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Corporate venture capital to promote the innovation capability of established companies - A systematic literature analysis (english version)


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Corporate venture capital is highly relevant as a strategic tool to promote innovation in established companies. Although numerous scientific papers deal with the topic and confirm the positive efficacy many companies fail on the practical implementation and use of corporate venture capital. In order to contribute to the dissolution of the gap between theory and practice the current state of the scientific literature is analyzed and research gaps are identified within this work. On one hand it is discovered that there is a high degree of disagreement in the scientific literature, particularly with regard to the objectives of corporate venture capital and the organizational structure. On other hand it is found that the interests of new ventures in the context of CVC have not been sufficiently appreciated.
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Michael Kötting (corresponding author)
University of Hohenheim, Wollgrasweg 49, 70599 Stuttgart, Germany.
Corporate venture capital is highly relevant as a strategic tool to promote innovation in established
companies. Although numerous scientific papers deal with the topic and confirm the positive
efficacy many companies fail on the practical implementation and use of corporate venture capital.
In order to contribute to the dissolution of the gap between theory and practice the current state of
the scientific literature is analyzed and research gaps are identified within this work. On one hand
it is discovered that there is a high degree of disagreement in the scientific literature, particularly
with regard to the objectives of corporate venture capital and the organizational structure. On other
hand it is found that the interests of new ventures in the context of CVC have not been sufficiently
Digital transformation and globalization affect companies of various industries and confront them
with increasing market dynamics (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Although these market dynamics
represent a great opportunity for companies to gain new competitive advantages, especially
established companies which are not able to adapt to the necessary changes face enormous
challenges (Bower & Christensen, 1995). In the past, established companies were able to establish
A German version of this paper is published under Kötting (2018) and appeared in Zeitschrift für KMU und
Entrepreneurship, 66(2), 113146. An online version can be found at the following address: https://elibrary.duncker- /8545/.
themselves in a market and develop their processes and structures over many years so as to be able
to operate as efficiently as possible in this market (Bower & Christensen, 1995; Greiner, 1998).
Having applied such a focused business approach, for a long time these companies were able to
use and refine existing resources in order to optimally meet customer requirements (March, 1991).
In a dynamic and quickly changing market environment, existing resources are no longer sufficient
to meet the increased requirements of customers and business partners (Tushman & Anderson,
1986). Instead, new resources must be developed through exploration and then combined to create
new products and services (March, 1991). However, many established companies have difficulties
shifting from the standardized use of existing resources, which has been practiced for many years,
to exploring new resources, which is subject to uncertainties (March, 1991).
Corporate venturing (CV) has taken root as a concept for exploring new resources (e.g., Covin &
Slevin, 1991; Narayanan et al., 2009). CV provides for the setup of new organizational units,
separated from the established company, so that these units can work without being influenced by
the established company (Sharma & Chrisman, 1999). A specific way to implement CV is the use
of corporate venture capital (CVC). Yang et al. (2014) define CVC as “direct equity investments
by firms (corporate investors) in external privately held entrepreneurial companies (portfolio
companies) […].” By using CVC, established companies launch partnerships with new ventures.
While established companies hope to stimulate innovation with these partnerships (Roberts &
Berry, 1985), new ventures expect to receive support in further developing their business
operations (Park & Steensma, 2012). In contrast to independent venture capital (VC), where new
ventures receive capital from independent investors with the aim of realizing profits, in this case,
established companies not only offer capital, but also strategy support (Maula et al., 2009).
In theory, the use of CVC appears to be advantageous for both new ventures and established
companies (e.g., Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005b; Keil, Autio, et al., 2008; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006).
However, regardless of the theoretical advantages, a look at practice shows that many CVC
initiatives were discontinued shortly after their launch because they did not achieve satisfactory
results (e.g., Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006; Gaba & Dokko, 2016). In order to contribute to
explaining the discrepancy described, this work aims at analyzing and reviewing the current state
of the science. First relevant findings have already been presented by Dushnitsky & Lenox (2006)
and Maula (2007). Due to the exploratory character of the scientific publications and the large
amount of new CVC literature
, this work intends to review the current state of the scientific
literature and identify gaps in the corresponding research.
