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People who run African affairs:
staffing and recruitment in the
African Union Commission*
THOMAS KWASI TIEKU
Department of Political Science, King’s University College at The University of
Western Ontario, Epworth Avenue, London, Ontario, Canada NAM
Email: ttieku@uwo.ca
STEFAN GÄNZLE
Department of Political Science and Management, University of Agder,
Universitetsveien , Kristiansand, Norway
Email: stefan.ganzle@uia.no
and
JARLE TRONDAL
Department of Political Science and Management, University of Agder,
Universitetsveien , Kristiansand, Norway and ARENA Centre for
European Studies, University of Oslo, Gaustadalèen , Oslo, Norway
Email: jarle.trondal@uia.no
ABSTRACT
This study contributes to the field of International Public Administration (IPA) and
the emerging area of Informal International Relations (IIR) by examining the
* We thank Nadja Sophia Bekkelund Kühn and the staff of the African Union Leadership
Academy (AULA) for helping us with data collection, the anonymous reviewers and JMAS team
for their outstanding work, Professors Daniel Bach, Kevin Parthenay as well as participants of the
International Workshop on Staffing Regional Organisations in the Global South held on
October at SciencesPo for helpful comments on an earlier draft of the article. Also, we are
grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for funding the
Informal IR Lab at King’s University College where a significant portion of this manuscript was pro-
duced and the Lab members, namely Jessica Afara, David Carson, Victoria Hinkson, Eugenia
Kontor-Kwateng, Elizabeth Kozak, Nordiah Newell, Megan Payler and Renae Pennington, for
research assistance. The views expressed here and any error in the article are solely ours.
J. of Modern African Studies,,(), pp. – © The Author(s), . Published by Cambridge
University Press.
doi:./SX
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politics of staffing and recruitment of the African Union Commission (AUC).
Although the AUC has become a major political player in international affairs,
there is a dearth of knowledge about the civil servants who work for the AUC and
who run this paramount pan-African executive body. To address the void, this
paper draws on a survey of AUC staff, archival studies and interviews to
explore recruitment of AUC staff. Combining organisational theory and informality
as analytical lenses, the study demonstrates that, first, many informal international
practices (IIPs) are embedded in AUC recruitment processes. Second, the AUC is
composed largely of short-term, contracted staff. Finally, it shows that the AUC is
dependent on lower-ranked personnel or that it is bottom-heavy. Many of these
lower-ranked officials are intimately involved in the making of AUC policies and
decisions, putting into question the assumption in existing scholarship that deci-
sion-makers of IOs are primarily reliant on top-ranked A-level officials (senior
management).
Keywords:Informal international practices (IIPs), African Union (AU), inter-
national public administration (APA), international civil servants, international
bureaucrats, regional organisations (ROs) and international public service.
INTRODUCTION
The administrative arm of international organisations (IOs) has become a
major field of study for scholars interested in international affairs (see
Trondal et al. ; Bauer et al.,). The vibrant scholarship has
shown that administrative autonomy, styles, recruitment and behavioural
logics within international bureaucracies have become indispensable in contem-
porary international order (Olsen ; Trondal ). While this scholarship
has advanced knowledge and is clearly on the rise, the case selection has often
been confined to organisations housed in countries of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (see Finnemore ;
Ege & Bauer ; for an exception, see Gänzle et al. ). These studies
focus primarily on the European Union (EU), the United Nations organisations
(UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Bretton Woods system
more generally, even though most of the growth in the absolute numbers of
IOs and international bureaucracies in the last two decades have occurred in
the Global South (Braveboy-Wagner ; Coe ).
The neglect of Southern-based IOs and their bureaucracies, especially those
in Africa, is surprising given the centrality of regional economic communities
(RECs) and continental organisations, such as the African Union (AU) in
regional governance. Since , the AU and its executive arm, the African
Union Commission (AUC), have spearheaded the development of regional
rules, norms and decision-making structures covering state sovereignty, military
interventions, peace and security, gender, international criminal justice, democ-
racy, elections, governance and other key aspects of African politics and inter-
national order (Williams ; Abdulqawi & Fatsah Ouguergouz ; Tieku
; Hardt ; Haastrup ).
THOMAS KWASI TIEKU,STEFAN GÄNZLE AND JARLE TRONDAL
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Studies show that the AU norms and decision-making structures influence
political dynamics within African countries (Witt ), shape African inter-
national relations (Karbo & Murithi ; Tieku a), and even impact
the politics of other regions (Souaré ). Hardt has persuasively argued
that AU member states delegate to the AUC even in sovereignty-sensitive
areas such as peace operations (Hardt :). This paper seeks to take
this analysis further as the AUC could not have been this influential without
its staff.
In fact, research shows that AUC staff do not only act as ideational entrepre-
neurs (Souaré ) and help African governments to develop their positions
on global issues (Ayebare :); they actually join forces with NGOs, think-
tanks, consultants and independent academics to influence African states to
develop common rules and norms (Engel & Porto ; Dersso ; Kioko
). Thus, the AUC staff are not mere neutral servants of African politicians
(Tieku ,a) but potentially influential decision-makers shaping politics
and policies on the African continent.
