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VOLUME 57
Climate Justice and Migration
Mobili, Development, and Displacement
in the Global South
Edited by Ali Nobil Ahmad and the Heinrich Böll Foundation
CLIMATE JUSTICE AND MIGRATION
PUBLICATION SERIES ON DEMOCRACY
VOLUME 57
Climate Justice and Migration
Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the
Global South
Edited by Ali Nobil Ahmad and the Heinrich Böll Foundation
Climate Justice and Migration: Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
Volume 57 of the Publication Series on Democracy
Edited by Ali Nobil Ahmad and the Heinrich Böll Foundation
Concept and editing: Ali Nobil Ahmad and Kirsten Maas-Albert
Copy Editor: Robert Furlong
Design: feinkost Designnetzwerk, Constantin Mawrodiew (derivation design by State Design)
Printing: ARNOLD group, Großbeeren
Title photo: Rising sea levels uproot a tree in Pigeon Point beach, Tobago. © Dizzanne Billy
(the Venezualian interviewee from «Care work, Climate work»)
ISBN 978-3-86928-223-7
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Schumannst raße 8, 10117 Berlin,
T +49 30 28534-0 F +49 30 28534-109 E buchversand@boell.de W www.boell.de
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Note
Some of the contributions in t his publication were presented at «Climate Justice and Migration»,
a workshop jointly organized by the Heinrich Böll Foundation and the Leibniz-Zentrum
Moderner Orient on 26-27th November, 2019.
CONTENTS
Foreword 7
Preface and Introduction 9
Avidan Kent and Simon Behrman
Mind the gap:
Addressing the plight of climate refugees in international law 21
Natalie Sauer
«Care work, climate work»:
A dialogue with Dizzanne Billy (Trinidad and Tobago),
Oladosu Adenike (Nigeria) and Joyce Melcar Tan (Philippines) 43
Hashim bin Rashid
Resisting rural dispossession and displacement:
Peasant pathways to climate justice 52
Nausheen H. Anwar and Malini Sur
Climate change, urban futures, and the gendering of cities in South Asia 66
Celia Mc Michael
Health and mobility in climate change adaptation:
The importance of well-being in a warming world 80
Paolo Gaibazzi
Can migration from West Africa be prevented by climate-resilient agriculture?
Lessons in im /mobility from rural Gambia 95
Ana Naomi de Sousa
«What makes us resist is the land itself»
An interview with Erileide Domingues, Brazil 110
Tristen Taylor and Delme Cupido
Drought in the Northern Cape, South Africa:
How climate change turned a small town into a permanent refugee camp 118
Natalie Sauer
Questioning the «poster child» cliché:
Mobility and attachment in the Pacific island of Palau 125
Christiane Fröhlich
Mobility and climate justice in the Mashriq 138
Arne Harms
Under the climate radar:
Disaster and displacement in the Bengal Delta 150
About the Authors 157
Abbreviations 160
7
Foreword
FOREWORD
e climate crisis is the greatest threat confronting humanity today. Its devastating
implications for peace and security, human rights, health and ecological sustain-
ability are already being felt across the planet. Every day, millions of people all over
the world are witnessing the destruction of their homes and livelihoods. For them,
the climate crisis manifests itself as desertication and crop failure, soil salinity
and water scarcity, oods and deadly heat waves. It has compounded hunger and
poverty and, as a result, exacerbated conict and displacement.
In many ways, the climate crisis is a crisis of global justice: Although industri-
alised countries such as Germany have contributed to today’s global warming far
more than their counterparts in the Global South, the latter will bear the brunt of its
harshest consequences. Within the Global South, in turn, it is the most vulnerable
groups that suer most: those dependent on natural resources for their subsistence
and livelihoods; those with least ability to protect themselves or adapt – women,
children, Indigenous people and other marginalised populations. As a result, the
climate crisis acts as a multiplier of existing injustices, with a tendency to amplify
conicts, and to further undermine fundamental human rights such as the right to
food, water, shelter, education, and health; the right to dignity, and to life itself.
Already today, the climate crisis is causing immeasurable damage to homelands,
community structures, and cultural heritage, threatening traditions and ways of life
that are thousands of years old. According to the Platform on Disaster Displacement,
an estimated 25 to 30 million people were displaced by climate-related disasters
every year between 2008 and 2017.
Currently, there are more internally displaced people as a result of environmental
disasters than of violence and conict. It is challenging, if not impossible, to pre-
dict with any great precision how many people will be forced out of their homes in
the context of the climate crisis. e World Bank estimates that 140 million people
will be displaced by 2050 in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and South America alone.
However, one thing is certain: We need to gather more data and support research
on climate-induced displacement, and thereby close the gaps in our knowledge as
much as possible – otherwise, just policies will be even more dicult to design than
they are at present. It is time to treat the topic with the seriousness it merits and
to make it a key priority for governments around the world. It is a globally shared
responsibility to drastically limit the harmful eects of human activity on the global
climate, and to respond to the unfolding humanitarian crises that result from it.
Berlin, November 2020
Claudia Roth, Vicepresident of the German Bundestag
9
Preface and Introduction
PREFACE AND INTRODUCTION
Amidst the upheaval caused by the ongoing global health crisis, much of what we
thought we knew about policymaking has been called into question. Above all,
the assumption that growth-oriented societies cannot be radically altered in short
spans of time has been rendered demonstrably false. For all the misery wrought
by the devastating spread of Covid-19, the rapidity and radical extent of societal
response has been a powerful lesson in the capacity and willingness of humans to
change behaviour.
It is, of course, too early to talk about positives. If anything, a more anxious
world of tighter borders, in which states subject citizens and foreigners to ever-
harsher forms of surveillance, could be taking shape. And yet, in political terms,
the pandemic has managed what scores of avowedly progressive politicians have
proven incapable of doing for most of the previous decade. It has exposed the emp-
tiness of ag-waiving populism and, alongside the terrible killing of George Floyd
in Minneapolis, drawn attention to social and racial inequality and injustice.
What does this mean for policy-relevant research on climate change and migra-
tion? e events of 2020 have reminded us that new scenarios and information can
spur individuals, groups and institutions to view and act dierently on matters of
longstanding concern. Indeed, the Black Lives Matter protests suggest the presenta-
tion of old information in new ways can be sucient to trigger reconsideration of
age-old systemic cruelties. Scholarship and journalism targeting the mainstream,
it follows, need not concede the centre ground to outmoded ideas that appear
immovable for no reason other than their prior hegemony. Now is a time to propose
alternative ways of understanding and legislating to address issues that have been
ignored or narrowly framed in the past; to advance new modes of thinking (and
unthinking), particularly those that emerge from the experiences and advocacy of
individuals, groups, organisations and social movements located at the peripheries.
e writings compiled in this volume provide fresh perspectives on the subject
of climate justice and mobility by leading scholars, experts, activists and journalists
across a range of formats and genres. Its geographic and thematic scope is broad,
with coverage of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean across a range of
scales and topics spanning health and socio-economic development to law and pol-
itics. In methodological terms, the approaches deployed encompass anthropolog-
ical observation, legal analysis, sociological inquiry and journalistic investigation.
Scholarly jargon has been avoided, but the overall terminological framing
requires two brief comments. Firstly, the term «mobility» is preferred over widely
used alternatives, a choice that seeks to disassociate our object of study from
some of the baggage that comes with bureaucratic classications. Legal issues are
10
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
crucial, and the question of «climate refugees» is addressed at length in the pages
that follow (Kent and Behrman). But so too are many other scenarios of climate-in-
duced movement and sedentariness not recognised by law or policy. Mobility – a
capacious concept encapsulating all types of migration and immobility – allows for
consideration of diverse phenomena within a single analytical framework.
Secondly, the title makes reference to climate «justice» (rather than climate
change). is is indicative of an ethical commitment to life, livelihoods and strug-
gles against inequality. Lest this normative orientation be construed as idealistic, it
is worth making the point that public investment in welfare should not be assumed
to be more expensive than mantras that prioritise productivity and eciency. As
will be seen in the pages that follow, justice is neither a luxurious extravagance
nor a question of morality. Rather, it is a rational response to the challenges of cli-
mate-induced mobility. If we have learnt one thing of relevance to climate change
in 2020, it is that when it comes to the health and wellbeing of mobile and immo-
bile humanity beyond our own households, tribes, nations and borders, we are all
stakeholders.
«Climate refugees»
How did migration – a basic fact of human history – come to be viewed as a pathol-
ogy that threatens the security and integrity of nation-states? A fulsome answer to
this question is beyond the scope of this introduction. Suce it to say, the instincts
and ideas that drive migration policies in Europe stem predominantly from
narrowly dened concerns about «security», «terrorism», and dubiously conceived
threats to Western culture («the European way of life»).1 at such concerns are not
necessarily rational is apparent from the disproportionate anxiety over numbers,
welfare burdens, and the supposed criminal threats presented by mobile popula-
tions from Asia and Africa. From Hungary to the United Kingdom, democratic elec-
tions and referenda can be won and lost on the basis of race-based majoritarian
fears of demographic change («e Great [white] Replacement»).2
Having entered popular consciousness independently of global heating, migra-
tion discourse rarely makes explicit reference to climate change. However, with
growing awareness among electorates about the impending threat of environmen-
tal catastrophe and species extinction, the ecological crisis is becoming increas-
ingly enmeshed with alarmism over immigration. is is particularly evident in the
realm of policymaking, where the convergence of these issues can be traced back
1 In 2019, «Protecting the European way of life» was made the responsibility of the EU's most
senior migration official, EU Commission Vice President Margaritis Schinas.
2 For an interesting discussion of this idea and its origins, see Polakow-Suransky, S., and Widlman,
S. (2019, March 18), «The Inspiration for Terrorism in New Zealand Came from France», Foreign
Policy , available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/16/the-inspiration-for-terrorism-in-
new-zealand-came-from-france-christchurch-brenton-tarrant-renaud-camus-jean-raspail-
identitarians-white-nationalism (accessed 1 September 2020).
11
Preface and Introduction
to the early 1990s, when American strategists were assessing threats to Western
security in a post-Cold War world.3
It is no coincidence that the legal rights of climate refugees within the interna-
tional order remain underdeveloped (see Kent and Behrman, this volume). Invo-
cations of this category can obfuscate the complex, multidimensional relationship
between human motion and ecosystems, serving as a vehicle for climate-reduc-
tionism that downplays the role of political and social inequalities that shape and
direct mobility and immobility (see Fröhlich, this volume).4 As can be seen in some
of the cruder recent attempts to quantify and/or inappropriately foreground the role
of environmental factors in generating the Syrian uprising and subsequent refugee
«crisis» in Europe, attempts to link climate change with conict can be motivated
by calls for securitisation of borders rather than protective rights for migrants.
«Adaptation» and «resilience»
«Adaptation», a widely used term in policy documents since the 2010s, oers a
more hopeful, optimistic outlook than the alarmist, pessimistic discourses of envi-
ronmental apocalypse. It focuses on the livelihoods of migrants and increasingly
accepts the inevitability of mobility as an economic strategy that will ensure their
survival under worsening climate change.5 It is also more attuned to what histo-
rians of migration are at pains to emphasise: Environmental migration is neither
new, nor necessarily born of crisis (see Gaibazzi, this volume). Part of traditional
livelihood strategies, it has been stigmatised by colonial and post-colonial states,
which have criminalised the mobility of pastoralists and tribes in a bid to modern-
ise agriculture and promote private property.6
at being said, this volume treats with suspicion policy articulations of «adap-
tation» that put a dangerously laissez-faire, fatalistic emphasis on «disaster prepar-
edness» that gives up on prevention and mitigation while refusing to countenance
resource redistribution. When invoked alongside calls for «resilience», the unwar-
ranted optimism of such calls for adaptation serves as an ideological justication
for leaving «surplus humanity» to its own fate as climate change intensies. Ha-
ving risen to prominence in a world rocked by three decades of economic deregu-
lation across a range of policy elds, its language of survival narrows life to coping
3 Kaplan, R. (1994), «The Coming Anarchy», The Atlantic , available at: www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/304670 (accessed 23 September 2020).
4 A 2019 special issue of the journal Mobilities (vol. 14, nr. 3) conceptualising climate migration
as «mobility in the anthropocene» contains several extensive critiques.
5 Warner, K. (2012), «Human Migration and Displacement in the Context of Adaptation to Cli-
mate Change: The Cancun Adaptation Framework and Potential for Future Action», Environ-
ment and Planning C 30(6), 1061–77.
6 Fahrenhorst, B. (2019, November 26–27), «Forced Migration As a Result of the Collapse of the
Traditional Climate-resilient Rural Livelihoods in African Drylands», workshop paper pre-
sented at «Climate Justice and Migration: Mobility, Development and Displacement in the
Global South», a collaboration between Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung and Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner
Orient, Berlin.
12
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
and/or barely subsisting, with responsibility for provision of resources, funds and
support foisted on aected individuals and groups.7
In many respects, «the resilient subject» is no less of an abstraction than the
trope of the climate refugee. Both are products of an imagination than cannot
envisage a world order of mobility other than the current regime. Where the climate
refugee terries the West with the prospect of turning up on its doorstep, the resil-
ient subject remains «emplaced», bearing responsibility for his/her own continued
existence at the planetary peripheries. In doing so, he/she absolves the consciences,
treasuries and taxpayers in auent, carbon-intensive societies, regions and social
classes of any obligations that might stem from feelings of common humanity, or
indeed a sense of justice stemming from the fact that their need to be «resilient» is
rarely a result of their own lifestyles and activities.8
Like many pessimists who warn of impending socio-political breakdown, opti-
mistic proponents of «resilience» cannot imagine a world order in which resources
and power are distributed dierently to the one that has produced ecological crisis.
Rarely, if ever, do they make reference to the political economy of unequal land
distribution. Framing climate-induced mobility in Malthusian terms, resilience
serves as an emblem of the status quo's post-apocalyptic survival. (It is the migrant
who must «adapt», not the system that displaces him/her.) And just as climate-
reductionist alarmism makes no mention of the complex, manifold factors that
cause and drive resource-conict and displacement, those who assess the conse-
quences of mobility through adaptation atten them into a single dimension: the
economy. As at least one contribution to this volume (McMichael) argues, the idea
of «adaptation» is too often deployed narrowly, in a way that does not encompass
health and wellbeing.
At its most sordid, climate-change «adaptation» promoted by government, in-
ternational agencies and market-obsessed organisations can be synonymous with
strategies that prioritise prots rather than people. As such, it functions as a kind
of green, anticipatory «disaster capitalism», which can have perverse impacts on
mobility, for instance by driving up land prices in urban areas to the extent that
relocation to cities becomes unaordable (see Sauer's essay on Palau, this volume),
or negatively aecting the livelihoods of rural populations, for instance by promot-
ing new kinds of export-oriented farming in coastal areas that undermines tradi-
tional modes of shing (see Anwar and Sur, this volume).
Climate justice: Broadening the framework
e existential threat confronting tiny populations of Pacic Islands such as
Kiribati and Tuvalu represents one of the most direct, visible, and dramatic types
of climate-induced migration. Many such populations, whose carbon emissions
7 Diprose, K. (2014), «Resilience Is Futile: The Cultivation of Resilience Is Not an Answer to Aus-
terity and Poverty», Soundings 58, 44–56.
8 Evans, B., and Reid, J. (2013), Dangerously Exposed: The Life and Death of the Resilient Sub-
ject, Resilience 1(2), 83–98.
13
Preface and Introduction
are negligible, have already incurred extensive loss and damages due to extreme
weather events. Understandably, the grim prospect of their submergence beneath
the sea has ensured that the plight of small island states gures prominently in
political and media discourse about the far-reaching migratory implications of
climate change. Several of the best-researched territories have eectively become
«poster children» of campaigns for mitigation and/or planned relocation.
Without detracting from the very real prospect of their disappearance under
water in coming decades, Natalie Sauer's report in this volume on the less studied
island of Palau sheds light on the complex nature of lived experience in such set-
tings, which is more internally varied and mediated by socio-economic dierence
than generally assumed. Far from a generalised portrayal of desperation to escape,
we encounter individuals and communities still wedded to staying put, some of
whom are still arriving as immigrants. Of those who do wish to emigrate, many
seek to relocate internally rather than internationally, in accordance with dis-
tinct capacities and social networks. Pathways are shaped and mediated by social
class, gentrication, and disputatious property relations as much as by extreme
«natural» events such as hurricanes – if not more than.
Broadening the temporal scope of what we understand as climate-induced
mobility to encompass slow-onset forms of displacement is essential for a compre-
hensive, justice-based international response. Currently, the plights of those whose
woes accrue over lesser velocities – for instance, as a result of coastal erosion that
forces migration in small, incremental steps – are accorded little attention. As
Harms' investigation in this volume on marginality in the Bengal Delta shows, dis-
placement can begin with moving to a dierent part of one's own land in the rst
instance, and continue to unfold over several years before causing actual reloca-
tion. e consequences for individuals for slow displacements such as these can
be equally if not more devastating than temporary trauma resulting from disasters,
because land lost to the sea can never be regained and is rarely compensated.
Development and urbanisation
e diculty of disentangling environmental factors from the multiple drivers of
internal displacement and rural-to-urban migration is often acute. It makes little
sense, for instance, to devise policy to combat climate-induced migration without
addressing the larger question of its relationship with economic development.
Agricultural modernisation and urbanisation present two particularly important
factors that already shape the mobility of populations in the Global South. Given
the colossal scale of historic and contemporary dislocation caused by resource
extraction, land acquisitions by corporations and governments, and infrastructure
projects such as economic corridors in rural areas,9 policies that seek to «emplace»
9 This latest bid to attack migration's «root cause» is not unprecedented. For an early critique,
see Thorburn, J. (1996), «Root Cause Approaches to Forced Migration: Part of a Comprehensive
Strategy? A European Perspective», Journal of Refugee Studies 9(2), 119–35.
14
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
migrants by engaging them in farming or targeting «root causes» seem wishful (see
Gaibazzi, this volume).10 As for those who seek to migrate voluntarily, they have
been ushered towards cities by the economic system itself at breakneck speed since
at least the 1980s.
A more sensible approach to attempting to discourage migration through de-
velopment would be to consider what some rural and Indigenous communities
have been demanding through their own representatives and leaders on the world
stage and at the local level for several decades (see bin Rashid, de Sousa, this
volume): land redistribution, the retention (or adoption) of peasant identity, and
livelihood strategies based on sustainable farming and attachment to place. Here-
in lies the dierence between the top-down «comprehensive approach» to restrict-
ing mobility through tried, tested and failed models of development on the one
hand, and on the other a climate justice-based empowerment of rural populations
that acknowledges their right to live in dignity on the land they steward. Unlike the
former, the latter recognises the sovereignty, traditions, knowledge and cosmolo-
gies of the peasantry as being central to the sustainability of a global food system
upon which we all depend.
Not that everyone in the Global South wants to be a farmer, of course. Empow-
ering those who wish to stay put cannot be an exercise in social engineering or
coercive de-urbanisation based on reied notions of the peasantry.11 Climate-in-
duced migration in the Global South is equally a question of governance in cit-
ies which are likely to be on the frontlines when extreme weather events result in
massive displacement. Where nation-states tend towards border fortication to
protect abstract and territorial space from outsiders, localities, neighbourhoods
and cities are sites of struggle for climate and mobility justice in which public
participation, grassroots initiatives, inclusive provisioning and mobilisation can
provide the basis of solidarity that counters xenophobia and racism.12
Yet cities lack the political power, autonomy and resources of nation-states. In
cities, as in rural domains, there is no easy way to separate the suering caused
by global warming from the workings of a system that has normalised displace-
ment, disenfranchisement and precarity among the poor, many of whom are
rural migrants living at the urban-rural interface in peripheral zones of cities
where public service provision is minimal or absent. Part of the problem stems
from the unplanned nature of Asian and African cities, where the bulk of rural-
to-urban migration results in informal settlement, both in mega cities and more
recent, spontaneously formed urban conglomerations, which receive less funding
10 See bin Rashid, this volume, and Sassen, S. (2014), Expulsions (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press).
11 For a discussion, see Edelman, M. (2013), «What Is a Peasant? What Are Peasantaries?», a brief-
ing paper on issues of definition (New York, NY: Hunter College, Graduate Centre), available
at: www.ohchr.org/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/wgpleasants/edelman.pdf (accessed 1 Sep-
tember 2020).
12 Turhan, E., and Armeiero, M. (2019), «Of (Not) Being Neighbors: Cities, Citizens and Climate
Change in an Age of Migrations», Mobilities 14(3), 363–74.
15
Preface and Introduction
than their larger, more powerful metropolitan counterparts. e other part of the
problem is that planning itself – in so far as it does exist – is subordinate to power-
ful agendas and regimes of urban development that, like their rural equivalents,
systematically uproot the poor, whose residences and economic activities are
routinely displaced and destroyed to make way for gentried housing enclaves,
infrastructure and commercial buildings. In South Asia, the poor are equally, if
not more likely, to face ruin by bulldozers than weather events. ose who evade
eviction cannot escape the negative health consequences of global heating, which,
when combined with dirty industry, road traffic, slash-and-burn agriculture
and construction, results in dwindling access to water, suocating levels of atmos-
pheric toxicity and alarming increases in temperature in densely populated areas
(see Anwar and Sur, this volume).
Many of the worst aected by these increasingly dicult conditions in cities
are migrant workers from rural areas who have eectively moved into zones of
climate risk (see McMichael, this volume). is underlines the importance of
understanding climate-induced mobility as part of a broader ecology of motion, in
which those who ee disasters are just one of the many constituencies aected
by climate change. Others include those who might otherwise migrate but have be-
come trapped (involuntarily immobile) or suspended by other contextual factors
in zones of climate risk. e contribution by Taylor and Cupido to this volume, for
instance, considers a curious case of «displacement in place» (or «dis-placement»)
in South Africa, where economically devastated farming communities in the
Northern Cape have entered a condition of dependency on state disbursements
that makes migration to cities unlikely. e authors use the term «refugee camp» in
a non-legal, sociological sense to refer to the dwellings of this population, whose
locality has been dramatically diminished, resulting in downward social mobility
and severe mental and physical health risks.13
Care work, climate work: Towards a new realism
Germany is leading calls for global warming to be taken seriously at the highest
echelons of world power, using its chairmanship of the United Nations Security
Council to push for urgent attention to the impacts of climate change on peace and
security. Foreign Minister Heiko Maas commissioned a comprehensive report –
to be published in 2022 – on climate security risks at the second Berlin Climate
and Security Conference in 2019. Its objective to identify concrete policy solutions
that will enhance the capacity of states to deal with climate-induced disasters, for
instance by creating early warning mechanisms, is laudable and welcomed as an
important point of departure for research and policy.
13 For a useful scholarly discussion of «displacement in place», see Lubkemann, S. (2008), «Invol-
untary Immobility: On a Theoretical Invisibility in Migration Studies», Journal of Refugee Stud-
ies 21(4), 454–75.
16
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
For the report to yield significant improvements in climate and mobility
governance, however, it must endeavour to be a starting point for discussions on
climate change that go beyond security, taking on board the concerns of civil so-
ciety and the many constituencies that represent the populations which stand to
lose most from global heating: organisations such as the International Organiza-
tion for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), which can and must cooperate to create better mechanisms of response
to deal with the migratory fallouts of global warming.14 is volume makes a case
for legislation and funding to target specic groups and problems relating to
climate-induced mobility, with the caveat that additional forms and layers of
support for displaced persons must supplement and build upon – not replace –
existing rights and protections (see Kent and Behrman, this volume).
At the same time, policymaking must stretch its framework of concer n to address
the myriad ways in which individuals and groups move and stay put in relation to
changing ecologies. Doing so entails loosening the imaginative grip of tropes and
archetypes that result in a disproportionate focus of attention and resources upon
a handful of displacement situations, and neglect of many others. What we need is
a comprehensive raft of policies and reforms across a range of spheres and scales –
policies that take shape from listening to a wider array of experts and voices. Some
of those closest to the ground will want to change the very basis of discussion to
talk about issues that go beyond extreme weather, pointing out that it makes little
sense to make arrangements for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)
without addressing the incongruities of a system that displaces millions without
help from «nature» (see bin Rashid, de Sousa, this volume).
Faced with the threat of climate change, policymaking has responded with fear
of climate refugees and/or callous complacency about their resilience to adapt to
appalling scenarios. At their most cynical, such perspectives breed an ugly, selsh
survivalism that prioritises stockpiling to preserve environmental privilege – the
geopolitical equivalent of hoarding toilet paper during a pandemic. Which brings
us back, full circle, to lessons of the ongoing health crisis.
As noted in the conversation between three young activists from Asia, Africa
and the Caribbean engaged in bringing about environmental change (see Sauer,
this volume), care work is climate work and must be acknowledged as such.15
Part of this recognition consists of ensuring that care systems are robust and t
for purpose. Equally, however, a change in cultural perception must occur, as
feminists have been saying for some time. Quite apart from esteeming care work
for its nobility and spiritual value, care is emerging as a core tenet of a new, post-
pandemic realism that understands the role of justice and welfare as essential lines
14 Lakeman, S. (2019, November 26–27), «UNHCR and IOM: Mandates and Cooperation in Re-
lation to Environmental Displacement», workshop paper presented at «Climate Justice and
Migration: Mobility, Development and Displacement in the Global South», a collaboration
between Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung and Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient, Berlin.
15 For a broader discussion of climate work as care work featuring Naomi Klein, see: https://lives-
tream.com/accounts/4838057/carework/videos/197593858 (accessed 1 September 2020).
17
Preface and Introduction
of defence against the ravages of ecological instability. Care, justice, and coopera-
tion are not utopian delusions. ey are the basis of human survival in the Anthro-
pocene, an era in which chauvinistic posturing, cynical isolationism and brash
boasts of control that promise to put autochthonous populations «rst» are being
swept away by the increasingly undeniable realities of interdependency between
and among humans and other species, and the terrifying limits of our grip over
nature.
Ali Nobil Ahmad and Kirsten Maas-Albert
Photo: © Tristen Taylor
A springbok's carcass on a sheep and game farm near Strydenburg,
a small town in the semi-arid Karoo region of Northern Cape,
where livestock farming has been devastated by protracted drought
21
Avidan Kent and Simon Behrman Mind the gap: Addressing the plight of climate refugees in international law
AVIDAN KENT AND SIMON BEHRMAN
Mind the gap:
Addressing the plight of climate
refugees in international law
e often gradual and diuse nature of climate change can obscure many of its
more devastating eects. But for those forced from their homes as a result of sea-
level rise, desertication or increased and more severe extreme weather events, the
eects of climate change are already causing acute trauma. From the thousands
who lost their homes during the Australian bush res in the summer of 2019/2020,
to the tens of thousands of Pacic Islanders whose habitable land is dramatically
shrinking every year, to the hundreds of thousands being forced to migrate annu-
ally as a result of desertication in North Africa and Central America, the eects
are not merely speculation about what may occur in the future.
e relative speed with which climate change is forcing increasing numbers of
people to seek a life elsewhere has so far not been met with a matching urgency in
devising just alternatives for them. Indeed, the legal constraints on cross-border
movement appear to be hardening almost everywhere. Yet, the picture is not as
bleak as it may at rst appear. Behind the headlines, and often in piecemeal fash-
ion, legal concepts and pathways are being developed. ese are sporadic and often
inadequate, but nonetheless they represent steps forward, at least in terms of recog-
nising that the problem exists. In this chapter, we shine a light on just a few of these
developments and suggest ways in which they can be built upon to produce more
eective protections and remedies for climate refugees.
A note on terminology
Before commencing, we would like to make a brief clarication regarding the ter-
minology used here. Few terms have been as hotly debated as «climate refugees».
Denitions of each of its components – «climate» and «refugees» – have been exten-
sively contested, and a myriad of alternatives are being used by academics, civil
servants and policymakers. e reader should be aware that there is no consensus
22
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
on any denition: ere are even those who object to any distinction between dif-
ferent types of refugees/migrants, regardless of the cause of movement.1
We advocate in favour of the term «climate refugees».2 e reader should be
aware, however, that our choice is controversial and that other terms – including
«climate-induced migration», «environmental displacement» or even the obscure/
watered-down «disaster displacement» – are often preferred. In brief, our view is
that the prex «climate» (as opposed to, say, «environmental», «disaster», etc.) en-
ables a focus on the specic causes and features of climate change. In particular,
there is now a substantial body of scientic evidence that not only demonstrates
climate change is man-made, but also identies the guilty parties. In the context
of this discussion, this is important in identifying who is responsible for mitigating
the eects on people displaced as a result, and for putting in place the necessary
protection regime.
e choice of the term «refugee» is particularly contentious, and we have chosen
it after careful deliberation. Opposition to its use in the context of climate change
comes largely from refugee lawyers who argue (correctly) that the main instrument
of international refugee law does not apply in the absence of persecution. is lim-
itation is discussed in detail below. However, in essence we argue that the narrow
denition found in the 1951 Refugee Convention, which denes as a «refugee» only
someone who cannot return to their home countries due to a well-founded fear
of persecution «for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particu-
lar social group or political opinion»,3 should not monopolise our understanding
of the term «refugee»; that indeed alternative understandings of this term exist
(including in international law4); and that a 70-year-old legal denition should not
stop the development of this term, especially in the context of new challenges, such
as the eects of climate change.
Moreover, the term «refugee» carries with it a power and a set of associations,
beyond that of a single legal denition, which makes it an appropriate one to apply
to people forced to leave their homes. It suggests that people who have been forced
to abandon their homes and seek refuge are distinct from those who make a more
or less free choice, as is common with migrants in general. It also strongly implies a
need for protection, which links back to our central argument about responsibility,
1 See, for example, UK Government (2011), Foresight: Migration and Global Environmental
Change , final project report (London: Government Office for Science), p. 11, available at: https://
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
287717/11-1116-migration-and-global-environmental-change.pdf.
2 For a much more detailed exposition of our argument, see Kent, A., and Behrman, S. (2018),
Facilitating the Resettlement and Rights of Climate Refugees: An Argument for Developing Exist-
ing Principles and Practices (Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge), Chapter 2.
3 Article 1(A)2, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United Nations,
Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137.
4 See, for example, UNRWA's definition of «Palestinian Refugees» (available at: www.unrwa.org/
palestine-refugees); the Fourth Geneva Convention's treatment of the term «war refugees»; the
African Union's 1967 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa; and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees.
23
Avidan Kent and Simon Behrman Mind the gap: Addressing the plight of climate refugees in international law
in both legal and moral terms, for granting access across borders and providing the
necessary nancial support to enable those aected to rebuild their lives.
Although some object that «refugee» implies «victims» or other negative con-
notations, our response is twofold. First, the images created of all types of migrants
have been degraded in the public consciousness in recent years. Second, it is pos-
sible to resist that negativity better by referring to «refugees» rather than alterna-
tives such as «migrants» and «displaced persons». Historically, refugees were both
active and heroic gures – think of those who escaped 19th century despotisms in
Europe, or the mid-20th century dictatorships. e root meaning of the word5 –
of people seeking asylum – suggests active subjects in a way that is absent in the
widely used descriptor «displaced».
In short, we believe that «climate refugee» captures many of the dening ele-
ments of the phenomenon – certainly better than the alternatives – and enables us
to better identify the needs of people who are forced from their homes, and who is
responsible for addressing their plight. Yet, whatever nomenclature one may choose
to describe this phenomenon, it does not change three fundamental facts.
First, those having to migrate due to climate change are not dened as «refu-
gees» under the 1951 Refugee Convention, and therefore do not enjoy the protec-
tions that come with this legal status. We elaborate more on this point in the second
part of this chapter (see «Mitigation and adaptation»).
Second, climate change is a driver for migration, even if it can be, on many
occasions, dicult to distinguish from other causes of migration.6 e issue of cli-
mate refugees must therefore be addressed primarily7 within the wider political
and scientic context of climate change.
ird, and most importantly, those having to leave their homes due to the
eects of climate change are vulnerable; they require protection, which interna-
tional law does not currently fully provide. is third element – the gaps in the
regulations and the failure of international law to protecting climate refugees – is
the focus of this chapter.
5 The term «refugee» is derived from the French verb se réfugier , which means to seek shelter
from danger; it was first applied to persecuted French Protestants, who fled to England and the
Netherlands in the 16th and 17th centuries.
6 See the discussion on causality in the section «The double problem of causality» below.
7 This is not to say that this topic should not be addressed in other forums (e.g. human rights
frameworks) as well. The argument here is that climate change debates and negotiations must
view climate-induced migration as part and parcel of the wider climate context and as a phe-
nomenon that must be addressed within this debate.
24
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
Defining the «legal hole»
What kind of protection should the law provide for climate refugees? ere are
three types of laws, or three objectives that the law must achieve in order to provide
a comprehensive solution to the plight of climate refugees:8
(1) e law should provide protection for climate refugees' most fundamental rights.
(2) e law must facilitate adaptation and mitigation policies that will reduce
(or even eliminate) the risks that are faced by climate refugees.
(3) e law should enable access to remedies for refugees, as well as for other rele-
vant entities (e.g. refugees' host states).
e following review addresses these three categories. e vulnerability of climate
refugees in each situation is discussed, as well as the relevant legal framework that
is available to them. e reader will notice that our classication is not rigid, and
that dierent elements related to protection, mitigation and remedies indeed often
overlap.
Protection
Protecting rights under international law
e vulnerability of migrants and refugees has been acknowledged by the interna-
tional community on numerous occasions, including in the context of climate-in-
duced migration.9 A Discussion Paper drafted by the Mary Robinson Foundation
identied how the act of climate migration might interfere with the enjoyment of
fundamental rights, such as the right to culture, work, water, food, housing, access
to land, self-determination, freedom of movement and, in the more extreme cases,
also the rights to life, liberty and freedom from torture.10 e UN Oce of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) added to this list
other rights, including to sanitation, social security, education, the prohibition of
collective expulsion, personal integrity, family unity and eective legal status.11
Certain groups and individuals have demanded protection of these rights
under dierent international fora. In an (unsuccessful) petition made by Inuit
8 Our categories are based on – but slightly different from – Kälin and Schrepfer's categories
(mitigation, adaptation and protection); see Kälin, W., and Schrepfer, N. (2012), «Protecting
People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change Normative Gaps and Possible
Approaches» (UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series), available at: www.unhcr.
org/4f33f1729.pdf.
9 See inter alia the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, the two Global Compacts,
the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and more.
10 Mary Robinson Foundation (2016, September 30), «Human Rights, Migration and Displacement
Related to the Adverse Impact of Climate Change», discussion paper, available at: www.ohchr.
org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/EM2016/HumanRightsMigrationDisplacement.pdf.
11 OHCHR (2018, June 18–July 6), Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights , Human Rights Council Thirty-eighth session, A/HRC/38/21, available at: https://undocs.
org/pdf?symbol=en/A/HRC/38/21.
25
Avidan Kent and Simon Behrman Mind the gap: Addressing the plight of climate refugees in international law
communities to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the petitioners
complained that the actions of polluting states (the United States in this case) were
leading to climatic changes in the Arctic region. It was claimed that these changes
were aecting these communities' ability to sustain their traditional ways of life,
interfering with their ability to enjoy their rights to culture, a healthy environment,
property (including intellectual property), health, life and more.12
In a dierent petition (pending at the time of writing) that was submitted by
a group of children/teenagers (including the well-known activist Greta unberg)
under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, it has been argued that climate
change is creating «mass migrations»,13 and that certain islands «could become
uninhabitable within decades».14 e petitioners argue with respect to their right
to culture that rising sea levels will eventually «decimate indigenous cultures,
including those of the indigenous petitioners […]».15 With respect to the right to life,
the petitioners state that «increasingly hot temperatures are threatening their
thousand-year-old subsistence traditions, which are intimately connected to their
livelihoods and wellbeing».16
In another (pending) communication submitted to the UN Human Rights
Committee by communities from the Torres Strait Islands, it has been claimed that
climate change is «causing regular ooding of land and homes, damaging impor-
tant cultural sites located on the edges of islands», and is predicted to result in the
«total submergence of ancestral homelands».17 e Islanders therefore claim that
Australia's inaction on climate change is interfering with their rights to culture and
life, as well as their right to be «free from arbitrary interference with privacy, family
and home».18
In yet another (unsuccessful) communication submitted to the Human Rights
Committee, a national of the Republic of Kiribati (Mr Ioane Teitiota) has claimed
that, by returning him to that country, the state of New Zealand has violated his
right to life. Life in Kiribati, it was claimed,
12 See review of the petitioners' claims in «Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human
Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and
Omissions of the United States» (2005), pp. 74–95. The full text of the petition along with
responses from the IACHR can be found at http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/petition-
to-the-inter-american-commission-on-human-rights-seeking-relief-from-violations-resulting-
from-global-warming-caused-by-acts-and-omissions-of-the-united-states.
13 Communication to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, in the Case of Chiara Sacchi et al.
(2019), available at: https://childrenvsclimatecrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/2019.09.
23-CRC-communication-Sacchi-et-al-v.-Argentina-et-al.pdf.
14 Ibid., p. 2.
15 Ibid., pp. 6, 43.
16 Ibid.
17 Although the Communication itself is not publicly available, the NGO that is supporting this
claim (Client Earth) has posted an informative Q & A with relevant information, available at:
http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-
us-case-documents/2019/20190513_Not-Available_press-release-1.pdf.
18 Ibid.
26
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
«has become increasingly unstable and precarious due to sea-level rise
caused by global warming. Fresh water has become scarce because of salt-
water contamination and overcrowding on Tarawa [the island in the archi-
pelago where the Teitiota family is from]. Attempts to combat sea-level
rise have largely been ineective. Inhabitable land on Tarawa has eroded,
resulting in a housing crisis and land disputes that have caused numerous
fatalities. Kiribati has thus become an untenable and violent environment
for the author and his family.»19
ere is no doubt that a signicant body of international law is available for the
protection of these basic human rights. Treaties such as the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights cover most of the rights mentioned above. Other «core»
human rights treaties,20 as well as a long list of regional human rights treaties and
domestic laws, are adding more layers of protection. Arguably, certain human
rights are protected, also under customary international law, and therefore enjoy
universal coverage.21
e relevance of this body of human rights laws to migrants and refugees, and
the need to enforce them, was recently recognised by the international community
through the conclusion of two UN Global Compacts, both of which have dened
human rights as a foundational principle.22 e Global Compact for Safe, Orderly
and Regular Migration states that it is
«based on international human rights law and upholds the principles
of non-regression and non-discrimination. By implementing the Global
Compact, we ensure eective respect for and protection and fullment
of the human rights of all migrants, regardless of their migration status,
across all stages of the migration cycle. We also rearm the commitment
to eliminate all forms of discrimination, including racism, xenophobia and
intolerance, against migrants and their families.»23
On the face of it, the commitment to – and the coverage of – human rights laws
seems both impressive and useful. A closer observation, however, reveals that cer-
tain problems nevertheless exist. It is useful to discuss the legal situation in two
19 UN Human Rights Committee, «Views Adopted by the Committee under Article 5 (4) of the
Optional Protocol», concerning Communication No. 2728/2016 (2020), para. 2.1.
20 For example, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrim-
ination; Convention on the Rights of the Child; Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women;
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
21 De Schutter, O. (2019), International Human Rights Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press), p. 59.
22 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, para. 15f.; the Global Compact on
Refugees, para. 5.
23 Ibid., para. 15f.
27
Avidan Kent and Simon Behrman Mind the gap: Addressing the plight of climate refugees in international law
scenarios/contexts: the event of internal displacement (i.e. where refugees are not
required to cross borders, but simply migrate to other regions within their home
countr y), and the event of cross-border migration (i.e. where the refugee will have
to cross a border in her search for shelter).
Protecting internally displaced persons (IDPs)
In the case of internal displacement, the legal situation is fairly clear: e above-
mentioned body of human rights laws applies, and in most cases it is binding on
states. States have reiterated their commitment to this body of law on numerous
occasions, including in the more specic context of migration, refugees24 as well as
climate change.25
Soft-law-based solutions have also enforced the protection of those internally
displaced due to climate change. e most notable document in this respect is the
UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (UNGP),26 which in some cases
have been incorporated into binding legal instruments,27 or have been proven use-
ful for states in dierent ways.28 e UNGP require the protection of a comprehen-
sive list of rights, including protection from discrimination, arbitrary displacement,
rights to life, dignity, liberty and more.
Although the legal framework discussed above is certainly comprehensive, cer-
tain challenges still exist. To begin with, the fact that international human rights
law instructs states to follow certain standards does not mean that in practice they
do.29 A line of reports and studies indicate that the presence of human rights laws
does not necessarily mean respect for human rights also in practice,30 and that
24 See, for example, the New York Declaration, para. 5 (see note 9).
25 See preamble to the Paris Agreement (2015).
26 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 22 July 1998, ADM 1.1,PRL 12.1, PR00/98/109.
27 For example, the African Union Kampala Convention states that the Parties are «[r]ecognising
the inherent rights of internally displaced persons as provided for […] in the United Nations
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement […]». See the preamble to African Union Con-
vention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa («Kampala
Convention»), 23 October 2009. See also a review of studies on the implementation of the
Guiding Principles in national legislations in Kälin et al. (see note 29 below).
28 Simon Russell explains that the UNGP has been used «as inspiration for the development of
national laws or policies […] durable solutions frameworks […] have been most successful in
forging international agreement on and conformity to the meaning of who is an ‹IDP›»; Russell,
S. (2018), «The Operational Relevance of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement» ,
International Journal of Refugee Law , 30(2), 307–08.
29 Kälin and Williams note in the context of the protection of IDPs: «[A] recurring theme is the
gap between law and practice. The legislation of many of the countries surveyed in this volume
contains important provisions for IDPs – in some cases specifying them as a separate cate-
gory and in others focusing on the universality of human rights for all citizens – but in practice
these rights are rarely fully realized, especially for IDPs»; Kälin, W., and Williams, R. (2010),
«Introduction», in Kälin, W. et al. (eds.), Incorporating the Guiding Principles on Internal Dis-
placement into Domestic Law: Issues and Challenges , p. 6 (Washington, DC: American Society
of International Law and Brookings), available at: www.refworld.org/pdfid/4b6c164e2.pdf.
30 De Schutter (2019), International Human Rights Law , p. 810 (see note 21).
28
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
compliance with international human rights law leaves much to be desired.31
Indeed, of the three petitions to international human rights courts mentioned
above, one was dismissed without even a full hearing (Inuits), another failed based
on contentious grounds (Teitiota)32 while the third (Chiara Sacchi et al.) is still
pending. Also, the implementation of the UNGP specically has been far from easy
and remains a challenge in many areas of the world.33
Moreover, it is important to note that certain human rights require the invest-
ment of resources, especially where population displacement is permanent and the
state is under obligations to provide benets such as adequate housing and access
to services. Where resources are less available, the delivery of rights becomes more
challenging. We elaborate more on this point below in our discussion on adaptation
rules.
