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Capital Inflows, Exchange Rate Flexibility,
and Credit Booms
Nicolas E. Magud, Carmen M. Reinhart, and
Esteban R. Vesperoni
WP/12/41
© 2012 International Monetary Fund WP/12/41
IMF Working Paper
Western Hemisphere Department
Capital Inflows, Exchange Rate Flexibility, and Credit Booms*
Prepared by Nicolas E. Magud, Carmen M. Reinhart, Esteban R. Vesperoni
Authorized for distribution by Martin Kaufmann
February 2012
Abstract
The prospects of expansionary monetary policies in the advanced countries for the foreseeable
future have renewed the debate over policy options to cope with large capital inflows that are, at
l
east partly, driven by low interest rates in the financial centers. Historically, capital flow bonanzas
h
ave often fueled sharp credit expansions in advanced and emerging market economies alike.
F
ocusing primarily on emerging markets, we analyze the impact of exchange rate flexibility on
c
redit markets during periods of large capital inflows. We show that bank credit grows more rapidly
a
nd its composition tilts to foreign currency in economies with less flexible exchange rate regimes,
a
nd that these results are not explained entirely by the fact that the latter attract more capital inflows
han economies with more flexible regimes. Our findings thus suggest countries with less flexible
e
xchange rate regimes may stand to benefit the most from regulatory policies that reduce banks’
i
ncentives to tap external markets and to lend/borrow in foreign currency; these policies include
m
arginal reserve requirements on foreign lending, currency-dependent liquidity requirements, and
h
igher capital requirement and/or dynamic provisioning on foreign exchange loans.
JEL Classification Numbers: E44, E52, F33, F34
Keywords: exchange rate flexibility, domestic credit, foreign currency loans, capital inflows, financial
regulation
Authors’ E-Mail Addresses: nmagud@imf.org, evesperoni@imf.org, CReinhart.PIIE.com
________________
* We thank seminar participants at the IMF, the Central Bank of Chile, and the Central Bank of Paraguay. We also
thank Marco Arena, Bas Baker, Martin Evans, Herman Kamil, Martin Kaufman, Anton Korinek, Marcelo
Olaverria, Jiri Podpiera, Sergio Schmukler, and Rodrigo Valdes for useful comments and suggestions. All
remaining errors are ours. This paper represents only the authors' views and not those of the International Monetary
Fund, its Executive Board, its Management, or the Peterson Institute for International Economics.
This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.
The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily
represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the
author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate.
2
Contents Page
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................3
II. Exchange Rate Arrangements and Credit: Basic Concepts ..................................................4
III. Data and Coverage ..............................................................................................................6
IV. Methodology ........................................................................................................................7
A. Identifying Capital Inflows Booms ........................................................................7
B. The Indicators .......................................................................................................10
C. Econometric Methodology ...................................................................................10
V. Main Findings .....................................................................................................................13
A. Domestic Credit ...................................................................................................14
B. Credit Composition ..............................................................................................15
C. Capital Flows........................................................................................................17
VI. A Digression: Parallels with Advanced Economies ..........................................................18
VII. Policy Implications and Further Issues ............................................................................19
References ................................................................................................................................21
Tables
1. The Exchange Rate Regime and Domestic Credit ...........................................................14
2. The Exchange Rate Regime and Credit Composition ......................................................15
3. The Exchange Rate Regime and Credit Composition: Transmision ................................16
4. The Exchange Rate Regime and Capital Flows ...............................................................18
5. Summary of Main Results ................................................................................................19
Figures
1. Exchange Rate Regime - Coarse Classification .................................................................7
2. Defining Regional Capital Flow Cycles ............................................................................9
3. Exchange Rate Flexibility, Credit, and Capital Flows .................................................... 11
4. Domestic Credit and Capital Inflows: Selected Advanced Economics ............................19
3
I. INTRODUCTION
Capital inflows bonanzas have become more frequent after restrictions to international
movements were relaxed worldwide over the last decades.1 Capital flows to emerging
economies can finance investment and foster economic growth, as well as increase welfare
by facilitating consumption smoothing. However, inflows may also induce excessive
monetary and credit expansions, build vulnerabilities associated with currency mismatches,
and distort asset prices.2 Large inflows tend to be associated with expansionary economic
policies and behave procyclically.3 These linkages between surges in capital inflows and
financial excess are not limited to emerging markets, as the recent wave of crises in advanced
economies attest.4
The prospects of expansionary monetary policies in advanced countries have renewed the
debate over policy options to cope with large capital inflows in emerging economies. As in
the past, spillovers from low international interest rates will likely have a significant impact
in emerging economies. These spillovers may be stronger this time around, for two reasons.
First, as advanced economies struggle with a massive public and private debt overhang,
expansionary monetary policies may be in place for a longer period of time than in past
“normal” business cycles (a ‘push factor’).5 Second, many emerging markets have been
conspicuously resilient during the financial crisis, increasing investors’ appetite for the asset
class (possibly a ‘pull factor’—although the relative attractiveness of emerging markets may
also stem from another push factor owing to the higher perceived risk of many advanced
economies, unprecedented since World War II).6 The debate over the right policy mix to cope
with capital flows has been and continues to be extensive. However, it has overlooked some
dimensions of the role played by the exchange rate regime, an issue we take up in this paper.
