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The Challenges to De-localising Constituencies through Electoral Reform in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan

November 2020
Europe-Asia Studies 73(2):1-26

DOI:10.1080/09668136.2020.1840518

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Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan introduced a single-district closed-list proportional electoral system in 2007. Despite similar rules, the relationship between MPs and their constituencies differs: while the reform fostered nationwide representation in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan’s MPs maintained a local, personalised representation style. This article explores how similar electoral rules lead to divergent outcomes under diverse party systems. Based on legal documents and 25 original interviews, the article provides two in-depth accounts of how electoral rules interacted with institutional counterincentives to guide the representative behaviour of MPs. The analysis covers the effects on MPs’ re-election strategies and the organisation of constituency service within factions.

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The Challenges to De-localising Constituencies

through Electoral Reform in Kazakhstan and

Kyrgyzstan

Esther Somfalvy

To cite this article: Esther Somfalvy (2020): The Challenges to De-localising Constituencies

through Electoral Reform in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Europe-Asia Studies, DOI:

10.1080/09668136.2020.1840518

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1840518

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The Challenges to De-localising

Constituencies through Electoral Reform in

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan

ESTHER SOMFALVY

Abstract

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan introduced a single-district closed-list proportional electoral system in 2007.

Despite similar rules, the relationship between MPs and their constituencies differs: while the reform

fostered nationwide representation in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan’s MPs maintained a local, personalised

representation style. This article explores how similar electoral rules lead to divergent outcomes under

diverse party systems. Based on legal documents and 25 original interviews, the article provides two

in-depth accounts of how electoral rules interacted with institutional counterincentives to guide the

representative behaviour of MPs. The analysis covers the effects on MPs’re-election strategies and the

organisation of constituency service within factions.

ELECTORAL RULES INFLUENCE HOW MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT (MPS) relate to citizens,

both in terms of which group they perceive as their constituency and what services they

perform for it. However, a similar set of electoral rules can lead to divergent citizen-

related activities by MPs, as this comparison of parliamentary representation in

Kazakhstan and the neighbouring Kyrgyz Republic illustrates. Since electoral reforms in

2007, Kazakhstan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s voters alike elect their representatives according to

a single-district closed-list proportional system. Kazakhstan’s lower house (Mazhilis) and

the Kyrgyz unicameral Supreme Council (Jogorku Kenesh) are both elected by a fully

proportional electoral system. Yet, a comparison of the relationship of MPs to their

constituencies in 2014 revealed that divergent representative practices had developed. In

This is an Open Accessarticle distributed under the termsof the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives

License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and

reproductionin any medium, providedthe original work is properly cited, andis not altered, transformed,or built upon in any way.

https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1840518

The research for this article was conducted while the author was a PhD-fellow at the Bremen International

Graduate School for Social Sciences. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the conference of

the Comparative Politics Section of the Deutsche Vereinigung für Politikwissenschaft in March 2017 and

at a workshop organised by Petra Stykow at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. I am grateful

to the participants for their comments and feedback. I would also like to thank my colleagues in Bremen

for their input, especially Michelle Hollman, Sarah Perumalla, Heiko Pleines, Clémentine Roth and Florian

Wittmann. Moreover, I am grateful for the research assistance of Aigerim Azimova, Matthias Kürzinger,

Malika Kudaybergenova and Alexandra Yurchenko.

EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, 2020

https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1840518

Kazakhstan, ties to personal constituencies virtually ceased to play a role for members of

parliament. MPs saw themselves primarily as party representatives, who largely abstained

from activities that could be linked to the cultivation of a personal constituency. In this,

their behaviour was in line with expectations of how MPs behave under a fully

proportional electoral system. The situation in Kyrgyzstan, however, was different: MPs

maintained close ties to local constituencies. In spite of the absence of formal electoral

districts, they continued to treat one district, often their place of origin, as a personal

constituency. The origin of politicians also continued to play a role in Kyrgyz elections,

with voters favouring local candidates in 2010 (Huskey & Hill 2013, p. 252). Another

unintended effect was the emergence of party alliances and mergers across ideological

lines, hindering the development of stable, programmatic parties (Juraev 2015, pp. 32–3).

This development ran counter to the expectations of policymakers, who had anticipated

that proportional representation would have a consolidating effect on the party system.

These diverging practices are even more striking as the electoral systems and

representative practices of both countries had shown many similarities up to the 2007

reforms. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, both newly independent states initially

chose to elect their representatives through majoritarian elections and subsequently

adopted a mixed-member majoritarian electoral system (Kyrgyzstan in 1995; Kazakhstan

in 1999). During those early days of statehood, MPs in both countries represented

relatively small and geographically concentrated groups of individuals with whom they

had close personal ties. In Kazakhstan, MPs deﬁned their ‘particular group of constituents’

in regional, economic or ethnic terms (Olcott 1997, p. 224). MPs’local ties were mainly

visible through their travel patterns and the channelling of funds to communities—either

through their power to inﬂuence the state’s budget, or contributions from their private

purse (Bowyer 2008, p. 59). In the Kyrgyz Republic political competition was structured

by geography, which played a more decisive role than kinship (Huskey & Iskakova 2010,

p. 251). Consequently, MPs in the Kyrgyz parliament represented places rather than

political ideas (Juraev 2015, p. 24). Interpersonal ties were reinforced by patronage

networks, as candidates for parliament channelled material resources to their communities

(Radnitz 2006, p. 137). The localised, individualist representative relationship was soon

considered problematic by politicians, and not only from the perspective of unequal

representation. The regional ties of MPs weakened the decisiveness of elections, as

unsuccessful parliamentary candidates routinely mobilised protesters to contest election

results (Radnitz 2006, p. 137). Furthermore, in both countries, the parties’lack of control

over individual MPs was seen as hampering the consolidation of the party system.

These negative effects of locally based representation were among the reasons cited by

the Kazakhstani and Kyrgyz governments when they decided to abandon the mixed-

In both countries, the electoral reforms were intertwined with broader strategies of authoritarian

consolidation, at the core of which was the elevation of the status of the respective presidential parties. In

Kazakhstan, the 2007 reform that tied MPs’electoral fortunes exclusively to the parties was accompanied by

measures that led to a concentration in the party system (Isaacs 2011,pp.98–9). In Kyrgyzstan, the 2007

reform coincided with the breakdown of the post-Tulip Revolution power-sharing agreement and the attempt

of President Kurmanbek Bakiev to create a presidential party, Ak Zhol,whichﬁrst competed in the snap

elections following the reform. Although the post-2010 reform added provisions to the electoral law to

institutionalise power-sharing (Marat2015, p. 326), it did not reverse the generaldirection of the electoralreform.

