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Racial, Religious, and Civic Dimensions of Anti-Muslim Sentiment in America
Abstract
This paper examines anti-Muslim sentiment in America. Existing research has documented rising hostility to Muslims in Western countries, but has been much less clear about what drives such sentiments or exactly what sort of “other” Muslims are understood to be. Our interest is in the cultural construction of Muslims as a problematic or incompatible “other.” We explore the extent, content, and correlates of such views. Building from recent work in critical race theory and the study of cultural boundaries in national belonging, we argue that Muslims are distinct in being culturally excluded on religious, racial, and civic grounds at the same time. Using nationally representative survey data with specially designed measures on views of Muslims and other groups, we show that nearly half of Americans embrace some form of anti-Muslim sentiment, and that such views are systematically correlated with social location and with understandings of the nature of American belonging.
... Unfortunately, within the United States, Muslims are consistently associated with a range of public problems regarding safety, morality, and politics (Gerteis et al., 2020). Muslims are seen as problematic, a threat to public safety and order, a challenge to collective morality, and as "taking over" American communities (Gerteis et al., 2020). ...
... Unfortunately, within the United States, Muslims are consistently associated with a range of public problems regarding safety, morality, and politics (Gerteis et al., 2020). Muslims are seen as problematic, a threat to public safety and order, a challenge to collective morality, and as "taking over" American communities (Gerteis et al., 2020). Many Americans have a negative stereotype of Muslims, which is heavily influenced by the violent radical Muslim extremist trope depicted in the media (Dunwoody & McFarland, 2018). ...
... Cultural belonging rests on recognition and acceptance, both of which shape access to social, economic, and political resources and civic inclusion (Gerteis et al., 2020). Anti-Muslim and anti-Arab sentiments need to be examined and understood through religious, racial, and ethnic lenses to bring more clarity to discourse on belonging, civic life, American identity, and the cultural bases of citizenship (Gerteis et al., 2020). ...
Information disseminated about particular groups feeds stereotypes and attitudes, which in turn feed prejudice and discrimination. There is a history of conflating Arabs and Muslims with terrorism, incited and perpetuated through media rhetoric, Hollywood, and political speeches, which has normalized racism and xenophobia against these groups. The impact of the media and the resulting sociopolitical environment toward Arabs and Muslims has culminated in discriminatory hiring practices, overrepresentation in unemployment, and perceptions of Arabs and Muslims as lacking warmth and work-related competencies and has had negative ramifications on the well-being and job satisfaction of Arabs and Muslims. According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the number of religion-based employment discrimination claims has dramatically increased across all states of employment over the past two decades. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission also noted a rise in claims made by Arabs specifically and a 250% increase in claims for those perceived to be Muslim, Sikh, Arab, Middle Eastern, or South Asian. Systemic racism hurts everyone; human development and societal health are hampered by a lack of knowledge and exposure to marginalized groups. To enhance societal and organizational health, it is essential to create inclusive environments that directly name and challenge the stereotypes and barriers faced by Arabs and Muslims by facilitating generative interactions and enacting policies to counteract discriminatory hiring and promotion practices.
... Certainly, these forms of exclusion have seemed to coincide in the modern American moment. While Muslims have long been a target of the religious right (Cimino 2005;Kidd 2009), lately a much larger swath of Americans adopted the view that Muslims are antithetical to American belonging: that they are not just outsiders but internal enemies (Braunstein 2017;Gerteis, Hartmann, and Edgell 2020;Love 2017;Selod 2018). Trump advisors Steven Bannon and Sebastian Gorka talked openly of their admiration for European fascist and anti-Semitic literature (Alexander 2019;Ewing 2017). ...
... Ideas about the cultural threat posed by Muslims and Jews are thus tied to claims about the boundaries of national belonging. In the contemporary United States, exclusionary nationalist claims about the boundaries of the nation (and thus about the religious, racial, and civic basis of belonging) have attached to both groups (Frankel 2013;Gerteis, Hartmann, and Edgell 2020;Perry and Whitehead 2015). Put differently, alt-right discourse and demonstrations like the Charlottesville rally involve claims about "otherness" -that is, about who does and does not belong in the American "we" (Braunstein 2017;Gorski 2019). ...
... Rejection of the "other" is thus not only a matter of internal prejudice, but also part of boundary-drawing in a political context (Kinder and Kam 2010). As we have argued above, the rejection of outgroups (and prominently of Muslims and Jews) is part of a restrictive understanding of American national identity, defined on both racial and religious grounds (Gerteis, Hartmann, and Edgell 2020;Perry and Whitehead 2015;Thompson 2021;Whitehead, Perry, and Baker 2018). Within such a discourse of belonging, existing research has shown that racial and religious boundaries of belonging connect in important ways. ...
Drawing from recent work on “otherness” and social boundaries in America, we investigate anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish opinion among white Americans. After outlining the logic of the comparison, we use nationally representative data to analyze these forms of othering. Although anti-Muslim opinion is more extensive, the two track together empirically and share a cultural logic as connected forms of ethno-religious boundary-making. Latent class analysis shows that anti-Semitism is nested within anti-Muslim attitudes, with political and religious identifications as consistent predictors of opinion. We conclude with a reflection on politicized boundary-making and the relationship between extreme and mainstream views of the “other.”
... Multiculturalism involves efforts to promote understanding, appreciation, and cohesion among members of diverse societies and to encourage social, cultural, and emotional harmony; it is often paired with antiracism efforts to eliminate racial/ethnic inequalities (Gerteis, Hartmann, and Edgell 2019;Hartmann 2015;Kendi 2016;Knoester, Ridpath, and Allison forthcoming;Spencer 1994). Research on multiculturalism and antiracism typically stresses the need for individuals and societies to work toward increased sensitivity, social inclusion, appreciation of diversity, and appropriate means of addressing the past mistreatment of racial and ethnic minorities in particular (Bell and Hartmann 2007;Cooper 2019;Duncan 2011;Hartmann 2015;Kendi 2016;Spencer 1994;Strong 2004). ...
... Along such a continuum of (in)equality, contestations and negotiations toward full cultural citizenship (i.e., a clear recognition of one's humanity, the receipt of equitable dignity and respect, and continual indications of appropriately belonging in cultural interactions and representations) for racial/ethnic minority group members have occurred and continue to occur; antiracism specifically refers to efforts to reduce racial/ethnic inequalities. Despite attempts to overcome racial/ethnic inequalities in the United States that are rooted in settler colonialism, genocide, and enslavement, complete recognition and valuing of the rights and humanities of minority racial/ethnic groups have yet to be achieved (Bell and Hartmann 2007;Gerteis et al. 2019;Kendi 2016;King 2016;Ong 1996). ...
... We focus upon the representations and inclusions of two relatively "invisible" yet "hypervisible" broadly defined racial/ethnic minority groups in sports and society: Native Americans and Muslims. That is, Native Americans and Muslims are invisible in the sense that they each represent only about 1 percent of the U.S. population, and their interests and needs are often neglected (Gerteis et al. 2019;Guiliano 2015). Yet they are hypervisible in that they are frequently present in cultural representations, most often in unflattering ways and through a history of being feared, and are commonly "othered," ignored, and juxtaposed with "real Americans" (Gerteis et al. 2019;King 2016;Mowatt, French, and Malebranche 2013). ...
Sports interactions offer contested cultural terrain where cultural citizenship is continually (re)established. Relatedly, this study uses National Sports and Society Survey data (N = 3,993) to assess public opinions about the use of Native American team names and mascots and the allowance of Muslim women to wear hijabs in sports. Descriptive results indicate that there is considerable but mixed support for eliminating Native American team names and mascots. There is more uniform agreement for allowing hijabs in sports, although over 20% of U.S. adults disagreed with allowing them. Multiple regression results show that dominant statuses and in-group identities, as well as indicators of traditionalism, are consistently associated with reduced support for the proposed changes in sports that are designed to result in multiculturalism and antiracism. Also, recognition of racial/ethnic discrimination is positively associated with support for eliminating Native American team names and mascots as well as allowing hijabs in sports.
... For our population sample, all participants identified as Muslims of Arab heritage. In comparison to individuals from other faiths, Muslims experience a higher rate of discrimination, antagonism and aggression in Western societies in different contexts, such as healthcare, workplace and educational settings [44,45]. Non-Muslim individuals of Arab heritage are also likely to experience discrimination, namely, due to negative stereotypes associated with their ethnicity such as terrorism [46]. ...
... Non-Muslim individuals of Arab heritage are also likely to experience discrimination, namely, due to negative stereotypes associated with their ethnicity such as terrorism [46]. However, Muslims of Arab heritage are more likely to experience discrimination, often due to Islamophobia-associated racialisation, conflicts with socially constructed Western nationalist ideologies and vilification in the media [44][45][46][47]. It is therefore unsurprising that participants in our study expressed a preference for their healthcare providers to be Arab and Muslim due to perceived trust and shared understanding of cultural and religious practices. ...
Introduction
Culturally and linguistically diverse population groups disproportionately experience higher weight and other non–weight‐related discrimination in healthcare settings outside of their ancestral country. Little is known about the experiences of individuals with Arab heritage. This study aimed to qualitatively explore the intersectional weight‐related healthcare experiences of individuals of Arab heritage with higher weight in Australia.
Methods
A general inductive enquiry approach was used. Purposive, convenience and snowball sampling was used to recruit individuals of Arab heritage residing in Australia. Individuals were invited to participate in an online semistructured interview. Interviews were recorded, transcribed and thematically analysed.
Results
Fifteen participants took part in the study. Of these participants, 93% were female (n = 14), 80% were aged between 18 and 44 years (n = 12), 73% were university educated (n = 11), 53% were born outside of Australia (n = 8) and all were Muslim (n = 15). Four main themes were identified: (1) appearance‐based judgement, (2) generalised advice and assumptions, (3) cultural responsiveness and (4) healthcare system constraints.
Conclusion
Individuals of Arab heritage with higher weight in Australia, namely, females, often perceive their healthcare experiences as dismissive of their cultural and religious needs and driven by causality assumptions around weight. It is crucial that care delivered encompasses cultural humility, is weight‐inclusive and acknowledges systemic constraints. Cultural safety training benchmarks, healthcare management reform and weight‐inclusive healthcare approaches are recommended to assist healthcare providers in delivering effective, holistic and culturally safe care.
Patient or Public Contribution
Insights gained from conversations with Arab heritage community members with lived experiences regarding weight‐related healthcare encounters informed the study design and approach.
... 2 Post-resettlement culture shock, language issues, and anti-Muslim sentiment also contributed to their health status. 3 Markers of social integration of migrants overlap with social determinants of health, including safety, education, housing, employment, and social connections. 4 This study aimed to: ...
... Government policies such as the "Muslim Ban" and anti-refugee bias in the US undoubtedly created challenges in forging social networks and exacerbated post-resettlement trauma for both women's families. 3 It is beneficial to provide psychosocial support for post-migration experiences and inform Syrian refugees of their rights in the US. Support for community organizations such as Brown Refugee Youth Tutoring and Enrichment (BRYTE) is also imperative to help Syrian children excel in school and integrate into the RI community. ...