We show that during capital inflow bonanzas, domestic credit grows more rapidly and its
composition tilts to foreign currency in economies with relatively inflexible exchange rate
regimes.7 Studies on economic performance under different exchange regimes have tended
to focus on growth, inflation, fiscal policies, and current account adjustments, but have been
relatively silent on the evolution of domestic credit. In a recent paper, Mendoza and Terrones
(2008) show that capital inflows increase before the peak in credit booms, and that these
latter have a higher frequency under less flexible exchange rate regimes. We discuss and
document why and how this relationship between capital inflows, domestic credit, and
exchange rate regimes works through banking intermediation. The main analysis is based on
a panel of 25 emerging markets in Asia, Europe, and Latin America. We identify periods of
capital inflows booms and document that episodes of relatively inflexible exchange rate
regimes are positively associated with the ratio of private credit to GDP. We also show that
1 See, for example, Reinhart and Reinhart (2008), and references therein.
2 See Magud et al (2011) describing the four fears to capital inflows.
3 Kaminsky et al (2004).
4 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
5 For the importance of ‘push factors’ during capital inflows booms, see Calvo et al (1995).
6 Especially in Latin America and Asia. Capital flow reversals were mild compared to previous inflows, and
relatively short-lived..
7 Throughout the paper, domestic credit refers credit extended by the banking sector.
4
the share of foreign currency credit is positively associated with less flexible exchange
regimes. The share of foreign currency credit also increases with larger capital inflows and
interest rate differentials.
These developments in credit could potentially be exclusively explained if countries with
more rigid exchange rate arrangements tend to record larger capital inflows. However, by
analyzing the relationship of the ratio of capital flows to GDP and the exchange rate regime,
we do not find compelling evidence that this is the case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the conceptual links
between exchange rate regimes and credit growth patterns while revisiting the existing
literature. Section III describes the data. Section IV presents the methodology for defining
capital inflows booms and for panel estimations. Section V shows the basic results, as well as
robustness checks encompassed in alternative estimations. Section VI gives a snapshot of
credit and exchange rate flexibility in advanced economies Section VII discusses results,
policy implications and directions for future research.
II. EXCHANGE RATE ARRANGEMENTS AND CREDIT: BASIC CONCEPTS
The collapse of several pegged exchange rate regimes during the 1990s led to the perception
that these arrangements were more prone to currency and financial crises after sharp credit
expansions.8 In this context, in a study of the occurrence of twin crises, Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999) show banking crises and currency crises in close succession. Overall,
evidence on the link between crises and alternative exchange rate regimes is not clear-cut,
but the literature suggests that the exchange regime may have an impact on developments in
financial markets and asset prices, through several channels.9
The basic textbook prediction tells us that in an economy with a pure floating exchange rate
regime capital inflows would appreciate the domestic currency with no further effect on
monetary aggregates. With a fixed exchange rate, however, the central bank would be forced
to intervene, accumulating international reserves so as to maintain the peg. Part or all of this
reserve accumulation can be (in principle) offset through sterilization, a contraction in
domestic credit effected through open market sales of domestic bonds. In practice,
sterilization is usually partial, as it is costly (risk premiums on domestic bonds may be large
in emerging economies) and foreign exchange intervention is associated with expanding the
monetary base. Consequently, economies with less flexible exchange rate regimes are more
likely to experience credit expansions in the presence of large capital inflows, the main
channel being bank intermediation of these flows.
Montiel and Reinhart (2001) describe another channel through which exchange regimes may
affect financial markets. They argue that by extending implicit improperly-priced guarantees,
fixed exchange regimes may contribute to stronger credit growth than flexible ones,
8 See, for example, Ghosh et al (2003) and Ghosh et al (2010).
9 For a discussion on the probability of crises and the severity of their macroeconomic impact under alternative
exchange regimes, see Ghosh et al (2003), Bubula and Otker-Robe (2003), and references therein.
5
especially in the context of large capital inflows. Hence, deposit guarantees and a peg are
perceived as a guarantee to foreign currency claims, increasing the scope for banks’
expansion through external funds, which can potentially feed into domestic credit (i.e., an
increase in the banking system’s leverage ratio). In a different context, Backé and Wójcik
(2007) develop a simple framework with an increasing trend in productivity growth in an
emerging economy that pegs its domestic currency to a developed economy with constant
productivity growth.10 The peg gives place to lower interest rates and higher domestic credit
compared to the equilibrium with a flexible regime.
Bakker and Gulde (2010) analyze the experience of new EU member states in Emerging
Europe in the context of large capital inflows during the 2000s. They notice that, as
economic activity and inflation accelerate, credit booms in countries with fixed exchange rate
regimes are difficult to contain—as increasing inflation lowers real interest rates further
fueling credit demand. In countries with floating exchange rates, credit booms can be
mitigated by letting the exchange rate appreciate, which will keep inflation low and real
interest rates high.
