Trilateral Talks on the Filling and Annual Operation of the GERD: Competing Demands and the Need for Revisiting the Status quo towards a Negotiated Settlement

Abstract

The Nile River Basin, with eleven riparian countries, lacks any agreed-upon basin-wide legal framework. Attempts at effective management and utilization of water resources inclusive of all countries along the basin have not been possible due to lack of consensus on the legal basis of already exiting colonial-era agreements that allocate an absolute share of the Nile water to Egypt and Sudan by excluding most of the upper riparians. The review has specifically focused on the trilateral negotiation processes between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt since November 2019 on the filling and annual operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which Ethiopia has been constructing since 2011. It has made a thorough review of a series of events and processes through which the negotiation has passed to conduct a critical analysis of facts, and has suggested reflections on the way forward. It considers the need for political will and flexibility of the negotiating parties to reconcile existing contradictory positions. To this end, pursuing a revisionist approach to take the dynamic socio-economic realities and development needs of co-basin countries is commendable. This further requires renegotiating long existed colonial-era agreements and formulating a basin-wide legal framework in line with existing international standards. Focusing on technical and expertise level of discussions and outcomes would minimize over politicization and specifically would help to address the negative impacts of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and optimize positive externalities. Peace is a necessity than any other option among the co-basin countries and the only avenue towards sustainable resolution of disputes. Negotiating in good faith and in a ‘give and take’ modality needs to be a second to none alternative to the parties. The international community may also need to play a neutral and genuine role to assist the parties to settle their differences amicably and reach a final negotiated settlement.

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PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development, Vol. 1, No. 2, August 2020
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Trilateral Talks on the Filling and Annual Operation of the GERD: Competing
Demands and the Need for Revisiting the Status quo towards a Negotiated
Settlement
Ermyas A. Wolde and Abiot D. Habte**
Abstract
The Nile River Basin, with eleven riparian countries, lacks any agreed-upon basin-wide legal
framework. Attempts at effective management and utilization of water resources inclusive of
all countries along the basin have not been possible due to lack of consensus on the legal
basis of already exiting colonial-era agreements that allocate an absolute share of the Nile
water to Egypt and Sudan by excluding most of the upper riparians. The review has
specifically focused on the trilateral negotiation processes between Ethiopia, Sudan, and
Egypt since November 2019 on the filling and annual operation of the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam, which Ethiopia has been constructing since 2011. It has made a thorough
review of a series of events and processes through which the negotiation has passed to
conduct a critical analysis of facts, and has suggested reflections on the way forward. It
considers the need for political will and flexibility of the negotiating parties to reconcile
existing contradictory positions. To this end, pursuing a revisionist approach to take the
dynamic socio-economic realities and development needs of co-basin countries is
commendable. This further requires renegotiating long existed colonial-era agreements and
formulating a basin-wide legal framework in line with existing international standards.
Focusing on technical and expertise level of discussions and outcomes would minimize over
politicization and specifically would help to address the negative impacts of Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam and optimize positive externalities. Peace is a necessity than any other
option among the co-basin countries and the only avenue towards sustainable resolution of
disputes. Negotiating in good faith and in a ‘give and take’ modality needs to be a second to
none alternative to the parties. The international community may also need to play a neutral
and genuine role to assist the parties to settle their differences amicably and reach a final
negotiated settlement.
Keywords: Agreement, Dam-filling, Negotiations, Nile Basin, Transboundary
Introduction
The demand for fresh water is increasing steadily at a global level with the increasing growth
of the population at an alarming rate. Fresh water is an essential resource for human survival
and the demand for it is growing at an unsustainable rate as populations have grown and
nations industrialized. Readily available fresh water is a strategic resource to fulfill domestic
needs, food production, livelihoods, power generation, industry, and navigation purposes.
However, increasing population pressure added with effects of climate change made water
resources subject to change over time and space that results in competition over access and
use of such resources (Perlman et al., 2017; Warner & Zawhari, 2012; Biswas, 2008).
Especially, developing countries‟ demand for swift development and economic growth
 Jimma University, Ethiopia, Email: ermyad@yahoo.com
**Jimma University, Ethiopia, Email: abiot.habte@ju.edu.et

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cannot be realized without the availability of adequate energy resources. Large-scale
generation of electric power requires a large quantity of water. The reliable availability of
adequate quality and quantity of water for agricultural production is also vital to feed the
increasing demand for food in these countries (Biswas, 2008). In response to these changing
circumstances, there has been an alteration of water resources through various mechanisms
by users with the cumulative effect of changing the availability, quantity and quality of water
resources for other users. Such alterations are potential sources of conflict (Perlman et al.,
2017).
Transboundary river basins, in this regard, are experiencing rapid physical and economic
changes generating a new era of relationships among the nations sharing them (Ibid.).
Nations, according to Benvenisti (2004), are faced with the choice between conflict and
cooperation as regulation of transboundary resources became desirable due to hiking
demands and advancing technology. Countries sharing an international river basin share a
complex network of environmental, economic, political, and security issues carrying with it
the potential for interstate conflict and opportunities for cooperation (Dinar, 2008).
Efforts at water resource developments are complicated by existing conflicts among riparian
states regarding economic development, infrastructural capacity, and political interests. This
could be the reason why Biswas (2008) underlined that development and management of
transboundary water resources sustainably and efficiently to ensure full cooperation and
agreement of co-basin states resulting in a win-win situation is a very challenging and
difficult task in the 21st Century. The actual process of allocating water among co-basin
countries is the most difficult part in materializing a basin-wide cooperative agreement,
particularly in the developing nations.
The Nile River Basin, which is the main focus of this review, is one of the most controversial
river basins without a negotiated legal framework for water sharing and management. The
existing colonial-era agreements are understood by most upper riparian countries as favoring
mostly to the lower riparian countries, Egypt and Sudan, by distributing the entire water
resources of the basin while the other nine riparian ones (Burundi, DR. Congo, Ethiopia,
Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda) are not parties to such
agreements and are excluded from any meaningful utilization of the basin. Weibe (2001)
posits that early agreements on the Nile River are very inadequate for managing and
conserving the basin resources as they are basically formulated to entertain colonial