To ensure transparency and replicability of the research, the literature search was conducted
according to Tranfield et al. (2003).
Figure 2-1: Process for literature search and selection
The literature search was based on the search term (CVC OR (Corporate AND Venture Capital)),
which was derived from the two keywords CVC and Corporate Venture Capital. To ensure high-
quality results, the search was limited to top-ranked journals at all times (Podsakoff et al., 2005).
70% of the literature identified in the course of this research was published after Dushnitsky & Lenox (2006) and
Maula (2007) and is therefore not included in these papers.
The search was conducted in journals with a rating of 4 or higher
from the relevant subject-matter
categories Entrepreneurship and Small Business Management, General Management, Ethics and
Social Responsibility, Innovation, Strategy and Organisation Studies of the ABS Academic Journal
Guide 2015 (Chartered Association of Business Schools, 2015). The databases ABI/INFORM
Collection and Business Source Complete were used to search the titles and abstracts of the
selected journals (see Figure 2-1).
Table 2-1: Result of the literature search
1981 -
1991 -
2001 -
2011 -
Academy of Management Journal
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice
Journal of Business Venturing
Journal of Management Studies
Journal of Product Innovation Management
Organization Science
Research Policy
Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal
Strategic Management Journal
The search identified 65 articles. These articles were then checked for relevant content. In the
course of this screening, 13 articles had to be excluded, as they did not address the CVC issue. A
further article was excluded as it was not a scientific paper. In total, 51 relevant articles were
identified (see Table 2-1).
The literature analysis aims to classify articles with a similar research focus in order to obtain a
first indication of relevant key research topics (Tranfield et al., 2003).
To make the analysis as objective as possible, the identified literature was screened along the
previously defined criteria research question, unit of analysis, theory, hypotheses, method, data
set and results and the findings were transferred to a data extraction form (Tranfield et al., 2003).
The rating scale ranges from 1 (lowest rating) to 4* (best rating).
In the course of the classification, the unit of analysis was used as the first classification criterion,
with the concrete contents of the paper serving as the second classification criterion (see Figure 2-
2). The results of the content analysis are presented hereinafter.
Figure 3-1: Classification of identified literature
3.1. Established companies
3.1.1. Reasons for CVC
The use of CVC is influenced by various external factors. Dushnitsky & Lenox (2005a) observed
that established companies make use of CVC primarily in industries with poorly protected property
rights, a highly dynamic technological change and a high importance of complementary goods.
The findings are supported by Basu et al. (2011), who additionally found out that a highly dynamic
competitive environment has a positive effect on companies’ CVC activities. The findings are
completed by Sahaym et al. (2010). There is a positive correlation between research and
development spending within an industry and the use of CVC. In addition, they revealed that this
correlation is more pronounced in industries with a high level of technological change. In their
paper, Gaba & Meyer (2008) prove that the adoption of a CVC program increases when there is a
geographical proximity to a cluster of successful VC companies.
Besides external factors, internal factors also influence the use of CVC. Dushnitsky & Lenox
(2005a) found out that the available capital of an established company and its capacity to absorb
knowledge have a positive effect on the use of CVC. Basu et al. (2011) confirm this finding. They
observed that the available technology and marketing resources of an established company and its
CVC experience have a positive effect on the number of CVC partnerships. Furthermore, Gaba &
Bhattacharya (2012) investigated whether the establishment of a CVC unit is influenced by a
company’s ability to innovate. In this context, the authors found that if a company’s ability to
innovate exceeds its level of aspiration, the company’s motivation to establish a CVC unit
decreases. Conversely, the authors were unable to prove that the motivation to establish a CVC
unit increases if the ability to innovate falls below the company’s level of aspiration. In conclusion,
Dushnitsky & Lavie (2010) found out that the use of strategic alliances has an inverted U-shaped
effect on the adoption of CVC. The relationship is influenced by the established company’s
available resources, level of maturity and CVC experience.
