Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies
... It is suggested that we can observe and reflect on this development through the analytical lens of the twin concepts of the strategic corporal (Krulak, 1999) and the tactical general (Singer, 2009). This leads us to argue that, in light of this disruptive digital and technological development, military practitioners and researchers have to rethink two relatively well-known concepts that have played a central role in Western military thinking over the last 150 years: mission command (see, for example, Shamir, 2011;Storr, 2003;Moltke, 1888Moltke, /1995 and coup d'oeil (Clausewitz, 1832(Clausewitz, /2021. ...
... A central question related to this concerns potential implications for the military concept of mission command. The concept, derived in the United States from the original German doctrinal concept of auftragstaktik, is today endorsed by NATO and its member states as the central command principle (NATO, 2019;Shamir, 2011). Mission command has been retained as a central leadership principle, also, in respect to future multi-domain operations (U.S. Army, 2022; see also Reynolds, 2022). ...
... Communicating through dispatches conveyed by horse, commanders of different units were nevertheless expected to manoeuvre in concert; this brought about bottlenecks where decision-makers at all levels, waiting for orders, would not always exploit the most appropriate solutions. In this perspective, mission command can be seen as a kind of response to Clausewitz's notions of fog and friction (Shamir, 2011). It was, however, always presented as a balanced decision, as a means to an end, not an end in itself (Sjøgren, 2022;Shamir, 2011). ...
The article describes how digitalization and the wide diffusion of knowledge technologies such as the Internet of (battlefield) things, big data, and artificial intelligence, are transforming military organization and practice, deeply affecting military practitioners and command at all levels. It considers how this transformation may affect Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) through a profound alteration in the ways in which data, information, and knowledge are generated, analysed, and applied. The relation between these technologies, Multi-Domain Operations, and mission command is also explored. It is argued that this transformation presents both possibilities and challenges; these are discussed using the concepts of the strategic corporal and the tactical general. Further, the article proposes two new concepts, digital mission command and digital coup d’oeil, derived from two traditionally well-known military concepts. The article discusses the practical implications of these two new concepts and suggests ways for the military organization to move ahead when navigating future technological landscapes in which data plays a significant role.
... El ethos fusiona cognición y emociones, convirtiendo lo abstracto en una visión lógica y coherente con una aplicación en la práctica militar. La cultura militar también define la diversidad de opciones de los oficiales para el desempeño profesional (Shamir, 2011). Dado que cada ejército ofrece respuestas diferentes a problemas similares, cada cultura militar tiene Reis. ...
... Rev formas propias de plantear objetivos y generar conocimiento (Nagl, 2002). Basándose en asunciones comunes, la cultura influye en cómo los militares aplican tácticas, técnicas y procedimientos (Nagl, 2002;Davidson, 2010), definiendo estilos de mando y la interacción entre niveles jerárquicos (Shamir, 2011;Kober, 2015). ...
... N.º 179, Julio -Septiembre 2022, pp. 59-78 el estilo de mando (Shamir, 2011). Investigaciones realizadas sobre liderazgo militar en España habían apuntado a una preferencia mayoritaria por un estilo participativo en lugar de impositivo (Martínez, 2007). ...
El artículo analiza cómo los factores culturales definen los procesos de cambio organizativo en el Ejército de Tierra. Se realiza mediante la propuesta de un modelo de análisis elaborado a partir de 23 entrevistas personales realizadas tanto a componentes del Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina como de la Brigada de la Legión. A partir de las mismas, se persiguen como objetivos: 1) establecer un modelo de análisis del cambio organizativo, 2) estudiar la aplicabilidad de planteamientos teóricos anglosajones a un caso español y 3) definir la relevancia de la cultura para el cambio militar. Los resultados muestran cómo esta condiciona los procesos de toma de decisiones, la dirección del cambio y la capacidad de aprendizaje organizativo del Ejército de Tierra.
... Indeed, mission command is frequently and elegantly explained in military doctrine and manuals as well as in academic works which deal with the subject. Yet, translating these conceptual principles into the practice of command is rather more complicated (Shamir 2011). As expressed by the respondents in this study, several competing and contradictory demands placed on them in their professional roles as military officers imply that the mission command principles prescribed in doctrine are not always easy to follow. ...
... In these missions, a deployed unit typically had few simultaneous combat engagements, making it possible for the higher command to pay full attention to the fighting in a specific location. Moreover, the strategic implications of even minor skirmishes were potentially significant, increasing the importance of detailed command and restrictive orders (Shamir 2011). While fit for the purpose during these expeditionary deployments, the same practices will not be suitable for the high-intensity fighting that can be envisioned during operations to defend territory against a peer adversary. ...
... A precondition for the development of a military organisational environment which is conducive to a consistent practice of mission command, and by extension to the type of tactical developments and innovation that can sustain flexibility and adaptability on the battlefield, is to encourage creativity, critical thinking and experimentation among officers at all levels (Shamir 2011, Vandergriff 2019, Lind 1985, Ghikas 2013, Brender 2018, Finkel 2011). This certainly does not imply that established methods and tactical solutions are necessarily suboptimal for resolving problems on the future battlefield. ...
The development of capabilities for national defence among land forces in the Baltic region underscores the need for mission command as a guiding principle of leadership and command. However, the practice of mission command in the contemporary military context is far from straightforward. This article presents the results of a survey conducted with Swedish Army officers, examining their perspectives on positive as well as negative influences on their ability to utilize mission in their contemporary working environment. While mission command is envisioned to become increasingly important in the future, several obstacles are identified to its utilization and development.
... Moreover, stating adherence to mission command at the doctrinal level is one thing; comprehensive practice is quite another. Military culture, civil-military relations, the particular demands of the counterinsurgency wars of the 2000s, traditions in education, training and human resources policies, and technological development are all factors that affect the practice of mission command in any particular national setting (Shamir 2011). ...
... However, they also facilitate interference with the work of subordinates, potentially a tempting prospect during low-intensity operations but impossible in high-intensity conflict. Thus, advanced command systems may invite micromanagement (Storr 2003;Vogelaar and Kramer 2004;Finkel 2011;Shamir 2011). ...