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aspirations of the British on the basis of optimizing the economic and political importance of
the Nile for a successful occupation. Hence, such treaties are being considered as an
impediment to current day negotiations (Perlman et al., 2017).
This article focuses on assessing and analyzing the negotiation process among Ethiopia,
Egypt, and Sudan as co-basin states of the Nile, on the filling and annual operation of the
Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a 4.8 Billion USD hydroelectric power
generation dam with 6450 Mega Watt capacity being constructed along the border with
Sudan since 2011. The competing demands of the three countries over the filling and annual
operation of the dam led to a deadlock diplomatic stalemate which may lead to destructive
conflict unless a negotiated settlement is reached.
Figure 1: The Nile River Basin
Source: Google Map, 2020.
Rationales and Objectives of the Article
Ethiopia‟s launching of the construction of the GERD in 2011 has been considered a
watershed in changing the political landscape in the negotiation process towards a
comprehensive legal framework in the management and utilization of the water resources
along the Nile River Basin. The GERD marked a new era of trilateral negotiation process
among Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan focusing on its probable impacts on downstream
countries. The trilateral talks mainly focused on dealing with technical and legal matters of
filling and operation of the dam. The three countries engaged in series of negotiations since
2013 that resulted in the formulation and signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) in

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2015, a document that is specifically dedicated to set a framework for future agreements on
setting guidelines for the filling and annual operation of the dam (Perlamn et al., 2017).
This has demonstrated the choice of cooperation in action among historically rival countries
to come to the negotiation table over shared Nile water resources (Ibid.). Trilateral talks have
been going on since the signing of the DoP but the ongoing negotiation process has started in
May 2018 and several discussions were held at technical, expertise, ministerial and Heads of
States/ Governments levels. Ethiopia‟s announcement to start the first phase of filling of the
dam in July 2020 intensified the tones of the diplomatic process and the frequency with
which the trilateral talks are taking place.
The inability of the United States of America (USA) and World Bank (WB) led negotiation
process, from November 2019 to February 2020, to bring a breakthrough has further
exacerbated the political stalemate and broadened the differences among the negotiating
parties at times even escalating in threats of war. In this regard, the appeal letters presented
by all the parties to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) exhibit the prevailing
disparities in terms of demands and interests that are unreconciled and unmet due to the state
of intransigence character that each party points against each other (MoFA, 2020a;
MoFAARE, 2020a; MoFARS, 2020a).
Conflicts over the Nile water would spread out into already existing conflicts in the Horn of
Africa adding more complexity to the instability of the region and making it harder to address
peace and security challenges in the region (Mbote, 2007). Hence, the review is conducted
on a very timely issue that has dragged the attention of politicians, policymakers, experts, the
general public, and regional and global multilateral organizations. Capturing the series of
events of the trilateral negotiation process and analyzing the ups and downs in a
comprehensive manner could contribute to improve understanding regarding the point of
views of the three actors and may indicate future directions.
To this effect, the paper was specifically aimed at: (i) describing and analyzing the context
and processes of the ongoing trilateral negotiations on the filling and annual operation of the
GERD; (ii) exploring and identifying the factors that hinder a negotiated settlement among
the parties, i.e. Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan, on the GERD talks; and (iii) suggesting the way
forward by pinpointing basic issues that negotiating parties should take into account for a
peaceful settlement of the dispute. In doing so, the paper has produced a more or less full-

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fledged document on the incidents and series of events of the trilateral talks in a more
analytical manner beyond a mere presentation of facts.
Theoretical Framework
Transboundary water conflicts vary significantly across different basins and times reflected in
the form of hostilities having effects on participants and even sometimes beyond. These
conflicts usually occur alongside with different forms of cooperation. Transboundary water
interactions are also accompanied by complex interests, illusions, power games, and distrust
in a political process (Zeitounae & Mirmachi, 2008).
The literature reveals the nature and magnitude of interactions among riparian countries in a
river basin categorized in value-based terms as negative, neutral and positive interactions.
Negative interactions exhibit a state of interactions with a significant degree of resentment
among one or more of the co-basin states characterized by high conflict and low cooperation
kind of interaction “driven by attempts to capture control of the resources or to contain
asymmetric outcome” (Ibid., p. 309). The desire to maintain control and historically existed
distrust may reinforce negative interactions. Positive interaction, on the other hand, indicates
the set of interactions that accommodates the interest of all actors ensuring sustained relations
at a broader political level characterized by low conflict and high cooperation. Transboundary
water that represents an interaction having little or no effect on the broader political context
and characterized by a minimally cooperative and conflictual relationship is neutral
interaction (Ibid.).
Sustainable and efficient management and development of transboundary water resources
with full agreement and cooperation among co-basin riparian countries is not an easy task due
to constraints arising from various factors of which state sovereignty and absence of
agreement on the modalities of managing such resources are major ones (Biswas, 2008).
Nonetheless, there are three major notable theories that are being used to define the
relationship among countries sharing transboundary water resources and from which water
conventions, treaties and agreements are originating. The absolute territorial sovereignty
theory holds the idea that co-basin states enjoy exclusive authority over the water of an
international watercourse within their territory. Hence, they consider themselves of not being
duty-bound to consult impacts of utilization on other riparian countries. This entails

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utilizations without bearing the needs of downstream countries in mind. The absolute
territorial integrity theory favors the interests of downstream countries entrusting them with
the right to the natural flow of the water into their territories. Therefore, interfering with the
natural flow of the upstream country requires the consent of downstream countries. The third
theory, limited territorial sovereignty, accommodates the interests of all riparian countries by
stating that the right to use an international watercourse is limited by the rights of other
riparian countries to use the watercourse. It empowers every co-basin state to use shared
rivers flowing on its territory as long as such utilization does not violate the rights and
interests of other co-riparian (Ibid.).
In practice, most upstream countries tend to go along the theory of absolute territorial
sovereignty, while downstream countries favor the principles of absolute territorial integrity.
However, the doctrine of limited territorial integrity is reflected most in the vast majority of
international water agreements including the UN convention on non-navigational use of
international watercourse upholding major principles such as equitable and reasonable
utilization, obligation not to cause significant harm, exchange of data and information and
peaceful settlement of disputes (UN, 1997). Considerations of national sovereignty issues
might escalate the controversial nature of transboundary water management issues while such
resources must be treated as shared and regulated by norms beyond each nation‟s unilateral
measures to gain optimal and sustainable resources (Benevenisti, 2004; Biswas, 2008).
Materials and Methods
This review is conducted with the aim of capturing the negotiation process between Ethiopia,
Egypt and Sudan on the filling and annual operation of the GERD, and analyzing the series of
events, revealing the major points of departure among the three parties and commenting on
the way forward. Though the review is limited to explicating the trilateral talks since
November 2019, it established historical facts on already existing treaties and agreements on
the Nile Basin to enable a comprehensive understating of the ongoing process. It, therefore,
made a thorough investigation and analysis of legal frameworks and treaties in the past and
the possibility of their applications in the existing circumstances.
The review mainly depended on the extraction of facts from treaties, agreements, cooperative
frameworks, and principles that have been established among the Nile Basin riparian
countries across different periods and under various circumstances. The investigators have
also made all possible efforts to capture a series of events of the negotiation process from