Protecting cross-border migration
e case of cross-border migration presents further diculties. Although it is clear
that many human rights protections still apply, this body of law does not grant indi-
viduals the right to cross a border, nor to legally remain within host countries' terri-
tories. e right to enter another state (and to remain there legally) is secured under
international law through a line of regional (e.g. the EU treaties) and bilateral (e.g.
US-Marshall Islands Compact of Free Association34
) agreements that grant rights
of entry/migration to nationals of the relevant member states. ese agreements
are naturally limited in coverage and are relevant only for the «lucky few» who are
living in relevant states.
International refugee law and its limitations
Another, more limited right to cross a border is available through international ref-
ugee law. Refugee treaties (notably the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and the 1967
31 See, for example, Human Rights Watch's annual World Report , or Amnesty International's
annual The State of the World's Human Rights reports.
32 Elsewhere, we give a detailed critique of this judgment: Behrman, S., and Kent, A. (forthcom-
ing), «Prospects for Protection in Light of the Human Rights Committee's Decision in Teitiota v
New Zealand», Polish Migration Review .
33 Kälin describes the impact of the UNGP as a glass «half full and, at the same time, half empty».
Kälin, W. (2018), «Consolidating the Normative Framework for IDPs», International Journal
of Refugee Law 30(2), 314. See more critical comments on the state of implementation of the
UNGP in Orchard, P. (2018), «Implementing the Guiding Principles at the Domestic Level»,
Forced Migration Review , 59, 11. This author (critically) mentions 30 laws and policies that
explicitly mention the UNGP. For a useful overview of IDP law more generally and its gaps in
relation to climate change displacement, see Koser, K. (2011), «Climate Change and Internal
Displacement: Challenges to the Normative Framework», in Piguet, E. et al. (eds.), Migration
and Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and UNESCO).
34 Available at: https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/173999.pdf.
29
Avidan Kent and Simon Behrman Mind the gap: Addressing the plight of climate refugees in international law
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees35
) provide those who are recognised as
«refugees» with the right to enter other states and legally reside there. Importantly,
the right to be considered a «refugee» is not applicable to all those seeking refuge.
e Refugee Convention denes as a «refugee» only those who cannot return to
their home countries due to a well-founded fear of persecution «for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion».36
ere is little doubt that, according to these criteria, climate refugees are not «ref-
ugees»: e eects of climate change are not persecutory in the generally accepted
meaning of the word.37 e Refugee Convention's denition was designed in the
immediate post-Second World War period, and it understandably conceptualised
refugees in light of the horrors and circumstances of that time. Unfortunately,
although this denition was amended in certain, very limited respects under the
1967 Protocol and has been expanded jurisprudentially, it is a very long way from
being able to accommodate more modern phenomena such as climate change.38
e Refugee Convention still has an important part to play in providing protection
to people eeing direct persecution for their political or religious beliefs, or other
personal characteristics – sadly these cases are still numerous. For that reason, we
do not believe that the Convention should be reopened for amendment, much less
dispensed with; rather, a category of «climate refugee» should be created elsewhere,
either through a new treaty, or more likely by establishing some kind of protection
mechanism via an existing human rights or environmental law framework.
Non-refoulement as an imperfect solution
Another relevant legal route for those having to cross a border is the principle of
non-refoulement, which has its roots in international refugee law but has since
been signicantly expanded as a universal principle via multiple human rights
35 United Nations (1951, July 28), Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, treaty series,
vol. 189, p. 137; United Nations (1967, January 31), Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
treaty series, vol. 606, p. 267.
36 Refugee Convention, ibid., Art 1(A)2.
37 It should be noted, however, that the New Zealand Supreme Court – in an earlier iteration of
the Human Rights Committee case mentioned above – left open the possibility that climate
change could be a contributory factor that opens the door to refugee status under the Refugee
Convention, although they did not go into any detail as to how this might occur. Ioane Teitiota
v the Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2015] NZSC 107,
at para. 13.
38 The 1967 Protocol simply removed the strict temporal and geographic limitations of the 1951
Convention by making it applicable to refugee-producing events outside of Europe after 1951.
Case law around the world has been used to extend protections to certain types of persecution,
such as those based on gender or sexuality. However, the focus on persecution appears to be
a boundary, beyond which the Convention cannot be stretched. It should be noted, though,
that regional agreements such as the 1969 Organisation for African Unity Refugee Convention
and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration do extend the refugee convention beyond «persecution»
and have greater potential for including people fleeing the effects of climate change.
30
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
treaties and cases.39 In a nutshell, the principle of non-refoulement forbids sending
people back to any place – including their home countries – where they face the
threat of serious harm. Whereas the Refugee Convention forbids only the return
of those qualifying as «refugees» (and thus less relevant for this chapter), under
human rights law this principle is much broader and applies to anyone threatened
by death, torture or other forms of inhumane treatment.40 e UN Human Rights
Committee has explained in the context of the Right to Life (Art. 6 ICCPR (Right to
Life)) that:41
«e duty to respect and ensure the right to life requires States parties to
refrain from deporting, extraditing or otherwise transferring individuals to
countries in which there are substantial grounds for believing that a real
risk exists that their right to life under article 6 of the Covenant would be
violated. Such a risk must be personal in nature and cannot derive merely
from the general conditions in the receiving State, except in the most
extreme cases.»
Many authors have made the link between the principle of non-refoulement and
the obligation to refrain from the deportation of climate refugees.42 ese authors
argue that the risks in returning to areas that can no longer sustain life (due to the
impacts of climate change) justify the prohibition on the deportation of climate
refugees: «e threat in this case comes from the environment, not from the home
state's policies, but the eect on the victim is the same.»43 e UN Human Rights
Committee has recently conrmed this line of argument. e Committee elab-
orated that the right to life must not be understood in a restrictive manner, and
that it «extends to reasonably foreseeable threats and life-threatening situations
39 See, for example, Kolmannskog, V. (2008), «Climates of Displacement», Nordisk Tidsskrift for
Menneskerettigheter 26, 302, 312.
40 UNHCR, «Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obli-
gations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol»,
available at: www.unhcr.org/4d9486929.pdf, see paragraphs following note 34 with respect to
specific HR treaties, and text below the section above «International refugee law and its limita-
tions» with respect to HR law, which is based on customary international law.
41 Human Rights Committee, «General Comment No. 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life» (30 October), CCPR/C/GC/36,
para.30.
42 See, for example, Kolmannskog (see note 39); Docherty, B., and Giannini, T. (2009), «Confront-
ing a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees», Harv Envtl L Rev
33, 349, 377; Scott, M. (2014), «Natural Disasters, Climate Change and Non-refoulement: What
Scope for Resisting Expulsion under Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights?», International Journal of Refugee Law 26(3), 404; Poon, J. (2018), «Drawing upon Inter-
national Refugee Law: The Precautionary Approach to Protecting Climate Change-displaced
Persons», in Behrman, S., and Kent, A. (eds.), «Climate Refugees»: Beyond the Legal Impasse?
(Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge).
43 Docherty and Giannini, ibid., 377.
31
Avidan Kent and Simon Behrman Mind the gap: Addressing the plight of climate refugees in international law
that can result in loss of life»,44 including threats that result from climate-related
environmental degradation.45
It should be noted, however, that certain limitations nevertheless exist. To
begin with, as stated in the Committee's quotation above, the threat must be «be
personal in nature and cannot derive merely from the general conditions in the
receiving State». e case of climate refugees is hardly ever «personal in nature»,
and, by denition, it will almost always derive «from the general conditions in
the receiving State». Furthermore, as pointed out by others, the risk to the person
returning to his/her state must be immediate.46 is requirement is reasonable in
the context of «ordinary» asylum cases, such as where the person is facing threats
related to loss of freedom, violence, etc. e slow-onset nature of many of the risks
associated with climate change, however, will fail most attempts to rely on rules
such as non-refoulement (or Art. 6 ICCPR), as the threats from events such as rising
sea levels are not (yet) immediate.
ese two sets of diculties (the «immediate» and «personal» nature of the
threat) have featured heavily in the Teitiota case discussed above. e Human
Rights Committee ruled in 2019 that the claimant did not demonstrate that the risk
was «personal» in any way, or dierent from other residents of Kiribati.47 e Com-
mittee further decided that the slow eect of climate change (notably the fact that
life, even if harder, is still sustainable on these islands) implies that the threat is not
imminent, but will materialise only in the not-so-near future (if ever at all).48 is
decision is certainly important, as climate-related events were, at last, recognised
as a justifying cause for prohibiting the deportation of persons back to areas that
have been dramatically aected by climate change. Yet, it demonstrates the limits
of the principle of non-refoulement and the diculty that will stand in the way of
climate refugees, should they attempt to rely on this principle in the future.
The potential statelessness of climate refugees
Another legal matter that concerns cross-border migration is related to the poten-
tial statelessness of climate refugees. is possibility can exist only where all avail-
able adaptation eorts fail;49 entire island nations, such as low-lying Kiribati, Tuvalu,
the Maldives and the Marshall Islands, will sink under the ocean and eectively
disappear. Where the state no longer exists, its (now exiled) citizens may, arguably,
be regarded as «stateless». e 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless
44 UN Human Rights Committee, para. 9.4 (see note 19).
45 Ibid., 9.5.
46 McAdam, J., and Limon, M. (2015), Human Rights, Climate Change and Cross-Border Displace-
ment: The Role of the International Human Rights Community in Contributing to Effective and
Just Solutions (Geneva: Universal Rights Group), p. 16.
47 UN Human Rights Committee, para. 9.7 (see note 19).
48 Ibid., paras. 9.10–9.12.
49 Some argue that at least in some cases, engineering solutions will prevent the complete sinking
of nation islands; see, for example, Esteban, M. et al. (2019), «Adaptation to Sea Level Rise on
Low Coral Islands: Lessons from Recent Events», Ocean & Coastal Management 168, 35.
32
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
Persons denes «stateless person» as one «who is not considered as a national by
any State under the operation of its law».50 e novelty of this situation – the lack
of a precedence, where a state simply physically disappeared – raises certain ques-
tions that are, for the time being, open.51
To begin with, the denition of «any State» is important, especially as it is not
clear whether once submerged under water, a state can still be legally regarded as
a «state». According to international law,52 a «state» requires elements such as a
dened territory, a permanent population, a government and a capacity to enter
into relations with other states. Should a state submerge in its entirety under water,
each of these elements will be questioned.
For example, can sinking states simply build articial islands in order to main-
tain their claim to a territory? Can perhaps the online, virtual presence of a state
be considered a sucient form of territorial existence? And what kind of a «govern-
ment» can a state have where its «citizens» are scattered around the world, eec-
tively (and permanently) living under the rule of other governments ? It is doubtful
whether climate refugees themselves would prefer such an arrangement, in which
they are subjected simultaneously to two governments (and two sets of rules). More-
over, certain basic cultural and social rights centred around the right of self-deter-
mination will be heavily compromised by living on the territory of other states.53
And what kind of relations may other governments have with submerged island
nations? Cooperation on issues ranging from trade to extraditions, investment,
environmental protection and many others will all become irrelevant. Potential
exceptions could be issues such as the exploitation of marine resources,54 but there
is no doubt that the range of issues requiring international relations will be lim-
ited. It is true that certain unique examples of «non-existing states» with (limited)
international relations exist: e Sovereign Order of Malta is often mentioned in
this respect, having entered into diplomatic relations with more than 100 states
and securing a permanent observer status at the United Nations. is example,
however, is both unique and misleading. e Order of Malta is eectively acting
today as a religious humanitarian organisation, not as a functioning state with
50 United Nations (1954, September 28), Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons,
treaty series, vol. 360, p. 117.
51 The International Law Commission is currently examining certain issues concerning the rise
of sea levels, including the question of statehood. United Nations (2019), Report of the Interna-
tional Law Commission , UN Doc A/73/10, p. 329, available at: https://undocs.org/en/A/74/10.
In addition, for a particularly interesting analysis of the novel issues thrown up by disappear-
ing states, see Burkett, M. (2011), «The Nation Ex-Situ: On Climate Change, Deterritorialized
Nationhood and the Post-climate Era», Climate Law 2(3), 345.
52 The accepted definition of a «state» is found in Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on
the Rights and Duties of States.
53 See, for example, Wewerinke-Singh, M. (2018), «Climate Migrants» Right to Enjoy Their Culture',
in Behrman, S., and Kent, A. (eds.), «Climate Refugees» : Beyond the Legal Impasse? (Abingdon-on-
Thames: Routledge).
54 Sharon, O. (2019), «Tides of Climate Change: Protecting the Natural Wealth Rights of Disap-
pearing States», Harvard International Law Journal 60(1), 95.
33
Avidan Kent and Simon Behrman Mind the gap: Addressing the plight of climate refugees in international law
aspirations to rule its subjects and protect their interests. e inescapable reality is
that the «sinking states» scenario is entirely novel, and international law does not
currently possess any easy answers.
In short, there is a strong possibility that, unless certain political arrangements
can be made (see below), the citizens of submerged island nations will become
«stateless», because their states will cease to exist as «states» in any meaningful sense.
Certain international rules provide protection for stateless persons, notably
the 1954 Convention and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.55
ese conventions secure certain rights for stateless persons, inter alia their rights
to religion, access to courts, travel documents, treatment similar to that granted to
other foreign nationals on a variety of matters (e.g. right to work, housing, educa-
tion, movement) and more. ere are nevertheless signicant limitations to these
conventions. To begin with, membership in these conventions is far from univer-
sal. e 1961 Convention has 75 parties, and the 1954 Convention has 94 parties,
that is, even after many decades, fewer than half of all states have signed up to
them. Secondly, the 1954 Convention does not require states to grant a nationality
for stateless persons, and the 1961 Convention only requires this in very specic
circumstances involving children born on the territory of the state or where one of
their parents already has citizenship in that state.
Certain solutions for preventing the statelessness of those residing on sink-
ing island nations have been proposed. Interesting possibilities include a territory
transfer with another state (including the full secession of sovereignty over said
territory), dierent forms of unication with other states or, simplest of all, the
mere acquisition of the nationality of a third state.56 ese solutions, however, are
all dependent on the political will of relevant countries, and it remains to be seen
whether they will be implemented when (and if) the time comes.
Supplementary soft-law guidelines
e protection rules discussed above are the most signicant parts in the legal
jigsaw currently available for climate refugees. ese rules are supplemented
by a long list of mostly soft-law-based recommendations, guidelines and other
non-binding documents that are aimed at the protection of climate refugees. ese
soft-law documents often protect only specic aspects that are related to the pro-
cess of migration. For example, the Migrants in Countries in Crisis principles and
guidelines from 2016 are designed to protect those ending up in unsafe environ-
ments, whether it be a conict or a natural disaster. Another example is the Inter-
national Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event
55 United Nations (1961, August 30), Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, treaty series,
vol. 989, p. 175.
56 These possibilities were identified by Park, S. (2011), Climate Change and the Risk of State-
lessness: The Situation of Low-lying Island States (Geneva: UNHCR), p. 17, available at: www.
unhcr.org/4df9cb0c9.pdf.
34
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
of Disasters from 2016, which provide useful instructions on international cooper-
ation and assistance.
Perhaps the most important soft-law-based supplementary guideline is the
Nansen Initiative's Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in
the Context of Disasters and Climate Change (the Nansen Protection Agenda). e
Nansen Protection Agenda is especially useful in the context of climate-induced,
cross-border displacement. is document includes a compilation of best practices
and guiding principles that states can learn from and apply in their own jurisdic-
tions. For example, it proposes criteria that governments could use for dening
who are «cross-border disaster-displaced persons»,57 as well as best practices for
those individuals' admission and stay in their host countries.58 Other useful prac-
tices include the protection of human rights, non-return (an adapted version of the
principle of non-refoulement, discussed above) and the long-term stay of refugees,
where necessary.59
Mitigation and adaptation
Mitigating climate-induced migration
e most important international framework for mitigation and adaptation eorts
is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its
related decisions and agreements. is Convention is very likely climate refugees'
only hope for mitigating the rise in emission levels and providing states with an
opportunity to adapt to climate change.
e mitigation of climate change is in many ways the ideal solution – it will
eectively remove the cause for migration (or at least reduce it where a mix of causes
exist) and consequently also the need for protection. Entering a discussion on the
UNFCCC and this framework's success in mitigating climate change is beyond the
scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, it must be said that current rules on climate
mitigation (notably the Paris Agreement's nationally determined contributions) are
insucient and not expected to succeed in reaching the emission reduction targets
set by the international community.60 As it is questionable whether the political will
to adopt more ambitious climate mitigation rules will be found in the near future,
perhaps one should not expect the «mitigation» of the problem (the reader is asked
to excuse our pessimism in this respect). In addition, we may already be at, or very
57 The Nansen Initiative (2015), Agenda for the Protection of Cross-border Displaced Persons in the
Context of Disasters and Climate Change , p. 22, available at: https://nanseninitiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/PROTECTION-AGENDA-VOLUME-1.pdf. It should be noted that on
completion of the agenda, the Nansen Initiative transformed itself into a permanent organ-
isation, known as the Platform for Disaster Displacement (PDD), carrying out research and
producing policy proposals around these issues. In particular, the PDD played a leading role
in the negotiations on the Global Compacts mentioned above, and it continues to work closely
with UN agencies and others to push forward the policy agenda.
58 Nansen Agenda, ibid., p. 26.
59 Nansen Agenda, ibid., pp. 28–29.
60 UNEP (2019), Emission Gap Report 2019 (Nairobi: UNEP).
35
Avidan Kent and Simon Behrman Mind the gap: Addressing the plight of climate refugees in international law
near to, certain «tipping points», whereby some eects of climate change are no
longer possible to control. More practically, rules on adaptation as well as «loss and
damage» may prove more useful in the context of this analysis.
Adaptation, loss and damage, and finance
e most signicant development to date in the context of loss and damage is the
establishment of a UNFCCC-led, cross-institutional Task Force on Displacement.
e Task Force submitted an initial report with several recommendations. ese
recommendations were endorsed in 2018 by the UNFCCC member states, and the
Task Force's mandate was extended until 2021. Its report includes recommenda-
tions on important elements, including improved institutional coordination and
coherence, and broader public participation. Importantly, the report calls on states
to «[c]onsider the formulation of national and subnational legislation, policies, and
strategies, as appropriate, that recognize the importance of integrated approaches
to avert, minimize, and address displacement related to adverse impacts of climate
change and issues around human mobility».61
Crucially, the Task Force is also addressing the matter of nance. As stated
above, the eective protection of refugees' rights involves the signicant allocation
of resources. Eective adaptation to large-scale climate migration requires the pro-
vision of public services, humanitarian assistance as well as the protection of rights
to shelter, education, health, etc. Some clue as to the nancial scale of this eort
can be learnt from Germany's own experience in hosting an inux of migrants in
the years 2015–2016. e cost of processing and accommodating asylum seekers
in Germany during this episode was estimated by the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) at around €10,000 per application.62 Over-
all, Germany spent €16 billion on asylum seekers in 2015 alone,63 a sum which many
nations may not be able to aord. Given that most climate refugees are expected to
seek refuge in the Global South, the allocation of signicant resources is expected
to be a signicant challenge.
e Task Force indeed addressed this gap in nance in several ways. To begin
with, it identied the existence of a «nance gap» as well as the fact that rele-
vant UNFCCC-related funds do not explicitly address climate-induced migration.
e Task Force points out that the lack of explicit reference could make the
61 UNFCCC (2018), Report of the Task Force on Displacement (New York, NY: UNFCCC), para. 33.
62 The estimated cost is for the first year of the application. OECD (2017), «Who Bears the Cost of
Integrating Refugees?» Migration Policy Debates, available at: www.oecd.org/els/mig/migra-
tion-policy-debates-13.pdf (accessed 11 October 2011). It should, however, be noted that in the
medium to longer term, there is much evidence that migrants/refugees produce a net economic
benefit. See, for example, a succession of reports produced by Jonathan Wadsworth on the
UK context for the London School of Economics' Centre for Economic Performance. Already
there is evidence that the mass arrival of refugees in Germany in 2015 is creating economic
dividends. See, for example, Dowling, S. (2019, June 20), «Germany Welcomed Refugees. Now
It's Reaping the Economic Benefits», Al Jazeera , available at: www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/
germany-welcomed-refugees-reaping-economic-benefits-190617194147334.html.
63 OECD, ibid., 2.
36
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
allocation of funds more complicated.64 is gap can have severe implications for
states' ability to adapt to future climate-induced migration, as well as for the level
of protection that they are able to provide refugees.
e Task Force further recommended that the «Parties and relevant organiza-
tions» will provide information on nancial support that they provide for averting,
minimising and addressing, climate-induced migration,65 and that the Executive
Committee of the UNFCCC's Warsaw International Mechanism, «in collaboration
with the Standing Committee on Finance and relevant organizations», will «facili-
tate mobilization of nancial resources for developing country Parties to avert, min-
imize and address displacement related to the adverse eects of climate change».66
ese developments are certainly useful. Unfortunately, these are all still
«recommendations», and no clear steps have so far been taken. Elsewhere, we have
argued that the rather vague mandate of climate funds could in fact be useful:
ere is nothing there to exclude the nance of climate-induced migration adapta-
tion projects.67 We claimed that the resources necessary for hosting climate refu-
gees could be dened as «adaptation eorts» and that – with the lack of any specic
instructions on the matter – states should at least attempt this route. Admittedly,
the UNFCCC funds are not sucient for supporting, say, the right to shelter for the
many millions that are predicted to migrate due to climate change. is limitation
should be acknowledged and ideally addressed through increased donations by
those states that are not currently hosting climate refugees. Realistically (and in
light of the Covid-19 nancial crisis), it could be that the more urgent adaptation
measures (e.g. humanitarian assistance to climate refugees) should be identied
by the member states in order to facilitate access to environmental funds (e.g. the
Green Climate Fund (GCF), the Global Environment Facility (GEF)).
Other authors have proposed dierent solutions with respect to the gap in
nance, notably the establishment of a newly designated international fund.68
We are not convinced, however, that a new fund is indeed the answer. e biggest
hurdle is – and always will be – the lack of nancial resources, and expecting ad-
ditional climate-related donations just because a new fund is created is unrealistic.
64 UNFCCC, Report of the Task Force , para. 23 (see note 61).
65 Ibid., para. 27.
66 Ibid., para. 27. See more relevant recommendations in the Report of the Task Force in para. 34,
p. 28 para. (h), p. 31 para. (c), and more.
67 Kent and Behrman, pp. 108–17 (see note 2).
68 Biermann, F., and Boas, I. (2010), «Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance
System to Protect Climate Refugees», Global Environmental Politics 10, 60; CRIDEAU (2013),
Draft Convention on the International Status of Environmentally-Displaced Persons (Third
version), available at: https://cidce.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Draft-Convention-on-the-
International-Status-on-environmentally-displaced-persons-third-version.pdf; Docherty, B.,
and Giannini, T. (2009), «A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees», Harvard
Environmental Law Review 33, 349; Hodgkinson, D., Burton, T., Young, L., and Anderson, H.
(2009), «Copenhagen, Climate Change ‹Refugees› and the Need for a Global Agreement», Pub-
lic Policy 4, 155.
37
Avidan Kent and Simon Behrman Mind the gap: Addressing the plight of climate refugees in international law
As stated above, existing funds (GCF, GEF) possess the required expertise; the
question is, primarily, one of political will to increase the scale of donations.
Supplementary soft-law guidelines
Other relevant pieces of legislation that are useful for enabling adaptation to
climate-induced migration include a variety of soft-law-based guidelines and reg-
ulations. e abovementioned Nansen Protection Agenda is one such example.
e agenda provides useful practices and guidelines on «preparedness», including
a recommendation to map communities (and areas) at risk, preparing future sce-
narios and plans for relocation, the establishment of education/training/accredita-
tion programmes for the facilitation of future migration and improved integration
in host communities.
Another key soft-law instrument in the context of adaptation is the Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. Although the Sendai principles are mostly
vague, some of its dened «priorities» are highly relevant for adaptation. e four
priorities are: «understanding disaster risk», «strengthening disaster risk govern-
ance to manage disaster risk», «investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience»
and «enhancing disaster preparedness for eective response and to ‹Build Back
Better› in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction». ese priorities are each
accompanied with a long list of specic key activities that provide concrete instruc-
tions for states wishing to prepare for the event of climate-related disasters (includ-
ing consequential migration) and adapt to it.
Access to remedies
e last element that international law will have to provide is access to reme-
dies. is part addresses the ability of those aected by climate-induced migra-
tion (mostly individuals and communities) to request a remedy from wrongdoers
that either contributed to the push factors in migration (e.g. by polluting) or failed
to protect refugees once they had to migrate (e.g. by not providing them with a
safe haven). Until recently, not many have attempted to demand a remedy from
responsible states. Recent years, however, have brought a barrage of climate-
related litigation in both national and international tribunals. Aected individuals
and communities are now trying their luck in courts, demanding eective reme-
dies from states. As reviewed below, certain obstacles are still standing in their way.
The double problem of causality
e most commonly requested remedy so far has been to reduce specic states'
emission levels in order to slow the eects of climate change. In some cases, this
request was fairly broad: For example, in the claim made under the UN Convention
on the Rights of the Child mentioned above, the petitioners asked that the respond-
ent states «ensure that mitigation and adaptation eorts are being accelerated to
38
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
the maximum extent of available resources».69 In other cases (e.g. Urgenda vs Neth-
erlands, Torres Strait Islanders vs Australia), far more specic reduction targets
have been requested. In a few cases,70 claimants have also asked for a monetary
remedy, mostly in the shape of the allocation of funds for adaptation purposes.
e main obstacle standing in the way of these claimants' search for remedies
is related to the double problem of causality.71 In essence, in order to get a remedy,
claimants will have to demonstrate two almost impossible causal links: between
a specic wrongdoer and the victim, and between climate change and the act of
migration.
e rst barrier cannot be easily overcome. It is impossible to isolate the action
of one country alone in the context of climate change and to attribute to this coun-
try results such as rising sea levels, melting permafrost or extreme weather events.
e damage is the result of a «common pool» of greenhouse gasses in the atmos-
phere, and this cannot be directly linked to specic states' emissions. Certain
creative solutions have been developed, including the establishment of a compen-
sation fund that would be based on large emitters' contributions,72 or a «pro-rata»
attribution of partial responsibility based on a given country's portion of green-
house gasses emitted into the atmosphere.73 e Dutch Supreme Court has indeed
accepted the latter possibility in its landmark Urgenda ruling of 2019, stating that
«each country is responsible for its part and can therefore be called to account in
this respect».74 is decision indeed oers a bit of hope on an obstacle that was con-
sidered until recently to be impassable. However, unless such ideas are developed
and accepted more widely, the establishment of a causal link will remain «well-
nigh impossible, however sophisticated science has become».75
e second causality-related barrier involves the link between climate change
and one's decision to migrate. Climate change is often not the only reason for migra-
tion, but one of many cumulative drivers that have led one to leave home. e Fore-
sight report famously stated that «migration is a multi-causal phenomenon and it is
problematic to assign a proportion of the actual or predicted number of migrants as
69 Communication to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, in the Case of Chiara Sacchi et al. ,
para. 329 (see note 13).
70 For example, the Inuit Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights (see note
12); the Communication submitted to the Human Rights Committee by communities from
the Torres Strait islands (see note 19).
71 Viñuales, J. (2016), «A Human Rights Approach to Extraterritorial Environmental Protection?
An Assessment», in Bhuta, N. (ed.), The Frontiers of Human Rights (Oxford and New York, NY:
Oxford University Press), pp. 216–17.
72 Ibid., 217.
73 Kolmannskog, V. (2008), Future Floods of Refugees: A Comment on Climate Change, Conflict
and Forced Migration (Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council), p. 31; Kent and Behrman, p. 93 (see
note 2).
74 Urgenda vs Netherlands (Netherlands' Supreme Court, 20 December 2019), 5.7.5.
75 Atapattu, S. (2015), Human Rights Approaches to Climate Change: Challenges and Opportunities
(Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge).
39
Avidan Kent and Simon Behrman Mind the gap: Addressing the plight of climate refugees in international law
moving as a direct result of environmental change».76 is assumption however, is
only partly accurate. For example, where migration is caused by rising sea levels, it
is often easy enough to isolate climate change as a major cause for migration. e
other «drivers» (e.g. economic diculties) are caused by climate change and hardly
independent from it. Indeed, in the recent Teitiota case discussed above, the UN
Human Rights Committee accepted that rising sea levels «can propel cross-border
movement of individuals seeking protection from climate change-related harm».77
In other cases, it could be that a lower threshold should be accepted: For example,
where it is likely that climate change has played a signicant role (even if not a
clinically isolated role) in the decision to migrate, or where research shows that
environmental conditions are unreasonably dicult in a certain area. Insisting on
a clear, strict, causal link would ignore the impact that climate change is having
on migration – and even more so, it would ignore that some states are responsible
for this reality. Also, existing refugee law does not insist that persecution must be
the only reason for seeking asylum, just that it is a signicant contributing factor.
Indeed, it would be dicult to reduce any individual's decision to migrate to a sin-
gle causal reason; issues of economics and family intersect with persecution, gen-
eralised violence, etc. It is somewhat unfair, therefore, to insist on a more clear-cut
or unitary push factor for climate refugees, so long as the eects of climate change
can be shown to be signicant.
The limits of a non-refoulement remedy
Other requested remedies involve a declaration that those states deporting refu-
gees back to their (environmentally degraded) home countries are breaching fun-
damental human rights, notably the right to life. Such a declaration will eectively
prohibit refugees' deportation. e main limits standing in the way of those asking
for such a remedy (notably, the damage must be personal and immediate in nature)
are discussed above. Although the requirement – according to which the injury
must be personal in nature – is dicult to full in the context of climate change, a
small window of opportunity nevertheless exists. e UN Human Rights Commit-
tee stated in this respect that more general conditions (rather than an individual's
plight) will be accepted, albeit only in «the most extreme cases, and that there is
a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of
irreparable harm exists».78 Although the Committee did not accept that the current
situation in Kiribati is «extreme» enough to qualify for this exception, they were
receptive to the possibility that in 10–15 years from now, it will be.
One may only wonder, however, about the wisdom in such an approach, which
grants the right to life only where all is eectively lost. is approach eectively
forces the residents of environmentally degraded areas to wait until the very last
76 UK Government Office for Science (2011), Migration and Global Environmental Change: Future
Challenges and Opportunities , Foresight report, p. 11, available at: www.gov.uk/government/
publications/migration-and-global-environmental-change-future-challenges-and-opportunities.
77 UN Human Rights Committee, para. 9.11 (see note 19).
78 UN Human Rights Committee, para. 9.3 (see note 19).
40
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
moment and experience a slow, continuous degradation in the quality of their lives.
ese residents are forced to play the odds of their island's survival, leaving them
at the mercy of the international community's will to act on climate change. ese
are odds that most would not choose in any other circumstances.
Will the courts play politics?
Finally, it is inevitable that at least some courts will refrain from granting a remedy
in areas that fall within the realm of political decision-making. Issues such as emis-
sion reductions are subject to international negotiations and involve economic and
social consequences. It is understandable that at least some courts will be reluctant
to intervene in such a process without a clear mandate. In January 2020, the US
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied a request to order the phasing out
of fossil fuel emissions in the United States, stating that «the plaintis' case must
be made to the political branches or to the electorate at large, the latter of which
can change the composition of the political branches through the ballot box».79 e
United Kingdom's High Court took a similar stand in 2018 when it refused to order
the government to take preventive measures in the form of more ambitious emis-
sion reductions.80 e High Court stated that «this is an area where the executive
has a wide discretion to assess the advantages and disadvantages of any particular
course of action, not only domestically but as part of an evolving international dis-
cussion».81 It is true that examples to the contrary exist (notably the Dutch Supreme
Court, as expressed in its recent Urgenda ruling, discussed above). However, such
examples are limited in number and, for the time being, also in their inuence.
International tribunals may be even more reluctant to provide such remedies
than national courts. International courts have traditionally walked a ne line
between securing the rule of law and avoiding activism that might unsettle the
international order. Moreover, in recent years, international courts have faced
unprecedented challenges to their legitimacy,82 including head-on collisions with
superpowers such as the United States, Russia and China. In short, it is likely that
the current atmosphere will lead courts to become more timid, and consequently
reluctant to grant remedies.
Future pathways?
We would like to conclude this chapter with a few observations about the future of
the international regulations on climate-induced migration. is chapter demon-
strated that, although a substantial body of law indeed exists, the gaps in the
79 Juliana et al. vs the United States of America Case , 18-36082 (01/17/2020), 32.
80 Plan B Earth vs Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Case No:
CO/16/2018 (20 July 2018). In 2019 the Court of Appeal refused the plaintiffs the right to appeal
the High Court's decision, thus definitively shutting down this particular claim.
81 Ibid., para. 49.
82 Kent, A., Skoutaris, N., and Trinidad, J. (eds.) (2019), The Future of International Courts (Abing-
don-on-Thames: Routledge).
41
Avidan Kent and Simon Behrman Mind the gap: Addressing the plight of climate refugees in international law
regulations of climate-induced migration are still signicant. ere is no doubt that
some of these gaps are unlikely to be lled, at least not in a satisfactory manner or
not in the immediate future. ere is currently no easy solution for those wishing
to cross a border in search of a new home; the protection of human rights law in
many parts of the world is unsatisfactory, and the nancial gap is unlikely to be
easily addressed. A careful look, however, reveals some developments – baby steps
mostly, but nevertheless steps in the right direction.
Importantly, global policymaking is moving forward. is is not a given: Until
2010 83 there was no international recognition of climate-induced migration under
any international forum. Since 2015, however, we have seen substantive references
in important documents such as the Paris Agreement, the New York Declaration for
Refugees and Migrants, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migra-
tion, the Global Compact on Refugees and elsewhere. We have also seen the inter-
national endorsement of the Nansen Protection Agenda, the establishment of the
UNFCCC Task Force, and other developments as well.
Whether such developments will lead to meaningful results remains to be seen.
Two interesting venues merit a closer look in this process. First, the work of the
UNFCCC Task Force is located at the heart of the climate negotiations process; it
may frame the discussion on climate-induced migration within this institution
and inuence the positions of the member states. Importantly, the Task Force has
already indicated that it will not shy away from crucial topics, notably with respect
to nance.
A second important venue that will merit attention is the UN International Law
Commission, which was mandated in 2018 to examine issues of sea-level rise in
relation to international law. It identied three issues for further investigation – two
of which (the protection of vulnerable aected individuals and communities, and
issues related to statehood) are highly relevant for climate refugees. Although the
Commission's investigation will be limited to the eect of rising sea levels, there is
no doubt that its conclusions will be relevant for climate refugees more broadly. At
the time of writing, this investigation is at its early stages, and in-depth conclusions
have yet to be made.
«Baby steps» are also visible in the context of remedies. e UN Human Rights
Committee's acknowledgment that the impacts of climate change may jeopardise
islanders' right to life is noteworthy. e decisions of national courts may also play
an important role. e Dutch Supreme Court's Urgenda ruling is especially impor-
tant: Although it does not address directly the issue of climate-induced migration,
it does provide solutions for some of the abovementioned legal problems. Notably, it
provides a partial answer to the problem of causality, and it demonstrates an activ-
ist approach towards the development of the law. Whether other tribunals (includ-
ing international ones) will follow remains to be seen. As to whether this approach
is democratically acceptable, this is a topic for a dierent essay.
83 The UNFCCC member states made their first ever reference to climate-induced migration in
October 2010 during the decisions that followed COP 16 (Decision 1/CP.16, December 2010).
Flooding in Jakarta, Indonesia
Photo: © Nora Bibel – laif
4343
NATALIE SAUER
«Care work, climate work»
A DIALOGUE WITH DIZZANNE BILLY (TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO),
OLADOSU ADENIKE (NIGERIA) AND JOYCE MELCAR TAN (PHILIPPINES)
From childhood, Dizzanne Billy, who is from Trinidad and Tobago, remembers
the great gushing Caura River, which she and her family would gather around. e
northern mountain ranges, at the foot of which she now lives, teemed with birds.
«Now the river is just dry,» she says. Coastal erosion is among the biggest threats
posed by global heating to the island. Since Trinidad and Tobago started to meas-
ure sea-level rise in the late 1990s, the ocean has surged from 1.6 mm per year to
close to 3 mm per year in 2019.1 ese days, when Billy drives down to the coast,
she can see waves tugging at the land and coconut trees. Fishermen are particularly
stressed, she explains, because the sea is taking away their infrastructure.
Oladosu Adenike, the ambassador of Fridays for Future in Nigeria, joins the
conversation from a crackling line in Nigeria. She was brought up on a small set-
tlement of farmland to the west of the capital, Abuja, now covered with buildings.
Although the country has always had to contend with droughts, often resulting in
famines, increasing temperatures and rain variability since the 1980s have aggra-
vated an already precarious climate and fed into food insecurity and conict.
Joyce Melcar Tan grew up on one of the 7,641 islands that make up the Philip-
pines. Industrial developments, large-scale buildings and tourism have supplanted
the pristine beaches and wooden houses of her childhood. When asked about the
impacts of climate change on the Philippines, Tan lists coastal erosion and coral
bleaching. More pronounced El Niños have also resulted in devastating droughts.
But it is the typhoons she worries about most. e country is one of the most
prone to tropical storms in the world, with 6 to 9 tropical storms on average mak-
ing landfall since 1970.2 In the past 40 years, their power has intensied by 50 per
cent due to warming seas.3 «Years of long-term infrastructure development and
1 Neaves, J. (2019, November 25), «TT Sea Level Rise Almost Doubles in Past 2 Decades», Newsday ,
available at: https://newsday.co.tt/2019/11/25/tt-sea-level-rise-almost-doubles-in-past-2-dec-
ades/#:~:text=THE%20SEA%2Dlevel%20rise%20in,in%20the%20past%20two%20decades.&tex-
t=He%20explained%20that%20when%20TT,the%20consequences%20included%20coastal%20
erosion (accessed 31 July 2020).
2 Blanc, E., and Strobl, E. (2016), «Assessing the Impact of Typhoons on Rice Production in the
Philippines», Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology 55 (4), 993–1007.
3 Mei, W., and Xie, S. (2016), «Intensification of Landfalling Typhoons over the Northwest Pacific
since the Late 1970s», Nature Geoscience 9, 753–57.
Natalie Sauer «Care work, climate w ork» – A dialogue with Dizzanne Billy (Trinidad and Tobago), Oladosu Adenike (Nigeria) and Joyce Melcar Tan (Philippines)
44
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
economic planning are wiped out within minutes,» Tan says, «leaving people losing
not only loved ones, but jobs, access to health services and the social fabric of their
communities.»
Tan currently works as an energy and climate law yer for the environmental
law charity Client Earth, while Adenike leads Earth Uprising and the African Youth
Climate Hub. Billy reported on the Paris Agreement as a journalist and is now a
communications ocer at the climate journalism advocacy group Climate Tracker.
What follows is the transcript of a conversation between them about how the
climate crisis may shape the migratory trajectories of Nigerians, Trinidadians and
Filipinos. Adenike, Billy and Tan examine the shortfalls of current policies and pro-
pose new ones to make life easier both for migrants and those who are left behind.
e impact of global heating on women is also considered. All interviewees speak
in a personal capacity.
N.S.: How has the climate crisis aected mobility?
D.B.: Climate migration is relatively new to the Caribbean region, but it is going to
get worse as we are being hit with more frequent and more intense tropical storms
and hurricanes. We saw this in September 2017 with the rst Category 5 hurricane
that we experienced, Hurricane Irma, and then two weeks later, another Category 5
hurricane, Hurricane Maria. ose two hurricanes, which were followed by weaker
tropical storms, bashed islands like Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica and Puerto
Rico. Even Haiti was aected.
We found ourselves in a situation where the Caribbean Community Secretariat
(CARICOM), which is the overall body representing Caribbean member states, had
to come together to gure out how we would deal with displaced people. Along with
Barbados, Jamaica and the Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago was one of the countries
that really stood up to nd a place for them.
e government particularly focused on supporting Dominicans, both in terms
of immediate relief and medium-term relocation. We sent out our defence force to
aid the relief eorts in Dominica. And our coastal guard deployed three vessels
carrying food, water, generators and a 21-member disaster relief team to assist the
islanders.
In terms of migration, the Caribbean also provided disaster-displaced persons
a right of entry into the country. After Hurricane Maria, Trinidad and Tobago used
CARICOM's free-movement agreement – a 6-month visa-free state provision used
to shelter displaced Dominicans. e prime minister quickly put into place poli-
cies to enable Dominicans to come to Trinidad and to allow their children to go
to school and integrate in society. Many other Caribbean countries followed suit
afterwards. It forced CARICOM to confront something that is going to just get worse
and to confront the question of the movement of people.
Right now, CARICOM, which is similar to the [European Union] for the Car-
ibbean, is supposed to have free movement of people – but it's not as smooth as it
should be. Dozens of Jamaicans, for example, have been denied entry or deported
45
over the past years for reasons that are often unclear.4 ese cases have been
brought to the Caribbean Court of Justice and some are still being dealt with (are
currently under way – this is based on Dizzanne's words and I did not manage to
nd evidence for this).5
In an ideal situation, it would be easy for people from Antigua or Guadeloupe
to move to another Caribbean country if they are hit, but the current system is not
in place for that [kind of] transition of people.
O.A.: In Nigeria climate migration takes dierent forms. First you have people who
have to leave their land within the country – internally displaced persons (IDPs).
If this fails to bring relief, they may leave the country, temporarily or permanently,
to seek refuge. is is happening in the Lake Chad area in the north-eastern part
of Nigeria. e Boko Haram insurgency and also drought and deforestation have
displaced over 3.4 million people, including 2.4 million people within the coun-
try.6 People's livelihoods are lost in the process. […] Overall, the number of IDPs is
alarming.
J.M.T.: Migration in the Philippines is a very complex issue because historically
we've had a lot of people moving, whether it be from rural to urban areas, or exter-
nally to other countries. e Philippines typically exports a lot of highly skilled
health care workers, including to countries in East Asia, like Hong Kong and Japan,
to the Middle East, and even to Europe and the United States.7 So it's hard to pin
down a particular climate change impact as the cause of migration and mobility,
because oftentimes the decision to move is a result of various factors. at said,
events like droughts, coastal erosion and other phenomena do make it dicult for
people to remain where they are and still be able to earn a living wage and support
their family with enough access to health services, food and water.
When extreme weather events such as huge tropical cyclones strike, there is
sudden forced migration. In such cases, as long as you can determine the link
between the extreme weather event and climate change, then you can also say that
that prompted the migration. Most of these would be internal displacement: move-
ment from the coastal area to the more inland areas, or to the urban centres, where
there would be easier access to food, water and electricity.