3.1.2. Expected results of CVC
Weber et al. (2016) provide the groundwork for the general advantages of CVC by applying the
concept of the relational view in the context of CVC. The authors succeeded in empirically
substantiating the relational view concept and in proving that the resources embedded in the CVC
relationship can generate competitive advantages for both parties. In their paper, Dushnitsky &
Lenox (2005b) discuss the positive effects of CVC on the established companies’ ability to
innovate. The authors observed that this positive effect is more pronounced for companies that
have a high organizational absorptive capacity. This observation is confirmed by Wadhwa &
Kotha (2006). They also discovered that knowledge generation within a company has an inverted
U-shaped dependence on the number of CVC investments. This curve shape can be explained by
the organizational absorptive capacity as stated by Dushnitsky & Lenox (2005b). Once the number
of investments exceeds absorptive capacity limits, no additional value can be generated for
established companies. In their research, Keil, Autio, et al. (2008) examined the acquisition of new
skills through CVC investments. The authors argue that the use of CVC and the associated
exploration of new technologies and products can promote the acquisition of new skills in an
established company. While an increased complexity of technologies and products has a negative
impact on the relationship, a good knowledge transfer within the established company can have a
positive effect. Smith & Shah (2013) were able to analyze that established companies incorporate
knowledge from CVC into new products and technologies more strongly than new knowledge
from other sources. The authors therefore argue that CVC investments have a positive impact on
the development of new products and technologies. Besides the numerous positive results, Basu
& Wadhwa (2013) found out that while CVC can have a positive impact on an established
company's ability to innovate, these companies primarily rely on CVC to expand existing business
areas. The exploration of innovations, for example by opening up new business areas, is therefore
not driven by the use of CVC. Due to the investment costs, CVC reinforces the direction a company
is taking rather than paving new paths for it. In addition to the strategic aspects mentioned above,
Allen & Hevert (2007) investigated whether CVC investments can also generate significant
monetary value for their investors. The authors identified positive financial results in
approximately one third of the cases, with larger programs achieving significantly better results
than smaller programs.
In addition to the aforementioned aspects, there are also papers that consider the impact of CVC
on more specific areas of application. In their paper, Benson & Ziedonis (2009) state that CVC
improves the ability of established companies to acquire new ventures. This effect is influenced
by the internal knowledge base and absorptive capacity of the established company. Van de Vrande
& Vanhaverbeke (2013) observed that a CVC investment in a new venture increases the
probability of the established company starting a strategic cooperation with the new venture at a
later stage. The described effect is influenced positively by the technological similarity between
the companies and the time of the last investment. As a last point, Maula et al. (2013) conducted a
study on how CVC influences the management’s perception of technological innovation. The
authors were able to reveal that the use of CVC has a strong positive effect on the management’s
3.1.3. Comparison with other CV forms
Kanter & Richardson (1991) argue that in practice especially external CV approaches, in which
they include CVC, tend to fail. Apparently they lead to disappointing financial results, conflicts
with the existing business units and high management costs. In response to the criticism, Sykes
(1993) argues that CVC is particularly suitable for internalizing developments taking place outside
the company and thus has a specific application scenario. Schildt et al. (2005) found out that CVC
is used in particular in the case of a high degree of uncertainty about new ventures. The authors
explain this circumstance by the fact that CVC is less binding than a joint venture or acquisition.
Tong & Li (2011) support this result. They worked out that the use of CVC is always preferred
over acquisitions when there is a high degree of uncertainty. Van de Vrande et al. (2011) focused
on another aspect and examined the influence of different forms of CV on the development of new
technologies. They observed that strategic alliances and CVC investments have a positive impact
on the development of new technologies, whereas acquisitions exert a negative impact. Keil,
Maula, et al. (2008) consider the effect of similarity between new ventures and established
companies on the established company’s ability to innovate. For CVC, alliances and joint ventures,
the relationship follows an inverted U shape.