Despite the influential position that the AUC staff occupy, we know little
about these international civil servants and thus those who run the premier
pan-African executive body. Therefore, the ambition of this study is to
unpack AUC staff composition and recruitment. The study offers three main
findings. First, combining organisational theory and informality as analytical
lenses, the study suggests that informal international practices (IIPs) are organ-
isationally embedded in AUC recruitment processes. Second, the study shows
that the AUC is composed largely of short-term contracted staff and relies on
fixed-term personnel. As Figure shows, a total of % of AUC workforce are
on short-term contracts. Third, the staff structure of AUC is bottom-heavy.A
total of % of AUC personnel are lower-ranked officials or in the bottom
half of the AUC pay grade (see below). Some of these lower-ranked officials
are deeply involved in policy/decision-making of AUC, putting into question
the assumption in existing scholarship that decision-makers of IOs are primarily
reliant on top-ranked A-level officials (i.e. senior management). This assump-
tion informs prominent works in the field, such as the survey study of
the European Commission (Kassim et al.). Our study suggests that even
‘lower-level’officials, especially the Pand P, are intimately involved in the pol-
icymaking processes of the AUC.
The paper proceeds in five stages. The first section briefly outlines the theor-
etical approach that informs the core argument. The second section presents
the mixed research methodology that is employed to gather data, and the fol-
lowing section sketches out the nature of AU staff and the organisational struc-
ture of the AUC. The fourth section turns attention to the selection processes of
the AUC, which includes examining the resources that staff brought to the AUC
and what enabled them to play influential roles in African politics. The final
section discusses the implications of the research findings and indicates
future research directions.
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AFRAMEWORKFORANALYSIS:ORGANISATIONAL THEORY AND
INFORMALITY
Drawing on organisational theory and public administration literature (see
Kassim et al.; Trondal & Peters :–), this study is grounded
on the idea that recruitment practices significantly impact on the level of organ-
isational efficiency, level of corruption, values staff practice, and the influence
staff have on societal well-being (Dahlström et al.; Rothstein ;
Pedersen & Johannsen ). It has been shown that organisations that practice
merit-based recruitment are significantly less marked by corruption than those
that recruit on patronage (Dahlström et al.). Civil servants who are
recruited and promoted due to their skills and merits, rather than their social
and political connections, tend to embrace values of integrity more than
others (Pedersen & Johannsen (). Moreover, scholars have found a posi-
tive correlation between ‘impartial’public bureaucracies, and good living con-
ditions and societal well-being (Rothstein ). Two proxies are applied to
gauge the degree of meritocracy in AUC recruitment processes. The first meas-
urement is whether expertise is weighed relatively more than the nationality of
recruits. The question then becomes, how much emphasis does the AUC place
on expertise of candidates (i.e. track record, formal education and accumulated
professional experience) relative to their country of origin or nationality or other
demographic characteristics, such as ethnicity, gender and age? A related ques-
tion is how much weight the AUC puts on the technical expertise of candidates
compared with other formal qualifications such as diplomatic background
(experiences from other IOs, embassies, etc.). The second measure looks at
the extent to which independent recruitment apparatus, which insulates the
process from member-state governments and patronage, has been installed at
the AU-level. Organisational theory ascribes an autonomous role for pre-existing
structures, both formal and informal, i.e. practices that are not codified or
written into treaties (Olsen ). Independent recruitment apparatus
encourages a more formalised approach to recruitment at the AUC level, while
a weak organisational structure biases recruitment practice towards informality.
This paper finds that a fine-grained version of informality called ‘informal inter-
national practices’(IIPs) are embedded in AUC recruitment process. IIPs, which
are unofficial actions, activities, rules and decision-making structures that exist in
the international arena (Tieku a), are part of informal international rela-
tions (IIR) (Tieku b). Tieku (a) suggests seven features of IIPs:
First, IIPs are unofficial in the sense that they are practices not sanctioned or
approved by official government agencies like the legislature and/or enforceable
by official state institutions, such as domestic courts and international tribunals.
In other words, IIPs lack the double consent that states give to international law
or formal international rules (Hurd ; Park ).
Second, IIPs are partially written or wholly unwritten. Unlike formal practices, which
can be found in written texts in the form of resolutions, charters, treaties,
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conventions, among others, most IIPs are not codified precepts. They typically do
not exist in textual form, although some of them may be partially written. An
example of a partially written informal practice can be seen in declarations of inter-
national organisations. Many declarations of IOs are partially written, but the extent
to which these pronouncements are respected is totally dependent on informal
understanding and practices of IOs members (Tieku b). A relevant example
of the unwritten or partially written practice is the convention that enabled only
American citizens to become the World Bank’s president or the practice that
allowed only a citizen of European countries to assume the position of the IMF’s
managing director (Glenn ). This partially written practice has so far
trumped the so-called open and merit-based formal election rules in the books of
the two international organisations.
Third, IIPs are reflexive. Actors such as states and non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) are aware of their existence or know what IIPs expect of them in any given
international social setting. Actors are socialised to know even the unwritten IIPs.
This enables them to follow them either consciously or unconsciously (Checkel ).
Fourth, IIPs are self-regulatory.Thereisnoofficial government agency that has the
responsibility to enforce them or punish actors who break them. Actors within the
international system have developed several self-regulatory punishment regimes,
which include isolation, naming and shaming, ostracism, retaliation, as well as the
court of the opinion of ingroup-members to enforce IIPs (Tieku b).
Fifth, IIPs are respected. Like many international norms, IIRs are followed even though
there are no third-party bodies to enforce them or oversee them. There is no third-
party agency to ensure respect for ‘a meeting of the P’, a tacit agreement between
the permanent members (China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA) to consult
each other on resolutions before they are distributed to other Security Council
members. However, there is almost always some form of consultation between the
Pmembers on resolutions before they are formally submitted to the Security Council.
