
• Political and social reforms for democratic governance that secure human rights so
that people can live in freedom and dignity, expanding [. . . collective] agency, par-
ticipation and autonomy;
• Equity in above three elements with a concern with all individuals. Special attention
to the downtrodden and the poor whose interests are often neglected in public policy;
• Policy and institutional reforms at the global level that create a more conducive eco-
nomic environment for poor countries to have access to global markets, technology,
information. (Fukuda-Parr 2002, p. 10)
The preceding list presents a robust agenda (or paradigm) for human development, but
human development is only a part – although an extremely vital part – of the broader
notion of sustainable development. If we take a holistic look at all the UN agreements, it
is possible to identify several elements that, if added to the New York Consensus, would
transform it into a consensus of sustainable development. It is possible to describe the
international community’s notion of sustainable development as consisting of five critical
components: (1) peace and security, (2) economic development, (3) social development,
(4) national governance that ensures peace and development, and (5) environmental
protection (Dernbach 1998, 2004). A comparison of these five components with the five
elements listed previously reveals that national governance that ensures peace and secu-
rity, environmental protection, and employment (an important objective of economic
and social development) are not explicitly mentioned in Fukuda-Parr’s New York Consen-
sus. Hence, if we are to integrate human development with the broader notion of sustain-
able development, the following elements need to be added:
• The creation of secure, satisfying, and safe employment with adequate purchasing
power;
• Environmental protection at local, regional, national, and global levels constitutes an
integral part of the social and economic development process and is not to be consid-
ered in isolation from it;
• Extending equity considerations to future generations; and
• National governance that ensures peace and security.
The first additional element, employment, is key to this book’s conception of sustainable
development and is discussed in Section 1.1.3 and throughout Chapter 5. The remaining
* The New York Consensus stands in stark contrast to the Washington Consensus, which promotes market-
liberalizing policies and a reduction in big government (ul Haque 2004). “Washington Consensus poli-
cies are sometimes referred to as ‘neo-liberal,’ based on ‘market fundamentalism,’ a resuscitation of the
laissez-faire policies that were popular in some circles in the nineteenth century” (Stiglitz 2002, p. 74).

Concern for a global future 71
three additional elements might be called the “Rio elements” because they stem from the
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. The most significant challenge
posed by these new elements lies not in the need to protect the environment or to provide
peace and security (although achieving these objectives has proved far from easy), but in
the idea of intergenerational equity. Put simply, we are unable to allocate resources equi-
tably in the present, let alone across generations. Hence, we do not have a near future that
is properly allocated.
The ability of governments to develop equitable social arrangements that also transition
societies toward more sustainable forms of development will depend on how they, and
society, view the purpose of development – either to establish a fair and just society (Rawl-
sianism) or to maximize the well-being of society in the neoclassical sense (utilitarianism).
Regardless of the approach, there is consensus that change is needed, as inequality is ris-
ing and the perception of well-being is decreasing (Friedman and Hertz 2015).
1.2.3 Rising inequality
Though economic inequality is a hallmark of human civilization, the size of the gap
between the haves and have-nots and what it is they “have” has varied throughout recorded
history. How the gap is measured reflects underlying societal ethics, and in recent years
has become increasingly sophisticated. The most common measure, the Gini coefficient,
is a “relative” measure of inequality – capturing the relative proportion of an individual’s
slice of cake, regardless of the size of the cake. In contrast, “absolute” measures consider
that adding a fixed amount to each individual’s slice of cake would not affect inequality,
whereas “centrist” measures attempt to account for the effect of both equi-proportional
income increase and fixed or equal increases ( Atkinson 2015; Subramanian 2014; Kolm
1975). Along with how we measure, there is also the question of what we measure: inequal-
ity of income, of wealth, of consumption, or of opportunity? Finally, with the advent of glo-
balization* came the idea of measuring not only within country inequality (intranational)
and between country inequality (international), but also global interpersonal inequality
(Milanovic 2005; Atkinson and Brandolini 2010).
After WWII, inequality in the U.S. and EU shrank, but since the early 1980s† it has
been increasing in both economic venues regardless of which inequality measure is used.
Thomas Piketty’s (2014) Capital in the 21st Century, which builds on the work of Atkinson
and others, has sparked a growing interest in such inequality trends, the data behind
them, and the ethical and societal questions they raise.
While many social and physical goods can be distributed unequally, it is the distribution
of capital ownership, capital income, and labor income both within and between countries
that has ignited global concern. This concern has fueled grassroots movements and politi-
cal shifts – including the Occupy Movement and the rise of Bernie Sanders in the U.S.
and Diem25 in Europe – and put Piketty’s 700-page economics text on the New York Times
bestseller list. It is not without reason that Piketty claims “Trump’s victory is primarily due
to the explosion in economic and geographic inequality in the US over several decades
and the inability of successive governments to deal with this” (Piketty 2016).
* In 1999, the UNDP called for policies to specifically address rising inequality caused by economic
globalization.
† While inequality is also on the rise in other developed and developing countries across the world, and
the U.S. is not considered to have the highest levels of inequality as captured by the Gini Coefficient
(South Africa does), the dramatic increase of inequality in the U.S. and the EU has been driving the
debate.