3.2. CVC units
3.2.1. Organizational structure
Souitaris et al. (2012) argue that the organizational structure of a CVC unit should be derived from
the strategic focus of that unit. According to the authors, the focus can be either on the established
company or on the new venture. Winters & Murfin (1988) come to a similar conclusion. However,
they make no distinction of the CVC unit’s focus, but base the decision for or against a structure
on the objectives of the established company. To realize strategic goals, it is recommended to set
up an organizational unit within the company, since the tight integration enables a regular
exchange of knowledge between the CVC unit and the operational units of the established
company. If the established company’s intentions are primarily of a financial nature, setting up a
separate CVC unit should be considered. The findings are confirmed by Siegel et al. (1988). They
also observed that the design of a CVC unit can follow a continuum between a low and a high
level of autonomy. Contrary to Winters & Murfin (1988), Rind (1981) and Siegel et al. (1988)
recommend always designing the CVC unit in such a way that it can act as autonomously as
possible, regardless of the objective. Thus the unit can act quickly and flexibly and better meet the
requirements of the VC market. This is the only way for a CVC unit to establish itself as an
attractive partner for new ventures. This argumentation is also supported by Kanter et al. (1990),
who add that it is important to ensure not only the CVC unit’s autonomy, but also the autonomy
of the new ventureeven if this means that the strategic objectives associated with the partnership
have to be abandoned. Hill et al. (2009) pick up on the aspect of autonomy. They observed that
CVC units that adapt practices of original VC companies are more successful. According to this
finding, CVC units should act independently of the interests of the established company and
introduce performance-related pay for their staff, syndicate investments, gradually disburse capital
to new ventures and specialize in specific subject areas. Keil et al. (2010) observed that the
provision of resources by the established company has a significant impact on the position of a
CVC unit within a VC network. The established company can thus control the position of the CVC
unit within a VC network and hence realize benefits for the CVC unit, for example through an
improved deal flow. Dushnitsky & Lenox (2006) conclude that CVC investments with a strategic
focus can ultimately generate more value for the established company than investments with purely
financial intentions.
3.2.2. Working methods
In their paper, Dokko & Gaba (2012) reveal that employees with experience gained in original VC
companies tend to align the CVC unit’s working methods to that of VC companies. If the
employees used to work for the established company, they adapt the working methods accordingly.
Keil (2004) found out that the company-wide ability to engage in CVC is enhanced by two learning
processes. One learning process is set outside a concrete use case. The knowledge gained this way
is very generic and cannot be applied directly. The second learning process involves learning-by-
doing, whereby generic knowledge is adapted to the specific needs of the CVC unit during
application. Furthermore, Keil (2004) observed that both learning processes strongly depend on
the initial prerequisites, which in this specific case correspond to the given organizational structure
and the available resources. Souitaris & Zerbinati (2014) confirm the findings by Keil (2004). The
practices applied by a CVC unit are highly dependent on its organizational structure. While
autonomous CVC units can be strongly oriented towards the practices of original VC companies,
CVC units with a low level of autonomy need to adapt practices that help to best support the goals
of the established company. Dushnitsky & Shapira (2010) substantiate the results by showing that
the type of pay has an impact on the way employees work. Fixed pay, which is common practice
in established companies, leads employees to invest at a later point in time and to rely mainly on
syndicates with many partners. By contrast, performance-based pay makes employees invest at
earlier points in time and rely on syndicates with few partners. In addition to the already mentioned
working methods, Sykes (1990) investigated which activities have a positive or negative impact
on the success of a CVC unit. Activities with a negative impact include, for example, the
established company’s intention to acquire the new venture as a result of the CVC investment or
to gain information. Activities with a positive impact can be the establishment of further
partnerships, the support of the new venture with expertise or the assistance in further
development. Basu et al. (2016) also investigated which working methods are used within CVC
units. In the context of knowledge generation, the authors were able to identify the formation of
syndicates with VC companies, the support of the new venture with resources, the evaluation of
the new venture and the focus on key topics as critical success factors. The integration process was
characterized by establishing formal governance mechanisms and supporting management with
technology and market trends. Yang et al. (2009) demonstrate that both wide experience and
specific experience as well as expertise in acquisitions have a positive effect on the CVC unit’s
selection capabilities. In addition, Wadhwa & Basu (2013) investigated the factors that determine
the amount of the initial investment. The authors discovered that the initial investment is high
when the level of exploration is particularly low or particularly high. Weber & Weber (2011)
revealed that social capital in a CVC relationship has a positive effect on knowledge transfer and
knowledge generation. The authors also found that CVC relationships adapt to changing
circumstances over time. In their paper, Gaba & Dokko (2016) focus on the reasons behind
abandoning a CVC unit. If the CVC unit is very active and makes a large number of CVC
investments, the probability of the CVC unit being abandoned is reduced. Similarly, the use of
external staff experienced in VC has a negative impact on the abandonment of a unit.