4 CEEN TV (2014), «Jamaicans Denied Entry into Trinidad & Tobago», online video, available
at: https://youtu.be/iA_IovNmy7E (accessed 31 July 2020) ; CEEN TV (2016), «12 Jamaicans
Deported Renew Calls for a Re-examination of the CSME», online video, available at: https://
youtu.be/i4kUzpCxyLU (accessed 31 July 2020).
5 For a legal perspective on the Freedom of Movement Agreements of CARICOM, see Francis,
A. (2019), Free Movement Agreements & Climate-Induced Migration: A Caribbean Case Study ,
Columbia Public Law Research Paper, available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3464594 (ac-
cessed 31 July 2020).
6 UNHCR (n.d.), Nigeria Emergency , available at: www.unhcr.org/uk/nigeria-emergency.html
(accessed 31 July 2020).
7 See Tan, E. (2006), «Labor Migration and the Philippine Labor Market», Journal of Immigrant &
Refugee Studies 4(1), 25–45.
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46
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
e other factor of where people would move to would also be the family that
they have in other places. So if there's family that may be in another island or
another region that the displaced community can move to, then that's where they
would normally do so.
ere is a divide, I would say, between the more auent members of the com-
munity and those that are more vulnerable, because the more vulnerable have
fewer options about where they can move to. e less auent would typically go to
cities and be part of the informal economies there, which means that there's greater
pressure on basic public services, but also a huge competition for low-skilled work.
In terms of external migration, where climate would be one of the factors, there
is also a dierence between the less privileged and the more privileged, [with] the
more privileged usually using their [wealth] to send their kids to school, often for
medical or nursing degrees, so that they can then go abroad and then earn a better
wage that they can send back home.
N.S.: What support is available to those making that leap? What kind of challenges
do they face?
J.M.T.: ere are numerous challenges. And I think one of the reasons for that is
because there is a huge dierence between the support that is available versus the
support that is required by the people that are moving[…] For ease, we can just call
them migrants at the moment, even if their movements might be outside of their
will and volition.
In terms of the internal movement within the Philippines from rural to urban
areas, one of the big challenges would be that the skill set of the migrants may not
match with the available work that is in the urban area. So, for example, traditional
agricultural families that may have been used to more manual labour, may have to
work in a commercial centre or in a call centre – an industry that is very big in the
Philippines.
e second one is access to safe housing, because as more and more people
migrate to urban areas – and in the Philippines, there is large rate of urbanisation –
the rent and housing costs rise and the corresponding space for each family unit
becomes smaller.
O.A.: Migrants have to start all over again. ey have to look for connections, see
how to rebuild their livelihoods and regain stability. Some may come out stronger,
but many don't.
D.B.: One of the key issues is being accepted by the society one is moving into. To
take the case of Venezuelan migrants in Trinidad and Tobago, for example, there's
a lot of tension between both communities because of the perceived strain on the
economy, job access and access to resources at large.
People may be moving from a situation where they had a comfortable lifestyle.
But as climate migrants they've lost everything and moved into this new country.
47
ey have to start again, often depending on state access to funds and social goods
to survive. It really changes people's quality of life in a dramatic way.
I think it would be good if we could create policies to smoothen the integration
process, including nancial buers for people moving into the country, so that they
can stabilise themselves and not have to worry about whether their children can go
to school or whether they can get access to civilian resources.
N.S.: What happens to those who have been left behind? And again, what kind of
policies should be carried out to facilitate that situation?
J.M.T: So in the Philippines, it has really depended on what kind of events have
forced those who left to leave. So, for example, if it's a sudden-onset event like the
tropical cyclone that hit the eastern seaboard of the Philippines, then those who
were left behind because they had no option of leaving really needed access to elec-
tricity, basic health services and important psychosocial support because of all the
death and devastation that they have seen at unprecedented levels. And then also,
of course, access to clean water and food.
In the longer term, I would say that the policies that are needed to help those
who are left behind are those which would allow the local communities to increase
their resilience, because we know that a disaster is not necessarily a foregone con-
clusion whenever there's an extreme event, right? It's a result of a lot of exposure, of
vulnerability and no coping capacity.
In the case of slow-onset events like prolonged droughts, I think policies would
need to focus on systemic and long-term changes. So policies like providing liveli-
hood opportunities and skills training for those younger members of the family of
farmers or shermen who would like to nd other ways to be able to support their
families without needing to leave to go to the cities. Education is equally important.
Another solution that can be controversial is sustainable tourism, because tour-
ism does bring a lot of development and also carbon emissions. At the same time, it
is a way for the people who have remained in local communities to be able to build
back and nd a way to support themselves without having to leave. I think that Kate
Raworth's «doughnut economics», whereby economic development is modelled on
planetary boundaries and social foundations, is very important.
N.S.: In January, the UN Human Rights Committee ruled that refugees eeing the
eects of climate crisis could not be forced to return home by their adoptive countries.
is judgement was made on the case of Ioane Teitiota, who applied for protection
from New Zealand after claiming his life was at risk in his home country of Kiri-
bati – the rst country at risk of disappearing under rising sea levels. e ruling was
in eect a landmark one, because it meant the UN recognised climate refugees after
decades of academic debates on whether it's ever possible to single out climate and
environmental factors as the cause of migration. What did you make of this ruling?
And do you think there are people in your countries who could consider applying for
climate refuge?
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Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
J.M.T.: I think that that indeed was a very important decision because, as you said,
it was a recognition by a UN body that there is this category of persons that stand
to lose their homeland because of the impacts of climate change. [Another] key fea-
ture of that event was that the Committee said that there are 10 to 15 years in which
the Republic of Kiribati – with the help of the international community – could still
come up with ways to adapt to climate change, and so therefore, his life was not in
imminent threat.
And I think that one opens up a whole range of very important conversations,
one of which is that, even if we stop all of the emitting activities at the moment,
there is still a level of commitment to global warming that has already happened
that we are stuck with. is underpins the global community's [urgent need to act]
to [spare] people from small island nations from having to leave their homelands,
and thereby their cultures, their families and their traditions.
Secondly, the decision also shows us how the obligation of the global commu-
nity to act on climate change has never been more urgent – so when we talk about
the adaptive capacity of the small island states, it's not just up to them to respond
to it, but there needs to be strong support internationally.
My third takeaway is that this decision has sparked a conversation on how most
emissions that have been made so far have been coming from completely dierent
regions in the world, such as Europe and North America – the Global North. How-
ever, the earliest and most severe impacts of climate change, such as people having
to leave their countries, are already being felt in the Global South in countries like
the Philippines. Will this encourage people from the Philippines to le a climate
migration lawsuit? I'm not sure, but I [do] think that it provides interesting oppor-
tunities to do that.
Having said that, the Philippines Human Rights Commission is currently con-
ducting an inquiry about climate mitigation. It's encouraging to see that our own
local Human Rights Commission has started investigating carbon meters and look-
ing into the question of whether or not they should be reporting what they are doing
to mitigate their emissions.
D.B.: I think it's denitely a step in the right direction. It's not something that I can
say has been reected in this region or locally. I see that climate litigation is hap-
pening more often, whether it be young people suing their governments or organi-
sations suing those responsible for what's happening. I think that it will eventually
reach us, but for now it hasn't yet happened.
N.S.: Do you nd it helpful to talk about the specic ways that climate change aects
women? For instance, do women's experiences of climate change dier from those of
men? And if so, in what way?
J.M.T.: Yes, denitely. ere are dierent impacts that women have to deal with, and
a lot of it has to do with the traditional family structure in the Philippines – and in
many other countries – whereby mothers are usually responsible for cooking. is
49
means having to access water to be able to cook with, but also water for domestic
use in general. Because of lower levels of access to water or the increasing salinity
of water from saltwater intrusion, women would then have to spend more hours of
their day doing that.
And that also aects the younger members of the household, because if there
are opportunities for education, for example, these are traditionally given rst to
the male members because the female members are seen as being able to be more
productive when helping with the housework.
In terms of the aftermath, for example, of a tropical cyclone, there is care work
that would often devolve to the female members of the family. And so there is a
disproportionate burden on females that is brought on by climate impacts.
D.B.: ere's denitely that gender imbalance – particularly with regards to access
to resources.
According to the [Food and Agricultural Organization], 43 per cent of the global
agricultural labour force is made up of women.8 So, as hurricanes become more
intense and droughts more frequent, we need to ask ourselves where this leaves
women who depend on the land for their food security. Providing these women
with the same resources as men can positively inuence climate adaptation and
sustainable development eorts.
As Joyce pointed out, it ties back to the traditional roles that women still hold in
many Caribbean countries. Women in the region often live in single-parent house-
holds, so when the land is impacted, this directly aects their ability to provide
for their families. Also, this kind of imbalance in power dynamics between men
and women determines who has rights to what and who has access to resources to
recover from the impacts of climate change.
Let's say a hurricane passes: It's much more likely that a man is able to bounce
back than a woman who has kids and is on her own. And that, sadly, is a situation
that aects many households in the Caribbean.
O.A.: Women are often at the receiving end of [climate-related insecurity]. On
April 2014, 276 schoolgirls were kidnapped from their dorms in Chibok, a city in
northeastern Nigeria, by Boko Haram. en in February 2018, they targeted the
Dapchi school girls.
As droughts become more frequent, so does early marriage. Some young
women are being forced into marriage against their own will in a bid to survive,
depriving them of their education. It cripples their opportunities to contribute to
the local community. It drains them.
Some of the people who give their daughters to early marriage depend on agri-
culture for subsistence. So when production is hit by ooding or drought, they will
end up giving their daughters for marriage so that they can secure what is known
8 FAO (n.d.), The Female Face of Farming , available at : www.fao.org/gender/resources/infographics/
the-female-face-of-farming/en (accessed 31 July 2020).
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50
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
as a «bride price» – money or property that the groom oers to his wife-to-be as
opposed to a dowry.
Insecurity generated by climate change also makes sexual abuse of women
more likely. We see Nigerian women engage in transactional sex for access to food.
And, of course, the women kidnapped by terrorist also suer sexual exploitation. It
can be a point of no return for girls. In cases of drought, housewives have to walk
longer distances to access cooking materials and water.
N.S.: Could you cite examples of policies that could soften that blow on women?
D.B.: No – and the reason I would say that is because it's something that has yet to
take place. On the whole, gender in the Caribbean is only just starting to be taken
seriously. Even outside of the climate change sector, gender mainstreaming in local
policies is denitely lacking.
J.M.T.: One would be to allow the children of women to be cared for so that their
mothers can either pursue educational or livelihood opportunities. Equipping local
community ocer clinics with breastfeeding stations could further help nursing
mothers to contribute positively to the economy and bridge the gender gap.
Another set of policies could deal with the immediate aftermath of a disaster,
for example, where people are living in shelters. Something that was very, very stark
in the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan was that the toilets in these temporary
shelters are usually shared by everyone. But certain women, depending on their
religious aliations, might be uncomfortable using the same toilets as men. And so
that's something that has been brought up as an issue and something to be worked
on in humanitarian circles – that there be separate bathrooms for women and men
for adaptation in the immediate aftermath of extreme weather events.
N.S.: You both touched upon care. And it's interesting – Naomi Klein, along with
many activists, is currently trying to make the point that care is climate work due to
its low carbon footprint, but also due to its central role in helping populations adapt
to the dierent environment that we're facing. Do you think that, in the wake of the
pandemic, care work is valued more?
D.B.: Yes, for sure. We are now seeing more appreciation for social work and front-
line workers. In general, children don't grow up hearing their parents encourage
them to become nurses or customer service representatives – but these jobs were
denitely seen as essential during the pandemic. When disasters hit, these are also
the jobs that will be essential to deal with the impact of a hurricane or other climate
disasters.
J.M.T.: Yes, I think care work has been emphasised by the pandemic as a very cru-
cial part of any society. But the pandemic has also highlighted a lot of systemic
issues with regard to access to basic health care services. [Questions such as] who,
51
among the population, are part of the essential workers, and how exposed are they
as a result of their situation?
[As far as the health services are concerned], it is true that they are less carbon-
emitting and could contribute to a greener economy. But then the pandemic has
also shown us that a lot of plastic pollution can be generated from all of the pre-
cautions that you have to take with the personal protective equipment that has to
be disposed of every day. So we do need to nd a way to manage that if we are to
assure ourselves that we will recover from the pandemic in a green way.
Care work also needs a lot of energy infrastructure, especially when it's not in
the context of care homes, but in hospitals. We need to really transform our energy
infrastructure so that it's based more on renewable energy rather than fossil fuel-
based energy.
N.S.: What message would you like to convey, above all, to the policymakers who
might be reading this, whether it be on the subject of a pandemic or climate migration?
J.M.T.: So I would say that the urgency to act on climate change and really respond
to it – as the crisis that it is – has only been highlighted by the pandemic. And
governments across the world have this opportunity right now to ensure that any
money that they use towards economic recovery does respect people and the planet
and is not disproportionately geared towards just economic recovery.
In terms of climate migration and migrants, there should be a continued rec-
ognition of this category of persons who are rendered vulnerable because of climate
impacts, which may be in geographically remote places where a lot of the big
decision-makers are. But that only highlights the global level of this problem and
also the requirement that we act as an international community and really coop-
erate to address it.
Finally, there has been this decades-long debate about whether or not climate
refugees can be protected under the Refugee Convention. What I would like to see
right now is recognition of a need for this category of persons without being tied to
the traditional denitions of the 50-year-old Convention that we have. We need to
protect this emerging class of persons, and one way to do so – without them having
to leave their homelands – is for us to mitigate our emissions where we are, and
especially those countries in the Global North.
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52
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
HASHIM BIN RASHID
Resisting rural dispossession and
displacement: Peasant pathways
to climate justice
e Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change1 has issued stark warnings about
the impacts of climate change on global agriculture, as well as the impacts of global
agriculture on climate change. is is reective of a growing recognition that the
organisation of food systems is a critical dimension of our response to the climate
emergency. Conversely, there is little recognition of the importance of mobility – of
people and food itself – within the food system. e ongoing Covid-19 pandemic
has illustrated this importance in dramatic fashion through two sets of distressing
scenes. e rst involves Indian migrant labourers without access to food return-
ing to their villages from cities. e second is the destruction of crops by those
who work the land in the face of collapsing demand in cities. Both underscore the
extreme inequalities and incongruities that underpin the mobility (and immobility)
of food and people in our food system – injustices that severely undermine policy
responses to the climate emergency already underway in the Global South.
is chapter argues that responses to climate change cannot be separated from
the historical and contemporary struggles of rural social movements to reshape
a global food system that systematically displaces millions of rural dwellers from
the countryside in the name of growth-led economic development. Rural social
movements in the Global South have challenged the ongoing dispossession of rural
populations and accompanying destruction of nature under existing development
models, questioning the necessity of «rural-urban transition», which underpinned
national and transnational development policies for much of the 20th centur y. ese
movements identify existing dominant models of development to be the root cause
of agrarian distress, rural displacement and ecological damage in the countryside.
Outlining their critiques, this chapter explores the counter-visions of national and
transnational rural social movements in order to map a peasant pathway to climate
justice. In particular, I focus on how these movements have asserted the right to
land, not just for the peasantries who till it, but also for those dispossessed by prior
1 IPCC (2007), Agriculture report in Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change' , available
at: www.ipcc.ch/report/ar4/wg3/agriculture.
53
Hashim bin Rashid Resisting rural dispossession and displacement: Peasant pathways to climate justice
waves of development. at is to say, my focus is on their advocacy for the rights of
rural and/or urban dwellers to remain and/or become peasants.
e rst section of this chapter («Rural dispossession, displacement and mobil-
ity») looks at the historical relationship between agricultural development, rural
dispossession and the production of precarious migrant labour. e second sec-
tion («Voices from below: How rural social movements respond to rural disposses-
sion») examines case studies of rural social movements from Brazil, South Africa
and Indonesia to show how they have contested this long history of dispossession
by asserting the right to land, as well as the right to rehabilitate nature through
peasant agroecology. is allows us to see how the right to stay put – articulated
as the right to become and/or remain a peasant – is mobilised in discourse and
political practice to enact economic and ecological justice. In the third section
(«Transnational peasant visions: Advocating food sovereignty for agrarian and cli-
mate justice»), we shall see how the practices and visions of rural social movements
are articulated in transnational spaces through the peasant movement La Via
Campesina. In particular, we shall examine the concept of «food sovereignty» as a
counter-vision for climate justice that addresses the dispossession of rural peoples
and the destruction of nature together, with important implications for mobility
justice. In the conclusion, I reect on how listening to rural social movements can
help us think about questions of climate justice and mobility through understand-
ing the right to remain and/or become peasants.
Rural dispossession, displacement and mobility
For centuries, agricultural production has been connected to mobility through
rural dispossession, with displaced rural populations providing labour to large
farm holdings, as well as industrial and service sectors of the Global South and
North. For instance, North America till the late 19th century continued to rely on
slavery and indentured labour, which forcibly moved millions from Africa across
the Atlantic Ocean, and now relies on underpaid, «illegal» migrant workers from
Mexico to pick grapes and tomatoes in California elds. Since the late 19th century,
Australia has been reliant on seasonal migrant labour from the Pacic Islands, such
as Papua New Guinea.
ese dynamics of dispossession and displacement have been informed by
a belief that the transformation of peasant populations into industrial workers is
inevitable. Both global and national policies have been designed to accelerate the
dispossession of rural populations through the conversion of agricultural land into
urban and industrial land, the mechanisation of farming and the accelerated con-
version of rural populations into workers in a range of national and transnational
industries.2
2 Araghi, F. (1995), «Global Depeasantization, 1945–1990», The Sociological Quarterly , 36(2)
(Spring), 336–37.
54
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
In parallel to the development of commercial agriculture, the expansion of
«extractivism» in what the climate justice movement calls «sacrice zones» has
exacerbated the diculties faced by rural populations. Sacrice zones are known
as places that «don't count and therefore can be poisoned, drained, or otherwise
destroyed».3 Rural populations that dwell within them are forced to choose between
moving away or staying put as the natural world around them disappears through
mining, chemical poisoning, soil depletion, urbanisation and/or the industrialisa-
tion of land from which they derive their sustenance. is concept has been used
to describe the experiences of rural communities in a range of contexts, including
the United States, the Niger Delta and Rajasthan in India. e last of these examples
is particularly good for illustrating these dynamics. Over the course of the 20th
century, rural Rajasthan found itself stripped of its natural resources, as forests
were chopped down and commercial farming began to expand. e land lost its
fertility due to over-farming through non-native practices, and, more recently, the
ar Desert began to engulf agricultural lands through human-induced climate
change. It became impossible for rural populations to reproduce themselves via
subsistence on their land or nd gainful employment within their region, which
forced them to nd employment elsewhere. Hundreds of thousands of men from
the region migrate for employment in the service and industrial sectors in the high-
growth region of Gujarat, where the average cycle of back-breaking work before
their bodies give up is around a decade. e same men then migrate back to their
home village in Rajasthan, where survival and coping strategies are almost wholly
reliant on the next generation of men completing the same torturous cycle.4 e
lockdowns during the Covid-19 pandemic have provided a glimpse into the sheer
scale of these populations, with tens of millions of migrant workers migrating back
to their home villages on foot in India, as well as the mass forced returns to various
South Asian states as work dried up in the Gulf.
e combined eect of commercial agriculture and extractivism has been to
dramatically reduce the peasantry, a process referred to by social scientists as
«depeasantisation».5 Its extent can be gleaned from the basic fact that, in 1950,
only around 16 per cent of the population of the Global South was living in urban
areas; by the turn of the 20th century, almost half of the world's population and 41
per cent of the population of the Global South lived in urban areas.6 Hundreds
of millions who once had direct access to land and means of subsistence in rural
areas have now become largely concentrated in urban locations.
Among rural social movements across the Global South, migration resulting in
depeasantisation is viewed as a consequence of decades of socially and ecologically
3 Klein, N. (2014), This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs the Climate (New York, NY: Simon &
Schuster), p. 169.
4 Jain. P., and Sharma, A. (2019), «Super-exploitation of Adivasi Migrant Workers: The Political
Economy of Migration from Southern Rajasthan to Gujarat», Journal of Interdisciplinary Eco-
nomics 31(1), 63–99.
5 Araghi (1995), «Global Depeasantization», p. 337 (see note 2).
6 Ibid.
55
Hashim bin Rashid Resisting rural dispossession and displacement: Peasant pathways to climate justice
destructive development policies that have led to the rapid deterioration of the abil-
ity of small peasants and landless workers to be able to live and reproduce within
the agrarian economy. With roots that stretch back to the late colonial period, the
opposition to such policies in Brazil, South Africa and many other countries man-
ifests itself today in campaigns for the right to stay put as well as movements call-
ing for land redistribution and/or reform. Moreover, many rural social movements
have been proposing alternatives to the dominant model of agricultural produc-
tion, which remains highly reliant on practices that are devastating the soil, water
and environment, and which produce high levels of greenhouse gases in the atmos-
phere. In the next section, I examine some of the responses from rural social move-
ments in the Global South to the ongoing dispossession of rural peoples.
Voices from below:
How rural social movements respond to rural dispossession
Responding to agrarian distress and rural dispossession in Asia, Africa and the
Americas, rural social movements have opposed the dispossession of rural peo-
ples, thereby providing powerful counter-visions of climate justice. In this section,
I examine three rural social movements and their visions: the Landless Workers'
Movement (MST) in Brazil, the Landless People's Movement (LPM) in South Africa
and the Indonesian Peasant Union (SPI) in Indonesia. Each of the movements in
question view land, livelihood and mobility as fundamentally related to each other
and climate justice.
The right to become peasants: The MST in Brazil and the dignity of rural life
e MST of Brazil, a movement with more than three million members, most of
whom have participated in land occupations, has challenged the dispossession of
rural peoples through assertion of the «right to become peasants», thereby provid-
ing an alternative vision of climate and mobility justice from below.
e Brazilian context is a particularly harsh example of how the expansion of
modern agricultural practices can bring agrarian and ecological devastation. e
modernisation of agriculture in the late 1960s under the military junta led to 28
million rural workers and peasants being expelled from the countryside to cities.7
is, in turn, created an employment crisis in Brazilian cities, as the ratio of rural
to urban residents was massively transformed within a short span of three dec-
ades. Since the 1980s, Latin American agriculture, especially in Mexico and Brazil,
began to be transformed by market and trade liberalisation, the specialisation of
production and domination of the world food system by agribusiness.8 e neg-
ative ecological impact of agribusiness in Brazil has been widely catalogued, with
7 Vergara-Camus, L. (2009), «The MST and the EZLN's Struggle for Land: New Forms of Peasant
Rebellions», Journal of Agrarian Change 9(3), 365–91, available at: https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/
13021.
8 Ibid., p. 370.
56
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
the most recent and obvious example being the res that blazed across the Amazon
rainforest in 2019.
It is in the context of these recent waves of mass dispossession and ecologi-
cal destruction in the countryside and the ensuing employment crisis in the rural
and urban economies that the MST emerged in Brazil. Its success lay in providing
an exit strategy to peasants and rural workers caught in the devastation caused
by expanding agrobusiness, leaving them to confront the choice between social
marginalisation in cities and land occupation.9 e movement emerged in the
1960s, when it began to gain support among land-poor peasants, landless peas-
ants and rural workers who had prior experience with «subsistence agriculture and
non-monetized relations of production».10 It was subsequently joined by landless
rural workers and even urban dwellers.11
e MST's objective is to create «a space for subsistence» by gaining access to
land and cultivating it for self-consumption.12 e Agrarian Programme of the MST
strongly opposes Brazilian agribusiness while holding it responsible for climate
change.13 It also asserts the right to reverse the historic dispossession of peasants
under agricultural modernisation by rejecting the precarious life in Brazil's fave-
las and undertaking land occupations as a mechanism to become peasants. Once
the occupations are completed, the MST ercely defends their new agrarian settle-
ments against continued attempts from the Brazilian state and agribusiness to dis-
possess them. is means that the MST's approach to climate justice and mobility
is constituted by a complex articulation of the right to move or stay put predicated
upon ideas of autonomy, dignity and self-determination. In asserting these rights,
the MST challenges the basic premise of modernisation theory, which assumed
the inevitability of the transformation of peasants into urban workers through dis-
possession. Its priorities compel us to think beyond narrow interpretations of the
climate crisis as producing migration of a particular form – from ecologically dis-
tressed rural environments in the Global South to the «developed» world.
Connecting land and labour: The LPM in South Africa
As in Brazil, the demand in South Africa for land constitutes a desire to reverse
patterns of dispossession and precarious mobility, which are often direct contin-
uations of the colonial period. In South Africa, dispossession and historical pat-
terns of migration have not been accidental outcomes of a developmental process.
Rather, they have been planned strategically by colonial rulers and the post-
colonial state through the creation of «labour reserve colonies». e latter involved
the large-scale alienation of land to colonial settlers. e dispossession of land for
9 Ibid., p. 371.
10 Ibid., p. 379.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 MST (2014, February), «Agrarian Programme of the MST», Sixth National MST Congress, avail-
able at: www.mstbrazil.org/files/CRI%20-%20%20Agrarian%20Program%20of%20the%20MST
%20-%20dez13.pdf.
57
Hashim bin Rashid Resisting rural dispossession and displacement: Peasant pathways to climate justice
white settler agriculture provided a mobile and cheap labour force for large farms
and plantations, as well as the mining industry.14
ese patterns of mobility have continued in the post-colonial period, whereby
South Africa continues to attract dispossessed migrant labour in the urban, agrar-
ian and mining sectors from within and outside the country. It is in this context that
the debate around land becomes crucial. Immediately after the end of apartheid,
the National Land Committee was formed in 1990 to articulate a way to reverse
the colonial landgrabs that had been the root of racial, economic and ecological
injustice in the country. e continued legacy of these processes became visible in
the run-up to the 2002 FIFA World Cup, when tens of thousands of land occupants
began to be dispossessed for infrastructure and beautication.15 is revival of the
land question coincided with the emergence of the LPM in 2001 and bottom-up
land reforms in Zimbabwe.
With the African National Congress showing little interest in addressing the
land question, it was left to social movements to articulate the demand for land
reform, as well as continue land occupations on the ground. One of the founding
documents of these movements – the Landless People's Charter, signed in August
2001 in Durban – states: «We are the people who have borne the brunt of coloni-
alism and neocolonialism, of the invasions of our land by the wealthy countries of
the world, of the theft of our natural resources, and of the forced extraction of our
labour by the colonists.»16
By connecting land and labour, the charter shows how the movements that
make up the LPM in South Africa view a connection between dispossession, forced
migration and exploited labour. Whereas developmental agencies are often happy
to see migration as an issue of economic choice, South African social movements
see the questions of land and migration in relation to racial, agrarian and ecologi-
cal justice. e LPM has acquired a growing list of allies – churches, development
agencies, iNGOs and the Brazilian MST – with whom it articulates a global struggle
against landlessness.17
Where land has been occupied or reclaimed and/or given to peasants by the
state in South Africa, it has been returned in a poor ecological condition.18 e
LPM recognises the ecological devastation of land that transpires with commercial
agriculture and the need to restore its ecological health. is is why, in 2018, the
LPM was signatory to a joint letter to South African President Matamela Ramaphosa
to call a special parliamentary session on the climate crisis to recognise the link
14 Bernstein, H. (2005), «Rural Land and Land Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa», in Moyo, S., and
Yeros, P. (eds.), Reclaiming the Land: The Resurgence of Rural Movements in Africa, Asia and
Latin America , p. 69 (London: Zed Books).
15 Sinhongonyane, M.F. (2005), « Land Occupations in South Africa», in Moyo, S., and Yeros, P. (eds.),
Reclaiming the Land: The Resurgence of Rural Movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America ,
p. 142 (London: Zed Books).
16 Ibid., p. 156.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 151.
58
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
between «drought, water inequality and the need for a food sovereignty system».19
Climate justice in South Africa, according to this perspective, requires addressing
the legacy of colonialism and post-colonial dispossession through redistributing
and rehabilitating the land.
Indonesian peasant movements' challenge to the plantation economy
In Indonesia, patterns of mobility and resistance were shaped for over a century
during the colonial period by the deliberate population of its outer islands to pro-
vide cheap, controllable labour for plantations.20 When the Sukarno government,
supported by movements such as the Indonesian Peasants' Front (BTI),21 began to
improve the conditions of rural populations in the plantations through land reform,
US-backed General Suharto seized power and undertook a series of massacres that
decimated peasant movements in Indonesia.22 e Suharto regime gave the plan-
tation economy new life by continuing the colonial project of transmigration to the
outer islands – a policy designed to ensure the plantations received a continuous
supply of migrant labour.23
For more than three decades, Suharto's authoritarian regime continued
expanding oil palm plantations through the forced dispossession of small land-
holders,24 which is a policy that has continued alongside the well-documented
cutting and burning of the country's vast tropical forests. By 2015, out of a total of
7.3 million hectares of oil palm plantations in the archipelago, 5.1 million hectares
were owned by 29 large oil palm tycoons. e current Indonesian regime plans to
expand these plantations by another 20 million hectares through the further dis-
possession of smallholders and forest destruction.25
Since the end of formal authoritarianism, rural social movements in Indonesia
have tackled the question of plantations head on through land occupations, and
have broken away from the contract farming model through the adoption of «peas-
ant agroecology». Although its success has been contested – and it remains a mode
of agrarian production very much in the process of being rened – the adoption of
«peasant agroecolog y» has the potential to disrupt centuries of ecological destruc-
tion and socio-economic dispossession.
e Federation of Indonesian Peasant Unions (FSPI) emerged amidst an erup-
tion of land occupations all over Indonesia in 1998, when thousands of landless
19 «Open Letter to President Ramaphosa on Climate Change», available at: www.markswilling.
co.za/2018/11/open-letter-to-president-ramaphosa-on-climate-change.
20 This was regulated under the Coolie Ordinance Acts of 1880.
21 Masalam, H. (2017), «Our Crops Speak: Small and Landless Peasant Resistance to Agro-extrac-
tive Dispossession in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia», in Kapoor, D. (ed.), Against Colonization
and Rural Dispossession: Local Resistance in South and East Asia, the Pacific and Africa , p. 107
(London: Zed Books).
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 100.
24 Aditjondro, G.A. (2001), «Suharto's Fire: Suharto Cronies Control an ASEAN-wide Oil Palm
Industry with Appalling Environmental Record», Inside Indonesia , 65 (January–March).
25 Masalam (2017), «Our Crops Speak», p. 99 (see note 21).
59
Hashim bin Rashid Resisting rural dispossession and displacement: Peasant pathways to climate justice
peoples began to occupy state and plantation lands.26 e movements began to
replace oil palm, rubber, cocoa, coee, teak and pine plantations with small-scale
farms growing smallholder crops such as coee, rice, cassava, banana, rubber,
mahogany, avocado and clove.27 In the same period, the nascent movement was
able to organise signicant protests and push the government to pass agrarian
reform28 – an important step towards formal recognition of the land occupations.29
e SPI has not only continued to occupy and resist dispossession, its members
have engaged in reclaiming ecologically devastated lands through agroecological
production. One case study involves a group of plantation workers who reclaimed
an abandoned industrial area in Casiavera and replaced it with small-scale agri-
culture.30 ese former plantation workers rejected precarious and mobile plan-
tation life to become smallholder peasants. Soon they were joined by another
200 families, which included former street vendors and construction workers in
Sumatra's cities, oil palm plantation workers and even nannies who returned from
Malaysia.31 e SPI supported the newly formed peasant community of Casiavera
to reclaim the land's fertility and biodiversity through agroecological agriculture by
inviting them to attend SPI agroecological schools.32
is case shows that dispossession and occupation are core issues around
which the discourse and practice of rural social movements are organised. In the
Indonesian context, reclaiming the land is supplemented by an objective to restore
its ecological balance and counter the domination of agrobusiness. Moreover, the
SPI has opposed projects to privatise almost 96,000 hectares of rainforest under the
REDD+ carbon trading scheme, where it has argued that such schemes consolidate
the ongoing corporate control over territory and expand prots.33 Having opposed
both deforestation and the dispossession of peasants, the SPI – like other rural
social movements such as the MST and the LPM – increasingly views land reform
and peasant agroecology as integral to climate and mobility justice.
26 Afifi, S., Fauzi, N., Hart, G., Ntsebeza, L., Peluso, N. (2005), «Redefining Agrarian Power: Resurgent
Agrarian Movements in West Java, Indonesia», working paper in Recent Work series, p. 4
(Berkeley, CA: Center for Southeast Asia Studies, University of California, Berkeley).
27 Gilbert, D.E. (2019), «Labourers Become ‹Peasants›: Agroecological Politics in a Sumatran
Plantation Zone», Journal of Peasant Studies 47(5),1030–51.
28 Known as the People's Consultative Assembly Decree No. IX/2001 or TAP MPR No. IX/2001.
29 Afifi et al. (2005), «Redefining Agrarian Power», p. 20 (see note 26).
30 Gilbert (2019), «Labourers Become ‹Peasants›», p. 1 (see note 27).
31 Ibid., p. 3.
32 Ibid., p. 4.
33 La Via Campesina (2018), «La Via Campesina in Action for Climate Justice», Ecology Volume
44.6 (Berlin: Heinrich Boll Stiftung), pp. 18–19, available at: www.boell.de/sites/default/files/
radical_realism_for_climate_justice_volume_44_6_1.pdf.
Flooding in Bedono, Demak Region, Indonesia
Photo: © Nora Bibel – laif
62
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
Transnational peasant visions:
Advocating food sovereignty for agrarian and climate justice
e MST, the LPM and the SPI are each part of a transnational peasant organisa-
tion, La Via Campesina (LVC), which brings agrarian reform and peasant agroeco-
logy together as essential components of its advocacy of «food sovereignty». With
more than 130 peasant and small-farmer organisations from more than 90 coun-
tries, many consider the LVC to be «the most important social movement in the
world»34 for its ability to set «innovative agendas for political and social policies» in
addition to developing a «new relationship between the [Global] North and [Global]
South» through «peasant movement to peasant movement» cooperation.35 e
LVC has been recognised as a leading member of the anti-globalisation movement
for its role in protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Free Trade
Area of the Americas as well as for its role in the World Social Forum process.
ough it is known for its scathing critiques of World Bank land policies, its most
important achievement has arguably been its establishment of the novel concept
of food sovereignty, which it has brought into common usage.36
A product of the bold ecological vision37 of peasant organisations in Latin
America during the 1980s, the LVC was formed in the presence of 70 peasant lead-
ers in Mons, Belgium, in May 1993. It quickly asserted itself at the heart of world-
wide opposition to globalisation, articulating a strong grassroots vision of social
and climate justice based on the experience of its member movements, which span
from South-East Asia to North America. e importance of the LVC movements at
the national level – discussed in the cases of Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia –
was now combined with an unprecedented ability to provide novel concepts in the
transnational arena. ese found support across a range of developmental actors,
including national governments, iNGOs and parts of UN bodies, such as the Food
and Agricultural Organization (FAO). Developed at its second international confer-
ence in Tlaxcala, Mexico, in April 1996, the concept of food sovereignty made its
way into public debate as a counter-position to the dominant «food security» dis-
course during the rst World Food Summit in 1996.38 Martinez-Torres and Rosset
note that «[d]ominant neoliberal viewpoints see food and farming as about little
more than producing interchangeable products for trade. In contrast, food sov-
ereignty argues that food and farming are about […] inclusive local and national
34 Martinez-Torres, M.E., and Rosset, P. (2010), «La Vía Campesina: The Birth and Evolution of a
Transnational Social Movement», Journal of Peasant Studies , 150.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 151.
37 For example, the 1990 Declaration of Quito states: «We do not own nature […] it is not a com-
modity […] we believe this meaning of humanity and of the environment is not only valid
for our communities of Indo-American people. We believe this form of life is an option and
a light for the people of the world oppressed by a system which dominates people and the
environment.»
38 Ibid., p. 160.
63
Hashim bin Rashid Resisting rural dispossession and displacement: Peasant pathways to climate justice
development, for addressing poverty and hunger, preserving rural life, economies
and environments, and for managing national resources in a sustainable way.»39
Food sovereignty as a concept asserts «the right to farm as an act of social
stewardship of the land and food redistribution against the destablising and exclu-
sionary impacts of the neoliberal model».40 e Declaration of Nyéléni from 2007
states its opposition to «development projects/models and extractive industry that
displace people and destroy our environments and natural heritage». Instead, it
asserts that «the rights to use and manage our lands, territories, waters, seeds, live-
stock and biodiversity are in the hands of those of us who produce food».41 ese
assertions reect a will to retain the right to remain/become peasants, to reshape
the food system, and to address the ecological crisis at both the domestic and
global levels.
e concept of «peasant agroecology» was consolidated in the Declaration of
the International Forum for Agroecology in Nyéléni, Mali, in 2015. Declaring itself
in opposition to «the industrial food system [as] a key driver of the multiple crises of
climate, food, the environment, public health and others,» it asserts that42
«[w]e must […] build our own local food systems that create new rural-
urban links, based on truly agroecological production by peasants, arti-
sanal shers, indigenous peoples, urban farmers. […] We see agroecology
as the essential alternative to the industrial model, and as the means of
transforming how we produce and consume food into something better for
humanity and Mother Nature.»
It is these principles that shape the LVC's involvement in a number of transnational
forums, including the United Nations, FAO, the Committee on World Food Security
(CFS) and the Conference of the Parties (COP), as well as its rejection of the agendas
of other transnational institutions such as the WTO, the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank.
e LVC has been a vocal presence within and outside the COP, where it has
pushed for a climate justice agenda that supports the adoption of peasant rights,
food sovereignty and peasant agroecology. In doing so, it has called into question
dominant thinking on the climate question, most of which revolves around osten-
sibly technological solutions: agrofuels, geoengineering, SMART agriculture, GM
crops, carbon trading and so on. In strong language, it has described these as false
39 Ibid., p. 160.
40 Michael, P. (2006), «Peasant Prospects in the Neoliberal Age», New Political Economy , 11(3), 414.
41 It goes on: «Food sovereignty prioritises local and national economies and markets and
empowers peasant and family farmer-driven agriculture, artisanal – fishing, pastoralist-led
grazing, and food production, distribution and consumption based on environmental, social
and economic sustainability. Food sovereignty promotes transparent trade that guarantees
just income to all peoples and the rights of consumers to control their food and nutrition.»
La Via Campesina (2007), «Declaration of Nyeleni», available at: https://viacampesina.org/en/
declaration-of-nyi.
42 The 2015 Declaration of the International Forum for Agroecology, Nyeleni.
64
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
solutions that constitute «crimes against humanity».43 It produces a wide array of
literature for both its members and the public in preparation for climate summits,
advocating the «replacement of industrialised agriculture and animal production
by small-scale sustainable agriculture».44 An LVC press releases at the COP 22 in
Bonn, Germany, makes clear that its solution to the climate crisis involves fun-
damental transformation of the global food system: «Our call for system change
is urgent because the damage is growing. Commons, including land, forests and
water, must be protected and restored to the people.»45
e LVC's advocacy of food sovereignty and agroecology won a crucial victory
in 2018 when, after decades of protests and lobbying, it secured the UN Declaration
on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas (UNDROP).
Moreover, the LVC has successfully operated within the civil society mechanism
as part of the CFS, where it has pushed for negotiations on guidelines pertain-
ing to land tenure, the right to adequate food, small-scale sheries' food systems,
nutrition and agroecology. ese engagements are often highly contested and
politicised, with negotiations taking place between national governments, inter-
national development agencies, the private sectors, civil society and social move-
ments. e LVC remains critical of ongoing processes at the UN, including the UN
Secretary-General handing control of the next World Food Summit to the head of
the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, Agnes Kalibata.46 Current discussions
in the LVC Public Policy collective – in which the author is involved as a repre-
sentative from LVC South Asia – include proposals to host an alternative world
food summit that centres on rural social movements and their allies rather than
global agribusiness, which it holds responsible for rural dispossession and the
ecological crisis in global agriculture.
Conclusion
is chapter has argued that climate justice cannot be separated from the historical
and contemporary struggles of rural populations for food sovereignty. It has aimed
to share some principles on how rural social movements from the Global South are
oering concrete visions and practices for a peasant pathway to climate justice. For
rural social movements, this course requires building an ecologically sustainable
43 LVC (2016), «Via Campesina at COP 22: False Solutions to Climate Change May Constitute
Crimes against Humanity», available at: https://viacampesina.org/en/via-campesina-at-cop-22-
false-solutions-to-the-climate-crisis-may-constitute-crimes-against-humanity.
44 LVC (2009), «Sustainable Scale Sustainable Farmers Are Cooling Down the Earth», Via Campesina
Views, Paper 5, available at: https://viacampesina.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/
12/EN-paper5.pdf.
45 LVC (2017), «La Via Campesina Responds to COP 23 Calling for Peasant Agroecology», available
at: https://viacampesina.org/en/via-campesina-responds-cop23-calling-peasant-agroecology.
46 LVC (2020), «Via Campesina Denounces UN Envoy for UN Food Systems Summit for Dimin-
ishing Peasants and Their Rights», available at: https://viacampesina.org/en/viacampesina-de-
nounces-un-special-envoy-for-the-un-food-systems-summit-for-diminishing-peasants-and-
their-rights.
65
Hashim bin Rashid Resisting rural dispossession and displacement: Peasant pathways to climate justice
food system that protects rural populations from dispossession and provides the
opportunity for mobile labouring populations to become rural producers. In con-
crete terms, this means rural social movements articulate the right to remain/
become peasants as integral to climate justice, in that they assert the right of rural
populations not to be displaced, as well as the right of vulnerable labouring popula-
tions to be able to nd a way of reasserting their dignity and sovereignty by occupy-
ing land and cultivating it through the developing practice of peasant agroecology.
Rural social movements assert their right to be more than passive recipients of
policy solutions in the midst of economic, ecological and climate change-related
distress, and to actively solve the global economic and ecological crises by assert-
ing the right to become stewards of the land and food. As we have seen in case
studies of the MST in Brazil, the LPM in South Africa and the SPI in Indonesia,
rural social movements in the Global South insist on their right to land, the rights
of nature, and the right to stay put, and they believe these rights are fundamentally
linked. Climate justice for vulnerable rural populations does not merely involve the
recognition of new legal categories such as «climate refugees». It requires policies
that address the continued legacy of the colonial and contemporary dispossession
of peoples and the continued destruction of rural environments.
Rural social movements are under attack in almost all countries of the Global
South. e MST, the SPI and the LPM operate under authoritarian regimes. eir
cooperation in La Via Campesina provides much-needed solidarity and contributes
to the creation of a collective idea of rural development designed by movements
rather than policymaking elites. Important victories, such as UNDROP, are increas-
ingly under threat in a political atmosphere where pro-industry authoritarian gov-
ernments that deny climate change have taken power across the world. Global
agribusiness has found itself empowered in relation to rural social movements, and
the Paris Agreement has been weakened. Within this context, the amplication of
rural voices in the transnational sphere is more important than ever. ese voices,
which seek to overturn a century and a half of developmental theory and practice
designed to displace rural populations, must gure prominently in the policies that
seek to address climate justice and mobility.