72 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
Piketty’s data – a century of income data and two centuries of wealth data created in
collaboration with Atkinson and Saez – does not support the neoclassical assumption that
inequality naturally decreases as nations develop. Instead, it reveals that capitalism con-
centrates wealth at the top, because over time the rate of return on capital is greater than
the rate of economic growth.* Furthermore, he shows that labor income or wage inequal-
ity is likely higher (in 2014) than at any time in the past, anywhere in the world. Finally,
the complex relationship between the inequalities of capital ownership and income and
labor income leads Piketty to conclude that income inequality is determined by a society’s
institutions and policies. While these factors surely play a dominate role, the role of inno-
vation and digital technology in displacing jobs and creating a winner-takes-all economy
must also be considered (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014).
We believe it is also optimistic that, as Milanovic (2002) argues, between country ine-
quality has been steadily decreasing as a direct consequence of globalization, driving a
steady decline in global (interpersonal) inequality. More recent analysis suggests that the
global inequality decline only holds true using relative measures, but that with both abso-
lute and centrist measures, global inequality has increased steadily (Niño-Zarazua et al.
2016).
The growing inequality trends are now raising serious questions about our economic
systems and their underlying ethical frameworks. They are also raising concerns about
social instability. For example, the 2014 report of the World Economic Forum’s Global
Risks ranked global income disparity as the risk most likely to manifest itself over the next
ten years (World Economic Forum 2014a).
Outside of the growing academic literature and debate around inequality, the commu-
nication of information has also brought information on the lifestyles of others to every
corner of the globe, increasing the awareness of the vast differences in wealth that exist.
Inequality looks set to be a defining characteristic and challenge of the coming decade
and beyond.
Intranational and international inequality represent both a social and moral problem,
especially for those people and nations who do not have access to, and are deprived of,
essential goods and services. Trade, as presently constructed, exacerbates inequality, as
well as local and global environmental damage. So does the present financial system,
which rewards wealth and income disproportionally and has created a quasi-permanent
underclass of people and nations. Furthermore, inequality exacerbates environmental
damage, and vice versa (Laurent 2013).
While there is much debate over the possible causes of rising inequality, there is a grow-
ing consensus that inequality is not the inevitable by-product of growth, but instead inhib-
its growth (Stiglitz 2016). Rising inequality has been associated with trends in developed
countries for capital return to exceed economic growth (Piketty 2014), the poor design of
legal and social structures (Stiglitz 2016), and unemployment since the Great Recession
(Eurofound 2017) (see Section 3.5.2 in Chapter 3). To address such trends will require
the restructuring of laws, regulations, and institutions in order to decrease inequality (see
the discussion in Chapter 13). Emmanuel Saez (2016), Director of the Center for Equi-
table Growth at the University of California at Berkley, has argued that the two countries
with the greatest income inequality are the U.S. and the UK, and, in his view, this occurred
as a result of their involvement in the financialization of the economy that led to the eco-
nomic meltdown in 2008 (see Section 3.3.1 in Chapter 3). His recommendation is that
these countries need to respond to the deficiencies in policies of corporate taxation and
financial regulation, which began to be dismantled in the 1970s. In particular, capital and
* See Chapter 5 for a discussion on inequality and growth, including the view that reducing inequality
could drive economic growth (Stiglitz 2016).

Concern for a global future 73
labor income and wealth need to be taxed appropriately (see the related discussion in
Chapter 13).
David Autor, who has written extensively on U.S. wage inequality and the negative effect
of the rise of China on the American worker, believes that inequalities in education drive
current U.S. inequality, and that “the best policies we have involve investing in our citi-
zenry [. . . and include] investments [in] preschool, good primary and secondary schools,
[and] adequate nutrition and health care” (Autor 2014a, 2014b). These recommenda-
tions tie inequality directly to opportunity and Sen’s notion of capabilities. Given that
ever-expanding consumption is not ecologically sustainable and is not directly correlated
with well-being (see Section 1.1.2), and employment is correlated with well-being (see Sec-
tion 1.1.3), a focus on increasing equality of opportunity rather than equality of income,
wealth, or consumption may best address the decreased sense of well-being resulting from
rising inequality, without putting at risk the well-being of future generations.
1.3 Living beyond our ecological means: the technology debate
Ethical decision-making relies not just on measurement of human progress and ethical
frameworks but also on the question of the flexibility of ecological limits with respect to
human activity and economic growth. This debate has continued since Thomas Malthus’s
1798 predictions of agricultural land constraining human population, through Ehrlich’s
(1968) treatment of population growth, Meadows et al.’s 1972 book Limits to Growth, and
Diamond’s 2004 book Collapse, and remains an increasingly urgent question today. Unfor-
tunately, global ecological collapse is not an unimaginable scenario. The consequences
of increased ecological damage as a result of economic growth has led to four optimistic
scenarios:
• That ecological impacts of growth (from population growth or increases in per capita
consumption) can be countered through the substitution of available existing tech-
nologies (see Solow’s notion of substitutability in Section 1.3.1);
• That increasing levels of wealth will be accompanied by environmental improvement
as the perceived value of the environment increases with rising affluence (see the
environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis in Section 1.3.2);
• That new technology can and will emerge to address even the most difficult environ-
mental problems (see the discussion of technological optimism in Section 1.3.3); and
• That both social and technological responses will arise in time to prevent irreversible
ecological damage (see the discussion of tipping points in Section 1.3.4).
The remaining alternative is that we pass an environmental tipping point beyond which
no solution can be found to be adequate because of its late realization and response and
that this results in ecosystem (and human population) collapse. Therefore, each of these
scenarios is essential to evaluate and informs the scope and rate of change needed to
avoid undesirable outcomes.
1.3.1 Growth, technology, and substitution versus a steady-state economy
The dominant neoclassical economic paradigm assumes the existence of utility functions,
which constitute the foundation of production and consumption functions. These func-
tions act as simplified abstractions of economic decisions. In the consumption production
framework, every material product in the system is produced by other products made
within the system, plus exogenous capital and labor (R. Ayres and Warr 2009). A particu-
larly interesting observation made by R. Ayres and Warr (2009), but also by Georgescu-
Roegen (1971; 1993), is that this model of the economy displays a characteristic neglect of

74 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
energy and material flows. In addition, there is an obvious need to relate changes in the
economy and technology to environmental impacts.
One of the earliest, most intuitive approaches to understanding environmental prob-
lems came from the “I = PAT” formula (Ehrlich and Holdren 1971):
Impact (environmental) = Population × Affluence (GDP per capita) × Technology
(environmental impact per dollar of GDP)
Since its publication, a number of revisions have been suggested. For example, Holdren
et al. (1995) adjusted the formula to disaggregate affluence from resource use and to
separate measures of the “stress” that technology imposes on the environment from meas-
ures of actual damage, which depend on stress and “susceptibility.” The measurement of
susceptibility is predominantly a function of cumulative damage from previous environ-
mental stress. Thus, the revised formula is:
Damage (environmental) = Population × Economic activity per person (affluence)
× Resource use per economic activity (resources) × Stress on the environmental per
resource use (technology) × Damage per stress (susceptibility).
It is important to acknowledge that formulas such as these are a simple representation of
a highly complex system. They are informative and can help stimulate discussions about
the causes of environmental degradation, but to argue whether they are “right” is unwise
(Holdren et al. 1995). What they indicate is that the magnitudes of all the factors need to
be considered, because these factors have multiplicative effects on environmental dam-
age. However, we should also recognize the limitations of these formulas. They do not take
into account the interdependencies or nonlinearity that might exist between the factors,
there is no explicit consideration of societal factors and how they can influence each vari-
able, and they do not consider how each of the variables can change over time, which is
especially critical for technological change (ibid.).
Given the political difficulty inherent in developing measures to curtail population
growth or limit/reduce affluence and the associated levels of consumption, it seems that
the easiest way to achieve a less environmentally destructive society is to focus on techno-
logical innovation. Indeed, the “technological fix” has become a major or integral aspect
of many theories put forward on how society can live within its ecological means.
Two interesting (somewhat academic) developments in economics that treat technology
differently are the ideas of substitutability (Solow 1993) and the steady-state economy (Czech
and Daly 2004; Daly 1991, 1996, 2008),* which is part of the much broader view of ecologi-
cal/green/natural/sustainability economics (R. U. Ayres 2008; Costanza 1991; Lawson
2006; Ruth 2006; Söderbaum 2008).†
* See the Center for the Advancement of the Steady State Economy, www.steadystate.org/sitemap/
(accessed October 16, 2017).
† In general, the emerging field of ecological (or sustainability) economics, which combines both the economy
and technology with ecology, provides a holistic perspective of sustainable development (R. U. Ayres 2008;
Costanza 1991; Söderbaum 2008). It studies the relationships between ecosystems and economic systems,
encompassing both biological and cultural change. The human economy is seen as part of a larger whole.
Its domain is the entire web of interactions between economic and ecological sectors. Ecological econom-
ics defines sustainability in terms of natural capital – the ability of natural systems to provide goods and
services, including clean air and water and climatic stability. Ecological economists propose that the vital
role of natural capital (e.g., mineral deposits, aquifers, and stratospheric ozone) should be made explicit
in commodity production (Daly 1994b). Thus, consumption should not deplete natural capital at a faster
rate than it can be replaced by human capital. Daly’s notion of the steady-state economy views natural eco-
systems as being finite and, therefore, focuses on the scale of human activity (i.e., the economy) that can