3.2.3. Comparison with other VCs
CVC units differ from original VC companies in certain key aspects. In their paper, Gupta &
Sapienza (1992) examined the characteristics of various VC companies. The authors found out
that CVC units have a very strong industry focus compared to other VC companies, but prefer a
very broad radius of action in terms of geographical proximity. Dimov & Gedajlovic (2010) came
to very similar conclusions. The authors found that when compared to other VC companies, CVC
units have very concentrated portfolios, invest in new markets at later stages and support new
ventures at very early stages.
3.3. New ventures
3.3.1. Portfolios of CVC units
Yang et al. (2014) discovered that there is a U-shaped relationship between the diversification of
a CVC unit’s portfolio and its strategic value. Wadhwa et al. (2016) examined the effects of
portfolio diversification on the established company’s ability to innovate. The authors identified
an inverted U-shaped relationship between portfolio diversification and the ability to innovate of
the established company. Furthermore, they discovered that the portfolio diversification also
depends on the portfolio companies’ level of technological integration.
3.3.2. Benefits for new ventures
New ventures also hope to gain strategic advantages from CVC. In their research, Alvarez-Garrido
& Dushnitsky (2016) found out that new ventures’ ability to innovate varies depending on the
group of investors. If an established company is part of the group of investors, new ventures have
a demonstrably higher number of publications and patents compared to new ventures where the
group of investors does not include an established company. The described effect occurs in
particular when the two companies are complementary. Wang & Wan (2013) also focus on the
group of investors. The authors show that there is a positive correlation with undervaluation when
new ventures which have received capital from original VC companies first go public. In contrast,
the initial public offering (IPO) of new ventures that have received capital from CVC units has a
negative correlation with undervaluation. The authors explain these findings with the different
interests of the investors. While an IPO is a good opportunity for original VC companies to realize
financial gains, CVC units continue to expect strategic advantages from their investment even after
the IPO.
3.3.3. Interests of new ventures
Park & Steensma (2012) analyzed that new ventures particularly benefit from CVC investments
when they are dependent on special resources or operate in an uncertain environment. However,
Dushnitsky & Shaver (2009) point out that numerous new ventures refrain from CVC investments
because they fear plagiarism by established companies. These fears are particularly pronounced if
both companies operate in the same industry which is additionally characterized by poor protection
of intellectual property rights. While Dushnitsky & Shaver (2006) focus on the American market,
the replication study conducted by Colombo & Shafi (2016) considers the European market.
Analogously to the findings of Dushnitsky & Shaver (2006), it shows that new ventures in Europe
particularly resort to CVC from established companies from the same industry when intellectual
property rights are well-protected. Contrary to the findings of Dushnitsky & Shaver (2006),
however, Colombo & Shafi (2016) found out that new ventures in Europe also lean toward CVC
if intellectual property rights are poorly protected. The reason they give for this finding is the lack
of financing alternatives in Europe. In principle, these results are also consistent with the findings
of Maula et al. (2009). The authors showed that if both companies have overlapping activities, the
new venture deploys protective measures to protect its knowledge. These measures ultimately have
a negative effect on social interaction and consequently also on the learning behavior of both
companies. In their study, Hallen et al (2014) look at how original VC companies as part of the
group of investors can serve as a social protection mechanism. The awareness and network
centrality of original VC companies can provide effective protection, as CVC units must expect
reputational damage in the event of misconduct.
4.1. Organizational structure of CVC units
In the literature, there is a consensus that a CVC unit can be designed along a continuum from a
low to a high level of autonomy (see Figure 2-3). When designing a CVC unit, the established
company’s goals should always be taken into account (Siegel et al., 1988; Winters & Murfin,
1988). There are, however, controversial discussions about the objectives that are advantageous
for established companies and the resulting implications.
