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Using the Past in Populist Communicational Strategies

Authors:
  • The Hub on Emotions, Populism and Polarization (HEPP), University of Helsinki

Abstract

This article investigates how political strategies interrelate populist rhetoric with memory issues. By looking at the case of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) from Romania, between 2017–2019, this article reveals how the slide to populism, generated by cyclical confrontations with the rule of law institutions, steered the PSD to adopt conspirational beliefs and appeal to traumatic memories to frame the judiciary as the new Securitate. Through the use of discourse analysis and virtual ethnography, this article analyses party resolutions and political rallies. This article explains how the populist rhetoric created a new hegemonic narrative of the judiciary, by intersecting its values and symbolism with the memory of the former Securitate from the Communist period.
©  , , |:./-
  () –
brill.com/popu
Using the Past in Populist Communicational
Strategies
How the Memory of Securitate is Instrumentalised in Romanian Politics?
Ionut Valentin Chiruta
Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia
ionut-valentin.chiruta@ut.ee
Abstract
This article investigates how political strategies interrelate populist rhetoric with mem-
ory issues. By looking at the case of the Social Democratic Party () from Romania,
between 2017–2019, this article reveals how the slide to populism, generated by cycli-
cal confrontations with the rule of law institutions, steered the  to adopt conspi-
rational beliefs and appeal to traumatic memories to frame the judiciary as the new
Securitate. Through the use of discourse analysis and virtual ethnography, this article
analyses party resolutions and political rallies. This article explains how the populist
rhetoric created a new hegemonic narrative of the judiciary, by intersecting its values
and symbolism with the memory of the former Securitate from the Communist period.
Keywords
parties – Romania – populism – memory – rule of law
1 Introduction
Between 2015–2019, the Romanian political scene witnessed a return to popu-
lism spearheaded by the rhetoric of the Social Democrat party (), which
was centred on strategic exploitations of the past to x the problems of the
present. Similar to other parties from Central and Eastern Europe, such as
PiS (Poland),  (Hungary) and  (Bulgaria), , along with the
Alliance of the European Liberals and Democrats () developed a mixture
... References to the past feature prominently in populist discourses and its political imaginary, just as historical legacies shape the opportunities and conditions under which populism gains political relevance. Yet, while these historical dimensions of populism are often tacitly acknowledged, explicit scholarly engagement with them is still in its nascent stage and has only of late found resonance in the field of populism studies (Chiruta 2020;Ding, Slater, and Zengin 2021;Elçi 2021;Hesová 2021;Volk 2022b), accompanied by emerging research in memory (politics) studies (Apryshchenko and Karnaukhova 2019;Balthazar 2019;De Cesari and Kaya 2019;Bourgeois 2020;Đureinović 2022;Kralj 2021;Lucksted 2022;Manucci 2019;Ferreira 2021;Schneider 2020;Rosenfeld 2021;Ugur-Cinar and Altınok 2021;Verovšek 2016Verovšek , 2020bVerovšek , 2020aZubrzycki and Woźny 2020;Wijermars 2019;Miklóssy and Kangaspuro 2021), and political historiography (Chiruta 2020;Gonçalves 2021;Finchelstein 2019;Kenny 2017;Saunders 2020;Mercer and Pattison 2022). ...
... References to the past feature prominently in populist discourses and its political imaginary, just as historical legacies shape the opportunities and conditions under which populism gains political relevance. Yet, while these historical dimensions of populism are often tacitly acknowledged, explicit scholarly engagement with them is still in its nascent stage and has only of late found resonance in the field of populism studies (Chiruta 2020;Ding, Slater, and Zengin 2021;Elçi 2021;Hesová 2021;Volk 2022b), accompanied by emerging research in memory (politics) studies (Apryshchenko and Karnaukhova 2019;Balthazar 2019;De Cesari and Kaya 2019;Bourgeois 2020;Đureinović 2022;Kralj 2021;Lucksted 2022;Manucci 2019;Ferreira 2021;Schneider 2020;Rosenfeld 2021;Ugur-Cinar and Altınok 2021;Verovšek 2016Verovšek , 2020bVerovšek , 2020aZubrzycki and Woźny 2020;Wijermars 2019;Miklóssy and Kangaspuro 2021), and political historiography (Chiruta 2020;Gonçalves 2021;Finchelstein 2019;Kenny 2017;Saunders 2020;Mercer and Pattison 2022). ...