... Indeed, the simultaneous existence of shared understanding and trust enable subordinate commanders to assume responsibility for carrying out missions in line with the commander's intent with a significant freedom of action, and commanders to rely on subordinates' capabilities. Trust should stem primarily from the degree of professional competence among military personnel, rather than from interpersonal acquaintances or relationships (Shamir 2011). Professional competence can be assessed and perceived from the perspective of reputation -a proven record of competence and capability in authentic situations. ...
As armies across Europe are currently developing capabilities to fight a high-intensity conventional war against a peer adversary, these armies will have to develop units that can fight independently in a complex environment, with limited direction from higher levels of command. Integral to this process is the need for a competent practice of mission command, viewed as a key component of maneuver warfare. The article identifies a set of enablers that need to be present in a military organization in order to practice mission command efficiently, including shared understanding and trust; initiative; a tolerant approach to failure, success, and learning; and the acceptance of mission command as an all-encompassing practice. The article then presents data from interviews with Swedish army officers focusing on the presence and significance of these enablers in their professional context. The article concludes that the increasing complexity of the peacetime tasks performed by military officers give rise to conflicting leadership demands. Consequently, exercising mission command and socializing younger colleagues into the practice is a far from straightforward process, which frequently competes with other demands placed on officers by their colleagues, the organization that they are part of, or the broader societal context.
... Inteligenca, inovacije in tehnologija v vojaškem delovanju To nas napeljuje na trditev, da morajo vojaški praktiki in raziskovalci v luči tega prelomnega digitalnega in tehnološkega razvoja ponovno premisliti o dveh znanih konceptih, ki imata še vedno osrednjo vlogo v zahodnem vojaškem razmišljanju: poveljevanje s poslanstvom (angl. mission command) 1 (glej na primer Storr, 2003;Shamir, 2011) in odločanje 2 (Clausewitz, 2004). ...
... Koncept poveljevanja s poslanstvom, ki je izpeljan iz prvotnega nemškega doktrinarnega koncepta auftragstaktik (angl. mission command), je danes v Natu in njegovih državah članicah uveljavljen kot osrednje načelo poveljevanja(Shamir, 2011;Nato, 2019). Poveljevanje s poslanstvom se je ohranilo kot osrednje načelo vodenja tudi v zvezi s prihodnjim večdomenskim delovanjem (glej tudiReynolds, 2022, 27). ...
This paper critically examines how digitalisation and broad knowledge
technologies, such as the internet of things, big data and artificial intelligence,
are changing the military organisation and its command and decision-making
practices. It also focuses on the interconnection between technology and multidomain operations in the military field as key indicators of future warfighting
capabilities, where, unlike in the past, small qualitative differences will be
counted. In the light of development trends it will be knowledge technology
that will represent the strategic balance between victory and defeat. Without the
consideration and application of this knowledge, armies will be at a tactical and
strategic disadvantage on the battlefield from the outset, determined by rapid
decision-making in the context of the ability to analyse large amounts of data.
This transformation brings both opportunities and challenges for the military
organisation in implementing advanced technologies in which data plays an
increasingly important role. This paper offers a reflection on the application of
two new concepts: digital mission command and digital decision-making.
... For officers, it was important to encourage individual initiative among their subordinates (EP01, EP03, EP07, EP09, EP15) and to be flexible when the circumstances surrounding the operation require it (Durán et al., 2016;López-Rodríguez, 2022b). This style is conditioned by the organisational culture of the Mission Command (Ben-Shalom and Shamir, 2011), fostering adaptation and improvisation, and building relationships based on trust between different hierarchical levels (Shamir, 2010(Shamir, , 2011. ...
... Para los oficiales era importante incentivar la iniciativa individual entre los subordinados (EP01, EP03, EP07, EP09, EP15), así como ser flexibles dependiendo de las circunstancias que rodeasen las operaciones (López-Rodríguez, 2022b; Durán et al., 2016). Este estilo está condicionado por la cultura organizativa, como el Mission Command (Ben-Shalom y Shamir, 2011), fomentando la adaptación e improvisación, y construyendo relaciones basadas en la confianza entre los diferentes niveles jerárquicos (Shamir, 2010(Shamir, , 2011. ...
Debido a la interacción entre los instructores extranjeros y los reclutas locales en la Asistencia a Fuerzas de Seguridad (SFA), los militares desplegados a menudo experimentan retos derivados de las fricciones culturales. Este artículo analiza la relevancia de la conciencia intercultural para el desempeño militar en la SFA. La investigación se basa en datos obtenidos de 22 entrevistas personales a militares españoles para conocer su experiencia en Iraq (2015-2022). Los resultados identifican las diferencias culturales como la principal dificultad para el despliegue. Los militares españoles han empleado diferentes estrategias para hacerles frente, basándose principalmente en la interacción mediante comunicación mediada o directa con el personal local. A pesar de ello, la sociabilidad de los efectivos ha sido identificada como un elemento distintivo de los militares españoles que facilita la construcción de relaciones. La cultura de origen de los militares actúa como una categoría transversal que facilita sustancialmente la conciencia intercultural en las operaciones internacionales.
... Calls for pushing decisionmaking authority to low-level officers are widespread in the academic and professional literature on military operations; decentralization is often referred to as a "force multiplier" or even as essential for the functioning of today's modernized armed forces (Moltke 1993;Van Creveld 1985;Boyd 1987;Moyar 2009;Finkel 2011;Muth 2011;Talmadge 2015). 15 Indeed, such appeals have been made by so many for so long that decentralization is featured in many militaries' operational doctrines (Vassiliou 2010;Shamir 2011). While empowering lower-level officers does help militaries manage uncertainty in combat, it is individually insufficient in managing information and maximizing martial strength for two reasons. ...
... The United States employed a quite centralized and undifferentiated command structure early in the Korean War. Finally, both the United States and Israel have recently centralized decision-making authority to a significant degree during combat actions in Iraq and Lebanon, even though both are democracies and their officers and soldiers are very highly educated (Muth 2011;Shamir 2011). The second empirical reason to be suspicious is that belligerents often change their command structures as wars play out. ...