Figure 4-1: Organizational structure of a CVC unit
On the one hand, the relevant literature advocates a focus on financial goals (e.g., Kanter et al.,
1990). Proponents argue that by focusing on financial goals, there is no need for a close link to the
established company and that the CVC unit can therefore be designed quite autonomously. The
high level of autonomy enables the adoption of original VC practices. The CVC unit can thus act
similarly to a VC company, which leads to high acceptance on the part of VC companies and new
ventures (Souitaris & Zerbinati, 2014). A high level of autonomy and the resulting advantages
have proven to contribute to the success of a CVC unit (Hill et al., 2009; Keil et al., 2010).
On the other hand, the literature argues that focusing on purely financial goals makes little sense
(Dushnitsky & Lenox 2006). Instead, the CVC unit should be closely linked to the operational
units of the established company to ensure an intense exchange of knowledge and resources
(Dokko & Gaba 2012). The CVC unit can thus respond to the specific requirements of the
individual operational units and align its investment strategy accordingly. In addition to direct
financial income, the exchange of strategic resources between the established company and the
new venture can generate a much greater indirect added value (Dushnitsky & Lenox 2006).
The dilemma of CVC can be illustrated by comparing the two approaches. According to the
argumentation, established companies have to decide between focusing on strategic goals and the
associated poorer chances of success or focusing on financial goals and thus better chances of
success. Neither of the two approaches allows for a full realization of the desired potential of CVC.
Based on this dilemma, the following questions therefore need to be answered:
(1) What is required to ensure the best possible balance between financial and
strategic goals?
(2) What is required to ensure a proper transfer of knowledge despite a high
level of autonomy?
(3) What is required to ensure good contact with VC companies and new
ventures despite a low level of autonomy?
(4) Are there other CV forms which help established companies avoid the
outlined dilemma?
4.2. Interests of new ventures
Another weak spot in the literature is the insufficient consideration of the interests of new ventures
(Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009). The literature largely assumes that enough new ventures are willing
to join forces with established companies. However, new ventures pursue their own interests and
stand up for them in negotiations with investors. Especially new ventures with good ideas and
technologies can display considerable confidence.
For new ventures, CVC units of established companies can be an interesting alternative to original
VC companies. This allows them to benefit greatly from strategic resources provided by the CVC
unit (Park & Steensma, 2012). At the same time, they have to fear that established companies may
consider acquiring critical knowledge (Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009; Sykes, 1990). New ventures
are therefore skeptical about CVC units (Maula et al., 2009) and, if in doubt, decide against a CVC
investment. This raises the following questions:
(5) What factors influence the decision of new ventures to accept investments by
a CVC unit?
(6) What are the negotiating positions of new ventures and CVC units?
(7) What factors influence the negotiating positions of new ventures and CVC
When it comes to CVC, the scientific literature paints a very heterogeneous picture. This refers in
particular to the objectives associated with CVC for established companies and the organizational
structure that needs to be implemented, as well as the interests of new ventures. To ensure that
these so far unanswered aspects are taken into account, concrete research questions have been
derived which need to be addressed in the context of further scientific studies.
As an implication for real-life situations, this research has identified that established companies
need to be clear about what their own objectives are. Only when the objectives have been worked
out can a CVC unit be aligned with these goals. If the established company merely aims at making
financial profits, it is advisable to set up a largely autonomous CVC unit, which is similar to an
original VC company in terms of structure and way of working. In this case, the established
company has to ask itself whether a professional VC company would not be more appropriate for
this project and whether developing the necessary resources internally is worth the effort. If the
established company pursues strategic goals, it is necessary to pay attention to and actively manage
the transfer of knowledge and resources with the established company’s business units. The
definition and design of these interfaces largely determines whether strategic goals will be
achieved and whether the CVC unit will ultimately be successful.
Limitations of this work result from the strict focus on contributions from top-ranked journals.
Although this approach has ensured a high quality of search results, it has also negatively impacted
the diversity of the literature screened. Furthermore, it must be noted that the influence of
subjective perceptions cannot be completely excluded when analyzing the contents.
(* considered within the literature analysis)
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companies: Did it pay?, in: Journal of Business Venturing, 22 (2), 262-282.
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sensitive to investor complementary assets? Comparing biotech ventures backed by corporate
and independent VCs, in: Strategic Management Journal, 37 (5), 819-834.
* Basu, S., Phelps, C. C. und Kotha, S. (2011): Towards understanding who makes corporate
venture capital investments and why, in: Journal of Business Venturing, 26 (2), 153-171.