Concern for a global future 75
Solow’s (1993) approach to sustainability is rooted in the idea that technology can cre-
ate high degrees of substitutability between one resource and another and, implicitly, that
natural and human-made capital are in some sense “fungible.” This is what R. U. Ayres
(2007) describes as the “weak” sustainability position, which essentially argues that all
kinds of natural capital can be substituted by human-made capital.* If resources are fungi-
ble, society has no obligation to save a resource for future generations as long as an alter-
native resource is made available. Solow (1993, p. 182) argues that “what we are obligated
to leave behind is a generalized capacity to create well-being, not any particular thing or
any particular resource.” It follows that resources should be assessed as if they were savings
and investments (that is, we have a choice between current consumption and providing
for the future through the investment of nonrenewable resource rents).†
In contrast, Daly (1991) holds what R. U. Ayres (2007) calls a “strong” sustainability
position, which entails that many of the most fundamental services provided by nature
cannot be replaced by services produced by humans or human-made capital. Daly (1991)
provides what is probably the best-developed vision of an economy that functions within
ecological limits. Arguing from the first principle of thermodynamics, Daly describes a
steady-state economy (SSE) as one in which births replace deaths and production replaces
depreciation. The objective of the SSE is to keep the throughput of raw materials (low
entropy) and waste (high entropy) at levels within the regenerative and assimilative capac-
ity of the ecosystem. Whereas neoclassical economics views the growth economy as a con-
tinual expansion of production and consumption (Figure 1.4), the SSE considers these
cycles to be in equilibrium with the ecosystem (Figure 1.5).‡
be supported. Living (and producing) within ecological limits is the major focus of ecological econom-
ics. Green economics (Lawson 2006) and natural economics (Ruth 2006) build on ecological economics
but focus more explicitly on informing/shaping political views and policy for sustainable economic
development.
* Neoclassical economics views technological innovation and reproducible human-made capital as providing
“substitutes” for natural capital (Hartwick 1977, 1978a, 1978b; Solow 1974). Under these assumptions
of weak sustainability, consumption can be sustained, environmental externalities can be overcome, and
resource scarcity problems can be solved. Neoclassical economists argue that as prices increase because
of scarcity, investment in technological innovation creates substitutes to replace the scarce resources.
The idea that technological innovation will free society from concerns of resource scarcity, enabling
economies to become less reliant on natural resources, has been rejected by some. R. U. Ayres (1978)
presented a convincing case that the laws of thermodynamics place limits on the ability of human-made
resources to replace or substitute natural capital. The basic argument is that human-made capital is
built and maintained using natural capital. Thus, both forms of capital are complementary and cannot
be substituted for one another. It follows that the maintenance of natural capital stock is essential for
the economic process. A reduction in the availability of natural capital will reduce the productivity of
human-made capital, which depends on ecosystem goods and services. The same argument is also made
by Georgescu-Roegen (1993). Similarly, R. U. Ayres (1997) argues that the neoclassical view of externali-
ties as exceptional occurrences in a larger economic context is incorrect. He considers environmental
externalities pervasive because the real economy depends on extracting, processing, and converting
materials (and energy), which create waste residuals that can have negative environmental and eco-
nomic consequences. Because these consequences are not priced in the real economy, the environment
is treated as a free good and medium for disposal.
† Solow (1993) describes resource rents as the investment of the pure return on a nonrenewable resource.
For example, in using up a natural resource such as oil in the North Sea oil field, the revenues that are
intrinsic to the oil itself should be invested in new technologies that will eventually replace oil. Hence,
investing the “rent” from the nonrenewable resource is seen as an effective way to continue the current
levels of consumption while providing for future generations.
‡ See Rees (1995a) for a useful review of the expansionist (neoclassical economic) and steady-state (eco-
logical economic) views of development.

76 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
Within the SSE, technology, knowledge, the distribution of income, and the alloca-
tion of resources are fluid.* Because a fixed amount of resources will yield constant flows
of goods and services (all else being equal), technological progress is one way in which
more (or more highly valued) goods and services can be produced (Czech 2003; Czech
and Daly 2004). However, given the laws of thermodynamics, there are limits to what is
technologically feasible. Thus, there is a theoretical maximum size (an ecological car-
rying capacity) at which a steady-state economy may exist. This constraint implies that
* In general, ecological economists, especially those who focus on steady-state economics, are concerned
with the size of the economy relative to the ecosystem. The efficient allocation of resources is a concern,
but it is not the primary focus, as in neoclassical economics.
Production
Production
Consumption
Consumption
Figure 1.4 Neoclassical economics view of growing cycles of production and consumption
Source: Adapted from Daly (1991, p. 181).
Production
ConsumptionWaste
Raw
Materials
ECOSYSTEM
Solar
EnergyHeat
Recycled
Materials
Figure 1.5 Steady-state economics view of production and consumption cycles in equilibrium
with the ecosystem
Source: Adapted from Daly (1991, p. 181).