Background:
Key elements of social integration of refugees overlap with the social determinants of health. Limited research exists about Syrian refugees' resettlement in Rhode Island (RI).
Methods:
Case study life history method: Two Syrian women in RI were interviewed and observed longitudinally. Content analysis cycles led to emerging topics. Key informant interviews informed the question guide.
Results:
Several themes emerged: (1) Interpreters, community health workers (CHWs), and patient navigators help access healthcare; (2) Education about healthcare maintenance is important; (3) Anti-refugee bias has compromised safety and psychosocial wellness; (4) Although hard work is prioritized, high hopes for education and employment conflict with reality; and (5) Syrian women have unique experiences during resettlement.
Conclusions:
RI leaders can address resettlement challenges through investment in CHW programs, peer-led health initiatives, English language education, interpreter services, psychosocial support, migrant rights education, social opportunities, and job training and matching.
... On the one hand, the media bias reflected in this analysis could be a subconscious bias rooted in decades of anti-Muslim sentiment that has manifested itself in the minds of the American public (Gerteis et al., 2020). On the other hand, it could be a conscious rhetorical choice aimed at targeting and degrading Muslim communities (Nadal et al., 2012). ...
What drives the religious media bias in their coverage of mass shooters in the US? Understanding the source of media bias can structure future research on the portrayal of mass shooters and can be a major step in promoting bias-free reporting. This article aims to identify the potential determinants of religious media bias by focusing on the shooter (religion and religious motivation) and victim (race) characteristics. It covers 34 mass shootings that took place since 9/11 and conducts content analyses of all media reporting about them in two major newspapers. We provide evidence that media religious bias occurs frequently in the case of Muslim shooters, while the other potential determinants do not make a difference.
... Scholars like Smith and Richards, and Throsby, highlight the growing focus on cultural activities in tourism policies (Radomskaya, 2020). Joseph et al. (2019) and Roberts in Pennington and Waxler (2017) discuss the role of cultural products in tourism. Popular culture has become a key asset in destination development. ...
The study employed a descriptive methodology with a cultural perspective, with a key focus on dissecting the novel ‘Princess: A True Story of Life Behind the Veil in Saudi Arabia’ by Jean Sasson published in 1993 to explore the impact of popular culture on the identity of Saudi women, focusing on the princesses within the royal palace. The cultural environment of Saudi Arabia presents a complex scenario for women as they reconcile traditional Islamic values with pervasive Westernized influences. This inquiry scrutinized how popular culture, introduced through migration and media exposure, molded Saudi women’s attitudes and actions, particularly those of the royal lineage. This novel is the source of data for the research. The analysis focused on themes, representations, and cultural significance. It examined language, imagery, and narratives to uncover meanings and relate them to broader societal issues, ultimately revealing how popular culture reflects or challenges prevailing ideologies. The findings revealed Sultana’s struggle to balance her Saudi princess identity with Western influences, revealing the complexities of cultural exchange, marriage practices, and societal expectations in both Western and Islamic contexts. Sasson’s narrative highlights how global influences, particularly Western culture, shape perceptions and interactions, enriching yet complicating societal norms. Vivid depictions of gender roles, sensory experiences, and emotional responses underline the ongoing struggles women face in patriarchal societies. These stories provide an understanding of the intersections of culture, gender, and identity, reflecting personal journeys while echoing broader themes of empowerment, resistance, and evolving cultural identities in a globalized world.
... They are ostracized or "othered" compared to their Caucasian American counterparts [28]. This prejudice may stem from a hostile sociopolitical climate and historical sentiment related to the clash of civilizations narrative and the racialization of Muslims [29][30][31]. Other surveys report significant discrimination against Muslims [32], whereas our findings indicate comparatively lower levels of perceived discrimination in healthcare and daily life. ...
We investigated the associations between sociodemographic factors, religiosity traits, and the perception of discrimination among Muslim Americans in both everyday life and medical settings. A self-administered web-based questionnaire, comprising validated measures of discrimination and religiosity, was completed by a convenience sample of English-speaking adult Muslim Americans, recruited through both in-person and online channels. Among the 1281 respondents, less than half were born in the USA (46%), and a significant portion displayed visible religious markers, such as wearing a hijab or having a beard (61%). Only 154 (12%) reported never experiencing everyday discrimination, while 358 (28%) reported not experiencing discrimination in medical settings. In a multivariable linear regression model, greater perceived everyday discrimination (β = 1.053, p < 0.01) was positively associated with greater discrimination in medical settings. Participants more comfortable self-identifying as Muslim in hospital settings (β = -0.395, p < 0.05) were less likely to perceive healthcare discrimination. Those visibly expressing their religiosity (β = 0.779, p < 0.01) and those with greater intrinsic religiosity (β = 0.231, p < 0.05) were more likely to encounter everyday discrimination. Conversely, older participants (β = -0.015, p < 0.05), adult immigrants to the US (β = -0.375, p < 0.05), those in better health (β = -0.157, p < 0.05), and those more comfortable identifying as Muslim (β = -0.305, p < 0.05) had lower perceptions of everyday discrimination. This study underscores the significance of the relationship between religiosity characteristics and experiences of both hospital and everyday discrimination for Muslim Americans.
... Following research about racial resentment, symbolic prejudices, and modern racism (Brandt and Reyna, 2012;Kinder and Sanders, 1996;McConahay 1986;Sears and Henry, 2003), as well as research about anti-Muslim attitudes and anti-Semitism in the United States (Gerteis et al., 2020;Hobbs et al., 2023), we account for participants' prejudices towards racial and religious minority groups. A BAM item reads, "Here is a list of potential problems in American society. ...
Americans generally celebrate the abstract principle of diversity, but research suggests that they have a comparatively lower (1) favorability towards policies that promote diversity and (2) sense of personal closeness with others from diverse backgrounds. The current study analyzes nationally representative survey data to assess such “principle-policy gaps” and “principle-personal gaps” in Americans’ diversity attitudes. We find that these attitudinal gaps indeed exist and are substantial in the general population. We also consider how individual-level factors relate to these attitudinal gaps. Following common findings in previous research, we find that participant racial identity and political partisanship have statistically significant relationships with these attitudinal gaps. But our overall findings illustrate that principle-policy gaps and principle-personal gaps in diversity attitudes are fairly substantial and prevalent across Americans who vary by race, politics, and several other individual-level factors. We consider our findings in the current social and political context, and we discuss directions for future inquiry.
... Scholars increasingly recognize the independent and important role that attitudes toward Muslims play in American politics. This emerging body of research finds that negative affect toward Muslims is held by a substantial portion of the electorate (Gerteis et al., 2020;Lajevardi, 2020;Mogahed et al., 2018;Panagopoulos, 2006), influences candidate evaluations (Calfano et al., 2020;Kalkan et al., 2018) and the prospect of substantive representation (Lajevardi, 2018), predicts vote outcomes and policy evaluations (Jardina and Stephens-Dougan, 2021;Lajevardi and Abrajano, 2019;Tesler, 2021), and shapes partisan preferences (Tesler, 2021). ...
Does American identity predict preferences for anti-democratic policies that aim to marginalize Muslim Americans? Absent significant priming of inclusive elements of American identity, we argue that individuals with stronger attachments to American identity will be less likely than their counterparts to reject a range of anti-Muslim policies that are antithetical to principles of religious liberty and equality. Across three surveys and multiple measures, American identity powerfully predicts preferences for curbing the civil liberties of Muslim citizens. Particularly striking is the finding that the effect of American identity spans the partisan divide; it consistently explains the endorsement of exclusionary policies among self-identified Democrats, who typically hold more progressive policy positions toward minority groups than Republicans. Overall, our study highlights the contradictory and exclusionary nature of American identity, which has important implications for minority groups constructed as outside the boundaries of Americanness.
... In addition to its deleterious health impacts, religion is intertwined with race and ethnicity in the US social context. Religious minorities in the US, such as Muslims, are racialized and oftentimes endure concurrent minority stress from both religion and race or ethnicity [10,12]. For example, prior research has shown that, compared to Whites, racial minorities were more likely to experience religious discrimination [14]. ...
Prior research has shown that experiencing religious discrimination is tied to adverse physical and mental health outcomes. However, less known is whether or not religious discrimination may influence one’s risk of smoking. In particular, there is
a paucity of research examining the impacts of religious discrimination on smoking for Asians in the United States, whose experience of religious discrimination is heavily racialized. To fill in these gaps, in this study, 356 Asian and Asian American
adults living in the US were surveyed. The key results suggest that perceived religious discrimination was associated with a higher risk of smoking among Asians and Asian Americans. Meanwhile, this deleterious effect of religious discrimination
does not vary by important sociodemographic variables, such as ethnicity, religious identity, gender, and acculturation. Surprisingly, once controlling for religious discrimination, racial discrimination was no longer associated with smoking. Therefore, when it comes to smoking, it may be possible that religion is a more hazardous source of minority stress than race for Asians and Asian Americans.
... Two studies test if religious identity impacts hostile attitudes: they find an association between the two if violent-prone ideas are prevalent and/or believers feel threatened by others, see B2 in Table 4. Furthermore, ingroup identification seems to increase hostile attitudes and threat perceptions (B3) due to intergroup biases as shown by several studies (see B3, Table 4). Drawing on case studies from France (Badea et al., 2020) and the United States (Gerteis et al., 2020), it becomes evident that threat perceptions are particularly high if people believe that their national/political identity is tied to religion (B4). Studies by Kanas et al. (2015Kanas et al. ( , 2017 as well as Obaidi et al. (2018Obaidi et al. ( , 2022 demonstrate how threat perception can lead to hostile attitudes, for example, through fears of replacement of the own religion by another one (B5). ...
Interreligious relations remain an important dimension of human coexistence and we currently observe an increase in religiously motivated violence and discrimination. Hence, we need to better understand determinants of interreligious peace. Building on a new concept of interreligious peace which includes but exceeds the absence of interreligious physical violence, we provide a systematic review of 83 quantitative empirical studies examining religious determinants of interreligious physical violence, hostile attitudes, threat perceptions, trust, and cooperation. We find that religious ideas foster or hinder interreligious peace depending on their content. Religious identities have negative effects but must be considered in context. Evidence regarding the role of religious practice is mixed and the role of religious actors and institutions remains understudied. Our results show the need for (1) more conceptual clarity, (2) replications in different contexts, (3) research on dimensions of religion beyond identities, and (4) a better integration of different strands of literature.
... Until recently, academic researchers had paid little attention to historical and contemporary associations between racism and Islamophobia (Meer, 2013;Rana, 2007). This is, however, slowly being corrected via the development of a literature interrogating linkages between the two (see, inter alia, Cheng, 2015;Gerteis et al., 2020;Jones et al., 2019;Meer, 2016;Meer & Modood, 2010;Moosavi, 2015;Sealy, 2021;Sian, 2017). Outside academia, in contrast, this ambiguity has not been interrogated so much as utilised to deflect demands to recognise Islamophobia. ...
