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Disinformation as a Threat to National Security
Abstract
Janis Sarts explores how the contemporary information environment has created a favourable space for the spread of hostile disinformation campaigns. He offers readers a detailed analysis of ‘state actors that use disinformation as a part of influence campaigns, to affect targeted society’, explaining how these actors exploit social weaknesses to disrupt a country’s social cohesion. Sarts highlights how state actors use military and diplomatic means ‘in conjunction with information space activities to achieve desired effects’. Although many of the tools used in hostile campaigns were developed during the height of the Cold War, there is newer emphasis on exploiting opportunities created by the digital environment, such as organised trolling (hostile social media campaigns). Sarts concludes by highlighting four ‘layers of responsibility’ in combatting hostile campaigns, adding that in order to protect societal processes like elections, ‘we need to discover ways of how the same technologies can be used in countering hostile influence and disinformation campaigns’.
... All research acknowledges the difference between misinformation and disinformation, where misinformation is false but without intent or false information by accident; disinformation has a controversial goal and a desirable effect (Bennett & Livingston, 2018;Gerrits, 2018;la Cour, 2020;Lanoszka, 2019;Sarts, 2021;Tenove, 2020). Disinformation is an increasingly salient feature of International Relations. ...
... To measure effectiveness, three potential indicators can be analysed: quantity of activity, opinion polls, and behavioural indicators (Heuer, 1990, pp. 25-28). Sarts (2021) explains how the new information environment created a favourable outlook for foreign adversaries' disinformation campaigns and analyses disinformation concerning national security and weakening democracy (Bennett & Livingston, 2018;Tenove, 2020). Moreover, the new information environment has led to new ways of reality construction as developments in communications has led to new ways of meaning production (Till, 2020, p. 4) and options to employ reflexive control (Till, 2020, p. 7). ...
... Disinformation can be mixed with news reports and documented events to enhance authenticity (Bennett & Livingston, 2018, p. 125). New technologies, like deepfakes, extend the possibilities for the dissemination of disinformation (Gerrits, 2018, p. 20;Sarts, 2021). ...
Constructions of reality take place in online environments where perceptions are managed from abroad. Ordinary people employ themselves daily on the frontlines of an information war and are the targets for achieving desired goals of international power politics.
This thesis defines the relation between disinformation and International Security by applying concepts of hybrid warfare and Realism. Drawing on case studies from Germany, the Baltic states, the United Kingdom, and France, this thesis analyses to what extent disinformation affects International Security. Furthermore, it describes the circumstances in which the campaigns can succeed in accomplishing desired (geopolitical) outcomes. Russian disinformation aims to influence public opinion to get desirable policy effects, and Russia certainly tries to affect International Security with disinformation. Foreign influence in public debates, discourse and elections are the new normal; an apparent use of disinformation is visible.
However, based on these specific case studies, a disinformation campaign in itself has little effect on International Security and should continuously be assessed as a means in a larger (geo)political objective and a longer-term goal. While building on existing grievances, those case studies fitted in a broader objective to weaken Western dominance and should continually be assessed in a broader context to measure effectiveness in an International Security environment. Disinformation contributes to International Security's effects and can affect long-term goals but should not be contributed solely to specific events.
... The distribution of dis/misinformation in cyber space create a snowball effect that has serious risk to public order and national security [6]. Even so, dis/misinformation has emerged become an industry. ...
... Disinformation, especially in AI enhanced form, is an increasingly pressing threat, considered to be detrimental to democratic societies 6 and presenting substantial challenges to national security. 7 It is seen as the leading cybersecurity hazard for businesses, governments, the media, and society as a whole. 8 Likewise, the destructive properties of disinformation are evident in the disciplines of medicine and public health, where unverified, false, misleading, and fabricated information can severely affect the health related decisions and behaviours of patients, as acknowledged by the World Health Organization and infodemiology scholars. ...