66
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
NAUSHEEN H. ANWAR AND MALINI SUR
Climate change, urban futures,
and the gendering of cities in
South Asia
Introduction
Comprised of the nation-states of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, India,
Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, South Asia is home to an estimated 1.5 billion
people. is region accommodates a large portion of the world's poor and margin-
alised populations, an increasing share of which live in urban areas. Between 2001
and 2011 South Asia's urban population grew by 130 million and is projected to
reach 250 million by 2030.1 South Asia is also anticipated to be one of the regions
worst aected by climate change; its cities are under serious threat from rising air
pollution and sea levels, increasing incidences of extreme weather events such as
oods, cyclones and storm surges, in addition to the irregularity of the monsoons
and intense heat waves. Many cities in this region are located on oodplains, in
dry areas or on coasts where severe oods have led to the destruction of homes,
the loss of livelihoods and the loss of life. e prediction of the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2007 that freshwater shortages in South
Asia would be compounded by ooding (from rivers, ash oods and sea surges)
has proven to be accurate.2 Furthermore, more than 800 million people in South
Asia presently live in communities projected to become zones with extremely
high temperatures that will cause increased damage, especially under the region's
carbon-intensive energy regimes.3
1 Ellis, P., and Roberts, M. (2016), Leveraging Urbanization in South Asia: Managing Spatial
Transformation for Prosperity and Liveability (Washington, DC: World Bank).
2 IPCC (2007), Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (New York, NY: IPCC).
3 Muthukumara, M., Bandyopadhyay, S., Chonabayashi, S., Markandya, A., and Mosier, T. (2018),
South Asia's Hotspots: Impacts of Temperature and Precipitation Changes on Living Standards
(Washington, DC: World Bank), available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28723.
67
Nausheen H. Anwar and Malini Sur Climate change, urban futures, and the gendering of cities in South Asia
If it was once possible to write about future rural and urban areas as distinct
sites of struggle and lived experience, today South Asian cities can no longer be
viewed as isolated zones protected from the vagaries of nature and climate change.
For instance, in the past, the plight of farmers who braved droughts and oods –
and even lost their lives to weather-related events – hardly impacted city dwell-
ers, except for price rises in food and other related commodities. Such scenarios,
in which the rural world suered in relative isolation, contrast sharply with the
impact of events such as Cyclone Ampan, which devastated large parts of eastern
India and Bangladesh in 16–19 May 2020. Not only did it wash away crops, cattle
and embankments in remote rural regions, Ampan also caused devastation in the
city of Kolkata, where high winds and oods damaged infrastructure: e city's air-
port was ooded and electricity poles, trees and settlements in urban slums were
razed to the ground. e disastrous eects of this cyclonic event were particularly
severe on the urban poor, especially those with inadequate and insecure housing.
e long-term impacts of such extreme weather events – along with the fallout
of ill-planned developmental projects for mitigating climate change – are particu-
larly evident in regions such as the Indus Delta in Pakistan, and Khulna and the
Sundarbans in Bangladesh – ecologically fragile zones from which the rural and
landless poor are displaced, eectively driven into insecure urban settlements in
South Asian cities. Of course, cyclonic events and ooding are by no means unique
or exceptional to these cities. Globally, city dwellers have been living and coping
with extreme weather events linked to climate change for many years. What we
propose to show in this chapter, however, is how the impact of such occurrences
exposes the foundational and structural aws of our cities, thereby raising urgent
questions and policy issues related to class and gender inequality.
Examining the relationship between climate change and urbanisation, we
show how climate change risks in urban South Asia disproportionately aect the
livelihoods, health and wellbeing of the poor, especially women; how they entrench
displacement and precarity; and how extreme heat, water scarcity, pollution and
dust impact their lives, health and livelihoods. As we propose to show, issues of
climate change mitigation and adaptation are compounded by the fact that provi-
sions for essential services such as clean water and clean air are far below regional
thresholds and do not meet general social welfare criteria. For instance, although
cities may factor in climate change, it is imperative that a broader understanding of
the interface between climate and development priorities across policy and govern-
ance at all levels be developed to reduce the ill-eects of climate change in urban
areas.4 Even as South Asian cities are transforming into global cities, the urban
poor remain conned to settlements that lack access to basic housing, water and
electricity supplies. Despite providing avenues of employment for large numbers of
the rural and urban poor, South Asia's construction boom is not ameliorating the
conditions in which most are forced to live and earn their livelihoods. In fact, for
4 Khosla, R., and Bhardwaj, A. (2019), «Urbanization in the Time of Climate Change: Examining
the Response of Indian Cities», WIREs Clim Change , 10, e560.
68
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
the migrant poor, who lack political voice in cities, real estate development disrupts
social networks while heightening exposure to emerging climate risks and nancial
precariousness, thereby generating conditions of injustice and exclusion.5
Climate change, urbanisation and displacement
Today, most South Asian cities are struggling with the pressures of population
growth on land, housing, infrastructure and basic services, alongside climate
change impacts that include fast-rising temperatures, volatile precipitation levels
and ooding. Seasonal high temperatures – concurrent with either summer-
time or with dry or rainy seasons – continue to break annual records in localised
manifestations of global heating. e combination of extreme heat with extreme
humidity is becoming more severe in South Asian cities, and this presents unique
health risks. Much of South Asia's urbanisation is reected in the older slums in
cities as well as the emerging informal settlements,6 in which nearly 130 million
South Asians reside.7 Informal settlements are also spreading out to the periph-
eries of cities. Indeed, amidst the massive urban transformation in South Asia,
it is now evident that the majority of the expansion is taking place beyond mu-
nicipal boundaries.8 Agrarian hinterlands and so-called urban peripheries have
witnessed the most dramatic changes.9
Urban and rural/agrarian entanglements are shaping the contested politics
of land, real estate and infrastructure to produce a «highly unequal and tense
socio-political landscape of access, inclusion and displacement».10 Within this
urban-rural landscape, pastoralists, indigenous groups and agriculturalists are
willingly, or through coercion, giving up their land and/or their livelihoods; the
bonds of kinship and social relations that underpin their communities are being
eroded.11 As Gururani and Dasgupta note:
5 Chu, E., and Michael, K. (2018), «Recognition in Urban Climate Justice: Marginality and Exclu-
sion of Migrants in Indian Cities», Environment and Urbanization 31(1), 139–56.
6 Not all informal settlements are slums and nor are they necessarily «informal». Context matters
but broadly speaking, informal settlements arise out of informalised processes of land acqui-
sition, e.g. incomplete property rights, self-help construction. For a substantive discussion on
the tricky matters of defining slums and informal settlements and relevance to policy, see Gil-
bert, A. (2007, December), «The Return of the Slum: Does Language Matter?», International
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 31(4), 697–713.
7 Ellis and Roberts (2016), Leveraging Urbanization (see note 1).
8 Ibid.
9 Anwar, N.H. (2018), «Receding Rurality, Booming Periphery», Economic & Political Weekly
53(12), 46–54; Gururani, S., and Dasgupta, R. (2018), «Frontier Urbanism: Urbanisation beyond
Cities in South Asia», Economic and Political Weekly 53(12), 41–45.
10 Gururani and Dasgupta (2018), «Frontier Urbanism», 42.
11 Anwar (2018), «Receding Rurality» (see note 9); Gururani and Dasgupta (2018), «Frontier
Urbanism» (see note 9).
69
Nausheen H. Anwar and Malini Sur Climate change, urban futures, and the gendering of cities in South Asia
«[…] these frontiers are made up of dispossessed peasants, displaced mi-
grants, and poor tenants, who battle for space with new middle- and upper-
class housing enclaves, shopping malls, oce towers, and infrastructure
corridors. ey must share these frontiers with exible state functionaries,
local intermediaries and landlords, rent extractors and land speculators,
petty entrepreneurs and real estate agents. Many are caught in the middle
of rapidly-changing livelihoods and aspirations, between value extraction
and appropriation.»12
In urban Pakistan, the combination of a high-density population and a heavily built
environment; the extensive use of asphalt and concrete in construction; and the
lack of green space all create an urban heat island eect that can add as much as
12° C to average recorded temperatures.13 In June 2015, temperatures in Karachi –
where an estimated 12.4 million people (62 per cent of the city's population) live in
informal settlements – rose to 44.8° C, resulting in more than 1,000 deaths being
recorded in 10 days.14 Prior to the heatwave, increased demand for energy had
triggered prolonged power outages; the rise in temperature placed further pressure
on already limited public water supplies. e eects were particularly pronounced
in high-density areas, where narrow lanes and congested built environments cur-
tailed wind circulation. Just as heatwaves have become a prominent source of
vulnerability in South Asian cities aected by climate change, so too has water
scarcity. Coupled with other climate-related factors such as extreme heat, unsea-
sonal rains and urban ooding, its impact is particularly harmful.
Dhaka, a city of 17 million people, exemplies the acute challenges of urban-
isation and water scarcity, as these intersect with climate change impacts. Nearly
one-third of Dhaka's residents confront what has been described as «climate apart-
heid».15 e elite navigate the city by avoiding slums and informal settlements,
which is where: the vast majority of Dhaka's poor and marginalised groups reside,
infrastructure services are generally lacking and safe drinking water remains
inaccessible. Inequality and lack of aordable housing force the urban poor to live
in informal spaces that are likely to be more vulnerable to climate change haz-
ards such as ash oods, thus increasing their exposure to ooding. With homes
destroyed and livelihoods compromised due to ooding, marginalised communi-
ties have less ability to cope with, and recover from, the damage caused by such
displacement.16
12 Gururani and Dasgupta (2018), «Frontier Urbanism», 43.
13 Anwar, N., Amin, S., Cross, J., Friedrich, D., Khandekar, A., Morelle, …Nastiti, A. (2020, July 2),
«Heat and Covid-19 in the Off-Grid City», Somatosphere .
14 Ebrahim, Z.T. (2019, July 26), «Is Karachi Ready to Fight the Next Big Heatwave?» Dawn .
15 Sultana, F. (2020, June 24), «Political Ecology 1: From Margins to Center», Progress in Human
Geography , https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132520936751.
16 Sultana, F. (2010), «Living in Hazardous Waterscapes: Gendered Vulnerabilities and Experi-
ences of Floods and Disasters», Environmental Hazards 9(1), 43–53.
70
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
However, displacement is a multifaceted dynamic in South Asian cities. It in-
cludes not only forced displacement due to land conicts and/or climate change
risks, but also development-induced displacement. Indeed, urban development
causes the displacement of millions of people worldwide every year, and the
proportion of displaced urban residents is rapidly growing.17 In 2018 alone,
approximately 70.8 million people were forcibly displaced in this manner.18 If the
uprooting of people from their land and homes through development is at times
highly visible (e.g. forced evictions), less visible manifestations include develop-
ment policies that undermine livelihoods.19 «Gentrication», «slum clearance»,
«slum evictions» and so forth are all terms indicating the involuntary movement
of people from their homes due to development. Such forms of land-based dis-
placement may interact in complex and violent ways with social and economic
outcomes of development that exacerbate risks and vulnerability for the urban
poor in a changing climate. For instance, assessments of the outcomes of forced
displacement and resettlement to accommodate development show that resettle-
ment policies create new vulnerabilities among resettled populations, particularly
among the poor.20 Resettled populations are often pushed to the rural-urban mar-
gins where social marginalisation, reduced access to infrastructure and unstable
employment combine to generate uncertainties. In fact, planned resettlement to
accommodate development has been associated with adverse health outcomes,
including food insecurity.21
In cities such as Lahore,22 Karachi,23 Delhi24 and Colombo,25 the experience
of displacement and the resultant resettlement and homelessness have dened the
process of habitation for the vast majority of the poor. In recent decades, urban
17 Cernea, M.M. (2008), «Compensation and Benefit Sharing: Why Resettlement Policies and
Practices Must Be Reformed», Water Science and Engineering 1(1), 89–120.
18 UNHCR (2019), Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018 , available at: www.unhcr.org/
globaltrends2018.
19 Penz, P., Drydyk, J., and Bose, P.S. (2011), Displacement by Development: Ethics, Rights and
Responsibilities (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press).
20 Cernea, M.M. (1997), «The Risks and Reconstruction Model for Resettling Displaced Popula-
tions», World Development 25(10),1569–87.
21 Ibid., 1997.
22 Abeyasekara, A., Maqsood, A., Perera, I., Sajjad, F., and Spencer, J. (2020), «Discipline in Sri
Lanka Punish in Pakistan: Neoliberalism, Governance, and Housing Compared», Journal of the
British Academy 7(s2), 215–44.
23 Anwar, N.H. (2018, August 21), «The State Wants to Make Karachi a ‹World-class› City. But
What's the Cost?», Dawn ; Hasan, A., Maher, M., Ahmed, N., and Qayyum, F. (2018), Karachi
Eviction 2018: A Brutal and Shameful Act in the Name of Law , vol. 1 (Karachi: Urban Resource
Centre).
24 Bhan, G. (2009), «This Is No Longer the City I Once Knew. Evictions, the Urban Poor and the
Right to the City in Millennial Delhi», Environment and Urbanization 21(1), 127–42; Dupont,
V.D. (2008), «Slum Demolitions in Delhi Since the 1990s: An Appraisal», Economic and Political
Weekly , 79–87.
25 Abeyasekara et al. (2020), «Discipline in Sri Lanka» (see note 22); Amarasuriya, H., and Spencer,
J. (2015), «With That, Discipline Will Also Come to Them: The Politics of the Urban Poor in
Post-war Colombo», Current Anthropology 56 (suppl. 11), S66–S75.
71
Nausheen H. Anwar and Malini Sur Climate change, urban futures, and the gendering of cities in South Asia
development plans that include mega-infrastructure projects, tourism and city
beautication have entailed heavy costs in terms of the demolition of slums and
informal settlements. Such plans have been enacted without solving critical issues
relating to adequate shelter for the urban poor. In Delhi, preparations for the 2010
Commonwealth Games provided an opportunity for urban authorities to «clean
up» the city, transform its land use and reshape the urban landscape;26 nearly
200,000 people were forcibly evicted as a result.27 In Karachi, the construction of
the mega-infrastructure project Lyari Expressway led to the forced displacement
of 77,000 families in 2002. Of those aected, only 30,000 were relocated to reset-
tlement colonies on the city's rural-urban margins, where they continue to strug-
gle with curtailed mobility and degraded infrastructure.28 For residents in Lyari
Basti – one of the resettlement colonies – life after resettlement has meant greater
vulnerability, especially in terms of access to infrastructure. One 70-year-old male
resident summarised his experience two decades after resettlement as follows:
«e Musharraf [government] gave us amenities [in 2003] before sending
us here. It was agreed […] that for 7 years there would be no bills for water
and electricity. But after 7 years passed, things gradually started getting
worse. For example, street cleaning stopped. Sewerage lines started getting
choked, and there was no one to maintain them. Piped water started com-
ing once a month, instead of once every week. en once a month became
once in six months, then once a year; now my street hasn't had piped water
for the past 7 years.»29
Over the past two decades, Karachi's infrastructure and urban development
projects have led to the displacement of well over 400,000 working-class and low-
income households from the city's centre.30 Fewer than 33 per cent of the house-
holds forcibly evicted have received any form of resettlement or compensation.31
Moreover, since 2018, a brutal wave of Supreme Court-backed anti-encroachment
drives have led to the demolition of residential spaces and informal markets.
is has not only made more people homeless but also eviscerated an estimated
200,000 jobs.32 ese are devastating consequences for the vast majority of Kara-
chi's poor residents, who rely on the informal economy for survival.
26 Dupont (2008), «Slum Demolitions» (see note 24).
27 Habitat International Coalition (2011), «Planned Dispossession: Forced Evictions and the
2010 Commonwealth Games», Fact-Finding Mission Report No. 14 (New Delhi: Housing and
Land Rights Network).
28 Anjum, G., Anwar, N.H., Abdullah, A., Toheed, M., Arif, M., Macktoom, S., …Rizvi, K. (2021),
Land, Governance, and the Gendered Politics of Displacement in Urban Pakistan
, manu-
script in preparation (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre), available at: www.
idrc.ca/en/project/governance-land-and-gendered-politics-displacement-pakistan.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Hasan et al. (2018), Karachi Eviction 2018 (see note 23).
72
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
Similar dynamics are evident in Pakistan's capital city of Islamabad, where
forced evictions have had a profound impact on certain populations, such as the
Pashtun and Afghan migrant-refugees, who ed from state-sponsored wars that
have devasted Afghanistan as well Pakistan's north-western region of Feder-
ally Administered Tribal Areas. Faced with no alternative housing, the migrant-
refugees found shelter in Islamabad's informal settlements. In 2015, approximately
20,000 people were displaced in a harrowing eviction operation that was carried
out against Islamabad's largest informal settlement of I-11, where many of the
migrant-refugees resided.33 ese are people who have experienced the brutality
of double-displacement: rst due to war, and later due to the criminalisation of
their ethnicity, as the state found it convenient to declare them «terrorists» as a
means of justifying the evictions.
Urban renewal and the making of global cities in South Asia are often accom-
panied by evictions. For instance, Colombo's development into a global city in-
volved mass evictions and forced resettlements along the city's margins. ese
processes of dispossession were ideologically normalised, reected in a shift in
language and public attitudes towards housing. Observers noted a reversal in the
way housing policies are framed and presented in Sri Lanka, where welfare provi-
sions for low-income urban residents have been reduced.34 In Indian cities such
as Kolkata, informal settlements provide a certain exibility for urban elites, who
plan and govern space to their advantage. e legal ambiguity allows them to push
slums, hawking and other visible signs of poverty beyond the borders of townships
into nearby slums, where residents lack access to the infrastructure and services
necessary to mitigate risk from weather events such as oods.35
Urban air pollution, dust and health
South Asian cities face severe climate-related air pollution and carbon emissions.
In Indian cities, the main emission sources for air pollution include vehicle exhaust,
on-road resuspended dust, construction dust, industrial exhaust, and domestic
cooking and heating. In addition, in cities such as Amritsar, Bhopal, Chandigarh,
Coimbatore, Kanpur, Ludhiana and Pune, small- and medium-scale industries are
major sources of emissions and industrial pollutants, which further contribute to
particulate material PM 10 and PM 2.5.36 Air pollution causes ill health ranging
from eyesight damage to serious cardiovascular, neurological and dermatological
complications. People in cities do not experience the same conventional seasonal
33 Turi, H. (2015, December), «They Razed Our Homes», Tanqeed , p. 10.
34 Abeyasekara et al. (2020), «Discipline in Sri Lanka» (see note 22).
35 Rumbach, A. (2017), «At the Roots of Urban Disasters: Planning and Uneven Geographies of
Risk in Kolkata, India», Journal of Urban Affairs 39(6), 783–99.
36 Guttikunda, S.K., Nishadh, K.A., and Jawahar, P. (2019), «Air Pollution Knowledge Assessments
(APnA) for 20 Indian Cities», Urban Climate 27, 124–41.
73
Nausheen H. Anwar and Malini Sur Climate change, urban futures, and the gendering of cities in South Asia
transitions; the air drastically changes due to extreme heat or cold and pollution.37
For people with pre-existing respiratory diseases, pollution can cause a life-threat-
ening deterioration of their baseline breathing capacity.38 Studies have also shown
that higher temperatures and shifting precipitation patterns will worsen these
trends, reducing living standards in communities across South Asia; more than 800
million people at present live in locations projected to become dangerous, given the
carbon-intensive climate scenario that seems set to continue.39
Today, it is evident that climate change is not only being driven by greenhouse
gases such as carbon dioxide but also short-lived methane, tropospheric ozone
and black carbon. Although they reside in the air for short durations of time, these
pollutants do considerable damage to the human body. ey also impact the
economy and wellbeing in a wider sense. On account of the high concentration of
black carbon in South Asia's densely populated cities, city dwellers' livelihoods are
especially adversely impacted.40 For instance, the urban poor who work in the
informal economy – including on construction sites and in occupations that rely
upon long hours of bicycling and walking – risk exposure to dust and air pollution.41
With state eorts to make South Asian cities global, construction is an all-
pervasive phenomenon of urban life. In India, the construction industry is a major
contributor towards gross domestic product, employs 33 million people and impacts
250 associated industries such as cement, coal and technology.42 Construction dust
is one of the primary pollutants of Indian cities. It exacerbates air pollution and
undermines the right to safe and secure housing of urban populations.
Urban land development in Indian cities unfolds through a complex combina-
tion of legal and electoral politics. Governments have taken aggressive measures
to transform cities in order to attract new capital investments.43 In Mumbai,
urban renewal, which is based on the conversion of land, rarely protects the hous-
ing rights of the poor.44 At the margins of the city, legislative acts and political
processes convert the land on which the poor reside into assets for the rich. State
policies transform «low-cost» shelters into middle-class apartments, and real estate
37 Sur, M. (2020), «Ambient Air: Kolkata's Bicycle Politics and Post-Carbon Futures», in Elinoff,
E., and Vaughn, T. (eds.), Beyond Environmental Crisis in Asia (Pennsylvania, PA: University of
Pennsylvania Press).
38 Mishra, M. (2019), «Poison in the Air: Declining Air Quality in India», Lung India 36(2)
(Mar–Apr),160–61.
39 Muthukumara et al. (2018), South Asia's Hotspots (see note 3).
40 US Environmental Protection Agency (2012), Reducing Black Carbon Emissions in South Asia:
Low Cost Opportunities (Washington, DC: Environmental Protection Agency).
41 Sur (2020), «Ambient Air» (see note 37).
42 Elinoff, E., Sur, M., and Yeoh, B. (2016), «Constructing Asia: An Introduction», City Special Fea-
ture 21(5), 580–86.
43 Sur, M. (2017), «The Blue Urban: Coloring and Constructing Kolkata», City 21(5), 597–606.
44 Bhan (2009), «This Is No Longer the City I Once Knew» (see note 24); Dupont (2008), «Slum
Demolitions» (see note 24).
74
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
developers use state-sponsored subsidies designed for the urban poor to prot
from the construction of apartments for the middle classes.45
In the city of Kolkata, informal urban practices of governance underline the
troublingly distorted priorities of a political elite that fails to protect citizens from
the harmful impacts of construction, yet rarely misses an opportunity to advance
its own brand. e ruling party cleverly uses the colour blue to rebrand the city in
order to advertise itself and attract investments. e colour's ubiquitous visibility
normalises its policies: disruptive real estate development, selective dispossession
and corruption.46 Despite the existence of such routine maintenance and repair
of public infrastructure, the city administration does not ensure the regulation
of construction dust, which inltrates the lungs of construction workers and city
dwellers.
e construction boom across South Asian cities employs large numbers of
rural to urban migrants in a never-ending cycle of urban expansion, but none of the
projects consider the lives and health of the construction workers who are build-
ing these cities. Dust from construction sites severely damages their health, and
cement dust poses an occupational hazard that causes respiratory, skin-related and
haematological health problems. A recent study on construction workers in Indian
cities conrms that their blood composition parameters are adversely aected;
the cause is attributed to cement dust at work sites.47
Cities and rural-urban displacements
South Asia's coastal cities face an uncertain future given the rapid urban growth in
low-elevation coastal zones. Global warming causes rises in sea levels, and these
climatic changes lead to higher winds, heavier rainfall, stronger storm surges and
increased coastal ooding.48 In Bangladesh, climate-induced changes are likely to
displace 134 million people who today reside in zones that could become moderate
or severely dangerous locations by 2050; this comprises more than 82 per cent of
the country's population. In addition to the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the port city of
Chittagong could become one such location.49 In the city of Dhaka, which is fac-
ing severe climate threats, scholars have shown how the focus of interventions has
been to assess impacts rather than mitigate adaptability and change. For instance,
climate change planning at the national level demonstrates that urban issues
45 Jose, G. (2017), «Hawa khaana in Vasai Virar», City 21(5), 632–40.
46 Sur (2017), «The Blue Urban» (see note 37).
47 Farheen, A., Hazari, M.H., Khatoon, F., Sultana, F., and Qudsiya, S.M. (2017), «Hematological
Parameters Are Acutely Affected by Cement Dust Exposure in Construction Workers», Annals
of Medical Physiology 1(1), 31–35.
48 Fuchs, R., Conran, M., and Louis, E. (2011), «Climate Change and Asia's Coastal Urban Cities:
Can They Meet the Challenge?», Environment and Urbanization 2(1) (Asia Issue), 13–28.
49 Muthukumara et al. (2018), South Asia's Hotspots (see note 3).
75
Nausheen H. Anwar and Malini Sur Climate change, urban futures, and the gendering of cities in South Asia
compete with coastal issues and agricultural production; in the process there is
a complete lack of coordination among local governments.50
Displacement in South Asia due to the impacts of climate change in both rural
and coastal regions that are zones of climate crisis impact urban futures. Severe
weather-related events such as coastal and riverine ooding, droughts and water
scarcity are forcing rural populations to migrate to urban centres. In 2010, more than
20 million people were aected by unprecedented oods that inundated one-fth
of Pakistan, triggering mass migration to cities from rural areas.51 Approximately
7 million people were rendered homeless with 1.8 million homes destroyed.52
Many people did not go back to their hometowns and permanently settled in cities
to make a living because of the destruction to their homes and farmlands. More-
over, in the southern region of Pakistan, the ongoing ecological devastation of
the Indus Delta has led to the steady outow of people moving from coastal areas
towards urban centres such as Karachi as well as smaller cities in search of better
livelihoods and shelter. A recent report on urban resilience in Pakistan details the
plight of migrants from the Indus Delta in southern Pakistan. It states:
«e Indus Delta is a coastal area comprising Kharo Chan and Keti Bunder
in atta District of Sindh. Changes in the rural ecology and political econ-
omy of the Indus Delta region have curtailed livelihoods and led to waves
of migration. For poor and landless farmers and shermen of the Indus
Delta region of Sindh, control of inland water bodies by inuential peo-
ple, indebtedness to and dependence on landowners, sea-water intrusion
and lack of fresh water, and susceptibility to climatic events have pushed
people outward over the last three decades. ey have mostly settled in
shing villages along the coast of Karachi – Ibrahim Hyderi, Rehri Goth,
and Lath Basti. […] When these migrants arrive in Karachi, there are other
disentitlements that impinge upon their desire for a better life – policing of
access points to shing, control of regulatory bodies and harbors by inu-
ential people, competition, and destructive shing practices such as harm-
ful equipment and deep sea foreign trawlers. Older migrants from atta,
Badin, and Sujawal were frustrated with failing municipal services and low
earnings.»53
50 Araos, M., Ford, J., Berrang-Ford, L., Biesbroek, R., and Moser, S. (2017), «Climate Change Adap-
tation Planning for Global South Megacities: The Case of Dhaka», Journal of Environmental
Policy & Planning 19(6), 682–96.
51 Rendon, R., and Thomas, A. (2010), Confronting Climate Displacement: Learning from Pakistan's
Floods , Refugees International, available at: www.humanitarianlibrary.org/sites/default/files/
2013/05/ConfrontingClimateDisplacement.pdf.
52 Ibid.
53 Ashfaq, A. (2020, May), Understanding Urban Resilience: Migration, Displacement and Violence
in Karachi (Islamabad: International Committee of the Red Cross), p. 20.
76
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
In Bangladesh's low-lying coastal islands, forming part of a densely populated delta,
rising waters, cyclones and oods are threatening communities. is is a region
where climate adaptation strategies, combined with the dynamics of agrarian
change, are displacing and dispossessing people who have historically depended
on agricultural work to survive. In the climate-vulnerable southern district of rural
Khulna, Kasia Paprocki has shown how the onset of shrimp farming as a climate
adaptation strategy that seeks simultaneously to promote export production has
reduced labour opportunities and triggered a process of de-peasantisation and
migration towards urban centres. She argues:54
«As shrimp ponds take over land from rice and other crop production, the
people who used to depend on agricultural work to survive and feed their
families increasingly nd themselves without a place in the rural econ-
omy. As the elderly proprietor of a tea stall commented to me, ‹shrimp has
destroyed all of the farmers›, invoking the Bengali word dhongsho, mean-
ing literally ‹destroy›, ‹kill›, ‹waste›, or ‹ruin›. ese dispossessed farmers
migrate out of their villages to nd work – to Khulna city, Dhaka, and
often Kolkata, in the neighbouring Indian state of West Bengal. us, the
expansion of commercial shrimp cultivation has a signicant impact on
the transformation of labour relations throughout the region, as well as the
survival of its inhabitants.»55
e Bangladesh case is particularly pertinent because it underscores the impor-
tance of understanding climate adaptation as a process wherein rural and urban
futures are deeply interwoven, and where there are inherent risks for poor rural
inhabitants who are often forced to bear the burden of climate mitigation strate-
gies. It also illustrates the potential links between climate-related issues and other
kinds of conict. e onslaught of saline water for shrimp farming and the enclo-
sure of what were formerly common resources led local communities to pursue
justice through various forms of mobilisation. is, in turn, was met with a violent
backlash from the state's military forces. e presence of battalions of the armed
forces and occasional interventions by revolutionary extremists have combined to
foster an atmosphere of fear and insecurity in this coastal zone.56 e potential for
strife that could trigger further displacement remains considerable.
Cities, climates and gender
Experiences of urban renewal, infrastructure development and displacement
interact with climate change impacts in ways that are dierentiated along lines of
54 Paprocki, K. (2019), «All That Is Solid Melts into the Bay: Anticipatory Ruination and Climate
Change Adaptation», Antipode 51(1), 295–315.
55 Ibid., 11.
56 Guha Thakurta, M., Hossain, H., and Sur, M. (2011), Freedom from Fear? Freedom from Want?
Rethinking Security in Bangladesh (New Delhi: Rupa), p. 56.
77
Nausheen H. Anwar and Malini Sur Climate change, urban futures, and the gendering of cities in South Asia
gender57 and social class. is section concerns itself with the manner in which
gender, in particular, shapes and reinforces power relations between and among
dierent groups. Across South Asia, gender inequality, in combination with climate
vulnerability, presents grave challenges to the wellbeing of the communities and
ecosystems upon which they depend. As Farhana Sultana explains:
«[the] [g]endered implications of climate change in South Asia are particu-
larly poignant as patriarchal norms, inequities, and inequalities often place
women and men in dierentiated positions in their abilities to respond to
and cope with dramatic changes in socioecological relations but also fore-
ground the complex ways in which social power relations operate in com-
munal responses to adaptation strategies.»58
In many South Asian urban contexts, the driving forces of displacement, the lack
of social safety nets, inaccessibility to safe water and weak government responses
to disasters interact with climate change risks and hazards to produce highly un-
equal urban landscapes in which poor women and men are increasingly being left
behind. Water injustice in urban contexts is deeply marked by gender dierences
because women are primarily responsible for domestic responsibilities, which
include fetching water for the family. Poor women who live in informal settlements
face the double burden of climate change and patriarchy.59 For instance, gendered
divisions of labour in patriarchal households mean water scarcity increases the
physical workload for women as well as the emotional stress they undergo, given
that they are often tasked with water provision. In essence, the gendered and lived
vulnerabilities of poor women to climate change are exacerbated by the expand-
ing footprint of urbanisation, decrepit infrastructure, displacement and anti-poor
urban planning, whereby they are forced to constantly negotiate a terrain of harm.
A good deal of this negotiating occurs at the urban-rural interface. In west-
ern Nepal's Kailali and Bardia districts, unpredictable and uneven rainfall has
created new challenges, such as increased risks of ooding and lower levels of
agricultural production. Women feel particularly vulnerable to these impacts, as
higher levels of food insecurity have created fertile ground for domestic violence
and greater burdens regarding care. As agriculture has become less reliable due to
unpredictable and changing rainfall patterns, men are migrating to cities within
57 We understand gender as the social (rather than biological) attributes, norms, roles and atti-
tudes that are considered appropriate for groups of men and women by a given society and
learnt through socialisation.
58 Sultana, F. (2014), «Gendering Climate Change: Geographical Insights», The Professional Geog-
rapher 66(3), 372–81.
59 Anwar, N.H., Sawas, A., and Mustafa, D. (2020), «Without Water, There Is No Life: Negotiating
Everyday Risks and Gendered Insecurities in Karachi's Informal Settlements», Urban Studies
57(6), 1320–37; Sawas, A., Anwar, N.H., and Anjum, G. (2020), «Climate Change and Security
in Urban Pakistan: A Gender Perspective», in Gender, Climate & Security: Sustaining Inclusive
Peace on the Frontlines of Climate Change (New York, NY: UN Women), pp. 1–17.
78
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
Nepal, to India and to Gulf countries to seek alternative income sources.60 Under
these constrained circumstances, women have reported shouldering higher levels
of insecurity as the sole providers for their families in ever more challenging envi-
ronments. However, as a UN Environment Programme study notes, «[d]espite the
gender-related risks associated with climate change and security in Nepal, women
have remained largely sidelined from decision-making processes. Barriers to inclu-
sion are especially high for female members of the aru ethnic minority, who
face multiple levels of marginalization as women and members of a traditionally
marginalized caste.»61
In Pakistan, ndings from research across two provinces – Sindh and Pun-
jab – underscore important trends in urban areas where the impacts of climate
change are exacerbating levels of precarity and contributing to domestic violence
and the formation of non-state armed groups. Men and women are increasingly
unable to live up to their prescribed gender roles, which, in some cases, is resulting
in domestic or communal violence. For instance, damages incurred from extreme
ooding have been found to keep men – who are typically daily wage or contract
workers – at home, resulting in loss of income and preventing them from fullling
their prescribed roles as breadwinners.62 Women and men have reported that the
anxieties and frustrations associated with this lack of fullment of their socialised
responsibilities could lead to domestic violence. Women have further reported that
they continue to face increased structural oppression as a result of certain aspects
of climate change, such as extreme water shortages.
Many women are expected to continue to manage the household without
problems, even with droughts aecting household water security in some of Paki-
stan's biggest cities. Women relayed experiences of tending to sick children with
no resources and of disappointing their husbands or other men in the household.
Women explained that they experienced physical forms of domestic violence for
either failing to manage the existing water in the house, or for breaking norms
around women's mobility by venturing out to secure new sources.63
Women's experiences of climate change make evident the complexities of
power. Relational privileges and intersectional politics extend to diverse contexts.
For instance, indigenous communities can also practice unequal and exploitative
gender power relations.64 is has a bearing on how research and policy agendas
can be inclusive of, and accountable to, dierent constituents and epistemological
framings. Otherwise, various forms of marginality are reproduced and reinforced
60 UNEP (2020, June 11), Gender, Climate & Security: Sustaining Inclusive Peace on the Frontlines
of Climate Change , revised edition, available at: http://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.
500.11822/32638/GCS.pdf?sequence=1.
61 Ibid., p. 37.
62 Anwar, N.H., Mustafa, D., Sawas, A., and Malik, S. (2016), Gender and Violence in Urban Pakistan ,
IDRC Report (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre).
63 UNEP (2020), p. 36 (see note 60).
64 Sundberg, J. (2014), «Decolonizing Posthumanist Geographies», Cultural Geographies 21(1), 33–47;
Sultana, F. (2020), «Embodied Intersectionalities of Urban Citizenship: Water, Infrastructure,
and Gender in the Global South», Annals of the American Association of Geographers , 1–18.
79
Nausheen H. Anwar and Malini Sur Climate change, urban futures, and the gendering of cities in South Asia
at the community – and especially at the institutional – level. For instance, patri-
archy extends beyond communities and is cemented in authoritative institutional
bodies. An assessment of government decentralisation in South Asia found that
although armative action brings women in greater numbers into the local gov-
ernment machinery, their presence does not alter inequities based on gender, caste,
class and religion. In fact, male family members have leveraged women's participa-
tion in these institutions to their advantage.65
As such, patriarchy has a pivotal impact on the degree of participation in
designing and implementing eective climate change policy and leads to dier-
ences in levels of opportunity. is is particularly evident in the fact that, despite
playing a major role in climate change research, most of the policy work originating
from countries such as Bangladesh and Pakistan has been designed and initiated
by men.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have provided a comprehensive analysis of what climate change
and urban development do to dense and heavily congested South Asian cities. We
have shown how ecological processes have adversely impacted impoverished city
dwellers, including those displaced from rural areas to cities due to climatic events.
As we proposed, issues of climate change cannot be viewed in isolation. We have
shown how weather events relate to the expansion of building and construction in
South Asian cities, land rights and air pollution, and also how such connected phe-
nomena relate to the electoral and immediate political contexts that shape lives,
livelihoods and ecosystems. Our illustrations evidence how each aspect of climate
change – whether extreme heat, oods, erosion or air pollution – exacerbates the
pressures on ordinary city dwellers, denying them their right to the city and under-
mining their claims to basic and essential services such as access to water, housing
and clean air.
e complexities of the impacts of a changing climate cannot be understood
without looking at how gender is articulated in urban ecology. is is especially
evident in the plights of impoverished men, such as those who rely on construction
work, and poor women who are disproportionately impacted and systematically
overlooked in policymaking processes at the global and national levels. If climate
justice is truly to be achieved, these marginalised voices must be elevated and
brought to the forefront. Addressing climate change calls for highlighting the ex-
periences of the most marginalised, including poor women, by including the voices
of feminist political ecologists and policymakers.
65 Mukhopadhyay, M. (2005), «Decentralisation and Gender Equity in South Asia: An Issues
Paper» (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre).
80
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
CELIA MC MICHAEL
Health and mobility in climate
change adaptation: The importance
of well-being in a warming world
Introduction
e impacts of climate change will generate higher rates of human migration and
displacement within low-income countries, as well as potentially create more
international migration.1 is climate-related migration and mobility will have
signicant implications for population health. ere are both potential health
benets and risks for migrants concerning their health and wellbeing, with health
outcomes shaped by contextual factors within migration processes and conditions
within sites of settlement. is chapter focuses on potential health outcomes of cli-
mate-related mobility. It discusses empirical case studies from dierent geographic
locations with reference to dierent types of climate-related mobility, including
forced displacement, migration and planned relocation. In addition, it considers
other under-recognised dimensions, including: t he health of returning mobile popu-
lations, trapped and/or voluntarily immobile populations and people who move
(for reasons unrelated to climate change) into sites of climate-related health risk.
Engaging with prevalent ideas of «adaptation» – in which migration is increas-
ingly cast as an economic solution to climate change – the chapter argues that it is
important to understand and address not only the livelihoods and economic expe-
riences of mobile populations, but also the health of those on the move. Human
health and wellbeing are increasingly being shaped by the changing global climate
via threats to food security, exposure to extreme heat and the changing geographic
distributions of infectious diseases. Left unabated, climate change will dene the
health of current and future generations, strain health systems, and undermine
progress towards the 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and universal
health coverage.2 As has been illustrated in stark fashion by the ongoing Covid-19
pandemic, it is critical to respond better to the potential health impacts on migrant
1 McLeman, R. (2019), «International Migration and Climate Adaptation in an Era of Hardening
Borders», Nature Climate Change 9, 911–18.
2 Watts, N. et al. (2019), «The 2019 Report of The Lancet Countdown on Health and Climate
Change», The Lancet 394(10211).
81
Celia Mc Michael Health and mobility in climate change adaptation: The importance of well-being in a warming world
populations and home/host communities in a way that conceives of wellbeing
beyond economic calculations, and in manner that acknowledges various kinds of
social and gendered inequality.
is chapter calls attention to population health as a measure of adaptation
eectiveness in contexts of climate-related mobility. It begins with the premise
that the eectiveness of migration, as a form of adaptation to climate risk, can-
not be assessed solely through livelihood diversication, economic opportuni-
ties and remittances; it is crucial to consider the broader dimensions of people's
lives, including their health and wellbeing. Bearing these imperatives in mind, the
chapter underscores the need for health systems to prepare for climate-related
mobility, thereby ensuring that mobile populations can access eective and af-
fordable health care services.
Migration as adaptation: A cautionary note
Since the 1990s, alarmist concerns emanating from the Global North about climate
change have centred on anxiety that changing weather patterns would induce mass
population displacement, produce oods of so-called climate refugees and result
in geopolitical security threats. In recent years, however, the climate-migration
nexus has been framed in more positive terms, whereby human migration is under-
stood to oer an important form of climate change adaptation.3 In policy circles,
governed voluntary migration is increasingly promoted as a proactive adaptation
strategy that can reduce climate vulnerabilities among at-risk populations.
Indeed, migration is increasingly widely positioned as a form of «adaptation»
to climate risk.4 e Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) denes
adaptation in human systems as «the process of adjustment to actual or expected
climate and its eects, which seeks to moderate harm or exploit benecial oppor-
tunities».5 Migration, according to this view, can increase adaptive capacity by
reducing vulnerability to climate-related harms, and by allowing people to better
respond to climatic hazards and other negative changes.6 e 2018 United Nations
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration7 – an international
3 Gioli, G., Hugo, G., Máñez Costa, M., and Scheffran, J. (2016), «Human Mobility, Climate Adap-
tation, and Development», Migration and Development 5(2), 165–70.
4 Black, R. et al. (2011), «Migration As Adaptation», Nature 478, 447–49; see also Foresight
(Migration and Global Environmental Change) (2011), Migration and Global Environmental
Change: Future Challenges and Opportunities (London: The Government Office for Science).
5 IPCC (2014), «Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report», in Pachauri, R.K., and Meyer, L.A.
(eds.), Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (Geneva: IPCC), 151 pp.
6 IPCC (2012), Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change
Adaptation: A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change , edited by Field, C.B., Barros, V., Stocker, T.F., Qin, D., Dokken, D.J., Ebi, K.L.,
…Midgley, P.M. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
7 United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, UN Document
A/RES/73/195, 19 December 2018.
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Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
agreement that seeks to improve outcomes for migrants and displaced people –
explicitly highlights the links between climate change, migration and adaptation.
e Global Compact calls for strategies to support climate-related migration in
ways that respect human rights, address humanitarian needs and ensure bene-
ts to migrants, their families as well as the sending and receiving communities.
Highlighting the need for formal channels of international labour migration to
build adaptive capacity in low-income countries that are highly exposed to climate
risks, the Global Compact frames mobility in terms that contrast sharply with
the pessimism of climate security discourse, challenging its dominance within the
policy mainstream.
e «migration as adaptation» thesis highlights the economic opportunities
of human mobility, and the expectation that resources and remittances will be
invested by households and communities to build resilience to climate risk. Cer-
tainly, where migrants can access labour markets (both internationally and within
national borders) and diversify incomes, migration can be a successful form of
adaptation to climatic hazards. For example, drawing on research focused on rain-
fall variability across eight countries (Ghana, Tanzania, Guatemala, Peru, Bang-
ladesh, India, ailand and Vietnam) A et al. position human mobility as an
opportunity for adaptation via livelihood diversication, whereas those who cannot
move remain «trapped» in situ.8
However, this chapter cautions against a narrow assessment of «migration as
adaptation», which focuses on livelihood diversication and the management of
climate-related mobility through labour migration. Livelihood diversication is
only one measure of adaptation. It is also important to consider the health out-
comes of mobility and migration. In Bangladesh, for example, moving to cities has
become a common coping strategy in the face of ooding. But although people
who move to a peri-urban area may take advantage of new livelihood and income
opportunities, they may also be exposed to health risks via their new living and
working conditions. People are as likely to migrate to places of environmental and
climatic vulnerability as away from them, and they may face associated health risks
in new sites of residence. ese points are developed in greater depth below.