2 ESTHER SOMFALVY

member majoritarian system. Kazakhstan did so in 2007, while the Kyrgyz Republic initially

adopted a two-round system in 2005 but abandoned it in favour of proportional

representation in 2007 (Lundberg 2009). Based on the experiences of other countries with

proportional representation, they were conﬁdent that the change in electoral rules would

alter MPs’behaviour vis-à-vis their constituents. Contrary to a majoritarian electoral

system that incentivises personal vote-seeking and an individual representation style,

proportional representation fosters a party-based representation low on local ties (Bowler

& Farrell 1993), particularly in closed-list systems, where the incentives for personal

vote-seeking decline in proportion to district magnitude (Carey & Shugart 1995). Hence,

policymakers had reason to expect that a switch to a single-district closed-list system

would lead to MPs having larger constituencies and acting more as the ‘face’of their

parties than under the prior mixed-member majoritarian system.

This article explores the day-to-day interaction of MPs with their constituents in 2014 and

examines the drivers of their behaviour. What made Kazakhstani MPs abandon their

geographically delineated constituencies, and what explains the continued loyalty of

Kyrgyz MPs to their local constituencies? A comparison of the two cases sheds light on

how MPs balance a discourse that favours a nationwide perspective on representation

with their expectations about what will increase their value in the eyes of the voters and

thus beneﬁt them in their bid for re-election, the organisational framework in which they

operate and constituents’demands. The two in-depth case studies of Kazakhstan and the

Kyrgyz Republic provide a new perspective on how electoral incentives within divergent

contexts play out for members of the respective parliaments, going beyond the limitations

of explanations based on the effects of electoral systems on representative activity. The

article complements studies that explore how personalism and local connections of MPs

operate during elections and how they drive voter choice (Huskey & Hill 2013) by adding

the perspective of the candidates or MPs and their activities between elections. The study

hence contributes to a better understanding of how electoral rules interact with speciﬁc

contextual factors (namely inconsistencies within the electoral framework, their

unexpected interaction with the party system and the organisation of parliamentarians’

day-to-day interaction with citizens) that explain the disparities. Ultimately, the case

studies also broaden our knowledge of why electoral systems often fail to deliver the

effects anticipated by reformers.

Electoral rules and MPs’relationship with their constituencies

The relationship of MPs with their constituencies varies according to the type and volume of

activities MPs perform and their target constituency. Based on the literature that explores this

relationship, the Kazakhstani and Kyrgyz governments could expect the electoral rules to

have an effect on MPs’constituency-related activities, both on which subgroup of citizens

MPs regard and treat as their constituency, and on their behaviour vis-à-vis said group.

The constituency-related activities of an MP are here understood broadly, encompassing

all activities that an MP directs towards the voters rather than the parliament. Such activities

For an overview see Renwick (2018, pp. 124–26).

DE-LOCALISING CONSTITUENCIES 3

include targeted policymaking that beneﬁts a particular area and constituency service

addressing the ‘nonpolicy interests’of citizens (Crisp & Simoneau 2018, p. 345).

Constituency service includes MPs delivering particularised beneﬁts to individuals or

small groups within their district (Crisp & Simoneau 2018, p. 345), or allocating

resources to favourite projects in the form of local public goods (Golden & Min 2013,

p. 77). MPs also offer out-of-pocket payments from their private wealth to individuals

who approach them with requests for help (IPU & UNDP 2012, p. 6). Finally, a large

proportion of MPs’actions are symbolic and aim to foster trust by showing that MPs are

aware of their constituents’problems (Leston-Bandeira 2012a).

A multitude of interrelated factors inform the speciﬁc shape of representative activities,

the amount of time MPs devote to performing them, and what group they choose to target by

their activities (Heitshusen et al.2005, p. 37). MPs devote time to constituency service for a

number of interrelated reasons: if it aligns with their career goals, their social background

and prior professional experience,

the demands of their constituents, or their role

orientation (how MPs see themselves) (Eulau et al.1959; Clarke 1978; Norris 1997;

Loewenberg 2011). MPs may simply ﬁnd constituency service to be a gratifying activity

(Norris 1997, p. 32). Although individual MPs focus on constituency service for different

reasons, structural factors are widely believed to exert a larger inﬂuence than party-level

factors or personal characteristics. This conclusion is supported by the ﬁnding that there

is more variation between systems than between individual MPs (Loewenberg & Kim

1978, p. 27).

The effects of the electoral system on MP behaviour have been thoroughly explored in the

literature. A study of members of the European Parliament from a dozen countries found it to

be the principal determinant of how much time representatives spent on constituency service

(Bowler & Farrell 1993). Electoral rules also affect MPs’focus and style of parliamentary

representation (Ingall & Crisp 2001; Benoit 2007). The size of the electoral district

affects the amount of constituency-related activities by MPs, with the lowest level of

constituency service found in cases where delegates are elected according to national

party lists (IPU & UNDP 2012, p. 59). The magnitude of electoral districts (the number

of seats per district) has been found to have an effect on activities related to personal

vote-seeking, which refers to intensive, local-level activities aimed at generating support

for a particular candidate (Cain et al.1987). In proportional systems, MPs obtain seats in

the legislature through the electoral success of their party and enhance their prospects for

re-election by putting a ‘face’to the party, which then may contribute to the party

winning more votes (Shugart 2005, p. 46). In such systems, doing more constituency

service will not signiﬁcantly enhance an MP’s re-election prospects. This effect is

strongest in closed party lists, where ‘personal reputation-seeking’declines in larger

districts (both in magnitude and area), whereas in open-list systems, MPs beneﬁt from

additional constituency-related activities (Carey & Shugart 1995, p. 430). While these

effects have mostly been studied for democratic cases, there is evidence that electoral

Scholarship on descriptive representation assumes that shared characteristics are the basis for MPs

representing groups, as they contribute to shared interests (Phillips 1994; Kymlicka 1995; Young 2000),

although there is a debate around the question in what respect and to what degree MPs have to be ‘like’

their constituents in order to represent them (Grifﬁths 1960; Mansbridge 1999).

4 ESTHER SOMFALVY

incentives also play a role in shaping MPs’behaviour in non-democracies (Malesky &

Schuler 2010).

Which groups MPs regard as their constituency can also be traced back to features of the

electoral system. MPs usually delineate their constituencies in terms of geography but can

alternatively deﬁne their constituencies functionally, in terms of individuals, or along

religious or ethnic lines (Fenno 1977, pp. 884–89; Malesky & Schuler 2010). The larger

the electoral district, the less likely it is that MPs perceive their constituencies in terms of

geography (Loewenberg & Kim 1978, p. 45). Beyond the expected mechanical effects,

the introduction of a single-district system also sends the powerful message that

geography should not be the relevant category of representation (Farrell & Scully 2007).

Although in theory it is possible to distinguish between two dimensions—whether

activities target a speciﬁc constituency, and whether a candidate’s actions are personalised

or if they are acting as the ‘face’of their party—in practice, these dimensions are

conﬂated, as a personalised representation style is usually associated with a narrow

geographical focus.

Although the effects of electoral rules on MPs’constituency-related activities are well

explored, there is also evidence that changes to electoral systems do not necessarily lead

to immediate change in MPs’constituency-related activities that would be in line with

how MPs are expected to behave under the new set of rules. For example, reforms with

the purpose of personalising politics do not necessarily reconnect politicians and voters

(Renwick & Pilet 2016). The effects of system change also regularly surprise those who

originally advocate for it (Renwick 2018, p. 124).