Debates about Islamophobia have been blighted by the question of whether the prejudice can be defined as a form of racism or as hostility to religion (or a combination of the two). This paper sheds light on this debate by presenting the findings of a new nationally representative survey, focused on the UK, that contrasts perceptions of Muslims not only with perceptions of other ethnic and religious minorities but also with perceptions of Islam as a religious tradition. We find that prejudice against Muslims is higher than for any other group examined other than Travellers. We also find contrasting demographic drivers of prejudice towards Muslims and towards Islam. Across most prejudice measures we analyse, intolerant views are generally significantly associated with being male, voting Conservative and being older, although not with Anglican identity. We find, however, that class effects vary depending on the question's focus. Anti‐immigration sentiment – including support for a ‘Muslim ban’ – is significantly correlated with being working‐class. However, prejudice towards Islam as a body of teachings (tested using a question measuring perceptions of religious literalism) is significantly correlated with being middle‐class, as is negative sentiment towards Travellers. Using these findings, the paper makes an argument for supplementing recent scholarship on the associations between racism and Islamophobia with analyses focusing on misperceptions of belief.
... The findings concerning Muslims are interesting in light of previous research finding that Muslims experience some of the highest rates of religious discrimination in the U.S., both in the workplace and outside of it (Gerteis et al. 2019;Scheitle and Ecklund 2020). This means that even though Muslims are experiencing high levels of discrimination at work, they are still choosing to express their religion in the workplace. ...
While many variables might influence an individual’s willingness to express their faith in the workplace, the role of regional context has not been fully considered. The different geographical regions in the U.S. consist of unique demographics and cultures that could shape an individual’s expression of faith at work. Moreover, these regional effects might be moderated by an individual’s specific religious tradition. Using data from a survey of U.S. adults featuring oversamples of Jewish and Muslim individuals, we utilize two unique measures of religious expression—displaying/wearing religious items at work and talking about religion at work—to assess the roles of region and religious tradition in expression of faith at work. We find that regional cultures can sometimes override religious subcultures to determine if and how people express their religion in the workplace. We find that evangelical-conservative Christians are more likely than those following most other religious traditions to say that they talk about their faith at work, regardless of the region in which they reside. However, we also find that individuals in the South tend to be more likely to express their faith in the workplace independent of their religious tradition while evangelicals in the Northwest are less so. The findings have broader implications for subcultures related to religious pluralism in an increasingly diverse U.S. society.
... The present globalized context of social polarization and hostility around Islam has placed several marginalized migrant communities under much duress [60][61][62][63] and the precipitous rise in Islamophobic attacks since 9/11 are a public health concern [64]. This polarization and hostility has cast the Muslim body as both a perplexity and a threat, which has served to legitimize anti-migrant and Islamophobic policies and rhetoric across the U.S. (along with a host of other countries) [65,66], in line with structural racism [67]. ...
While Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C) continues to garner global attention, FGM/C-affected migrant communities, who are often racialized minorities in the U.S., face additional challenges which may impact their physical and mental health and well-being. It has been proposed that an overly narrow focus on the female genitalia or FGM/C status alone, while ignoring the wider social experiences and perceptions of affected migrant women, will result in incomplete or misleading conclusions about the relationship between FGM/C and migrant women’s health. A cross-sectional study was conducted across two waves of Somali and Somali Bantu women living in the United States, ( n = 879 [wave 1], n = 654 [wave 2]). Socio-demographics, self-reported FGM/C status, perceived psychological distress, and self-reported FGM/C-related health morbidity was examined against self-reported experiences of everyday discrimination and perceived psychosocial support. In statistical models including age and educational attainment as potentially confounding socio-demographic variables, as well as self-reported FGM/C status, self-reported discrimination, and perceived psychosocial support, self-reported discrimination was the variable most strongly associated with poor physical health and psychological distress (i.e., FGM/C-related health morbidity and psychological distress), with greater perceived psychosocial support negatively associated with psychological distress, when controlling for all the other variables in the model. FGM/C status was not significantly associated with either outcome. Discrimination, more frequently reported among ‘No FGM/C’ (i.e., genitally intact or unmodified) women, was most frequently perceived as linked to religion and ethnicity. Our findings are consistent with views that discrimination drives negative outcomes. In this population, discrimination may include the ‘quadruple jeopardy’ of intersecting relationships among gender, race, religion, and migration status. We find that self-reported experiences of discrimination—and not FGM/C status per se—is associated with adverse physical and mental health consequences in our sample drawn from Somali migrant communities living in the United States, and that social support may help to mitigate these consequences. Our findings thus reinforce calls to better contextualize the relationship between FGM/C and measures of health and well-being among Somali women in the United States (regardless of their FGM/C status), taking psychosocial factors more centrally into account.
Clinical Trials.Gov ID no. NCT03249649, Study ID no. 5252. Public website: https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT03249649
... Guided by CRT and the study of cultural boundaries in national belonging, Gerteis et al. (2020) explore the anti-Muslim sentiment in the USA. They found that nearly half of Americans embrace some form of anti-Muslim sentiment, and that "the more Americans embrace colorblind liberalism and reject racial nationalism, the less likely they are to reject the idea that Muslims belong in the public sphere" (p. ...
In higher education institutions, critical race theory (CRT) is known to be associated with fields that study racial disparities or systemic oppression such as law, education, and ethnic studies. The impression that CRT is unrelated to fields like business or computer science may have led scholars and practitioners from these disciplines to put their focus on elsewhere than on racial inequality and its implication in their research and practice, despite apparent need. To counter such fallacy, this review article—focusing primarily on the US context—discusses CRT literature in fields where its presence is less known which are nevertheless among the major domains of higher education institutions: health sciences, computer science and information technology, sports, business, and religion. By discussing example research of how scholars have utilized CRT in different fields to challenge the race-neutral thinking that often obscures structural racism, this paper exposes racism’s ability to alter manifestations and to appear through various shapes and forms within the higher education context. Initial recommendations on how educators may engage in further discussions or actions will also be considered. This paper concludes that racist ideologies are often hidden behind discipline-specific vocabulary or technical language, and it is by tackling the ideologies at work underneath the technicalities can we address the chameleon-like nature of racism more effectively.
... Studies also show that these threats affect whites' punitiveness toward other racial minorities. For instance, perceived cultural threat from Hispanics and Muslims is associated with increased support for the deportation of Hispanics and systematic bias in the criminal justice system against Muslims (Dahab and Omori 2019;Edgell et al. 2016;Gerteis, Hartmann, and Edgell 2019;Newman, Hartman, and Taber 2012). ...
A “tough on crime” attitude has dominated criminal justice policy and practice in the United States since the 1970s. In an effort to understand this rise in punitiveness, scholars have identified racial attitudes and religion as significant predictors of punitive sentiment. However, little or no extant research has examined the potential mediating effect of racial resentment on the relationship between religion and punitive attitudes. Using data from the 2017 Kids’ Wellbeing Survey, ordinal and logistic regressions are employed to measure the relationships between religion, racial resentment, and punitive attitudes toward youth criminals. Findings indicate that the effects of religion, particularly Mainline Protestant, Evangelical, and Catholic affiliation, on punitive attitudes toward criminally involved youth is mediated by racial resentment. This suggests that racial resentment plays a significant role in understanding the relationship between religion and punitive sentiments.
... This provides an answer to how majority-group members discriminate. Future research could contribute to the field by investigating why companies discriminate (e.g., due to perceiving Muslims as a threat to safety or due to an understanding of national belonging that excludes Muslims; see Gerteis, Hartmann, and Edgell 2019), which goes beyond the scope of this paper. By exploiting geographical variations between countries and regions as well as market conditions (the popularity of venues), we made some attempts to approach the question of "why." ...
We add to the current debate on ethno-religious discrimination by studying to what extent discrimination in the wedding venue business is based on religious or ethnic grounds. Do the two reinforce each other? Does the explicit mentioning of a non-religious wedding help to reduce ethnic discrimination in a secularized society? We draw on two field experiments in Germany and Austria. We sent 805 valid emails to wedding venues. We randomly varied two traits, the names (Arabic-origin and native-origin) and whether the wedding was religious (Islamic or Free Church) or not. Using linear probability models and ordinary least squares regressions, we predicted the likelihood of receiving a confirmation, the response time from venues, the length, formality, and tone of the emails as well as the prevalence of mistakes in the emails. Our analyses showed that couples with Arabic-origin names, celebrating an Islamic wedding, received significantly fewer confirmations compared to couples with native-origin names. Celebrating a non-religious wedding of couples with Arabic-origin names reduced the disadvantage. The study suggests statistical discrimination based on religiosity that is inferred from Arabic-origin names.
The full text is available here (open access): https://academic.oup.com/socpro/advance-article/doi/10.1093/socpro/spab032/6356008
... They are also a targeted minority. Islamophobic attacks only lagged behind anti-Semitic hate crimes in 2019 (Gerteis, Hartmann, & Edgell, 2020;Hassan, 2019). The Muslim community presented a convenient target for both overt and covert rhetoric during the Trump administration to drum up support in the Republican rank and file. ...
The COVID-19 pandemic disproportionately affects already-vulnerable minorities, highlighting the need for strong, trusting relationships between governments and minority nonprofits for everyone's benefit. The current scholarship suggests minority members often lack trust in government. This study contributes to the field by examining trust levels Muslim-American nonprofits have for federal, state, and local government. Nearly two-thirds (65%) of Muslim nonprofit leaders believe that they may be discriminated against in the award of CARES Act funding, but on racial rather than religious ones. Moreover, partisanship affects trust levels. Muslim nonprofits in Republican “red” states show less trust in government compared with those in Democratic “blue” states. This study finds evidence that past relationships with the government strengthen trust. Past awards of government grants correlated positively with higher trust at both federal and local levels.
... Research on the constructions of American identity and immigration suggests that "speaking English" is an implicit but critical component of what it means to be American (see Gerteis et al. 2020). Given this assumption, the present research asks what happens when individuals are exposed to a foreign language in a U.S. context? ...
The number of non-English speaking and bilingual immigrants continues to grow in the U.S. Previous research suggests that about one third of White Americans feel threatened upon hearing a language other than English. The current research examines how exposure to a foreign language affects White Americans’ perceptions of immigrants and group-based threats. In Study 1, White Americans were randomly assigned to read one of four fictional transcripts of a conversation of an immigrant family at a restaurant, where the type of language being spoken was manipulated to be either Korean, Spanish, German, or English. In Study 2, White Americans read the same fictional transcript—minus the Spanish; however, there was an addition of two subtitles conditions in which the subtitles were provided next to the Korean and German texts. The two studies suggest that exposure to a foreign language—regardless of whether they are consistent with Anglocentric constructions of American identity—lead White Americans to form less positive impressions of the immigrant targets and their conversation, experience an uptick in group-based threats, and display greater anti-immigrant attitudes. Moreover, there is evidence that the (in)ability to understand the conversation (i.e., epistemic threat) influences participants’ perceptions of immigrants and group-based threats.