Concern for a global future 77
high-quality, long-lasting, and repairable goods are preferable to low-quality, short-lived,
and disposable goods.*
To help describe the SSE, Daly (1991) compares it to a steady-state library, where the
addition of a new book would mean the removal of an old book. Thus, although the
quantitative physical scale remains constant, the library would continue to improve in a
qualitative sense. In this regard, Daly’s view of the necessary technological fixes for envi-
ronmental degradation is more conservative than Solow’s. Rather than continuing busi-
ness as usual and investing in future alternatives, Daly’s focus is to develop new science/
technology that reduces the environmental burden to rates within ecosystem limits and
also extends human lives. Daly’s and Solow’s viewpoints are quite different and represent
contrasting views of the role that technology plays in development.
R. U. Ayres (2007) offers a critique of proponents of both strong and weak sustainability.
In his view, although the mathematics of Solow’s argument are “impeccable,” the under-
lying assumptions, or what Ayres calls “the physics,” are not. R. U. Ayres (2007, p. 116)
believes that proponents of strong sustainability are right to point out the relevance of
entropy law, the second law of thermodynamics, and the impossibility of perpetual-motion
machines; however, they are wrong to assert that human civilization is totally dependent
on a finite stock of high-quality (low entropy) resources stored in the earth’s crust. As R.
U. Ayres (ibid.) points out,
the fact that much of our industrial base currently utilizes fossil fuels and high quality
metal ores is merely due to the ready availability of these resources at low cost. It does
not follow from the entropy law that there are not substitutes.
Nonetheless, R. U. Ayres (2007, p. 126) concludes,
I have to reiterate that, while there is plenty of room for substitution and some pos-
sibility of major breakthroughs (e.g., in manufacturing room temperature super-
conductors or carbon nanotubes) the pessimists – those who espouse the notion of
“strong sustainability” appear to be closer to the truth than the optimists who believe
in more or less unlimited substitution possibilities.
In general, in this time of growing ecological and economic crisis, it becomes increas-
ingly apparent that questions of ecology cannot be separated from questions of econom-
ics, and that building a truly sustainable future will necessarily involve new theories, new
paradigms, and new policies. Ecological and steady-state economics provide the first step
in thinking about the economy and the environment in different terms.
The financial crisis that began in 2008 is connected to the issue of ecological limits to
growth. In tandem with the significant economic and financial disturbances, the ecologi-
cal situation is particularly problematic and is a direct consequence of the workings of our
industrial systems. Kallis et al. (2009) put forward an alternative framework for studying
the financial crisis of 2008. According to their analysis, the economy must be analyzed at
three levels (from top to bottom):
• The financial level;
• The real economy; and
• The “real–real” economy.
* Although one could argue that an effective recycling process reduces the need to extend the lifespan
of goods, this argument is weakened by the fact that (1) recycling processes use energy that reduce
the available stock of terrestrial resources (assuming that the recycling process is not powered by solar
energy), and (2) most recycling involves the degradation of material, which means that it is suitable only
for poorer-quality goods. The latter point is often referred to as “downcycling.”

78 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
Kallis et al. (2009, p. 16) note:
At the top there is the financial level that can grow by loans made to the private
sector or to the state, sometimes without any assurance of repayment as in the pre-
sent crisis. The financial system borrows against the future, on the expectation that
indefinite economic growth will give the means to repay the interests and the debts.
Then there is what the economists describe as the real economy, the GDP at constant
prices. When it grows, it indeed allows for paying back [. . .] some or all the debt,
when it does not grow enough, debts are defaulted. Increasing the debts forces the
economy to grow, up to some limits. Then, down below underneath the economists’
real economy, there is what the ecological economists call the “real–real” economy,
the flows of energy and materials whose growth depends partly on economic factors
(types of markets, prices) and in part from physical and biological limits. The “real–
real” economy also includes land and capacity of humans to do work.
The ecological approach to the present crisis states that the level of finance grew too
large and too fast for the real economy to adapt. The financial system also increased
debts too much, in the absence of coherent regulation, and this expansion of credit lines
was mistaken for real wealth (Kallis et al. 2009). At the same time, the economy is not a
closed system but operates within certain ecological limits and biophysical constraints,
which condition the rate at which real wealth can increase. This analysis resembles that of
Polanyi (1944), who placed markets within social systems rather than regarding them as
independent “value-neutral” entities.
In general, energy resources appear to be of increasingly pivotal importance around
the world. As Klare (2001, p. 13) notes, ever since the end of the Cold War, political ana-
lysts of different persuasions have attempted to identify the “defining principle of the new
international environment.” Although there have been many competing theories about
this new defining paradigm, such as Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations,” Robert
Kaplan’s return to Malthusian dynamics, and Tom Friedman’s “flat world,” Klare is correct
to note that “the fervent pursuit of resource plenty in total disregard of any civilizational
loyalties” appears to have much more significant explanatory power with regard to con-
temporary international dynamics (ibid.).
1.3.2 The environment and affluence: the environmental Kuznets curve
A somewhat academic idea – but one that seems to persist in many development/ policy
dialogues* – that focuses on the relationship between economic growth and environ-
mental impact is the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC). The EKC hypothesis postulates
* For example, the WTO promotes an environmental Kuznets curve approach to development in its dis-
cussion of how trade liberalization and stable and predictable trade conditions support the environ-
ment. “An important element of the WTO’s contribution to sustainable development and protection of
the environment comes in the form of furthering trade opening in goods and services to promote eco-
nomic development, and by providing stable and predictable conditions that enhance the possibility of
innovation. This promotes the efficient allocation of resources, economic growth and increased income
levels that in turn provide additional possibilities for protecting the environment.” WTO, “An Introduc-
tion to Trade and Environment in the WTO,” www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envt_intro_e.htm
(accessed October 17, 2017). The WTO’s statement implies that negative environmental impacts that
result from economic growth can be addressed once income levels increase, which is clearly the opposite
of a precautionary approach to development.

Concern for a global future 79
300
250
200
150
100
50
5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000
25,000
0
0
Turning point
Kg SO
2
per capita
$ GNP per capita
Figure 1.6 Environmental Kuznets curve for sulfur dioxide emissions
Source: Adapted from Panayotou (1997), from Stern et al. (1996, p. 1152).
that the relationship between a specific environmental pollutant (such as sulfur diox-
ide) and per capita income follows an inverted-U shape (Figure 1.6). This relationship
implies that as a nation’s GDP per capita increases, environmental degradation will first
increase up to a turning point that varies by pollutant (Barbier 1997a; Yandle, Bhattarai,
et al. 2004), after which it will begin to fall. See Box 1.1 for a summary of key points
related to the EKC.
The EKC hypothesis effectively challenged the idea that the process of industrialization
and economic development “inevitably hurts the environment” (IBRD 1992, p. 38). For
example, Beckerman (1992, p. 482) claimed that
there is clear evidence that, although economic growth usually leads to environmen-
tal deterioration in the early stages of the process, in the end the best – and probably
the only – way to attain a decent environment in most countries is to become rich.
Bartlett (1994, p. 18) even suggested “existing environmental regulation, by reducing eco-
nomic growth, may actually be reducing environmental quality.” The clear focus of these
“income deterministic” arguments was that economic growth is the best way to alleviate
poverty and (eventually) address environmental degradation.
In a critique of the environmental Kuznets curve that is traditionally focused on a few
specific pollutants as measures of total environmental pressure, Spangenberg (2001) finds
no indication that an environmental Kuznets curve can be found for the total resource
throughput in several advanced countries. The vast majority of man-made emissions of sus-
pended particulate matter, SO2, and CO2 all originate from the use of fossil fuels for which
environmental laws eventually limit emissions through end-of-pipe abatement technolo-
gies. The modernization of pollution sources more generally requires substitution and
more fundamental technological change than end-of-pipe traditional pollution control.

