The Very Idea of Organization: Social Ontology Today: Kantian and Hegelian Reconsiderations
... Since its inception, MOS has offered guidance about people behaviour within organizations. The phenomenon of organization dominates modern society where people are embedded (Krijnen 2015). Therefore, the presence of organizations within the world deserves clarification. ...
... In the Western philosophical tradition, the presence of truth in organizational activities can be studied from different perspectives, such as German idealism or critical realism, among others (Krijnen 2015). Truth in organizations is a hot issue, with a growing number of applications (authored by MOS scholars, regulators, and practitioners) concerning phenomena like whistleblowing, raising concerns, or the ethical dimension of organizational life (Vandekerckhove and Langenberg 2012). ...
Management and organization studies (MOS) scholarship is at a crossroads. The grand challenges (such as the climate emergency) humankind must face today require an improved contribution from all knowledge fields. The number of academics who criticize the lack of influence and social impact of MOS has recently grown. The scientific field structure of MOS is based on its members’ accumulation of symbolic capital. This structure hinders speaking truth to the elite dominating neoliberal society. Our literature review suggested that a deeper interaction between MOS and philosophy could aid in improving the social impact of MOS. Specifically, an attitude by MOS scholars based on parrhesia (παρρησíα, to speak truth to power) could revitalize the field through heterodox approaches and, consequently, allow them to utter sound criticisms of the capitalist system. Parrhesia would lead MOS scholars towards a convergence of ethics and politics. We investigate whether daring to speak inconvenient truths to the powerful (some peers in the field and some individuals and corporations in society) can be a straightforward tool for revitalizing MOS. Boosting a candid philosophy-MOS interaction requires the fulfilment of three objectives: practical dialogue between these fields, reconsideration of the fields’ structures based on symbolic capital, and a post-disciplinary approach to philosophy. That fulfilment implies the delimitation of the MOS-philosophy interaction, a respectful mutual framework, mutual curiosity, and moving from prescriptive theoretical reflection towards more socially useful MOS. Ethical betterment through parrhesia could be the key to surpassing MOS stagnation.
Purpose
Organization theory seeks to explain how people coordinate their behaviors to achieve common objectives, but it has offered little insight into how organizations emerge from such coordination. Fully understanding entities requires knowing their origins. The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to and to suggest an approach for fortifying a foundational weakness in organization theory: pre-organization theory.
Design/methodology/approach
To develop pre-organization theory, this paper employs an evolutionary approach that integrates three theories. This paper first employs memetics to articulate a unit of selection, the i-memeplex, and next introduces inducement-contribution theory to tailor the i-memeplex to pre-organization, yielding a founder’s mental map for exchanges of inducements and contributions. It then applies generalized Darwinism to complete its evolutionary theory of pre-organization.
Findings
Memetics, inducement-contribution theory, and generalized Darwinism can be integrated to create a promising theoretical solution, but further investigation is needed to assess the empirical and practical value of pre-organization theory.
Originality/value
This paper contributes to organization theory by (1) explicating a foundational weakness in organization theory – its lack of pre-organization theory – and (2) integrating a novel set of theories to develop an evolutionary theory of pre-organization.
En este trabajo se investiga el concepto de apariencia [Schein] que Kant desarrolla en la Crítica de la razón pura y textos complementarios. Se sostendrá que la propuesta crítica de Kant ha de ser comprendida en relación con la tradición metafísica previa —«metafísica dogmática»— y que el concepto de apariencia constituye un punto de anclaje privilegiado para abordar esta relación, además de situar a Kant como pensador moderno. Asimismo, se ofrece, siguiendo a G. Lebrun, una propuesta de distinción entre apariencia lógica y trascendental. Finalmente se demarca el lugar de la ontología y la metafísica tras la operación crítica kantiana.
With his heterology, the southwest German neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert developed a doctrine that proved to be groundbreaking not only for neo-Kantianism, but also for the theory of subjectivity in postwar transcendental philosophy in the broad sense. Rickert’s heterology is primarily concerned with the original structure of thought. Since the discussion of Hegel plays an important role for Rickert, heterology simultaneously concerns the relationship between Hegel’s speculative idealism and (advanced) Kantian transcendental philosophy. However, on the whole, the debate has until now been far from unanimous with regard to the validity of Rickert’s critique of Hegel. This study develops a new interpretative perspective, focusing on the issue of formalism as a methodological problem. It turns out that Rickert’s heterology is a case of, in Hegel’s words, mere external reflection. Rickert hastily moves from the beginning of philosophy to the origin of thinking. Thus, unlike Hegel, Rickert provides an insufficient account of the very concepts with which he determines the origin of thought—the Achilles’ heel of transcendental philosophy.