Sixth, IIPs are widely shared ways of doing things among in-group members.In-group
members often believe that respect for IIPs is either appropriate, serves their interests,
or both. In other words, the most effective IIPs often have the logic of appropriateness
(LOA) and the logic of consequences (LOC) embedded in them. Thus, IIPs are
respected in part because of the influence of LOA, and in part because of the operat-
ing logic of the LOC (March & Olsen ).
Seventh, IIPs are temporal and short-term. Informal practices may emerge in institutions
as temporary measures due to the fact that officials have yet to agree on permanent
rules, they intend to develop a permanent measure to replace them, or they have to
account for the concerns of third parties, such as other international organisations
or donors.
One consequence might be the rise in the recruitment of short-term staff.
Reliance on short-term contracted staff has increased in government
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institutions across the Western world. The short-term hiring is also a conse-
quence of New Public Management (NPM) (Murdoch & Trondal ). One
driver has been substantial (financial) constraints when government institutions
facing fiscal austerity tend to initiate budget cuts, thereby down-sizing perman-
ent staff and up-sizing short-term contracted staff (Hall ). This follows one
of the curative prescriptions of the NPM reform wave, and is designed to
promote greater flexibility in, and performance of, public services (Lægreid
& Wise ). Although this trend has been extensively studied in national-
level bureaucracies (Hall ), contracted personnel working above the
state have thus far escaped any comprehensive analysis (Newman & Ravndal
). This study contributes to filling this theoretical gap.
DATA AND METHODS
This study is based on data gathered through mixed research method techni-
ques. First, a thorough examination of scholarship on IO staffing was con-
ducted, supplemented by analysis of soft primary materials such as decisions,
declarations and resolutions made by the AU, as well as an archival research
of internal documents such as confidential reports, memos, activity reports,
meeting notes and rapporteurs’reports of closed-door meetings. In particular,
the research benefited from assessment reports of the AUC, including the May
comprehensive study of the structure, staffing needs and funding of
the AUC by consultants, as well as the -page confidential report that the
Chairperson of the AUC wrote on the study which was submitted to the
Permanent Representative Council on May .
Second, we launched an online survey inside the AUC, collaborating with the
African Union Leadership Academy (AULA), to survey altogether AUC
staff, representing approximately % of the total global workforce of the
AUC. More fundamentally, the survey captures the views of all categories of
AU employees, including regular staff, short-term employees, professional
staff and non-professional workers of the AUC. To probe further on questions
that the online survey was unable to capture, a member of the research team
conducted approximately open-ended interviews with key AUC officials
between – June , at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa. As the inter-
viewees have been promised anonymity, we can only disclose their ranks and the
time of the interview.
ORGANISATIONAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE AUC
Established in May bytheConstitutiveAct,theAUCbecameoperational
in after the Assembly of the AU had adopted its Statutes (African Union
). The Statutes of the AUC (henceforth Statutes) explained in detail the
functions and the composition of the AUC. In functional terms, the AUC acts
as the ‘engine room’(Fagbayibo :) of the AU and is responsible for
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the day-to-day management of AU affairs (African Union ). According to
Article ()oftheStatutes,theAUCismandated to: represent the AU and
defend its interests under the guidance of, and as mandated by the
Assembly and Executive Council; initiate proposals to be submitted to the
AU’s organs, as well as implement decisions taken by them; act as the custo-
dian of the AU Constitutive Act and OAU/AU legal instruments; provide
operational support for all AU organs; assist member-states in implementing
the AU’s programmes; draft common African positions and coordinate
member-states’actions in international negotiations; manage the AU
budget, resources and strategic planning; elaborate, promote, coordinate
and harmonise the AU’s programmes and policies with those of the
Regional Economic Communities (RECs); ensure gender mainstreaming in
all AU programmes and activities; take action as delegated by the Assembly
and Executive Council (African Union :). These functions highlight
the AUC’s central role in contributing to pan-African integration and man-
agement of African affairs.
Composition of the AUC: elected officials
The AUC comprises elected officials called Commissioners and an appointed
‘corps of suitably qualified, experienced, and well-motivated senior administra-
tive, professional, and technical staff’(African Union ). The elected
officials include the Chairperson of the Commission (COC), the Deputy
Chairperson of the Commission (DCP) and eight Commissioners. Each one
of the five regions of Africa (i.e. Central Africa, East Africa, North Africa,
Southern Africa and West Africa), is entitled to two Commissioners.
According to Article of the Statutes, one of the two Commissioners from
each region must be a woman. The Article, moreover, implied that the COC
and the DCP could not come from the same region, by stipulating that the
‘region from which the Chairperson and the Deputy Chairperson are
appointed, shall be entitled to one () Commissioner each. All other regions
shall be entitled to two () Commissioners’(African Union :). Thus,
the Statutes were inclusive of both regional and gender balance in the selection
of the elected officials.
The COC is elected by the Assembly together with the DCP. The COC acts
as the AU’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and its accounting officer. As the
CEO, the COC is supposed to assume the overall management of the AUC.
This means that in practice, the COC is mandated to develop and execute
strategic plans of the AUC, take measures to enhance the performance of
the AU, promote its activities, act as secretary at meetings of other AU
organs, appoint and manage AUC staff, as well as chair all AUC meetings
when present.