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varieties of media outlets, official letters, communiqués, press releases and official statements
from governments and international organizations. The facts are organized in a systematic
manner and maintained in chronological order, which is supplemented with analysis by
indicating directions towards achieving a negotiated settlement of the matter. The facts are
also cross-examined and triangulated with the existing literature on cooperative frameworks
and conflicts on transboundary water resources to forward critical reflections.
Results
The Nile: A River Basin without a Legal Framework
The Nile is one of the river basins where conflicts are persisting over distribution, co-
management and utilization of water resources among its riparian countries (Zeitoun &
Mirumachi, 2008). Legal frameworks on the utilization and distribution of water shares have
been formulated since the early 20th Century among some of the actors and stakeholders,
which in most cases are conducted either under the influence of colonial forces of the time or
with the exclusion of most countries along the basin when concluded between downstream
countries.
Three such agreements, concluded in 1902, 1929 and 1959, are notable. The 1902 treaty was
signed between Ethiopia and Britain representing its colony, Sudan with the aim of
demarcating the boundary between the two countries. However, the agreement included a
provision that precluded Ethiopia from constructing or allowing any construction across the
Blue Nile, Lake Tana and the Sobat that could arrest the flow of the water down streams.
Such a project, according to the treaty, can be carried out only in agreement with the British
colonial administration in Sudan (Wiebe, 2001). Later, in 1929, Egypt and Britain concluded
a bilateral agreement with the later representing its East African colonial boundaries (Sudan,
Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika). The treaty outrightly recognized the historical and natural
rights of Egypt giving it uncontested veto power over construction projects along the Nile and
its tributaries. Moreover, the 1959 bilateral treaty between Egypt and Sudan nailed the
historical and natural rights of the two downstream countries by respectively allocating 66%
and 22% of the Nile water (Ibid.).
The first post-colonial era initiative towards basin-wide cooperation along the Nile basin was
launched in the 2010s when the “riparian entered into a multi-stakeholder bargaining
process” with the facilitation and support of bilateral and multilateral aid institutions. The
initiative finally came with the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in 1999, setting the platform for a

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basin-wide treaty (Warner & Zawahri, 2012, p. 219). The NBI paved the way for a new
comprehensive legal framework for the management of the Nile basin (Mbote, 2007) named
as “the Comprehensive Framework Agreement (CFA)”. Egypt was for the first time forced to
engage in multilateral relations over the Nile along with other basin states (Zeitoune &
Mirumachi, 2008).
The CFA recognized the importance of the Nile River to the economic and social wellbeing
of the people in the riparian countries and stressed the importance of strengthening
cooperation among them. The framework formulates the establishment of “the Nile River
Basin Commission” as an intergovernmental organization to “promote and facilitate the
implementation of the principles, rights and obligations provided in the framework” (CFA,
2010, p. 26). The CFA can be considered as the first all-inclusive and organized effort to
institute a legal framework for fair and equitable utilization of the Nile River basin water
resources. The agreement has been open for signature since May 14, 2010 at Entebbe,
Uganda, and it was supposed to become operational after signing and approval by six of the
then ten riparian countries. Till now, six countries signed it, and four have already ratified.
Securing and sustaining existing water share has been an obstacle to the realization of the
CFA. The major sticking point was on the water security where many of the upper riparians
advocated putting each state in the basin under obligation “not to significantly affect the
water security of the other.” On the other hand, lower riparian countries, such as Egypt
proposed the inclusion of a provision that “obliges all basin states not to adversely affect the
water security and current uses and rights of any other Nile Basin state” (Mahemud, 2020).
The other lower riparian countries equated this claim to sustaining the already existing
colonial-era treaties along the Basin.
The GERD and Declaration of Principles
Ethiopia launched the construction of the GERD in 2011. Prior to this, most of the projects
along the Nile Basin for the use of the Nile water resources were undertaken mainly by Egypt
and Sudan. Warner and Zawahri (2004, p. 219) opine “Egypt‟s hegemony on the Nile has
long impeded hydraulic development along the Nile” and Ethiopia pursued the construction
of the dam over objection by the downstream powerful nation of Egypt as well as Sudan
(Perlman et al., 2017).

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After the launching of the GERD, concerns were raised by Egypt and Sudan over the
operation of the dam. Then, the three actors were engaged in series of negotiations since 2013
that resulted in a specific legal framework involving only the three countries focusing only on
the filling and annual operation of the dam, the Declaration of Principles (DoP) signed in
March 2015 (Perlman et al., 2017). They are expected to agree on guidelines and rules on the
first filling and annual operation of the dam, a process that should be accomplished within
fifteen months since the launching of technical and expertise level studies (DoP, 2015). The
other important provision of the DoP is regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes whereby
any dispute arising out of the implementation and interpretation of the DoP shall be resolved
in consultation and amicably with the spirit of cooperation and good faith. If such attempts
fail, the matters could be forwarded for considerations by heads of states/governments of
each country or may jointly request for conciliation and mediation (Ibid.).
The application and interpretation of the DoP have become a major sticky point in the
negotiation process since November 2019 at the point where Ethiopia is finalizing the
construction of the dam and officially announced its plan for first-round filling in July 2020.
Diplomatic wrangling and, at times, the threats of war are being experienced due to the
absence of negotiated settlement and polarized demands made it more complex and difficult
to reach compromise.
Competing Demands on the Filling and Operation of the Dam
Though the DoP (2015) provides a fifteen months timeline for the preparation of rules and
guidelines on the filling and annual operation of the dam, this has not been achieved due to
lack of conclusive agreement for which both parties accuse each other. The process,
therefore, has been lingering until Ethiopia‟s announcement of the first step filling of the dam
set to take place in July 2020.
Such a move triggered a new round of diplomatic discord where the downstream countries
demanded Ethiopia not to take any “unilateral action” in filling the dam before a settled
agreement is reached among the three actors. It is with this background that the United States
of America (USA) and World Bank (WB) initiated a negotiation process in November 2019,
assuming observer status. Many rounds of trilateral talks took place among the three parties
on the filling and annual operation of the GERD which finally ended without resulting in any
settlement acceptable to the three parties with Ethiopia withdrawing from the process
rejecting the draft agreement proposed by the USA and WB on condition of its inability to