Connecting climate change, human mobility and health
Since 1990, when the IPCC noted that climate change could have a signicant im-
pact on human migration, there have been many (contested) estimates and pro-
jections of the scale of climate-related mobility. ere are three widely recognised
types of mobility in which climatic factors play a pronounced role, either directly
8 Afifi, T., Milan, A., Etzold, B., Schraven, B., Rademacher-Schulz, C., Sakdapolrak, P., …Warner,
K. (2016), «Human Mobility in Response to Rainfall Variability: Opportunities for Migration
As a Successful Adaptation Strategy in Eight Case Studies», Migration and Development 5(2),
254–74.
83
Celia Mc Michael Health and mobility in climate change adaptation: The importance of well-being in a warming world
or by amplifying other drivers of human mobility: climate-induced displacement,
migration and planned relocation.9
ere is also a large body of research that considers the connections between
climate change and human health. Projected impacts of climate change are ex-
pected to alter the geographic range and population burden of climate-sensitive
disease (e.g. dengue) and contribute to heat-related illness and mortality due to
extreme weather events, undernutrition from food insecurity and the mental
health consequences resulting from exposure to climate risks.10 e World Health
Organization (WHO) has estimated that between 2030 and 2050, there could be
approximately 250,000 deaths annually due to climate change-related increases
in heat exposure among elderly people, as well as increases in diarrheal disease,
malaria, dengue, coastal ooding and childhood stunting. is is a conservative
estimate.11
Despite the existence of extensive research and policy discussions around the
consequences of climate change for human mobility and human health, the cli-
mate change-mobility-health nexus remains under-examined. Although many
rightly point out that there will be adverse health outcomes for «climate migrants»,
eorts to understand the complex connections between mobility and health have
been restricted to generalised remarks.
e following sub-sections explore how dierent migratory responses to cli-
mate change may aect population health, with reference to dierent types of
mobility, that is, forcibly displaced populations, people involved in planned re-
location, migrants (including people who move away from, as well to, sites of cli-
matic risk), and trapped and voluntarily immobile populations. ey explore the
opportunities for and threats to the wellbeing of people on the move, as well as host
and home communities.12
Forced displacement
e attribution of individual extreme weather events to anthropogenic climate
change is a complex and often problematic area.13 e public debate often refers
to climate change as a «cause» of environmental disasters, whereas science views
anthropogenic climate change as a «contributor» to a particular event or to trends
in extreme events. For example, there has been an upward trend in ood events
since 2005, with almost three times the global land area aected in 2019 compared
9 UNFCCC (2010), Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative
Action under the Convention , advance unedited version, draft decision -/CP.16, available at:
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf.
10 Haines, A.D., and Ebi, K. (2019), «The Imperative for Climate Action to Protect Health», New
England Journal of Medicine 380, 263–73.
11 WHO (2014), Quantitative Risk Assessment of the Effects of Climate Change on Selected Causes
of Death, 2030s and 2050s (Geneva: World Health Organization), available at: www.who.int/
iris/handle/10665/134014.
12 McMichael, C. et al. (2012), «An Ill Wind? Climate Change, Migration and Health», Environmen-
tal Health Perspectives 120(5), 646–54.
13 Huggel, C. et al. (2013), «Loss and Damage Attribution», Nature Climate Change 3, 694–96.
84
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
with the 1986–2005 baseline; the frequency and intensity of these extreme weather
events , which include wildres, oods, storms and droughts, is shifting as a result of
climate change, with associated health consequences for those who are displaced.
Large numbers of people are displaced annually by the impacts of environ-
mental disasters, with these numbers likely to increase over time with the impacts
of climate change.14 e currently observable trends include elevated incidences
and frequencies of environmental disasters, increased intensity of disaster hazards
contributing to the destruction of built environments and habitats, and greater
resource losses. Although most forced displacements due to environmental disas-
ters take place within countries, some people will cross international borders.15
In either case, the populations in question are, for the most part, located in/from
lower-income countries and regions.
Extreme weather events tend to lead to adverse population health outcomes,
particularly in contexts of the large-scale, forced displacement of people and
populations. In emergencies, public health infrastructure is often limited, such
that forcibly displaced persons are especially vulnerable. Mortality rates are high-
est in the rst six months of displacement, and the provision of adequate services
and infrastructure is critical in this «emergency phase».16 e health of displaced
populations is determined by water and sanitation conditions, nutrition, shelter
conditions, indoor air quality, exposure to disease vectors (e.g. mosquitoes, ro-
dents), levels of immunity to vaccine-preventable diseases and access to health
care services.17
Approximately three-fourths of deaths in displacement contexts are caused by
infectious diseases. Common infectious diseases include diarrhoeal disease, mea-
sles, acute respiratory infections, vector-borne diseases (malaria, dengue), tuber-
culosis and malaria.18 For example, ooding in Mozambique in 2000 resulted in
large-scale forced displacement. Among displaced populations, there was a sig-
nicant increase in the incidence of diarrheal disease, with an estimated 8,000
additional cases and 447 deaths from the disease in the months following the
oods and a doubling in the number of malaria cases.19 Other health challenges
14 Black, R., Nigel, W., Arnell, W., Adger, N., Thomas, D., and Geddes, A. (2012), «Migration, Im-
mobility and Displacement Outcomes Following Extreme Events», Environmental Science and
Policy 27(S1), S32–S43.
15 McAdam, J. (2016), «From the Nansen Initiative to the Platform on Disaster Displacement:
Shaping International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement», University
of New South Wales Law Journal 39(4), 30.
16 Shackelford, B.B. et al. (2020), «Environmental Health in Forced Displacement: A Systematic
Scoping Review of the Emergency Phase», Science of the Total Environment 714, 136553.
17 Watson, J.M. et al. (2007), «Epidemics after Natural Disasters», Emerging Infectious Disease 13(1),
1–5.
18 IFRC (2007), The Johns Hopkins and Red Cross and Red Crescent Public Health Guide in Emer-
gencies , (Geneva: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies).
19 Cairncross, S., and Alvarinho, M. (2006), «The Mozambique Foods of 2000: Health Impact and
Response», in Few, R., and Matthies, F. (eds.), Flood Hazards and Health: Responding to Present
and Future Risks , pp. 111–27 (London: Earthscan).
85
Celia Mc Michael Health and mobility in climate change adaptation: The importance of well-being in a warming world
in displacement contexts include the disruption of disease surveillance and health
programmes (e.g. immunisation), food insecurity and food scarcity, and interrup-
tions in treatment regimens. Following extreme weather events, population health
measures for forcibly displaced populations should include: surveillance systems
for early case detection and treatment; adequate site planning; appropriate man-
agement of water and sanitation systems; adequate food supplies and storage; and
strong vector control and vaccination programmes.20
Where violent conict is involved, scientic literature linking climate change
and migration is particularly scarce and contested, making it important to avoid
assuming simple causal relations between ecological processes and political out-
comes.21 If climate change does not necessarily generate conict, forced displace-
ment and asylum-seeking, it does likely represent a risk amplier, particularly
in places of political unrest and conict. Such instability could well result from
discontent of the population about ineective government responses to climate
impacts. Where such combinations of environmental and political turmoil occur,
it could be argued that climate change indirectly contributes to forced migration,
with all of its associated health risks, including premature death, disability, psycho-
logical trauma, physical injury and malnutrition.
Given the complexity and multiplicity of causal factors, rather than initiatives
and mechanisms to promote migrant health that are specic to climate-related
displacement, it remains important to strengthen existing eorts to address popu-
lation health in disaster settings.
Planned relocation
Planned relocation is a potential response to climate change risks, whereby people
and communities are systematically relocated away from sites of environmental
risk or from areas that are no longer inhabitable. e terms «managed retreat»,
«planned retreat» and «managed realignment» are also used to refer to planned
relocation. Pla nned relocation may be necessar y where areas are ex posed to increas-
ingly severe and frequent sudden-onset natural disasters (e.g. ood areas), where
livelihoods are undermined (e.g. increasing drought) or where land becomes un-
inhabitable (e.g. due to sea-level rise). Planned relocation is a last resort for when
other adaptive strategies are unavailable or exhausted.22 It can occur on the
community, household or individual level and is – by denition – carried out under
the authority of the state. is mobility option has received increasing attention
in the context of a warming world, particularly for low-lying populations aected
by sea-level rise.
20 Kouadio, I. et al. (2012), «Infectious Diseases Following Natural Disasters: Prevention and
Control Measures», Expert Review of Anti-infective Therapy 10(1), 95–104.
21 Abel, G.J. et al. (2019), «Climate, Conflict and Forced Migration», Global Environmental Change
54, 239–49.
22 Farbotko, C. et al. (2020), «Relocation Planning Must Address Voluntary Immobility», Nature
Climate Change 10, 702–04, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0829-6.
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Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
To date, there are few places in the world where planned climate-related re-
location has occurred. However, there are emerging cases at dierent levels of
planning and implementation, including in Fiji, the Solomon Islands and the
United States. e health dimensions of planned relocation include mental health,
food security, water supply, sanitation, infectious diseases, injury and health care
access. For example, Vunidogoloa is a small, low-lying Indigenous village in Fiji that
moved inland in 2014, within the boundaries of their customary land, in response
to coastal ooding and erosion, saltwater intrusion and the failure of seawalls.
e potential health benets of the relocation include improved access to health
services and improved sanitation. Yet, the health risks include the adverse psycho-
social impacts of disrupted place attachment, reduced access to sh and seafoods,
and increased use of packaged and processed foods now that they are closer to a
road.23 So, Vunidogoloa's relocation appears to have brought both health benets
and risks. Few assessments of these early cases of planned climate-related re-
location directly address population health issues. Although hundreds of millions
of people globally have been involved in development-forced displacement and
resettlement (DFDR) projects, it is not clear that these are analogous to climate-
related relocation. Further research is needed to understand the health opportuni-
ties and risks of planned climate-related relocation.
What is clear is that relocating communities themselves must be central to
decision-making processes: e right to self-determination is a key principle and
a foundation for enabling good population health outcomes. Indeed, international,
regional and domestic human rights frameworks, instruments and institutions
highlight people's right to self-determination, which includes the right to decide
where to live. Lessons from DFDR suggest that when planned relocation is un-
avoidable, the scale of population resettlement should be minimised; planning
should have sucient lead time; aected communities must be directly involved;
relocation should provide for appropriate land acquisition and sucient nanc-
ing; and there should be long-term attention to restoring and improving lives and
livelihoods.24
Migration
People can migrate both away from and into sites of climate risk. In popular dis-
course, policy, practice as well as research and scholarly literature, there is a
preoccupation with so-called climate migrants who move away from sites of esca-
23 McMichael, C. et al. (2019), «Planned Relocation and Everyday Agency in Low-lying Coastal
Villages in Fiji», The Geographical Journal 185(3), 325–27.
24 Ferris, E. (2012), Protection and Planned Relocations in the Context of Climate Change, UNHCR,
Legal and Protection Policy Research Services , available at: www.unhcr.org/5024d5169.pdf. See
also Warner, K.T. et al. (2013), «Changing Climates, Moving People: Framing Migration, Dis-
placement and Planned Relocation», Policy Brief No. 8 (Bonn: United Nations University Insti-
tute for Environment and Human Security).
87
Celia Mc Michael Health and mobility in climate change adaptation: The importance of well-being in a warming world
lating climate risk. However, it is also important to consider the health of people
and populations who move to sites of climate risk.25
First, in an era of widespread human mobility, people may move into areas of
high environmental and climatic risk. For example, people could migrate to low-
lying urban areas in mega-deltas that are aected by sea-level rise and storm
surges (e.g. climate-vulnerable peri-urban areas in the Indian Bengal Delta),26 or
water-insecure areas in the urban peripheries of expanding cities (e.g. urban popu-
lations are likely to double in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa by 2040, with many
of the fastest-growing cities being located in areas of limited water availability).27
Source: Author's own; own chart.
Figure 1: Migration to and from sites of climate change risk
Migration into
a site of
climate-related risk
Migration away from
a site with
climate-related risk
Climate change
risks
Consequently, although climate risks do not drive these migration ows, these
migrants may face elevated climate-related health threats.28 Emerging research
has documented health risks for migrants who move to sites of climate vulner-
ability. In the Pacic Island countries, for example, people moving into urban-poor
areas may be exposed to climate-related threats to health in sites of settlement,
including elevated exposure to vector-borne diseases such as dengue, and inade-
quate water supply.29
The agricultural and construction sectors involve increasing numbers of
migrant workers globally and require better management of heat-related health
risks. For example, during the 2015 heat wave in Pakistan, which resulted in more
25 McMichael, C. (2020), «Human Mobility, Climate Change, and Health: Unpacking the Connec-
tions», Lancet Planetary Health 4, e217–18.
26 DECCMA (2019), Climate Change, Migration and Adaptation in Deltas: Key Findings from the
DECCMA Project (Southampton, UK: University of Southampton).
27 Kookana, R.S., Drechsel, S., Jamwal, P., and Vanderzalm, J. (2020), «Urbanisation and Emerging
Economies: Issues and Potential Solutions for Water and Food Security», Science of the Total
Environment 732, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.139057.
28 Foresight (2011), Migration and Global Environmental Change (see note 4)
29 Campbell, J., and Warrick, O. (2014), Climate Change and Migration Issues in the Pacific (Fiji:
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific).
88
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
than 1,000 deaths in Karachi, outdoor migrant workers were identied as being at
risk of heat stroke and heat-related mortality.30 Similarly, among Nepali migrant
workers employed in construction in Qatar (2009–2017), migrants working in high
temperatures (greater than 31° C) experienced morbidity and mortality due to heat
stroke and cardiovascular disease linked to extreme heat.31 So, climate change can
amplify risks to health among migrant populations (as well as host communities).
Second, migration can be an adaptative strategy to reduce vulnerability to
climate change risks. Many countries and regions are preoccupied with the pos-
sibility that climate change will lead to increases in cross-border migration (and
these are often the countries that are largely responsible for climate change), yet
the likelihood and magnitude of such migration remains unclear.32 Most analyses
of climate-related migration suggest that international migration to high-income
countries will be minimal compared to mobility within climate-vulnerable coun-
tries and regions in poorer regions and countries.33 It is probable that climate-
related migration will follow existing migration pathways, particularly internal
migration within the borders of a country. Where climate change contributes to
migration, health outcomes among migrating populations will be shaped signi-
cantly by the nature, location and context of migration. Heath determinants will
include health services in sites of transit and settlement; policy and legal contexts;
resources and capacities of migrant populations; and living and working conditions
in sites of settlement.
In some contexts, the health of populations that migrate away from sites of cli-
matic threats may improve as health benets accrue – for example, via increased
economic and educational opportunities, better nutrition and improved access to
health services. Studies from Senegal have found that farmers in rain-dependent
zones move to better irrigated areas to farm during the dry season, and this mobil-
ity enables the continuity of familiar livelihoods and improved food security.34
However, the conditions surrounding migration processes can contribute to health
vulnerabilities. In India, drought-aected farmers who migrate to urban areas were
found to be at increased risk of contracting HIV and other sexually transmitted
infectious diseases.35 A study in Bangladesh found that people who are displaced
by climate-related disaster and who move into urban slums experience adverse
30 Dearden, L. (2015), «Pakistan Heatwave: Death Toll Tops 400 I Karachi As Morgues Overflow
and Power Cuts Worsen Crisis», The Independent , available at: www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/asia/pakistan-heatwave-death-toll-tops-400-in-karachi-as-morgues-overflow-and-pow-
er-cuts-worsen-crisis-10339798.html.
31 Pradhan, B. et al. (2019), «Heat Stress Impacts on Cardiac Mortality in Nepali Migrant Workers
in Qatar», Cardiology 143(1), 37–48.
32 Missirian, A., and Schlenker, W. (2017), «Asylum Applications Respond to Temperature Fluctu-
ations», Science 358, 1610–14.
33 Foresight (2011), Migration and Global Environmental Change (see note 4).
34 Zickgraf, C. (2019), «Climate Change and Migration Crisis in Africa», in Menjivar, C. et al (eds.),
The Oxford Handbook of Migration Crises , pp. 347–66 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press).
35 Anupama, G.V. et al (2016), Seasonal Migration and Moving Out of Poverty in Rural India. In-
sights from Statistical Analysis , p. 19, available at: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/258850.
89
Celia Mc Michael Health and mobility in climate change adaptation: The importance of well-being in a warming world
health outcomes associated with unhygienic and overcrowded living conditions,
undernutrition and inadequate water and sanitation.36 So there are concerns that
migration will lead to substantial risks to population health due to poor living con-
ditions, inadequate water and sanitation, underemployment, income instability
and increased pressure on infrastructure. ere is, as yet, no research that explicitly
examines the health consequences for people who cross international borders and
for which climate risks are considered a contributing driver of mobility decisions.
Trapped populations and voluntary immobility
Despite the concern with climate-related mobility, there is growing acknowledge-
ment of the risks and realities of population immobility, meaning those who are
unable or unwilling to migrate.37 ere are many people and populations who
remain in sites of climate risk: is includes «trapped» populations who lack the
resources, assets and networks that enable migration away from sites of climate
risk; it also includes voluntarily immobile populations who choose to remain in
their homes and communities for reasons of attachment to a place and socio-cul-
tural continuity. is challenges the widely accepted narrative that, in a warming
world, the poor and vulnerable are likely to migrate.
ere is a limited amount of empirical research that has considered the health
proles and experiences of immobile populations. It seems likely that immobile
populations living in sites of climate vulnerability may experience adverse health
consequences due to changes in water and food security, disease ecology, ooding
and saltwater intrusion, and the psychosocial impacts of disrupted livelihoods.
Notably, a recent landmark ruling highlighted the health risks experienced
by immobile or «trapped» populations in the low-lying Pacic nation of Kiriba-
ti.38 e ruling relates to the case of Ioane Teitiota from Kiribati, who applied for
protection in New Zealand in 2013, claiming he and his family's lives were at risk
due to climate change impacts. Teitiota's case referred to his experience of health-
related climate risks, including lack of fresh water due to loss of rainfall and salt-
water contamination of freshwater lenses and aquifers, food insecurity, over-
crowding on Tarawa and ood-risk. New Zealand courts and the UN Human Rights
Committee rejected Teitiota's protection application on the basis that there was not
sucient risk to his or his family's lives at the time in question, and because Kiri-
bati has the capacity to adapt to climate threats. However, the Committee accepted
that Teitiota and his family are being exposed to hazards related to sea-level rise,
with associated risks to health and wellbeing.
36 Rahaman, M.A. et al. (2018), «Health Disorder of Climate Migrants in Khulna City: An Urban
Slum Perspective», International Migration 56(5), 42–55.
37 Foresight (2011), Migration and Global Environmental Change (see note 4).
38 OHCHR (2020), Views Adopted by the Committee under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol,
Concerning Communication No. 2728/2016 Communication submitted by: Ioane Teitiota (rep-
resented by counsel, Michael J. Kidd), available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/
treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2f127%2fD%2f2728%2f2016and
Lang=en.
90
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
In north-west Alaska, climate change impacts include delayed freeze-up,
decreasing levels of sea ice, storm surges, coastal erosion and thawing permafrost.
e majority of residents in the region are Indigenous Inupiat people. Although
the health of Indigenous people in the region has improved in the past 50 years,
they are vulnerable to climate change-related health threats: for example, weather-
related injuries, respiratory infections and declines in the amounts of traditional
foods (e.g. caribou, moose).39 e state of Alaska and federal government agen-
cies are working with some communities (e.g. Kivalina, Newtok and Shishmaref)
to plan organised relocations, yet for now people are unable to move due to lack
of resources, funding and broader political will. In Shishmaref, Alaska, the lack
of political will and resources to support their relocation has been found to cause
signicant stress among residents.40 ese high-prole cases draw attention to the
residents of places that are vulnerable to climate impacts, and where people are
exposed to climate-related health threats. Despite that, migration and relocation
pathways – whether national or international – are not (yet) readily available.
However, not all immobile populations are «trapped». People have connections
to a place and often prefer to adjust and adapt their local socio-economic systems
and ways of living rather than move. Indeed, some studies have highlighted the
strong preference for in situ adaptation rather than migration. For example, a study
of four low-lying island communities in the Philippines that experience ooding
during normal high tides found that island residents generally prefer in situ adap-
tation strategies rather than migration and relocation to the mainland. Adaptive
strategies include stilted housing and raised oors.41 Where people choose to
remain in sites of climate risk, it is important to understand and address poten-
tial threats to health and wellbeing, including injury and fatalities related to severe
weather events, food and water insecurity, changing infectious disease patterns
and mental health consequences.42 It is also worth recognising the potential ben-
ets to psychosocial wellbeing among those who might choose to remain in sites
of climate risk. ese benets might be generated through attachment to a place,
continuity of culture and access to local (even if altered) food sources, including
produce from subsistence farming and seafood (for those living in coastal areas).
39 Parkinson, A., and Evengård, B. (2015), «Climate Change and Health in the Arctic», in Butler,
C.D. (ed.), Climate Change and Global Health , pp. 206–16 (Wallingford, UK: CABI Publishing).
Marino, E. (2012), «The Long History of Environmental Migration: Assessing Vulnerability Con-
struction and Obstacles to Successful Relocation in Shishmaref, Alaska», Global Environmental
Change 22, 374–81.
40 Wolsko, C., and Marino, E. (2016), «Disasters, Migrations, and the Unintended Consequences of
Urbanization: What's the Harm in Getting Out of Harm's Way?», Population and Environment
37(4), 411–28.
41 Laurice Jamero, M., et al. (2017), «Small-island Communities in the Philippines Prefer Local
Measures to Relocation in Response to Sea-level Rise», Nature Climate Change 7, 581–86.
42 McMichael, A.J. (2013), «Globalization, Climate Change and Human Health», NEJM 368,
1335–43.
91
Celia Mc Michael Health and mobility in climate change adaptation: The importance of well-being in a warming world
Discussion
is chapter began by arguing that the human health consequences of climate
change impacts and adaptive strategies are an important measure of risk and adap-
tation. As such, good population health is an important indicator of the success of
mobility as an adaptive strategy; conversely, poor health outcomes among people
on the move indicate an amplication of risk and adverse outcomes.43
As discussed above, human mobility that is related to climate change encom-
passes diverse scenarios. ere is a spectrum of human mobility – from forced dis-
placement to voluntary mobility. ere are clear distinctions between dierent
types of climate-related mobility as well as associated risks and opportunities.
e scale and nature of population health outcomes depend not just on the bio-
physical risks of a changing climate, but also on the sensitivity and capacity of
people, communities and health systems to prepare for and manage population
health risks. Indeed, there are also signicant dierences within dierent «types»
of climate-related mobility. Access to mobility is often experienced unequally
along lines of gender, ethnicity, race, religion, age and social class. Gender, for
example, inuences climate-related migration patterns. Gender can shape who
migrates, who is left behind, who is able to return and rebuild their lives, as well
as the nature of mobility experiences. Among those who move, the vulnerabilities
and priorities of migrants vary according to gender, including due to the dierent
levels of responsibility, access to information, resources, education, physical safety
and job opportunities available to men and women.
ere are concerns that women are disproportionately burdened with risks
and vulnerabilities in contexts of climate-related mobility.44 A small number of
empirical studies have examined the linkages between climate change, migra-
tion and gender. Findings diverge substantially, depending on the context. A study
conducted in rural Mexico where communities are engaged in fruit and vegetable
processing found that altered precipitation patterns and declines in water avail-
ability led to the out-migration of many men. is increased the workloads of
women, as they had both family care responsibilities as well as ongoing work in
the food processing industry.45 Yet, others posit that male out-migration related
to climate change can increase autonomy and decision-making power for female
members of the family.46
43 Schwerdtle et al. (2020), «Health and Migration in the Context of a Changing Climate: A Systematic
Literature Assessment», Environmental Research Letters , https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ab
9ece.
44 Demetriades, J., and Esplen, E. (2010), «The Gender Dimensions of Poverty and Climate
Change Adaptation», in Mearns R., and Norton, A. (eds.), Social Dimensions of Climate Change:
Equity and Vulnerability in a Warming World (New York, NY: The World Bank).
45 Buechler, S. (2009), «Gender, Water, and Climate Change in Sonora, Mexico: Implications for
Policies and Programmes on Agricultural Income-generation», Gender Dev. 17, 51–66.
46 Brown, O. (2008), «Climate Change and Forced Migration: Observations, Projections and Im-
plications», background paper for the Human Development Report 2007/08 (Geneva: United
Nations Development Programme).
92
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
So, there are substantial dierences and inequities in the nature of, access
to and experience of mobility. Accordingly, health outcomes will diverge within
mobile populations, including along lines of gender, ethnicity, age, disability and
other characteristics. Given that the relationships between climate change, human
mobility and health are highly varied, there is no one-size-ts-all policy response
that will ensure the health of migrating populations.
Nonetheless, mitigation would decrease the scale of health risks for mobile and
trapped populations, particularly in the medium to long term. Of utmost impor-
tance is the international political will and cooperation to reduce the rate of climate
change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Climate change science predicts a
range of possible futures that depend on the degree of mitigation action in the face
of a warming world. Mitigation implemented now will determine these eventuali-
ties. Ultimately, this is a choice between two pathways: «business as usual» or one
that puts our world on a path to remain well below 2° C.47
Further, health systems have a critical contribution to make in mediating rela-
tionships between climate change, population health and mobility.48 Universal
health coverage is a critical population health challenge, and there are widespread
calls for migrant-sensitive health systems. In 2015 the United Nations General
Assembly adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 SDGs.
Embedded in the framework are goals and targets promoting action on migrant
health. An explicit SDG target (10.7) is to facilitate orderly, safe, regular and respon-
sible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of
planned and well-managed migration policies. In addition, SDG target 3.8 on uni-
versal health coverage calls for the establishment of reliable and accessible health
services for all, a target that presumably encompasses migrants and mobile peo-
ple.49 Additionally, the UN Global Compacts on migration and refugees are two
landmark agreements that ensure further commitments by international bodies
and nations to provide high-quality health care to these population groups.
It is not clear, however, whether these policy prescriptions adequately en-
compass the diversity of climate-related mobility, including, for example, short-
distance relocations in response to sea-level rise or circular rural-urban mobility
in contexts of drought. Arguably, there is a neoliberal overtone of seeking to man-
age climate-related migration through labour migration. Such policies are oriented
towards permanent migrants and those travelling longer distances who move from
one location to another with the aim of settling and improving their social and
economic status. Better consideration of the ways that health systems can respond
to short-term, short-distance and circular forms of mobility is required.
47 Watts, N., et al. (2019), «The 2019 Report of The Lancet Countdown on Health and Climate
Change», The Lancet , https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(19)32596-6.
48 Ridde, V. et al. (2019), «Climate Change, Migration and Health Systems Resilience: Need for
Interdisciplinary Research», F1000 Research 8(22).
49 Villa, S., and Raviglione, M.C. (2019), «Migrants' Health: Building Migrant-sensitive Health
Systems», Journal of Public Health Research 8(1), 1592.
93
Celia Mc Michael Health and mobility in climate change adaptation: The importance of well-being in a […]
Climate policies and initiatives are required that allow adaptation to be done by
rather than to people, giving them increased control over climate adaptation deci-
sions, including decisions about whether to move or remain. Signicant policy
improvements are required in many related areas that will have benets for the
health of mobile populations, including: climate-sensitive policies that build resil-
ience and reduce the need to migrate away from adversely aected areas; funding
mechanisms that better and more equitably facilitate climate change adaptation;
and expanded and improved development assistance mechanisms.50
Where there are people who are displaced or have relocated or migrated, it is
important to support and enhance good health, regardless of the extent to which
mobility is attributable to climate impacts. Some examples include the need to
enhance infectious disease surveillance; improve specic vector-control measures
(such as for dengue and malaria); adapt building codes to address rising tempera-
tures; ensure that urban planning reduces the risk of ooding; improve air quality;
ensure eective water and sanitation; and increase awareness among health care
workers about climate-sensitive health risks. Conducting vulnerability assessments
and identifying adaptation options at the local levels can be the rst steps in identi-
fying the challenges and opportunities for addressing climate-related health risks,
50 Hugo, G., and Bardsley, D. (2014), «Migration and Environmental Change in Asia», in Piguet, E.,
and Laczko, F. (eds.), People on the Move in a Changing Climate: The Regional Impact of Environ-
mental Change on Migration (Dordrecht: Springer).
Photo: © Maria Magdalena Arrellaga – New York Times /Redux /laif
Roughly a quarter of the Pantanal wetland in Brazil has burned in
wildfires worsened by climate change
94
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
including among mobile populations.51 Because the world will continue to warm
for years and centuries (even millennia), exible and responsive population health
and adaptation approaches are needed to address evolving health risks.
Approaches are needed that enhance the capacities of society and health sys-
tems to address migrant health in general, that protect the rights of migrants,
and that can deal with the uncertainties and complexities of human mobility in a
warming world.52 Both migrant-inclusive and climate-resilient health systems will
support the broader sustainable development agenda that seeks to leave no one
behind, including populations engaged in or aected by climate-related mobility.
is is a matter of justice – climate justice and health justice – given that the human
health impacts of climate-related mobility will not be borne equally: populations
(including mobile populations) in lower-resource settings are often the most vul-
nerable to climate risks, and yet they are the least responsible for climate change.53
Ultimately, migration and mobility can only be considered an eective adaptive
response to climate risk where good health is sustained, promoted and achieved.
Pervasive climate-related threats to human health require decisive actions from
health professionals and governments to protect the health of current and future
generations, including the health of mobile populations and those who choose to
remain or are trapped in sites of climate risk.
51 Haines, A.D., and Ebi, K. (2019), «The Imperative for Climate Action to Protect Health», New
England Journal of Medicine 380, 263–73.
52 Wardekker, J. et al. (2012), «Health Risks of Climate Change: An Assessment of Uncertainties
and Its Implications for Adaptation Policies», Environmental Health 11, 67.
53 Patrick, M., Grewal, G., Chelagat, W., and Shannon, G. (2020), «Planetary Health Justice: Femi-
nist Approaches to Building in Rural Kenya», Buildings and Cities 1(1), 308–24, http://doi.org/
10.5334/bc.18.
95
Paolo Gaibazzi Can migration from West Africa be prevented by climate-resilient agriculture? – Lessons in im /mobility from rural Gambia
PAOLO GAIBAZZI
Can migration from West Africa
be prevented by climate-resilient
agriculture?
LESSONS IN IM /MOBILITY FROM RURAL GAMBIA
Media and policy discourses in and beyond Europe are fraught with warnings that
climate change will cause mass migration. More often than not, however, these
warnings feed a self-referential narrative rather than evidence-based analysis.
ey add to a myth of invasion that, especially in the Global North, calls for tighter
controls and further restrictions on foreign immigration.1 ese discourses are
eventually accompanied by proactive measures to manage actual or potential cli-
mate refugees and migrants before they arrive at their destinations, or even before
they depart from their places of residence.
Europe's current approach to migration from Africa provides a case in point.
Europe has not only heavily restricted legal migratory channels for people from all
African countries (except Mauritius) wishing to travel to the continent; it has also
sought to avert unauthorised migration by going to the very roots and routes of
ows.2 It has sought to recruit the governments in North Africa and sub-Saharan
Africa to do the dirty work of restricting and controlling African migrants head-
ing towards Europe. In response to the so-called refugee crisis, a more ambitious
agenda on migration from Africa has gained ground to address the «root causes»
of unauthorised migration in countries of origin. Development and capacity-build-
ing are being pursued to reinforce «resilience» to desertication, droughts, oods,
salinisation and other ecological factors that allegedly push Africans to venture
through deserts and seas to reach Europe. e underlying idea is that these meas-
ures will keep people in their places of origin.
In this contribution, I focus on e Gambia as an exemplary case of how cli-
mate change feeds into misguided approaches to migration governance. Despite
its small size and population, e Gambia has been one of the main suppliers of
1 Trombetta, M.J. (2014), «Linking Climate-induced Migration and Security within the EU:
Insights from the Securitization Debate», Critical Studies on Security 2(2), 131–47; Boas, I. et al.
(2019), «Climate Migration Myths», Nature Climate Change 9(12), 901–03.
2 Gaibazzi, P., Bellagamba, A., and Dünnwald, S. (eds.) (2017), Eurafrican Borders and Migration
Management: Political Cultures, Contested Spaces, and Ordinary Lives (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan).
96
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
unauthorised migrants to Europe during the so-called refugee crisis (2013–2017).3
A growing industry of programmes being funded by the European Union (EU) is
targeting Gambian youths as «potential irregular migrants» to change their minds
and take advantage of local opportunities instead. Mitigating and adapting to cli-
mate change is an important objective of such programmes, particularly in con-
junction with improving a decaying agricultural sector to stem a purported rural
exodus.
I propose to challenge the premises of this development discourse on migration
and climate change. In the rst place, I argue that climate change and environmen-
tal degradation might induce non-migration or «permanence» as much as it might
fuel emigration. Secondly, those framing development as a means to contain migra-
tion by keeping people in place often profoundly misunderstand how those who
dwell in degraded environments conceive of sedentariness and mobility. I draw my
conclusions from ethnographic research in Sabi,4 a village in Eastern Gambia that
shares with so many rural communities in the Western Sahel a history of erratic,
worsening ecology and a present that is dominated by agrarian decline and emi-
gration. Although Sabi farmers have adapted to the environmental degradation by
migrating to all corners of the world, including to Europe, more have stayed on the
land than the actual conditions of agricultural production might lead one to think.
ese are not conservative peasants who stick to their sedentary tradition. Migra-
tion is part of the agricultural economy and gures prominently in the life-cycles
of those who stay. Migrating and staying put are intimately related phenomena.
Just as cultivating crops in a eld can be a way to sustain migrants and prepare for
travel at a later stage, migration (e.g. through remittances) enables people to stay on
the land and come to terms with environmental and other challenges. Understand-
ing not only the economic and ecological aspects, but also the socio-cultural rela-
tionship that binds migration and permanence leads us away from the discourse on
development as a means of migration control and containment.5
Climate change
August 2019, Sabi village. I walk into the chief's compound with two friends, and
I begin shaking hands and exchanging lengthy greetings with old and new ac-
quaintances. It has been ve years since I have last visited the village. We are
oered a seat under the imposing mango tree dominating the entrance of the house.
3 Conrad Suso, C.T. (2019), «Backway or Bust: Causes and Consequences of Gambian Irregular
Migration», The Journal of Modern African Studies 57(1), 111–35.
4 Research for this article was supported by: MEBAO (Ethnological Mission in Benin and West
Africa); University of Milano-Bicocca; Germany's Federal Ministry for Education and Research
(funding code 01UG0713); and collaboration (2019) with ActionAid Italy on return migration
and repatriation programmes to the Gambia. The author is responsible for the content of this
publication.
5 Landau, L.B. (2019), «A Chronotope of Containment Development: Europe's Migrant Crisis
and Africa's Reterritorialisation», Antipode 51(1), 169–86.
97
Paolo Gaibazzi Can migration from West Africa be prevented by climate-resilient agriculture? – Lessons in im /mobility from rural Gambia
«It's hot, eh?» Sherif smiles as I wipe sweat from my brow. It is indeed an un-
usually hot day for the time of year. It is the height of the rainy season, when fre-
quent showers and light rains should keep the air cool. e last rains fell almost
three weeks ago. «ese days the rain is no longer falling normally. If it goes on
like this,» Sherif warns, «this year's farming is spoiled!» In Sherif's family eld,
the stalks of millet would normally reach hip level; today, they are barely knee high.
In his wife's eld, groundnuts are still ne, but the fear is that the hot sun might
dry up the soil and burn the germinating plants. Another man sitting together with
Sherif on the platform reports that, in his elds, crops are beginning to wilt. And
that's not the worst: e seeds of his neighbour, who planted late, have not even
managed to sprout and pierce the soil baked by the scorching sun.
Gambian farmers have historically grappled with erratic weather conditions.6
Mini-droughts in the rainy season have become recurrent since the end of the
1960s, when major droughts hit the Sahel.7 Yet, rainfalls have on average become
less abundant and more irregular in what is largely rainfed agriculture in this
part of the country. Farmers in the lower valley closer to the Gambia River rely on
swampland and cultivate paddy rice, but they have in turn been coping with the
intrusion of sea water in the Gambia River and are hit by recurrent ooding.
As Sherif and others clearly pointed out, Gambians are poignantly aware of
climate change – or «weather change» – and its impact on agriculture. e Upper
River region, where Sabi is located, has a glorious agricultural past. It had been
known as one of the main exporting regions of the so-called Peanut Basin. House-
holds such as Musa's and small estates rather than large plantations were behind
this relative economic success.8 From the late 1960s onwards, just as the newly
independent Gambia (1965) was savouring the possibility of thriving on an expand-
ing commercial agricultural sector, the climate conditions of cultivation became
challenging. If the 1970s and 1980s witnessed agricultural experimentation – with
farmers adopting new technologies, methods and commercial crops such as cotton
and horticulture – the general trend in e Gambia since then has been to grad-
ually reduce involvement in commercial production in favour of subsistence agri-
culture.9 e millets Musa planted were a way to adapt to the more unpredictable
and less abundant rainfalls in recent years.
Climate is one of several interrelated factors of environmental and agrarian
decline over the past half century. Ongoing since the mid to late 19th century, the
expansion of the agricultural frontier along the Gambia River valley has damaged
6 Swindell, K., and Jeng, A. (2006), Migrants, Credit and Climate: The Gambian Groundnut Trade,
1834–1934 (Leiden and Boston: Brill).
7 Webb Jr., J.L.A. (1992), «Ecological and Economic Change Along the Middle Reaches of the
Gambia River, 1945–1985», African Affairs 91(365), 543–65.
8 Ibid.
9 Gajigo, O., and Saine, A. (2011), «The Effects of Government Policies on Cereal Consumption
Pattern Change in the Gambia», Review of African Political Economy 38(130), 517–36; Loum, A.,
and Fogarassy, C. (2015), «The Effects of Climate Change on Cereals Yield of Production and
Food Security in Gambia», Applied Studies in Agribusiness and Commerce 9(4), 83–92.
98
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
the ecology through deforestation, soil erosion and reduced fallow periods, among
other factors. Although attempts were made to mitigate and adapt to the degrading
environment, economic and political factors have created further obstacles. In the
1980s, international donors demanded structural adjustments. As was the case in
many other countries in the Global South, neoliberal reforms aimed to roll back
the purportedly inecient, overgrown public sector and make room for the free
market. As a consequence, Gambian farmers received less support from the state
to buy fertilisers and seeds, but they were now competing in a supposedly global
free market (in which their competition included heavily subsidised agriculture,
above all US peanut farmers10). e reorganisation and privatisation of parastatal
companies tasked with collecting peanuts and other produce has been a constant
source of frustration and uncertainty for Gambians. Next to the weather, a common
topic of conversation among Sabi farmers in the summer of 2019 was the welcome
decision by the government to subsidise fertiliser, even if its distribution occurred
late and was allegedly marred by embezzlement. Although agriculture employs
around 60 per cent of the population, unsuccessful agrarian policy and bias favour-
ing urban development have led many Gambians living in the countryside to feel
abandoned.
Migration
Few households in Sabi subsist on agriculture alone. To make up for the meagre
yields, Sabinko have increasingly relied on o-farm activities. Chief among these
is intensifying migration to urban areas along the Atlantic coast and abroad. I say
«intensify» because migration is a long-standing phenomenon in this region, par-
ticularly in Soninke-speaking villages such as Sabi in the stretch from the Upper
Guinea Coast to the Sahel-Sahara frontier.11 Sabi has expatriate communities in
almost every continent. Whereas women are mobile, men have dominated eco-
nomic migration. Historically, men have travelled for work or trade during the dry
months that followed the agricultural season; spending several seasons away from
home has been common. Seasonal labour migration to the cities, which remains
an important phenomenon today, has built on the networks and patterns forged by
these movements. Similarly, recent trends of intra- and inter-continental migration
have grown out of existing practices.12 Parallel to these seasonal and international
migrations are ows to West and Central Africa triggered by a boom in commer-
cial opportunities during the mid-1950s. Since then, migration has become deeply
entrenched in rural livelihoods, with ows to European and North American
labour markets progressively segmented from regional pathways of mobility.
10 Sallah, T.M. (1990), «Economics and Politics in the Gambia», Journal of Modern African Studies
28(4), 621–48.
11 Manchuelle, F. (1997), Willing Migrants: Soninke Labor Diasporas, 1848–1960 (Athens and
London: Ohio University Press and James Currey).
12 Gaibazzi, P. (2015), Bush Bound: Young Men and Rural Permanence in Migrant West Africa
(Oxford and New York, NY: Berghahn).
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Paolo Gaibazzi Can migration from West Africa be prevented by climate-resilient agriculture? – Lessons in im /mobility from rural Gambia
By the 1980s, all socio-economic and ethnic groups of Gambian societ y were
engaged in migration, as has occurred in the rest of West Africa. With youth unem-
ployment rampant in the aforementioned wider context of economic and ecolog-
ical decline, having one or more householders working or trading abroad became
a common strategy to oset uncertain household budgets. e worsening political
situation during Yahya Jammeh's authoritarian rule between 1994 and 2016 has
further contributed to the outow of critics and ordinary citizens deprived of civil
liberties.13 Europe and North America have been preferred destinations for stu-
dents, workers and refugees, but Africa, the Middle East and Asia remain popular
among Gambian entrepreneurs and students (particularly those choosing an
Islamic education).