* Basu, S., Phelps, C. C. und Kotha, S. (2016): Search and integration in external venturing: An
inductive examination of corporate venture capital units, in: Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal,
10 (2), 129-152.
* Basu, S. und Wadhwa, A. (2013): External venturing and discontinuous strategic renewal: An
options perspective, in: Journal of Product Innovation Management, 30 (5), 956-975.
* Benson, D. und Ziedonis, R. H. (2009): Corporate venture capital as a window on new
technologies: Implications for the performance of corporate investors when acquiring startups,
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* Colombo, M. G. und Shafi, K. (2016): Swimming with sharks in Europe: When are they
dangerous and what can new ventures do to defend themselves?, in: Strategic management
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Covin, J. G. und Slevin, D. P. (1991): A conceptial model of entrepreneurship as firm behavior,
in: Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice, 16 (1), 7-25.
* Dimov, D. und Gedajlovic, E. (2010): A property rights perspective on venture capital
investment decisions, in: Journal of Management Studies, 47 (7), 1248-1271.
* Dokko, G. und Gaba, V. (2012): Venturing into new territory: Career experiences of corporate
venture capital managers and practice variation, in: Academy of Management Journal, 55 (3),
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M. (Hrsg.): The Oxford handbook of entrepreneurship, New York: Oxford University Press, 387-
* Dushnitsky, G. und Lavie, D. (2010): How alliance formation shapes corporate venture capital
investment in the software industry: A resource-based perspective, in: Strategic Entrepreneurship
Journal, 4 (1), 22-48.
* Dushnitsky, G. und Lenox, M. J. (2005a): When do firms undertake R&D by investing in new
ventures?, in: Strategic Management Journal, 26 (10), 947-965.
* Dushnitsky, G. und Lenox, M. J. (2005b): When do incumbents learn from entrepreneurial
ventures?: Corporate venture capital and investing firm innovation rates, in: Research Policy, 34
(5), 615-639.
* Dushnitsky, G. und Lenox, M. J. (2006): When does corporate venture capital investment
create firm value?, in: Journal of Business Venturing, 21 (6), 753-772.
* Dushnitsky, G. und Shapira, Z. (2010): Entrepreneurial finance meets organizational reality:
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Full-text available
How do external venturing units effectively achieve external knowledge search and integration of their initiatives with mainstream organizational units? We investigate this largely unexplored question through an inductive study of 17 corporate venture capital units. We document a set of five novel practices that influence the efficacy of a unit’s external search and internal integration, and identify how these practices complement a broader set of practices used by all units. We highlight the entrepreneurial nature of managing an external venturing unit, often to overcome unfavorable corporate contexts, a perspective that prior research has largely overlooked. Our findings provide unique insights into why some corporate investors are better at learning from external startups than others.
Full-text available
New ventures face a trade-off when considering corporate venture capital (CVC) funding. Corporate investors can provide complementary assets that enhance the commercialization of new venture technologies. However, tight links with a particular corporate investor has drawbacks and may constrain new ventures from accessing complementary assets from diverse sources in an open market. Taking this trade-off into account, we explore conditions under which CVC funding is beneficial to new ventures. Using a sample of computer, semiconductor, and wireless ventures, we find that CVC funding is particularly beneficial for new ventures when they require specialized complementary assets or operate in uncertain environments. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Technological discontinuities pose serious challenges to top managers’ attention. These discontinuities, which often occur at the fringes of an industry, are usually driven by innovative and, often, venture capital-backed start-ups creating new products and transforming existing industries in ways that are difficult for incumbent managers to understand against the backdrop of their existing cognitive schemata. However, failing to appreciate and embrace successful technological discontinuities might endanger incumbents’ very existence. Extending the attention-based view, we explore whether and how interorganizational relationships guide top managers’ attention either to or away from technological discontinuities. We propose that homophilous relationships (e.g., alliances with industry peers) should exhibit a negative relationship with incumbents’ timely attention to technological discontinuities, whereas heterophilous relationships (e.g., with venture capitalists as a result of co-investments) should exhibit a positive relationship. Furthermore, we hypothesize that the status of the partners strengthens the effect of homophilous and heterophilous relationships with the timely attention of top managers to technological discontinuities. Based on a longitudinal study of the incumbents in four information and communications technology industry sectors, we find that heterophilous ties through corporate venture capital (CVC) co-investing with high-status venture capital firms exhibit a strong positive relationship with timely attention. CVC, when it connects senior management to high-status venture capitalists (VCs) through co-investments, has a special role in directing top managers’ attention to technological discontinuities and ensuing business opportunities. Implications for the understanding of the role of interorganizational ties as structural determinants of top managers’ attention are discussed.