Complex explanations: how context interacts with electoral rules

Beyond explanations focusing on the effects of electoral systems, a number of works offer

more complex explanations of how electoral rules interact with the wider institutional

context. Scheiner, for example, states that ‘electoral rules interact with other features of

the political system’(Scheiner 2008, p. 169). Pitkin’s seminal account maintains that a

representative relationship is never isolated from its surroundings and means

‘representation in context’(Pitkin 1967, p. 221). Here, context refers to the overall setting

within which the representation is embedded and is ‘equivalent to variation in the values

of important variables’that inﬂuences how certain determinants’effects unfold in a

systematic way (Moser & Scheiner 2012, p. 8). For analytical purposes, it is important to

state that electoral reforms have both mechanical and psychological effects (Fiva & Folke

2016). The mechanical effects are exerted on the actual political status quo (how votes

translate into seats), while the psychological effects refer to how actors’expectations are

changed. Psychological effects that alter actors’behaviour may manifest later, sometimes

several electoral cycles after the reform (Scheiner 2008, p. 168).

Differences at the party-system level also alter the electoral calculus of MPs, leading to

different behaviour from the one predicted when looking at basic electoral design. MPs are

expected to be responsive to those actors, usually parties, which provide them with

resources, votes and access to the electorate (Hazan 2014, p. 219). The majority of MPs

are party members and their ‘dual accountability’to voters and party affects their

constituency relations (Mezey 2008, p. 138). Party demands affect MPs’electoral

DE-LOCALISING CONSTITUENCIES 5

incentives even when term-limits preclude the pursuit of re-election. This was the case with

parties in Costa Rica, where MPs engaged in unexpectedly higher levels of constituency

service: in this context, party leaders tend to reward active MPs with appointed positions

in the executive after their career as legislators. The MPs’engagement with constituency-

related activities can be explained by the electoral strategies of the party, not of individual

MPs (Taylor 1992). Intra-party candidate selection procedures may outweigh incentives

created by the electoral system; for example, Israeli MPs, elected in a single, nationwide

constituency, conducted more localised campaigns after the introduction of regional party

primaries to the candidate selection processes of the largest political parties in 1992–1996

(Hazan 1999, p. 801). These examples show that accounts focusing on institutions within

speciﬁc contexts can offer more complete explanations for the puzzling observations

regarding representational activities. Party-level differences promise to be particularly

insightful for understanding differences between the cases this article is based on, as the

party systems of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic are very dissimilar in terms of the

structure and strength of parties vis-à-vis individual MPs. MPs in party systems with

strong discipline know their electoral fortunes to be determined by the party, which

creates no incentives for additional constituency service (Lancaster 1986, p. 75). Party

discipline is lower in countries with weakly institutionalised party systems (Mainwaring

1998, p. 79). In such countries, MPs have ample incentives and opportunities to do

additional constituency service and further their personal electoral goals (Thames 2007,

p. 457). There, MPs also have more control over their careers, using party switching to

advance their careers if they do not expect to win a seat via their current party. The

opposite should be true in cases where one party has control over a large share of

parliamentary seats, particularly so if electoral competition is skewed towards that party.

Differences in how parties relate to MPs do not only alter individual MPs’electoral

calculus, but also affect resources and the logistics of MPs’constituency-related

activities. From the literature on Western democracies, we know that material resources

affect the legislative activity of parliaments to a larger degree than do their formal rights

(Schnapp 2004, pp. 309–10). Such resources include the existence of a budget line for

constituency-related expenses and the infrastructure at an MP’s disposal for such

activities, including ofﬁces in the regions, transportation and communications resources,

such as internet and telephones (Schnapp 2004, p. 306; Leston-Bandeira 2012b). A lack

of parliamentary resources affects the distribution of tasks between the executive and the

legislature: the executive takes over tasks if the parliament is insufﬁciently funded

(Schnapp 2004, p. 293). Hence, the availability of resources for constituency-related

activities and whether they are channelled through parties and factions, or whether

individual MPs can use them freely (or even provide them out of their own pocket) does

not merely affect the volume of MPs’activities but also reﬂects the relationship between

an MP and the party.

Other explanations help our understanding of what might have driven the differing

reactions of Kazakhstani and Kyrgyz MPs to change in the electoral system. Electoral

rules have effects on MPs’behaviour other than the known mechanical ones. Through

their effect on the accountability and competitiveness of elections they inﬂuence MPs’

calculations about the activities necessary to secure their reselection and election (André

et al.2014, p. 232). Moreover, rule change does not lead to an immediate adjustment of

6 ESTHER SOMFALVY

MPs’behaviour or of voter expectations towards MPs. How voters expect to be represented

may not depend on the electoral system at all. For example, Barkan describes how, in

countries characterised as having an ‘agrarian society’(a label that can be applied to the

Kyrgyz Republic), where people’s identity is shaped by their place of residence,

candidates and parties are evaluated on the basis of their ability to provide goods and

services for the local community (Barkan 1995, p. 107). Consequently, whether MPs’

representational activities are oriented towards the entire nation or, rather, their village of

origin has an effect on citizens’acceptance of arrangements. Finally, although we know

about some correlations of electoral systems and representation styles of MPs, this does

not mean that change in the electoral system leads to the desired change in behaviour or

expectations; however, traditions of how MPs and constituencies relate to one another

may be affected by regime-level changes (Leston-Bandeira 2012b, p. 271). In sum, I will

explain the constituency focus of MPs by supplementing the analysis of the effects of

electoral rules with a closer look at the party system. I expect to ﬁnd that different

features of the party system (including its structure and the strength of individual parties)

through its effect on the (s)election strategies of MPs affect how MPs relate to their

voters. Additionally, the same features of the party system are expected to shape the

organisation of MPs’activities on the ground, particularly through the regulatory

framework and resources at an MP’s disposal, which then play out in different patterns of

representative behaviour. Hence, the study will complement our understanding of how

electoral rules shape the relationship between representative and citizens through its wider

focus.

Cases and method

The article comprises theory-guided exploratory case studies of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz

Republic in 2014. A comparative approach to studying electoral reforms has been suggested

as helping to clarify when they achieve their goals (Scheiner 2008, p. 168). The case studies

are based on a wide array of legal documents, including the constitutions, electoral laws,

parliamentary rules of procedure and the legal framework governing interaction with

citizens, publicly available government statistics, and NGO reports. Since 2011, the

Kyrgyz Republic has published the annual Report of the Speaker of the Jogorku Kenesh

(Otchet Toraga) that contains information on parliament’s activities. Additionally, I

conducted 25 semi-structured interviews with MPs across the entire political spectrum,

their assistants, faction and party staffers, and local experts during two ﬁeld trips in 2014,

undertaken in May–June (Kyrgyz Republic) and August–October (Kazakhstan). Interview

partners were identiﬁed using snowball sampling. A multi-method, multi-data approach of

data triangulation was used that supplements interview material with other data sources

(Shih 2015, p. 22). This approach has been suggested to help overcome problems

prevalent in research into authoritarian regimes, where the transparency of research has to

be weighed up against protecting the anonymity of interviewees (Shih 2015, p. 22). The

interview material (in the form of protocols and transcripts) was hand-coded using the

software Atlas.ti and analysed using qualitative text analysis (Kuckartz 2014, p. 19).