In addition, the COC is supposed to consult and coordinate the AU’s work
with member governments, the African regional economic communities and
international partners. The COC is required to enhance the functioning,
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decision-making and reporting of all units of the AUC, and ensure that activities
of AU organs are in conformity with the AU’s agreed policies, strategies, pro-
grammes and projects. As the accounting officer, the COC is supposed to
render account for the performance of the AUC to the Assembly. Finally, the
COC acts as a depository for all AU and OAU treaties and other legal instru-
ments, and also represents the AU at international forums.
The DCP is not a typical deputy of an IPA or IO, as this individual is neither
appointed nor can be fired by the COC. The Statutes of the AUC further
strengthened the position of the DCP by making them responsible for the
administration and finance of the AUC. This means, in practice, that the
DCP controls both the purse of the AUC and the international civil servants
who work in various units of the AUC. In practice, the AUC staff report to
the DCP rather than the chairperson. The longstanding joke at the AUC is
that all roads lead to the th floor, the location of the DCP’soffice, rather
than the th floor where the COC is housed. Thus, although the DCP is
accountable to the COC, the former does not have any power to dismiss or
even discipline the latter. In other words, the DCP is a powerful chord
within the AU system, and the COC has little choice but to co-manage with
the deputy.
The checks and balances embedded in the management of the AUC do
not end at the doorsteps of the COC and the DCP, as each one of the eight
AUC departments is headed by a Commissioner who is selected by the
Council of the AU and appointed by the Assembly of the Union. Although
Commissioners are accountable to the COC, they cannot be fired or disciplined
by the COC or the DCP. Only the Assembly has the power to terminate the
appointment of Commissioners. The Statutes further enhanced the powers of
Commissioners by making each one of them responsible ‘for the implementa-
tion of all decisions, policies and programmes in respect of the portfolio for
which he/she has been elected’(AU Assembly ).
In practice, each Commissioner has a fiefdom, and both the COC and the
DCP cannot micromanage any department without the acquiescence of a
Commissioner (Interview with a Commissioner; also, see Tieku b).
Indeed, even though Commissioners are accountable to the Chairperson of
the Commission in theory, the COC does not have the powers to discipline or
fire Commissioners, including the DCP. It is only the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government of the AU that has the power to hire, fire and even dis-
cipline Commissioners. The checks and balances built into the AUC and the
limited power that the COC has over departments and directorates under
Commissioners and the DCP have forced the COC to co-manage the AUC
with other Commissioners. Thus, unlike the single corporate IPA model as oper-
ated by the UN and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the
AUC has been characterised as a co-management IPA (Tieku a). The
reform proposal submitted by the current COC to AU members makes a
strong and sustained case for changing the current system to the single corpor-
ate model (African Union :).
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Composition of the AUC: appointed staff
The appointed staff of the AUC are made up of approximately , (May
figure) at the headquarters in Addis Ababa, and at the representative missions
around the world (African Union :). They are categorised into two
groups: Professional Staff (ranked from Pto D) and General Service Staff
(GSS). The GSS people are grouped into General Service A (GSA) and
General Service B (GSB). The GSA people are primarily administrative, clerical,
maintenance and paramedical personnel, while the GSB, or what the AUC calls
the Auxiliary Staff, are mainly drivers and security personnel.
The grading scale for those in the professional category are: Dis a designa-
tion for directors of departments, directorates and the Chief of Staff of the
Chairperson; Pare advisers, and they are mostly in the Bureau of the
Chairperson, the Bureau of the Deputy Chairperson and the Deputy Chief of
Staff; Pare heads of various divisions; Pare primarily interpreters; Pare
senior policy officers; Pare policy officers; finally, Pare mostly documenters
(Interview with Pon June ). The AUC operates a – step scale at
each grade, and a step is given for each year that a member of staff spends at
the AUC. In other words, it would take about years to move from Pto
P, and so on. Even then promotion to a higher level is not automatic. To
move to another level in the AUC system, a staff member must possess the
requisite qualification for the advanced position, apply to be considered for
appointment to the position, and then must be prepared to go through a com-
petitive recruitment process. In other words, the AUC does not use an automatic
career progression system. The AUC appointed staff are housed in departments,
directorates and representational offices. As of March , there were eight
Figure Distribution of staff categories (frequencies). Source: Authors, based
on data submitted to PRC Sub-Committee on Structural Reforms.
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portfolio Departments, each under a Commissioner, Directorates under the
Deputy Chairperson, Directorates/Offices, Permanent Representational
Offices (PRO) and Special Envoys under the Chairperson.
The typical AUC official is middle-aged. While out of the (%) who
responded to our survey indicated between – years as their age, of
(%) selected between – years as their age.
Only out of (%)
and out of (%) indicated they were either below years of age or
above years of age. In the case of gender classification, respondents’demo-
graphic balance mirrors that of the workforce of the AUC. Eighty-two respon-
dents, including (%) female-identifiable and (%) of self-
identifiable males, indicated their gender. The gender balance of respondents
reflects fairly well the male-female ratio of the global AUC workforce, which is
male-dominated. As of March , the female identifiable staff constituted
about % of the total appointed workforce of the AUC while approximately
% are classified as men.
The ratio is % men and % women among
the elected officials of the AUC.
The typical AUC staff member is highly educated, as a majority of those respond-
ing to the survey indicated they possessed at least one postgraduate degree. As
Figure shows, % respondents who provided information about their highest
level of education indicated they possessed either an MA degree or a PhD
degree. While a small majority (%) have studied abroad, a great majority
(%) are educated in social sciences. Although the nature of respondents may
have exaggerated the actual number of postgraduate degree holders in the
AUC system, the highly sought-after nature of international organisation jobs in
the African continent, and the AUC management’s insistence on a postgraduate
degree for even internship positions, suggest that the majority of AUC staff are
highly trained and educated.