This study examines the relationship between a firm’s venturing activities and its undertaking of strategic renewal. The study was motivated by some important gaps in the corporate entrepreneurship literature on venturing and renewal. The extant literature has not focused on the different types and dimensions of firms’ renewal activities. In particular, discontinuous renewal involving shifts in firms’ core businesses is not well understood. Moreover, the conditions that drive firms to undertake strategic renewal have not been examined. For example, it is not known how venturing increases or reduces the benefits of undertaking renewal. This study focuses on a discontinuous form of renewal involving major changes in firms’ core businesses, and examines firms’ external venturing activities which complement their internal development. We examine corporate venture capital (CVC) investments, which are direct minority equity investments made by established companies in privately held ventures. Discontinuous renewal is conceptualized as resulting from a set of related, and often sequential, managerial decisions. The first managerial decision is to initiate growth in a business that is relatively newer or smaller for the organization. The second decision is to move away, or even withdraw completely, from the current core business which enabled prior growth and prosperity for the firm and served as its primary revenue earner. Employing a real options perspective, we argue that CVC investments create growth options in new and existing businesses, but do not result in firms’ withdrawal from existing businesses. Therefore, we expect CVC activity to be negatively associated with the likelihood of a firm undertaking discontinuous renewal. We also propose that the benefits of withdrawing from existing businesses are even lower, and the costs even higher, for firms in dynamic industries and for firms that possess strong internal capabilities. The predictions of the study are tested using longitudinal data on 477 firms from the 1990 Fortune 500 list for the period 1990-2000. We find support for all our predicted hypotheses. These results help address important limitations in the corporate entrepreneurship literature. The study also contributes to the real options and organizational capabilities literatures.
This analysis develops a conceptual model of entrepreneurial behavior at the organizational level. Entrepreneurship is considered to be a dimension of strategic posture, and thus all manner of organizationals may behave entrepreneurially. This strategic posture encompasses a firm's risk-taking propensity, its ability to be competitively aggressive, proactive manners, and product innovation. Key characteristics for the creation of this organizational model are presented -- the dependent variable is firm performance; environmental, organization, and individual level variables are utilized; and both direct and moderator effects are included. The external variables consist of environmental technological sophistication, environmental dynamism, environmental hostility, and industry life cycle stage, while the internal variables are top management values and philosophies, organizational resources and competencies, organizational culture, and organizational structure. Strategic variables are mission strategy and business practices and competitive tactics. Forty-four propositions are derived from this model. Among the theoretical and managerial implications. First, firms should be viewed as entrepreneurial entities, and this entrepreneurial behavior is often an integral part of the firm's management. Further, entrepreneurial posture can be managed. (SRD)
This study examines how different governance modes for external business development activities and venture relatedness affect a firm's innovative performance. Building on studies which have suggested that interorganizational relationships enhance the innovative performance of firms, we propose that governance modes and venture relatedness interact in their effect on innovative performance. Analyzing a panel of the largest firms in four information and communication technology sectors, we find that degree of relatedness for corporate venture capital investments, alliances, joint ventures, and acquisitions influences their impact on innovative performance.
We investigate how corporate venture capitalists (CVCs) can rapidly attain central positions in venture capital syndication networks. Using data of CVC investments by U.S. corporations between 1996 and 2005, we complement prior research, which suggests that centrally positioned VCs predominantly invest together with other centrally positioned VCs. While we find clear support for the social network theory arguments that prior central positions in syndication networks significantly explain future network positions of CVCs, we also find a negative interaction effect between past centrality and corporate resources. This finding implies that resources of CVCs can substitute for their lack of prior centrality and allow them to gain rapidly central positions in rigid VC syndication networks.