80 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
Otherwise, increased wealth associated with economic growth increases the production
of other kinds of pollution that can only be offset by technology modernization and
improvements in resource productivity that lead to an absolute reduction in resource con-
sumption. Commenting that “wealth is not green,” Spangenberg (2001) argues that the
emphasis of ecological economics must be that resource productivity needs to improve
well beyond the economic growth rate for there to be a future positive effect of growth on
pollution reduction.
The validity and implications of the EKC hypothesis have been the subject of much
critical debate (K. Arrow et al. 1995; Barbier 1997a; Cavlovic et al. 2000; de Bruyn
et al. 1998; Dinda 2004; D. I. Stern 1998, 2003, 2004; D. I. Stern et al. 1996; Unruh
and Moomaw 1998). Although the empirical support for the EKC relationship and its
very existence have been disputed (Harbaugh et al. 2002; P. Lawn 2006; Perman and
Stern 2003), a more general criticism is that EKCs have been shown to exist only for
local air pollutants and not for long-lived measures such as carbon dioxide (CO2),
Box 1.1 Key points relating to the environmental Kuznets
curve (EKC)
The EKC hypothesis
The EKC hypothesis states that the relationship between a specific environmental
pollutant – such as sulfur dioxide (SO2) – and per capita income follows an inverted-
U shape. This relationship implies that environmental degradation will first increase
with rising income per capita up to a turning point, after which it will start to fall
with higher levels of income. If one accepts the EKC hypothesis, the solution to
global environmental degradation would appear to be rapid economic growth.
Points of concern
• The EKC does not seem to hold for CO2 or for toxics associated with increasing
industrialization and especially increasing consumption.
• The EKC may not even hold for regular pollutants like SO2.
• The adoption of pollution-prevention and cleaner technology reflecting sustain-
able practices may explain Kuznets-type behavior, but such behavior depends
on the constant application of these sustainable practices that are promoted by
regulation, not laissez-faire policies.
• Late developers and those that decide to adopt cleaner technology late may
seem to provide evidence for Kuznets-type behavior, but this action highlights a
cultural shift in the importance of protecting a community’s livelihood and not
an income effect.
• The adoption of more efficient technology that initially reduces environmental
degradation, resource usage, and overall costs might eventually lead to higher
levels of environmental impact through the Jevons paradox or rebound effect –
that is, the lower cost of using a more efficient technology increases its demand
and (potentially) offsets the original efficiency gains.
• Even if per capita production of pollution declines, population increases could
swamp any environmental gains.

Concern for a global future 81
municipal waste, and persistent toxic chemicals (M. A. Cole et al. 1997; S. Dasgupta
et al. 2002; Hettige et al. 1992; Holtz-Eakin and Selden 1995; Rothman 1998). These
mainly consumption-based measures are shown to increase monotonically with per
capita income.
Other criticisms are that the EKC hypothesis is not directly concerned with the total impact
of economic growth on the environment and whether this may (in some cases) be irreversi-
ble; that the earth’s stock of resources may not be able to support indefinite economic growth
(K. Arrow et al. 1995; Rothman 1998); and that the focus on economic growth ignores the
more important issue of human well-being (Daly and Cobb 1994; Max-Neef 1995).
Even if one accepts that an EKC relationship may exist for specific pollutants such as
local air pollutants, the vast majority of the world’s population lies on the upward slope
of EKC curves, which means that considerable environmental damage is likely to occur
before any environmental improvement becomes visible (Ekins 1997). Similarly, any envi-
ronmental improvements gained through production efficiencies can be overwhelmed by
growing levels of consumption in both developed and developing economies. The deter-
ministic nature of the EKC hypothesis raises the question whether developing nations
can learn from developed nations and adopt initiatives to “tunnel through” or “flatten”
the inverted-U relationship (S. Dasgupta et al. 2002; Munasinghe 1999; Panayotou 1997).
These initiatives include the establishment and enforcement of sophisticated and antici-
pative environmental regulation and the adoption of cleaner technologies that allow
developing nations to leapfrog over older, dirty technologies.* In general, the idea that
developing nations could “escape the pattern of the EKC” is becoming more widely sup-
ported and finds some support in the literature (M. A. Cole and Neumayer 2005, p. 316).
However, for greenhouse gas emissions, the evidence is clearly the other way (Ansuategi
and Escapa 2002; Huang et al. 2008).
In conclusion, one can argue that (1) technological change is critical to enabling soci-
ety to live within ecological limits, and (2) governments have a vital role in creating an
innovative regulatory environment that protects critical ecological systems and spurs the
necessary technological change.
1.3.3 Technological optimism
During the emergence of sustainable development, the environmental discourse was
strongest between the technological optimists† on one side and the self-proclaimed
Malthusians on the other, who could foresee no technological solution to the pending
problems of pollution and scarcity (Krier and Gillette 1985). Although the technological
optimists were concerned about the environment, they believed that human scientific and
technological ingenuity would be able to extend any limits faced by society.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the growth of new (and successful) technology tends to
follow an S-curve. Therefore, if we consider the entire field of technological advance, it
* Interestingly, the decision of developing nations to adopt cleaner technologies may not be due to an
income effect but rather to a cultural shift in the importance of protecting a community’s livelihood.
† Krier and Gillette (1985, p. 406) describe technological optimism as “a term of art, an article of faith,
and a theory of politics.” They argue that technological optimism obtained its precise meaning as a
result of the limits-to-growth model, which assumed that factors such as population, industrial produc-
tion, and pollution would continue to grow exponentially. Thus, it follows that the position of a tech-
nological optimist is “that exponential technological growth will allow us to expand resources ahead of
exponentially increasing demands. This is the precise meaning of technological optimism as a term of
art” (ibid., p. 407). There is also the implicit assumption that technological innovation will not cause any
further pollution or social problems.