A credible fixed exchange rate regime may also place incentives for taking on debt in foreign
currency. To begin with, the increase in banks’ leverage—loan to deposit ratios—that large
capital inflows usually bring about can place incentives to lend directly in foreign currency,
as this would allow banks to avoid currency mismatches in their balance sheets. As for
debtors, in credible pegs, a small differential between interest rates in domestic and foreign
currency may create incentives to borrow in the latter, as they would deflate a lower interest
rate by expected domestic inflation or wage growth.11 These incentives have typically played
a critical role during inflation stabilization programs, especially when they were coupled with
policies allowing liability dollarization. Cavallo and Cottani (1997), for example, analyze the
Argentinean experience with the currency board where the peg, as a nominal anchor, played
a fundamental role in the dollarization of the financial system.12
Our preceding discussion highlights that the flexibility of the exchange rate regime should be
an important element in conceiving the policy mix to cope with large capital inflows and
domestic credit expansions.13 The potential impact of the exchange regime on both the
amount and composition of private credit highlights the importance of macro-prudential
regulations like marginal reserve requirements on foreign lending, currency-dependent
liquidity requirements, debt-to-income and loan-to-value ratios, and higher capital
requirement and/or dynamic provisioning on foreign exchange (FX) loans.
10 This is particularly relevant in Emerging Europe.
11 See, for example, Rosenberg and Tirpák (2008), and the underlying theoretical model on the determinants of
credit dollarization developed by Jeanne (2003).
12 While policies allowing liability dollarization created challenges, the authors highlight that they were critical
to extending the maturity of financial assets, thus reducing the risks associated with short-term debt overhangs.
Also, Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003) argue that in the context of a portfolio model, by reducing exchange rate
volatility, pegs may increase incentives for foreign-currency lending.
13 See, for example, Ostry et al (2010) for a recent debate on these issues. For a discussion on the effects
exchange rate flexibility on domestic demand see International Monetary Fund (2010).
6
III. DATA AND COVERAGE
We use annual data for five Asian economies (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and
Thailand), 13 emerging European countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Serbia, and Turkey),
and seven Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and
Uruguay). The series span different periods, chosen using the criterion defined below for
identifying capital inflows booms. For Latin America we use data for the period 1993–2002;
for Asia, 1990–1997; and for Emerging Europe, 1999–2008.
As for macroeconomic variables, time series were obtained from the International Monetary
Fund’s International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook databases, numerous
IMF’s Staff Reports for the countries in our sample, national central banks, Saint Louis
Federal Reserve Bank’s FRED database, Haver Analytics databases, and Eurostat. These
series are real GDP, external debt, exports and imports of goods and services, the external
capital and financial account balance, interest rates, domestic credit to the private sector,
consumer price indices, broad money, the real effective exchange rate, and domestic credit in
foreign currency. For the international interest rate, we used the U.S. 2-year Treasury bonds,
as well as Fed funds rate and the European Central Bank policy rate, with similar results in
all specifications.
For the exchange rate regime, we used the Reinhart and Rogoff de-facto exchange rate
regime (COARSE) classification.14 In the latter, regimes are classified as described in Figure
1 below, with an increase in the index pointing to more flexible exchange rate regimes. We
have also considered Reinhart and Rogoff’s fine classification, and the IMF’s Annual Report
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), which for the more
recent period yield similar results. Given the time-varying nature of exchange rate regimes,
using de-facto arrangements have the advantage of drawing a distinction between what
countries declare as their official de jure regime and their actual practices, which may even
capture to a certain degree the endogeneity of policies, shocks, and markets reactions.15
14 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), and the subsequent update from Ilzetski, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010).
Updates for Emerging Europe in 2008 were based on changes in exchange rate regimes as described in the
Fund’s AREAER.
15 Notice that our empirical methodology is based on ex-post information, i.e., is backward-looking. An
alternative approach could be to conduct event studies to capture market reactions on an ex-ante basis. Event
studies could focus on authorities’ announcements (signals), and analyze how forward-looking agents react to
these announcements.
7
The variable labeled financial deepness is based on measures of financial development
pioneered by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000), which was updated since this work
began in the early 2000s.16 The index reflects the sum of stock market capitalization,
deposits, and private and public bond market capitalization, all in terms of GDP. Financial
integration is the index for financial openness developed by Chinn and Ito.17 This index
measures the scope of capital controls based on the information from the IMF’s Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).
IV. METHODOLOGY
We pursue three different tasks in this section. First, we identify capital inflows booms in the
countries included in the dataset. Second, we define the three dependent variables in the
exercise and explore the relationship between the exchange rate regimes, capital flows, and
the amount and composition of domestic credit to the private sector through cross-plot
analysis. Finally, we describe the econometric methodology used in the paper to test the
impact of the exchange regimes on credit and capital flows.
A. Identifying Capital Inflows Booms
The countries in the sample have not necessarily experienced capital inflows booms
simultaneously. Asian and Latin American countries received large capital inflows during the
1990s and the early 2000s, while Emerging Europe recorded large capital inflows in the
2000s. Furthermore, although Latin America and Asia received large inflows during the same
16 We are grateful to Sergio Schmukler for kindly sharing with us the updated Beck et al (2009) database.
17 See Chinn and Ito (2008).
1 No separate legal tender
1 Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement
1Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
1De facto peg
2Pre announced crawling peg
2Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
2De factor crawling peg
2De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
3Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2%
3De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5%
3Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for both appreciation
and depreciation over time)
3Managed floating
4Freely floating
5Freely falling
6Dual market in which parallel market data is missing.
Figure 1. Exchange Rate Regimes - Coarse Classification
8
decade, the specific years differ. Therefore, our first task is to identify periods of large capital
inflows systematically before pooling the data.