The founding fathers of modern philosophy of culture, the neo-Kantians, and
especially the Southwest school, brought the concept of culture into play as
a counter concept to that of nature. Taking Heinrich Rickert’s conception of
culture as a starting point, the article shows how culture is conceived of
as a self-formation of the (concrete) subject (agent). It leads to
transcendental idealism of freedom, typical of a Kantian type of
transcendental philosophy. However, in this self and world formation of the
subject it is presupposed that nature is to any extent formable by values
and thus by freedom. This presupposition cannot be accounted for properly
within transcendental idealism. Hegel, by contrast, conceives of culture as
a manifestation of the idea, leading to speculative idealism of freedom. The
origin of culture, i.e., its original determinacy, should not be conceived
of in terms of an opposition to nature, and consequently in the fashion of a
subject (agent) of thought and action that forms itself by forming its
world, culture. Rather, it should be conceived of in terms of a
manifestation of the idea as the truly transcendental subject qua absolute
ground of validity and thus the ground of being too. Nature and culture are
both primarily determined by their ideal character and the relationships
emerging therefrom.
En este artículo se presenta una interpretación de la crítica de la economía política de Marx como teoría filosófica: una teoría de la apariencia que tiene sus raíces en la intervención kantiana en la historia de la metafísica. En primer lugar, se presenta el proyecto de la crítica de la economía política como una crítica de la “apariencia real” “objetiva” realer, gegenständlicher Schein. A continuación, se apunta a “fetichismo” y “mistificación” como las categorías centrales de esta teoría de la apariencia marxiana. Después se precisa su origen y posibilidad en el espacio filosófico abierto por Kant y Hegel, que sientan las bases de una teoría de la apariencia propiamente moderna. Finalmente, se profundiza en esta relación entre Marx y Kant mostrando que es posible clarificar tanto las diferencias como los contenidos del fetichismo y la mistificación al hilo de las dos clases de apariencia pensadas por Kant –según la distinción de Lebrun–, “apariencia lógica” y “apariencia trascendental”.
The chapter begins by establishing the absence of organizations in the organization of philosophy as a specialist academic discipline. The second section highlights the reasons why this gap is detrimental to philosophical inquiries. The third section seeks to clarify how philosophy, as a type of theoretical inquiry, can contribute to the study of organizations. Three basic features are proposed as underpinning the philosophical method. Hegel’s social theory is then put forward as an exemplary model of what a philosophical account of organizations might achieve. The fourth and final section shifts the perspective to focus on the life of individuals in organizations. Following a recent book combining post-Hegelian critical theory and Christophe Dejours’ psychodynamic approach, the paper highlights important aspects of individual and collective work that lead to a cooperative conception of management.
Dieser Artikel informiert über Sozialontologie - ein Forschungsfeld, das in der akademischen Philosophie und in der Sozialwissenschaft Beachtung findet. (1) Es wird ein Überblick über die Forschung aus beiden Disziplinen gegeben und (2) die beiden Lexikonartikel zum Thema, aus der International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Latsis, 2015) bzw. dem Handbuch der politischen Philosophie und Sozialphilosophie (Scholz, 2008), werden besprochen. Schließlich (3) wird eine kritische Einschätzung Pirmin Stekelers referiert, die besagt, dass die Rede von Ontologie verfehlt sei.
Der heute weitverbreitete Fokus auf ‚interdisziplinäre Zugänge‘ zu den Problemen, so wichtig er für ein adäquates Sachverständnis auch sein mag, sollte sich, gerade wenn die Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften im Spiel sind, vor der Suggestion einer allzu großen disziplinären Homogenität hüten. Die augenfälligen Grabenkämpfe der ‚Paradigmen‘ sind geradezu kulturelle Mahnmale, die uns dessen immer wieder eingedenk werden lassen. Solche Grabenkämpfe zeichnen in besonderem Maße die Philosophie aus.
Contemporary philosophy of recognition represents probably the most prominent direction that presently claims to introduce an updated version of classical German idealism into ongoing debates, including the debate on the nature of sociality. In particular, studies of Axel Honneth offer triggering contributions in Frankfurt School fashion while at the same time rejuvenating Hegel’s philosophy in terms of a philosophy of recognition. According to Honneth, this attempt at a rejuvenation also involves substantial modification of Hegelian doctrines. It is shown that Honneth underestimates the implications of Hegel’s thoughts about the theme, method and systematic form of philosophy. As a consequence, Honneth’s social philosophy is, on the one hand, in need of a plausible foundation. This leads, on the other hand, to a different construction of the social within philosophy than Honneth offers.
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