82 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
follows that it will be composed of a series of such curves. The question is, however, what
shape will this series of S-curves follow? Technological optimists responded to this ques-
tion by arguing that technological innovation will continue to advance at a significantly
higher exponential rate, thereby establishing a world of utopia as opposed to disaster
(Boyd 1972; Kaysen 1972; Starr and Rudman 1973). Others, however, were not as con-
vinced (K. J. Arrow 1969). Indeed, as Krier and Gillette (1985) argue, if the S-curve holds
for a single technology, why should it not be true for a set of technologies (Figure 1.7)?
And if it holds for a set, should it not also be true for the entire field of technology? Thus,
if we are experiencing rapid growth in technological performance, it might simply be
due to the fact that we are in the center of a series of S-curves that together also form an
S-curve (Figure 1.7).
The problem with this type of debate, as recognized by Krier and Gillette (1985), is that
the assertions made are most likely not provable. Although it is possible to assess individual
technologies, it is extremely difficult to assess (in any rigorous manner) whether technology
as a whole is progressing at a faster or slower rate than before and whether this means that
we are reaching a plateau in performance (however “performance” is defined).
With the publication of Our Common Future (WCED 1987), it was clear to many that
technological optimism had prevailed (Moser 1999). The WCED had chosen science and
technological innovation – two mainstays of economic growth in industrial (expansion-
ist) societies – as central pillars of the notion of sustainable development.* As Dryzek
* A retrospective analysis of Our Common Future concluded that the economic and environmental objec-
tives put forward by the Brundtland Commission “cannot be achieved simultaneously” (Duchin and
Lange 1994, p. 8). To address this problem, Duchin and Lange (1994) put forward two paths of action.
First, much broader technological and social changes are needed than those espoused in Our Com-
mon Future if sustainable development is to be brought within reach. Second, “development economics”
(which includes factors such as international lending and advisory practices) need to focus on specific
Time
Performance
Figure 1.7 The accumulation of S-Curves for a technology set

Concern for a global future 83
(1997, p. 136) notes, the concept of sustainable development would surely have been lost
“unless it could be demonstrated that environmental conservation were obviously good
for business profitability and economic growth everywhere, not just that these competing
values can be reconciled.”
As a result of the decision to focus more heavily on science and technology – as opposed
to market reforms and/or government policy to guide development – there has been a
strong (European and Japanese) research interest in what has been termed “factor X”
(Reijnders 1998). The idea of factor X is similar to that of dematerialization, eco-efficiency,
and enhanced natural resource productivity, but whereas these measures of environmen-
tal impact tend to be more open-ended, the factor X debate attempts to put an exact
number on the level of efficiency to be achieved (ibid., p. 14). This willingness to quantify
implies that (1) the environmental problem is in fact quantifiable, and (2) that techno-
logical improvements are required beyond what current technology is able to achieve.*
The current set of factor X values ranges from 4 to 50 (Factor 10 Club 1995, 1997; Jansen
and Vergragt 1992; Reijnders 1996; von Weizsäcker et al. 2010; von Weizsäcker et al. 1997);
however, there is no overall agreement on the environmental impact to which factor X
relates (Reijnders 1998). This fact, combined with differences in the perceived severity of
the environmental threat, explains the wide range of factor X values.
It is helpful to connect the factor X debate to the I = PAT formula because they are
closely interlinked. The factor X approach is clearly a technologically optimistic view
of development. But technology is only one factor that affects the environment. It is
quite plausible that the environmental benefits achieved by technological innovation
will be countered by growth in population and/or affluence leading to greater total
consumption of materials and energy (Herman et al. 1989; Reijnders 1998; W. Sachs
1993).† In addition, there is also the problem that although technological improve-
ments increase the efficiency with which resources are used, the total consumption of
these resources might increase rather than decrease. This phenomenon is known as
the rebound effect (Berkhout et al. 2000) or the Jevons paradox (Clark and Foster 2001;
Jevons 1965 [1865]). William Stanley Jevons was a nineteenth-century economist who
observed that efficiency gains in the use of coal did not necessarily lead to a reduction in
situations and move away from the conviction that there is only one development path – that of liber-
alized markets that situate all factors of production in the most privately profitable location for their
exploitation. Duchin and Lange (1994) argue that a failure to consider national circumstances is likely
to affect traditional social relationships in a way that (indirectly) leads to the rise of “both religious fun-
damentalism and urban misery in the developing world” (ibid., p. 9).
* It is important to recognize that although the notion of a factor X economy recognizes the inher-
ent unsustainability of prevailing human activities, its proponents’ conceptualization of development
remains firmly grounded in the “growth ethic and technological fix paradigm” (Rees 1995a, p. 355). An
alternative view of development is based on the idea of a steady-state economy (SSE), whereby economic
(human) activity remains within fixed ecological limits.
† Here we should recognize that whereas the connection between population growth and ecological
decline is widely understood, the same cannot be said for increasing levels of affluence and consump-
tion and their associated impacts on the environment. Indeed, consumption “is almost universally seen
as good, [. . . and] increasing it is the primary goal of national economic policy” (Durning 1994, p. 41).
Although the environmental and psychological problems associated with consumption are well docu-
mented (de Graaf et al. 2002; Durning 1992, 1994; Goodwin et al. 1997; Kasser 2002; Princen et al.
2002; J. C. Ryan and Durning 1997; Schlosser 2002; P. C. Stern et al. 1997), they have yet to gain traction
in mainstream political and economic decision-making. For an insightful debate on the effects of eco-
nomic growth and consumption on the environment, see Sagoff’s (1997) article in the Atlantic Monthly
and its rebuttal by Ehrlich et al. (1997).