As in so many other West African communities, young men in Sabi grow up in
a milieu in which friends and relatives are dispersed around the world. eir pres-
ence is nonetheless visible in the food supplies they buy, the houses they build, the
school fees and medical bills they pay, the goods and money they send home, the
development projects they nance collectively through hometown associations in
the diaspora, and so on. It has thus become normal that young men cultivate the
idea that they too must migrate in order to ensure the survival and prosperity of
their families, and thus qualify as mature, responsible sons and breadwinners.14
Once away from home, they will earn money to pay bride wealth and marry, to
raise children, and eventually build houses and buy property in the city. In addition
to money, travelling means visiting new places and exploring foreign cultures, and
returning with experience and knowledge. In sum, travelling is an integral part of
the life course of men, and an avenue through which they can attain and perform
respectable forms of masculinity. In Sabi, women also migrate, often after their
husbands send for them. Across the country and the region, there has been none-
theless a growing feminisation of migration ows involving unmarried women.15
Although migration from e Gambia is highly diversied in modalities and
geographical destinations, the so-called backway has recently hijacked public
and policy discourse on migration. A popular name for unauthorised migration to
Europe via North Africa and the Mediterranean, the back way has eectively become
a signicant phenomenon. Between 2013 and 2017, arrivals from e Gambia in
Italy via Libya increased vefold, which has made international headlines. Aside
from the media, the backway has been a concern for families and communities,
many of which have lost members along the route. By 2019, the backway seemed
to have faded. Yahya Jammeh's defeat through democratic elections in December
2016, and his departure into exile in January 2017 after having caused a political
stalemate, has galvanised the citizenry's hopes and seems to have reduced pressure
13 Hultin, N. et al. (2017), «Autocracy, Migration, and the Gambia's ‹Unprecedented› 2016 Elec-
tion», African Affairs 116(463), 321–40.
14 Timera, M. (2001), «Les Migrations Des Jeunes Saheliens: Affirmation De Soi Et Emancipation»,
Autrepart 18, 37–49.
15 See, for example, Rosander, E.E. (2015), In Pursuit of Paradise: Senegalese Women, Muridism
and Migration (Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute).
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Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
on people to leave the country.16 Another factor has been disruptions along the
route that was created more or less directly by Europe's pressure on governments
in Libya and Niger to stop migrants.17 e dangers of the route have been broad-
cast by the thousands of Gambians who have returned empty-handed from transit
countries in recent years. Between mid-2017 and mid-2019, more than 4,000 were
brought back by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) alone through
a scheme nanced by the EU.18 Upon return, they would be channelled to one of
the many programmes addressing the plight of disenfranchised youths at risk of
leaving for the backway. Such programmes have increasingly targeted youths from
impoverished and environmentally degraded rural areas, and eventually reached
peripheral communities such as Sabi.
Stemming the rural exodus through climate-resilient agriculture
Rather than the weather and agriculture, I have come to see Sherif to talk about
migration. But there is no need to change the topic of conversation, as migration
is directly related to what we have been discussing so far. «is backway problem,
you know, is all due to hardship,» says Sherif. «If you cannot feed yourself and your
family, what will you do?» e question is rhetorical; the answer obvious.
Sherif is brother and proxy to the chief, and he oversees the administration of
the village.19 I ask him to tell me about recent programmes that are supposed to
address the hardships he refers to. Less than two months ago, he says, a meeting
was held in Sabi upon request of representatives of the Youth Centre and the newly
created Migration Information Centre in Basse Santa Su, the regional capital. Rep-
resentatives of the two institutions brought information about current initiatives
to counter the backway and discuss future collaborations with the villagers on this
subject. I gather from Sherif that this entails mobilising village youths to organise
and participate in events that raise awareness about the dangers of the backway
and redress distorted images of Eldorado Europe. But it also means supporting and
recruiting for training programmes to teach youths professional skills and increase
their employability, and eventually to create their own businesses thanks to other
schemes providing small grants and micro-credit lines for starting up an enterprise.
ese schemes constitute the core of a large project called «Building a future –
Make it in e Gambia», which began at around the time of the meeting in Sabi.
Endowed with €23 million, it is the main project nanced through the Emergency
16 However, in 2019 dissatisfaction with the transitional government was rampant again.
17 Raineri, L. (2018), «Human Smuggling across Niger: State-sponsored Protection Rackets and
Contradictory Security Imperatives», The Journal of Modern African Studies 56(1), 63–86.
18 Action Aid (2019), Willing to Go Back Home or Forced to Return? The Centrality of Repatriation
in the Migration Agenda and the Challenges Faced by the Returnees in the Gambia (Milan: Action
Aid Italy), available at: www.actionaid.it/app/uploads/2019/12/Rimpatri-e-Gambia_ENG2.pdf
(accessed 10 April 2020); Zanker, F., and Altrogge, J. (2019), «The Political Influence of Return:
From Diaspora to Libyan Transit Returnees», International Migration 57(4), 167–80.
19 The village chief (alkalo ) is a customary authority that has been included into the state.
101
Paolo Gaibazzi Can migration from West Africa be prevented by climate-resilient agriculture? – Lessons in im /mobility from rural Gambia
Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), which was launched in 2015 at the EU-Africa Summit
in Valletta, Malta, in the heat of the 2015 «refugee crisis». e EUTF has become
a major tool to addressing the «root causes» of irregular migration from Africa
to Europe. e EUTF funds two other projects in e Gambia. One is the Youth
Empowerment Project, which has eectively been integrated into the «Build-
ing a future» project to focus on socio-economic opportunities and resilience.
e other is the previously mentioned EU-IOM partnership pertaining to repatri-
ation, which has a broader goal of strengthening migration management.20 is
latter aspect included the creation of three Migration Information Centres in e
Gambia in collaboration with the National Youth Council, which is the govern-
mental body that runs youth centres in Basse and other cities throughout e
Gambia. e meeting in Sabi was the result of this development. I would later
learn from one of the ocers that Sabi was selected as one of the 10 villages in the
Upper River to run pilot projects on community-based migration management. In
addition to mobilising Sabi authorities and youths to become involved in existing
programmes for individuals, this would ideally promote socio-economic develop-
ment and resilience at the community level.
Sherif welcomes the idea of Sabi youths learning a profession, but he also wishes
for greater support for agriculture. For him, Sabi farmers need better tools and
fertilisers to cope with an impoverished soil as well as irrigation to oset erratic
rains. He reckons that «if young people can see that they get something out of
farming, they will automatically focus their minds on it.»
Agriculture and climate change feature centrally in EUTF projects in e Gam-
bia. Climate change is a «cross-cutting issue», and it is identied as a main driver
of migration. Accordingly, «climate change mitigation» and «resilience to climate
change» are identied as «Important Objectives» within the markers system of
the Rio Conventions. Climate change is enveloped into a broader plan to boost
agri-business value chains, which should achieve «increased employment of youth
and the most vulnerable with an emphasis on the green and climate-resilient econo-
my».21 is would include the use of renewable energies, climate-resistant crops,
sustainable production techniques and irrigation schemes.
If on the surface it appears that the development solutions embedded in
Europe's externalised migration management in Africa are on target, there are rea-
sons to doubt the rhetoric, objectives and outcomes.22 What I want to highlight
here is that, behind an apparent convergence between local and transnational
governance on causes and solutions of «irregular migration» to Europe, there is a
fundamentally divergent understanding among actors of how youth, migration and
agriculture relate.
20 Interview with Mohamed Ceesay, Basse Youth Centre, 22 August 2019.
21 EU Trust Fund (2018), «Action Document for ‹Building a future – Make it in The Gambia›».
22 For a critique from within the development sector, see CONCORD and CINI (2018), Part-
nership or Conditionality? Monitoring the Migration Compacts and EU Trust Fund for Africa
(Brussels: CONCORD).
Musa loading bundles of millet on a donkey chart. Sabi, Gambia, 2014
Photo: © Paolo Gaibazzi
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Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
Agrarian pedagogy vs the culture of migration?
Almost thirty years ago, Lisa Malkki found a «sedentarist metaphysics» in policy,
public and social scientic discourse, especially on refugees and migrants.23 is
means that people are thought to be naturally rooted in a place and that movement
is abnormal, a disruption of their settled lives. Today, international migration gov-
ernance partly accepts migration as a normal condition and a positive resource.
In e Gambia, the policy discourse values diaspora engagement and the circula-
tion of highly skilled migrants. In contrast, the approach to «irregular migration»,
which is mainly concerned with lower-skilled youths, is largely driven by a seden-
tarist bias.24 It typically sees climate change and other factors as disrupting peo-
ple's local livelihoods, forcing them to move. Development would then keep them
in their place.25
Yet, mobility has been a normal and routine activity for Sabi men. Undoubt-
edly, times of crisis exacerbate migration. Sherif views hardship and environmental
challenges as push factors. For him, local employment and agrarian development
would encourage Sabi youths to stay on the land. His views are widely shared in
the village, also by many youths wishing to migrate. But in Sabi, migration is not
necessarily the result of crisis. Let us recall that migration from the Upper River to
other West African destinations boomed in the 1950s at a time of relative agricul-
tural prosperity. Signicantly, Sherif does not say that development will x people
in a place. He says that they will focus their minds on agricultural opportunities,
and away from the hazardous backway – an option that is in any case considered
too risky by most youths in the village. is does not remove other migratory paths.
A return migrant himself, Sherif has several sons abroad who take good care of his
family.
Migration governance not only struggles to accept the normality of migration
in places such as Sabi, but also seeks to actively contrast it and inculcate norma-
tive sedentariness. e project «Building a future – Make it in e Gambia» was
launched through a campaign that promoted the concept of «tekki i» («make it
here» in the Wolof language). e concept was popularised through a country-wide
campaign of music, song and videos featuring entrepreneurs who «made it» in e
Gambia and the surrounding region. e scope of the campaign went beyond pub-
licising economic opportunities. It targeted attitudes and orientations in a context
in which migration is perceived to be the prime model of success and the default
aspiration of Gambian youths. at Gambian and other West African youths put
their lives at risk in order to reach Europe is attributed not solely to poverty but
also to a «culture of migration» that is fed by misrepresentations and peer or family
23 Malkki, L.H. (1992), «National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of
National Identity among Scholars and Refugees», Cultural Anthropology 7(1), 24–44.
24 Zanker, F., and Altrogge, J. (2019), «The Political Influence of Return: From Diaspora to Libyan
Transit Returnees», International Migration 57(4), 167–80.
25 Bakewell, O. (2008), «‹Keeping Them in Their Place›: The Ambivalent Relationship between
Development and Migration in Africa», Third World Quarterly 29(7), 1341–58.
105
Paolo Gaibazzi Can migration from West Africa be prevented by climate-resilient agriculture? – Lessons in im /mobility from rural Gambia
pressures to leave. In the media, the illusion of Eldorado Europe is leitmotiv. So is
the role of migrants in silencing the hardships encountered on the route to – and
within – Europe as well as the circulating success narratives. e excesses of this
culture of migration, the discourse goes, must therefore be curtailed through
information and sensitisation campaigns on the realities of backway migration.
is is where agriculture becomes important – not simply as a form of employ-
ment, but also as a pedagogical tool to instil a culture of sedentariness. Current
initiatives are in continuity with an older discourse on agrarian development in
e Gambia. In the early 2000s, the Gambian government insisted that Gambians
should return to agriculture. A number of campaigns were created, such as «Back
to the Land» and «Operation Feed Yourself», which envisioned agricultural mod-
ernisation and the creation of exemplary farms able to attract alienated youth back
to the rural areas. Yahya Jammeh, then president, liked to portray himself as an
entrepreneurial farmer who lived by the motto «grow what you eat and eat what you
grow» on his vast agricultural estates. e initiatives and rhetoric around a return
to the land soon became wedded to an anti-migration stance. Engaging agriculture
would help reverse uncontrolled urbanisation, and especially counter migration
to Europe. is attracted the attention of European policymakers searching for
African partners to stop emigration to Europe. In 2012, «Operation No Back Way» –
the governmental campaign against irregular migration – received funds from the
EU via the Gambia Emergency Agricultural Production Project. For the Gambian
government, it was not only a matter of creating jobs and opportunities, but also of
transforming what public discourse depicted as lazy, deviant youths daydreaming
of Europe into hardworking and morally upright farmers earning their bread by
the sweat of their brow. As noted, the reality of so many Gambian youths aected
by unemployment, rural decline and political oppression was, and still is, quite
dierent.
Elements of this agrarian pedagogy, as I will show, resonate with popular views
in e Gambia. Yet, I would like to challenge the very premises of past and present
discourses on migration and agriculture that envision agrarian life as a solution
and corrective to a culture of migration, which threatens to not only empty the
countr yside, but also wipe out a generation of young men and women venturing
through deserts and seas in pursuit of their European dreams. My critique targets
the received view that migration means neglecting agriculture, and that investing
in agriculture re-roots youths and mitigates their migratory aspirations.
The agri-culture of migration
Rather than a culture of migration, Sabi villagers have an agri-culture of migration.
e etymology of the Latin word cultura is linked to agri-culture. I am aware of
the risks that this etymology entails, in that it may reproduce what Malkki termed
an «arborescent culture», which ties culture to territory, and identity to roots.26
26 Malkki (1992), «National Geographic», p. 27 (see note 23).
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Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
is is not my intention. To the contrary, I want to show that sedentary and mi-
gratory activities are combined in ways that are not necessarily intuitive and go
against the canonical dichotomy between agriculture and migration, immobility
and mobility.
I rst met Demba27 in late 2006. It was the dry season, farming was over and
there was barely any work to do in the village. Demba was then in his mid-twenties,
wore nice clothes and was a popular «ghetto» leader. He gathered around him a
number of young men, treating them to cigarettes, music and green tea late into the
night. e year 2006 was the peak of boat migration to the Canary Islands, includ-
ing from the Gambian coast. It was a turning point in Europe's attempt to curb un-
authorised migration from Africa directly on sub-Saharan African soil, and it laid
the foundation for the initiatives I have described so far.28 It was also the high
point of Jammeh's anti-migration rhetoric. Observing Demba and his friends at
this time of the year, one was tempted to view them in stereotypical terms as lazy
boys wasting away, jobless, in «ghettos», shunning farming and daydreaming of
Europe. Demba and virtually every other young man in his gathering wanted to
leave for greener pastures abroad. Even though none of them wanted to board a
boat to the Canary Islands, Europe and North America topped their lists of desir-
able destinations.
But the stereotype proved to be inaccurate upon closer observation. Demba
had been busy farming the past rainy season, as he had done since childhood.
Like many men of his generation, he grew up as a farmer and then as a Quranic
student. He liked to recount the hardships of his childhood when he was studying
and working at the Quranic master's compound, where he would do hard work in
the elds, fetching rewood, a little food, sometimes sleeping on mats, all of which
was subjected to the whims of bullish seniors: «Eh, my friend, we suered. But it's
good. Now that my body has become stronger [Soninke: kendo ], I am t for hus-
tling. I can go and nd money. I can work hard, I fear no job.» After that, Demba
farmed in the rainy season (June–November) and hustled – that is, nding money
through work and business – in the urban areas of the Atlantic coast of e Gam-
bia in the dry season (December–May). When I met him in 2006, he had just
returned from the city for a visit.
Rather than seeing incompatibility between farming and migrating, Demba
clearly sees agrarian life and work as what prepared him to go and hustle away
from his village. In contrast to the public discourse on migration, young men like
him do not expect to nd an easy life and easy money abroad. ose focussing on
Europe know that they will have to endure long hours in menial occupations, face
discrimination and lead frugal lives. How do they prepare for this? By farming.29
27 A pseudonym.
28 Andersson, R. (2014), Illegality, Inc.: Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering
Europe (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press).
29 In Sabi, formal education, both secular and religious, has been growing steadily since the
1990s. Although this partly competes with this agrarian pedagogy, many families in Sabi send
their children to both farms and schools.
107
Paolo Gaibazzi Can migration from West Africa be prevented by climate-resilient agriculture? – Lessons in im /mobility from rural Gambia
In addition to training the body to do hard work, farming means replenishing
the granaries of the household, which teaches boys the value of ensuring family
survival in a collective manner. Once abroad, they will continue to ll the gra-
nary by sending money for bags of rice and other staples. In farms, households or
Quranic schools, boys gain experiential knowledge of rural hardship, which is said
to prepare them to cope with crowded rooms, live simple lives and endure sacri-
ces. Knowing hardship at home will further remind them of those they have left
behind and to do all they can to help.
Certainly, few young men want to remain farmers for the rest of their lives. Even
if agriculture remains an important activity, one might still nd a strong migra-
tion culture luring young men away from farms. Migrating abroad means money
and experience as well as the possibility of becoming a breadwinner, marrying and
making a name for oneself. In 2008, Demba was nally able to convince his elder
brother to sponsor his migration to Angola, where he promptly began hustling as
a petty trader while navigating the tough migrant life there.30 Yet, agriculture and
rural life was again to become important when he came back in 2013. He simply
meant to visit the family and return to Angola, but he was delayed by nancial
problems. Meanwhile, his mother was ailing and the household head had passed
away. Several other men in the household had migrated and were unable to replace
him. In the household, there were mostly the wives and children of these migrants.
Somebody had to stay and take care of the family, tend to the elds and teach the
children how to farm. Since then Demba has remained in Sabi, farming and doing
business in the village and administering the remittances sent by members of his
household who have migrated. His work in the household is more precarious and
less noted than that of his brothers abroad. It is nevertheless a crucial element of
the economy and morality of migrant households. He stays put not simply because
he failed to re-emigrate or prefers a peasant way of life. Rather, his farm work, care
work within the family and management of the household enable other men to be
away on a quest for money. e latter, in turn, support his being in the household
by sending money and commending his role.
Conclusion
In policy and public discourse, agriculture is often depicted as the bedrock of a
sedentary life and value system, which climate change – among other human-
made calamities – disrupts, leading to emigration. In this view, Sahelian countries
like e Gambia that are aected by fragile ecologies, rural poverty and rising
emigration rates seem to be omens of the masses of migrants leaving Africa for
better shores. Europe handles this as a security problem, marrying a discourse
on climate change to one about controlling migration at the source. e proposed
30 See Gaibazzi, P. (2018), «West African Strangers and the Politics of Inhumanity in Angola»,
American Ethnologist 45(4), 470–81.
108
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
solution is to develop agricultural sectors that are resilient to climate and sustain-
able so that Africans will stay at home.
Although this greening of Europe's containment approach to development
and migration can be criticised at dierent levels, I have relied on evidence from
Eastern Gambia to question the false premises of this discourse. In the rst place,
the assumption that environmental degradation spurs migration is not granted.
A growing body of scholarship shows that climate-related challenges may cause
immobility.31 It may further impoverish and enclave people, preventing them from
gathering the necessary resources to go anywhere. As other contributions in this
collection show, environmental events refract political and economic inequalities
that dispossess people of the means to adapt to challenging situations, including by
moving. In this contribution, I have also highlighted the socio-cultural aspects of
what we might provocatively call «environmental permanence» as a counterpoint
to the concept of «environmental migration». Notwithstanding the growing sig-
nicance of ecological degradation and emigration along e Gambia, villagers in
Sabi stick to the land as a resource that creates not just food to eat, but also sociality
and values, thereby ensuring the future of their agrarian communities.
Secondly, staying on the land is by no means in opposition to migration. On
the contrary, there exists in Sabi an agri-culture of migration: a synerg y between
agriculture and migration as well as sedentary and mobile lifestyles. Agriculture
does not merely feature as a residual or resilient element neglected by youth, but as
an integral component of their mobility. In the elds, boys learn skills and virtues
that they then employ as labourers and traders abroad. ose who do not migrate
or are required to stay do not shun farming either. Migrants depend on their pres-
ence at home, their work in the elds, their care for other households and their
help with a number of errands and investments.
ere are certainly frictions between mobile and immobile lifestyles. Young
men aspire to become migrants, not farmers. Migrants acquire wealth and travel
the world; their eorts are celebrated back home. Toiling in family elds for a mea-
gre yield does not quite bring the same status and knowledge; erratic weather,
among other uncertainties, might reduce their eorts to zero. Poverty, frustration
and despair in Sabi and elsewhere in rural West Africa are real enough to make
young people leave the land and even embark on the backway.
On the other hand, we should avoid making too close an association between
rural decline, cultures of migration and unauthorised migration to Europe. Sabi is
by no means a ghost village that all the able men have left. Villagers have felt the
backway as a poignant problem and mourned the loss of a handful of their fellow
villagers on the route. Yet, there is no alarmism in this village, which has endured
so many seasons of migration – and continues to do so. Although some leave, some
always stay and/or return.
31 Zickgraf, C. (2018), «Immobility», in McLeman, R., and Gemenne, F. (eds.), Routledge Handbook
of Environmental Displacement and Migration (Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge).
109
Finally, in this context, pushing for a sedentarist reform of West African youth
might do more harm than good. Even where it is well-designed and not merely an
embellishment of repressive measures of migration control, using development
to emplace would-be migrants often misunderstands the local logics of migration
management. e people of Sabi welcome rural development that brings job oppor-
tunities for local youths – development that might improve local livelihoods and
enable the disenfranchised to stay with dignity. Yet, so far, what has enabled them
to stay put has been migration, actually, rather than the state, non-governmen-
tal or other development organisations. Migrants' economic, social and cultural
investment has given purpose and sustenance to sedentary men, despite the vari-
ous imbalances between migrants and non-migrants. Impossible visa conditions,
perilous routes, suspended lives in camps and the bureaucratic entanglements of
asylum and migration in Europe and elsewhere delay migrants and hamper their
ability to remit and invest back home, thereby preventing them from forging per-
manence. In other words, further restrictions and deterrence measures against
migration from Africa – even if combined with the carrot of rural development –
might prevent people from staying put, and eventually push them to leave in their
turn.
Paolo Gaibazzi Can migration from West Africa be prevented by climate-resilient agriculture? – Lessons in im /mobility from rural Gambia
110
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
ANA NAOMI DE SOUSA
«What makes us resist is the
land itself»
AN INTERVIEW WITH ERILEIDE DOMINGUES, BRAZIL
Erileide Domingues, 29, is a Guarani-Kaiowá spokesperson who lives in the village
of Guyraroká on a piece of land that has been retomada [«taken back», referring
to land that has been occupied as part of land struggles] by the Indigenous
Guarani-Kaiowá people. Guyraroká is located in the western Brazilian border
state of Mato Grosso do Sul. e Guarani-Kaiowá people are natives of Brazil,
Paraguay and Argentina.
In Brazil, the Guarani-Kaiowá people were rst displaced from their lands
and enslaved by colonial invaders who arrived in the 16th century. Over time,
much of that land was deforested and used for cattle grazing or farmed intensively.
During the military dictatorship of 1964–1985, the Guarani-Kaiowá were among
the Indigenous people forced onto reservations. Since the end of the dictatorship,
many Guarani-Kaiowá have ended up working on the sugarcane plantations that
cover the state, while many others live on small tracts of roadside land where they
await legal decisions on the possible reattribution of their traditional lands. ere
has been an epidemic of suicides among young Guarani-Kaiowá men living in
this limbo.
Over the past three decades, the Guarani-Kaiowá people in Brazil have inten-
sied their struggle to take back their ancestral lands through a combination of
territorial occupations and court petitions for demarcations. is struggle has led
to hundreds of deaths of Indigenous people, often at the hands of armed farmers
and their militias. More than 40 per cent of the Guarani-Kaiowá people in Brazil
suer from malnutrition, and there have been dozens of reported cases of mass
poisonings from the aggressive use of agricultural chemicals.
Meanwhile, the election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018 has resulted in the dramatic
defunding and dismantling of State Indigenous institutions (including FUNAI, the
National Indian Foundation, an ocial State institution in Brazil) and, at the same
time, the emboldening of the agricultural lobby, known in Brazil as the Bancada
Ruralista.1
1 The Bancada Ruralista is Brazil's agricultural lobby, associated with the political right-wing and
explicitly opposed to agrarian reform, environmental conservation and Indigenous land rights.
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Ana Naomi de Sousa «What makes us resist is the land itself» – An interview with Erileide Domingues, Brazil
Ana: To begin with, can you tell me a little about the community you are from and
its history? And about your history in relation to the land you're currently occupying?
Erileide: I have been involved in this struggle since I was eight years old, alongside
my grandfather. He's very old now but he's still active – we Indigenous people can't
stay still, even when we're ill we have to keep working!
I will tell you in my grandfather's words, what he says about how the Guarani-
Kaiowá people lost their territories: It's been more than 100 years since people were
pushed out of Guyraroká. Many were killed when the [Portuguese] colonels and
generals arrived and lied to the Indigenous people – by telling them that they had
purchased the land, and that because it had been purchased, they were obliged to
leave. Having been expelled, many died; some ed and some tried to stay around
here and eventually went looking for other reserves. ose who stayed ended up
becoming a pião [serf, or casual – usually landless – farm labourer] working in
exchange for food, and surviving like that.
What led to the retomada of the Guyraroká traditional lands more recently was
the same reason that the Guarani-Kaiowá have taken back many other lands: e
[reservation] the government had allocated to us, where they had penned us in,
was overcrowded – they had made a pigst y for us Indigenous people, basically. We
Indigenous people need to have our space, we need the forest, we need expanses of
land – and when we feel like we're in a cage, in a pigsty, penned in on all sides, we
can't have our freedom: freedom to cultivate and plant, hunt, and that's hard. For
years our parentes [referring to another Indigenous person] were just going round
and round inside that pigsty. When they went beyond its boundaries, they were
chased, shot at, killed, women were raped – many things happened, and there was
no peace for us. So in 1999 my grandfather brought together 600 people who had
been kicked o our land and they decided to return here, to take back the land.
I'm saying «they» because at the time I was only 8 years old, and I didn't fully
understand what was going on.
So, from 1999 on, they persevered with their attempt to re-occupy the land –
they were kicked o three more times, under the landowner Zé Teixeira, the federal
congressman for Mato Grosso do Sul. A lot of people were injured and much blood
was spilled so that we could be here today, 20 years on. It's a source of great anger
for the landowners around here that we have stayed. Many of our parentes have
died in Guyraroká, but we have persevered. We hope to gain back 11,401 hectares
in total, including the 55 hectares that this village, Guyraroká, lies on – if we can
win the demarcation case. Last year, my grandfather celebrated his 100th birthday
in Brasília, right opposite the presidential palace. e petition had been recognised
initially, but then Judge Gilmar Mendes annulled it. He said the territory is not
recognised as traditional lands, so everything has ground to a halt at the Supreme
Court. But still, we have stayed here in this struggle for our lands. It's my grand-
father's dream to see it given back, and this is the dream of the Guarani-Kaiowá
people, too.
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Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
Ana: So when did you become involved as an activist yourself?
Erileide: e Guarani-Kaiowá people are treated as children until they reach ado-
lescence, and then they are taught about the situation and gradually move further
towards the frontline of the struggle. In my case, that began when I was 12 years
old. At that age, we're not aware of everything, but by being there we bear witness
to events, we see what happens, we see people being targeted with weapons, people
being shot, and so on.
When I was 8 years old, I heard they were going to re-occupy the land that had
always been theirs. As a child you don't get involved much – but I would always
hear my grandfather and grandmother and the other elders saying that «the land
cries out for its keepers». en, when I was 12, I started to take part alongside them.
As a teenager it was good, yet at the same time it was… frightening, to see weapons
being pointed at your family, for example – you start to experience a more adult
reality. And you see how dicult it really is to take back the land. We would receive
verbal and physical threats, and we were often shot at with rubber bullets. And
those experiences are not easy to get over. My late uncle who was a leader here was
killed, shot in front of his people by a gunman like a wild animal. It is very sadden-
ing, but over time this has become easier to deal with.
So, until I was 16 I still wasn't deeply involved – what I was doing was simply
watching and living, the way we grow and live together, in unity, which is tied to
how important the land is to Indigenous people. en I left and spent 10years in the
capital – I went seeking knowledge and information, and to nish my studies, too.
I never thought I would end up working with the Guarani-Kaiowá people, or being
a spokesperson for Indigenous peoples, whose rights are still being violated today.
I don't know how to explain exactly what happened… But I came back in 2017, when
my uncle had died on this 55 hectares gained partly through his own struggle, for
which he spilled his blood. at's here, the land where we are today. So with that
comes, I don't know how to explain the form of it exactly but… it's like I have a role
to play, it's in my hands now. From then on I started to accompany my grandfather,
following his dream and the dream of the Guarani-Kaiowá people that we would
someday get back the land that was always ours. He is one of only four people here
still alive who was actually born here, so we have our ancestors' stories, which we
have inherited from them. And I'm here by his side, in this struggle, helping with
communications and the phones and paperwork, in guiding the community and
so on. He can't do so much now because of his age, but he is always listening to his
community to hear what they have to say. Today I am one of the spokespeople and
activists for both the community and my grandfather as well as for the Guarani-
Kaiowá people. Regaining this land is our great challenge. But it's what we have to
do, what we will do in the name of our parentes who have already left us.
Helping my grandfather is a very big responsibility – he can speak of many
things, orally, but there has to be someone to help with the written word, because
without the written word today, we can't prove anything. It's not easy to work with
parentes , just as it's not easy to work with the non-Indigenous people who spread
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Ana Naomi de Sousa «What makes us resist is the land itself» – An interview with Erileide Domingues, Brazil
hatred of the Guarani-Kaiowá. With the little experience I have – I say that because
I feel I am still on a path of learning – we, as activists and spokespeople, carry a
sad burden about what has happened to the Guarani-Kaiowá people. Many of our
people are still living along the roadside, in the hope, the dream of recovering their
own lands so that one day they can have a base and the freedom to rest there in
peace again.
Ana: You said that the land is calling for its keepers. I wanted to ask you about this
relationship with the land and nature, and the wider issue of the environment, too.
Lately, people are realising the importance of learning from Indigenous communities
about the relationship to nature and with the land. What do you think about that?
Erileide: ere is just so much to say. For Indigenous people, traditional people,
everything is linked; each thing is connected to the other. I will speak a little more
generally about Indigenous people now. I am going to speak on our behalf about
what led us to take back the land. e land had been devastated ever since the
arrival of non-Indigenous people, that is, since what I would call the invasion of
Brazil. ey came and exploited medicinal herbs, exploited the animals, exploited
Indigenous peoples, exploited the land and exploited Mother Earth. And over time
they ended up obliterating, killing, suocating nature, and then there came a point
where the non-Indigenous people – the anti-Indigenous people as I am going to call
them – surrounded this land where [our] people have always lived. We Indigenous
people always observe the laws of nature, we full and we obey them. at's part of
the Indigenous mindset, because we know that everything we depend on – for our
lives and for our bodies – is the land. It is the root of everything, and everything we
give to the Earth, to Mother Nature, is given back to us, to our bodies, to our heath,
including as food and as medicine.
So, when we think about the Bancada Ruralista today, you know what they do?
ey destroy. If you could see the scene here in the village, I could show you what
Brazil is like these days. e land we've been occupying for the last 20 years is not
forested, there are no trees left – there used to be cattle grazing here and the land
was badly damaged. As a result, it's hard to grow food for our community, to get
food from the land to feed our families. is is taking time… We are practically
starting from zero. Over these 20 years, some plants have been sown, and time has
done its work. Even some birds have started to return, and for each child that is
born we replant trees. But our river here has been drying out due to the spreading
of poisons, because we are surrounded by plantations of crops like sugarcane and
corn. When it rains, the poisons that they spray by tractor and plane penetrate the
water table and pollute the environment and the air we breathe. Last year, I had
to lodge a national and international legal case because the community here was
poisoned. Since it rst began, the children complain constantly of stomach aches,
headaches and weakness, particularly here in Guyraroká, but also in other areas
where the Guarani-Kaiowá live in Mato Grosso do Sul – because in this state we are
surrounded by crops. We don't have many options of where we can plant and har vest
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Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
in the way we Indigenous people would like in order to feed ourselves, because for
us nutrition is a kind of medicine. Here, for example, we plant pumpkins or po-
tatoes, because the drying agents they use on their crops dry everything else out –
the only things that can survive are things like that or cassava, which survives
underground. Other things like bananas, papayas and other fruits, they all dry out.
is scarcity, this shortage, has a huge impact on our health. We can already tell
that we will be more susceptible to coronavirus and its spread because of that.
Ana: e poisoning – can you tell me a little bit about what happened there?
Erileide: Ah yes, so the lands around us were used for cattle rearing until around
2014, then they started growing crops. In May 2019 they took away all the cattle and
they sprayed a product on the soil – I don't know exactly what it is, but it's similar
to an agricultural lime. ose lands come right up to just 15 metres away from our
schoolhouse, and it ended up being sprayed on the community. Some people who
were there lmed it. We didn't really get medical help; medical attention here any-
way is scarce. ey might come by every couple of weeks, and they don't do tests or
keep track. My own mother got poisoned too, and for a week she couldn't keep any
food down at all. She had stomach cramps, diarrhoea – but the doctor just gave her
a pill and didn't follow up. ere were children, including a newborn baby, whose
mothers had to go running to the roadside for help because the children had been
sprayed with it, it was on their skin, and they were cr ying and vomiting. Almost the
whole community was aected, so we made an ocial complaint. I made a peti-
tion in the Human Rights court, but absolutely nothing else has been done about
it – nothing, nothing at all. All that the Public Prosecutor's Oce did was to tell the
farmers to respect a 250-metre boundary – but it's not being observed. Since May
2009 until now, lots of dogs and chickens and cattle here have died – often animals
are much more fragile than us. We can take much more, we keep going through it,
although we do get weakened too. e children still say they have stomach pains,
diarrhea, vomiting. We don't have much help from SESAI [the Indigenous health
service of Brazil's Ministry of Health].
Ana: In terms of migration and mobility, how are you and the communities being
aected by climate change? Is this making people leave the land?
Erileide: ere have been changes to the climate for a long time. ese changes
are really due to the lack of wild nature and the lack of forests. Now summer comes
instead of winter and winter comes instead of summer. Everything is back to front…
We are in the month of May, which is not supposed to be cold, it is not supposed
to be raining, yet now it is raining. Our health deteriorates and our plantations are
really no longer viable, but we also have to try and keep up with these times.
People have not left due to the problems caused by climate change, simply
because we cannot leave. Because of the new government, we cannot migrate.
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Ana Naomi de Sousa «What makes us resist is the land itself» – An interview with Erileide Domingues, Brazil
To ensure our place on this land, as we are currently occupying it, we have to
remain here irrespective of the weather, or the climate, or the situation.
And so instead, we tr y to take advantage of the rainy weather, for example
planting fruit trees and bearing in mind that next year we can take advantage of the
heat. We make the most of the cold, of each season. Even though it is very strange
for us, we have to keep up and stay put in this place we have taken back. If we were
to migrate because of changes to the climate, we would end up losing, and the gov-
ernment would get its way and take the land back again. ey have already sprayed
poison on us, dried our crops, killed our plants. ey warn the community not to
hunt, not to sh, not to get rewood, all so that we might be discouraged from stay-
ing and move away to a reserve or to another village. But we have been here for 20
years, surviving all these hardships, and always staying. So we have been through
what we had to, but we are staying here, keeping up with the weather, making the
most of it. Indigenous people are in tune with the weather, for example my grand-
father, Tito Vilhalva, prays for the rain to stop, or if he wants it to warm up. He is
a leader, and he is also what the non-Indigenous call a Pajé , a prayer. He may be
100 years old, but he still plants and harvests, he loves to sh – his thing is shing.
Ana: Speaking now more generally about the various Indigenous communities in
Brazil, can you talk about the challenges in relation to the Bolsonaro government,
and the environmental and land issues under this government?
Erileide: e government of… it's shameful even to say his name. Hearing it has a
powerful eect somehow – I will say «that man», ok? Him and that [Environment
Minister] Ricardo Salles are part of an anti -Indigenous lobby. It is very worrying
for those of us who are involved in these territorial claims, in this struggle for our
lands. ere are 50,000 Guarani-Kaiowá people, which is the second-largest Indig-
enous population in Brazil, and there are currently between 42 and 46 land occu-
pations with land rights cases now in progress. e new government has brought
everything to a standstill, and we are very worried because they have already made
it very clear to us that they will not draw a demarcation line for one single centime-
tre of Indigenous land. When we Indigenous people are threatened, Mother Earth
herself is threatened, because our lives speak for the Earth, the Earth speaks for
our lives.
e lives of the Guarani-Kaiowá of Mato Grosso do Sul are greatly aected by
being landless, and in turn by the lack of land demarcation. Many Guarani-Kaiowá
leaders have already shed their blood in this struggle. Now they are being reborn
again because, as the saying goes, «they cut our trunks but forgot to pull out the
roots». e new leadership have grown from these roots, and we are occupying
these spaces as young people, learning to move forward along the path of the
struggle.
Many other Indigenous people throughout Brazil already have their lands,
unlike in Mato Grosso do Sul. But the anti-Indigenous faction is still xated on the
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Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
wood that could be cut, the ore that could be mined – they want to do to other
Indigenous people what they have done here in Mato Grosso do Sul, by withdraw-
ing their land rights, expelling them and sending them packing to the roadside.
But look at the Guarani-Kaiowá: We were living at the roadside yet after everything
they have done to us, we have come back and are still hoping for our return.
Ana: I didn't ask about FUNAI. What's the situation right now?
Erileide: FUNAI is currently in a dicult moment. It's being decimated, nancially,
and FUNAI today has actually become an anti-Indigenous organisation. So we
don't look to FUNAI anymore. I mean, I don't even know what's become of them
lately because, even in the middle of this pandemic, they haven't been present at
all for the Guarani-Kaiowá in Mato Grosso do Sul. ey seem not to care. Last year
they passed a decree banning FUNAI sta from using FUNAI vehicles to visit any
occupied villages that are not fully legalised, so from then on they stopped coming
and we've seen nothing of them since. If a FUNAI sta member wants to go to
a village, then the national president of FUNAI has to approve it… and he's a
Bolsonarista [a supporter of the right-wing government of Jair Bolsonaro].
Ana: What would you say is the biggest threat in terms of the ght for the land,
at this moment?
Erileide: Look, we are facing a very big challenge with this government. Our lives
are being challenged by this government. We are attacked from left, right and
centre, and the attacks are not small, you know, it's like… a bomb going o every
day. ere are many Indigenous people who have been bought o by the Bancada
Ruralista and the anti-Indigenous lobbies. What the government is doing is causing
genocide.
I think, actually, I would leave a message for them: that they respect their broth-
ers and sisters, because before God all of us are brothers and sisters. And really, the
government we are facing today sees us Indigenous people as less than human –
I think they see us as worse than animals. But we are really going to ght what-
ever comes our way. We will insist for our rights as they exist in the Constitution,
because ultimately the government is temporary, but our rights are enshrined in
law. So the message I want to leave them is that they respect what is in the Consti-
tution and not only put into practice what it says, but also consult with Indigenous
peoples before making their decisions. We are human like everyone else.
Ana: I don't know if you would like to say anything more about something we talked
about – the environment, the struggle for land, the community, or as an activist and
spokesperson?
Erileide: What I feel today, as a young person, is that it is not easy to be Indige-
nous and to face anti-Indigenous people. Part of our struggle as young people is to
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endure prejudice and racism. We Indigenous people have gone through a lot, and
I myself have – but I hold my head high. I am always ready as much for my com-
munity, for the Guarani-Kaiowá people as for anyone who is in need. e challenge
is huge. As a young woman, I always remember that the most important thing is
that Indigenous rights must be upheld. Today I am on this journey of becoming a
leader – I don't really like that word but that's what they call me – and accompany-
ing my grandfather, still learning. Sometimes it is not easy, there are many chal-
lenges and it's a huge responsibility to bear. As activists and spokespersons, we run
a very big risk from anti-Indigenous people, but we always have the guidance of the
elders, because our elders are teachers for all us activists.
Ana: How do you think about your resistance? In terms of the way that you think
about creating your resistance and responding to these challenges?
Erileide: Well, this resistance comes from within us, and from working in unity:
What makes us resist is the land itself. e land is everything – there is not much
more I can say than this. We Indigenous people are resilient because of Mother
Earth, because of nature, because of our elders. We resist and we insist because of
the past, in order to be able to exist – because without resistance, and without the
land, we could not.
«Resistance» is a very beautiful word, very powerful. I see this word «resistance»
used a lot in posters all over the place. But if you stop to think about it, resistance
has brought, and still brings us, death. Sometimes I reect on everything that has
happened during our existence, our resistance. It is very painful for us to think
about. Something that sometimes upsets the people who come here to confront us
is that this resistance is within us, it adorns our soul, it adorns us. We resist with our
lives. at's what I take from it – when one of us falls, another rises.
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Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
TRISTEN TAYLOR AND DELME CUPIDO
Drought in the Northern Cape,
South Africa: How climate
change turned a small town into
a permanent refugee camp*
Commercial agriculture is collapsing in South Africa's Karoo region, a semi-arid
desert covering more than 400,000 km². e Karoo's economy is dependent upon
dry-land agriculture, primarily sheep farming. Since at least 2015 it has been
severely aected by a prolonged drought that has blighted South Africa, Namibia
and Botswana.
Karoo's fate exemplies the stern reality described by experts such as Andrew
Marquard, a professor at the Energy Research centre, University of Cape Town: «I
would say that for any drought in Southern Africa now, there is a climate factor.
It seems the latest science is that we are now not anticipating climate change, we
are now in it.»
e current drought is bigger than any the country has known, according to
Dr Imtiaz Sooliman, director of South Africa's largest disaster relief NGO, Gift of
the Givers. At least 63 towns are in need of immediate and substantial drought
assistance. «e scale is far bigger than anyone in this country understands,» says
Sooliman, who describes commercial agriculture in the Karoo as being in a state
of «total collapse».
Gift of the Givers has provided US $12 million in drought relief since 2017.
Sooliman estimates that a further US $17 million is needed in 2020 for the North-
ern Cape province alone. According to Stats South Africa, the Northern Cape
experienced a 16.3 per cent year-on-year reduction in farm employment in 2018/19.1
Eight thousand agricultural jobs were lost.
* This text is based on field research that started in 2016 and culminated with in-depth field
research during May 2019. The field research, which focused on three towns, consisted of
gathering photographic evidence and face-to-face interviews across social class and race. For
example, farmers, politicians, business people, farmworkers and residents. In additional to
these interviews, desktop quantitative research and interviews with experts were conducted.
The research was funded by the Heinrich Boll Foundation.
1 Statistics South Africa (2019), Quarterly Labour Force Survey, Quarter 1: 2019 , p. 52, available at:
www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02111stQuarter2019.pdf.
119
Tristen Taylor and Delme Cupido Drought in the Northern Cape, South Africa: How climate change turned a small town into a permanent refugee camp
With a population of about 3,000 people, Strydenburg is a small Karoo town
180 km south-west of Kimberley, the provincial capital of the Northern Cape, where
matters are well past desperation. e main road that runs through it starts at a
petrol station with a liquor store, runs past a variety of closed shops, and ends at an
abandoned community centre.
In 2019 Hopetown, which is 50 km from Strydenburg and part of the same win-
ter-rainfall region, only received 6 mm (16 per cent) of its 37 mm average in January,
a critical month for rainfall.2
Strydenburg's community centre is abandoned. Beyond its empty swimming
pool and rotting diving board, the desert stretches out to the horizon, covering
farmland that was productive before the drought.