Altogether, 105 different codes were assigned, with a total of 1,632 codes. The interview

material is preserved in the form of interview protocols and transcripts. It is not possible

DE-LOCALISING CONSTITUENCIES 7

to provide the full interview transcripts due to considerations of conﬁdentiality. An interview

methods table, framed in line with the suggestions advanced by Bleich and Pekkannen

(2015), can be found in the Appendix.

Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic share historical and cultural ties. They particularly

lend themselves to comparison as both countries adopted similar closed-list proportional

electoral systems in 2007. In contrast to the similarity of their electoral frameworks, the

two cases display differences in their party systems, both in structure and

institutionalisation. Kazakhstan’s party system is dominated by one well-institutionalised

presidential party, whereas Kyrgyzstan’s volatile, fragmented system is made up of a large

number of weakly institutionalised parties (Doolot & Nogoibayeva 2014; Isaacs &

Whitmore 2014). In the Kyrgyz case, the party system has been suggested to foster

personal politics by providing incentives that run counter to those offered by the electoral

system (Huskey & Hill 2013). However, what makes it difﬁcult to isolate the effects of the

party system is the fact that its structure is merely one expression of how power is actually

distributed between different groups of actors (Hale 2015). The literature suggests that in

the post-Soviet region, party system institutionalisation is correlated with the degree of

authoritarian control (Stykow 2015, pp. 415–16). Here, absence of the consolidation of

authoritarian (party) rule goes hand-in-hand with more political pluralism (Stykow 2015,

p. 398). In other words, the cases represent two different kinds of autocracies with distinct

logics according to which parties relate to power and to the electorate. This makes it

challenging to attribute effects to the party system and demands a broader perspective that

treats the party system as part of the context within which electoral rules unfold. It also

makes the cases interesting for studying the effects of institutions in different kinds of

autocracies, namely competitive and full autocracies. Several studies have shown that this

distinction leads to interesting new insights; for example, the presence or absence of

genuine electoral competition affects which manipulation strategies are used to secure

electoral victories, with more authoritarian regimes relying more on excessive electoral

manipulation than competitive ones (Simpser 2013, p. 7).

In line with this reasoning, this study expects MPs in fully authoritarian regimes to relate to

their constituencies differently than MPs who face genuine electoral competition. However, I

also expect that across cases, the forms and practices of political competition are somewhat

similar. Even in more authoritarian regimes, electoral rules shape political competition. For

example, in the Soviet Union, elections were seen as a ‘test of the apparatus’ability to

deliver in style, along with the proof of ability to choose a good candidate’(Friedgut 1979,

p. 145). This implies that the range of possibilities regarding electoral rules and how

elections are conducted is limited, and that deviations from internationally recognised

practices may not be blatant, otherwise they would compromise the regime’s ability to derive

legitimacy from the arrangements. However, as we know little about how diminished

electoral competitiveness actually inﬂuences the electoral calculations of candidates (and

subsequently, their relationship with voters), the article will pay particular attention to this.

Kazakhstan: MPs as representative agents of the party

Members of Kazakhstan’s lower house Mazhilis have, as envisioned by the 2007 reforms,

mostly abandoned servicing individual, geographically concentrated constituencies. I ﬁrst

8 ESTHER SOMFALVY

sketch MPs’constituency-related activities before turning towards the explanations for the

patterns observed.

A top-down approach to constituency-related activities

In large and thinly populated Kazakhstan, the main challenge regarding constituency service

is facilitating regular direct interaction between MPs and citizens via MPs’travels

throughout the country. According to the parliamentary house rules, MPs are required to

travel to the regions (vyezd) four times per year for ten days during a ﬁxed period.

During their travels in the regions, Kazakhstani MPs visit professional organisations or

universities and attend town hall meetings with 100–500 participants.

During one

parliamentary session alone, records state that MPs participated in 4,000 meetings with

500,000 citizens.

The settings of the meetings and the fact that MPs do not usually visit

the same place repeatedly curtails spontaneous interaction and critical questions. It also

limits the opportunity for citizens to follow up on promises made. Therefore, the large

number of carefully managed and showcased meetings goes hand-in-hand with

diminished opportunities for meaningful interaction. Moreover, MPs spend a lot of time

during their travels disseminating information and educating citizens about government

policy, a practice reminiscent of Soviet times, when MPs were expected to act as

‘representative[s] of the state to citizens’(Friedgut 1979, p. 145). MPs also use the

meetings to collect information about issues that are important to the citizens and then

pass it on to the government and its agencies.

The most effective MP–citizen linkage, according to MPs, is the handling of personal

complaints. MPs regularly write letters to the government and its agencies on behalf of

citizens.

The party Ak Zhol, for example, received 326 letters between January 2012 and

May 2014, which were forwarded to the attorney general (91 letters), the national bank

(61 letters) and local administrative bodies (53 letters).

To exemplify MP conduct in the

regions, Kurmangaliev (2016) describes a visit to Aktobe by an MP originally native to

the region. The MP had chosen the local public reception ofﬁces (priemnaya)ofNur

Otan as a meeting venue and was approached there by several citizens with grievances.

While the MP helped one petitioner with a payment out of his own pocket, he delegated

most issues to the relevant government agencies. This example captures situations that

many of my interview partners have also identiﬁed as not uncommon occurrences during

their visits to Kazakhstan’s regions. In their attempts to address citizens’grievances,

‘Reglament Mazhilisa Parlamenta Respubliki Kazakhstan’, Rules of Procedure, Article 2.1.5, No. 3,

1996, available at: http://www.parlam.kz/ru/mazhilis/Info/Reglament/reglament, accessed 23 September

2020. For a detailed account on how MPs relate to their voters, also refer to Somfalvy (2020).

Interview KAZ_7, MP, Nur Otan party, Astana, 29 September 2014.

‘Nurlan Nigmatullin: Reshenie voprosov naseleniya—vazhneishaya chast’raboty parlamentariev’, Press

release of the Mazhilis, 28 June 2013, available at: http://www.parlam.kz/ru/mazhilis/news-details/id10113/1/

15, accessed 21 October 2016.

Interview KAZ_9, MP, Nur Otan party, Astana, 1 October 2014.

Interview KAZ_10, employee of administration and former MP (Nur Otan), Astana, 2 October 2014.

‘Kratkaya informatsiya o deyatel’nosti fraktsii DPK “Ak Zhol”v mazhilise parlamenta respubliki

Kazakhstana. Za perioda s yanvarya 2012 g. po mai 2014 g. (I-III Sessii V Sozyva)’, Democratic Party Ak

Zhol, 2014, unpublished.

DE-LOCALISING CONSTITUENCIES 9

Kazakhstani MPs have opted for specialisation by topic, not by origin of petitioner.