84 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
its overall use.* More recently, it has been observed that increases in the fuel efficiency
of vehicles have been accompanied by an increase in vehicle-miles traveled and by an
increase in sales of larger vehicles (Goldberg 1998). Therefore, the implementation
of factor X (or highly efficient) technology needs to be part of a more comprehensive
process of environmental improvement or ecological modernization (Ashford et al. 1985;
Kemp 1995; York et al. 2003).
When one is considering factor X targets, it is possible to focus on individual prod-
ucts/technologies or the economy as a whole. Although factor X advocates support the
notion of setting informed and modifiable targets, it is recognized that the pace of rapid
technological change and the presence of the Jevons paradox complicate the manage-
ment of such a schema (Reijnders 1998). In this regard, movement in a more sustainable
direction might provide an alternative. However, the problem here is what instrument
will be used to encourage such movement. Examples of types of mechanisms that can
be used to encourage the adoption of factor X technology are demonstration projects
(for social learning), government-driven technology forcing (using legislation), finan-
cial incentives, ecotaxation,† and market mechanisms (such as tradable emissions per-
mits) (ibid.). The role of government in stimulating technological change is discussed
in Chapter 8.
1.3.4 The reformulation of sustainable development in terms of tipping points
A “tipping point” can be described as the point beyond which it becomes extremely dif-
ficult (if not impossible) to reverse a negative trend. An alternative way to think about
tipping points is to consider the idea of “overshoot” – that is, to inadvertently go beyond
a system’s limits, creating a situation that is nearly impossible to reverse (Meadows et al.
1972, 2004).
The current discourse on sustainable development is becoming dominated by concerns
about global climate change (see Box 1.2). Within the climate-change debate, several
possible tipping points have emerged. These include the sudden disintegration of the
Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets (Alley et al. 2005; Feldmann and Levermann 2015),
the collapse of coral reefs due to “coral bleaching” caused by rising sea temperatures
(Knowlton 2001; Hughes et al. 2017), and the shutting down of the Atlantic thermohaline
circulation that conveys warm surface water to northern Europe and returns cold, deep-
ocean water south (Vellinga and Wood 2004; Meyer 2017). Although these potential sys-
tem collapses are of great concern, there are other environmental tipping points not far
* Jevons (2001 [1865]) observed that the consumption of coal in England increased significantly when
the efficiency of the steam engine was improved by James Watt. Watt’s innovations, the condenser and
the expansive mode of working, reduced the amount of coal needed to fuel the steam engine’s furnace,
making the engine a cost-effective power source that was soon adopted by industry. As the number
of industries using steam engines grew, so too did the amount of coal required to fuel these engines,
thereby increasing the overall usage of coal.
† See Daly (1994a) and Rees (1995b) for a discussion of how taxing the bads (such as resource extrac-
tion/depletion or pollution) and not the goods (such as labor and income) provides a good example of
considering both the environment and employment in one macroeconomic framework. The basic idea
is to shift the tax burden away from the goods and onto the bads in a revenue-neutral manner. In addi-
tion to promoting a more sustainable form of industrialization, ecotaxation would also reduce the price
of labor, making it more attractive to retain existing workers or employ more workers. See also Green
Innovations Inc., Ecotaxation, www.green-innovations.asn.au/ecotax.htm (accessed October 17, 2017).

Concern for a global future 85
on the horizon that deserve equal attention. Examples of these other modes of collapse
include the following:
• Limits on the ability of conventional antibiotics and pesticides (through antibiotic
and pesticide resistance) to prevent virulent disease and pestilence, leading to a rapid
decline in population and food crops;
• Damage to reproductive health (through endocrine disruption) to the extent that
all species (including humans) no longer reproduce or reproduce with reproductive
anomalies, such as sterility and hermaphroditism (Colborn et al. 1996; Cordier 2008;
Saey 2008);
• The widespread decline of human health due to increasing levels of toxic chemical
exposures that cause cancer, autoimmune diseases, neurological harm such as autism,
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and general toxic-induced loss of tolerance
(Ashford and Miller 1998; Sasco 2008); and
• Significant growth in the incidence of human disease and deaths in regions experi-
encing rapid population growth, worsening levels of malnutrition, and environmen-
tal degradation (D. H. Meadows et al. 2004; Pimentel et al. 2007).
Box 1.2 Concern with global climate change
In recent years, starting with the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, through negotiations in
Copenhagen, and ultimately culminating in the Paris Agreement known as COP21,
there has been a dramatic increase in the international visibility and international
activities related to the climate problem. The release of Al Gore’s documentary, An
Inconvenient Truth, followed by his award of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize – together
with the International Panel on Climate Change “for their efforts to build up and
disseminate greater knowledge about man-made climate change”a – did much to
raise global concern on the issue. Equally important was the publication of the Stern
Review on the Economics of Climate Change (known as the “Stern Review”) by the UK
Treasury on October 30, 2006 (Stern 2007). While the review was not the first eco-
nomic analysis on climate change (Cline 1992; Mendelsohn et al. 1998; Nordhaus
and Boyer 2000), its status as an official government document significantly raised
its importance and made it one of the most widely known and debated studies of
its kind.
The Stern Review focused on the impact of global climate change on the world
economy. More specifically, it argued that if governments fail to take action today,
the overall costs and risks of climate change will be equivalent to losing at least
5% of global GDP each year, now and forever. If a wider range of risks and
impacts is taken into account, the estimates of damage could rise to 20% of
GDP or more. (Stern 2007, p. vi)
The study equated the potential future impacts of inaction to social and economic
systems as “on a scale similar to those associated with the great wars and the eco-
nomic depression of the first half of the 20th century” (ibid, p. vi). The study con-
cluded by arguing that these impacts could be significantly reduced if 1 percent of

86 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
global GDP is invested each year in mitigation activities. Such activities include the
pricing of carbon (via taxes, carbon trading, and/or regulation), mechanisms to
support innovation for low-carbon technologies, and actions to remove perverse
incentives or barriers to energy efficiency gains.
The enthusiastic response by many politicians and environmental groups to the
Stern Review was tempered somewhat by heavy criticism of the study from several
well-known economists (Dasgupta 2006; Nordhaus 2006; Tol 2006; Tol and Yohe
2006; Yohe 2006; Mendelsohn 2006–2007; Yohe and Tol 2007). Others, while criti-
cal of the study’s basic assumptions and analysis, gave more positive commentar-
ies (Arrow 2007; Neumayer 2007; Weitzman 2007). The concerns with the study
tended to center around several key issues. First, the review relied upon existing
data sources and did not develop any new estimates on the impacts or costs of cli-
mate change. Thus, it was surprising to some that the review developed numbers
that lay far outside the range of estimates found in previously published literature
(Tol and Yohe 2006; Mendelsohn 2006–2007).
Second, a dual critique of the science and economic aspects of the Stern
Review concluded that the study “greatly understates the extent of uncertainty,
for there are strict limits to what can be said with assurance about the evolution
of complex systems that are not well understood” (Carter et al. 2007, p. 168).
These authors were also greatly concerned with the treatment of sources and
evidence that they perceived as “persistently selective and biased” (ibid., p. 224).
Their general opinion of the Stern Review is that it is a “a vehicle for speculative
alarmism” (ibid., p. 224).
A final criticism worth mentioning, which is perhaps the most controversial issue,
was the Stern Review’s selection of a low discount rate. The study selected a rate that
was 0.1 percent above the global rate of growth of consumption. Since the rate of
consumption is assumed to increase at 1.3 percent per year, the chosen discount rate
was 1.4 percent. This value falls below the conventional range used by many econo-
mists when considering measures to mitigate climate change (Weitzman 2001). It is
also lower than the discount rates used by HM Treasury, which decline from 3.5 per-
cent (for years 0 to 30) to 1 percent (after 300 years) (HM Treasury 2003). The
Stern Review argued that selecting a higher discount rate would be unethical since
it would reduce the importance given to the welfare of future generations who are
likely to bear the brunt of climate change. A higher discount rate would also reduce
the pressure for immediate and aggressive action to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions. As Mendelsohn (2006–2007, p. 43) comments, “the low discount rate implies
far future events are important in the near term.”
Analyses since the publication of the Stern Report only strengthened its message
(IPCC 2014). The concern with global climate change has only become stronger
over time, now dwarfing other environmental concerns with the risk that other criti-
cal environmental concerns might be excluded or marginalized – or even exacer-
bated – from sustainable development strategies.
a Source: www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/press.html (accessed
October 17, 2017)
Supporting or driving these modes of collapse are the processes of rapid technological
change and economic globalization. These are increasing the ease with which diseases can
be transmitted between populations. The significant growth in travel and trade between