... For example, Newman, Hartman, and Taber (2012) report that when whites interact with immigrants who speak little to no English, this heightens their perception that immigrants are a cultural threat and leads to them favor capture and deportation. Recent work has also documented a growing perception of Muslims as an ethno-cultural "other" that poses a political and cultural threat to Americans (Dahab and Omori 2019;Edgell et al., 2016;Gerteis, Hartmann, and Edgell 2019). This othering of Muslims has led to an increasing number of poorer Muslim Americans experiencing similar profiling, harsh policing, and general punitiveness in the criminal justice system as have Black and Latino individuals and communities (Norton 2013). ...
America's judicial system is both exceptionally punitive and demonstrably unjust toward racial minorities. While these dual realities are structured into America's institutions, we propose they are also partially sustained by the intersection of ideologies that are both racialized and sacralized. Using multiple waves of the General Social Surveys and a unique measure that asks Americans to choose between two forms of judicial injustice (wrongful conviction or erroneous acquittal), we examine how white racial identity intersects with biblical literalism to bolster America's bent toward unjust punitiveness. In the main effects, Americans who affirm biblical literalism are more likely to show a preference for convicting the innocent, as are whites compared to Black Americans. Examining interaction effects, however, we find whiteness moderates the influence of biblical literalism such that only white biblical literalists (as opposed to non-white biblical literalists or white non-biblical literalists) are more likely to prefer RACIALIZED RELIGION AND JUDICIAL INJUSTICE wrongful conviction. Indeed, in our full model, being a white biblical literalist is the strongest predictor of preferring wrongful conviction. We theorize that preference for wrongful conviction over erroneous acquittal stems, at least in part, from the combination of sacralized authoritarianism and perceived racial threat.
... Closely related to public views about race and immigration are attitudes toward Muslims, which became increasingly negative after 9/11 and a subsequent backlash occurring in negative media coverage of Islam (Bail 2012(Bail , 2014, followed by a corresponding negative turn in public opinion (Peek 2011). Such anti-Muslim views are amplified to the extent that people perceive Muslims as a cultural threat (Gerteis et al. 2019). Empirical research finds a close connection between negative views of immigrants and Muslims in Western countries, such that people with xenophobic attitudes also tend to have Islamophobic attitudes (Kalkan et al. 2009;Strabac and Listhaug 2008). ...
Some of the strongest predictors of voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election were Christian nationalism and antipathy toward Muslims and immigrants. We examine the interrelated influence of these three factors on Americans’ intentions to vote for Trump in 2020. Consistent with previous research, Christian nationalism and Islamophobia remained strong and significant predictors of intention to vote for Trump; however, the effect of xenophobia was stronger. Further, xenophobia and Islamophobia significantly and substantially mediated the effects of Christian nationalism. Consequently, though Christian nationalism remains theoretically and empirically distinct as a cultural framework, its influence on intending to vote for Trump in 2020 is intimately connected to fears about ethnoracial outsiders. In the penultimate year before Trump’s reelection campaign, the strongest predictors of supporting Trump, in order of magnitude, were political party, xenophobia, identifying as African American (negative), political ideology, Christian nationalism, and Islamophobia.
... Closely related to public views about race and immigration are attitudes toward Muslims, which became increasingly negative after 9/11 and a subsequent backlash occurring in negative media coverage of Islam (Bail 2012(Bail , 2014, followed by a corresponding negative turn in public opinion (Peek 2011). Such anti-Muslim views are amplified to the extent that people perceive Muslims as a cultural threat (Gerteis et al. 2019). Empirical research finds a close connection between negative views of immigrants and Muslims in Western countries, such that people with xenophobic attitudes also tend to have Islamophobic attitudes (Kalkan et al. 2009;Strabac and Listhaug 2008). ...
Some of the strongest predictors of voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election were Christian nationalism and antipathy toward Muslims and immigrants. We examine the interrelated influence of these three factors on Americans’ intentions to vote for Trump in 2020. Consistent with previous research, Christian nationalism and Islamophobia remained strong and significant predictors of intention to vote for Trump; however, the effect of xenophobia was stronger. Further, xenophobia and Islamophobia significantly and substantially mediated the effects of Christian nationalism. Consequently, though Christian nationalism remains theoretically and empirically distinct as a cultural framework, its influence on intending to vote for Trump in 2020 is intimately connected to fears about ethnoracial outsiders. In the penultimate year before Trump’s reelection campaign, the strongest predictors of supporting Trump, in order of magnitude, were: political party, xenophobia, identifying as African American (negative), political ideology, Christian nationalism, and Islamophobia.
This article explores how primordial, tribally rooted bonds become sacralized within the Civil Sphere (CS), challenging prevailing assumptions about the sphere?s inertial universal horizon. Through a structuralist-hermeneutic analysis of communicative and regulatory institutions surrounding the Trump Administration?s Muslim Ban (2017-2021), the study reveals how exclusionary, anti-civil policies become legitimized within ostensibly civil frameworks. Central to this dynamic is a paradox within the CS, wherein the discourse of liberty inherently justifies repression when targeted groups are represented as threats to democratic universality. This analysis demonstrates the persistence of a ?tribal solidaristic horizon,? rooted in primordial ties to blood, land, and religion, strategically mobilized through civil motives, relations, and institutions to narrow solidarity. The Muslim Ban initially faced fierce opposition, characterized by widespread protests and judicial scrutiny framed by civil binaries profaning the ban as un-American, anti-democratic, and unconstitutional. Subsequent iterations adapted strategically to these cultural binaries, gaining legitimacy through orderly, procedural implementation. This strategic civil rebranding exemplifies how primordial ties-grounded in race, place, and religious identity-continue to shape and constrain the civil sphere, facilitating democratic backsliding through the relativization and manipulation of civil motives, relations, and institutions. Ultimately, the study extends Civil Sphere Theory by underscoring vulnerabilities to relativization of core cultural binaries, highlighting that resilience in democratic societies requires critical recognition of how civil discourses themselves can be co-opted to legitimize exclusion. The Muslim Ban case thus reveals significant deficits in universalistic CS resilience, signaling vulnerability to sustained exclusion despite apparent civil repair.
Muslim Americans have faced periods of heightened hostility, particularly in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and, more recently, during the presidency of Donald Trump. Yet, dynamics driving this hostility and the ways individuals might draw boundaries across different time periods is not well understood. We begin to address these data gaps using measures of U.S. adults’ support for anti-Muslim policies appearing in separate surveys in 2002 and 2019. The analysis finds that support for anti-Muslim policies follows more distinct social patterns in 2019 than in 2002 and that overall support for anti-Muslim policies has decreased over time but become more polarized in 2019 when compared to 2002. Results have implications for understanding the impact of different conditions on how intergroup hostility and polarization occur.
In American mainstream cultural discourse, Islam is often constructed as undemocratic, violent, and un-American. How do American Muslim advocates react to these tarnished representations of their religion? This paper examines the ways in which Muslim advocates construct public discourse around Islam by exploring the possibilities for and recognizing the constraints on their public religious expressions in U.S. civic life as advocates navigate cultural templates infused with de-sacralized Christian meanings. Based on participant observation in two Muslim advocacy organizations, the article demonstrates that advocates map Islam differently, depending on whether the imagined audience of their public discourse is other Muslims or non-Muslims. When advocates imagine addressing non-Muslims, the public discourse of both groups similarly emphasizes Islamic compatibility of Muslim with American values. Among both groups, there is a process of filtering certain religious expressions for more expansive social maps that uncovers the unequal power dynamics shaping trajectories of public religion in civic life for one of the most stigmatized ethno-religious groups in the United States today. This paper contributes to expanding our understanding of how civic culture enables and constrains historically marginalized groups’ attempts at redefining belonging.
Islamophobia is a reality facing Muslim college students daily on and off campus. In this chapter, I highlight Islamophobia in higher education environments and explore its structural and interactional manifestations. I provide practical recommendations to address institutional and interpersonal Islamophobia and specify how campus educators can work to respond to and prevent Islamophobic incidents. I also make policy recommendations to respond to the hostility toward Muslims in the national discourse. Finally, I outline future frontiers for higher education research, such as the need to account for the complexity of the Muslim identity and its intersections and the need to distinguish Islamophobia from Muslim appreciation through empirical measurement. Future directions in higher education should take on the responsibility of responding to Islamophobia and eradicating its hold on Muslim lives.
Practical Takeaways
Colleges and universities should critically examine their infrastructures and policies concerning accommodating the religious needs of Muslim students. Each campus should have an academic accommodations policy that specifies how students may go about requesting an accommodation for religious reasons. This policy should be explicitly stated in syllabi, websites, and orientation materials.
Institutional leadership should explicitly commit to countering religious‐based hate, including Islamophobia, through policies that condemn such forms of hate and outline specific means of responding to incidents when they occur. A proactive effort to counter hate on campus requires knowledge of the structures in place to utilize these resources when needed and to identify areas for improvement.
Educators should create programs and opportunities that promote interactions across religious, spiritual, and secular (RSS) identities and must offer the time, resources, and effort to support formalized campus activities that foreground interfaith engagement. Educators should proactively create spaces for these encounters and incorporate these opportunities into campus architecture and the required programming (e.g., orientation).
In the face of a national movement to eliminate, ban, or otherwise weaken diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) resources on college campuses, religious accommodations must be codified in both state and federal laws and guidelines to create consistency across states and a standard of how universities could actively work to create a welcoming environment for all.
Recent research documents extensive Islamophobia and discrimination against Muslims in the United States. The current study seeks to better understand the discrimination experienced by Muslims and its mental health consequences in comparison to that experienced within a general sample of Americans. Using data from an original national survey of 700 American adults and an oversample of 300 Muslims, our analyses indicate elevated levels of perceived discrimination
among Muslims (both White and non-White), relative to White non-Muslims, and comparable to that experienced by non-Muslim racial/ethnic minorities. Furthermore, Muslims report higher rates of depressive symptoms than Christians and non-religious individuals, and this mental health disparity is fully explained by Muslims’ greater perceived discrimination. These findings suggest that the racialization of Muslims in the United States is a public health concern.
How do native-born Americans evaluate citizenship claims made by immigrant groups? Prior research identifies three broad patterns: respondents (1) make judgments based on immigrants’ willingness to adhere to national norms and civic values, (2) rely on ethnoracial cues, and (3) rely on economic cues. Using a conjoint survey experiment, this is the first study to examine how these patterns hold across two distinct dimensions of citizenship—legal membership (being considered a citizen of the state) and cultural membership (being perceived as a fellow American). The results reveal that legal status and age of arrival are powerful determinants for attitudes toward legal membership. By contrast, ethnoracial boundaries have a more significant impact on cultural membership, even after accounting for key predictors, such as legal status and English proficiency. Moreover, we show that evaluations of citizenship claims differ for White and non-White Americans in meaningful ways. Compared to White respondents, Black and Latino respondents express higher levels of ingroup preference for legal membership, and Latinos are significantly more likely to use an inclusive definition of cultural membership. In tandem, these results highlight the importance of measuring citizenship as a multidimensional concept and the limitations of focusing on the dominant group to understand immigration attitudes in contemporary diverse societies.