Definition 1. We define a capital flow boom as:
(i) a period in which trend capital inflows monotonically increase with a structural
trend change; or
(ii) a period 


 in which inflows exceeds their long-term
trend, i.e.,  
, where .refers to capital inflows in region during
period . A bar over a variable represents its long-term value.
First, we compute regional cyclical components of capital flows.18 For each region—
 
  —we compute the total volume of capital inflows by adding the dollar-
value of capital inflows of each country






for the 
      countries, as 


 , obtaining total regional capital flows in each
year t. These series are then de-trended using the standard Hodrick-Prescott filter. As we are
using annual data, we set   . The cyclical components are computed by subtracting the
HP-trended value from total capital inflows in each period t.
Figure 2 below depicts trend and observed total component in their left panels and the
cyclical component in the right panels. In the early 1990s, Latin America and Asia received
large capital inflows, which reversed during the early 2000s for Latin America, and during
the late 1990s for Asia. Capital inflows in Emerging Europe were virtually zero before the
late 1990s, and picked up with prospects for European Union access in the early 2000s.
Following Definition 1, we identify capital inflows booms as follows:
For Emerging Europe, we define a capital inflows boom between 1999 and 2008.
Trend capital inflows were virtually zero before the late 1990s, and switched to an
increasing positive value in 1999. While the trend remains positive in 2009, we
exclude this year from the sample as the region as a whole experienced a sharp
reversal in capital flows.
For Latin America and Asia, the periods are defined as 1993–2002 and 1990–1997
respectively. For these two regions—and especially in Asia—observations over the
entire sample period seem to be mean-reverting—with capital inflows during the
1990s and outflows thereafter. As such, periods of large capital inflows are better
defined by identifying periods in which inflows are above their long-term trend.
18 We conduct this exercise regionally due to heterogeneity among regions.
9
After identifying regional capital inflows bonanzas, we build a panel of 25 cross-sections,
with 10 observations per cross-section in Latin American and Europe, and 8 observations in
Asia. Note that this method for identifying regional bonanza episodes accords well with the
country-by-country approach developed in Reinhart and Reinhart (2008), as, for example,
Asian capital flow bonanzas in that study are bunched in the 1990–1996 period. The
maximum sample size is 240 annual observations.
Figure 2. Defining Regional Capital Flow Cycles
-12 0
-10 0
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009
Total HP-trend
Asia--Capital Inflows
(in U.S. billion dollars)
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006
Asia-Cyclical Comp
Asia-Cyclical Comp
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008
Total
HP-trend
Latin America-
-
Ca
p
ital Inflows
(in U. S. b il lion d ollar s)
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008
Latin America-Cyclical Comp
Latin America-Cyclical
Comp
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
Total HP-trend
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
Euro pe--Cy lic al Com p
Europe--Cylical Comp
(inU.S. billion dollars)
(inU.S. billion dollars) (inU.S. billion dollars)
Europe--Capital Inflows
(in U.S. billion dollars)
10
B. The Indicators
The three variables we study are defined as follows. The domestic credit variable is the ratio
of banking system credit to the private sector to gross domestic product at current prices. The
second variable—foreign currency credit—is defined as the ratio of credit to the private
sector in foreign currency to total credit to the private sector. The capital flows variable is
defined as the ratio of capital flows to the gross domestic product at current prices, both in
U.S. dollars. The association between domestic credit, capital inflows and the exchange rate
regime can be promptly illustrated through cross-plot charts:
Figure 3, panel (a) suggests that credit to the private sector is higher in economies
with less flexible exchange regimes.
Figure 3, panel (b) shows that there seems to be a significant relationship between the
share of credit in foreign currency and exchange rate regimes, with a higher share in
economies with less flexible regimes.
Figure 3, panel (c) shows that capital flows are higher in economies with less flexible
exchange rate regimes. The scatter, though, suggests that this relationship may be
associated with a few outliers in very inflexible regimes (classifications #1 and #2).
C. Econometric Methodology
There are a number of empirical studies analyzing macroeconomic performance under
alternative exchange rate regimes. This literature concentrates on the study of the behavior of
growth, interest rates, fiscal policy, inflation, and the external accounts. Using panel
regressions, they analyze the role played by the exchange rate regime by using variables
classifying exchange rate regimes on either ‘de jure’ or ‘de facto’ basis.
To study the impact of alternative exchange regimes on capital inflows and domestic credit,
we use the same broad approach as in the recent literature.19 We extend the analysis by
controlling for the degree of domestic financial development and the financial integration
with international capital markets. We also control for macroeconomic factors that are
important in the evolution of capital flows and domestic credit, like the international interest
rate and interest rate differentials.
The explanatory variables can be grouped in four different categories: (i) a variable capturing
the flexibility of the exchange rate regime (already described in more detail in Section II),
(ii) macroeconomic factors, (iii) financial sector variables, and (iv) country and time
dummies.
19 See, for example, Ghosh et al (2003) and Ghosh et al (2010).
11
V.