The

focus on pursuing the constituents’grievances and the corresponding perception of MPs

by the public as ‘a last-chance administrative box’has been documented in other cases

(Costa et al.2012, p. 308), and dates back to the early days of parliamentarianism (Norris

1997, p. 29). Some MPs found a strategy to follow up citizen requests in spite of their

lack of power to do so as part of their parliamentary work, and pursue constituents’

grievances through a party commission instead of parliamentary channels.

Consequently, and in combination with the fact that contact with MPs is usually

facilitated by the parties and individual meetings take place at party venues, it is not

surprising that it is the parties, rather than the parliament, which are seen by voters as

points of access to ‘the power’.

One activity frequently mentioned in the literature when discussing MPs’connection to

particular sub-constituencies, namely legislative allocation, has become virtually

non-existent in Kazakhstan. Parliament is not allowed to make adjustments to the budget

without the consent of the government.

This makes any independent legislative

allocation by MPs impossible.

Even more so, parliament barely uses its right to initiate

legislation: of the 454 bills approved by the Mazhilis during the ﬁfth convocation (2012–

2015), only 28 were initiated by MPs, while 425 originated from the government.

Electoral incentives: the party assigns the seats

Which electoral framework rules account for the successful (from the perspective of its

designers) de-localisation of constituency service in Kazakhstan? The most powerful

explanatory factor for this is the electoral system: it contains several provisions that

discourage activity associated with the cultivation of a particular constituency.

Kazakhstan’sMazhilis has 107 deputies, 98 of whom are directly elected for a ﬁve-year

term based on a closed party list-based system.

MPs are elected in a single, nationwide

district.

Nine seats in Kazakhstan’s parliament are ﬁlled by indirect election via the

Interviews: KAZ_2, director of a local research organisation, Almaty, 12 September 2014; KAZ_8, MP,

Nur Otan party, Astana, 30 September 2014; KAZ_9, MP, Nur Otan party, 1 October 2014, Astana.

Interview KAZ_10, employee of administration and former MP (Nur Otan), Astana, 2 October 2014.

‘Reglament Mazhilisa Respubliki Kazakhstan’, Rules of Procedure, Article 3.24-4, No. 3, 1996,

available at: http://www.parlam.kz/ru/mazhilis/Info/Reglament/reglament, accessed 23 September 2020.

Interview KAZ_10, employee of administration and former MP (Nur Otan), Astana, 2 October 2014.

Legislative activity of the faction ‘Zakonotvorcheskaya deyatel’nost’fraktsii’, website of Nur Otan,

available at: http://nurotan.kz/ru/zakonotvorcheskaya-deyatelnost-frakcii, accessed 21 October 2016.

Article 50.5, Konstitutsionnyi zakon Respubliki Kazakhastan O Parlamente Respubliki Kazakhstana i

statuse ego deputatov, 1995, No. 2529, available at: https://online.zakon.kz/document/?doc_id=1003961,

accessed 10 October 2020; however, early elections seem to be the norm. See also, Article 9.2,1-1,

Konstitutsionnyi zakon o vyborakh v Respubliki Kazakhstan, 1995, No. 2464, available at: https://www.

akorda.kz/ru/ofﬁcial_documents/constitutional_laws/o-vyborah-v-respublike-kazahstan, accessed 10

October 2020.

Article 21.3, Konstitutsionnyi zakon o vyborakh v Respubliki Kazakhstan, 1995, No. 2464, available at:

https://www.akorda.kz/ru/ofﬁcial_documents/constitutional_laws/o-vyborah-v-respublike-kazahstan,

accessed 10 October 2020.

10 ESTHER SOMFALVY

consultative Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan (Assambleya Naroda Kazakhstana).

Parliamentary seats are awarded to the parties, not individual MPs. Since the 2007

reforms, independent candidates and electoral coalitions are no longer permitted to run

for ofﬁce.

Delegates who lose their party membership are deprived of their mandate.

This rule strengthens party control over MPs. Parties competing for seats in the Mazhilis

have to pass a 7% electoral threshold, a relatively high threshold by international standards.

Candidate selection procedures and criteria remain opaque. Political analysts believe that

the party leadership has the last word on candidate selection but seeks agreement with the

presidential administration over candidacy decisions.

No formal measures are in place

to ensure proportionality of party lists by region and gender. However, interviewees from

Nur Otan and the Communist People’s Party (Kommunisticheskaya Narodnaya Partiya

Kazakhstana—CPPK) agreed that, even without quotas, gender balance and regional

proportionality are considered by the party leadership when drawing up the party lists, in

order to appeal to voters.

One Kazakhstani peculiarity was the opportunity for parties to

engage in ex post candidate selection: candidate lists compiled before elections were

signiﬁcantly longer than the total number of seats in the Mazhilis and, moreover, were in

alphabetical order. Seats to individual candidates among the large pool used to be

distributed after the elections, once the parties found out the number of seats they had

won, leaving it up to party ofﬁcials to engineer a parliament to their liking after the

elections.

This practice allowed for the formation of a parliament representative in

numerical terms, or to reward or punish candidates for their performance during the

campaign period. It also made it difﬁcult to predict who would win seats based on the

party lists

and contributed to party control over candidates. A 2018 change to the

electoral legislation abolished this practice of not ranking candidates, so that for future

elections it should be more predictable who among the candidates will win a

parliamentary seat.

The unpredictability of the current selection procedure means that candidates perceive

their candidacy not so much in terms of ‘standing for elections’but, rather, ‘agreeing to

be included on the party list’.

Indeed, some MPs interviewed while researching this

article seemed rather passive about their candidacy. One interviewee even reported having

Article 51.5, Konstitutsiya Respubliki Kazakhstan, available at: https://www.akorda.kz/ru/ofﬁcial_

documents/constitution, accessed 9 October 2020.

Article 87.2, Konstitutsionnyi zakon o vyborakh v Respubliki Kazakhstan, 1995, No. 2464, available at:

https://www.akorda.kz/ru/ofﬁcial_documents/constitutional_laws/o-vyborah-v-respublike-kazahstan,

accessed 10 October 2020.

Article 52.5, Konstitutsiya Respubliki Kazakhstan, available at: https://www.akorda.kz/ru/ofﬁcial_

documents/constitution, accessed 9 October 2020.

Interview KAZ_3, researcher, Almaty, 26 September 2014. The leader of Ak Zhol maintained that he

alone decided the distribution of seats (Mamashuly 2016).

Interviews: KAZ_4, employee of CPPK party, Astana, 29 September 2014; KAZ_5, MP, Nur Otan,

Astana, 29 September 2014; KAZ_8, MP, Nur Otan, Astana, 30 September 2014.

Article 87.3, Konstitutsionnyi zakon o vyborakh v Respubliki Kazakhstan, 1995, No. 2464, available at:

https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=39866584#pos=1321;0, accessed 10 October 2020. Please note

that this is the version from 2009, valid until 29 June 2018.

Interview KAZ_1, director of a local NGO, Almaty, 8 September 2014.

Interview KAZ_9, MP, Nur Otan, Astana, 1 October 2014.

DE-LOCALISING CONSTITUENCIES 11

been taken by surprise by his inclusion in the party list and stated that he was ‘in shock’when

he found out.