Concern for a global future 87
regions has also exposed previously healthy populations to new health risk factors (Yach
and Bettcher 1998a, 1998b; Drager and Sunderland 2016). Indigenous societies that are
becoming interconnected with the global economy are now exposed to modern diets,
additive products, pharmaceuticals, and toxic products that significantly increase cancer
risks (Sasco 2008). In this context, the historic debate between economic development
and environmental degradation (questioning the logic of the environmental Kuznets
curve – see Section 1.3.2) must be expanded to include the impacts of economic develop-
ment on human health. This new dimension is different from the impacts of environmen-
tal degradation on human health, which could be considered as a negative side effect of
industrialization. The concern is that the products and services associated with the cur-
rent form of industrialization are themselves directly causing harm.
A final mode of possible collapse relates to social systems, such as the global financial
system, the ability of the nation–state to provide gainful employment, and the crisis cre-
ated by migration accelerated by both economic and political factors. Although these
tipping points are influenced by external environmental factors, the modes of failure
are firmly embedded within social networks. Another example of a “social tipping point”
could be increasing social tensions that lead to persistent regional/global conflicts due
to increasing shortages of resources such as fresh water or oil (Myers 1993). Some see the
Syrian War and resulting migrant crisis as a relevant example of this kind of driver, with its
combination of water shortage with war and mass migration.
With this discussion of tipping points and drivers of collapse, it must also be mentioned
that these same disruptive forces could drive our complex global system towards trans-
formative systemic change. The Next System Project is, for example, bringing key thinkers
together to design, model, and disseminate new sustainable political–economic possibili-
ties for the twenty-first century in an effort to avoid collapse through transformation (Alp-
erovitz et al. 2015).
1.4 Rationalizing the competing pressures on sustainability
This chapter has attempted to outline our concern for a global future. Since the focus
of sustainable development is to meet human needs without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their own needs, we began by taking an anthropocentric
look at development. We explored the notion of human needs and how they drive eco-
nomic and democratic political systems, and how employment and income are essential
to human well-being (via both the purchasing of basic goods and services, and other ben-
eficial aspects of working). The growing trends of income inequality were then considered
within the context of social justice and social contract theory, which help frame the role of
government (as trustee of the people and the environment) in advancing a development
agenda that ensures basic human needs are met. Since economic activity/growth is cur-
rently the underlying mechanism for enabling people to meet their needs, our focus then
expanded to consider the impact of this mechanism on the natural environment. More
specifically, we considered a series of approaches or theories that have been advanced to
keep economic activity within ecosystem limits. For each approach, technology and inno-
vation were considered to have a central role in advancing change.
A key question we raise throughout this work – which underlies our concern for the
global future – is what impact will technology- and innovation-driven approaches to sus-
tainable development have on meaningful and well-paid employment in the future? Fur-
ther, if incomes from labor and/or capital ownership can be increased and people are
able to purchase basic goods and services, will the technological/efficiency advances real-
ized be sufficient to outpace a rebound effect – i.e., where the sheer scale of purchasing
outpaces any reduction in environmental impacts (Brown 2016). Further, changes in what
industrial or industrializing nations choose to produce – or incentivize the production

88 Multidimensional concept of sustainability
of – in order to meet human needs requires more thorough consideration, which we take
up later in this work.
Poverty and inequality can be reduced by income transfers, by providing a guaranteed
basic income, or by creating a larger base of ownership of productive physical capital and/
or energy through binary economics or community-based ownership, but an egalitarian,
environmentally sustainable society requires something much more. What is needed is a
cultural transformation in which basic demands are altered, as the current conception of
the good life neither matches what we know of basic human needs and well-being, nor is it
feasible for our planet to meet these needs for everyone. This does not mean that meeting
human needs and well-being and a sustainable future are mutually exclusive. On the con-
trary, there is increasing evidence that some drivers of human happiness are frequently
experiential and of no environmental impact (Gilovich et al. 2015).
Despite the potential for law and economic instruments to be used to redistribute
wealth and income, internalize environmental, employment, and societal externalities,
and otherwise create a sustainable future, those who have the power to act often do not
see it in their immediate interest to act, even if their longer-term interests would be better
served. To overcome this barrier to action, it may be necessary for crises, such as finan-
cial collapse, environmental and public health catastrophes, and social disintegration to
increase the urgency for action. Alternatively, we must hope for far-sighted and progres-
sive leadership of institutions and organizations – public and private – that have long
gained from, and gamed, the present system. The world instead could be on the road to
a splintering of winner and loser populations within and among nation–states, although
voiced resistance to this trend is rising. We hope this book will help chart new pathways
towards sustainable development and be a valued resource for those who are also con-
cerned for a sustainable global future.
1.5 Additional readings
Ayres, R. U. (2008). “Sustainability Economics: Where Do We Stand?” Ecological Economics
67(2): 281–310. Available at www.researchgate.net/publication/223085707_Sustainability_
economics_Where_do_we_stand (accessed October 10, 2017).
Bertram, E., and K. Sharpe. (2000). “Capitalism, Work, & Character.” The American Prospect.
Available at http://prospect.org/article/capitalism-work-and-character (accessed October
10, 2017).
Better Life Initiative: Measuring Well-Being and Progress. OECD (official website). (2013).
“Measuring Well-Being and Progress.” Available at www.oecd.org/statistics/better-life-
initiative.htm www.oecd.org/std/Measuring%20Well-Being%20and%20Progress%20Bro
chure.pdf (accessed October 6, 2017).
Daly, H. (1991). “Chapter 9: The Steady-State Economy: Alternative to Growthmania.” Steady-
State Economics. Washington, DC, Island Press.
Max-Neef, M., A. Elizalde, et al. (1989). “Human Scale Development: An Option for the
Future.” Development Dialogue 1: 5–81. Available at www.daghammarskjold.se/wp-content/
uploads/1989/05/89_1.pdf (accessed October 10, 2017). (Read pages 19–27).
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