... Existing research (e.g. Shamir 2010Shamir , 2011King 2017, Glenn 2017, indicates that a number of combat theater commanders who have implemented MCP have successfully defeated their opponents. MCP differs from a detailed military command approach. ...
... During its implementation all bottlenecks ought to be eliminated (Gates 2008), so as to foster operational effectiveness. Shamir (2011) postulates that in mission-type command cases, local commanders managed to succeed in their operations. This is attributed to the fact that these commanders did recognize the advantages of the new way of thinking and implemented it at any given opportunity. ...
In an effort to strengthen the principal tenet of shared understanding in mission command, the following article advocates the selective teaching of philosophy be included in the training of military commanders. The article introduces a brief but relevant philosophical context, from Plato to Machiavelli, to distinguish both the potency of liberal education and its ability to develop shared understanding and trust between commanders. The evolving landscape of military operations in the Information Age entails a growing need for officers to think critically and act quickly, thus lending authority to the argument that philosophical understanding can eliminate potential shortcomings of otherwise inadequately implemented mission command.
... Existing research (e.g. Shamir 2010Shamir , 2011King 2017, Glenn 2017, indicates that a number of combat theater commanders who have implemented MCP have successfully defeated their opponents. ...
... During its implementation all bottlenecks ought to be eliminated (Gates 2008), so as to foster operational effectiveness. Shamir (2011) postulates that in mission-type command cases, local commanders managed to succeed in their operations. This is attributed to the fact that these commanders did recognize the advantages of the new way of thinking and implemented it at any given opportunity. ...
The modern Mission Command philosophy in military operations originated with the German concept of Auftragstaktik (mission tactics). It emphasizes in general terms the exercise of disciplined initiatives by subordinates during the execution of mission-type orders in the course of military operations that are conducted within the overall intent of a commander. The present paper contains an overview of the historical evolution of the mission command concept and its application. The paper compares the mission command concept with the detailed or linear method of command. This paper focuses on the relevance of the mission command concept for the Hellenic Land Forces (HLF) in Greece. The paper provides a historical account on when and where mission command was successfully exercised by the Hellenic Armed Forces in the modern military history of Greece. The authors support the premise that the mission command concept is essential for safeguarding Greek national security in the current environment of evolving symmetric and asymmetric threats, and in meeting operational challenges in a diverse and difficult terrain. The paper examines the cultural reasons that have impeded the adoption of the mission command concept within the HLF and recommends a three-phase model for its permanent implementation.
... Granting autonomy to subordinate leaders enhances their sense of responsibility and ownership, leading to higher morale and greater willingness to innovate. This empowerment fosters creative problem-solving and adaptability, essential in complex and unpredictable operational environments (Shamir, 2010). Moreover, the trust and responsibility placed in junior leaders create a more engaged and proactive force, ultimately enhancing overall mission effectiveness. ...
In the contemporary business landscape, characterized by heightened Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity (VUCA), leadership is increasingly pivotal in navigating organizations toward sustained success. This paper examines two leadership paradigms—self-similarity and decentralization—by analyzing their respective efficacies within stable and VUCA environments. The self-similarity model, predicated on the principles of consistency and uniformity, is traditionally effective in stable contexts where operational predictability and efficiency are essential. However, this model's inherent rigidity may render it inadequate in VUCA environments, where adaptability and responsiveness are paramount. Conversely, decentralization, which empowers decision-making at multiple levels within the organization, offers enhanced agility and responsiveness, indispensable traits in navigating the complexities. However, this model's emphasis on flexibility and localized autonomy can also introduce risks related to coherence and strategic alignment, particularly in environments that demand uniformity and centralized control. It is important for leaders to be aware of these potential pitfalls when considering the implementation of decentralization. Through a comparative analysis, this paper proposes a strategic framework that enables leaders to discern when and how to transition between these leadership approaches. Doing so underscores the importance of dynamic leadership in fostering organizational resilience and adaptability. Leaders capable of balancing self-similarity with decentralization are better equipped to steer their organizations through challenges of stable and volatile environments, thereby securing long-term organizational viability.
... However, nations have slightly different principles guiding its practice. Additionally, different organizational cultures within the alliance impact how mission command is interpreted and practiced, ultimately influencing its effectiveness (Shamir & Mcmaster, 2020). Due to the absence of a comprehensive doctrine on mission command within the Norwegian military, we opted to rely on US Army doctrine which is consistent with the Norwegian understanding of the concept (Forsvaret, 2020). ...
It is well documented that leadership behavior influences employees’ motivation. In particular are autonomy-supportive leadership styles associated with desirable outcomes through basic psycho-logical needs satisfaction and subsequent autonomous motivation. Mission Command, a leadership philosophy endorsed by the armed forces of many nations, can be considered autonomy-supportive and should therefore foster motivational outcomes beyond effective mis-sion execution. Despite this, research on the relationship between mission command and soldiers’ motivation is currently lacking. In the current study, an instrument was developed to measure the perceived degree of mission command behavior. Using structural equation modeling, the instru-ment was then used to examine the relationship between perceived degree of mission command, basic psychological needs satisfaction and autonomous motivation, as well as soldiers’ job satisfac-tion and turnover intention. The empirical sample comprised 286 respondents from three different rapid-reaction forces in the Norwegian Home Guard. The results indicate that mission command was not directly related to autonomous motivation. However, there was a direct relationship between mission command and the satisfaction of the need for autonomy, and a significant indirect effect of mission command on autonomous motivation through satisfaction of the need for autonomy. Moreover, there was a positive relationship between autonomous motivation and job satisfaction and a negative relationship between autonomous motivation and turnover inten-tion. Taken together, this study suggests that mission command leadership behaviors can con-tribute to basic needs satisfaction, promote soldiers’ autonomous motivation and job satisfaction, and reduce turnover intention. Practical and theoretical implications are discussed
... Very few studies consider the organisational aspects of command. The most well-known examples are contrasting Allied and German perspectives in World War II or the interwar period, or discuss mission command (Samuels, 2019;Shamir, 2011;van Creveld, 1987). ...