After 9/11, the stereotypes and generalizations against Muslims are exacerbated. By examining Lalami’s The Other Americans, this paper aims to challenge the prejudice and orientalist perceptions towards Muslims and US-Muslims through the aesthetic strategies that the author uses: Islamic tenets and values. The method used for this analysis is a Critical Textual Analysis and engages with Postcolonial Studies, particularly Edward Said's concept of the Othering. The analysis found that prejudicial perception is a challenge through Islamic tenets such as the practice of Qur'an recital and fasting (sawm) which promotes Islam as consolation and peace. The novel also challenges the image of savagery and backwardness in the orientalist views through Islamic values that reflect the qualities of the Prophet Muhammad by depicting the values of perseverance (istiqamah), compassion, and innovation through embracing entrepreneurship. The findings reveal that the prejudiced views of Islam that are maintained by insularity and ignorance are countered by the Islamic tenets and values that are promoted in Islam and practiced by its believers. Thus, Lalami’s novel undermines anti-Muslim racism by exploring Islamic tenets and values, including the Quran and hadiths, practiced by Lalami’s characters who have suffered from the exclusion of U.S. belonging for centuries.
Research finds that experiences of religious discrimination are often associated with poorer health outcomes. However, there remain important questions to consider gaps, including whether religious discrimination has similar health impacts on religious minority groups and religious majority groups, whether religious discrimination is equally harmful for both mental and physical health, and whether specific types of discrimination have different impacts on health. Using survey data from a probability sample of U.S. adults and measures representing a variety of discrimination experience types, our analyses suggest that religious discrimination is indeed harmful for health, but that experiences of religious discrimination do not universally affect mental and physical health in the same ways. Rather than significant differences in the health impacts of religious discrimination across different religious groups, we find more variation in the health impacts of different types of experiences with discrimination. Further, we find that mental health is negatively impacted by a wider range of experiences with religious discrimination than physical health. These findings are in line with social psychological research on the differential health impacts of discrimination, and they highlight the importance of context in studies of the health effects of religious discrimination.
Building on the insight that American religion is fundamentally “raced” and “complex,” we theorize American religion is so deeply racialized that seemingly “race-neutral” religious claims about national identity are ultimately more oriented toward racial rather than religious considerations. Drawing on recent, nationally representative data, we test how technically “race-neutral” measures of Christian nationalism interact with race to shape how Americans evaluate the national implications of religious and racial diversity. Though Christian nationalism predicts viewing both religious and racial diversity as national hindrances, its association with racial diversity is much stronger. This holds across racial groups, and particularly among Black and Asian Americans. In contrast, interactions show Black Americans diverge from whites in that they become more favorable toward religious diversity as Christian nationalism increases. Combining outcomes into four categories, Americans who score higher on Christian nationalism are more likely to become “Ecumenical Ethno-Pessimists” (viewing religious diversity as a strength, but racial diversity as a hindrance) than pure “Ethno-Nationalists” (viewing both religious and racial diversity as hindrances). This association is especially strong among Black and Asian Americans. Findings demonstrate even with seemingly “race-neutral” measures that would ostensibly target religious heterogeneity as the core national threat, it is racial diversity that threatens national unity.
Asymmetric social alignments are transforming American partisan rhetoric, particularly how politicians leverage identity-based appeals. For example, asymmetric religious, racial, and ideological alignments within the Republican party now make reactionary religious rhetoric increasingly strategic. Focusing on that case, I propose a novel conceptual model to understand what such rhetoric aims to accomplish. Reactionary religious rhetoric advertises, appeals, and activates on a spectrum from overt to subconscious registers, which I explain using three metaphors: mating call, dog whistle, and trigger. Within a context of asymmetrical partisan “sorting,” Christian nationalist rhetoric overtly advertises partisanship (mating call). Rhetoric deploying encoded terms like “Christian” and “socialist” appeals to ethno-culture, connecting specific political opponents to abstract ethno-religious threats (dog whistle). Lastly, research on overlapping identities increasingly suggests rhetoric involving threats to “Christianity” may unconsciously activate White racial threat (trigger). I consider applications of this conceptual model to growing political appeals to nationalist and populist identities.
A principal concern regarding nationalist sentiment is the tendency to sanctify “the nation” and support it as chosen and pure regardless of its complicity in injustice. Building on research showing the tendency to whitewash America’s past is primarily localized to white Americans, and particularly those who stress its Christian heritage, we theorize Christian nationalism amplifies Americans’ willingness to endorse “blind patriotism” (supporting the nation even in the wrong), but only for white Americans as opposed to Blacks or Hispanics. General Social Survey data affirm the more Americans conflate Christian and American identities, the more they agree citizens should support their country even if it is wrong. As anticipated, this association is pronounced for white Americans, but virtually non-existent among Blacks and Hispanics. Stemming from American religious and national identities being deeply racialized, conflating the two sanctifies “the nation” but only among whites, whose national membership and hegemony were historically assumed.
Populist movements seek to bolster the power of “the people” and undermine elites. In the United States a businessman, Donald Trump, has convinced a significant portion of the population that he is a man of the people. We answer three inter-related questions about what may be Trump’s biggest “win”: the transformation of populist discourse for a new century. How does Trump embed himself inside his followers’ own deep story? How does he fuse their story with a tale of American restoration? And how does he delegitimize politics as a vocation and valorize politics as business? Drawing on a systematic analysis of Trump/MAGA rallies held in four different regions from 2015 to 2021, we analyze how Trump used his performance to crystalize a distinctly American style of populism. We focus on the cultural accomplishment of his performance, particularly the creation of a business-friendly rhetoric that leverages popular cultural idioms to legitimate politics not as a vocation, but as a business. We find that Trump uses the popular idioms of standup comedy and competitive sports culture. This performance contributed to his 2016 win, yet framing politics as a game to be won runs the risk of reducing deliberative democratic process to election-night outcomes, makes political parties into opposing teams, and divides voters into winners and losers.
An underappreciated aspect of critical race theory (CRT) is its analysis of the intersection of race, law, religion, and spirituality. These topics are of concern to critical race theorists because a complete critique of U.S. law must account for how religion is embedded in the nation’s founding documents and subsequent jurisprudence. Recently, leading scholars have called for a theory that accounts for the codefining quality of race, racism, and religion. I argue that CRT is an appropriate answer to these calls. I demonstrate CRT’s utility by renewing the religion and spirituality-based critique of race law that undergirds early CRT. Then, I discuss the spirituality of CRT, noting its founders’ reliance on Christian tradition and the spiritual claims in its tenets. Finally, I suggest future lines for research and show how CRT speaks to several debates among religious practitioners and academic researchers.
Purpose of Review
There is a growing body of work that documents the impact of 9/11 and the war on terror on Arab and Muslim children and families. This review is designed to provide a brief overview and suggest new ways to better understand this understudied population.
Recent Findings
Several studies show anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiments at its highest levels since 9/11. There is strong evidence that Arab and Muslim children and families experience some of the highest levels of discrimination, and as a result, they report higher levels of mental health symptoms.
Summary
Given the limited data, we need future studies (a) to focus on populations outside of the USA and Europe; (b) to use longitudinal designs; (c) to pay attention to within group variations by race, gender, social class, and immigration status; and (d) to use culturally validated instruments.
Atheists are among the most disliked groups in America, which has been explained in a variety of ways, one of which is that atheists are hostile towards religion and that anti-atheist prejudice is therefore reactive. We tested this hypothesis by using the 2018 American General Social Survey by investigating attitudes towards atheists, Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, and Muslims. We initially used a general sample of Americans, but then identified and isolated individuals who were atheists, theists, nonreligious atheists, religious theists, and/or theistic Christians. Logically, if atheists were inordinately hostile towards religion, we would expect to see a greater degree of in-group favouritism in the atheist group and a greater degree of out-group dislike. Results indicated several notable findings: 1). Atheists were significantly more disliked than any other religious group. 2). Atheists rated Christians, Buddhists, Jews, and Hindus as favourably as they rated their own atheist in-group, but rated Muslims less positively (although this effect was small). 3). Christian theists showed pronounced in-group favouritism and a strong dislike towards atheists. No evidence could be found to support the contention that atheists are hostile towards religious groups in general, and towards Christians specifically, although this may have been a Type II error. If atheist groups do dislike religious groups, then this hypothetical dislike would be significantly smaller in magnitude than the dislike directed toward atheists by Christians.
How do American Muslims practice inclusivity and bridge religious differences in U.S. civic life? Sociological research on bridging focuses mostly on bridging efforts on the part of majority groups, leaving unanswered the timely question of if and how inclusivity is practiced by minority groups, particularly religious minorities, in U.S. civic spaces. Drawing on participant observation among two Muslim groups in Los Angeles, this paper identifies two practices of inclusivity that participants adopt to bridge religious difference: the interreligious heritage practice and the shared ethics practice. Both practices simultaneously draw and diffuse group boundaries, emphasize sameness, albeit using different sets of religious meanings, and are grounded in an understanding of civic spaces as implicitly exclusionary of minorities. I find that these practices can create tension points in the pursuit of mutual understanding and create textures of meanings that operate differently depending on the situation and the participants in the interaction.
Sociologists continue to debate the levels of civic participation of multiply marginalized groups. While scholarship traditionally portrayed marginalized groups as disengaged, others have theorized how group identity threat may incite higher engagement levels. Nevertheless, few examine the extent to which marginalized religious groups also have higher levels of civic engagement. This study contributes an empirical account of a racialized-religious community’s civic participation compared to other religious and nonreligious groups while accounting for complex religion (i.e., how religion is embedded with inequality). Drawing on large-scale undergraduate survey data, this article suggests that Muslims’ faith and collective racialized-religious identities enhance their civic participation compared to other religious groups. Findings extend group identity threat and complex religion theories to consider how a racialized-religious identity may produce different engagement patterns within and across religious communities.
We extend theories about “immigration backlash” and right-wing populism in three ways by analyzing trend data to examine the interplay between views of immigration, partisan polarization, and voting patterns in presidential elections. First, we document how immigration views became more aligned with partisan polarization between 2000 and 2018. Second, we show that immigration views were significantly more predictive of voting for Donald Trump in 2016 compared to Republican presidential candidates in the 1992 through 2012 elections. Due to increased partisan polarization, the indirect effects of immigration views on presidential voting (as mediated through political ideology and party identification) also increased over time, and were stronger in 2016 compared to previous elections. Finally, we show evidence of a post-Trump backlash on immigration views, with political independents and Democrats becoming significantly more favorable toward immigration after 2016. By 2018, the American public was more polarized over matters of immigration than at any time previous in the available data, and these views corresponded more strongly with voting patterns. These findings highlight the increasing importance of immigration for understanding partisan politics in the contemporary U.S., and reiterate the importance of anti-immigrant sentiment and partisan polarization to the success of right-wing populism in electoral democracies.