AUC STAFFING AND RECRUITMENT PROCESSES:BOTTOM-HEAVY,
SHORT-TERM AND INFORMAL
The nature of the AUC staffing is a story of a bottom-heavy organisation, in the
sense that the AUC is heavily reliant on staff at the lower-level of the pay grade;
, (%) of the , total AUC staff are lower-level officials or in the P
category, or below.
Of the , lower-level officials, (%) are non-pro-
fessional staff and may have little to do with the policymaking processes of the
AUC. Only (%) of the AUC workforce are in the professional category
and involved in the day-to-day execution of the AUC mandate. Of the profes-
sional category, only % (i.e. staff) are in the P–Drange, which is con-
sidered to be a middle to senior professional level in a conventional
international public administrative set-up.
The other professional staff (%) are in the P–Prange and would be
expected to have little influence on policymaking. It is also important to note
that the (%) who are in the Plevel are documenters, and the (%)
in the Pare mostly interpreters. The AUC staff in these two categories are
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less likely to get involved in the decision-making of the AUC. The work of P
staff does not normally go beyond documentation, while the overwhelming
majority of the staff in the Pcategory confine themselves strictly to the inter-
pretation of AUC meetings.
That said, it would be a mistake to conclude that all AUC lower-level officials do
not shape and influence AUC decision-making processes. The Pand PAUC
staff are major players in the AUC system. Data from our survey show that the
Pand Pstaff are deeply involved in the decision-making processes (also see
the quotation from an interview with a member of the Pbelow). A variety of
reasons explains why the Pand P, or the so-called lower-level officials, are
influential in the AUC’s decision-making processes. First, the fact that most of
the professional officers in the AUC system ( or % of the AUC professional
staff) are concentrated in the Pand Plevels means that the scanty number of
staff in the top half of the AUC administrative structure (i.e. the % of the staff
who are at the level of Pand beyond) have little choice but to download some of
the decision-making to those at the Pand Plevels. In fact, the AUC leadership
prefers hiring professional staff at Pand Plevels in part because it is cost-effect-
ive for the AUC, and in part because of a broad understanding (see features and
of IIP) that the Pand Pofficials do most of the heavy lifting in the AUC system.
As one of them put it when answering an unstructured question about the role of
Pand Pin the AU system,
I don’t need to tell you what we the nobodies do in this building …Let me ask you
who does most of the work when you go to DPS (Department of Peace and Security)
meetings? Isn’t it my colleagues who develop work schedule of our units, write the
concept papers, identify and invite you people to meetings, prepare reports and
make them ready for everyone, and write speeches that directors and commissioners
read? It is the same everywhere in this building. (Interview with a member of the P
group on June )
Figure Distribution of educational backgrounds (frequencies and %) (N = ).
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While it may well be that this member of the AUC staff is exaggerating the
influence of the Pand Ppeople, the survey backs up the view that the
lower-level officials are deeply involved in the decision-making processes. As
Table I suggests, while %ofP–staff indicated they spend as much/very
much of their time on drafting proposals, % noted they provide information
to AUC leadership. This finding is consistent with Tieku’s(c) observation
that most key AU policy ideas/documents such as AU transitional justice policy
and post conflict and reconstruction policy were initiated by AUC bureaucrats
(not member states), often in collaboration with actors he called Outinsiders.
Second, many of those who enter the AUC system are experienced profes-
sionals. Those who enter the entry-level position of the AUC have often
worked in the public service of African states or IOs. As Table II shows, %
of those surveyed indicated they had worked for government or an IO before
joining the AUC. The minimum requirement to apply for Step One of Ppos-
ition (i.e. the entry stage of P)isfive years’work experience in a related field
(African Union –). This factor, together with the AUC’s preference
for mature workers and the relatively high pay level of the AUC positions,
means that many of those shortlisted for Pand Ppositions often have post-
graduate degrees and work experience well beyond the required skills-set indi-
cated by the AUC.
Third, the relatively high skill-level of the typical AUC Pand Pstaff com-
pared with even senior officers in public services of AU member-states, may
also account for their influence. The survey shows that most of the AUC staff,
including the Pand Pmembers, hold postgraduate degrees and are by no
means novices in policymaking processes or in African affairs. In recognition
of the fact that most people who join the AUC are highly educated and have
extensive work experience, the informal practice that has emerged in AUC
hiring processes is that although the AUC professional category starts at P,
almost all the policy officers recruited since , when the AUC came into
existence, were given Plevel and up contracts (see IIP features and ;
TABLE I
How much/very much time do you spend on specific tasks (frequency and
per cent).
Frequency Percentage Total N
Drafting policy proposals ()
Providing scientific, technical, legal advice ()
Giving political advice ()
Providing background information to the AUC leadership ()
Meeting/contacting people ()
Facilitating compromises between AUC units/departments ()
Facilitating compromises between different AU institutions ()
Facilitating compromises between AU MS ()
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interview with Pmember on June ). The informal practice of barring
the hiring of professional policy officers at the Plevel is unwritten yet highly
respected (see IIP features ,and ).