Figure 3. Exchange Rate Flexibility, Credit, and Capital Flows
Panel A
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
0123456
Domestic Credit to GDP
Exc han ge Rate Fl exib ilit y
Panel B
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0123456
Foreign Currency Credit (Share of Total)
Exc han ge Rat e Fl exib ilit y
Panel C
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
0123456
Annual Capital Flows to GDP
Exc han ge Ra te F lex ibilit y
12
The second category involves macroeconomic variables. Real GDP reflects the level of gross
domestic product at constant prices, and intends to capture how the level of economic
development affects in time the amount of capital flows. Real GDP growth captures whether
higher economic growth attracts more capital inflows. The ratio of external debt to GDP and
the ratio of exports and imports to GDP capture how the level of indebtedness and trade
openness affect the amount of capital flows. The annual rate of inflation controls for the
effect of inflation on the amount and composition of domestic credit. The ratio of broad
money to GDP controls for factors that affect disposable funding for credit in the domestic
financial system. The ratio of foreign currency deposit to total deposits measures the impact
of domestic foreign currency financing on foreign currency lending. Finally, the real
exchange rate level controls for the incentives that it may place on the decision to shift
towards foreign currency lending. All these variables are standard in the literature.
The variables in the third category control for the impact of financial sector developments.
Interest rate differentials capture incentives for borrowers to demand credit in foreign
currency. Capital inflows capture the impact of foreign funding in the volume and
composition of domestic credit.
As a last category, we include country dummies and time dummies to control for aggregate
time shocks, i.e., international developments. Specifications including country and time
dummies help us assess whether results are driven by cross-country or cross-time variation,
which may have different implications in terms of policy.
We estimate panel regressions for every dependent variable. The basic regression uses annual
data for the pooled sample panel under ordinary least squares. The estimated equations are:
tititii,tti FMX'Y ,,,, ''
, (1)
such that ,...,Tt,...,Ni 1 and ,1 . We assume that the error term
i,t can be characterized
by independently distributed random variables with mean zero and variance 2
,ti
. Yi,t
represents the dependent variables defined above. The sub-indexes i and t stand for country
and time respectively. Xi,t stands for the variable capturing exchange rate flexibility. Mi,t
denotes variables controlling for macroeconomic effects. Fi,t captures the impact of financial
sector variables.
As a first alternative, we report within (or fixed effects) and time effects estimates. These
models are estimated as:
i,ttctii,ttiti FMXfY
'''' ,,/,
, (2)
such that fi/t are country and time specific effect, respectively. We assume that the error term
i,t, can be characterized by independently distributed random variables with mean zero and
variance 2
,ti
. Finally, for robustness, through generalized least squares we estimate the panel
allowing for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the residuals.
13
The above estimations assume exogeneity of the explanatory variables. However, to control
for potential endogeneity biases and to check the robustness of the results, we also estimate
instrumental variable models of equation (1), as the last alternative specification.
V. MAIN FINDINGS
Following the evidence in Figure 3, we explore three main issues both in the basic pooled
estimates as well as in alternative ones. We first analyze the impact of exchange rate
flexibility on domestic credit to the private sector. Second, we study how the currency
composition of domestic credit is affected by flexibility. Finally, we assess whether the
volume of capital flows is also affected by the exchange rate policy.
A. Domestic Credit
The estimates reported in Table 1 show that exchange rate flexibility has an impact on
domestic credit levels, confirming the findings described in Figure 3. The pooled estimate
suggests that the exchange rate regime variable is statistically significant (at the 1 percent
level) and has a negative sign, implying that less flexible regimes are associated with higher
credit to the private sector.20 The point estimates suggest that the impact of exchange rate
flexibility is economically relevant. A 1-point increase in the exchange rate classification
index (a 17 percent increase) increases the ratio of domestic credit to GDP by about 4¼
percentage points (a 10 percent increase in the average credit to GDP ratio in the sample,
which stands at 40 percent).
Alternative estimates suggest that results are robust. Fixed (cross country and time) effects
specifications, as well as Generalized Least Squares (GLS) and instrumental variables
estimations suggest that the variable exchange rate regime has a negative and statistically
significant coefficient (in all cases, at the one percent level), suggesting that this relationship
is explained both by cross-country and cross-time effects. Point estimates suggest that
elasticities are similar to the ones obtained in the pooled estimates.
As for the impact of other variables on domestic credit, Table 1 suggests that larger capital
inflows and a larger depositor base (captured by the ratio of broad money to GDP) also have
a positive impact on domestic credit.21 These coefficients are statistically significant across
specifications.
In summary, these results suggest that large capital inflows (i.e., which include banking
system external funding) and less flexible exchange rate regimes tend to exacerbate domestic
credit cycles. The fact that the exchange rate regime is statistically significant despite
controlling for capital inflows suggests that the impact of exchange rate flexibility is likely
working through a transmission channel that goes beyond the monetary expansion associated
20 A higher value in the exchange rate regime variable is associated with more flexible regimes.
21 Regressions were also run using banking system leverage (i.e., loan to deposit ratios) instead of capital
inflows. Results are in line with the ones reported in this section, and are available upon request.
14
with capital inflows. A larger share of capital inflows could be intermediated through the
banking system or the credit multiplier might be larger in economies with less flexible
exchange regimes. This would be consistent with Montiel and Reinhart’s (2001) intuition,
i.e., that a peg may be perceived as a guarantee on foreign currency claims, increasing the
scope for banks to expand credit through external funding.