Candidates are often chosen from among the ranks of civil servants. Reshufﬂing

between different branches of the executive and the legislative is rather common

(Bader 2011). Other authors reported a large share of former low-level or mid-level

public ofﬁcials among MPs, likening their tenure in the Mazhilis to a ‘business trip’,

from which they would later return to the state apparatus (Bader 2011, p. 194).

Some

observers perceive the candidate nomination in terms of an internal party power game,

suggesting that seats are awarded to the losers of internal power struggles, who are

then sent off to occupy a position perceived as less prestigious than one in the

administration.

However, whether rotating into the Mazhilis is indeed synonymous

with a demotion cannot be conﬁrmed. In contradiction to this perception, one MP

interpreted inclusion in the party list as a sign of faith by the party.

Regardless of

nomination to the Mazhilis being a reward or a rebuke, it is clear to MPs that their

career will most likely continue, be it in parliament or the administration, if they stay

on the good side of the presidential party.

The party system reveals the concentration of power in the hands of a presidential

party. With only nine registered parties during the legislative period of the ﬁfth

convocation (2012–2016) and seven in 2019, the number of parties was relatively low

(Masanov 2019).

The presidential party Nur Otan is a highly personalist, ‘party of

power’(Isaacs 2011, p. 38; Isaacs & Whitmore 2014, p. 700) and has the best

infrastructure on the ground by far; in the 2000s, it was the only party to have a

presence in every district (Bowyer 2008, p. 14). Both smaller parties in the legislature

—the CPPK and Ak Zhol, which represents business interests—belong to the ‘soft’

opposition, which is not fundamentally opposed to the president (Bowyer 2008,

pp. 21–6). The results of all three parliamentary elections conducted after the

introduction of proportional representation illustrate the dominance of Nur Otan:

according to the Central Electoral Commission, Nur Otan won 88% of votes and all

seats in the Mazhilis in 2007, as none of the other parties surpassed the 7%

thresholds. Nur Otan won 83 of the 107 seats (2012) and 84 seats (2016) in the

subsequent elections.

Interview KAZ_8 MP, Nur Otan, Astana, 30 September 2014.

See also Engvall (2014).

Interview KG_4, MP, Ar Namys party, Bishkek, 5 June 2014.

DE-LOCALISING CONSTITUENCIES 19

p. 29). Defections are so frequent that one analyst claims that the ‘party-building process

takes place after the elections and inside the parliament’(Marat 2015). Altogether, these

arrangements have been detrimental to party cohesion (Huskey & Hill 2013, p. 257).

In sum, relations between Kyrgyz MPs and citizens have remained local because of

internal inconsistencies within the electoral framework. While the wider electoral

framework aims for a nationwide constituency, this is inconsistent with incentives created

by the regional electoral threshold. The weakness of the parties and their lack of

representation locally makes it difﬁcult for them to campaign in regions where they are

not well established. Consequently, party election strategies rely heavily on MPs’

pre-existing ties. Parties want MPs to cultivate personal constituencies, which, owing to

the nature of Kyrgyzstan’s past political system, are local. This leads to the recruitment of

party candidates based on their already-existing local constituencies, a practice that

incentivises MPs to focus even more on cultivating their local ties. In the context of

uncertain candidate lists and the general instability of parties, individual vote-seeking by

MPs is a rational strategy. Finally, attempts to establish a nationwide mandate by the

2007 electoral reform were not backed up by actual reorganisation of constituency service

within parties. While MPs adhere to the rules laid out in the framework regulating

constituency-related activities, they interpret these rules to relate to their constituencies in

a spontaneous and individual way. As they are often informed about MPs’visits after the

fact, faction secretariats are relegated to the function of record-keeping. Consequently, the

form of organisation described by the MPs interviewed in 2014 further strengthens local

constituencies instead of making them obsolete.

Conclusion

Similar electoral rules can lead to different behaviour by MPs vis-à-vis their constituencies,

depending on the wider political context. That much has been noted by other studies

examining MPs’representation style and focus. This work adds to this body of literature

by examining how the political context—the differing party systems of Kazakhstan and

the Kyrgyz Republic—affects the representative relationship both during and between

elections. It also contributes new ﬁndings on how parties and individual MPs organise

constituency-related activities in response to electoral calculations and resource

availability. The ﬁrst case, Kazakhstan, shows how the expected effects of the

introduction of proportional representation materialised when electoral incentives

provided by the comparatively strong parties were consistent with the direction mapped

out by electoral rules. Moreover, during the legislative term, the parties control how

day-to-day contact between MPs and voters is organised. As a result, MPs relate to their

voters through the parties, fall in line with the party leadership’s expectations, and engage

in little personal vote-seeking. No other concept of constituency has developed to replace

the geographically delineated constituencies that disappeared when MPs’activities

stopped being local. The top-down approach to representation pursued by Kazakhstan’s

political parties has resulted in generally diminished activity by MPs and the weakened

visibility of parliament. Citizens, who have lost trust in the legislature’s ability to deliver,

use the parties as ‘access points’to power instead.

20 ESTHER SOMFALVY

The electoral setup plays out quite differently in the second case, Kyrgyzstan, where

measures created to prevent the emergence of parties with a regional power base

(speciﬁcally, the double electoral threshold), in conjunction with weakly institutionalised

parties and a fragmented party system, create incentives for personal vote-seeking in a de

facto local constituency. The inconsistent electoral incentives are reinforced by the

logistics of constituency-related activities that rely heavily on individual MPs’initiative

and funds, with only minimal and ex post control by the factions. Although a local

orientation prevails, it is still noteworthy that MPs in Kyrgyzstan have accepted the

nationwide mandate as the norm and feel the need to justify their local activities. The

literature suggests that it takes time for MPs and citizens to adjust their behaviour to a

new set of rules (Scheiner 2008, p. 168), and even more so for citizens to adjust their

expectations, so that the behaviour of MPs is sometimes out of synch with voter

expectations. If we believe that change in behaviour does not automatically follow from

changes to the institutional framework, it would be interesting to see how representative

patterns evolve across a longer period; that is, if the same electoral rules apply for

multiple elections. Up to now, this has never been the case, with sometimes multiple rule

changes between elections (Jones Luong 2002;Aydɪngün & Aydɪngün 2014, p. 407). The

question remains how purposefully the main political actors manipulate the electoral

framework in order to maximise their votes,

and to what degree a more concentrated

party system is only a low priority for powerful individuals who have, in spite of regime

change, managed to return to power several times, using different parties as electoral

vehicles. If party-building is not as much of a priority as maintaining an individual power

base for powerful politicians, it should not be much of a surprise if they design electoral

incentives to meet these goals, thus resulting in what we see as inconsistencies. One

limitation of this study, a snapshot of MP–citizen relations, is, in fact, its limited time

period, particularly as the electoral framework constantly changes. Recent ﬁndings also

suggest a decreasing effect of geographic identity over ﬁnancial incentives for voting in

the 2015 elections in Kyrgyzstan (Doolotkeldieva & Wolters 2017, p. 32). The authors of

the study suggest that the perpetual uncertainty Kyrgyz politicians face from their party

leadership regarding their re-election prospects and the increasing monetisation of party

lists has left them with incentives to hedge their bets vis-à-vis their parties through vote-

buying, even in localities where they enjoy genuine authority with voters (Doolotkeldieva

& Wolters 2017, p. 39). In addition, the relationship under observation may regularly

vary over the legislative period. Media accounts of electoral campaigns in Kyrgyzstan

claim that politicians have a particular tendency to distribute goods to local communities

during the pre-election period. Hence, a longer data-gathering period would help to

clarify how the MP–citizens relationship varies over time.