Hennie Zwiegers owns a sheep farm a few kilometres outside Strydenburg. His
family has been farming there since 1837, but he will probably be the last person
in his family to do so. He says «there's no future in farming» and doesn't expect to
make it through the next winter (2019/20). Even if the rains were to return in the
winter months (November to February), Zwiegers thinks it would take another ve
years for the land and livestock to recover. His few remaining sheep have stopped
reproducing, and his game (primarily springbok) are dying from the lack of edible
vegetation.
e disintegration of the livestock industry is leaving Karoo towns like Stryden-
burg with an economy revolving around social grants and a few state jobs. Hardly
sucient to deal with unemployment, expanding townships are experiencing
deepening social ills. e average annual income in the embelihle municipality,
which incorporates Strydenburg, is US $1,650. irty-ve per cent of embelihle's
population is under the age of 19, and only 27 per cent of the total population has
nished secondary school.3
Brenda Mphamba, the African National Congress mayor of embelihle, says
that since 2016, the community has seen a substantial increase in the use of meth-
amphetamine, locally known as «tik». is is on top of a serious problem with
alcohol. e Northern Cape province has one of the world's highest rates of fetal
alcohol syndrome. De Aar, a large town 100 km from Strydenburg, has a foetal alco-
hol syndrome rate of 119.4 per 1,000.4 e HIV/Aids prevalence rate in the Pixley ka
Seme District (which covers Strydenburg) is 16.7 per cent.5
2 Diamond Fields Advertiser (2019, February 4), «Gloomy Rainfall Figures for NC», available at:
www.dfa.co.za/news/gloomy-rainfall-figures-for-nc-19121325.
3 Statistics South Africa (2016), South African Community Survey 2016, available at: https://wazi-
map.co.za/profiles/municipality-NC076-themb.
4 Olivier, L. et al. (2016), «Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders: Prevalence Rates in South Africa»,
SAfrMedJ 6, S103–S106, available at: https://core.ac.uk/reader/194295564.
5 Woldesenbet, S.A., et al. (2019), The 2017 National Antenatal Sentinel HIV Survey, South Africa
(Pretoria: National Department of Health), p. 81, available at: www.nicd.ac.za/wp-content/
uploads/2019/07/Antenatal_survey-report_24July19.pdf.
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Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
Steven Paulus, principal of the Strydenburg Combined School, describes the
town's social problems as «a horror state of aairs», adding that: «We have a spike
in drug abuse, we have a spike in teen pregnancy, we have a spike in lawlessness.»
Almost all of Strydenburg is now dependent upon social grants for survival.
e grants range from old-age pensions, which are US $106 a month, to child sup-
port grants of US $25 a month per child. According to ocial statistics, the mini-
mum per person income required to meet the most basic of food needs is US $32
a month; 18 million South Africans (30 per cent of the total population) rely upon
social grants.6
In 2018, South Africa's second-largest city, Cape Town, almost reached Day
Zero, the day when the city would have run out of water. e primary cause was the
drought, and that drought was almost certainly induced by climate change. A 2018
analysis of the drought led by Friederike E. L. Otto of the Environmental Change
Institute concluded that, «e likelihood of an event like the observed 2015–2017
drought has increased by a factor of 3.3 (1.4–6.4). Unlike for other drought analy-
ses in other parts of Africa, this is a very clear result with anthropogenic climate
change having signicantly increased the likelihood of such a drought to occur.»7
Day Zero arrived for Strydenburg in 2016. Leon Jantjies, head of the local branch
of the African National Congress, is familiar with the challenges faced by policy-
makers as a result. He sits on the board of the local clinic and of Future Leaders, an
NGO that tries to give the town's youth a pathway out of drug abuse, despair and
hopelessness.
Since the start of the drought, Jantjies has seen a dramatic increase in house
break-ins, youth unemployment and drug abuse. He says, «Water is at the heart of
everything. Without water you can't have development.»
Strydenburg has been under severe water restrictions for the past three years:
supply is limited to six hours per day at the most. However, the Mandela Square
township has such low water pressure that residents have to rely on four vertical
storage tanks. e water for the tanks gets trucked in from Hopetown.
Hester Obermeyer is the spokesperson for Save the Sheep, an NGO working out
of Sutherland, which is 470 km from Strydenburg. Statistics collected by Save the
Sheep show that Sutherland used to have a carrying capacity of 400,000 sheep in
2015, but now can support only 63,000 sheep.
To unlock US $142 million in disaster relief, Save the Sheep has called on the
provincial government to declare the whole of the Northern Cape a disaster area.
Without urgent assistance from the state, Obermeyer predicts that, «Farms are
going to close down, their gates are going to be locked and the keys handed over to
the banks. People are going to lose their jobs. A year ago the job losses in Suther-
land, directly due to the drought, were 224 people. For a small town like Sutherland
that is disastrous.»
6 See www.groundup.org.za/article/everything-you-need-know-about-social-grants_820.
7 Otto, F. et al. (2018), «Anthropogenic Influence on the Drivers of the Western Cape Drought
2015–2017», Environ. Res. Letter 13, 124010, available at: https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aae9f9.
121
Tristen Taylor and Delme Cupido Drought in the Northern Cape, South Africa: How climate change turned a small town into a permanent refugee camp
South Africa's agricultural sector declined by 13.2 per cent in the rst quarter
of 2019.8 e drought is undermining the South African government's land re-
distribution eorts. Both emerging black and established white farmers are aban-
doning their farms, leaving them for the banks to reprocess. According to a local
coordinator for drought relief, farms that used to sell on auction for US $170,00.00
are now worthless, with the land resembling a gravel parking lot.
Strydenburg had 75 emerging farmers three years ago; emerging black farmers
are the intended beneciaries of the government's land redistribution programme,
which is an attempt to redress the inequalities of apartheid and colonialism. About
80 per cent of the emerging farmers have now left farming altogether. ose who
still farm do so on the sparse municipal land in and around Strydenburg, according
to Andries Maries, chair of the Emerging Farmers Association.
Maries, a former farm worker, has been farming in the area for more than 30
years. If the drought continues for another year or two, he says, «It will be very di-
cult for me as an emerging farmer. I will have to sell my animals and stop farming.»
e expectation has been that, as climate change causes drought in this region,
people would move from the rural areas to South Africa's main cities: for example,
Johannesburg, Kimberly and Cape Town. Despite endemic poverty, a catalogue of
social ills and a complete lack of employment, the people of Strydenburg are stay-
ing put. With an ocial national unemployment rate of 27.6 per cent, prospects
of nding work in cities such as Kimberly and Cape Town are few.9 Additionally,
moving would mean leaving the community's informal support system and living
in an urban slum.
With South Africa's social grants system now functioning as a disaster relief
scheme in Strydenburg – individuals most basic needs are just about met – the
town has become a permanent but unintended humanitarian camp: e people of
Strydenburg are seeking refuge from climate change in their own homes. However,
the drought itself is not the only cause.
South Africa's economy last saw any kind of meaningful economic growth in
2007, and corruption has become endemic. e national debt continues to grow, the
electricity supply has become erratic, the unemployment rate continues to rise and
the water infrastructure is decaying: Some towns have seen the re-emergence of
cholera. Although there has been the creation of a black middle class, the majority
of the population has yet to receive redress from historic injustices, especially in
rural areas.
ese economic and social problems can only hamper eorts to mitigate the
impacts of South Africa's rst climate-induced drought. Towns such as Stryden-
burg are particularly aected due to these problems existing before the drought.
Negative social, political and economic factors have amplied – and in turn been
reinforced by – the impacts of the drought.
8 Department of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries (2019), Quarterly Economic Overview of the
Agriculture Sector: First Quarter 2019 (DAFF), p. 6, available at: www.daff.gov.za.
9 Statistics South Africa (2019), Quarterly Labour Force Survey, p. 1 (see note 1).
Photo: © Tristen Taylor
Township residents of drought-stricken Strydenburg
124
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
On a broader scale, this case study suggests that the problem of climate
change and its impact on human mobility will be more complex than commonly
assumed. Because of social safety nets and little opportunity elsewhere, some
climate change-aected persons may be less likely to migrate elsewhere. Addi-
tional research into this phenomenon is needed to understand the deep and
far-reaching impacts of climate change upon these populations, whose circum-
stances rarely gure in debates about policymaking in response to climate change
in the Global South. As of July 2020, the drought continues in the Northern Cape.
125
Natalie Sauer Questioning the «poster child» cliché: Mobility and attachment in the Pacific island of Palau
NATALIE SAUER
Questioning the «poster child»
cliché: Mobility and attachment
in the Pacific island of Palau
It takes three to four years for 69-year-old Isabella Yano to grow a lush taro. e
tall green plant, which can reach 1.8 metres, is the main staple of the Micronesian
islands of Palau. Such is the importance of the crop in local culture that a Palauan
proverb claims it to be «the mother of our breath» («A mesei a delal a telid» ). Elderly
women, known as mechas , have nursed it for centuries, drawing pride in the neat-
ness, productivity and health of their taro patches.
Every now and again, Yano's breath is cut short by the high tide. Seawater
creeps into her patch, painting the green leaves a morbid yellow and then brown.
«It makes me feel sad and discouraged because when it happens all of the younger
taro die,» Yano says.
Although much ink has been poured over the fate of low-lying islands such as
the Marshall Islands and Kiribati, the higher islands of Palau are also vulnerable
to climate change, with important implications for mobility. Located in the West
Pacic between the Philippines and Guam, the small island state of the Republic
of Palau consists of more than 300 atoll and high islands, of which only nine are
inhabited.
At rst glance, Palau's 18,008 inhabitants1 appear safe from sea-level rise, with
much of the country standing 9 metres above sea level on average. However, most
of the higher ground is not well-suited for habitation, agricultural and economic
activity due to its hilly and forested topography. As a result, Palauans like Yano live
and work in the exposed coastal regions.
According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the main
environmental factors relating to anthropogenic climate change that will become
signicant in the coming years are the increased strength of storms, droughts and
sea-level rise.2 Palau suers from all three.
Not that these challenges are unfamiliar to the islanders. Lying just outside the
Northern Pacic typhoon belt, Palau saw 68 tropical storms or tropical depressions
1 United Nations Population Division (2019), World Population Prospects: 2019 Revision , available
at: https://population.un.org/wpp.
2 IOM (2014), IOM Outlook on Migration, Environment and Climate Change (Geneva: Interna-
tional Organization for Migration).
126
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
come within 200 nautical miles of its islands or reefs between 1945 and 2013.3
On occasion, these have spurred exodus. In 1904, a huge typhoon pummelled the
Sonsoral islands, which are located more than 300 km away to the south-west of
Koror. e German administration relocated the people of Merir and Pulo Anna to
the main islands.4
But residents and scientists alike say storms have taken on a new force. «In
generalised Palau talk, storms have got more severe,» says Peter Black, an ethnol-
ogist who lived in Tobi Island in the 1960s and 1970s. He has dedicated his life to
documenting the island's culture. «I got to Palau in 1968 and they had a typhoon
right away. ere were very few people there who had experience of that. e big
typhoons in that part of the world were always passing north of Palau.»
«Now it's become semi-routine,» he says, adding: «You'll see these Facebook
posts: ‹Watch out everyone, a storm is coming.›» In December 2012, weather reports
announced a «one in a million typhoon». Super Typhoon Bopha, as it was to become
known, ripped into the coral reefs east of Koror state, unleashing storm waves of
35 feet or more. Super Typhoon Haiyan – one of the most powerful Pacic tropical
cyclones on record – followed almost on its heels in December 2013, its eye moving
close to the island of Kayangel.
Palauans can no longer take fresh water for granted. In March 2016, cumu-
lative rainfall for Koror was the lowest recorded in 65 years,5 prompting Presi-
dent Tommy Remengesau to declare a state of emergency. Water was rationed and
emergency assistance was delivered by the IOM. e harmless golden jellysh from
Palau's popular Jellysh Lake died by the hundreds of thousands.
e ocean, on which Palauans depend upon for food and tourism, has become
a menacing gure. Rising by about 9 mm annually since 1993, it chews into the
island's taro patches incrementally, as stilts and raised foundations appear under
houses. «Old people say: When we were young, we knew the wet season and the
dry season and now it's all over the place,» says Margo Vitarelli, a Hawaii-based
Palauan artist. When drafting Palau's climate law in 2015, President Remengesau
voiced similar concerns, describing the «biggest predictability» for his country as
«unpredictabilit y».6
Has such unpredictability led people to leave their islands and Palau? e fol-
lowing sections of this report respond to this question by considering past and cur-
rent migratory trends, surveying the academic debate on climate migration in Palau
before turning to stories of unsustainable urban development on the mainland.
3 Coral Reef Research Foundation (2014), A Summary of Palau's Typhoon History 1945–2013 ,
available at: https://coralreefpalau.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/CRRF-Palau-Typhoon-
History-2014-1.pdf (accessed 15 July 2020).
4 Ibid.
5 Republic of Palau (2016), Drought Report , available at: www.palaugov.pw/wp-content/uploads/
2017/06/2016-Drought-Report.pdf (accessed 15 July 2020).
6 SPC (2015), Palau's Climate Change Policy to Prepare the Island Nation for «Unpredictability» ,
available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/palau/palau-s-climate-change-policy-prepare-is-
land-nation-unpredictability (accessed 15 July 2020).
127
Natalie Sauer Questioning the «poster child» cliché: Mobility and attachment in the Pacific island of Palau
I then consider the Kayangel people displaced by Typhoon Haiyan and the threat-
ened repopulation eorts of Tobi Island. I conclude with a note on the question of
adaptation.
Climate migration in Palau: A few figures and references
As this volume makes clear, the term «climate migration» has courted much con-
troversy over the past decades, with critics arguing that it is almost impossible to
disentangle environmental factors from socio-economic factors driving people to
move. e task of linking migration to climate change gets even trickier in the case
of Pacic Islanders, who, thanks to their rich transnational migration traditions,
often see themselves rst and foremost as sea voyagers.
«Pacic Islanders have always been migrating,» says Yimnang Golbuu, head of
the Palau International Coral Reef Center. «e original people who came to these
islands migrated here. We've been migrating to dierent places for dierent rea-
sons: education, jobs. So it's not like we never migrated and all of a sudden we are
forced to move.»
is tradition of mobility exists alongside a rm attachment to place, accord-
ing to chief of sta for the governor of Koror, Joleen Ngoriakl. Palauans' identities,
she explains, are intimately bound up with the islands themselves. In its 2017–2020
countr y prole for Palau, the IOM sides with her, evoking the «deeply rooted rela-
tionship that communities have with the land».7
Current emigration
Palau, which in 2019 counted 18,008 inhabitants, has recently seen an increase in
migration towards developed countries. Coupled with a decreasing fertility rate,
this development has resulted in a declining population growth rate, estimated
in 2020 to be 0.39 per cent.8 Internal migration from outer-island communities
towards the urban centre of Koror also continues to proceed apace. However, the
rate is less signicant than departures overseas.
Political-economic alliances stemming from Palau's colonial history strongly
inuence where Palauans choose to migrate. e great majority head for the
United States and its insular areas of Guam and the Commonwealth of the Mari-
ana Islands, as a result of the Compact of Free Association with the United States.
Passed in 1994, the agreement allows Palauans to travel to the United States as
non-immigrants without a visa and enjoy an indenite stay. More than 15 per cent
of the population does this.9 Others migrate to Japan, Taiwan, New Zealand and
the Philippines.
7 IOM (2018), The Republic of Palau IOM Strategy 2017–2020, available at: https://publications.iom.
int/books/republic-palau-iom-country-strategy-2017-2020.
8 Ibid., p. 6.
9 Ibid., p. V, Foreword.
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Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
Migration patterns are thus overwhelmingly circular, with most Palauans
choosing to migrate with the aim of returning home after studying abroad, enlist-
ing in the American military or doing various other jobs.
It is important to note, however, that just as Palauans increasingly seek opportu-
nities overseas, the country itself has developed a sizeable immigrant community.
Around a third (28.1 per cent) of Palau's population is foreign born, with migrants
primarily hailing from Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, China, the Philippines, Japan
and the United States. is strikingly high gure underlines what many social
scientists of climate change and mobility have been at pains to emphasise for some
years now: A signicant proportion of human migration under climate stress will
involve movement into zones of higher risk from climate change.
The lure of the coast
e density of population in the urban centre of Koror renders Palau particularly
vulnerable to climate-related displacement. As the country's touristic powerhouse,
Koror hosts the vast majority of Palau's businesses, restaurants and oces. Criti-
cally, Koror is home to the country's only hospital and college: Palau Community
College. It comes as little surprise, therefore, that more than 80 per cent of Palau's
population lives in Koror.10
«When people think of low-lying islands, they think of the Marshall Islands
and Kiribati,» Golbuu says. «But along the coast of Koror, on the eastern coast of
Babeldaob, where people live, it's very much around sea level.»
Designed to attract foreign investment, a controversial policy to extend the land
lease from 50 to 99 years has worsened an already precarious situation consider-
ably.11 In a 2015 blog post,12 Ngoriakl slammed the «inux of foreign developers
building hotels left and right, only to ll it up with their own imported labour,
services and goods». e resulting surge in prices has priced many ordinary Palau-
ans out of the centre.
«It's a combination of people getting displaced from sea level and economic
growth,» says Xavier Matsutaro, Palau's focal point for the UN Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change. «People competing for the same space… has produced
tension. ere have been landlords kicking out folks for economic reasons and
people are oering higher rent for the same place.»
Speaking over the phone, Ngoriakl remarks that she never knew Palauans
living in apartments when she was growing up.
10 UNDP (2016), Human Development Report 2016: Human Development for Everyone (New York,
NY: UNDP).
11 Vogt, I. (2019), Tourism and Land in Palau , available at: https://youngphilanthropist.blog/2019/
10/03/tourism-and-land-in-palau (accessed 15 July 2020).
12 Ngoriakl, J. (2015), The Unattractive Side of Paradise , available at: https://medium.com/@joleen-
ngoriakl/the-unattractive-side-of-paradise-a162cf83046 (accessed 15 July 2020).
129
Natalie Sauer Questioning the «poster child» cliché: Mobility and attachment in the Pacific island of Palau
Vitarelli agrees. «Before everybody had a piece of land, it was pretty egalitar-
ian, pretty equal, you couldn't see a rich-poor dierence. Now there is a rich-poor
delineation in Palau,» she says.
In the face of rising seas and prices, relocating away from the coast – if not to
Palau's higher inlands – would seem to be in order. But the area away from the
coast within Koror is in even higher demand than the centre, placing it out of reach
to ordinary families. e absence of essential infrastructure, including transport,
in Babeldaob's higher regions means that those relocating would have to commute
by car daily to the centre – an expense that is unimaginable in a country where the
national minimum wage is US $3.50.
Relocation as an adaptation strategy is further complicated by a notoriously
complex land law system. Conicting surveying systems developed during the
German and Japanese periods of colonisation, followed by the destruction of land
records during the Second World War,13 have produced countless land disputes.
Palauans, Matsutaro says, «cannot just pick up and go to traditional lands outside
of Koror because they're still in the middle of guring out whether they can legally
move there. Until that is settled, they're kind of stuck.»
«Even though [it is customary] for Pacic Islanders to adapt [to circumstances]
moving around, but then there are also times when you cannot move to a dierent
place,» Golbuu adds. «It takes a lot of resources to make that happen. It's not an
easy thing to say ‹Move there or don't move to these coastal islands, because you're
susceptible to storms and sea-level rise.›»
Trapped
Unable to ee to safety in town or to the hills, poorer households spill into Koror's
mangrove areas. ese are among the most exposed lands to climate impacts.
Highly susceptible to high temperatures, they also get ooded during high tides.
«e poor families that are living in the mangroves are usually stuck in inter-
generational poverty,» an ocial who wishes to stay anonymous, says. «I've visited
families living in those areas and they're basically squatting.»
But even that bolthole is not safe from housing speculation. Over the past years,
an increasing number of middle-class families have attempted to purchase man-
grove areas to reclaim and live on. e ocial describes the market as «prime real
estate». «It can be very dicult between rich and the poor,» the ocial adds.
If not the mangroves, marginalised Palauans may illegally occupy buildings
under litigation – a common occurrence in a country grappling with land owner-
ship delineation following colonialism.
13 Asian Development Bank (2017), Palau: Policies for Sustainable Growth, a Private-sector Assess-
ment , available at: www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/230131/palau-psa-
2017.pdf (accessed 15 July 2020).
130
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
Typhoon Haiyan
On 7 November 2013, Super Typhoon Haiyan unfurled across the north of Palau.
Of the republic's 16 states, the island of Kayangel, located 50 miles to the north of
Koror, was worst aected. Resident Ungilreng Takawo,14 who had initially consid-
ered the authorities' oer to shelter in Koror, eventually chose to stay on the island
along with most Kayangel people. With fourteen others, she sat tightly before one
of the largest Category 5 typhoons on record made landfall. Around 11 pm, win-
dows shattered, and a shard of glass ew across the room, embedding itself into
one of the men's foreheads.
«After the windows broke, there was chaos everywhere,» Ungilreng says.
«One heavy bench that was at the front porch of the house ew inside through one
of the windows. e double door burst open and everything was ying around.
Even the inside walls were ripped o.»
e group eventually took shelter in the concrete restrooms in the garden.
Takawo thought she would die. «I never prayed so much like that night and I'm
forever grateful to God to be alive.»
Out of 39 Palauan houses destroyed by winds of more than 260 km per hour
near the storm's centre, 22 were in Kayangel. All infrastructure and agricultural
crops were attened.15 According to a report by the National Emergency Com-
mittee, 30 people stayed at the Palau Cultural Centre in Koror City, a govern-
ment-funded facility, while 21 others went to live with relatives in Palau. In
addition to their desire for secure accommodation, the possibility of giving their
children continuous access to education was key in the Kayangel people's decision
to relocate to Koror as they waited for their island to be rebuilt.
Other Kayangel residents returned to the island to assist with the reconstruc-
tion eorts. e government of Taiwan donated 20 temporary houses to assist
Kayangel people while they rebuilt their homes. Japan funded and carried out the
reconstruction of a typhoon-proof school, which could double up as a typhoon
and tsunami shelter. Overall, the Kayangel community stayed in Koror for around
one year, Matsutaro said, which is the time threshold between short-term (3 to 12
months of mobility) and long-term displacement (over a year away from home),
according to UN terminology.
«While waiting for homes to be rebuilt, some Kayangel residents found jobs
while in Koror,» Matsutaro says. «ey earned enough income to make a living so
they have since settled in Koror, although they travel to Kayangel to visit from time
to time.»
14 The story of Ungilreng Takawo is based on a private interview supplied to the author by Palau's
Ministry of Natural Resources, Environment & Tourism and the documentary After the Storm
(2013) by Witham, L., and Wentworth, K. for Film Truth Productions.
15 Thomson, P. (2013, November 14), «In Palau, a Glancing Blow from Typhoon Haiyan Prompts a
Glance toward Climate Change», The World , available at: www.pri.org/stories/2013-11-14/palau-
glancing-blow-typhoon-haiyan-prompts-glance-toward-climate-change (accessed 15 July 2020).
131
Natalie Sauer Questioning the «poster child» cliché: Mobility and attachment in the Pacific island of Palau
In 2020, Kayangel is still recovering. Water access has particularly been
aected, after the storm caused saltwater to intrude into the island's main well.
Reverse osmosis is required. Taro patches are also still recovering. Freak storms
are far from the only problem Kayangel faces on a warming planet. As an atoll
island, it is among Palau's most vulnerable islands to sea-level rise. In 2009, Palau's
president, Johnson Toribiong, warned that the state could cease to exist by 2100
if the sea-level rise advances one metre from its current level. Save for such an
extreme scenario, the prospects for relocation appear to be out of the question to
most.
After asking her what she would do if the sea rose, e World journalist Ari
Daniel later reported that a woman said she would set up shop in a boat «because
she's Palauan and she plans to stay here.»
Ngoriakl raises a more profound question. «If they relocate from Kayangel to
another state, would they still be Kayangel people? What happens to their identity
and history?»
Repopulating Tobi Island: A dream sunk by rising sea levels
Former Tobian governor omas Patris has a dream: Play a part in repopulating
Tobi. Located more than 600 km from Koror, the island is part of a group of ve
oceanic islands and one coral atoll, Helen Reef, known as the Southwest Islands.
At 0.85 km2, it is but a minuscule dot in the Pacic. At an administrative level, Tobi
and Helen Reef form Hatohobei state – the southernmost state of the Republic of
Palau. Travelling there from Babeldaob requires a two-day journey by boat. Its
current population stands at 29 people, rising to around 40 people during the
school term.
It wasn't always like this. Back in the early 20th century, a German ethno-
graphic expedition16 marked the population at slightly under 1,000 inhabitants.
e island was self-sucient, surviving on a gardening and shing base. But
population density and remoteness put it at the mercy of storms and disease. In
the 1930s, there was a slow trickle of people to the Echang hamlet on the out-
skirts of Koror – currently known as the Southwest Island settlement. Tobians
took part in the nascent cash economy, interacted with the Catholic mission and
enjoyed government-funded access to education and health.
Meanwhile, back on Tobi, by the 1950s people had incorporated several fea-
tures of life in Koror with their traditions. A church brought everyone together
twice a day, children attended school and a clinic dispensed medical care. Produc-
ing a small amount of copra – the dried meat or kernel of the coconut – brought
in enough cash so that the necessities and even some luxuries that could not be
produced locally could be purchased from the ship. ere was still no electricity,
16 Eilers, A. (1936), Tobi In Ergebnisse der Südsee Expedition 1908–1910. II. Ethnographie: B.
Mikronesien Band 9. Westkarolinen 2. Halband: Tobi und Ngulu. Georg Thilenius ed. , Vol. 9
(Hamburg: Friederichsen, De Gruyter & Co. m.b.H.), p. 44.
Koror, the most populous island and commercial centre of Palau,
is a common destination for migrants from the outer islands
Photo: © Mark Priest
134
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
running water or any communication with the outside world apart from the occa-
sional government ship or the even more seldom seen shing boat from Taiwan or
Japan. But Tobian society increasingly oscillated between the two islands.
at fragile equilibrium came to a halt with the closure of the nursery and
school in the 1980s, prompting Tobians to move back to Koror. In 1994, Palau's inde-
pendence brought an end to regular publicly funded shipping, precipitating the
exodus further. ese days, more than 150 Tobians currently live in Koror, whereas
Tobi's population can jump from 20 to a high of 60 people during the island's school
term, according to Patris.
However, the cohabitation with other Palauans is far from idyllic. Like many
Palauans, Tobians' land in Echang was handed to them under colonial rule and is
vulnerable to repossession under the country's complex land titles system. Tobians
can also suer from discrimination from the main islanders. As a result, although
only 70 per cent of the population lived in Tobi or Helen Reef as children, a 2009
report17 found 81 per cent of Tobians wanted to move back to Tobi or Helen Reef.
«It is important to understand that this dream [of repopulation] acquires its
force not merely from nostalgia for a lost Eden, or romantic discontent with mun-
dane reality,» ethnologist Black writes. «It also arises from the tenuous position
Tobians occupy in Palau.»
«Where would they go?» Black asks as he considers a repossession of the South-
west Island settlement in Koror. «Some have Palauan relatives, from whom they
might acquire land upon which to relocate, many do not.»
Tobians have attempted to revive the island in the past years. When Patris was
elected governor in 2009, fewer than 10 people lived there. He and other Tobians
reopened Tobi's elementary school with support from the Department of Educa-
tion. In 2012–2013, a fortuitous drop in transport costs lured more people back.
«When they opened the school, I was really surprised to have so many stu-
dents,» Patris says. «ere were 10 students,» he tells me via video link. Tobian
elders, he adds, have run a series of workshops to teach traditional skills, such as
how to weave shing lines from tree bark and baskets from coconut leaves.
«At the moment, Tobians [in Koror] see that island, and they're controlling
Helen Reef – which is very rich in resources,» says Black. «at is their future, if
they can somehow manage to hang out in Palau and establish themselves better
there, have this Southern place, where they can go spend time, go there and raise
kids.»
«What's working against them is climate change,» Black says. «is is like a
reverse migration, which is politically, culturally and even economically promising,
but the island itself – the physical place – has been badly hit by warming.»
Tobi is eroding away. Rising tides wrench coconut trees o the southern tip of
the island and tease dangerously close to the island's only taro patch. e island's
17 Oldiais, N., Ngiraiwet, A., Patris, P., Ngirkuteling, B., Polloi, C., Rekemsiik, D., …Andrew, W.
(2009), Helen Reef and the Hatohobei Community: SEM-Pasifika Socioeconomic Assessment
Report (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Coral Reef Conservation Program,
Palau International Coral Reef Center, and Helen Reef Resource Management Office).
135
Natalie Sauer Questioning the «poster child» cliché: Mobility and attachment in the Pacific island of Palau
current governor, Huana Nestor, predicts houses close to the beach in the south
will need to be relocated in 10 to 15 years, and he worries about the vulnerability of
Second World War historical sites to rising tides.
«ey were people who surveyed their land and put a marker on it,» Patris
says. «But last year when we went down, their land had already washed again. e
cement marker they had put was in the reef. at's how bad it is.»
Located 70 km east of Tobi, Helen Reef is the most threatened land location
in the Republic of Palau, according to Palau's Coral Reef Research Foundation.18
Situated on a sandbar, the island has moved and eroded considerably over the past
decades. It is uninhabited, save for a marine ranger station with a sta of three.
Rising sea levels also put pressure on the island's only freshwater lens, resulting
in salinated water. «At this time, it is not drinkable, whereas it used to be before,»
Nestor says. «When we use the wells to do laundry, the soap doesn't get suds as it
used to because of the high salinity.»
Fish, which are another key element for Tobians, are also growing scarce. «It's
not like it was before, when you just dropped a line and could catch a sh,» Patris
says. «Nowadays you have to wait for the sh to bite your hook.» Tuna, the sta-
ple sh, is also becoming rarer. «Last week there was no tuna, only barracuda and
wahoo.»
Patris worries about the impact of global warming on the local corals. «Once
the coral is gone, then the small sh are gone and then the big sh will be too.»
Potential adaptive solutions for Hatohobei include an airstrip and seawall,
though here too funds and technical expertise are lacking. «We keep singing about
the need for planning for climate change and the future of Tobi, but without fund-
ing it's incredibly dicult,» she says.
«Personally, I see little chance of that [repopulation] dream becoming reality,
but you never know,» Black writes. «Talk of an airstrip comes and goes but, along
with the perennial notion of creating some kind of tourist operation, remains in
the category of ‹ideas to help the island› – plans which function to show that those
promoting them are public-spirited but are not within the realm of practicability.»
«e people who are staying there just hang on to what they have now,» Patris
says. «But they know that someday the island will disappear, will be washed away
unless there is a big change in climate change.»
Discussion
is report has demonstrated that climate change has started to shape migration in
Palau – at least at an internal level. Of the three stories mentioned above, the most
tangible example has been that of medium-term mobility in the case of the reloca-
tion of the Kayangel people in Koror in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan. An unspecied
18 Patris, S., and Colin, P. (n.d.), «Island Erosion and Migration in Tobi (Hatohobei) State, Palau»,
Coral Reef Research Foundation, available at: https://coralreefpalau.org/education/posters
(accessed 15 July 2020).
136
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
number of them, according to the government, have settled on the mainland for the
long term after taking up jobs.
Other cases are less quantiable. In Koror, one can only speculate as to how
many would have moved from the coast to the higher inlands in the presence of,
among other factors, higher incomes, sound infrastructure and land ownership
laws. And how to count the number of Tobians who would have shared Patris'
dream and settled on Tobi Island in a world free of warming? e one certainty we
can cling to is that Palauans are unwilling to leave their land.
us, even though the sea occasionally spoils her taro, relocation towards
the higher ground appears unthinkable to Yano. «I have seven taro patches,» she
explains. «Most of them are higher up, but that one closer to the ocean has a nicer
colour than the other ones.» e patch is also close to her house, where she wishes
to spend her late years, she adds. Both people and country continue to favour in situ
adaptation over migration as a response to the climate crisis.
«My remedy is to use the Giant Swamp Taro leaves to help block the salt water
from entering,» Yano continues. «It's not perfect and sometimes the saltwater still
gets in, but I've learned that if I wait for rain for three to four months, the saltiness
of the soil will eventually go away and then I am able to plant again,» she says,
adding that she would be interested in learning about salt-resistant varieties of
taro crops.
Yano's rooted resilience extends to national policy. Palau is internationally
renowned for its sustainable leadership. In 2016, it became the second countr y in
the world, after Fiji, to ratify the Paris Agreement to limit global temperature rise
to well below 2° C following a 2015 framework climate law.19
In January 2020, it closed 80 per cent of its waters to commercial shing – an
area roughly the size of France – in a agship Marine Sanctuary policy in order to
allow coral reefs to recover and protect coastal areas against the impacts of climate
change. e government has launched a national housing programme for displaced
families, with the aim to actively include the aected population in the adaptation
planning process. Among the programme's aims is the relocation of households
aected by inundation in nine states. Contemporary construction permit require-
ments also call for more housing to be elevated.
However, top-down directives popular with international NGOs do not always
t with local realities, as evidenced when Ngoriakl makes a call to «balance con-
servation and the lives of the people». e chief of sta points out that a 2003 con-
servation policy that sought to protect 30 per cent of Palau's near-shore marine
environment by 2020 has driven people that used to sh «to move to buying frozen
chicken, or sh illegally».
Tarita Holme, an environmental consultant who has advised on climate pol-
icy for the Palau National Marine Sanctuary and the United States Agency for
19 Government of Palau (2015), Palau Climate Change Policy for Climate and Disaster Resilient Low
Emissions Development , available at: https://chm.cbd.int/api/v2013/documents/6A6546C6-
0283-0455-5974-30F4B8A2F29E/attachments/Climate%20Change%20-%20PalauCCPolicy_
LowResolution.pdf (accessed 15 July 2020).
137
International Development, also calls for climate funding to broaden its eligibility
criteria in a bid to ease adaptation. Holme points to an invasive macaque in the
south-western island of Anguar that has caused 12 bird species to desert the island.
«People from island conservation who deal with invasives have said: ‹While it's
just on this island we have a chance to address it. But if it gets out and goes to
Babeldaob, then there's no way to get rid of it.›» She adds that the macaque could
damage crops and ultimately food security. According to Holme: «It's so hard to
nd funding to address that issue, because all of the funding is in climate change
and the… donors don't realise that this is [part of] our adaptation decit.»
Although the sea may be rising, Ngoriakl wants to believe that the tide is turn-
ing at home. «I spend a lot of time with younger people – the Generation Z,» she
says. «It's interesting because they're not like us, the millennials… We left. Now
there's demand to make the only community college into a university so that they
can stay here and learn here.»
Natalie Sauer Questioning the «poster child» cliché: Mobility and attachment in the Pacific island of Palau
138
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
CHRISTIANE FRÖHLICH
Mobility and climate justice
in the Mashriq
Today, we have a better understanding than ever of the social phenomena associ-
ated with anthropogenic climate change, especially climate-related human mobil-
ity. Research has conrmed that climate change mostly engenders South-South
movements,1 internal displacement within the so-called Global South2 and
immobility,3 thus essentially debunking the ongoing securitisation of so-called
climate migration to the Global North.4 Studies have also underlined that the
eects of climate change play out dierently for already disenfranchised or margin-
alised groups and elites, and that this discrimination is rarely suciently addressed
in negotiation processes linked to the issue of climate change.5
is raises questions of both climate and mobility justice. e concept of mobil-
ity justice underlines that access to mobility is experienced unequally, along inter-
sectional categories such as gender, race, religion, age or socio-economic status.6
e concept of climate justice highlights the fact that although climate change
is caused mainly by industrialised states, developing states bear the brunt of its
1 Weber, E. (2015), «Envisioning South-South Relations in the Fields of Environmental Change
and Migration in the Pacific Islands – Past, Present and Futures», Journal of the Global South 2(1).
2 Foresight (2011), Migration and Global Environmental Change (London: The Government Of-
fice for Science).
3 Black et al. (2013), «Migration, Immobility and Displacement», Environmental Science and
Policy 27(S1), S32–S43; Zickgraf, C., and Perrin, N. (2017), «Immobile and Trapped Popula-
tions», in Gemenne, F., Ionesco, D., and Mokhnacheva, D. (eds.), Atlas Der Umweltmigration ,
pp. 44–46 (München: oekom).
4 For a recent rendering, see Lustgarten, A. (2020, July 23), «The Great Climate Migration Has
Begun», The New York Times , available at: www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/23/magazine/
climate-migration.html (accessed 29 July 2020).
5 Kaijser, A., and Kronsell, A. (2014), «Climate Change through the Lens of Intersectionality»,
Environmental Politics 23(3), 417–33.
6 Sheller, M. (2018), Mobility Justice: The Politics of Movement in an Age of Extremes (London and
Brooklyn, NY: Verso).
139
Christiane Fröhlich Mobility and climate justice in the Mashriq
impacts,7 without adequate resource transfers, development assistance or equi-
table donor-recipient relationships.8
is contribution explores how dierent aspects of mobility and climate jus-
tice play out in the Mashriq,9 a geographic region that Encyclopaedia Britannica
denes as comprising the modern states of Egypt, Sudan, the Gulf states, Israel,
Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.10 e region is a prime example of the
eects of anthropogenic climate change. It illustrates that how a society, state or
individual is impacted by climate change depends on socio-economic and political
conditions, and/or individual positionality. Studying the Mashriq thus provides an
avenue to better understanding the interplay between climatic and non-climatic
pressures, thereby oering a more comprehensive approach to questions of justice
in the context of a changing climate.11
Climate change in the Mashriq
Like many other regions of the world, the Mashriq has been suering from a ris-
ing average temperature, increasingly erratic precipitation patterns, sea-level rise,
and an increase in both severity and frequency of extreme weather events such
as heat waves, droughts and oods.12 Climatic pressures are expected to increase
further in the coming years and decades13 and will likely impact water supply, crop
production, health and economic growth.14 For instance, the densely populated
coastlines along the Red, Arabian and Mediterranean seas with their fertile coastal
lands, shallow lagoons and sheries are increasingly vulnerable to sea-level rise and
7 Sowers, J. (2019), «Understanding Climate Vulnerability in the Middle East and North Africa»,
International Journal of Middle East Studies (October), 1–5.
8 Klepp, S., and Herbeck, J. (2016), «The Politics of Environmental Migration and Climate Justice
in the Pacific Region», Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 7(1), 54–73; Tanner, T., and
Allouche, J. (2011), «Towards a New Political Economy of Climate Change and Development»,
IDS Bulletin 42(3).
9 Using «Mashriq» rather than «Near East» or «Middle East» helps to avoid the Eurocentric and
orientalist connotations of the latter terms. For a discussion, see Culcasi, K. (2010), «Construct-
ing and Naturalizing the Middle East», Geographical Review 100(4), 583–97.
10 The editors of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (n.d.), « Mashriq | geographical region, Middle East»,
Encyclopaedia Britannica , available at: www.britannica.com/place/Mashriq (accessed 30 July
2020).
11 Mason, M., Zeitoun, M., and Mimi, Z. (2012), «Compounding Vulnerability: Impacts of Climate
Change on Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank», Journal of Palestine Studies XLI(3), 38–53.
12 IPCC (2014), « Asia», in Barros, V.R. (ed.), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulner-
ability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change available at: www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/up-
loads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-Chap24_FINAL.pdf, p. 1333.
13 Al-Saidi, M. (2020), «Contribution of Water Scarcity and Sustainability Failures to Disintegra-
tion and Conflict in the Arab Region – the Case of Syria and Yemen», in Amour, P.O. (ed.),
The Regional Order in the Gulf Region and the Middle East: Regional Rivalries and Security
Alliances , pp. 375–405 (Cham: Springer International Publishing).
14 IPCC (2014), «Livelihoods and Poverty», chapter 17 in IPCC Report 2014, Part A: Global and
Sectoral Aspects , available at: www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/livelihoods-and-poverty.
140
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
salinisation (Egypt, Gaza, Israel and Lebanon are cases in point).15 Also, changing
and inconsistent rain patterns will likely aect water availability and, thus, water
utilisation – a development that led to a decrease in agricultural productivity, and
even agricultural collapse, in parts of the region in the past.16
Although the peoples of the Mashriq have been adapting to changing climates
for centuries, the speed and severity of anthropogenic climate change is creating
new and unprecedented challenges.17 is situation is exacerbated by the relative
ability (and willingness) of regional governments to adapt to and mitigate climate
change impacts. e World Bank's World Development Report 2007 attests that
countries in the Mashriq (and the Maghreb) not only suer from physical resource
scarcity, for instance of water, but that they are also characterised by a lack of both
organisational capacity and accountability, which points to a breaking or broken
social contract between the regional populations and their governing institutions
and actors. Specically, researchers diagnose regional public agencies with «over-
lapping and unclear functions or diculties in coordinating», as well as a «lack of
a sound institutional environment».18 Although it is important to reect on what
is considered a «sound institutional environment» by whom, this diagnosis illus-
trates that while climate change eects are real in the Mashriq, the incapability or
unwillingness of regional states to adapt to and mitigate the changing conditions
is just as big of a problem.19
In addition, if and when eorts to mitigate climate change are made, pre-
existing power structures within a state – together with the state's position within
the international system – moderate who benets from these eorts. Consequently,
the responses of states in the Mashriq to climate change need to be understood
as being embedded in specic North-South relations, pre-established patterns
of international cooperation, as well as pre-existing sub- and international con-
icts. For instance, a state's capacity to adapt to climate change often hinges on
economic power: Economically weaker states, which are often less integrated into
the global economy, have fewer options than rich(er) states. Post- and decolonial
approaches help us to ask critically why states outside of the Global North often
have less economic (and political) power, pointing to historically grown disbal-
ances and inequalities in the international system. e eects of climate change
can be outweighed by such power structures, for instance in the cases of Israel
and Palestine, where Palestinian livelihoods are impacted far more severely by
the eects of the Israeli occupation than by climate change (without wanting
15 Sowers, J. (2019), «Understanding Climate Vulnerability» (see note 7).
16 Wodon, Q. et al. (2014), «Climate Change, Migration, and Adaptation in the MENA Region»,
in Wodon, Q. et al. (eds.), Climate Change and Migration. Evidence from the Middle East and
North Africa , World Bank Studies, pp. 3–35 (Washington, DC: World Bank).
17 Verner, D. (ed.) (2012), Adaptation to a Changing Climate in the Arab Countries: A Case for
Adaptation Governance and Leadership in Building Climate Resilience , MENA Development
Report (Washington, DC: World Bank), p. 9.
18 Al-Saidi, M. (2020), «Contribution of Water Scarcity» (see note 13).
19 Sowers, J., Vengosh, A., and Weinthal, E. (2011), «Climate Change, Water Resources, and the
Politics of Adaptation in the Middle East and North Africa», Climatic Change 104(3–4), 599–627.