B. Credit Composition
Table 2 suggests that credit composition is affected by exchange rate flexibility, also
confirming the findings described in Figure 3. The pooled estimate suggests that the
exchange rate regime variable is statistically significant (at the 1 percent level) and has a
negative sign, implying that less flexible regimes are associated with a higher share of credit
in foreign currency. The point estimates suggest that the impact of exchange rate flexibility is
economically relevant. A 1-point increase in the exchange rate classification index increases
the share of credit in foreign currency by about 14 percentage points (a 35 percent increase in
the average share of foreign currency lending in the sample, which stands at 41 percent).
Dependent Variable: Domes tic Credit/GDP
IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 1/
C 13.53 *** -5.86 15.38 *** 9.32 *** 12.82 *** 14.51 ***
Capital Inflows 1.04 *** 0.94 *** 0.93 *** 0.55 *** 1.04 *** 1.24 ***
Exchange Rate Regime -4.26 *** -5.19 *** -4.59 *** -2.59 *** -3.68 *** -4.39 ***
Inflation (-1) -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 * -0.01 -0.02 **
Broad Money/GDP 0.71 *** 1.16 *** 0.70 *** 0.75 *** 0.69 *** 0.73 ***
Dumm y Crisis 26.81 * 31.12 *** 26.68 * 18.85 ** 26.73 ** 17.16
Fixed Effects No Yes No No No No
Tim e Effects No No Yes No No No
Cross-Sec tion Weights No No No Yes No No
Period W eights No No No No Yes No
Observations 202 202 202 202 202 202
Adjusted R-squared 0.57 0.88 0.57 0.64 0.58 0.59
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1/ Instruments are lagged independent variables for capital inflows and broad money.
Table 1. The Exchange Rate Regime and Domestic Credit
OLS GLS
15
Alternative estimates suggest that results are again robust. Fixed-effects, GLS, and
instrumental variables estimations suggest that the exchange rate regime has a negative and
statistically significant coefficient (in most cases, at the one percent level).22
As for other variables, Table 2 suggests that capital inflows and a larger share of deposits in
foreign currency are associated with a higher share of foreign currency credit. Both variables
capture the incentives described above. Larger capital inflows (i.e., an increase in foreign
funding) and deposit in foreign currency allow banks to expand credit portfolios, but they try
to avoid a currency mismatch in their balance sheets by lending in foreign currency. As for
borrowers, a higher interest rate differential between domestic and foreign currency financing
places incentives to contract credit in foreign currency, which is reflected by the positive and
statistically significant coefficient for this variable.
As a robustness test, we use banking leverage ratios instead of capital inflows as an
explanatory variable for the share of domestic credit in foreign currency.23 Leverage ratios
22 By lagging the exchange rate regime variable, the IV estimation addresses potential endogeneity problems
associated with central banks keeping a less flexible exchange regime due to a high degree of dollarization.
Dependent Variable: Domestic Credit in Foreign Currenc y/Total Domes tic Credit
IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 1/
C 60.02 *** 38.42 *** 60.69 *** 49.75 *** 59.40 *** 62.09 ***
Capital Inflows 0.55 * 0.42 *** 0.54 * 0.93 *** 0.62 ** 0.78 **
Exchange Rate Regime -14.14 *** -4.17 ** -14.48 *** -11.14 *** -14.04 *** -15.50 ***
Domestic deposit in FC/Tot Depos its 0.27 *** 0.35 *** 0.27 *** 0.33 *** 0.27 *** 0.26 ***
Inflation (-1) 0.11 0.18 *** 0.13 0.09 0.11 -0.01
Interest Rate Differential 0.75 *** 0.06 0.75 *** 0.45 *** 0.76 *** 1.03 ***
Dumm y Crisis 16.13 -5.51 15.56 21.13 *** 16.18 -62.09 ***
Fixed Eff ec ts No Yes No No No No
Tim e Ef fec ts No No Yes No No No
Cross -Section Weights No No No Yes No No
Period Weights No No No No Yes No
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 132
Adjusted R-squared 0.31 0.94 0.27 0.77 0.31 0.34
Prob(F-s tatistic ) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1/ Instruments are lagged independent variables (exc ept for the dummy for crisis ).
Table 2. The Exchange Rate Regime and Credit Composition
OLS GLS
16
capture the increase in banking system external funding sources associated with large capital
inflows. Table 3 shows that the results are consistent with the regressions in Table 2: a higher
share of domestic credit in foreign currency over the total is associated with less flexible
exchange regimes and higher leverage ratios. Moreover, we also explore the interaction
between leverage and exchange rate flexibility, which shows that the positive relation
between leverage and credit in foreign currency is stronger in countries with less flexible
exchange rate regimes. This interaction variable has the opposite sign than the leverage
variable—reducing its elasticity by more than a third in the pool estimate. In other words,
less flexible exchange regimes exacerbate this interaction, i.e., banks tend to have lower FX
open exchange positions in economies with less flexible exchange rate regimes. This reduces
currency risk at the expense of taking more credit risk associated with borrowers’ unhedged
FX positions.
23 Leverage is defined as the loan-to-deposit ratio, and it proxies the expansion of the credit portfolio beyond the
deposit base in the domestic financial system.