In this article, I explore how contemporary military commanders understand command in the context of standardised planning processes, doctrine, and a supporting staff organiation. The article is based on 30 interviews with former and current NATO commanders and senior staff officers. I describe the interplay between commanders and their staff, including its clear division of labour, authority, and responsibility. I argue that commanders make key decisions in the planning process based on professional judgement. Commanders recognise the usefulness and limits of structured decision-making processes and doctrine while acknowledging also the need for surprise, creativity, and risk-taking. Left unattended, the military staff tends to develop mechanical behaviour by following a bureaucratic logic of rationality, control, and optimisation. In this context, command is a distinct and necessary function for the making of key decisions that allow for creative applications of doctrine, while avoiding any succumbing to predictable textbook solutions. Finally, the article points toward the importance of developing future commanders and their staff officers to understand the limits of doctrine and procedural approaches and develop professional judgement.
... In this study, we set out to summarise and integrate what is already understood as 'mission command'. Although mission command is a familiar concept in militaries worldwide, such as in the United States, Great Britain, Israel and South Africa, it is frequently misunderstood (Shamir, 2011). A conceptual analysis of mission command allowed us to make recommendations for the force preparation of commanders. ...
The South African National Defence Force (SANDF), as a member state of the United Nations, the African Union and the Southern African Development Community, has certain continental and regional responsibilities. It is foreseen that the main areas of influence and operations of the SANDF will be situated in Africa and are referred to as the African battlespace, which holds challenges for deploying military commanders. We argue that the elevated levels of complexity and uncertainty in this context make mission command, as a command approach, especially relevant. The conceptual study on which this article is based, found that mission command is highly suitable to promote a command culture that is flexible yet robust, fosters unity of command at all levels, and simultaneously provides subordinate commanders with the freedom to act decisively when new opportunities are identified. For mission command to be applied in the African battlespace, sensemaking is an important cognitive skill that should form an integral part of the psychological preparation and training of commanders. Recommendations are made for sensemaking development in the current training of commanders in the SANDF.
... The function and role of sensemaking is ideally suited for mission command where authority for decision-making and the responsibility to act are delegated to the lowest levels (Shamir, 2011), but would require the concept, process and techniques of sensemaking to be included in mission command training. ...
The study on which this article reports, addressed the problem with which modern military leaders on the battlefield are faced in assisting the soldier at basic level to make sense of what is happening. In this study, the term 'sensemaker' implied a process of individual and group sensemaking that forms the basis for meaning-making in the volatile, unpredictable, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) world within which soldiers are functioning. The authors postulate a best-fit world view for military leaders in this military leadership sensemaking and meaning-making nexus. They coined 'social constructivism in complexity' where the military leader acts as a guide for soldiers through a sensemaking process. This process is graphically represented, and requires a toolkit to assist military leaders in working as sensemakers on the battlefield. The article concludes with recommendations to military psychologists and military educators who have to make policy changes to develop and implement such a toolkit for sensemaking on the battlefield. "War is the most complex thing that humans do"-Donald Stoker (Cassidy, 2019, introductory section).
... Daha da önemlisi görevin nasıl yapılacağı tamamen uygulayıcı birliklere bırakılır. Yani hem inisiyatif vardır hem de mikro-yönetime (micro management) izin verilmez (Shamir, 2011). Dolayısıyla savaşın karmaşık ortamında zaman kaybı azaltılır ve ayrıca fırsatlardan faydalanmak mümkündür. ...
Bu makale askeri liderlik kavramının ve uygulamalarının gelişimini,
farklı yorumlarını ve son olarak günümüzdeki durumunu incelemektedir.
Öncelikle askeri lider kavramının ve askeri lider özelliklerinin tanımları yani komutan, lider ve yönetici arasındaki farklar ele alınmıştır. Daha sonra farklı hiyerarşik kademelerdeki askeri liderlerin özellikleri açıklanmıştır. Ayrıca askeri liderliğin değişmesine
neden olan siyasi, sosyal, teknolojik ve hatta uluslararası gelişmeler ve
bunların sonucunda ortaya çıkan askeri lider tipleri incelenmiş ve son
olarak Türkiye’de askeri liderlik ve bununla ilgili araştırmalar da çalışmaya dahil edilmiştir.
... Ideally, it should support mutual goals. As such, the teaching method of PBL, through its emphasis on problem elaboration and relevant processes of analysis, may be expected to add value to military education, not only to the deeper learning of any particular subject, but to the enhancement of mission command and the planning and conduct of operations -especially when it comes to the analysis of complex operational problems and the development of alternative causes of action (Shamir, 2011). ...
What characterises the development and social transformation of the military profession in Scandinavia? Has the broadening of tasks, function and scope of the military profession lead to changes in the values, outlook and behaviour of groups of the armed forces? And what kind of changes are the cultural and structural interpenetration of civilian and military spheres, including hybrid forms of professionalism, generating and what are the significance and implications of such changes? Transformations of the Military Profession and Professionalism in Scandinavia brings together a number of expert scholars within Military Studies and related fields to provide timely and updated answers to these highly important questions – answers with potential implications far beyond the Scandinavian case.
... Ideally, it should support mutual goals. As such, the teaching method of PBL, through its emphasis on problem elaboration and relevant processes of analysis, may be expected to add value to military education, not only to the deeper learning of any particular subject, but to the enhancement of mission command and the planning and conduct of operations -especially when it comes to the analysis of complex operational problems and the development of alternative causes of action (Shamir, 2011). ...
What characterises the development and social transformation of the military profession in Scandinavia? Has the broadening of tasks, function and scope of the military profession lead to changes in the values, outlook and behaviour of groups of the armed forces? And what kind of changes are the cultural and structural interpenetration of civilian and military spheres, including hybrid forms of professionalism, generating and what are the significance and implications of such changes? Transformations of the Military Profession and Professionalism in Scandinavia brings together a number of expert scholars within Military Studies and related fields to provide timely and updated answers to these highly important questions – answers with potential implications far beyond the Scandinavian case.
... Hence, the commander would form the "intent" of the mission, thus providing a framework and guidance. Within the framework the operative level is also able to improvise on the battlefield to fulfil the mission, but in addition also exploit opportunities that occur from the friction in the war [11,12]. ...