The ﬁndings of this article suggest that the case of Kazakhstan is partially driven by the

non-democratic nature of the ruling regime, while the alternative outcome in the Kyrgyz

Republic is due to the more competitive setting of a political system that has been

alternating between milder forms of autocracy and a hybrid regime. This is particularly

This has been demonstrated to have been the main driver of electoral reform in Poland by Benoit and

Hayden (2004).

DE-LOCALISING CONSTITUENCIES 21

relevant if the differences in competitiveness and regime character are correlated with the

party system structure, as suggested by Stykow (2015). The case of Kazakhstan supports

claims that, when elections are not competitive, ﬁndings can be better understood from

the perspective of the overall political career concerns of MPs, beyond re-election (see

also Taylor 1992; Kerevel 2015). Finally, the article also relates emerging research on the

activity of parliaments in non-democracies that focuses on how non-democracies

incentivise their parliamentarians to do the ‘right’kind of activity and be responsive

towards citizens on select issues only, while abstaining from actions in areas that the

regime deems as potentially destabilising (Truex 2016). Therefore, the study of Central

Asian parliamentarianism complements the emerging comparative scholarship that seeks

to broaden our understanding of representative practices beyond Western democracies.

ESTHER SOMFALV Y, Research Centre for Eastern European Studies at the University of

Bremen, Forschungsstelle Osteuropa an der Universität Bremen, Klagenfurter Straße 8,

28359 Bremen, Germany. Email: somfalvy@uni-bremen.de

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DE-LOCALISING CONSTITUENCIES 25

Appendix. List of interviewees

No. Interviewee Language Interview details

KG_1 Two employees, development consultancy English Conducted in person

23 May 2014, Bishkek

KG_2 Four employees, NGO English Conducted in person

13 June 2014, Bishkek

KG_3 Aide to MP, Respublika Kyrgyz Conducted by research assistant

4 June 2014, Bishkek

KG_4 MP, Ar Namys Russian Conducted in person

5 June 2014, Bishkek

KG_5 Employee, Ata Meken faction Russian Conducted in person

5 June 2014, Bishkek

KG_6 MP, Ata Meken English Conducted in person

6 June 2014, Bishkek

KG_7 MP, Ar Namys, leadership position Russian Conducted in person

11 June 2014, Bishkek

KG_8 MP, Deputy Group Yntymak Russian Conducted in person

16 June 2014, Bishkek

KG_9 Employee, SDPK faction Russian Conducted in person

17 June 2014, Bishkek

KG_10 MP, Respublika Russian Conducted in person

23 June 2014, Bishkek

KG_11 Aide to MP, Deputy Group Onuguu-Progress Russian Conducted in person

23 June 2014, Bishkek

KG_12 Aide to MP, Ata Zhurt Russian Conducted in person

23 June 2014, Bishkek

KG_13 MP, Ata Zhurt Kyrgyz Conducted by research assistant

23 June 2014, Bishkek

KG_14 MP, independent Russian Conducted in person

24 June 2014, Bishkek

KG_15 MP, Deputy Group Onuguu-Progress Russian Conducted in person,

13 June 2014, Bishkek

KG_16 Director, local NGO English Conducted in person

12 May 2014, Bishkek

KAZ_1 Director, local NGO Russian Conducted in person

8 September 2014, Almaty

KAZ_2 Director, local research organisation Russian Conducted in person

12 September 2014, Almaty

KAZ_3 Researcher Russian Conducted in person

26 September 2014, Almaty

KAZ_4 Party employee, CPPK Russian Conducted in person

29 September 2014, Astana

KAZ_5 MP, Nur Otan Russian Conducted in person

29 September 2014, Astana

KAZ_6 MP, Ak Zhol Russian Conducted in person

29 September 2014, Astana

KAZ_7 MP, Nur Otan Russian Conducted in person

29 September 2014, Astana

KAZ_8 MP, Nur Otan Russian Conducted in person

30 September 2014, Astana

KAZ_9 MP, Nur Otan Russian Conducted in person

1 October 2014, Astana

KAZ_10 Employee of administration and former MP, Nur Otan Russian Conducted in person

2 October 2014, Astana

KAZ_11 Researcher Russian Conducted in person

17 September 2014, Almaty

26 ESTHER SOMFALVY

Socio-philosophical analysis of education as the basis of the social and investment model of the strengthening of the statehood, social identity and elite of Kyrgyzstan

Article

Full-text available

Jan 2025

This paper seeks the goal of developing a new – social and investment – model for strengthening statehood, social identity and the elite of Kyrgyzstan. Econometric modeling of the role of education in strengthening the statehood, social identity and elite of Kyrgyzstan based on the data of the official statistics for 2006–2021 is performed. As a result, a close connection between education and other interests in enhancing the statehood, social identity and elite of Kyrgyzstan is substantiated. The key role in this process belongs not to higher but to secondary vocational education. That is why it is set in the basis of the proposed social and investment model of strengthening of statehood, social identity and elite of Kyrgyzstan. The theoretical significance of the authors’ conclusions is due to the most complete description of cause-and-effect relationships of enhancing the statehood, social identity and elite of Kyrgyzstan through the clarification of education’s role in them. The social significance of the paper lies in the rethinking of the theory and practice of strengthening statehood, social identity and elite from the position of sustainable development. The authors’ recommendations support the practical implementation of SDG 1, SDG 4, SDG 9, SDG 10, and SDG 11. The practical significance of the developed social and investment model of strengthening of statehood, social identity and elite of Kyrgyzstan consists in its enhancing the scientific and methodological framework for the practical implementation of the National strategy of development of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2018–2040, adopted by the Decree of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic dated 31 October 2018, No. 221. The developed social and investment model will allow the Kyrgyz Republic to adopt the status of great power and to reach the leading positions in Central Asia in the Decade of Action.

What do we mean when we talk about constituency service? A scoping literature review of four decades of research

Article

Full-text available

Jul 2024

Constituency service is a crucial concept for understanding the nature and intensity of the links between representatives and their constituents. However, studies have been inconsistent about the meaning of constituency service, its causes and consequences, justifying a systematic analysis of where we stand in this field of studies. This article conducts a scoping literature review of 198 studies on constituency service published between 1975 and 2021. It aims to answer the following questions: how has constituency service been defined? Which research designs are commonly used when studying it? And what are its driving factors and political effects? These questions are answered using a dataset that codes each study along several dimensions tapping into conceptualization, research design, explanatory factors, and effects. The analysis shows that this field of research has grown significantly over the last decade, covering more activities (inside and outside the geographic constituency) and countries, with increased methodological pluralism. This review makes an original contribution by charting the main trends in the study of constituency service, advancing a dynamic conceptualization of constituency service, and opening up new avenues for research on the subject.