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address issues of fundamental concern to its national interest (MoFA, 2020a). Egypt, after a
failed attempt to convince Ethiopia and Sudan to sign the agreement, took the matter to the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) by writing a letter of appeal on 1st May 2020.
In a letter addressed to the UNSC on 14th May 2020, Ethiopia stated that 86% of the Nile
water originates from its mountains, but its need for use has been arrested for centuries on the
basis of colonial-era treaties to which it is not a party but allocated lion‟s share of the water
resources of the basin to Egypt. Egypt, based upon such treaties, introduces a “self-claimed
notion of historic rights and current use” (Ibid., p. 1). The GERD, according to Ethiopia‟s
view, is a “vital project of the enormous potential for cooperation and regional integration”,
the benefits of which are going beyond Ethiopia, including Egypt itself. It should be noted
that it is very crucial for the survival, development and prosperity of Ethiopia and its people.
The country is in urgent need to lift millions of its citizens out of extreme poverty struck
frequently with recurrent drought and food insecurity. It is yet to provide electric power to
65% of its population and meet the demands for energy that is growing by 19% annually with
the majority of its rural population depending on firewood as a source of energy accelerating
deforestation. This may reduce the vitality of the Nile and should be a matter of high concern
for Egypt as well. The GERD, therefore, is instrumental to the national development efforts
of Ethiopia in spurring development through industrialization and alleviation of chronic
energy deficit. Ethiopia has legitimate and sovereign rights to use the Nile water without
causing significant harm to downstream countries (Ibid.).
Egypt has also addressed its concern to the UNSC in a letter officially released on 1st May
2020. In the appeal letter, Egypt mentioned its “hydrological precarious situation” due to high
dependence for fresh water on the Nile basin. An upstream project, according to the letter,
that comes with a shortage of water could be catastrophic in terms of cultivation, food
security, high urbanization and migration. It, generally, underlined Egypt‟s vulnerability to
any waterworks undertaken in the Ethiopia highlands (MoFAARE, 2020a, p. 9).
The commencement of the construction of the GERD on the 2nd April 2011, for Egypt, is a
“unilateral action”, to which downstream countries that could be invariably affected by such a
project are not consulted, so it represents a breach of Ethiopia‟s international legal obligation.
The unilateral filling of the dam was regarded as a development that jeopardizes the water
and food security of 100 million Egyptians. It could cause significant harm to downstream

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countries and pose threat to the peace and security in the region. Hence, the international
community is deemed to put pressure upon Ethiopia to refrain from unilateral actions (Ibid.).
The Sudanese side of the story was expressed in a letter addressed to the UNSC on 2nd June
2020. It emphasized that Sudan is an important riparian country to the Blue Nile and an
immediate downstream country to the GERD, and it could be impacted the most by it. The
Blue Nile is the lifeline of Sudan‟s 40 million people serving 70% of irrigated land and the
heart of agricultural activities in the country (MoFARS, 2020a). Sudan understood the dam to
be “a towering permanent structure presence with the potential of bringing both positive and
negative impacts to Sudan.” The GERD, for Sudan, will have positive impacts in terms of
regulating the water flow of the Blue Nile reducing the annual flow of floods and ensuring
better management of its dams. It also enhances the navigational depth of both the Blue Nile
and the main Nile rivers. However, for Sudan, the dam effects change in the “flow regime of
the Blue Nile.” It raised technical and safety-related matters of the dam and the risks
associated with faulty design, construction and operation which might threaten the lives of its
people and safety and operation of its dams. It also indicated environmental impacts across
the basin alongside its boarder (Ibid., p. 2). Sudan recognized Ethiopia‟s right to develop its
water resources but underlined the vitality of addressing negative impacts in consultation
with downstream countries (Ibid.).
The three parties also reflected contradictory positions on the understanding and
interpretation of the DoP as Ethiopia announces the first round impoundment of the dam in
July 2020. Ethiopia clearly underlined that its decision is in line with the DoP quoting
principle five from the document where filling of the dam is part of the construction process
to which Egypt is fully informed and fully consented by signing the agreement (MoFA,
2020a). Egypt‟s position, on the other hand, reflects that the DoP puts Ethiopia under a full
international obligation not to commence the impoundment of the dam before reaching an
agreement governing the filling and operation of the dam with Egypt (MoFAARE, 2020a).
Such misinterpretations and understandings of the DoP escalated the conflicting demands and
put the three actors in stark diplomatic spats hindering the success of the negotiation process.
Contradictory Views on the USA and WB Brokered Deal Process
The USA and WB joined the negotiation process in November 2019 as observers with the
aim of supporting the three countries reach a final agreement on the filling and operation of
the dam. Twelve rounds of meetings were held at the Ministerial and experts level with the