Dependent Variable: Domestic Credit in Foreign Currenc y/Total Domes tic Credit
IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 1/
C 48.26 *** 32.29 *** 49.32 *** 48.25 *** 47.59 *** 51.73 ***
Leverage 0.23 *** 0.07 0.22 ** 0.23 *** 0.23 *** 0.23 **
Exchange Rate Regime -8.70 ** -6.23 *** -9.18 ** -11.13 *** -8.39 ** -9.96 **
Leverage*Exchange Rate Regime -0.09 ** 0.05 * -0.08 ** -0.06 *** -0.09 ** -0.09 **
Domestic deposit in FC/Tot Depos its 0.30 *** 0.40 *** 0.30 *** 0.39 *** 0.30 *** 0.30 ***
Inflation (-1) 0.07 0.17 *** 0.11 -0.06 0.06 -0.02
Interest Rate Differential 0.69 *** 0.16 0.70 *** 0.67 *** 0.70 *** 0.90 ***
Dummy Crisis -6.57 -0.29 -6.51 8.20 -7.83 -57.41 **
Fixed Eff ec ts No Yes No No No No
Tim e Ef fec ts No No Yes No No No
Cross -Section Weights No No No Yes No No
Period Weights No No No No Yes No
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 132
Adjusted R-squared 0.32 0.95 0.28 0.80 0.32 0.34
Prob(F-s tatistic ) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1/ Instruments are lagged independent variables (except for the dummy for crisis).
Table 3. The Exchange Rate Regime and Credit Composition: Transmission
OLS GLS
17
C. Capital Flows
Is it the case that the relationship between domestic credit and the exchange rate regime is
largely explained by differences in the amount of capital inflows received by economies with
different degrees of exchange rate flexibility?
In principle, fixed exchange rate regimes may attract larger volumes of capital inflows
compared to flexible ones. By reducing nominal exchange rate volatility—compared to
flexible regimes—pegs can reduce transaction costs, encouraging cross-border investment.24
On shorter horizons, nominal exchange rate stability can place strong incentives for foreign
investors to take advantage of even small interest rate differentials through carry trade.25
Another reason why a fixed exchange rate regime may attract more capital is associated with
a policy tool ubiquitous in pegs to prevent inflation and lower real interest rates in the
presence of large capital inflows: sterilized intervention. Sterilized intervention would
introduce a wedge in domestic interest rates and likely magnify the volumes of capital
inflows.26
However, the estimates reported in Table 4 suggest that exchange rate flexibility does not
have an impact on the volume of capital flows going to emerging economies. Alternative
estimations, including fixed effects, GLS controlling for heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation in error terms, and instrumental variables do not change the picture. Capital
inflows are larger in more open economies, economies that are more integrated to
international financial markets, and economies with a larger stock of external debt.27 While
the first explanatory variable may be capturing the fact that capital flows are oftentimes
associated to trade flows, the last two variables suggests that more open financial accounts
and previous access to financial flows (captured by the external debt stock) may have
facilitated new foreign investments in emerging economies.
We have not been able to identify a variable capturing ‘push factors’, but regional factors
may be playing a role. In Latin America, the 1990s were characterized by stabilization
programs aiming at reducing inflation, reforming policy frameworks, and embarking in
ambitious supply-side structural reforms that likely attracted new foreign investment. In
Emerging Europe, the prospects (and eventually, the realization) of access to the European
Union likely attracted significant amounts of new foreign investment. In this context, even if
there was an impact associated with exchange rate flexibility, it may have been marginal
compared to other pull factors.
24 For an analysis on nominal exchange rate volatility, see Ghosh et al (2003) and references therein.
25 On carry trade, see for example Plantin and Shin (2011) and Brunnermeier et al (2009).
26 On sterilization, see for example Calvo (1991), Fernández Arias and Montiel (1996), Montiel and Reinhart
(2001), and Reinhart and Reinhart (2008).
27 We lag these explanatory variables in the different specifications to avoid endogeneity biases.
18
VI. A DIGRESSION: PARALLELS WITH ADVANCED ECONOMIES
While our analysis focuses on emerging markets, a snapshot of advanced economies suggests
that lack of exchange rate flexibility may also play a role on credit expansions. Figure 4
below suggests that capital inflows may have also been associated with credit expansions in
the euro zone since the mid-1990s.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Obstfeld and Gourinchas (2011) suggest that the impact of
the recent financial crisis in advanced economies is similar to the one experienced by
emerging markets in the past, and that credit expansions have been a critical element in these
crises. While very preliminary, the evidence presented here suggests the impact of exchange
rate flexibility and capital inflows on domestic credit may be relevant for some European
advanced economies as well, and that this is an issue worth exploring.
Dependent Variable: Capital Flows /GDP
IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 1/
C -1.10 -7.72 *** -2.58 0.31 1.08 -0.90
Exchange Rate Regime 0.27 -0.10 0.34 0.06 -0.08 0.02
Financial Deepness (-1) -0.01 0.16 *** -0.05 * -0.01 0.00 -0.03
Financial Integration (-1) 0.92 *** 1.21 *** 0.57 * 0.46 *** 0.70 *** 0.73 ***
Trade Openness (-1) 0.04 *** 0.09 *** 0.05 *** 0.03 *** 0.04 *** 0.05 ***
Real GDP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00
Output Growth -0.08 0.09 0.03 0.06 -0.10 -0.03
External Debt/GDP (-1) 0.05 *** 0.02 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.06 ***
International Interest Rate 0.00 0.18 0.39 0.02 -0.11 0.08
Dummy Crisis -11.33 ** -7.58 * -11.19 ** -9.41 *** -10.85 -9.41 *
Fixe d Effect s No Yes No No No No
Tim e Effects No No Yes No No No
Cross-Section W eights No No No Yes No No
Per iod Weights No No No No Yes No
Observations 202 202 202 202 202 189
Adjusted R-squared 0.30 0.70 0.32 0.53 0.25 0.32
Prob(F-statis tic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1/ Instruments are lagged independent variables for real GDP, output growth, and the exchange regime.