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The goal of this introduction to the special issue is threefold. First, we map a nascent research field on connections between populism and the past and, in so doing, point to gaps in existing work. Second, we develop the contours of an integrated analytical framework that, addressing these gaps, reconstructs the relationship between populism and the past comparatively and on multiple levels. Our approach pays special attention to the interlinked dynamics of populist political agency, the way they employ particular, idealized, and historically embedded narratives about a nation’s past, as well as contextual and structural factors that help facilitate the success of populist nostalgia. Third, we pose novel research questions induced by our process-oriented, multi-level framework and discuss how the articles in this special issue advance this line of research.
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The article develops a typology of political strategies of coming to terms with the past as a theoretical frame of reference against which it assesses the transitional politics of memory pursued in Romanian post-communist society. It argues that after an initial ‘elusive’ strategy based on a politics of amnesia gave way to a confrontationist stance promoting a politics of anamnesis, the communist past was both politically criminalised and symbolically demonised. The article concludes by arguing that the failure of the ‘mastering the past’ paradigm epitomised by the 2006 Tismăneanu Report needs to give way to a ‘normalising’ paradigm of remembering Romanian communism.
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Book
Cambridge Core - Russian and East European Government, Politics and Policy - Romania Confronts its Communist Past - by Vladimir Tismaneanu
Chapter
Initially, Romania shared with all the communist regimes of Eastern Europe a total reliance upon terror as an instrument of political power. This terror was wielded in two stages: first to eliminate opponents in the drive to consolidate power, and second to ensure compliancy once revolutionary change had been effected. In Romania’s case the first stage, broadly speaking, encompassed the period 1945 until 1964, the year in which an amnesty of political prisoners was completed, and the second ran from 1964 to 1989. There was a perceptible change in the degree of repression exercised by the regime in 1964. Until this penultimate year of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej’s rule as General Secretary of the Romanian Workers’ Party, terror embraced the whole of Romanian society. After 1964, Romanians were marked by fear, rather than terror of the Securitate and the Ceausescu regime, for all its appalling abuses of human dignity and contempt for human rights, never used the tactics of mass arrests and internal deportations that were a feature of most of the Dej era.
Chapter
Since the overthrow of Ceauşescu, Romania’s progress with transition has been hesitant. Given the chequered achievements of successive governments over the past decade it is difficult to escape the conclusion that there has been a lack of political will to reform. Events have shown that the impetus for reform has come from outside rather than from within. The International Monetary Fund, the Council of Europe, and the European Union have been the major catalysts of reform, and the need to satisfy the requirements of these institutions in order to achieve integration into the so-called ‘Euro-Atlantic structures’ has spurred and guided the reform process in Romania. Nowhere is this more true than in the realm of the security services. In recognition of the fact that transparency and accountability in the democratic process are cornerstones of the European Union (EU) entry criteria established at the Copenhagen summit in 1993, and that fitness for entry into NATO requires changes at the top of the security services, President Constantinescu took significant steps to reform these services. This chapter examines the progress that Romania has made up to 1998 in coming to terms with and overcoming the legacy of one of the most feared and notorious components of Ceauşescu’s totalitarian state: the former Department of State Security (DSS) better known as the Securitate. It begins by considering the dismantling of the Securitate along with the structure and composition of the successor security services. Subsequently, the chapter focuses on some of the scandals which have resulted from disclosure of links with the Securitate, along with efforts to regulate access to the former Securitate files.