... Next, the distribution of * Corresponding author: vidya.prahassacitta@binus.ac.id information disorder causes serious harm not only to individuals but to public order and national security. Distribution of information disorder can incite other people, creating a riot that disrupts public order or national security [5]. Therefore, it's crucial to regulate the distribution of information disorder on the internet and its part of digital policy. ...
The paper aims to criticize Indonesia’s digital policy against the dissemination of information disorders and to offer a better policy model against the distribution of information disorders that meets sustainable society goals. The paper does not confer and analyze information disorders produced and published by the press and broadcasting media. Nonetheless, it only discusses and analyzes information abnormalities created and spread by regular internet users. Document research and secondary data analyses reveal that Indonesia has two policies in place to combat the development of information disorders. First, penal policy on Article 14 and Article 15 Criminal Law Act of 1946 and Article 263 and Article 264 Penal Code of 2023 criminalizes a person who intentionally and/or negligently distributes information disorder that disrupts public order. Second, there is a non-punitive approach to the Information and Electronic Transactions Act regime. Unfortunately, the acts and their execution do not accord with the ideals of a sustainable society. According to the study’s findings, the present policy focuses on criminal law, which does not support freedom of expression and minimizes the liability for internet intermediaries. Further research findings indicate that the new and integrated policies necessitate criminal law and regulating greater responsibilities for internet intermediaries to battle and stop the spread of information disorder.
Drawing upon case study research investigating the Irish Health Service Executive’s (HSE) response to a fake news attack on their human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccination campaign, we argue that responses to fake news should be analyzed from a legitimacy perspective. A model for emotional legitimacy management is proposed in which the HSE and a third-party collaborate to (a) connect with the emotional aspects of the issue; (b) leverage emotions to build vicarious legitimacy; (c) transfer the third-party’s legitimacy to the HSE; and (d) emotionally activate the public. This study contributes to fake news and legitimacy management by moving beyond fact-checking and debunking strategies. We suggest a framework centered on legitimacy in which emotions are used to counteract fake news. Finally, we emphasize the importance of third-party vicarious legitimacy building and the transfer of this legitimacy to the organization.
مع تزايد اعتماد أفراد المجتمع المصري على الإنترنت، وتنامي أعدادهم على منصات التواصل الاجتماعي، كان هناك ازدياد مضطرد في كم المعلومات المضللة والأخبار الكاذبة؛ حيث تعمد العديد من الأفراد والجماعات والتنظيمات من الداخل والخارج، إلى الترويج لمثل هذه المعلومات، بغرض تهديد الأمن القومي المصري، وتماشيًا مع بروز هذه الظاهرة، وتصاعد وتيرة التهديدات الأمنية التي تواجهها الدولة المصرية، جاءت هذه الدراسة انطلاقًا من افتراض أن شيوع المعلومات المضللة عبر الإنترنت عن المجتمع المصري وأخباره ومشكلاته وقضاياه الاقتصادية والاجتماعية والسياسية، يحمل انعكاسات سلبية على الأمن القومي.
واعتمدت الدراسة أسلوب المسح الاجتماعي، من خلال إجراء مسح ميداني، باستخدام أداة الاستبيان الإلكتروني لجمع البيانات، وبلغ حجم عينة الدراسة (309) مبحوثين. وقد توصلت الدراسة إلى أن هناك انتشارًا واسعًا للمعلومات المضللة والأخبار الكاذبة حول عدد من القضايا الاقتصادية والسياسية والاستراتيجية التي تخص المجتمع المصري، ويُحتمل أن تؤثر على أمنه القومي، وذلك من خلال انعكاساتها على الرأي العام، وتقويض الثقة بين المواطنين والحكومة، علاوة على بروز الاحتقان والاضطرابات الاجتماعية، وزيادة حدة الاستقطاب السياسي.
وأوصت الدراسةُ الحكومةَ المصرية بضرورة التعاون مع مالكي منصات التواصل الاجتماعي للحد من المعلومات المضللة، وتعزيز دور منصات المؤسسات الحكومية على مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي؛ لنشر الحقائق والمعلومات الموثوقة بشكل لحظي ومستدام، ودعم آليات الشفافية والتواصل المفتوح مع المواطنين.