Islam is increasingly theorized as a “racialized” category in the United States, yet these accounts can too often emphasize a top-down approach of racial identification and obfuscate the importance of the African-American Muslim experience. Using Maghbouleh’s (2017) concept of “racial hinges”, the author synthesizes previous work and provides evidence from his own ethnographic research to describe how immigrant Muslims in the United States leverage different racial “strategies of action” (Swidler, 1986), including white acculturation and black appropriation. In the conclusion, the author suggests a third strategy: brown solidarity.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks and heavy-handed state and popular response to them stimulated increased scholarship on American Muslims. In the social sciences, this work has focused mainly on Arabs and South Asians, and more recently on African Americans. The majority of this scholarship has not engaged race theory in a comprehensive or intersectional manner. The authors provide an overview of the work on Muslims over the past 15 years and argue that the Muslim experience needs to be situated within race scholarship. The authors further show that September 11 did not create racialized Muslims, Arabs, or South Asians. Rather, the authors highlight a preexisting, racializing war on terror and a more complex history of these groups with race both globally and domestically. Islamophobia is a popular term used to talk about Muslim encounters with discrimination, but the concept lacks a clear understanding of race and structural racism. Newer frameworks have emerged situating Muslim experiences within race scholarship. The authors conclude with a call to scholars to embark on studies that fill major gaps in this emerging field of study—such as intersectional approaches that incorporate gender, communities of belonging, black Muslim experiences, class, and sexuality—and to remain conscious of the global dimensions of this racial project.
Despite Americans’ commitment to religious freedom, religious minorities have been marginalized and excluded since the country’s founding. Focusing on the 2016 election, this article analyzes the latest chapter in this history, in which Republican candidates constructed symbolic boundaries that defined Muslims as non-American (outsiders), anti-American (enemies), and un-American (others). It then draws parallels between contemporary anti-Muslim rhetoric and the historic treatment of Catholics, Jews, Mormons, and atheists. In each case, these religious groups have troubled a vision of American belonging that is tightly linked to white Protestant identity, and more subtly, to individualist and voluntaristic notions of the good religious (and democratic) subject. This recurrent pattern complicates the notion that American nationhood is rooted in civic rather than ethnic membership, instead revealing a complex interplay between civic and ethnic logics of exclusion. While efforts to purify the “Christian nation” rest explicitly upon an ethno-religious vision of American peoplehood, a subtler civic logic is also at work in efforts to frame religious minorities as uncivil threats to American values and norms, including religious freedom itself.
Islamophobia was originally developed as a concept in the late 1990s by political activists to draw attention to rhetoric and actions directed at Islam and Muslims in Western liberal democracies. In recent years, Islamophobia has evolved from a primarily political concept toward one increasingly deployed for analytical purposes. Researchers have begun using the term to identify the history, presence, dimensions, intensity, causes, and consequences of anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiments. In short, Islamophobia is an emerging comparative concept in the social sciences. Yet, there is no widely-accepted definition of the term. As a result, it is extremely difficult to compare levels of Islamophobia across time, location, or social group, or to levels of analogous categories like racism, anti-Semitism, or xenophobia.
Framing metaphors for counterterrorism have been analyzed theoretically but their effect has not yet been fully understood empirically. One framing metaphor that has been employed for counterterrorism is a ‘War on Terror’. The present study examined the effect of using the phrase ‘War on Terror’ on support for security policies that unfairly target Muslims. We manipulated the frame to make federal action or community action salient. Additionally, we tested the effect of the release of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS/Daesh, hereafter ISIS) propaganda films by collecting data before and after the February 2015 video featuring the execution of 21 Egyptian Copts by a Libyan ISIS group. We found that, after the video was released, a community-based framing of the ‘War on Terror’ significantly increased support for anti-Muslim security policies. We also examined the demographics of those who had seen ISIS videos versus those who had not and the factors that predicted whether participants were distressed by the videos. Those who had seen the videos were more likely to be male and have personal ties to the military or law enforcement. Those who were distressed by the videos were more likely to be politically conservative, female, younger, and have personal ties to the military or law enforcement.
Twenty percent of American adults claimed no religious preference in 2012, compared to 7 percent twenty-five years earlier. Previous research identified a political backlash against the religious right and generational change as major factors in explaining the trend. That research found that religious beliefs had not changed, ruling out secularization as a cause. In this paper we employ new data and more powerful analytical tools to: (1) update the time series, (2) present further evidence of correlations between political backlash, generational succession, and religious identification, (3) show how valuing personal autonomy generally and autonomy in the sphere of sex and drugs specifically explain generational differences, and (4) use GSS panel data to show that the causal direction in the rise of the “Nones” likely runs from political identity as a liberal or conservative to religious identity, reversing a long-standing convention in social science research. Our new analysis joins the threads of earlier explanations into a general account of how political conflict over cultural issues spurred an increase in non-affiliation.
The concept of colorblind racism has been developed in recent years to explain racial attitudes held by white Americans in the post-civil rights era. The authors use data from a new nationally representative survey with an oversample of black Americans to investigate the prevalence of core elements of colorblind ideology and to see the extent to which both black and white Americans adhere to three core dimensions of colorblindness theory: (1) abstract liberalism, (2) minimization of racism, and (3) cultural racism. They find that there are differences between black and white Americans with regard to their awareness of systemic dimensions of racial inequality. Yet they also find that the differences are not always large and that there is more awareness of racial inequality among whites than existing theories might suggest. Additionally, although blacks are much more likely than whites to reject some elements of colorblindness, the ideals of one element, abstract liberalism, are widely adopted by black and white Americans alike. The authors conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings and the underlying tensions and variations for existing theories of colorblindness.
Racialization is a concept that is theoretically underdeveloped. Although there has been an increased interest in Islamophobia since 9/11, it is very rarely discussed as racial in its nature. In this special issue on Islamophobia and the Racialization of Muslims scholars connect racism to Islamophobia. This issue situates racialization as a way to explain and understand Islamophobia, as racism towards a Muslim population. Through empirical studies, this issue uncovers the processes of racialization of Muslims and the rise of Islamophobia in both Europe and the USA. Case studies include the experiences of middle-class US Muslims; of white British converts to Islam; of young working-class British-Pakistani men; policing practices in Ireland; and the construction of Muslim identities through online comments about a reality television show. As well as identifying some issues specific to the nation, each case study also reveals the intersection of the racialization process with class and gender experiences.
This short discussion article addresses both the problem/s of defining Islamophobia and the ways in which our definitions impact on how we see the world and by what method/s the social problem of Islamophobia is measured. Because of growing internal tensions among Muslims in the world and because of the politicised nature of Islam and Muslims in the West, we argue that there is a growing need to consider how Islamophobia should be defined.
In the midst of growing reservations about Muslims in America, this study seeks to explore the factors accounting for Islamophobia by utilizing nationally representative data. The findings suggest that religious affiliations have differential effects on the degree to which one respects Islam, with Christians more likely to have low regard for Islam. The image of a God who punishes his followers for their sins has a positive association with the odds of Islam being least respected among all religions. While higher frequency of contact with Muslims predicts an overall improved opinion for Islam, evangelical and black Protestants present the opposite picture. Their increased exposure to Muslims leads to lower respect for Islam. I discuss the implications of these findings for theories of intergroup contact and subcultural identity.
Christian nationalism seeks the preservation or
restoration of a supposed religio-national purity. We argue
that, within the racialized social system of the United
States, this idealized religio-national purity is inextricably
linked with notions of ethno-racial purity. Focusing on
interracial families as a violation of ethno-racial purity, we
theorize that adherents to Christian nationalism will be less
supportive of family formations in which ethno-racial
purity is formally transgressed. We demonstrate this by
examining the impact of Christian nationalism on Americans’
views toward transracial adoption (TRA). Americans’
attitudes toward TRA provide an interesting test case
in that, unlike attitudes toward racial exogamy, TRA
implies no biological or cultural race-mixing between
social peers, but only a socio-legal guardianship across
races. Opposition to TRA thus taps Americans’ attitudes
about the ‘‘ideal’’ ethno-racial composition of families
socially and legally, rather than their beliefs about the
biological or cultural incompatibility of ethno-racial
groups. Analyzing national survey data, we find that
adherence to Christian nationalism is strongly and negatively
associated with support for TRA, net of relevant
controls. We demonstrate that the influence of Christian
nationalism is robust and independent of respondents’ trust
of other races and their religious commitment, both that
are strongly and positively associated with support for
TRA. Findings affirm that Christian nationalism implies
ethno-racial separation and purity, and thus, we propose
that a resurgence of Christian nationalist ideology in the
public sphere may serve to reinforce racial boundaries and
exclusion in other realms of American social life.
The racialization of Muslim Americans is examined in this article. Qualitative in-depth interviews with 48 Muslim Americans reveal they experience more intense forms of questioning and contestation about their status as an American once they are identified as a Muslim. Because Islam has become synonymous with terrorism, patriarchy, misogyny, and anti-American sentiments, when participants were identified as Muslims they were treated as if they were a threat to American cultural values and national security. Their racialization occurred when they experienced de-Americanization, having privileges associated with citizenship such as being viewed as a valued member of society denied to them. This article highlights the importance of gender in the process of racialization. It also demonstrates the need for race scholarship to move beyond a black and white paradigm in order to include the racialized experiences of second and third generations of newer immigrants living in the USA.
We investigate the relationship between stereotypes of immigrants and assessments of the impact of immigration on U.S. society. Our analysis exploits a split-ballot survey of registered voters in Ohio, who were asked to evaluate both the characteristics of one of four randomly assigned immigrant groups and perceived impacts of immigration. We find that associations between impact assessments and stereotypes of Middle Eastern, Asian, and European immigrants are weak and fully attenuated by control covariates. By contrast, this relationship for Latin American immigrants is strong and robust to controls, particularly in the areas of unemployment, schools, and crime. Our findings suggest that public views of the impacts of immigration are strongly connected to beliefs about the traits of Latin American immigrants in particular.
This article reviews how racialization enables an understanding of Muslim and Muslim American experience as racial. Race scholarship in the United States has historically been a Black/White paradigm. As a result, the experiences of many racial and ethnic groups who have become a part of the American landscape due to the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 have largely been ignored in race scholarship. By reviewing racialization and its application to Arabs and Muslims, it is apparent that scholars must continuously explore newer theories and languages of race. Racialization not only provides a way to understand the fluidity of race and racism but it also contributes to the advancement of race scholarship by reflecting on the current contextual influences on race.