The objective of this study is to investigate the structure for learning and the learning outcomes from a paper exercise based on multiagency collaboration, and point to potential benefits for crisis leadership and management in civil organizations. The current study was conducted by participant observation in one exercise and a questionnaire was handed out in the following exercise to measure outcomes. Social interaction and concurrent learning are used as the theoretical foundation in the current study. The exercise can be used as an input for multiagency collaboration when linked to the strategic and operative context. The Norwegian Armed Forces operate from a leadership perspective of intention-based leadership. The organization has also developed a pedagogical platform that guides learning activities. In a complex world, we aim at finding training areas that can prepare the cadets for scenarios that also heavily involve the unforeseen. Improvisation is seen as important for military leaders and the exercise provides a sound arena for this purpose. We have seen that even for a table exercise, important lessons can be learned. The current study makes suggestions as well as improvements that could be performed based on the lessons learned for both the Norwegian Armed Forces as well as for other organizations that find the experiences interesting. The article identified five management principles for interaction under unforeseen conditions: (1) develop a pedagogical view for the organization, (2) facilitate and train using processes for complementary process development, (3) develop precise and common language, (4) train the organization in concurrent learning, (5) develop tolerance and mutual respect.
... Hence, the commander would form"intent" of the mission providing a framework and guidance. Yet, the personnel on the ground delivering this mission need to understand it well such that they can improvise on the battlefield to fulfil the mission and also exploit opportunities that occur from the friction (Murray, 2011;Shamir, 2011). Friction then becomes the culture of flexibility promoting the capacity to question how the intended plan is to be executed. ...
Purpose
The purpose of this paper – PART II – is to present the lived experiences of Sensuous Organisational Learning drawn from the educational practices and learning culture of the Norwegian Defence University College, Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy’s (RNoAFA) approach to growing (Military) leaders.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper reflects the co-creation of actionable knowledge between military officers, academics at the RNoAFA and international scholars engaged as research collaborators. The objective is to present the benefits of “practising knowing through dialogical exchange” (MacIntosh et al., 2012) as an approach to co-creating knowledge for responsible action. In this case, the authors present the conceptualisation and illustration of the idea of the New Learning Organisation they advance.
Findings
The Sensuous Organisational Learning – 8As framework explains how Attentiveness, Alertness, Awareness, Appreciation, Anticipation, Alignment, Activation and Agility form an integral part of the educational strategy that enables the RNoAFA to respond to the wider Educational Reforms and Modernisation programme of Norwegian Defence. The RNoAFA is presented as an illustration of how the New Learning Organisation serves the common good if Institutional Reflexivity and High Agility Organising were key aspects of the Learning Leadership it fosters.
Research limitations/implications
Consistent with MacIntosh et al.’s (2012) dialogical exchanges the authors present the relational and intersubjective nature of meaningful dialogue between the co-authors that provides scope for integrative stories of practice. The resulting illustrative example of the New Learning Organisation, is an account of the learning experienced. Hence, this paper is presented neither as a traditional empirical paper nor as a self-disclosing or even auto-ethnographic account. Instead, it is one of a series of research outputs from innovative research collaboration between the authors all committed to “practising knowing”.
Practical implications
The New Learning Organisation promoted here focuses on responsible action to serve the common good. Investing in Institutional Reflexivity becomes critical in continuing to broaden the ways of being and becoming. As individuals, communities and organisations, that comprise the institution (in this case Norwegian Defence) grow and elevate their practical judgements to serve the common good the capacity to engage in reflexive critique heightens organisational agility and leadership.
Social implications
Embedding care as the essence of learning not only enables accepting mistakes and owning up to these mistakes, but reinforcing the strength of character in doing so demonstrating what it means to be resilient, flexible and ready to respond to the VUCA. This is what permits High Agility Organising to foster learning on an ongoing basis driving the commitment to continually renew operational and professional practices. By focussing on how the common good can be better served, the New Learning Organisation cares to pursue the higher purpose that social actions must serve.
Originality/value
Advancing leadership as a personal, relational and organisational quality supported by an orientation towards practising goes beyond single, double and triple loop learning. In doing so, the Learning Leadership that drives the New Learning Organisation energises Attentiveness, Alertness, Awareness, Appreciation, Anticipation, Alignment, Activation and Agility. This paper marks a new chapter in Organisational Learning research and practice by demonstrating the value of sensuousness as a foundation for improving the practical judgements across professional practices.
The weaponization of Artificial Intelligence is rapidly changing the logic of modern conflicts: in fact, the integration of AI into the decision-making activities of military commands, thanks to the speed of information processing, is leading to a profound transformation of decision-making framework, which can be faster and more precise. If until a few years ago the classic military command model (Mission Command) was focused on human factors, such as leadership, ability, quality, feelings, judgments, values, troops motivation, mutual trust between comrades, clear understanding of orders, threat assessment and timeliness of decisions, today Artificial Intelligence poses new challenges to traditional decision-making models and the leadership of chains of command, supporting human decision-making capacity (also made up of instinct and intuition) with predictive models and algorithms capable of taking control of the situation without the need for human intervention, allowing a rapid understanding of scenarios and the processing of faster and more effective decisions. It is still too early to talk about replacing humans with AI agents on the battlefield, but the rapid progress in artificial intelligence and the growing use of autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), combined with the fears raised by much of the scientific community (including the creators of AI themselves), suggest worrying prospects that lead to a crucial question: could a human army ever rely on the command of a machine?
This work presents a possible alternative to the risks of the advent of technological singularity in the military: in the context of the debate on 'human enhancement', we will describe the development of a new model of human-machine relationship in the military field, which does not subject the human being to the control of the AI, but offers a cooperative framework in which the human factor does not completely disappear behind the artificial decisions of the machine. In the context of an evolutionary analysis of military command models, the transition to a different logic of AI-assisted military command, the Network Command, will be described, which requires a collaborative network command practice and a cyborg ethics governance framework able to guarantee meaningful human control and a clear accountability profile in the conduct of military operations, incorporating military rules and doctrines into the AI reasoning process, with the aim of generating a truly adaptive system. The various applications of artificial intelligence in current warfare scenarios will then be illustrated, examining how AI is used both tactically and strategically in military planning, and highlighting how human decision-making processes can become more accurate, efficient and targeted, while increasing human control over autonomous weapon systems, in order to reduce the risks of intrinsic instability of artificial intelligence. After having analyzed the risks and opportunities inherent in the militarization of Artificial Intelligence, will be illustrated the supposed best path to take: the cooperative human-machine teaming.