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attendance of the representatives from the USA and WB that finally resulted in the
formulation of agreement on the filling and operation of the GERD (MoFAARE, 2020a).
The three parties have different and contradictory positions about the final outcome of the
negotiation process brokered by the USA and WB. The proposal by the two observers was
questioned by Ethiopia, which requested for postponement of the meeting scheduled to take
place on February 28, 2020 (MoFA, 2020a). However, the meeting went on and Egypt took a
strong stand for all the parties to accept and sign the agreement. In the eyes of Egypt, “the
agreement is fair, balanced and mutually beneficial and prepared on the basis of positions
espoused by the three parties”. It satisfies Ethiopia‟s demand to expeditiously generate
hydropower and, at the same time, protects downstream states from the adverse effects of the
GERD (MoFAARE, 2020a).
Sudan, on the other hand, took a position of both a „party‟ in the negotiation process and also
a „mediator‟ to convince the two parties to resume talks when the process is stalled. Sudan
viewed the process as instrumental in helping to achieve major progress on key issues but
only unfortunately stalled due to “the escalation in rhetoric statements from both Egypt and
Ethiopia” (MoFARS, 2020a). It expressed its efforts in convincing the other two parties to
come back to the negotiation table to resolve a few of the remaining differences standing on
the way of a final negotiated settlement. A comprehensive deal involving all the three parties
is expressed to be the core interest of Sudan in the trilateral talks.
Ethiopia‟s withdrawal from the USA and WB brokered negotiation process, which Egypt
claimed to fairly address all fundamental matters of significance to the three parties, is on the
ground of its inability to resolve “outstanding difference on matters of fundamental
importance that have far-reaching consequence for the interests of Ethiopia and contravening
the DoP” (MoFA, 2020a, p. 10). The proposal, from the viewpoint of Ethiopia, severely
limits the capacity of the dam to generate electricity by imposing rules that are impractical for
filling and operating the dam. Moreover, it curtails the rights of any future efforts of upstream
water resources development and undermines its sovereign rights to operate its own dam.
This is in line with Egypt‟s request to open an office at the GERD site for joint management
and insistence to shift all draught time burdens towards Ethiopia by obliging to maintain the
water level at High Aswan Dam (HAD) to 165 meters Above Sea Level (ASL). The official
communication from Egypt‟s side about the completion of the negotiation is blatant
disinformation as the negotiation cannot be completed before addressing Ethiopia‟s

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fundamental concerns and no mediation has taken place as no mediator is invited in line with
the principles of the DoP (Ibid.).
The Role of the USA and WB: Observers or Mediators?
Though the DoP prioritized an internal dispute resolution mechanism, Egypt, has unilaterally
called for the international mediation of the USA and WB through its letter to the UNSC on
1st May 2010. Ethiopia stated that it accommodated Egypt‟s unilateral move “in good faith
and to show flexibility” and to give a chance to the success of the trilateral talks, though the
move is not in line with the DoP (MoFA, 2020a, p. 9).
The USA and WB observership, however, took a different form and came under question
after the USA Treasury Department‟s official announcement of warning Ethiopia to sign the
agreement and not to proceed with the first filling of the dam before reaching an agreement
with the other two parties (US Department of Treasury, 2020). This has reiterated Egypt‟s
stance on the matter and casted doubt on the neutrality of the USA as an „observer‟ of the
trilateral talks. Ethiopia, in line with this, raised its concerns on the legality of the USA‟s role
stating that “negotiation is not completed and no mediator is invited as the DoP requires”
(Ibid., p., iii). In the eyes of Ethiopia, the WB and USA played only an observer role during
the negotiation process and would not be in a position to impose a proposal on any of the
parties.
The USA has again expressed its position on the matter after the failed video conference
trilateral discussions from 9-17th June 2020. A tweet from the United States National Security
Council restraining Ethiopia from filling the dam “unequivocally echoes Egyptians interest
on the issue and again indicated US‟s clear position” (Solomon, 2020, p.11). In line with this,
seven former African Affairs Assistant Secretaries, in a letter addressed to the Undersecretary
of State Political Affairs of the USA, urged the USA to embrace neutrality in the negotiation
process. Any perception on the absence of the US neutrality in the process, according to the
letter, will limit its ability to support efforts to reach a negotiated settlement. Any pressure on
Ethiopia “would harden position and makes compromise difficult” (Worku, 2020, p. 2).
Ethiopia has suggested three major avenues including: discussions between heads of states,
the continuation of already started NBI and the AU to find a regional remedy for regional
disputes (MoFA, 2020a).
The Video Conference and Ensuing Outcomes

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The three parties agreed to resume the trilateral talks through a virtual video conference with
Sudan taking the initiative to mediate between Ethiopia and Egypt itself being one of the
parties to the ongoing talks. Sudan held a bilateral talk with the other two parties to finally
arrange the virtual discussions which were held from 9-17th June 2020. The Republic of
South Africa, the European Union (EU) and the USA were invited as observers. The
countries, in the first few days, reached understanding on the first stage of filling, the volume
of environmental flow, guidelines for first stage of filling and approaches to draught
management rules (Kiram, 2020).
Diplomatic discords and conflicting understanding of the negotiation process were being
however reflected sooner than expected. Within two days into the negotiation process,
Egypt‟s Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation released an official statement that no
fruitful outcome will be expected from the ongoing trilateral negotiation due to Ethiopia‟s
“intransigent position” even though an agreement has to be reached before Ethiopia starts
first filling in July 2020. The statement indicates that “consensus is reached on none of the
discussion points” and Ethiopia is trying to force Egypt either to sign an agreement of its
interest or else it will fill the dam anyways (Egypt Independent, 2020a).
Sudan and Ethiopia have a very different understanding of the negotiation projecting positive
and constructive explanation regarding its outcomes. Sudan confirmed that the three countries
reached an agreement on 90% of issues related to the GERD except for a few outstanding
legal matters (Egypt Independent, 2020b). Ethiopia, on the other hand, criticized Egypt‟s
pessimism on the latest round of talks and expressed that understanding was reached on many
important matters and also urged Egypt to stop issuing confusing statements and continuing
diplomatic pressure while negotiating (Addis, 2020).
The key issues of disagreement as presented by Ethiopia constitute few major points. This
relates in the first place with the annual operation of the dam where the release from the
storage during drought years should not impede the operational flexibility of the GERD.
Sharing of draught season water shortage burden among the three countries is also the second
point of departure. Ethiopia thirdly took a stand not to tie the future water resources
development of upstream countries with the GERD negotiation process and the current
negotiation process not to contradict the basic tenets of the CFA as a promising basin-wide
legal framework. It also took a firm stand on the inseparability of the impoundment of the
dam from the construction process as per the DoP (FBC, 2020a).