Objective
This study explores variation in stereotypes of U.S. immigrants from Latin America, the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. Method
We exploit a split-ballot design in two waves of the Ohio Poll to test hypotheses about effects of contextual and respondent-level characteristics on immigrant stereotypes. ResultsRespondents generally rated Asian immigrants most positively and Latin American immigrants most negatively, with European and Middle Eastern immigrants occupying an intermediate position. Findings from regression analyses indicate little direct effect of county-level percent foreign born or media consumption. The strongest effects observed were income on stereotypes of Middle Eastern and Asian immigrants and concerns about the problem of unauthorized immigration on stereotypes of Latin American and Middle Eastern immigrants. Conclusion
Our findings suggest that views about the characteristics of certain groups of immigrants are strongly linked to national-level debates about unauthorized immigration.
This article investigates the determinants of anti-Muslim sentiment in the West. Starting from the premise that Islamophobic attitudes are more nuanced than a simple dislike of Muslims, I focus on specific forms of attitudes which link Muslims to violence and terrorism. Data from the Pew Global Attitudes Surveys are used to test three theories: perceived threat, social identity, and cognitive capabilities. A series of logit estimations are used for the empirical analysis of individual level data in the USA, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Spain. The results show that perceived realistic and symbolic threat is the most significant source of Islamophobic attitudes in the West. While individuals cognitively differentiate between general feelings toward Muslims and their specific characteristics, higher levels of education significantly reduces negative sentiments. A good number of Westerners think of Muslims as violent individuals while some believe that they support al-Qaeda. Citizens in the West are more likely to associate Muslims with terrorism if they feel threatened by their physical and cultural existence.
A comprehensive, compelling, and clearly written title that provides a rich examination of the history of Asians in the United States, covering well-established Asian American groups as well as emerging ones such as the Burmese, Bhutanese, and Tibetan American communities.
History of Asian Americans: Exploring Diverse Roots supplies a concise, easy-to-use, yet comprehensive resource on Asian American history. Chronologically organized, it starts with Chinese immigration to the United States and concludes with coverage of the most recent Asian migrant populations, describing Asian American lives and experiences and documenting them as an essential part of the continuously evolving American experience and mosaic.
The book discusses domestic as well as international influencing factors in Asian American history, thereby providing information within a transnational framework. An ideal resource for high school and undergraduate level students as well as general readers interested in learning about the history of Asian Americans, the chapters employ critical racialization and ethnic studies discourses that put Asian and Asian Americans subjects in an insightful comparative perspective. The book also specifically addresses the important roles played by Asian American women across history.
The declaration of a "War on Terror" in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks brought sweeping changes to the American criminal justice and national security systems, as well as a massive shift in the American public opinion of both individual Muslims and the Islamic religion generally. Since that time, sociologist Saher Selod argues, Muslim Americans have experienced higher levels of racism in their everyday lives. In Forever Suspect, Selod shows how a specific American religious identity has acquired racial meanings, resulting in the hyper surveillance of Muslim citizens. Drawing on forty-eight in-depth interviews with South Asian and Arab Muslim Americans, she investigates how Muslim Americans are subjected to racialized surveillance in both an institutional context by the state and a social context by their neighbors and co-workers. Forever Suspect underscores how this newly racialized religious identity changes the social location of Arabs and South Asians on the racial hierarchy further away from whiteness and compromises their status as American citizens.
Omi and Winant examine the creation and negotiation of race's role in identify construction, contestation, and deconstruction. Since no biological basis exists for the signification of racial differences, the authors discuss racial hierarchies in terms of a "racial formation," which is a process by which racial categories are created, accepted, altered, or destroyed. This theory assumes that society contains various racial projects to which all people are subjected. The role that race plays in social stratification secures its place as a political phenomenon in the United States. This stratification is tantamount to what Omi and Winant call "racial dictatorship," which has three effects. First, the identity "American" is conflated with the racial identity "white." Second, the "color line" becomes a fundamental division in American society. Finally, oppositional racial consciousness became consolidated in opposition to racial dictatorship.
While some research argues that religious pluralism in the United States dampens conflict by promoting tolerance, other work documents persistent prejudice toward religious out-groups. We address this ambiguity by identifying a distinct cultural style that structures Americans’ attitudes toward religious others: support for public religious expression (PRE). Using data from a recent nationally representative survey, we find a strong and consistent relationship between high support for PRE, negative attitudes toward religious out-groups, and generalized intolerance. Addressing the previously overlooked public aspects of religion and cultural membership in the United States has important implications for studies of civic inclusion.
Are conservative Protestants distinct in their support for individualistic explanations of racial inequality in America? Past research has generated contradictory findings on this question, along with debates about the best measure of evangelicalism and the factors that moderate religious influences on racial attitudes. Using data from the nationally representative Boundaries in the American Mosaic Project (2014), we examine how structural location interacts with religious commitment to influence understandings of and preferred solutions to African-American disadvantage. We show that religious beliefs, involvement, and centrality influence adherents differently, depending on their age, gender, education, income, and race. We find that measures do matter, and that denominational affiliation is less predictive than the orthodoxy and centrality of religious belief. We also find that straightforward talk about distinctiveness can mask the strong and pervasive effects of structural location on racial attitudes. We call for more research that makes the interaction between religiosity and structural location a central focus of analysis.
We use data from a nationally representative survey to analyze anti-atheist sentiment in the United States in 2014, replicating analyses from a decade earlier and extending them to consider the factors that foster negative sentiment toward other non-religious persons. We find that anti-atheist sentiment is strong, persistent, and driven in part by moral concerns about atheists and in part by agreement with cultural values that affirm religiosity as a constitutive moral grounding of citizenship and national identity. Moral concerns about atheists also spill over to shape attitudes toward those who are spiritual but not religious (SBNRs) and influence evaluations of the recent decline in religious identification. Americans have more positive views of SBNRs than of atheists, but a plurality of Americans still negatively evaluate the increase in the percentage of Americans who claim no religious identification (nones). Our analyses show the continuing centrality of religiously rooted moral boundary-making in constituting cultural membership in the American context.
Three stereotypical figures have come to represent the 'war on terror'-the 'dangerous' Muslim man, the 'imperilled' Muslim woman, and the 'civilized' European. Casting Out explores the use of these characterizations in the creation of the myth of the family of democratic Western nations obliged to use political, military, and legal force to defend itself against a menacing third world population. It argues that this myth is promoted to justify the expulsion of Muslims from the political community, a process that takes the form of stigmatization, surveillance, incarceration, torture, and bombing. In this timely and controversial work, Sherene H. Razack looks at contemporary legal and social responses to Muslims in the West and places them in historical context. She explains how 'race thinking,' a structure of thought that divides up the world between the deserving and undeserving according to racial descent, accustoms us to the idea that the suspension of rights for racialized groups is warranted in the interests of national security. She discusses many examples of the institution and implementation of exclusionary and coercive practices, including the mistreatment of security detainees, the regulation of Muslim populations in the name of protecting Muslim women, and prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib. She explores how the denial of a common bond between European people and those of different origins has given rise to the proliferation of literal and figurative 'camps,' places or bodies where liberties are suspended and the rule of law does not apply. Combining rich theoretical perspectives and extensive research, Casting Out makes a major contribution to contemporary debates on race and the 'war on terror' and their implications in areas such as law, politics, cultural studies, feminist and gender studies, and race relations.
In recent years, growing communities of Muslim-Americans have faced tension in a series of debates over the construction of Islamic prayer spaces in American cities. Islamic community members have found themselves fighting for representation within the political process and for their philosophical right to exist within American society. This study presents a framing analysis of the debate in five US newspapers between 2010 and 2013 as a way of examining the position of Muslims within contemporary American society. The study examines five frames: Local Regulation, Legal Authority, Political Debate, Muslim Neighbors, and Islamic Threat. The first three were episodic frames, while the other two were thematic. Some of the discourse showed evidence of Islamophobia, or indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims. Other stories showed evidence of Islamophilia, which is the stereotypical presentation of ‘good Muslims’ who are model citizens in contrast to the ‘bad Muslims’ who serve as rhetorical enemies.
In July 2010, Terry Jones, the pastor of a small fundamentalist church in Florida, announced plans to burn two hundred Qur'ans on the anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Though he ended up canceling the stunt in the face of widespread public backlash, his threat sparked violent protests across the Muslim world that left at least twenty people dead. In Terrified, Christopher Bail demonstrates how the beliefs of fanatics like Jones are inspired by a rapidly expanding network of anti-Muslim organizations that exert profound influence on American understanding of Islam. Bail traces how the anti-Muslim narrative of the political fringe has captivated large segments of the American media, government, and general public, validating the views of extremists who argue that the United States is at war with Islam and marginalizing mainstream Muslim-Americans who are uniquely positioned to discredit such claims. Drawing on cultural sociology, social network theory, and social psychology, he shows how anti-Muslim organizations gained visibility in the public sphere, commandeered a sense of legitimacy, and redefined the contours of contemporary debate, shifting it ever outward toward the fringe. Bail illustrates his pioneering theoretical argument through a big-data analysis of more than one hundred organizations struggling to shape public discourse about Islam, tracing their impact on hundreds of thousands of newspaper articles, television transcripts, legislative debates, and social media messages produced since the September 11 attacks. The book also features in-depth interviews with the leaders of these organizations, providing a rare look at how anti-Muslim organizations entered the American mainstream.
Anti-immigrant sentiment reached a fever pitch after 9/11, but its origins go back much further. Public rhetoric aimed at exposing a so-called invasion of Latino immigrants has been gaining ground for more than three decades-and fueling increasingly restrictive federal immigration policy. Accompanied by a flagging U.S. economy-record-level joblessness, bankruptcy, and income inequality-as well as waning consumer confidence, these conditions signaled one of the most hostile environments for immigrants in recent memory. In Brokered Boundaries, Douglas Massey and Magaly Sánchez untangle the complex political, social, and economic conditions underlying the rise of xenophobia in U.S. society. The book draws on in-depth interviews with Latin American immigrants in metropolitan New York and Philadelphia and-in their own words and images-reveals what life is like for immigrants attempting to integrate in anti-immigrant times. What do the social categories "Latino" and "American" actually mean to today's immigrants? Brokered Boundaries analyzes how first- and second-generation immigrants from Central and South America and the Caribbean navigate these categories and their associated meanings as they make their way through U.S. society. Massey and Sánchez argue that the mythos of immigration, in which newcomers gradually shed their respective languages, beliefs, and cultural practices in favor of a distinctly American way of life, is, in reality, a process of negotiation between new arrivals and native-born citizens. Natives control interactions with outsiders by creating institutional, social, psychological, and spatial mechanisms that delimit immigrants' access to material resources and even social status. Immigrants construct identities based on how they perceive and respond to these social boundaries. The authors make clear that today's Latino immigrants are brokering boundaries in the context of unprecedented economic uncertainty, repressive anti-immigrant legislation, and a heightening fear that upward mobility for immigrants translates into downward mobility for the native-born. Despite an absolute decline in Latino immigration, immigration-related statutes have tripled in recent years, including many that further shred the safety net for legal permanent residents as well as the undocumented. Brokered Boundaries shows that, although Latin American immigrants come from many different countries, their common reception in a hostile social environment produces an emergent Latino identity soon after arrival. During anti-immigrant times, however, the longer immigrants stay in America, the more likely they are to experience discrimination and the less likely they are to identify as Americans.