Role of digital journalism in public policy preparation framework is central as media provides critical and crucial insights on various issues. Since media coverage and analysis of public issues influence public policy framework, policymakers look forward to media inputs as the specific media frame highlights an issue in a larger canvass. It is found that the policymakers respond to the media coverage of public issues on the belief that the media broadly reflects the public opinion. The media salience of an issue to prepare a public policy is seen in the theory of agenda setting; the policymakers view the specific issue from the preparation of public policy. For instance in two issues—corruption in India and crime against women, the digital media combined with mainstream media highlighted the significant issues reflecting the public opinion and compelled the policymakers to come out with a public policy. Similarly, dissemination of fake news needs to be contained by a proper public policy in India on the lines of Singapore model. With the increasing use and utilisation of digital media by different segments of the population, the public policymakers in India need to prepare a public policy by engaging individuals, communities and the government in containing the spread of fake news which is harming the society. The present chapter discusses the significance of digital journalism in the preparation of public policy framework as digital journalism has influenced public policy in two issues in India—corruption in India and violence against women. Digital journalism inter alia digital platforms have played a key role in highlighting the public opinion while mobilising public support to these issues. If digital journalism combined with mainstream media can also influence the preparation of public policy framework in containing the spread of disinformation albeit fake news in the public domain, the digital journalism can attain its objective as a responsible player in societal issues.
Deepfakes bezeichnen Videos mit gefälschten Inhalten. Hierfür nutzen sie Technologien der Künstlichen Intelligenz, um Stimmen und Ähnlichkeiten zu überlagern, und können buchstäblich die Worte einer fremden Person in den Mund eines anderen legen. Deepfakes sind vor allem in sozialen Medien zu finden, und diese versuchen fieberhaft, die Verbreitung von diesen Inhalten auf ihren Plattformen zu steuern. In diesem Artikel wird vorgestellt, was Deepfakes sind, deren Typologien und Einsatzgebiete, sowie die Entstehung und Erkennung von Deepfakes.
What are legal sources? The term “sources of law” refers to the causes of origin of legal norms, i.e. how norms are created and where they can be found. Thus, when working with the law, one must know whether a certain regulation is recorded as law and whether it should be taken into account. The concept of “source of law” therefore shows a strong connection to the concept of “law”.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime has taken control of the traditional media in Russia: TV, radio and newspapers. As Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu has stated, the Kremlin sees the mass media as a ‘weapon’. Now Russia’s leadership is trying to take control of social media too, and for this massive operation a new information warfare tool has been mobilised—an army of fake social media Putin-fans, known as ‘trolls’. My investigation has discovered that coordinated social media propaganda writers are twisting and manipulating the public debate in Finland, too. Trolls and bots distribute vast amounts of false information in various languages, and target individual citizens for aggressive operations. Aggressive trolls have created a feeling of fear among some of my interviewees, causing them to stop making Russia-related comments online. Trolling has had a serious impact on freedom of speech, even outside Russia. Thus, it should be viewed as a national security threat that needs to be addressed accordingly. The question is: how should the Kremlin’s trolls and disinformation be countered?
Lies spread faster than the truth
There is worldwide concern over false news and the possibility that it can influence political, economic, and social well-being. To understand how false news spreads, Vosoughi et al. used a data set of rumor cascades on Twitter from 2006 to 2017. About 126,000 rumors were spread by ∼3 million people. False news reached more people than the truth; the top 1% of false news cascades diffused to between 1000 and 100,000 people, whereas the truth rarely diffused to more than 1000 people. Falsehood also diffused faster than the truth. The degree of novelty and the emotional reactions of recipients may be responsible for the differences observed.
Science , this issue p. 1146
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Russia’s Footprint in the Nordic-Baltic Information Environment. Riga: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence
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