141
Christiane Fröhlich Mobility and climate justice in the Mashriq
to negate climate change impacts in the Jordan River basin).20 Impor tant l y, the
unprecedented severity of global warming can be used to «greenwash» such pre-
existing power structures, eectively blaming climate change for worsening living
conditions without acknowledging the role of political decision-making for those
very conditions.21
It is therefore crucial to look at environmental change and responses to it not
as separate from, but as integral to politics, both on the domestic and interna-
tional levels. For instance, international climate change politics increasingly utilise
climate policies as a new tool of governance,22 for example by investing in climate-
related interventions such as adaptation and mitigation measures, or by condi-
tioning aid on climate policy reform. One example is the Paris Agreement of 2015,
which was signed by all states of the Mashriq except war-ravaged Syria. e treaty
promises new sources of nancing and incentives for low-carbon development
decisions to developing states and states that depend on fossil fuel exports.23
What is more, both national and international climate change policies can re-
sult in second-order eects of climate change, which are often neither recog-
nised nor transparent. For instance, the (re-)nationalisation of natural resources
or economic sectors can aect control of – and access to – resources and liveli-
hoods for parts of a population or society.24 Also, with a rise in awareness about
climate change, the voices of international and non-governmental organisations
grow stronger and can start to inuence the power-knowledge nexus that is cen-
tral for climate and adaptation politics.25 Problematically for both trends, however,
power relations on the ground and local, indigenous knowledge are rarely consid-
ered; in the worst case further weakening already marginalised and vulnerable
populations.26
20 Mason, M., Zeitoun, M., and Mimi, Z. (2012), «Compounding Vulnerability: Impacts of Climate
Change on Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank», Journal of Palestine Studies XLI(3), 38–53.
21 This has happened in Syria, for instance: Fröhlich, C. (2016), «Climate Migrants as Protestors?
Dispelling Misconceptions about Global Environmental Change in Pre-revolutionary Syria»,
Contemporary Levant 1(1), 38–50.
22 Klepp, S., and Chavez-Rodriguez, L. (eds.) (2018), A Critical Approach to Climate Change Adap-
tation: Discourses, Policies, and Practices (London and New York, NY: Routledge/Taylor & Francis
Group).
23 Sowers, J. (2019), «Understanding Climate Vulnerability» (see note 7).
24 Hein, J. (2020), Political Ecology of REDD+ in Indonesia: Agrarian Conflicts and Forest Carbon
(n.p.: Taylor and Francis).
25 Morchain, D. (2018), «Rethinking the Framing of Climate Change Adaptation : Knowledge,
Power, and Politics», in Klepp, S., and Chavez-Rodriguez, L. (eds.), A Critical Approach to Cli-
mate Change Adaptation: Discourses, Policies, and Practices (London and New York, NY: Rout-
ledge/Taylor & Francis Group); Eriksen, S.H., Nightingale, A.J., and Eakin, H. (2015), «Reframing
Adaptation: The Political Nature of Climate Change Adaptation», Global Environmental Change
35, 523–33; Cameron, E.S. (2012), «Securing Indigenous Politics: A Critique of the Vulnerability
and Adaptation Approach to the Human Dimensions of Climate Change in the Canadian Arctic»,
Global Environmental Change 22(1), 103–14.
26 Klepp, S., and Fröhlich, C. (2020), «Migration and Conflict in a Global Warming Era: A Political
Understanding of Climate Change», Social Sciences 9(5), 78 (Multidisciplinary Digital Publish-
ing Institute).
142
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
Climate change and human mobility in the Mashriq
Mobility, that is, the ability to change one's place of residence if needed (or wanted),
is one of many ways of adapting to the eects of climate change. Environmen-
tally induced mobility is not new. In the history of mankind, people have always
responded to changing climatic conditions by moving out of one region and to
another.27 is option is not available for everyone, however; under some circum-
stances, climate change can also constrain mobility, raising questions of mobility
justice. It is therefore crucial to ask who can move, and who cannot, in any given
context.
Despite its deep entwinement with human society, a unified theoretical
approach to environmentally-induced human mobility is still lacking. For instance,
dierences between a) climate variability and climate change, and b) responses
to the two phenomena are often not adequately represented. Similarly, the dier-
ences and similarities between mobility in the context of slow- (rising tempera-
ture, droughts, land degradation) or fast-onset events (oods, storms, hurricanes)
are still unclear.28
Impacts of fast-onset events such as hurricanes, torrential rains, oods and
landslides on human movement are comparatively easy to determine. Research
shows that, in most such cases, displacement tends to be temporary and over short
distances.29 is is often due to the fact that, in poor(er) countries, victims of such
events do not have the resources to migrate over long distances, again pointing
to issues of mobility justice.30 Mobility following a fast-onset event is often short-
term, as the majority of people return as soon as possible to rebuild their properties.
In fact, this is one of the few points that research is in relative agreement on,31 so
that judging from past fast-onset events, they can be considered unlikely to cause
signicant long-term and long-distance movement, especially across international
borders.32
Slow-onset events such as drought, desertication and a rise in temperature are
generally associated with more gradually progressing movements. Here, research
ndings are less consistent. Although there are many well-documented cases of
mass departures (predominantly internal displacement) in response to drought,
27 Romm, J. (2011), «The Next Dust Bowl», Nature 478(7370), 450–51; Marris, E. (2014), «Two-
Hundred-Year Drought Doomed Indus Valley Civilisation», Nature (March).
28 Cattaneo, C., Beine, M., Fröhlich, C., Kniveton, D., Martinez-Zarzoso, I., Mastrorillo, M., …
Schraven, B. (2019), «Human Migration in the Era of Climate Change», Review of Environmental
Economics and Policy (June).
29 McLeman, R. A., and Gemenne, F. (2018), Routledge Handbook of Environmental Displacement
and Migration (New York, NY: Routledge).
30 Lonergan, S. (1998), «The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population Displacement»,
Environmental Change and Security Project Report (4), 5–15; Zickgraf and Perrin (2017), «Im-
mobile and Trapped» (see note 3).
31 McLeman and Gemenne (2018), Routledge Handbook (see note 29).
32 Cattaneo et al. (2019) «Human Migration» (see note 28).
143
Christiane Fröhlich Mobility and climate justice in the Mashriq
also in the Mashriq,33 other researchers have argued that the migration numbers
are small compared to the number of people impacted by drought, pointing out that
environmental change is just one of many factors inuencing migration decisions.34
In some cases in the Mashriq – pre-revolutionary Syria specically – migration has
even been shown to be more a function of political issues than associated with
environmental issues, despite contrary claims in prominent discourses.35 What is
more, droughts and other slow-onset events can also reduce movement, especially
in poor countries with liquidity constraints.36
e picture is further complicated by the many forms human mobility can
take, ranging from internal to international, and from seasonal and short-term
to permanent. Migration is also inuenced by dierent factors that are highly
context-dependent, including migration history and the interaction between
economic, political, demographic, social and environmental factors in origin as
well as destination countries.37
One way of approaching these complex relationships and assumed linkages
is to look at how climate change interacts with phenomena that research has
identied as inuencing human mobility. Economic conditions are among them,
especially income dierentials (dierences in the return to labour between origin
and destination) and income variability (uctuations in income over time).38 For
instance, economic growth has been found to be negatively impacted by worsening
climatic conditions.39 Although most studies do not focus on the Mashriq – as the
data situation is often less than ideal – some of these research ndings can likely be
extrapolated to this region. For instance, one study nds that in sub-Saharan states,
rainfall was a signicant negative inuence for economic growth,40 meaning that
less rain equals less income, resulting in a) a widening income gap between origin
33 Miyan, M.A. (2015), «Droughts in Asian Least Developed Countries: Vulnerability and Sustain-
ability», Weather and Climate Extremes 7, 8–23; Piguet, E., and Laczko, F. (eds.) (2014), People
on the Move in a Changing Climate: The Regional Impact of Environmental Change on Migra-
tion (Dordrecht: Springer).
34 Smith, K. (2013), Environmental Hazards: Assessing Risk and Reducing Disaster (Routledge);
Black, R. et al. (2011), «The Effect of Environmental Change on Human Migration», Global En-
vironmental Change 21, S3–S11; Martin, M. et al. (2014), «Climate-related Migration in Rural
Bangladesh: A Behavioural Model», Population and Environment 36(1), 85–110.
35 Fröhlich, C. (2016), «Climate Migrants» (see note 352); Selby, J. et al. (2017), «Climate Change
and the Syrian Civil War Revisited», Political Geography 60, 232–44.
36 Cattaneo, C., and Peri, G. (2016), «The Migration Response to Increasing Temperatures»,
Journal of Development Economics 122, 127–46; Gröschl, J., and Steinwachs, T. (2017), «Do Natural
Hazards Cause International Migration?», CESifo Economic Studies 63(4), 445–80.
37 Cattaneo et al. (2019) «Human Migration» (see note 28); Black (2011), «The Effect» (see note 34);
Martin (2014), «Climate-related Migration» (see note 34).
38 Lilleør, H.B., and Van den Broeck, K. (2011), «Economic Drivers of Migration and Climate
Change in LDCs», Global Environmental Change 21, S70–S81.
39 Dell, M., Jones, B.F., and Olken, B.A. (2009), «Temperature and Income: Reconciling New
Cross-sectional and Panel Estimates», American Economic Review 99,198–204.
40 Barrios, S., Bertinelli, L., and Strobl, E. (2010), «Trends in Rainfall and Economic Growth in
Africa: A Neglected Cause of the African Growth Tragedy», Review of Economics and Statistics
92, 350–66.
144
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
and destination countries, and b) an increase in mobility of those who depend on
consistent precipitation, that is, especially farmers and herders.41
However, as mentioned above, liquidity constraints can also limit mobility
options, pointing to mobility injustices related to socio-economic status.42 Poor
people have higher incentives to migrate, as they are often highly vulnerable to the
impacts of climate change, but they have little to no capacity to adapt. At the same
time, they lack the resources to cover the cost of moving in a planned, more long-
term way. ey are thus doubly at risk, not being able to move away from environ-
mental crises while also having few resources to mitigate their impact.43 Although
this often results in precarious immobility,44 it can also result in «crisis» or «sur-
viva l m ig ration».45
at increasing migration can be a result of decreasing agricultural productiv-
ity has been shown, for instance, for international mobility towards states belong-
ing to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).46
Also, a decrease in income caused by natural disasters (connected to both climate
change and other anthropogenic activity) can lead to higher numbers of inter-
nally displaced people, as well as greater levels of international mobility.47 In fact,
the prospect of losing income, or of lasting income variability, can already lead to
higher levels of mobility, again especially for households depending on agricultural
activity, as has been shown for Syria as well as other states in the Mashriq.48 is is
often internal and seasonal movement.
If income losses are most likely to happen in families and households that
depend on agriculture – with the likelihood of migration increasing proportion-
ate to the decrease in land protability and crop yields – then less-developed
states are more likely to suer from this kind of adverse climate impact, pointing
41 Cattaneo et al. (2019) «Human Migration» (see note 28).
42 Kniveton, D., Schmidt-Verkerk, K., Smith, C., Black, R. (2008), «Climate Change and Migration:
Improving Methodologies to Estimate Flows», pp. 29–36, available at: www.iom.cz/files/Climate_
Change_and_Migration_MRS_331.pdf; Bryan, G., Chowdhury, S., and Mobarak, A.M. (2014),
«Underinvestment in a Profitable Technology: The Case of Seasonal Migration in Bangladesh»,
Econometrica 82(5), 1671–1748; Cattaneo, C., and Peri, G. (2015), «The Migration Response to
Increasing Temperatures», Working Paper 21622 (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research).
43 Foresight (2011), Migration and Global Environmental Change (see note 2); Black (2011), «The
Effect», Global Environmental Change 21, S3–S11.
44 Black et al. (2013), «Migration, Immobility and Displacement» (see note 3).
45 Martin, S., Weerasinghe, S., and Taylor, A. (2014), «What Is Crisis Migration?», Forced Migration
Review 45, available at: www.fmreview.org/crisis/martin-weerasinghe-taylor%20.html; Betts,
A. (2013), Survival Migration. Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press)
46 Cai, R., Feng, S., Pytlikova, M., and Oppenheimer, M. (2016), «Climate Variability and Inter-
national Migration: The Importance of the Agricultural Linkage», Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 79,135–51.
47 Beine, M., and Parsons, C. (2015), «Climatic Factors As Determinants of International Migra-
tion», Scandinavian Journal of Economics 117, 723–67.
48 Selby (2017), «Climate Change» (see note 35).
145
Christiane Fröhlich Mobility and climate justice in the Mashriq
to aforementioned issues of climate justice. Such states often depend much more
on agriculture than industrialised states and – due to colonial exploitation and its
economic, political and social consequences – are often less capable of adapting to
changing climatic circumstances.
e relationship between climate change and human mobility may also be
aected by socio-political factors. Here, the linkages between violent conict and
climate change have received a lot of scholarly attention in past years.49 Stud-
ies are inconclusive, and the often taken-for-granted causality between climate
change, conict and migration/mobility is contested.50 In Syria, for instance,
some researchers suggest that a «century drought» thought to have been connected
to global warming contributed to the 2011 uprising and war by causing massive
increases in internal mobility.51 Such simple and linear causalities have been rig-
orously questioned, however, highlighting the complex and contextual character
of climate, migration and conict connections.52 For other regions, it has also
been shown that climate-related conict not only causes migration, but may also
restrict it.53
Social and economic factors also play a role in determining whether climate
change translates into mobility in the Mashriq. For instance, climate change
aects income dierentials between origin and destination countries, and it can
increase economic uncertainty, fostering conditions conducive to emigration.54 At
the micro-level, the individual decision and ability to move away from environ-
mental crisis is inuenced by the positionality of the potential migrant, that is,
by the socio-economic and political characteristics of the individual, household
and community exposed to the climatic events.55 is means that intersectional
49 Koubi, V. (2019), «Climate Change and Conflict», Annual Review of Political Science 22(1), p. null.
50 Abel, G.J. et al. (2019), «Climate, Conflict and Forced Migration» (see note 238); Brzoska, M.,
and Fröhlich, C. (2016), «Climate Change, Migration and Violent Conflict: Vulnerabilities,
Pathways and Adaptation Strategies», Migration and Development 5(2), 190–210; Hermans, K.,
and Ide, T. (2019), «Advancing Research on Climate Change, Conflict and Migration», Die Erde –
Journal of the Geographical Society of Berlin 150(1), 40–44.
51 Femia, F., and Werrell, C. (2012, March 3), «Syria: Climate Change, Drought and Social Unrest»,
Think Progress , available at: https://thinkprogress.org/syria-climate-change-drought-and-so-
cial-unrest-3db624b8dd76; Gleick, P.H. (2014), «Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict
in Syria», Weather, Climate, and Society , 6(3), 331–40; Kelley, C.P. et al. (2015), «Climate Change
in the Fertile Crescent and Implications of the Recent Syrian Drought», Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences 112(11), 3241–46; Werrell, C., Femia, F., and Sternberg, T. (2015),
«Did We See It Coming? State Fragility, Climate Vulnerability, and the Uprisings in Syria and
Egypt», SAIS Review of International Affairs 35(1), 29–46.
52 Ide, T. (2018), «Climate War in the Middle East? Drought, the Syrian Civil War and the State of
Climate-Conflict Research», Current Climate Change Reports 4, 347–54; Selby (2017), «Climate
Change» (see note 366); Selby, J. (2018), «Climate Change and the Syrian Civil War, Part II:
The Jazira's Agrarian Crisis», https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2018.06.010.
53 Simpkins, P. (2005), Regional Livestock Study in the Greater Horn of Africa (Geneva: International
Committee of the Red Cross).
54 Cattaneo et al. (2019) «Human Migration» (see note 28).
55 Black (2011), «The Effect» (see note 34); Martin (2014), «Climate-related Migration» (see note 34).
146
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
characteristics such as individual wealth, gender, age, health, pre-existing migra-
tion networks, etc., play a key role.56
Gender seems to play a particularly important role for mobility and climate
justice in the Mashriq. Unequal gender relations as well as gender-dierentiated
access to resources and the labour market can render women more vulnerable to
climate change impacts, thus increasing the number of reasons for moving. One
study reports how female interviewees in the Mashriq recalled how prolonged
droughts led to economic diculties, which made hiring cheap agricultural labour
impossible, so that the female (or female-read) members of the household had to
start working on the elds in addition to their common chores.57 is was cited
as a reason for moving away from the countryside. But patriarchal structures may
already exclude them from (parts of) the labour market, impairing their ability to
move. For instance, if the male (or male-read) members of the household move
away before the rest of the family, women are often left to deal with the increased
workload at home. For the women who do migrate from the Mashriq, job opportu-
nities are often less attractive than for other members of the household.58 Although
there is no agreement as to the impact that gender has on human mobility, studies
showing that women are migrating less due to climate change59 as well as studies
showing the opposite60 indicate that gender is a key factor for both mobility and
climate justice.
Furthermore, whether and how state and non-state actors in a given country
address climate change impacts also inuences migration decision-making. It is
therefore relevant to look at state or government approaches to climate change in
the Mashriq. As shown by Sowers, national communications from states in Mashriq
«provide little insight into climate inequality or the political and economic factors
that structure them».61 Structural drivers of vulnerability towards climate change
are commonly presented as «natural» conditions rather than as eects of policy
choices, historical processes, or socio-cultural norms and conventions, thus eec-
tively «greenwashing» vulnerabilities and avoiding responsibility. But rapid popu-
lation growth, urbanisation trends, migration to urban centres and gender relations
56 Sowers, J. (2019), «Understanding Climate Vulnerability» (see note 7).
57 Wodon, Q. et al. (2014), «Climate Change» (see note 16).
58 Ibid.
59 Dillon, A., Mueller, V., and Salau, S. (2011), «Migratory Responses to Agricultural Risk in
Northern Nigeria», American Journal of Agricultural Economics 93(4), 1048–61; Gray, C., and
Mueller, V. (2012), «Drought and Population Mobility in Rural Ethiopia», World Development
40(1), 134–45; Mueller, V., Gray, C., and Kosec, K. (2014), «Heat Stress Increases Long-Term
Human Migration in Rural Pakistan», Nature Climate Change 4(3), 182–85.
60 With regard to labour migration, see Gray, C., and Mueller, V. (2012), «Natural Disasters and
Population Mobility in Bangladesh», National Academy of Sciences 109(16), 6000–05; Thiede,
B., Gray, C., and Mueller, V. (2016), «Climate Variability and Inter-Provincial Migration in South
America, 1970–2011», Global Environmental Change 41, 228–40; Baez, J. et al. (2017), «Heat
Exposure and Youth Migration in Central America and the Caribbean», American Economic
Review 107(5), 446–50.
61 Sowers, J. (2019), «Understanding Climate Vulnerability», p. 2 (see note 7).
147
Christiane Fröhlich Mobility and climate justice in the Mashriq
aect how climate risks are distributed and are a direct result of political decisions.
For instance, decisions not to fund family planning and social support systems
can increase climate vulnerability for certain societal groups.62 Similarly, societal
movements that focus on issues related to climate change – for instance the envi-
ronment, pollution or health – are mostly silenced at the national level in the Mid-
dle East.63 It is particularly interesting, in light of the upheavals of 2011/12, that
the relationship between the various revolutionary movements across the region
and climate governance is not identied in national communiqués about climate
change from Mashriq states, for instance the individual climate action plans fol-
lowing the Paris Agreement.64 Overall, programmes targeting households and
communities that are particularly vulnerable and exposed to climate change
impacts seem to be the exception rather than the rule throughout the region.65
e focus most commonly is on the national and international (meso and macro)
levels, often perpetuating existing power structures and risking already dire and
worsening living conditions in marginalised and vulnerable communities.
Conclusion
e main limitation for a study discussing climate and mobility justice in the
Mashriq is that there is little systematic evidence available to analyse the relation-
ship between climate change and human mobility in the region, as many states
do not conduct regular surveys or collect and share other relevant data. is is
at least in part due to the fact that such data is considered political, for instance
when discussing water availability, utilisation and distribution in the Jordan River
basin.66 But nonetheless, the mechanisms discussed above have been shown for
the Mashriq, too. e relationship between climate and mobility in the region
is shaped by whether climate events are slow- or fast-onset, and climate-related
mobility diers in terms of duration, space covered and level of voluntariness. In
particular, there seems to be a link between slow-onset events such as droughts
and increased mobility, as chronic droughts lead to decreasing crop yields, making
agricultural activity increasingly less viable.67
62 Sowers, J. (2019), «Understanding Climate Vulnerability» (see note 7).
63 Sowers, J. (2018), «Environmental Activism in the Middle East and North Africa», in Verhoeven,
H. (ed.), Environmental Politics in the Middle East , pp. 27–52 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
64 Sowers, J. (2019), «Understanding Climate Vulnerability» (see note 7). See this webpage for all
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions: www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissions/indc/
Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx.
65 Wodon, Q. et al. (2014), «Climate Change» (see note 16).
66 Fröhlich, C. (2012), «Water : Reason for Conflict or Catalyst for Peace? The Case of the Middle
East», L'Europe en Formation 365(3), 139.
67 Wodon, Q. et al. (2014), «Climate Change» (see note 16).
148
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
Socio-economic factors are found to be at least as important as changes in cli-
mate, however.68 As has been shown above, understanding aspects of mobility and
climate justice in the Mashriq requires a thorough understanding of the political,
economic and social factors that structure climate vulnerability and adaptation
or mitigation capacities. Importantly, when discussing these issues in the Mashriq
(or any region, for that matter), we need to reect on two key questions.
e rst of these concerns the focus on mobility in the media and policy debates:
What does it reveal, and what does it hide? In addressing this issue, when discussing
mobility and climate justice, we need to remember that movement away from envi-
ronmental risk is just one possible strategy for adapting to climate change – and
one that is not available to everyone. Also, although increased mobility in response
to changing climatic conditions is commonly considered a key adaptive strategy by
those who undertake it,69 it can also be interpreted as a failure to adapt, occurring
only when all else has failed. For instance, an increasingly precarious life in the
countryside, including lack of water, food, income and jobs, has been reported to
lead to family members working the elds instead of going to school, to the whole
family eating less, and to selling assets – before migration was even considered.70
In both cases, however, it is necessary to reect on why mobility is deemed positive
or negative, and by whom.
Alternatively, increased mobility could be seen as an option to diversify adap-
tive capacities, for instance by giving household members the opportunity to build
new knowledge on agricultural innovations through education, which can help
family members at home better adapt to changing environmental conditions. is
can happen through shared new knowledge, for instance about more climate-
resilient crops, less water-intensive irrigation methods or new techniques of crop
and feed preservation. It may also happen through direct money transfers (remit-
tances), which can help alleviate income uctuations or losses in the place of origin.
But each of these adaptive measures is limited by the state of mobility and climate
justice in the respective states. Not everyone can move, even when at extreme risk,
and not every state can adapt to climate change in an eective and targeted way.
e second question we must ask relates to changing conceptions of «human»
aairs in our era, a moment at which the relationship between natural, social and
political science is being rethought. is last problem can be summarised as fol-
lows: What does the focus, in mainstream political and media debates, on human
mobility in the context of man-made global warming hide with regard to nature
and the planet as a whole? As addressing this question is beyond the scope of this
chapter, I close by raising it to invite reection upon the fact that vulnerability
68 Grant, A., Burger, N., and Wodon, Q. (2014), «Climate-Induced Migration in the MENA Region:
Results from Qualitative Fieldwork», in Wodon, Q., Liverani, A., Joseph, G., and Bougnoux, N.
(eds.), Climate Change and Migration: Evidence from the Middle East and North Africa (Wash-
ington, DC: World Bank).
69 McNamara, K., Bronen, R., Fernando, N., and Klepp, S. (2018), «The Complex Decision-Making
of Climate-Induced Relocation: Adaptation and Loss and Damage», Climate Policy 18,111–17.
70 Wodon, Q. et al. (2014), «Climate Change» (see note 16).
149
to climate impacts is by no means limited to humans. On the contrary, in the
Anthropocene, it has become plainly evident that human life cannot be sustained
without extending equal care to nature in all its facets. Climate change will con-
tinue to aect both human and non-human life on this planet, including increasing
rates of extinction, new patterns of mobility of ora, fauna, water, re and so on.71
Examples from the Mashriq include the eect of invasive species on biodiversity
in the Jordan River basin,72 and an increase in forest res across the region, for
instance in Iran.73 Eorts to achieve climate justice and mobility justice therefore
need to engage with the movement for non-human life and climate vulnerability,
too.
71 Baldwin, A., Fröhlich, C., and Rothe, D. (2019), «From Climate Migration to Anthropocene
Mobilities: Shifting the Debate», Mobilities 14(3), 289–97.
72 See www.biodiv.be/jordan/biodiversity/species-diversity/invasive-and-introduced-species-1/
invasive-and-introduced-species (accessed 20 August 2020).
73 Hadian-Jazy, T. (2020, July 20), «The Forest Fires in Iran That Won't Stop Burning», Atlantic
Council , available at: www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/the-forest-fires-in-iran-that-
wont-stop-burning (accessed 20 August 2020).
Christiane Fröhlich Mobility and climate justice in the Mashriq
150
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
ARNE HARMS
Under the climate radar:
Disaster and displacement in
the Bengal Delta
For decades, coastal erosion has been rampant in the Bengal Delta, which spans
much of the Indian state of West Bengal and neighbouring Bangladesh. Deltas like
this one are highly dynamic landscapes – the erosion of soft muddy lands at the
hand of estuarine waters is met, or even outweighed, by the accretion of fresh soil.
On many of the coastal margins of this vast delta today, erosion outweighs accre-
tion, by far.
Alongside storms ploughing through this area with increasing velocity, erosion
is a serious threat to life on the coastal margins. It threatens the much-revered
tiger population roaming what remains of the mangrove swamps, as is well-known
internationally thanks to media coverage and high-prole campaigns by the Inter-
national Union for Conservation of Nature. e equally menacing danger it poses
to resident farmers and shermen eking out a living in the densely populated, sink-
ing and shrinking parts of the delta inhabited by low-income rural populations is
rather less publicised. Displacement by increasingly turbulent river and sea water
is the order of the day. Every year, a number of families lose land to an advancing
sea. e land is eroding slowly but continuously due to diurnal tides, spring tides,
the turbulence of the monsoons and recurrent storm surges. Every year, a num-
ber of families lose all their remaining land. Reduced to homeless paupers, they
seek refuge in makeshift roadside huts or with sympathetic family, or they end up
migrating to the slums of nearby cities.
e Bengal Delta is among the poster children of climate change. e unfolding
tragedies associated with the delta oer a preview – or so the story goes – of the
potentially crisis-ridden plight of many other coasts in the not too distant future.
Although it certainly is true that anthropogenic sea-level rise is taking its toll, cli-
mate change is just one of a number of dynamics causing the rapid erosion of land
on these shores. Others relate to the natural growth trajectory of this delta, human
interventions in the form of embankments and barrages, and the silting of estuaries
through excess sedimentation caused by intensive agriculture in the plains.1
1 Chakrabarti, D.K. (2001), Archeological Geography of the Ganga Plain: The Lower and the Mid-
dle Ganga (New Delhi: Permanent Black).
151
Arne Harms Under the climate radar: Disast er and displacement in the Bengal Delta
For those who must confront the consequences of eroding shorelines, debates
on what is making the waters so belligerent and voracious are academic. e con-
cerns of people forced to deal with failing embankments, recurrent oods and
the disappearance of land remain largely unaddressed by state institutions and
NGOs charged with delivering humanitarian assistance. Despite its widespread
impacts – and the fact that it is experienced as calamity by those aected – coastal
erosion goes under the radar of disaster governance. Consequently, little is known
about the plights of people holding out at the very edge of India's most severely
eroding coastline. How might consideration of their anxieties and hopes shape an
agenda for social justice that encompasses some of the less visible manifestations of
climate-related injury and loss? And how might it compel us to broaden our under-
standing of disaster and disaster preparedness?
Maiti2 and his family tried to hold out. A few years before we rst met, the
rough brackish waters of the Indian Ocean felt far away. Now the sea stalks them.
e part of the village in which they live used to be tucked behind rows and rows of
houses, gardens, ponds and elds. All fell victim to coastal erosion. ey have been
encroached upon by the shore, they say, dragged into its direct reach – its waves,
currents and winds. Marooned on an exposed corner of a battered island, there is
little hope that their home will survive the water's inland march for much longer.
Like thousands of villages in the delta, theirs depends on a ring embankment.
Ideally, it is supposed to keep the tides out, preventing the salinisation of elds and
swamping of homes. But on my last visit, this essential outer embankment lay in
tatters. Its poor condition, I learnt, was not unusual. It is rebuilt every year, only
to collapse a few months later. As a consequence, the stretch between the outer
embankment and the next one to the interior is ooded regularly. Saltwater intru-
sion has eliminated agriculture. e oods and tides continue to level the terrain,
diligently washing out what is left of this part of the village. All know that the retreat
of the outer embankment is imminent – that this stretch will not be saved. Villagers
fume at the state for the neglect. Local politicians exclaim that their hands are tied
by empty coers and the funding priorities of development authorities and minis-
tries. e outer embankment is continually being rebuilt with the cheapest, least
durable materials, such as mud, wood and bamboo.
is is not the rst time Maiti has had to weather disaster. Everyone in the
village has sustained severe damage from tropical cyclones and devastating
surges. But loss from erosion is of a dierent order. at which breaks in a storm,
I hear people exclaim, can be mended, replanted or rebuilt from scratch. Erosion,
however, takes the land for good. e ground under one's feet is washed away,
homesteads lost and agrarian futures undone.
e government or humanitarian assistance that is supposed to help locals
confront this – the actual disaster that, in their eyes, threatens them – is almost
entirely lacking. is is ironic since, in the past, this village has been a beneciary of
dedicated programmes to adapt to natural disasters and foster resilience in
2 Name anonymised.
Photo: © Arne Harms
Coastal erosion is rampant in the Bengal Delta,
which spans much of the Indian state of West
Bengal and neighbouring Bangladesh
154
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility, Development, and Displacement in the Global South
vulnerable rural areas.3 Such programmes target what customarily count as nat-
ural disasters – enormous events that interrupt normalcy and involve the sudden
destruction of lives and assets. When surges have struck, ocial advice has been
broadcast reminding people to take precautions in the stormy season – to stock
potable water, canned food and rewood to ensure their survival. Individual
organisations have arranged for the construction of cyclone shelters in robust,
multi-storied buildings. Villagers such as Maiti appreciate these eorts. Yet, they
regard them as being o the mark. e real disaster, they argue, rests in the
repeated collapse of embankments, the annual oodings occurring between the
ruined outer embankment and the minor one in the interior, and in the slow dis-
appearance of their land.
Staers and ocials oering assistance in the past knew very well what worried
villagers the most. But the problem was at once too big and too unmanageable, it
appears, for it to be actionable. e chronic onslaught of waves and currents in
a shifting waterscape – taking their toll day after day all along hundreds of kilo-
metres of banked shores in the Indian part of the delta alone – made it too big.4
It very rarely involved death or the sudden loss of substantial assets, all the while
advancing in ways that were hardly visible, aecting substantial populations only
over the course of years and decades.
Maiti knows what the future holds in store for him. Together with his wife, he
has seen two villages that once stood between his own and the sea peeled away by
waves. ey have seen how other villages retreated with the shoreline once homes
were washed away or buried under a new embankment. And they have witnessed
roads that once crisscrossed their village being lined by makeshift huts, occupied
by people seeking refuge after their houses were submerged.
A familiar pattern emerges from the experiences of these unfortunate people.
Many of those who now live in huts were displaced by the waters several times.
After losing their original homes and lands, they sought refuge nearby. But the
waters drew near again, forcing them to move once more. Many I spoke to during
my research went through displacement ve times or more, living miserably with
worsening choices and being at the whims of an encroaching sea.5
Now Maiti nds himself at the fringe, where most other huts have long been
dismantled, their inhabitants having moved on. e road that connected them has
been washed away. It is hard to keep track of where people move to. Maiti him-
self is unsure. Few leave the delta for good, betting on cities to make a fresh start
3 Harms, A. (2019), «Adapting to Sea Level Rise in the Indian Ocean: The Cases of India and
Bangladesh», in Harris, P. (ed.), Climate Change and Ocean Governance: Politics and Policy for
Threatened Seas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
4 Mukhopadhyay, A. (2016), Living with Disasters: Communities and Development in the Indian
Sundarbans (Delhi: Cambridge University Press).
5 Harms, A. (2017), «Citizenship at Sea: Environmental Displacement and State Relations in the
Indian Sundarbans», Economic & Political Weekly 52(33), 69–76.
155
Arne Harms Under the climate radar: Disast er and displacement in the Bengal Delta
in urban slums.6 More stay within the delta in volatile conditions. is is home,
they say. Familiar with the terrain, they bet on shared histories and networks.
Some manage to buy tiny plots somewhere else with cash pooled from savings and
remittances sent by family members labouring on construction sites across India
or in middle-class households in nearby towns. I hear one such individual – Jana,
a middle-aged former farmer and father of four – complain about the diculties of
making do on these often meagre sums while living among unfamiliar neighbours.
Others, such as Sheikh, a painter and sherman, managed to secure tiny plots of
public land on which to build permanent homes. (As one of the lucky few, he bene-
ted from the patronage of an inuential politician and was not formally resettled
by the state.)
All around Maiti, the land and the village is disappearing. e slow and gradual
changes that swallowed plots and homesteads – turning farmers into paupers – has
continue unabated. In drawing special attention to Maiti, I am not suggesting that
humanitarian or state interventions to prevent or respond to calamities make no
sense. ey do. But in being underpinned by a conceptualisation of disaster that
favours eventful disruption as well as the sudden and massive destruction of assets,
such programmes fail to engage in meaningful ways with the slow and wide-scale
anthropogenic degradations already unfolding in various parts of this planet, not
least the Global South, where the toll is the greatest. Shifting shorelines and sub-
merged homes require a re-orientation of disaster policies and institutions. e
latter must continue to address the many dramatic manifestations of climate-
related disaster that we are certain to continue seeing across densely populated
regions of Asia. Equally, however, they must attend to disastrous processes that
involve gradual changes, such as those experienced by Maiti and others like him:
slower transformations that bruise land and people continually over the course of
years, resulting in the disappearance of homes and plots, livelihoods and attach-
ments to place. Such processes, which often lead to more permanent forms of
loss for those aected than extreme climate-related weather events, are barely
less cruel in their consequences.
6 Ghosh, A. (2017), Sustainability Conflicts in Coastal India: Hazards, Changing Climate and
Development Discourses in the Sundarbans (Springer).
157
About the authors
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Dr Ali Nobil Ahmad is an independent researcher, journalist, consultant and cura-
tor with interests in migration, ecology and visual culture in South Asia and its
diaspora. He has written widely on these subjects in peer-reviewed journals, news
outlets and policy forums. He has held academic positions in the US, Germany,
Pakistan, Italy and the UK. For more information see: ww w.alinobil.com
Prof Nausheen H. Anwar is Director, Karachi Urban Lab & Professor of City &
Regional Planning, in the Department of Social Sciences & Liberal Arts (SSLA),
Institute of Business Administration (IBA), Karachi. She received her PhD from the
Graduate School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation (GSAPP), Columbia
University. She also holds a MIA from the School of International and Public Af-
fairs (SIPA), Columbia University. Nausheen's work focuses on the politics of urban
planning/urban development, climate change and infrastructural development in
the urban Global South.
Dr Simon Behrman is Associate Professor at the University of Warwick. He has
published widely in the eld of refugee and immigration law. Recent books in-
clude Law and Asylum: Space, Subject, Resistance (Routledge 2018) and Facilitating
the Resettlement and Rights of Climate Refugees [co-authored with Avidan Kent]
(Routledge 2018).
Delme Cupido (Namibian) is a human rights law yer and freelance writer who
works with Indigeneous (San) communities in Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and
South Africa. He has worked with San communities for the past 18 years in a variety
of capacities and roles. Most recently he consulted with the Indigenous Peoples of
Africa Coordinating Committee, coordinating their work in Southern Africa. He
has published in Business Times , the Mail & Guardian and e Namibian and for
the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa.
Dr Christiane Fröhlich is a research fellow at the German Institute for Global
and Area Studies in Hamburg, Germany. Her work focuses on (forced) human
mobility in the context of political and environmental crises and on the interlink-
ages between environmental crises and violent conict. She has conducted ex-
tended eldwork in Palestine, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, and her work
has been published widely, for instance in Political Geography, International
Political Sociology , and Journal of Peace Research . More information is available at
www.christianefroehlich.de.
158
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility Development and Displacement in the Global South
Dr Paolo Gaibazzi holds a Heisenberg-Position at the Chair of Social Anthro-
pology, University of Bayreuth. He has previously been research fellow at the
Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO) in Berlin, and lecturer at the Univer-
sity of Latvia. He is author of Bush Bound: Young Men and Rural Permanence in
Migrant West Africa (Berghahn 2015), an ethnography of immobility and social re-
production among Soninke speakers in the Gambia. His current project looks
at migration, borders and postcolonial legacies in the Euro-African zone.
Dr Arne Harms is Postdoc Researcher at the Institute of Anthropology, University
of Leipzig, and Research Associate at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthro-
pology, Halle. Using ethnography, he explores environmental degradation and cli-
mate change mitigation in India and contemporary environmentalism in Europe.
Dr Avidan Kent is an Associate Professor of International Law. Avidan is the
Founder and Convenor of UEA's International Law Research Group and is the
editor of the International Law@UEA blog. Avidan has written/edited books, reports,
journal articles and chapters on a varied list of topics, including Climate-Induced
Migration, International Environmental Law, Public Participation, International
Courts and International Economic Law (mostly Investment Law and WTO Law).
Avidan holds an LLM from McGill University, and a PhD from the University of
Cambridge.
Kirsten Maas-Albert, M.A. in Islamic studies, political science and media studies,
has headed the Africa Division of the Heinrich Böll Foundation since 2007 and is
the coordinator for migration issues in the Foundation's international department.
She worked as an Associate Expert for the UN in Gaza from 1995 to 1998, and sub-
sequently directed the Heinrich Böll Foundation's oces in Ramallah and Beirut.
Dr Celia McMichael is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Geography at Melbourne
University. She is a human geographer whose research investigates human migra-
tion, environmental change and health. She has conducted eld-based research
in Australia, Peru, Fiji, Philippines and Nepal; she works closely with local co-re-
searchers in fieldwork sites. Dr McMichael is an author and collaborator on
the Lancet Global Countdown on Climate and Health.
Hashim bin Rashid is a doctoral candidate at the Department of Development
Studies at SOAS, London. His PhD is on the Punjab peasantry since the early 20th
century. He is on leave from the Department of Liberal Arts at the Beaconhouse
National University in Lahore, Pakistan. He has also lectured at SOAS, Warwick
University, and the Institute of Ismaili Studies at the Agha Khan Centre in London.
He worked as a journalist for almost a decade, as well as working with national and
transnational movements, including La Via Campesina.
159
Claudia Roth is Vice President of the German Bundestag since October 2013. As
member of parliament for Alliance 90 /e Greens, she is member of the Com-
mittee on Economic Cooperation and Development and the Subcommittee for For-
eign Cultural and Education Policy. Her political activities have always focused
particularly on human and civil rights, ghting racism, climate change and culture.
She is an active and inuential advocate of the «One World» philosophy and of the
alter-globalization movement in Germany.
Natalie Sauer is a French British environmental journalist based in London.
A former journalist at Climate Home News, she has contributed to a number of
international outlets, including Politico Europe , AFP , Le Monde Diplomatique and
e Ecologist .
Ana Naomi de Sousa is an award-winning documentary lmmaker and writer
whose work addresses history, spatial politics and identity. Her documentaries
include e Architecture of Violence (2013), Angola – Birth of a Movement (2012),
and Hacking Madrid (2015). As a collaborator with Forensic Architecture, she was
the lmmaker on the 2016 Saydnaya project. She has written for e Funambulist ,
e Guardian and Al Jazeera English , among others. Her latest short, about a rain-
forest conservation project led by women in Ecuador, aired on Al Jazeera English
in February 2020 as part of the Women Make Science series.
Dr Malini Sur is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Culture and Society
at Western Sydney University where she teaches anthropology. She is the author
of «Jungle Passports: Fences, Mobility and Citizenship at the Northeast India-
Bangladesh Border» (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021). Her work addresses
three lines of inquiry. e rst examines border infrastructures, smuggling and
citizenship. A second explores the relationship between mobility and urban space.
Finally, she examines the afterlives of natural disasters, air pollution, and climate
change. She has conducted eldwork in Bangladesh and India, and with South
Asian asylum seekers in Belgium.
Dr Tristen Taylor is a South African writer, researcher, photographer and academic.
He was the director of the South African climate justice organisation Earthlife
Africa JHB for a decade. He is also a National Geographic Explorer and a research
fellow at Stellenbosch University. He lives in Johannesburg, South Africa.
About the authors
160
Climate Justice and Migration Mobility Development and Displacement in the Global South
ABBREVIATIONS
BTI Indonesian Peasants' Front / Barisan Tani Indonesia
CARICOM Caribbean Community Secretariat
CFS Committee on World Food Security
COP Conference of the Parties
CRIDEAU Centre de Recherches Interdisciplinaires en Droit de l'Environnement, de l'Aménage-
ment et de l'Urbanisme
DFDR development-forced displacement and resettlement
EU European Union
EUTF Emergency Trust Fund for Africa
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization
FSPI Federation of Indonesian Peasant Unions / Federasi Serikat Petani Indonesia
GCF Green Climate Fund
GEF Global Environment Facility
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IDP internally displaced person
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
iNGO international non-governmental organisation
IOM International Organization for Migration
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LPM Landless People's Movement (South Africa)
LVC La Via Campesina
MST Landless Workers' Movement / Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra (Brazil)
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
SPI Indonesian Peasant Union / Serikat Petani Indonesia
UNDROP UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGP Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNWRA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
WHO World Health Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Schumannstraße 8, 10117 Berlin
The Green Political Foundation 030 28 53 40 info@boell.de www.boell.de
Climate Justice and Migration
Mobili, Development, and Displacement
in the Global South
How should policymakers respond to the reality and future
prospect of vast populations being displaced and relocated in
an era of global heating? With climate change looming,
anxiety over immigration from the Global South is increasingly
fuelled by apocalyptic fears of ecological breakdown.
This volume offers fresh perspectives on the relationship between
climate change and human migration, questioning the
pessimistic prisms of «security» and market-oriented approaches
to «adaptation» that currently guide policy.
Featuring an array of contributions on law, health, care work,
rural and urban development by leading scholars, activists, and
journalist s,
Climate Justice and Migration
offers coverage of
Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Caribbean
across a range of scales and approaches: immersive fieldwork,
scholarly and legal analysis, journalistic reportage, and interviews
with activists.
In a world increasingly shaped by climate instability and
inequality, the contributors make an impassioned call for the
incorporation of justice within frameworks of environmental
and migration governance.
ISBN 978-3-86928 -223-7
DEMOCRACY
VOLUME 57