Table 4. The Exchange Rate Regime and Capital Flows
OLS GLS
19
Figure 4. Domestic Bank Credit and Capital Inflows: Selected European Economies
VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER ISSUES
This paper contributes to the current debate on policies to manage large capital inflows in
emerging economies. This debate focuses on policies that help contain domestic demand—
critical to prevent exchange rate overshooting—and avoid boom-bust credit cycles and their
consequences on asset prices—critical to avoid a hard-landing in case of capital flows
reversals.28 Our work suggests that exchange rate flexibility may be instrumental in curving
the effects of capital inflows on domestic credit. From a policy perspective, it suggests that
relatively inflexible exchange rate regimes may need to be ‘counteracted’ by carefully
designed macro-prudential policies.
With the main findings from our empirical exercise summarized in Table 5, we discuss in
this section the kind of regulatory measures that could be used ‘counteractively’, as macro-
prudential policy tools comprise a wide scope of instruments.
28 For the relationship between exchange rate flexibility and domestic demand, see IMF (2010).
0.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0
Credit to Private Sector (Percent of GDP)
Capital Inflows (Pe rcent of GDP)
Domes tic Credit Share of FX Credit Capital inflows
Exchange rate regime 1/ (-) (-)
Capital inflows (+) (+)
Broad money (+)
Share of domestic deposits in FX (+)
Interest rate diffferential (+)
Leverage (+)
Leverage*exchange rate regime (-)
Financial integration (+)
Trade openness (+)
External debt (+)
1/
This variable decreases as the exchange rate regime bec omes more rigid.
Table 5. Summary of Main Results.
20
Our findings suggest that the most relevant tools to counteract lack of exchange rate
flexibility (apart from the obvious implication of allowing for greater exchange rate
flexibility) should target banks’ external funding and incentives to lend/borrow in foreign
currency.29 Measures to curb banking sector credit could include:30
Currency-dependent liquidity requirements—maybe even combining them with
marginal reserve requirements on external wholesale financing. Both contain credit
and reduce incentives to borrow in foreign currency by reducing the interest rate
differential between loans in domestic and foreign currency. Increasing reserve
requirements across the board or imposing limits on external borrowing by the
banking sector may of course also reduce domestic credit growth.
Increasing capital requirement for FX loans and/or introducing dynamic provisioning
on FX loans (i.e., provisions increase as the share of FX loan over the total increases).
These would place incentives for banks to internalize the higher credit risk associated
with potential borrowers’ currency mismatches. They would also facilitate the
building of buffers to cope with capital flows reversals.
Tightening debt-to-income and loan-to-value ratios (conditional on the debts’
currency denomination) would also contribute to contain domestic credit directly, and
might be more effective than traditional monetary tightening—i.e., increasing
domestic interest rates.
On the other hand, the fact that we do not find convincing evidence that the exchange regime
has an impact on the amount of capital inflows—i.e., the former affects credit through
‘transmission channels’ rather than a ‘volume effect’—suggests that less flexible exchange
regimes do not necessarily call for broader forms of capital controls to curb bank credit.
Our findings also suggest that lack of exchange rate flexibility may make the economy more
vulnerable to reversals in capital flows, as credit expansions are more significant in
economies with less flexible exchange regimes.31 Capital flow reversals could potentially
trigger a credit bust and asset price deflation, with significant consequences in
macroeconomic conditions. While the empirical evidence in this paper focuses on periods of
large capital inflows, exploring the dynamics in credit markets during capital inflows
reversals and their possible differences across exchange rate regime is no doubt needed to
reach a fuller evaluation of the relative merits of some of the policies sketched here.
29 For a thorough description of alternatives prudential regulation measures in the presence of large capital
inflows, see Ostry et al. (2011).
30 The relative effectiveness of these measures would depend on country or regional macroeconomic factors.
See Ashvin and Nabar (2011), Lim et al (2011) and Terrier et al. (2011).
31 See Eyzaguirre et al (2011) for a recent debate on capital flows reversals.
21
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... Meanwhile, numerous studies have documented that capital inflows can be associated with credit booms, inflation, exchange rate appreciation, and overall economic growth (Caradelli, Elekdag, and Kose 2010;Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999;Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh 2005;Magud, Reinhart, and Vesperoni 2011;McKinnon and Pill 1996;Mendoza and Terrones 2012;Reinhart and Reinhart 2009;Reinhart and Rogoff 2011). However, there is still limited empirical discussion regarding the effects of capital inflows on inflation, encompassing not only the expansionary features discussed above but also the contractionary aspects of capital inflows. ...
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Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief and written in nontechnical language, and so are aimed at a broad audience interested in economic policy issues. This Web-only series replaced Staff Position Notes in January 2011.
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