The Use of Artificial Intelligence as a Decision Support in the Military: From Mission and Network Command to AI DSS.
The weaponization of Artificial Intelligence is rapidly transforming the logic of today's conflicts: in fact, the integration of AI into the decision activities of military commands is leading to a change in decision-making processes. Whereas until a few years ago, mission command was supported by human capabilities, qualities, feelings, judgements and values, such as leadership, troop motivation, mutual trust, clear understanding of commanders' orders, threat assessment, timeliness of decisions, today AI poses new challenges to traditional decision-making models and to the leadership of the chains of command, by supporting human decision-making capability (also made up of instinct and intuition) with predictive models and algorithms capable of taking control of the situation without the need for human intervention, enabling fast understanding of scenarios and the processing of quick and effective decisions. It is still too early to talk about replacing humans with AI agents on the battlefield, but the fast advances in Artificial Intelligence and the increased use of autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), combined with the fears raised by much of the scientific community (including the AI creators themselves), suggest worrying prospects that lead to a crucial question: could a human army ever rely on the command of a machine? This paper presents a possible alternative to the risks of the advent of technological singularity in the military: in the context of the debate on human enhancement, it will describe the development of a new model of human-machine relationship, which does not subject the human being to the control of AI, but offers a new cooperative framework, in which the human factor does not disappear completely behind the artificial decisions of a machine.
Résumé
Cet article propose une réflexion sur les initiatives politiques déployées ces dernières années un peu partout en Occident afin de rendre les forces armées plus « représentatives ». S'il est difficile de contester la légitimité démocratique de ces initiatives, celles-ci risquent néanmoins de porter atteinte à l'autonomie professionnelle des officiers au sein des forces armées, conformément à ce que nous appelons le « compromis huntingtonien », soit le modèle de relations civilo-militaires qui domine encore aujourd'hui en Occident. En effet, en intervenant directement dans les « affaires internes » des forces armées, le pouvoir civil se trouve ainsi à empiéter sur les pouvoirs et le champ des responsabilités professionnelles exercées par les officiers sur les forces armées. Pour pallier ce risque, nous proposons un élargissement du « rôle politique » de l'officier, à l'intérieur même du cadre fixé par le compromis huntingonien. Cela devrait se traduire par deux axes complémentaires d'action pour l'officier aujourd'hui négligés : d'une part, défendre la place singulière des forces armées dans la société et, d'autre part, agir en tant qu'agent de changement culturel au sein des forces armées.
Celem artykułu jest analiza zasadniczych problemów z określeniem istoty oraz samego pojęcia Mission Command w warunkach polskich. Problemy te pojawiają się już na poziomie tłumaczenia słów, którymi określa się tę koncepcję, a także wynikające z tego nieporozumienia i chaos znaczeniowy. Określenie Mission Command jest stosowane do koncepcji dowodzenia w wojsku, ale jednocześnie wynika ze zmian w systemie podejmowania decyzji także w środowiskach cywilnych, na poziomie politycznym i innych. Koncepcja ta jest wprowadzana od co najmniej 20 lat na gruncie polskim, ale do 2018 roku nie miało to ram formalnych pozostając jedynie w wersji obiegowej i deklaratywnej. Przez ten czas albo nie przebiło się do świadomości na wielu szczeblach dowodzenia, albo narosło nieporozumieniami i wieloznacznościami. Wynika to jednak nie tylko ze specyfiki samego wojska, ale jest kwestią.
Rwandan military behavior in Mozambique operationalizes Kigali’s rhetorical commitment to aggressively defend endangered civilians. The counterinsurgency doctrine applied in Cabo Delgado balances insurgent pursuit and civilian protection through a combination of contact patrolling and tactical restraint. This formula demonstrates learning from the country’s past experience with domestic rebellion and international peacekeeping but contrasts sharply with Rwandan army conduct in eastern Congo. The disparity suggests Rwandan battlefield demeanor is conditioned by institutional culture and role conception. The campaign underscores the influence of ideology on Rwandan soldiers' self-understanding and complicates the equivalence of nondemocratic regime type with repressive strategies of counterinsurgency.
The chapter will extend this discussion into Cyberdiplomacy. It will build on the theoretical framework built in the previous chapter to situate it in relation to science diplomacy and the broader international and geopolitical environment. It will explore the conflict of cyber agendas and the challenges of building norms of behaviour in cyberspace.
Wbrew potocznym, często wręcz zwulgaryzowanym opiniom wojna jest nie tylko fizycznym starciem dwóch uzbrojonych grup ludzi, ale przede wszystkim konfrontacją dwóch zbiorowych woli i intelektów (…) Z satysfakcję przyjąć trzeba fakt, iż problematyka doktryny, rozumianej jako intelektualny wysiłek ukierunkowany na wprzęgnięcie wojny w szeroko rozumiany wysiłek mający zapewnić przetrwanie i uzyskanie dogodnych warunków rozwojowych państwa, stała się przedmiotem wysiłku badawczego doktora Łukasza Przybyło. Autor, zbudował interesujący, oryginalny fundament metodologiczny swoich rozważań. W kluczowej warstwie obejmującej omówienie pięciu przypadków wypracowania oraz implementacji doktryny w różnych uwarunkowaniach politycznych, przez państwa o różnych ustrojach politycznych i modelach sił zbrojnych dostarcza nader bogatego materiału badawczego. Recenzowana praca ma przede wszystkim-i to jest zapewne jej największy walor-charakter analityczno-problemowy (…). Stanowi ona zerwanie z powszechnym w polskiej literaturze "kronikarsko-opisowym" podejściem do myśli wojskowej. prof. dr. hab. Krzysztof Kubiak (z recenzji wydawniczej)
One approach to military leadership is the philosophy of mission command. Mission command is supported by several principles and all of them are essential, without those it cannot be fully applied. These principles are the mutual trust between participants, the understanding, the clearly articulated intent of the superior, the decentralized execution and the timely-made decisions. As the Artificial Intelligence is progresssing and gaining ground it will influence the entirity of the military command and control process: new decision situations will arise and the human-machine cooperation may create new relationships. This paper scrutinizes whether the identified principles of mission command can be applied in the same way in the Artificial Intelligence-infused operational environment as it can be among traditional circumstances
Besedilo obravnava doktrino in načela poveljevanja z namero, njegov izvor in temeljne pogoje za njegovo delovanje. Glede na to, da je bila doktrina poveljevanja z namero razvita konec 19. stoletja, članek v nadaljevanju opredeli nekatere družbene, tehnološke in vojaškostrokovne dejavnike, ki so bistveni za uveljavitev poveljevanja z namero, so se pa od nastanka doktrine do danes precej spremenili. Nazadnje spregovori tudi o smiselnosti uveljavitve te doktrine v Slovensko vojsko in čemu bi bilo treba ob njenem uveljavljanju nameniti posebno pozornost. The text deals with the doctrine and principles of mission command, its origin and basic precondition for its functioning. Given that the doctrine of mission command, developed in the late 19th century article goes on to identify some of the social, technological, and military technical factors that are essential for the implementation of mission command, but have, since the creation of the doctrine, changed significantly. Finally, it speaks about the reasonableness of the entry into force of such a doctrine in the Slovenian army and what should be given special attention in the enforcement of the doctrine.