Written in engaging and approachable prose, Migration, Incorporation, and Change in an Interconnected World covers the bulk of material a student needs to get a good sense of the empirical and theoretical trends in the field of migration studies, while being short enough that professors can easily build their courses around it without hesitating to assign additional readings. Taking a unique approach, Ali and Hartmann focus on what they consider the important topics and the potential route the field is going to take, and incorporate a conceptual lens that makes this much more than a simple relaying of facts.
This study examines the relationship between interreligious contact and negative attitudes toward the religious outgroup among minority Christians and majority Muslims in Indonesia. It answers two research questions: Does interreligious contact reduce negative outgroup attitudes equally for minority Christians and majority Muslims? Are mediation by perceived group threat and moderation by perceived discrimination equally important for religious minorities and majorities? The analysis is based on unique survey data collected from among Christian and Muslim students in Ambon (the Moluccas) and Yogyakarta (central Java). Results show that a higher quantity of interreligious contact reduces negative outgroup attitudes among majority Muslims but not among minority Christians. However, the quality of contact reduces negative attitudes regardless of relative group size. Perceived group threat is an important mediator of the contact-attitude relationship and is equally so for Christians and Muslims. Findings suggest that perceived discrimination does not affect the relationship between interreligious contact and negative attitudes.
We correct, update, and elaborate Curtin, Presser, and Singer’s (2000) report that the University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumer Attitudes (SCA) experienced only a small response rate decline
between 1979 and 1996, contrary to the widespread perception of plunging response rates. Our aims are to (1) correct errors
in the SCA response rate data that affected Curtin, Presser, and Singer’s (2000) result, (2) examine the trend in SCA response rates after 1996, when caller identification technology became widespread,
and (3) describe the roles played by the various sources of SCA nonresponse over time. The results show that the response
rate decline from 1979 to 1996 was larger than described by Curtin, Presser, and Singer (2000); the response rate drop was significantly steeper from 1996 to 2003 than from 1979 to 1996; and the 1979 to 2003 trends differed
substantially for refusals and noncontacts.
This article draws upon recent research on race and diversity, much of it conducted by the author and his collaborators on the American Mosaic Project at the University of Minnesota, to provide a critical-theoretical perspective on multiculturalism in contemporary American culture. It is based upon three main empirical findings. The first is that Americans are, on initial inspection, generally quite open to and optimistic about diversity. Further analysis and deeper probing, however, reveals a second, cross-cutting discovery: that thought and talk about diversity is marked by a series of underlying tensions and misgivings. The third and perhaps most important finding is that the discourse about diversity is deeply informed and determined—over-determined perhaps—by race in the United States. Taken together, it is argued that the contradictory, race-based attitudes Americans exhibit toward diversity reflect and reproduce many of the key, animating ambivalences of multiculturalism in both theory and practice: for example, the tensions between individuals and groups and between abstract ideals and empirical realities. The article concludes by suggesting that multiculturalism is not only at a crossroads in the United States but is a crossroads where many conflicting impulses and ideals about solidarity, belonging, and equality come together in the same cultural space.
This article explores the conditions under which political modernization leads to nation building, to the politicization of ethnic cleavages, or to populism by modeling these three outcomes as more or less encompassing exchange relationships between state elites, counterelites, and the population. Actors seek coalitions that grant them the most advantageous exchange of taxation against public goods and of military support against political participation. Modeling historical data on the distribution of these resources in France and the Ottoman Empire from 1500 to 1900 shows that nation building results from strong state centralization and well-established civil societies; ethnic closure, from weak state capacity and civil societies; and populism, from medium centralization and weak civil societies. The results are consistent with French and Ottoman political histories of the 18th and 19th centuries.
Using a quasi-experimental research design, this study examines the effect of terrorist events on the perception of immigrants across 65 regions in nine European countries. It first elaborates a theoretical argument that explains the effect of events and points to economic conditions, the size of the immigrant population, and personal contact as mediating factors. This argument is evaluated using the fact that the terror attack in Bali on October 12, 2002, occurred during the fieldwork period of the European Social Survey. The findings from this natural experiment reveal considerable cross-national and regional variation in the effect of the event and its temporal duration. The analysis on the regional level supports the argument about contextual variations in the response to the event and a second analysis based on the 2004 Madrid bombing confirms the study’s conclusions. Implications of the findings for societal responses to terror attacks, the literature on attitudes toward immigrants, and survey research are discussed.
After the September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S., evangelical leaders emerged as strong critics and even antagonists of Islam. This rhetoric is reflected in evangelical books and articles that have been published in the last decade, but particularly since 9/11. Through a content analysis of evangelical books on Islam published before and after 9/11, this article finds that there was a noticeable change of emphasis and perspective on Islam after the attacks. Most of the post-9/11 literature draws sharper boundaries between Islam and Christianity and asserts that Islam is an essentially violent religion. This polemic against Islam takes three forms: apologetics to prove the truth of Christianity against Islam; prophetic literature linking Islam as the main protagonist in end-times scenarios; and charismatic literature applying "spiritual warfare" teachings to Islam. The article concludes that the greater and more visible pluralism in American society is challenging evangelical identity, leading to the erection of new boundary markers between evangelicalism and other religions. Such new boundaries can strain interfaith relations, yet they also function to strengthen evangelical Protestant identity in the U.S.
Despite the relevance of nationalism for politics and intergroup relations, sociologists have devoted surprisingly little attention to the phenomenon in the United States, and historians and political psychologists who do study the United States have limited their focus to specific forms of nationalist sentiment: ethnocultural or civic nationalism, patriotism, or national pride. This article innovates, first, by examining an unusually broad set of measures (from the 2004 GSS) tapping national identification, ethnocultural and civic criteria for national membership, domain-specific national pride, and invidious comparisons to other nations, thus providing a fuller depiction of Americans’ national self-understanding. Second, we use latent class analysis to explore heterogeneity, partitioning the sample into classes characterized by distinctive patterns of attitudes. Conventional distinctions between ethnocultural and civic nationalism describe just about half of the U.S. population and do not account for the unexpectedly low levels of national pride found among respondents who hold restrictive definitions of American nationhood. A subset of primarily younger and well-educated Americans lacks any strong form of patriotic sentiment; a larger class, primarily older and less well educated, embraces every form of nationalist sentiment. Controlling for sociodemographic characteristics and partisan identification, these classes vary significantly in attitudes toward ethnic minorities, immigration, and national sovereignty. Finally, using comparable data from 1996 and 2012, we find structural continuity and distributional change in national sentiments over a period marked by terrorist attacks, war, economic crisis, and political contention.
In 2010, Oklahoma passed the "Save Our State Amendment," becoming the first state to officially ban "Sharia law." Despite the fact that a federal court issued an injunction blocking the measure— holding that the ban violated the Establishment Clause—nearly two dozen state legislatures have since proposed similar measures. In this Comment, I propose that the Oklahoma law exhibits an increased hysteria towards Islam and Muslims—one that creates a distinct second-class citizenry that is not entitled to the privileges associated with, and considered a necessary condition of, citizenship in a nation-state. This problematic trend represents a continuation of a longer history in which law reinforces racism toward Arabs and Muslims and threatens to isolate and alienate one of the fastest growing segments of the American population. Unfortunately, our present understanding of law and society in the context of anti-Muslim and anti-Shariah rhetoric is severely limited. While the literature on post-9/11 backlash has focused primarily on encroachments upon civil liberties, the deeper, subversive relationship between Islamophobia and the erosion of the substantive citizenship rights of American Muslims has remained largely unexplored within the legal academy. After providing a brief history of Islamophobia in America, I propose a tripartite temporal framework for understanding Islamophobia in its contemporary context—the pre-9/11 period, the period immediately following the 9/11 attacks, and the period that began during the 2008 presidential campaign. I use Oklahoma's Save Our State Amendment as an operative example of how, in the third phase, an institutionalized version of Islamophobia is depriving American Muslims of citizenship, not only as a term of identity, but also as a vehicle for practical rights and political activity.
American civil religion (ACR) burst on to the scholarly scene in 1967, and has been periodically revived as a source of analytic insight and normative hope since that time. It posited a universalist, prophetic, nonsectarian faith, referenced on the nation, that served as both a source of unity for the American people and a discursive resource for political leaders and protest movements. Using recent political events as illustrative cases, I argue that ACR is not only a universalist, prophetic creed, it is also an expression of tribal identity that ascribes a particular character and purpose to the American people. In particular, this “tribal” civil religion has an often-unstated assumption about the inseparability of religion, race, and national identity—that is, white, Christian, and American. Recent events have disrupted those implicit connections, leading to a vociferous reemphasis of their centrality to the national story. I maintain that neither ACR, nor recent politics involving immigration and Barack Obama's presidency, can be understood fully without considering the religion-race-national identity nexus.
There has been much negative focus on Muslims in public debates in the West and it is a matter of great interest to examine whether Muslims are particularly exposed to prejudice and hostility. Since it is known that immigrants tend to be exposed to prejudice, and practically all Muslims living in Western countries are either immigrants or are of immigrant origin, it is useful to analyse whether Muslims are viewed more negatively than immigrants in general. Using data from survey experiments conducted in Norway, Sweden, the USA and the United Kingdom in 2009, we find that Muslim immigrants were not more negatively viewed than immigrants in general. In the two countries that have experienced large-scale attacks by Islamic extremists, the USA and the United Kingdom, the expressed levels of anti-Muslim attitudes were actually lower than the levels of general anti-immigrant attitudes. We find that individual traits that influence general xenophobia also influence anti-Muslim attitudes.
This article reflects critically on the study of Muslims in European countries of immigration. ‘Muslim’ is both a category of analysis and an increasingly salient – and contested – category of social, political and religious practice. The traffic between categories of analysis and categories of practice makes it important for scholars to adopt a critical and self-reflexive stance towards the categories we use. The article sketches some ways in which the use of ‘Muslim’ as a category of practice – a category of self- and other-identification – has changed in recent decades, and it concludes with some cautionary remarks about the use of ‘Muslim’ as a category of analysis.
This article delineates a number of conceptual-normative, analytical and political concerns, characterized as matters of (1) ‘semantics’, (2) ‘scales’ and (3) ‘solidarities’, in the ways in which we can approach an understanding of the relationships between antisemitism and Islamophobia. As such it takes its cue from Goldberg's (2009) insistence that in addition to comparativist methodologies employed in the study of race and racism, we also need relational methodologies. That is to say that where the former compares and contrasts, the latter also seeks to connect. In so doing, the article harnesses the explanatory power of long-established organizing concepts within the study of race and racism, to explore how racial categories of religious minorities continue to be formed. Taking its cue from the introduction to this special issue (Meer this issue), this article explores what purchase the ideas of ‘cultural racism’ and ‘racialization’ can bring to bear on our conceptualization of each.