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With these developments, Egypt on 19th June took the matter officially to the UNSC for the
second time in less than two months. As per the appeal letter, filling the GERD without a
negotiated settlement poses a “clear and present danger to Egypt and threatens international
peace and security”. It based its request on Article 35 of the UN Charter which allows a
member state to alert the Council on any update that threatens international peace and
security. Egypt requested the UNSC “to urgently consider the issue under agenda item peace
and security in Africa” (Egypt Today, 2020; MoFAARE, 2020b, p. 3).
Ethiopia, similarly, submitted its appeal to the UNSC in a letter addressed on 22nd June 2020.
It primarily condemned Egypt‟s withdrawal from the negotiation process while it was going
on. Egypt also bypassed all regional and continental mechanisms of settling disputes by
taking the matter to the highest possible institutional mechanism undermining the possibility
of finding “African solution to African problem” (MoFA, 2020b). As per Ethiopia‟s stand,
“nothing can be further from the truth” than suggesting that the issue constitutes a threat to
international peace and security. The negotiation is only about filling and operation of a
single dam and “can‟t by any means invite invocation of the mandate of the Security Council
under article 5 of the charter”. Lack of progress in the trilateral talks, for Ethiopia, is due to
Egypt‟s insistence on “historic rights and current use” principles. Ethiopia accommodated
Egypt‟s demand at the expense of the optimal operation of the dam and its own benefits.
Ethiopia requested the UN to “reject Egypt‟s unwarranted demand to ensure the continuity of
unequal colonial-era agreement” (Ibid., p. 4).
Sudan, on its part, announced its unreserved diplomatic efforts to convince the other two
parties to resume the trilateral negotiations in a letter addressed to the UNSC on 24th June
2020. The virtual negotiations, for Sudan, “succeeded in bridging the divergent views and
positions” and progressed towards the major technical matters while fundamental legal issues
are yet to be resolved (MoFARS, 2020b, p. 1).
The UNSC, as per the call from Egypt, held a video conference on 22nd June 2020 but failed
to agree on an open discussion in the presence of all concerned parties and finally ruled the
three parties to continue their trilateral negotiation. Divergent views were reflected in the
UNSC where the USA pushed for the open discussion favoring Egypt‟s stance. China
suggested for the principle of subsidiarity recommending on the importance of looking for
“African Solution to African problem”, while South Africa and Nigeria similarly advocated
the resumption of the trilateral talks and the African Union (AU) to play its own role in

Ermias A. & Abiot D., Trilateral Talks on the Filling and Annual Operation of the GERD …
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resolving the matter (EBC, 2020). A strong statement or resolution from the UNSC
restraining Ethiopia from filling the dam was in the best interest of the USA aligning with
Egypt (Addis Standard, 2020).
The Arab League has also been brought to the diplomatic front by Egypt as an instrument of
putting more pressure on Ethiopia and securing Egypt‟s interest in the trilateral talks, though,
Qatar, Somalia and Djibouti failed to support Egypt‟s proposal to take the matter to the
UNSC and restraining from unilaterally filling the dam (FBC, 2020b). Egypt, later on, made a
statement that it will be “explicit and clear about its position if the UNSC intervention to
resolve the disputes arising from Ethiopia‟s GERD is not successful”, hinting the possibility
of military measure (Middle East Monitor, 2020a).
Coming Back to Africa with the AU Brokered Deal
The idea of finding an “African solution to African problem” has got prominence when the
three parties once again resumed the trilateral talks through the mediation of the AU. The
extraordinary meeting of the AU Assembly regarding the ongoing trilateral negotiation
process among the three parties was held virtually on 26th June 2020. The meeting was
convened by Cyril Ramaphosa, President of the Republic of South Africa and Chairman of
the African Union Assembly. The leaders of the three states presented on the status of the
negotiation process after underscoring the importance of seeking African solution to African
problem. Thus, the UNSC requested to take note of the AU seizing the matter (PM Office,
2020).
The heads of states accordingly agreed to reconvene in two weeks‟ time to report on the
outcome of the trilateral talks (African Union, 2020, p.3). A press release from the Office of
the Prime Minister clarified that “Ethiopia scheduled to begin filling the dam within two
weeks during which the remaining construction work will be done.” It is within this period
that the three countries are expected to reach an agreement on the pending matters (PM
Office, 2020, p. 1).
The three countries‟ agreement for an AU-led negotiation process was followed by UNSC‟s
open discussion on 29th June 2020 where the three countries forwarded their points of view.
Most of the member countries in the UNSC called for a “continued dialogue” under the
initiative of South Africa led the AU negotiation process. The UNSC applauded the AU‟s
effort and emphasized the importance of the parties‟ full commitment and political will for a

PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development, Vol. 1, No. 2, August 2020
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compromise to reach a final agreement focusing on their remaining differences (Al-Monitor,
2020a; UN News, 2020).
The AU led first-round talks started on 3rd July 2020 and ended after eleven days. Reports
came out that the three countries have not been able to resolve their differences reflecting
continued disagreements. They have at the end agreed only to submit reports to South Africa
regarding the final outcomes of the first round talks and possibly restart the talks to decide on
the next steps (Egypt Independent, 2020c). The most persisting matters are still attached to
technical and legal disagreements, the amount of water to release during a multiyear drought
and future dispute resolution mechanisms. The legally binding nature of the agreement is
construed by Ethiopia as an obstacle to its future development efforts along the Nile Basin
(Aljezeera News, 2020).
Ethiopia‟s announcement of the initial filling of the GERD on 14th July 2020, just after the
reported deadlock of the first round talks, invited political outrage and demanding
clarification by Egypt and Sudan regarding the validity of the information. The Ethiopian
Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Energy stated that construction and filling of the dam are
“one and the same” process and filling should not wait for completion and the water level
rose from 525 to 560 meters (Middle East Monitor, 2020b). Later on, the information was
rephrased by the Ethiopian authorities that “filling had not begun” and the heavy rainfall that
led to the huge flow of water to the dam is the major source of confusion. However, in only a
week‟s time, Ethiopia announced the completion of the first round filling of the dam on an
official press release on 22nd July by PM Abiy Ahmed. The filling was attributed mainly to
highly increasing precipitation leading to an increase in water level overtopping the dam well
ahead of the schedule (Ethiopian Herald, 2020).
The PM stated that Ethiopia has no intention of harming Sudan and Egypt in the process of
construction and operation of the dam. The dam‟s first filling is completed without reducing
the water flowing to them. This, according to him, shows to the world the soundness of
Ethiopia‟s argument that the dam poses no harm to downstream countries (Ibid.). Ethiopia‟s
move faced strong criticism from Egypt and Sudan, which questioned the feasibility of
continuing the negotiation process and the possibility of reaching a fair agreement. Sudan
expressed it as “a harmful and disturbing precedent in the course of cooperation between the
countries concerned” (Al-Monitor, 2020b; Tesfalem, 2020).