Forty years after its occurrence, the 1982 Lebanon war remains academically understudied with the received wisdom about the conflict largely based on political and journalistic accounts. According to these accounts, the war was a political ploy by Defence Minister Ariel Sharon and Prime Minister Menachem Begin aimed at achieving far-reaching political goals rather than a defensive attempt to remove the terrorist threat to Israel’s northern areas. By placing the conflict within the context of Israeli history and the Arab-Israeli conflict, on the one hand, and the nature and characteristics of modern warfare, on the other, this article offers a more nuanced interpretation of the Lebanon War, showing that it was not fundamentally different from past military encounters.
High Reliability Organizations (HRO) need to devise and implement organizational processes aimed to minimize the risk of failure, facing high risks and high stakes. In this paper, we look at the case of military HRO operating under Mission Command principles. Mission Command is a doctrine born to address unexpected circumstances through diffused leadership. Nonetheless, digital enabled Command and Control (C2) systems may challenge this doctrine. Remote-control technologies, automatic arms systems and tracking tools have seen a widespread application in modern warfare. Such advancements may favor purely vertical approaches whereby commanders can monitor and control the battlefield from afar. We investigate the tensions between digital enabled Mission Command and Control systems and the centripetal force of purely vertical C2 structures. This scenario contrasts with Mission Command as leaders may veer to more task-oriented approaches, which in turn may lead to a progressive decrease in accountability of subordinates. This is problematic for the entire command pyramid. We contribute to the HRO literature by shedding light on the paradoxical role of digital technologies in mission-oriented organizing.
This paper to uncovers how leaders practice emergent strategy as a core strategic philosophy. The article uses the case of general and statesman Moshe Dayan as a principal case study to uncover leadership and management practices of emergent strategy. Following a discussion on the emergent versus deliberate strategy schools, I show why Moshe Dayan as a leader can be considered as an archetype of the emergent approach worth studying. I then present six leadership principles that enabled him to practice the emergent approach. The article concludes with discussion of the limitations and value of the emergent approach for leaders today.
Brexit is a watershed moment in the life of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that significantly reflects its circumstantial national socio-political and psychological situation. The article argued that national desperation and frustration greatly affect society, politics, and national psychology. These elements trigger and act as the fundamental driving force in shaking and shaping the course of action in the life of nations and states (most importantly former colonial powers). However, national desperation and frustration are not limited towards taking desperate measures but could also result in a radical shift in alliances and the overall orientation of the state. The article took a brief survey of Britain’s politico-strategic and psychological history and analysed the variables culminating in the form of Brexit. It considered the psychological, socio-political, economic, geopolitical, geostrategic, and military aspects, in analysing the Brexit. It concluded in the light of such variables. Moreover, it presented potential ramifications of such endeavours. The article offered a tentative road in overcoming British national desperation.
The purpose of this paper is to reassess the widespread accepted criticism of Moshe Dayan’s functioning as defense minister towards and during the 5 Yom Kippur War. Now that most of the archival documents have been opened to public view, we can better assess his performance during the war. This reassessment changes the picture: Dayan did not collapse, and the professional opinions he expressed were generally sound when accounting for the information available to him; however, there is no doubt that he allowed his subordinates to see his disturbed emotions and shook their confidence – a failure of leadership..
This article examines how 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps General Alfred M. Gray strengthened the Corps’ “brainpower” as a key element in his efforts to rehabilitate the Corps’ warfighting capabilities. Gray’s brainpower reform included both the establishment of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC)—to serve as a “skull”—and other educational reforms that would develop the Corps’ brain, which was expected to yield new warfighting concepts. This article stresses that the transition from the Marine Corps Development and Education Command to MCCDC was not just the establishment of a new organization but was Gray’s challenge to bring about fundamental change to how the Corps would prepare for future warfare. While his predecessors mainly focused on modernization of existing equipment and formations after the end of the Vietnam War, Gray intended to transform the Corps’ requirement system to produce new doctrine, education, training, equipment, and organization. The new requirement system was designed as a warfare-based, concept-based, and future-based system. This article also emphasizes that this new requirement system had been studied and designed by then-unknown colonels prior to Gray’s inauguration as Commandant. Although Gray did not see his new requirement system through to completion, his efforts were an important beginning to the new system.
This paper aims to take a step towards overcoming two lacunae in Professional Military Education (PME) literature. First, the lack of conceptualisation of what PME is and its relationship to military professionalism. Second, the fact that the vast majority of PME literature consists of studies concerning a single PME organisation, e.g. a specific military academy or college; there is almost a complete lack of national, regional and global studies of PME. The current paper takes a first step in overcoming the first lacuna by defining PME as an institution and taking a historical institutionalist approach to tracing the evolution of PME in the Western world. This new approach will also demonstrate how a sound conceptualisation of PME could contribute to overcoming the second lacuna.
