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The Functions of Anger in Moral Courage—Insights From a Behavioral Study

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Julia Sasse at Hochschule für angewandte Wissenschaften Ansbach
Julia Sasse
Anna Halmburger at University of the Bundeswehr Munich
Anna Halmburger
Anna Baumert at University of Wuppertal
Anna Baumert
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Abstract

Moral courage is manifested when bystanders intervene to stop or prevent others’ norm transgressions, despite potential costs to themselves. Although theoretical models propose a key role of emotions, in particular anger, in the psychological processes underlying moral courage, to date this role is underexplored. In a behavioral study, we proposed a conceptual differentiation between experienced and expressed anger in response to a witnessed moral transgression. By staging the embezzlement of money from project funds in the lab, we tested whether anger arises in response to a witnessed moral norm transgression and scrutinized its unique contribution to predicting who intervenes and who remains inactive in the context of other theoretically relevant emotions (guilt, fear, and empathy). In addition, we investigated the role of bystanders’ anger expression in response to the transgression. Lastly, we tested whether experienced and expressed anger reactions were predicted across time from dispositions. Our paradigm allowed us to obtain observational data of behavioral responses and anger expression and experienced emotion reports in response to a realistic moral norm transgression. Results showed that experienced anger increased after the transgression and uniquely predicted intervention. Experienced anger reaction was predictable across time from dispositional sensitivity to observed injustice. Anger expression was only loosely associated with anger experience and intervention, suggesting it may constitute a display of disapproval in itself. The present findings from a realistic moral transgression situation evidence the important role of anger in the psychological process underlying moral courage.
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The Functions of Anger in Moral Courage—Insights From
a Behavioral Study
Julia Sasse
Max-Planck-Institute for Research on Collective Goods,
Bonn, Germany
Anna Halmburger
University of the Federal Armed Forces
Anna Baumert
Max-Planck-Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany, and Technical University Munich
Moral courage is manifested when bystanders intervene to stop or prevent others’ norm transgressions,
despite potential costs to themselves. Although theoretical models propose a key role of emotions, in
particular anger, in the psychological processes underlying moral courage, to date this role is underex-
plored. In a behavioral study, we proposed a conceptual differentiation between experienced and
expressed anger in response to a witnessed moral transgression. By staging the embezzlement of money
from project funds in the lab, we tested whether anger arises in response to a witnessed moral norm
transgression and scrutinized its unique contribution to predicting who intervenes and who remains
inactive in the context of other theoretically relevant emotions (guilt, fear, and empathy). In addition, we
investigated the role of bystanders’ anger expression in response to the transgression. Lastly, we tested
whether experienced and expressed anger reactions were predicted across time from dispositions. Our
paradigm allowed us to obtain observational data of behavioral responses and anger expression and
experienced emotion reports in response to a realistic moral norm transgression. Results showed that
experienced anger increased after the transgression and uniquely predicted intervention. Experienced
anger reaction was predictable across time from dispositional sensitivity to observed injustice. Anger
expression was only loosely associated with anger experience and intervention, suggesting it may
constitute a display of disapproval in itself. The present findings from a realistic moral transgression
situation evidence the important role of anger in the psychological process underlying moral courage.
Keywords: moral courage, anger, emotions, morality, justice sensitivity
Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/emo0000906.supp
As humans, we have the urge to see ourselves as good and
moral. Hence, it may not come as a surprise that many people are
convinced that they would stand up against moral transgressions of
others, even if this incurs negative consequences for themselves.
Unfortunately, however, despite good intentions, in reality people
often fail to do so; that is, people rarely show moral courage
(Baumert, Halmburger, & Schmitt, 2013;Craig & Pepler, 1997;
Voigtländer, 2008).
What, then, drives some people to act morally courageously?
We argue that emotions constitute an important element in the
psychological process promoting or impeding morally courageous
acts. Indeed, theoretical models (e.g., Halmburger, Baumert, &
Schmitt, 2016;Osswald, Greitemeyer, Fischer, & Frey, 2010b) and
empirical findings (Greitemeyer, Fischer, Kastenmüller, & Frey,
2006;Halmburger, Baumert, & Schmitt, 2015;Niesta Kayser,
Greitemeyer, Fischer, & Frey, 2010) suggest that anger is central
XJulia Sasse, Max-Planck-Institute for Research on Collective Goods,
Bonn, Germany; XAnna Halmburger, Department of Psychology, Uni-
versity of the Federal Armed Forces; Anna Baumert, Max-Planck-Institute
for Research on Collective Goods, and School of Education, Technical
University Munich.
This research was funded in part by the “Beacon Project” at Wake Forest
University which was supported by a grant from the Templeton Religion
Trust (www.moralbeacons.org). Data were collected in the psychological
lab of a German University and not at the Max-Planck-Institute for Re-
search on Collective Goods as lab rules there preclude deception. Data
were presented at conferences but have not been published previously.
Materials and Hypotheses can be accessed here osf.io/pcqke and here
osf.io/7m84x.
We thank Marlene Buchwald, Julia Dewitz, Louisa Engelskirchen, Jea-
nette Feldmann, Amelie Feuerstein, Isa Garbisch, Nadine Henrici, Steph-
anie Hochgeschurz, Mariska Höfert, Marie Horak, Dana Indreica, David
Izydorczyk, Lena Jansen, Gabriela Küchler, Christin Schmidt, and Alisa
Uder for their help in conducting this study, analyzing video materials, and
with preparing this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Julia
Sasse, Max-Planck-Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-
Schumacher-Straße 10, 53113 Bonn, Germany. E-mail: sasse@coll
.mpg.de
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Emotion
© 2020 American Psychological Association 2022, Vol. 22, No. 6, 1321–1335
ISSN: 1528-3542 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/emo0000906
1321
This article was published Online First November 30, 2020.
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