The reservation of the Plevel for those who take care of AU documents
largely explains why only a handful of people, approximately % of the total
AUC staff, are at the Plevel. The informal practice of hiring professionals at
the Pinstead of the Plevel emerged in part also to address the tortoise-like
mobility or grading scale system that the AUC operates. This IIP, together
with other unwritten rules in AUC recruitment processes, including the practice
of hiring only interpreters at Plevel, provides a good idea about the import-
ance of informality in recruitment processes (one of the most formal spaces
in the international system).
AUC recruitment processes: the influence of formal structures and IIPs
The AUC recruitment processes are based on a mix of informal practices, guide-
lines in AUC staff rules, and hiring procedures provided in the AUC Statutes.
According to Article of the AUC Statutes, appointment of ‘senior administra-
tive, professional and technical staff of the Commission shall be made by a
Recruitment Board, comprising the Members of the Commission, the Head
of Human Resources, the Legal Counsel and a Representative of the Staff
Association’(African Union ). Article () of the Statutes added that
‘prior to the commencement of the recruitment process of senior administra-
tive, professional and technical staff of the Commission, the approval of the
Advisory Sub- Committee on Administrative, Budgetary and Financial Matters
of the PRC shall be obtained, upon the submission of job descriptions, justifica-
tion and financial implications’(African Union ). Article () was inserted
in the Statutes to ensure that AU member-states exercise control over the hiring
of AUC staff, but it has never been invoked.
The first generation of AU Commissioners, led by the former President of Mali
Alpha Konaré (–), developed informal recruitment practices that rendered
the invocation of Article () unnecessary and further prevented member-states
through the PRC from micromanaging AUC hiring processes (Interview with P
TABLE II
Prior work affiliation before joining the AUC (frequency and per cent).
Prior affiliation (yes/no) Frequency Per cent N
Domestic government (%)
Academia/research institute (%)
Private sector (%)
NGO (%)
IO (%)
Interest group (%)
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member on June ). Instead of seeking approval from the PRC before the
commencement of recruitment, the Konaré Commission developed hiring pro-
cesses that started and ended with the Chairperson of the AUC (Interview with
Pon June ). Drawing on his reputation as a highly respected former
president, his direct access to the leadership of African states as well as the inde-
pendence granted in the Statutes to the Commission, the Konaré Commission
developed a four-stage recruitment processes.
First, approval for new positions will be sought from the Bureau of the
Chairperson rather than the PRC. Second, the Konaré Commission empowered
the Human Resources Division of the Administration and Human Resource
Management Directorate (AHRMD) to establish a hiring committee made up
of AUC staff, including a representative of the AUC unit where the services of
the prospective staff will be needed to manage all new recruits. The purpose
of the hiring committee is to shortlist candidates, interview them, and
conduct written tests for prospective staff. Third, the results from the test and
interviews are forwarded to the Chairperson through an Appointment,
Promotion and Recruitment Board (APROB) chaired by the Deputy
Chairperson of the Commission. The job of the APROB is to rank candidates
and make recommendations of the four best candidates to the Chairperson
for appointment. At the final stage, the Chairperson has the right to select
among four recommended persons.
As a result of the liberty granted to the Chairperson to appoint anyone from
the four recommended candidates, it is not uncommon for Chairpersons to
appoint the fourth-ranked candidate instead of the first person recommended
by the APROB. Many Chairpersons have used this opportunity to appoint staff
who may not necessarily be the best-ranked candidate, but who might help the
Chairperson to achieve his/her objective, whatever that might be. For instance,
Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was accused of overusing it to address the gender
imbalance within the AUC staff (Interview with Pon June ).
The AU’s involvement in several peace missions in its first decade together
with donor support for such operations, raised concern about transparency,
accountability, as well as clear rules for mission staff. In response to this, the
AUC Peace Support Operation Division (PSOD) attempted from
onwards to develop detailed recruitment procedures and staff rules for field per-
sonnel on peace support missions.
This effort, together with the appointment
in of Amine Idriss Adoum as AHRMD director, led to the development of
a detailed recruitment policy in that covered hiring of staff at the head-
quarters and those on field missions.
The Deputy Chairperson of AUC
Erastus Mwencha tried to formalise the recruitment policy in by submit-
ting it to the PRC for consideration for adoption by the Assembly (African
Union a).
Although the recruitment policy was not formally adopted and approved by
the AU member-states, the roadmap proposed in the draft policy is shaping
current AUC recruitment (Interview with Pon June ). The roadmap
established guiding recruitment principles (see African Union –).
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The guidelines required that potential applicants for the AUC position must dem-
onstrate a high level of technical knowledge, be motivated, and have a strong
commitment to the policies and programmes of AUC. In addition, applicants
must be able to work well in a multicultural environment, as well as have
working experience at national and/or international level. Furthermore, they
should be proficient in at least one of the official languages of the organisation
(Arabic, English, French and Portuguese), and have a working knowledge of a
second. Moreover, it committed the AUC to non-discrimination on any grounds
including race, creed or sex thereby promoting diversity among the workforce
and achieving a broad representation of member country nationals. Last, this
was meant to provide an environment where the contribution of everyone is
valued, as well as dedicating the AUC to the selection of staff on a competitive
basis (African Union –).