An often used Danish war studies analytical format, 'Krigsførelsens Kredsløb' (literally the Warfare Cycle), is critically assessed and found unsuited to the analysis of warfare. Yet, it is merely found to be misnamed. Used as a tool for analyzing the purposes and capabilities of a given armed force and its internal coherence between materiel, organization, and doctrine, the model excels. Such analysis requires the model to be operationalized, and a matrix for the full analysis of a military unit or an entire armed force is proposed. Particular attention is paid to the assessment of military professionalism and of the command culture of the forces analyzed. Thus, the model is renamed the Capability Cycle to reflect its actual best use. Resumé Krigsførelsens Kredsløb kan ikke analysere krigsførelse, idet den udelader de fleste af de væsentligste faktorer, der former krigsførelse. Modellen er derimod velegnet til analyse af militære styrker fra små enheder til hele forsvar. Den kan bidrage til dels at forklare, hvorfor militære kapaciteter er opstillet som de er, dels vurdere deres parathed til og potentielle styrke i krig. Kredsløbsmodellens indre og ydre rings seks elementer gennemgås, relationerne imellem de seks elementer udredes, og det tilbagevises, at det indre kredsløb – doktrin, organisation og teknologi – skulle søge mod en balance eller et optimum, og begrebet rationalitetsforstyrrende faktorer indarbejdes i modellen. Hvert af de seks elementer omsættes til mellem tre og fem målepunkter, der hver især kan undersøges konkret for en given militær organisation. Særligt begreberne militær professionalisme samt føringskultur udfoldes. Der foreslås i alt 23 målepunkter, der efter behov kan anvendes til at vurdere eget og andres militære forsvar eksempelvis i rammen af landestudier. Grundet modellens anvendelighed til netop analyse af militære kapaciteter snarere end krigsførelse foreslås et navneskifte til Kapaciteternes Kredsløb, på engelsk 'Capability Cycle'. Nøgleord: Krigsteori; Krigsførelsens Kredsløb; doktrin; teknologi; professionalisme; organisation
What explains combat motivation in warfare? Scholars argue that monitoring, material rewards, and punishment alone are insufficient explanations. Further, competing ideological accounts of motivation are also problematic because ideas are difficult to operationalize and measure. To solve this puzzle, the authors combine extensive information from World War II about German soldiers’ combat performance with data about conditionally exogenous potential exposure to Nazi radio propaganda. They find evidence that soldiers with higher potential exposure to propaganda were more likely to be decorated for valor even after controlling for individual socioeconomic factors, home district characteristics like urbanization, and proxies for combat exposure.
Er militær ledelse en kunst? Et håndværk? Eller en videnskab? Med afsæt i en analyse af begrebet militær ledelse viser artiklen, hvordan arbejdet med metaforer har en helt central organisatorisk funktion og kan udgøre et væsentligt redskab til udvikling af organisationer og professioner. Artiklen præsenterer dels en teoretisk udfoldelse af og refleksion over, hvad vi kan få blik for, hvis vi betragter metaforer som et perspektiv. Dels undersøger artiklen konkret, hvordan tre forskellige metaforiske forståelser af militær ledelse – som henholdsvis en kunst, et håndværk eller en videnskab – har afgørende betydning for, hvordan den militære organisation vurderer og udvikler sine militære ledere.
This volume contains six essays with a focus on how to conduct and lead ground operations. The essays are written by officers of the Swedish Higher Joint Command and Staff Programme. The contributions in the volume all have a focus on ground operations and tactics, but also cover a wide range of questions selected by the contributors themselves. The texts are written in conjunction with a field exercise [fältövning] to the Ardennes, where we put focus on the interplay between theory and ractice. The course itself is part of the Program’s tactical profile. This profile aims to facilitate combining scientific foundations and the proven experience of the military profession. The profile is intended to provide a holistic and professionally-oriented, in-depth understanding of the tactical level.
Military innovation and adaptation are regarded as essential attributes of modern military organizations, while conservatism is condemned. Here I define and exemplify a new kind of conservatism – by choice, according to which military organizations deliberately choose not to change. The argument is twofold. First, a combination of conservatism by choice, innovation, and adaptation will lead to a more balanced and agile force than the current trend that over-emphasizes innovation. Second, conservatism by choice of professional military education, unit organization, and command philosophy will enable better utilization of innovations in the fields of weapon systems and tactical doctrine.
This article explores the extent to which Moscow’s modus operandi during the military campaign in Syria demonstrates change or continuity in Russian strategic culture. It discusses five main characteristics of the Russian conduct and argues that these traits demonstrate more continuity than change in the Russian style of war. However, it suggests that change possibly might be evolving on the tactical-operational level – the emergence of a mission command culture. The article offers competing explanations for this eventuality, which the Syrian campaign has highlighted, and advances a conceptual debate in IR on the shifts in strategic culture.
Neoliberal epistemologies are grounded in a temporal paradox. To prosper, you have to know how actions taken now will pay off in the future. But you can’t know that—the future is uncertain and unknowable. In this context, qualitative inquiry becomes less a matter of explanation or interpretation than of feeding information into efforts to collapse the temporal horizon and format the future in a form that you can dominate. This article examines manifestations of this approach in the qualitative research practices of two key institutional sectors of neoliberalism: the corporate and military.
This paper investigates how leadership behaviors affect offshore and onshore teams’ ability to adapt from their normal routine to crisis operations in the oil and gas industry. The industry has invested substantial resources into risk and crisis management, emphasizing evidence-based procedures, drills, and centralized leadership. Through a multi-method case study, we find that the utilized leadership practices hamper efficient intra- and intergroup cooperation during normal routine operations. In addition, and more alarming, the shift to authoritarian “control and command” leadership during crisis settings, which emphasizes rapid decisions and effectivity, hinders teams’ ability to adapt to and handle unforeseen and chaotic situations. To change this situation, we argue that the oil and gas industry should look into modern maneuver warfare to innovate organizational practices. Maneuver warfare has abandoned command and control strategies and instead focuses on contextual leadership and autonomous teamwork.
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