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The 2nd round of AU-led talks started on 27th July 2020 while Egypt and Sudan were
expressing their concern on Ethiopia‟s first filling of the dam and underlining its official
announcement of “not seeking a binding agreement but a guiding agreement that can be
modified as needed.” Ethiopia‟s stand is counter to their need to reach a comprehensive
agreement seeking assurance to their long-existed water share rights (Al-Monitor, 2020b).
The 2nd round of talks, later on, came to a halt on 5th August after Egypt and Sudan
announced the suspension of talks due to Ethiopia‟s new proposal constituting draft
guidelines on rules of filling the dam neglecting provisions on operating rules and the legally
binding nature of the agreement (Arab News, 2020). The proposal reflected Ethiopia‟s firm
stand of not wanting to sign a legally binding agreement under international law with a
capacity to subject its future projects on the Blue Nile to the consent of Sudan and Egypt. It
also took a stand that a sustainable water-sharing agreement should involve the other basin
countries (Sudan Tribune, 2020).
Discussion
The theoretical discussion in the review indicated three major scenarios of interactions among
countries in a river basin namely: positive, negative and neutral interactions (Zeitounae &
Mirmachi, 2008). The results implied that the Nile Basin countries in general and three
countries involved in the current trilateral talks, in particular, have been exerting efforts to
formulate a cooperative basin-wide framework to address their conflicting interest. This
shows that they are in the process of transiting from negative interaction characterized by
“high conflict and low cooperation” to positive interaction with the ability to accommodate
the interest of all the actors ensuring sustained relations at a broader level. However, this all
depends on the outcome of the ongoing and upcoming negotiation processes to formulate an
all-inclusive benefits packages to interested parties which again all depends on the political
will and commitment to accommodate each other‟s interests and redefine existed relations
and legal frameworks.
The results also indicated that in the Nile Basin, Egypt as a lower riparian country asserts the
“prior” or “historical use doctrine” as well as the “no harm” doctrine emphasizing the upper
riparian countries should not use the water resources in a way that harms the interests of
downstream countries, which takes its stand closer to the absolute territorial integrity theory.
On the other hand, even though Ethiopia is expected to uphold the principles of absolute
territorial sovereignty that advocates the unconditional use of the water by an upstream

PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development, Vol. 1, No. 2, August 2020
22
country, in reality, it is involved in benefit sharing and cooperative agreements with the
downstream countries. This may demonstrate that Ethiopia as a country, which has never
used a river basin to which it contributes a significant share of the water, is trying to
renegotiate the status quo claiming a fair share of the water resources from the basin. The
discussions below also confirm the alignment of the existing scenario among the basin
countries with the available theoretical literature.
According to Mbote (2007), co-basin states are highly interdependent and their ability to gain
benefits is linked with the hydrological cycle of the river crossing their boundary. In light of
this, the Nile Basin countries can achieve sustainable development and regional stability
“under a sound legal and institutional framework” inclusive of all parties (Ibid., p. 5).
Cooperative water regimes, once formulated among riparian, remain to be resilient over time
even when countries are in conflict due to other issues. Such frameworks help to resolve
tensions arising out of the “distributional nature of water conflict” avoiding the scramble for a
larger share of water resources from the basin (Zeitoune & Miruachi, 2008, p. 300).
International transboundary water conflicts may be resolved through benefit sharing. The
main idea of benefit sharing is that “the riparian states should not seek the water itself, but
instead share various benefits from the water itself” and through such agreement “a zero-sum
game of water sharing is being replaced by a positive-sum game of benefit-sharing”
(Dombrowsky, 2009, p. 125). The discussions best explain the existing conflicts among the
Nile co-basin states indicating the importance of basin-wide legal frameworks inclusive of all
parties. Transboundary river conflicts are more of an outcome of how water is governed than
a scarcity of water (Perlman et al., 2017).
However, the most important issue is how to achieve a cooperative framework of agreeable
outcome to all the parties involved. In this regard, countries sharing transboundary river may
be convinced in formulating equitable and fair legal framework, but may not agree on the
how. Ethiopia‟s practical move by starting the construction of the GERD in 2011 is
considered by many as a breakthrough and altered the political landscape over the Nile Basin
as no such meaningful developmental project has been previously attempted by any of the
other upper riparian countries. This is the reason why Egypt and Sudan entered into intensive
trilateral talks in order to regulate the filling and operation of the dam. According to Warner
and Zawahri (2012), the interest in negotiation and the potential outcome might be influenced
by their geographical location along the river and distribution of military and economic

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23
power among the riparian countries. Upstream countries tend to use water to gain political
control, while their downstream counterparts may use military power to gain more control of
the water.
In the current negotiation process, Ethiopia is asserting its right to use a water resource
significantly originating from its territory due to its pressing need for achieving development
and reducing poverty. Egypt, on the other hand, has been insisting to maintain its historical
rights. Hence, the negotiation process is stalling in between maintaining and revising the
status quo. Zeitoune and Mirumachi (2008) highlighted the nature of transboundary
interactions as a political process subject to the whims of power. This is mainly true in the
absence of legal constraints and well-defined rights (Benevenisti, 2004).
Regardless of perceived power positions, negotiating parties cannot rule the importance of
flexibility and readiness to concede to the needs and demands of others in order to resolve
contradictory views and reach a negotiated settlement of sustainable outcome. Allan and
Mirumachi (2007) argue that a successful water management and allocation scheme should
take changing circumstances such as intensities of conflict and cooperation and politico-
economic dynamics into account. Intensification of conflict over the use and management of
the Nile Basin and evolving needs to achieve swift economic development by many upper
riparian countries implies the need for new thinking and legal framework than sticking to
long existed trends.
The modalities, with which negotiations have to continue, could emerge as a potential area of
controversy and source of disagreement among negotiating parties. This has exactly
happened in the current trilateral talks among the three parties. The involvement of
„observers‟ such as the USA and WB with an invitation from Egypt but the form of
interventions induced by them casting doubt over their neutrality in the eyes of Ethiopia,
emerged as a point of hot areas of discussions backsliding the process from achieving a
breakthrough. Therefore, dispute resolution mechanisms among the parties now, and in the
future, have become another sticky point in the negotiation process. Biswas (2008) provides
that negotiating parties on transboundary rivers prefer to resolve their disputes on the basis of
bilateral and multilateral forums other than intermediary actors and international
organizations.
This could be in line with Ethiopia‟s push to exhaust internal dispute resolution mechanisms
primarily among the negotiating parties and invite observers of their choice when such

PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development, Vol. 1, No. 2, August 2020
24
avenues have failed. The review, however, reveals Egypt‟s continued effort to resolve the
matter through external actors such as the USA, WB, and the UNSC and at times through the
Arab League to put diplomatic pressure on Ethiopia. For Perlman et al. (2017), two sides of
power inequalities could be reflected in transboundary water negotiations. One could be
inequality in the interactions between riparian countries and the other in terms of
relationships with powerful actors outside the region. Some parties might be more important
to powerful external actors than others whose involvement might influence the form,
directions and possibly also the final outcomes of the negotiation. Third-party involvement in
the transboundary water negotiation process is appreciated when it helps to break deadlocks
and provides assistance in the form of technical expertise and platforms to host the talks.
There has not been a time when the Nile water resource utilization was not politicized
(Zeitoune & Mirumachi, 2008). The review reveals that even during the current trilateral
talks, there has been a tendency most often to drift away from scientific and technical aspects
of water management and utilization in the filling and operation of the GERD. Exhaustive
discussions at the scientific and technical levels could have helped to find out ways of
optimizing positive externalities and minimizing the negative environmental and water
scarcity impacts on downstream countries. Politicization has been projected through a
stringent emphasis on the legality of existed colonial-era agreements and exaggeration of the
negative impacts of GERD from downstream Egypt and Sudan and questioning the fairness
and equitable nature of the previous agreements under existing circumstances from upstream
Ethiopia.
Benvenisti (2004) opines that upstream and downstream relationships could at times be
constrained by the upstream threat to the use of force to protect their water shares while
downstream countries may refuse to recognize their duty to share water with their
downstream counterparts. He mentioned Egypt as the best instance of issuing military threats
against its relatively weaker neighbors to restrain them from interfering in the natural flow of
the water. For a fair observer of the matter, the current dispute on the Nile Basin is more of
an upstream country trying to assert its right for the utilization of the water resources and a
downstream country insisting to maintain its century‟s old absolute control and use of the
water along the basin.
Conflicts over the utilization and co-management of transboundary water resources still
persist along several water basins of which the Nile Basin is a prominent one. However,

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25
many studies indicate that, in recent decades, states tend to cooperate over shared water
resources than entering into military confrontations. Tensions over the utilization of water
resources are gradually being replaced by cooperation (Zeitoune & Mirumachi, 2008). The
very nature of transboundary water resources entails collective action leading to more
beneficial shared regulatory mechanisms providing optimal and sustainable results
(Benivenisti, 2004).
Concluding Remarks
The Nile is one of the most controversial River Basins without an inclusive and effective
legal framework entirely depending on the old and exclusionary colonial-era agreements
favoring the lower riparian countries. This has made management and utilization of water
resources along the Basin with the full participation of all riparian countries a very difficult
task. Many authors reflect the insufficiency of the colonial era agreements formulated to
entertain the aspirations of the then colonial forces and are nowadays becoming an
impediment to effective management, utilization and water-sharing schemes that can
accommodate the interest of all riparian countries.
Ethiopia‟s move to construct the GERD in 2011 has altered the political and diplomatic
landscape of the Nile Basin. No other upper riparian ever before attempted such a
groundbreaking project of high significance to achieve development. The move, however, is
to the dismay of lower riparian countries that perceived the dam as a threat to their „historical
rights‟ and „existed and current water use security‟. That is why the trilateral negotiation
process has been going immediately after the launching of the GERD project. The concerns
of lower riparian countries are understandable as they depend for the most part on the water
resources from the Nile Basin. However, a balance should also be maintained to the socio-
economic needs of Ethiopia and its immediate need to uplift more than half of its population
from abject poverty. The trilateral talks on the filling and annual operation of the GERD
could not lead to a final negotiated settlement due to a lack of flexibility and continued
insistence to maintain existing water share. The political will and commitment to follow a
revisionist approach basing premises on newly emerging socio-economic realities along the
basin could help to break the deadlock. Working towards formulating an all-inclusive and
efficient basin-wide legal framework benefiting all riparian countries in a fair and equitable
manner according to existing international legal standards may ensure to resolve the matter
sustainably.

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One effect of over politicization of GERD talks is externalizing the matter and attempting to
find solutions through diplomatic and political pressures. Seeking technical and advisory
assistance from observers, mediators and negotiators on transboundary water conflicts is
normal international practice, but on conditions of consensus among the parties involved.
Real political commitment and negotiation in line with the baseline principle of give-and-take
could help to address the competing interest of all parties. Externally imposed solutions may
not sustainably resolve the matter or may even drag it to already prevailing global power play
among competing powerful actors.
Conflict and cooperation go all the way along among co-basin countries sharing
transboundary water resources. Empirical evidence shows a rare possibility of full-scale
destructive conflicts among such countries. This specifically holds true to the Nile Basin
where a significant portion of the water originates from upper riparian Ethiopia, and the
lower riparian excessively depends on it for fresh water. Their fates are inextricably
intertwined and only a more cooperative scheme would help them to achieve each other‟s
goals. A protracted conflict that could escalate into war would be much more destructive and
would severely destabilize the already fragile and unstable region of the Horn of Africa.
Therefore, the riparian countries and specifically those with relatively stronger military power
should restrain from considering war as an alternative to resolve the matter. The international
community also needs to remain neutral and provide the negotiating parties with genuine
support in their efforts to amicably resolve their differences.
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