The informal recruitment policy introduced new elements into the AUC
recruitment processes. It moved the AUC away from the manual submission
of application materials to an online recruitment database called E-recruitment,
where a prospective applicant can create a profile and submit an application
(African Union a). The launch of the AUC career and recruitment
website on December to process applications electronically provided
open access to AUC jobs, which were hitherto gated and controlled by the
African diplomatic community and political class (Interview with Pmember
on June ). The electronic system opened the gate for ‘the African
Union to attract not only African applicants from the continent and diaspora
but also maintain talent warehouse of potential candidates who can join the
AU team as and when demand arises’(African Union a). The informal
policy insisted on a thorough medical examination of prospective staff by a
qualified medical team and facility. An appointment letter is issued only after
the prospective candidate has submitted the result of the medical examination.
Finally, it retained the two-stage interview process, including the oral interview
by the AHRMD in conjunction with the relevant unit recruiting the prospective
staff and the written examination (Interview with newly hired Pon June
).
Short-termism
This section suggests that the IIP approach to recruitment adopted by the AU is
driven by short-term considerations (see feature of IIP). This is because the
majority of AU staff are on short-term contracts. A total of (%) of the
AUC global workforce are on short-term contracts while only (%) staff
are on regular contracts (African Union :).
There are at least five types of short-term contracts out of a total of seven kinds
of appointments that the AUC make (African Union ). The first short-term
contract is called the ‘Fixed-term appointment’, which refers to appointments
made for a period not exceeding two years, but not less than one year, with
terms and conditions of services often stipulated in the contract. Many of the
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staff given this type of appointment are individuals working on projects funded
by donors, or senior professional staff. Many of the professional people in P
and upwards, including many heads of division, are on this type of contract.
For instance, as of September , the heads of all four divisions in the
Department of Peace and Security were on this type of contract (Interview
with Pon June ). This further demonstrates that the AU has
become very dependent on these short-term staff.
The second type of limited-term appointment is called ‘Short-term
Appointment’, which is a contract given to AUC staff for a period not exceeding
one year, but not less than three months. Similar to the fixed-term contract,
those given this type of appointment also work on projects usually funded by
donors. These contracts are often given to researchers and those who write
reports for the AU. The third short-term contracts are ‘Consultancy contracts’,
which are given for a period not exceeding three months. These contracts are
specifically termed as consultancy contracts to signify that a person/firm has
been recruited for the purpose of providing services on a pre-determined time-
frame. Those given these contracts usually have a regular appointment with
another institution but work on AU projects within the three-month period.
These contractors support the AU with research and technical knowledge or
are given special assignments.
The fourth short-term contracts are what the AUC calls ‘Special Services
Appointment’. These contracts are awarded on a very short-term basis and
are renewable as often as the person is needed by the AUC. However, the AUC
does not confer a staff member of any kind to that employee. Usually, those indi-
viduals are often brought to the AU to do specifictasks,andtheappointment
would continue as long as that individual’s work continues to be needed by the
AUC. This is of course subject to the availability of funds. The final short-term con-
tracts are the ‘Political and Special Appointments’, which are given to elected
officials for a duration usually not exceeding four years and renewable once. In
other words, no elected official can stay for more than eight years.
Even the regular AUC appointments, or the so-called permanent staff, are not
permanent in the strict sense of the word. This is because regular staff are given
afixed-term contract for a period of three years, the first months of which are
considered as a probational period (African Union ). The so-called per-
manent staff are required to renew their contracts every two years, subject to
performance and the needs of the AUC. The staff who have served a five-year
term for the AU on a regular service are considered permanent staff. They
are considered permanent even though they always have to renew their con-
tracts every two years and can be allowed to leave the organisation based on
mutual consent, or when their superiors feel their services are no longer
needed. Put differently, these permanent staffs exist largely on the goodwill
of their superiors and the needs of the organisation. Interestingly, the AU
staff rules stipulate that the AU shall ensure that the number of continuing
staff members shall not exceed % of regular staff of the AUC (i.e. those
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who have continuing appointments cannot be in the majority of any staff cat-
egory) (African Union :).
This staffing situation is, by and large, the result of the tremendous growth of
donor-funding of the AU programme budget and short-term posts. According
to the AU Golden Rules for financial management, approximately % of the
total AU budget should go to the operational budget, while about %is
devoted to the programme budget, which is largely funded by donors
through short-term financial arrangements (African Union ). The tempor-
ary nature of donor funding arrangements means that only short-term contracts
can be issued for positions paid from these extra-budgetary supports.
The preeminent position of these extra-budgetary supports in AUC recruit-
ment processes raises the contentious issue of the influence of funders on the
AU. Although the issue is beyond the scope of the current study, it is important
to note that salaries and allowances are supposed to be paid from the oper-
ational budget of the AU. According to Assembly decision (XXV) of June
, AU members are supposed to pay for % of the operating budget
yet the salaries of hundreds of AUC staff are still paid by external funders,
such as the UNDP and the EU (African Union b).
It will however be a mistake to conclude, as most journalistic writings on the
AU tend to assume and intuitive reasoning may suggest, that donors call the
shots at the AUC including on recruitment matters. As those who know the rela-
tionship between AU-external partners intimately and have studied the issue in
a systematic way such as Engel (:) have shown, ‘donors may play an
important financing role, but they do not call the tune’. This begs a number
of important questions, including why and how such a resource-dependent
organisation located in the Global South is able to take money from powerful
global actors but can still manage to maintain a semblance of independence/
decision-making autonomy? And what impact does dependence on external
funding have on AU legitimacy and credibility? These are some of the questions
that future research may explore.