Constitutional and Legal Stages in the Development of Electoral Law in the Recent History of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic

Article

May 2023

Serimzhan Dossumov

"A study of the history of electoral law development provides a clear understanding of how it will evolve in the future, especially in the post-Soviet space. The purpose of the study is to identify the legal stages of the development of electoral law through the adoption of constitutional norms in the Republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and to carry out a comparative analysis of these stages between the countries studied. The main methods used are the historical and legal method, which analyses the development of constitutional and legal norms and identifies the stages in the development of electoral law, and the comparative-legal method, which compares the constitutions and electoral law norms in the two countries. The result of the study is an identification of the specific stages of change in constitutional provisions relating to the electoral law, and an analysis of these changes and their impact on electoral law and the political regime in post-Soviet Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. A description of the amendments that have been made to the Constitution in the context of electoral law has been carried out, and the consequences of the adoption and amendment of the Basic Law for the change of the political regime in the state have been identified."

Remnants of the ancien régime : renomination and re-election of former members of a demised ruling party in Ukraine

Article

Feb 2022

Masatomo Torikai

Although much scholarly attention has recently been devoted to authoritarian successor parties, most existing studies have not empirically examined the survival patterns of former elite cadres of overthrown regimes. This study explores the conditions under which members of former ruling parties survive in the elections that follow the collapse of authoritarian regimes. Exploiting the comprehensive data of 450 incumbents of the national legislature and 2869 incumbents of the regional legislatures in Ukraine, this study examines the survival of the former members of a collapsed ruling party, the Party of Regions (PoR), and demonstrates that former PoR deputies with individual resources, such as those elected in single-member districts, were more likely to secure seats in the subsequent elections. Additionally, electoral calculations prevailed over political programmes or ideologies in terms of party affiliations of former PoR deputies. These findings highlight the importance of individual resources of ex-members of authoritarian ruling parties in political survival.

Studying states and regimes in Central Asia: contributions to comparative politics and future challenges

Article

Full-text available

Jul 2021

This article surveys research on regimes and states in Central Asia and assesses its contribution to Political Science, specifically the subfield of comparative politics. It discusses three areas in which research on the region has been influenced by and, in turn, fruitfully shaped the comparative political analysis of state and regime: a turn from macro- to micro-level topics; innovations in research design; and the embrace of interdisciplinarity. It then addresses the challenges confronting scholars of the region, including uneven theoretical contributions to comparative politics and impediments in the feasibility of field research. It identifies several lively debates in comparative politics to which Central Asianists have the potential to contribute important insights. It concludes that the study of states and regimes in Central Asia has greatly enriched some debates in comparative politics (and vice versa), but declining pools of funding, the politicization of academic research, and unequal access to institutional resources among local and Western scholars threaten to diminish the field’s contributions in the coming years.

Qualitative Text Analysis: A Guide to Methods, Practice & Using Software

Book

Jan 2014

Udo Kuckartz

Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in Modern China

Book

Oct 2016

Rory Truex

Can meaningful representation emerge in an authoritarian setting? If so, how, when, and why? Making Autocracy Work identifies the trade-offs associated with representation in authoritarian environments and then tests the theory through a detailed inquiry into the dynamics of China's National People's Congress (NPC, the country's highest formal government institution). Rory Truex argues that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is engineering a system of 'representation within bounds' in the NPC, encouraging deputies to reflect the needs of their constituents, but only for non-sensitive issues. This allows the regime to address citizen grievances while avoiding incendiary political activism. Data on NPC deputy backgrounds and behaviors is used to explore the nature of representation and incentives in this constrained system. The book challenges existing conceptions of representation, authoritarianism, and the future of the Chinese state. Consultative institutions like the NPC are key to making autocracy work.

Uncertainty Perpetuated? The Pitfalls of a Weakly Institutionalized Party System in Kyrgyzstan

Article

Dec 2017

The parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan in October 2015 garnered widespread approval from commentators for the level of fairness and freedom maintained throughout the campaign. However, the results of the vote do not provide a clear indication of the current state of affairs of parliamentarism in the republic. Focusing on the commercialization of party lists, we argue that neither identity politics nor the logic of neopatrimonialism adequately explain the dynamics of political competition in Kyrgyzstan. Instead, we see perpetual uncertainty emerging from contradicting yet increasing attempts to harness the capital of privatized party lists and to impose discipline. Eventually, and beyond short-term threats of an emerging super-presidentialism, Kyrgyzstan risks suffering from hollow parliamentarism, with political parties persistently failing to supply legislative initiatives with substantial agendas and adequate professionals. The weakly institutionalized political parties and their short-sighted electoral strategies undermine both the parliamentary system and its political pluralism.

Democratization and the growth of political participation in Kazakstan

Chapter

Jun 1997

Martha Brill Olcott

Edited by two of the world's leading analysts of post communist politics, this book brings together distinguished specialists on the former Soviet states of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Chapters on Kazakhstan, Kyrkyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, provide a systematic analysis of elite politics, factionalism, party and interest group formation, and social and ethnic groupings. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott provide theoretical and comparative chapters on post communist political development across the region. This book will provide students and scholars with detailed analysis by leading authorities, plus the latest research data on recent political and economic developments in each country.

On Legislatures: The Puzzle of Representation

Book

Nov 2015

Gerhard Loewenberg

Faces on the Ballot: The Personalization of Electoral Systems in Europe

Book

Jan 2016

Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts

Book

Apr 2002

Pauline Jones

The establishment of electoral systems in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan presents both a complex set of empirical puzzles and a theoretical challenge. Why did three states with similar cultural, historical, and structural legacies establish such different electoral systems? How did these distinct outcomes result from strikingly similar institutional design processes? Explaining these puzzles requires understanding not only the outcome of institutional design but also the intricacies of the process that led to this outcome. Moreover, the transitional context in which these three states designed new electoral rules necessitates an approach that explicitly links process and outcome in a dynamic setting. This book provides such an approach. Finally, it both builds on the key insights of the dominant approaches to explaining institutional origin and change and transcends these approaches by moving beyond the structure versus agency debate.

The Concept of Representation

Book

Dec 1967

Hanna Fenichel Pitkin

Parliamentary Representation in Central Asia: MPs Between Representing Their Voters and Serving an Authoritarian Regime

Book

Jun 2020

Esther Somfalvy

Far Away, So Close: Parliament and Citizens in France

Book

Jun 2013

The connection between Members of Parliament and citizens in France faces major cultural, institutional, and sociological challenges. Culturally, the legacy of both Rousseau’s theory of the general will and the Jacobins’ view on the unity of the nation’s territory and representative body show a consistent set of thoughts and claims emphasising the independence of the legislative branch from any other estate – including groups of citizens. MPs are called to present themselves as elected by the French nation, and not by voters of a given consti- tuency: they are not supposed to advocate for local interests or refer systemati- cally to their own constituency.

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