The short-term approach to staffing has enormous implications for recruit-
ment and staff dynamics. It is often stretched to its limit when it comes to the
appointment of female employees and gender dynamics in the AU system. As
a letter from the Deputy Chairperson of the Commission Ambassador Kwesi
Quartey to the President of Ghana, Nana Addo Dankwa Akuffo-Addo, stated,
‘female staff were deliberately being given short-term contracts (around three
months) so that the renewal (of contracts) then would be negotiation
between unequal parties’, often involving favours in return for extending
these contracts (Ouartey ). The practice of targeting female employees
for short-term contracts does not exist in any AU policy document on recruit-
ment (see IIP feature ). It did not receive the explicit consent of state
parties (see IIP feature ). Yet, the practice is widely followed within the AUC
system even though it is not written anywhere, nor approved by member-
states. The female employers, as well as their superiors, agree to this informal
practice, in part because of the logic of consequences (see IIP feature ). The
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females acquiesce to it due to fear for their jobs and in the case of the male
superiors, they do it because of apprehension that their proposal will be rejected
without the promise of a contract extension (see IIP feature ).
CONCLUSIONS
This study contributes to the IPA literature by examining the politics of staffing
and recruitment of IO headquartered outside the OECD area. Studying AUC
recruitment ties into a broader scholarship on open organised systems (Scott
& Davis ), organisational theory (Pfeffer ; Egeberg & Trondal
), sociology of regionalism (Parthenay ), and representative bureau-
cracy (Gravier & Roth ; Christensen ). Three key contributions are
highlighted. First, the AUC is heavily dependent on short-term contracted
staff with a staff structure that is largely fixed-term. This finding supports previ-
ous research that shows that administrative bodies of IOs are becoming overly
reliant on short-term contracted staff, often directly placed by governments
(Egeberg et al. :–; Murdoch & Trondal ), or seconded
agents
from various non-governmental/donor organisations. Although
secondment is not very prominent in the AUC in terms of absolute numbers,
the IPA and IO literature will benefit from a systematic study of seconded per-
sonnel and consultants, especially their impact on AU decision/policymaking
processes.
Moreover, the finding joins previous studies in drawing attention to the emer-
gence or re-emergence of short-term contracting as the preferred approach to
staffing of IOs. Contracted personnel have become an important part of inter-
national public governance, as governments aim towards more flexibility in the
management of international affairs. It was quite the norm for IOs, such as the
EU, to rely on contracted staff in its early days (see Duchêne ). Although
contracted staffing never dominated the EU Commission staff, their number
has steadily increased –especially during the s, when the rapid expansion
under the Delors Commission created a need for additional staff outside regular
posts (Murdoch & Trondal :–; Trondal et al. ). The re-appearance
of contracting staffing has important implications, including the critical fact that
it makes IO staff live in precarious job environments and may compromise inter-
national civil servants’security of tenure. Also, short-term contracting may open
the door for member-states to use secondments of government officials to
control international bureaucracies and lead to short-lived and erased institu-
tional memories, especially in IOs that do not have stellar documentation
track records (Egeberg & Trondal ). In addition, it may make international
public governance less resilient.
Second, the study reveals that the AUC is bottom-heavy, and that lower-
ranked staff are important in governing the AUC. Many of these so-called
‘lower-level’officials, especially those in the Pand Pgrades, are intimately
involved in AUC policy processes and decision-making, contrary to the assump-
tion in existing scholarship which suggests that decision-makers of IOs are
THOMAS KWASI TIEKU,STEFAN GÄNZLE AND JARLE TRONDAL
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primarily reliant on top-ranked A-level officials. Scholars interested in IOs and
their administrative staff may lose key insights by focusing mainly on senior-
ranked officials or neglecting junior staff.
Finally, this study suggests that informal international practices are embedded
in AUC recruitment processes and they influence the overall staff structure.
This finding is significant because previous studies have ignored, or rendered
peripheral, informal dimensions of IPA recruitment. Our study shows how infor-
mal practices are deep-rooted in one of the most formal arenas in the inter-
national system. Informalisation of staffing is unlikely to be a peculiar AUC
phenomenon. Scholars of international affairs may have lost invaluable knowl-
edge by failing to study in a systematic way informal dimensions of administra-
tive staffing of IOs. This study provides a guide and direction for further
research into the role and influence of informal international practices in IOs.
NOTES
. The number of departments and commissioners will change from to in when the new AUC
departmental structure comes into force. For details, see African Union ().
. In the interest of space, the bar graphs/tables of the data in this section will not appear in the pub-
lication. Readers may obtain information about data provided from the designated corresponding author.
. The figures were obtained from the Administration and Human Resource Management Directorate
(AHRMD) and crosschecked at the Registry on April .
. The analysis in this section is based on statistics in African Union (:).
. See section b for more analysis of the informal dimensions of AU recruitment.
. The independence of the Commission is provided by Article of the Statutes, which stipulates that
‘in the performance of their duties, the Members of the Commission and the other staff shall not seek or
receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Union. They shall
refrain from any action which may reflect adversely on their position as international officials responsible
only to the Union.’
. We thank reviewers for drawing our attention to this.
. Several interviewees indicated Adoum was determined to introduce to the AU some of the major
human resource practices he acquired while heading a regional division of ECOBANK in Togo and
Nestle in Philippines.
. Reference is made to the Deputy Chairperson because she or he is head of administration, not the
Chairperson of the AUC or Commissioners, as explained earlier.
. Also, they agreed that AU members should pay % of the programme budget and % of the
peace support operations budget by the year .
. There is a significant body of literature on secondment, especially in relation to the European
Commission. See for instance Trondal et al.().
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