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Volume 8 • Issue 6 • 1000439
J Infect Dis Ther, an open access journal
ISSN: 2332-0877
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ISSN: 2332-0877
Burdekin RCK. J Infect Dis Ther 2020, 8:6
Mini Review Open Access
Journal of Infectious Diseases & Therapy
Economic and Financial Effects of the 1918-1919 Spanish Flu Pandemic
RCK Burdekin*
Robert Day School of Economics & Finance, Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, United States of America
Abstract
The 1918-1919 Spanish Flu represented the biggest worldwide health threat prior to the 2020 coronavirus pandemic. Although its
mortality eects have been widely studied, much less has been done to assess its economic and nancial impact. This mini review
incorporates ndings from recent studies of the Spanish Flu’s eect on economic performance and stock market performance in the
United States and worldwide. Although US impacts may have been very short-lived, more pervasive eects seem evident in other
countries. It also appears that contemporary stock market participants reacted signicantly, and negatively, to the surging death rates that
were seen during the Spanish Flu.
“In the year nineteen eighteen
We’re killed by the disease called inuenza
Which nished our beloved relatives
Mothers, fathers, sisters and brothers
In other households no one was left
It took young women and men
It chose the beautiful ones
It even took the good looking men
It took the teenagers
It took even the young maidens
It took the engaged ladies
It took the strummers (bridesmaids)
Even the grooms
It was like there was a black cloud over the earth”
(First stanza of “Inuenza 1918” by Reuben Tholakele Caluza -- as presented in English translation by Okigbo, p. 96)
*Corresponding author: Richard C.K. Burdekin, Robert Day School of Economics
& Finance, Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, United States of America,
E-mail: rburdekin@cmc.edu
Received date: November 02, 2020; Accepted date: November 17, 2020;
Published date: November 24, 2020
Citation: Burdekin RCK (2020) Economic and Financial Eects of the 1918-1919
Spanish Flu Pandemic J Infect Dis Ther 8:439.
Copyright: © Burdekin RCK. This is an open-access article distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and
source are credited.
Keywords: Spanish u; Economic performance; Stock markets;
Europe; United States
Introduction
ere remains much uncertainty regarding the full impact of the
1918-1919 pandemic widely referred to as the “Spanish Flu.” Although
there is now a consensus that it actually began at a US army base in
Kansas in March 1918, estimates of its toll vary owing to diculties
in determining exactly how many of the recorded deaths were actually
caused by the epidemic. It was clearly highly deadly, however. e u
was accompanied, for example, by the rst decline in the population of
England and Wales since records of civil registration began in 1837 –
with the epidemic “stated to be a primary or contributory cause of death
in 98,998 cases, or 41 per cent. of the total.” (Economist [1]). Meanwhile,
US death rates in 1918 were 5-20 times above the levels consistent with
standard seasonal inuenza eects [2]. Unlike the usual pattern where
the youngest and eldest cohorts are most vulnerable to epidemics, the
Spanish Flu deaths tended to be concentrated in younger adults, with
the peak eect being felt by those in their twenties and early thirties. In
addition to the tragic human consequences, this meant that the Spanish
Flu had a disproportionately high impact on the working population.
Although the Spanish Flu began in March 1918, its most deadly
eects were concentrated under the second September-November
1918 wave – followed by a less serious, and nal wave, experienced
by many nations in early 1919. e pronounced fall 1918 spike in US
death rates shown in (Figure 1) (data source [3]) was similar to the
pattern experienced in most major European countries (see Burdekin
[4]). Any assessment of its impact remains complicated by the fact that
the peak virus deaths occurred while World War I was still in progress
[5,6]. Continuing for some months aer the Armistice of November 11,
1918, the remainder of the pandemic is then conated with the eects
of demobilization and a return to peacetime production.
Volume 8 • Issue 6 • 1000439
J Infect Dis Ther, an open access journal
ISSN: 2332-0877
Citation: Burdekin RCK (2020) Economic and Financial Eects of the 1918-1919 Spanish Flu Pandemic J Infect Dis Ther 8:439.
Page 2 of 3
Economic and Financial Eects on the United States
US output eects of the Spanish Flu appeared to be only transitory
in nature and primarily reected in a negative labour supply shock.
Velde [7] uses high frequency data to show how this negative labour
supply shock is conrmed by coal industry data, but nds that this
impact was very brief and not accompanied by any major demand-
side or balance sheet eects. Although some familiar containment
measures were applied, including closing churches, schools and places
of entertainment, banning mass gatherings and requiring masks, the
enforcement of these controls was uneven across the country and much
shorter in duration than the lockdowns later employed in the face of
the 2020 coronavirus. Restrictions were, in fact, rarely maintained for
much more than a month (see Bootsma and Ferguson’s [8] Appendix).
e war eort itself limited the potential restrictions in New York City
given that it was the main departure point for troops heading to Europe
– with President Woodrow Wilson insisting that transports continue
even as the epidemic hit hard in October 1918 (Spinney [9], p. 104).
Nevertheless, data on Major League Baseball attendance provides
a window into the potential impact on leisure spending. Overall
attendance fell by over 50% from 4,762,705 in 1917 to 2,830,613 in 1918
before more than doubling to 6,532,439 in 1919 aer the pandemic
came to an end [10].
e possibility that the baseball data are indicative of a more
far reaching pent-up demand could help explain the fact that, aer the
pandemic came to an end, rising bank loans nanced a “speculative
orgy of 1919” (Wicker [11], p. 236). Such bank loans add to the amount
of money in circulation, in turn fueling ination insofar as too much
money ends up chasing too few goods. As shown in Figure 2, the
acceleration in both US money supply and price increases through
most of 1919 followed a slackening around the time of the second wave
of the Spanish Flu in late 1918 (data from Friedman and Schwartz [12],
pp. 708-711 and Global Financial Data). Although it is unclear whether
the temporary pause was truly driven by eects of the epidemic, it is
notable that the re-acceleration in money and price growth was delayed
until March 1919 whereas the war ended in November 1918. Despite a
number of cities removing their restrictions in October or November
1918, others such as Kansas City, Milwaukee, San Francisco, Spokane
and St. Louis continued interventions into January or February 1919
[8].
Quantifying the International Eects
e US experience, where expansion resumed by March 1919, was
not necessarily indicative of the experience in the rest of the world.
Karlsson, Nilsson, and Pichler [13], for example, not only identify
initial negative eects of the Spanish Flu on Swedish capital income but
also nd evidence of a sustained increase in poverty rates continuing
aer 1920. Whereas they do not nd any initial signicant eects on
Swedish earnings, other countries may well have experienced wage
declines as demand fell in the face of the pandemic. For Spain, which
faced one of the highest death rates in Europe at 12.3 per thousand,
Basco, Domènech and Rosés [14] nd that the Spanish Flu’s eects were
actually concentrated amongst wage rates – with short-lived negative
declines of up to 15% in 1918. Guimbeau, Menon and Musacchio [15]
identify long-term eects using data from the State of Sao Paulo in
Brazil, suggesting carryover in the pandemic’s eects on literacy rates,
in-patient hospital admissions and productivity that was still evident
in 1940. More generally, Jordà, Singh and Taylor [16] nd evidence
of sustained reductions in real rates of return in the aermath of the
Spanish Flu as well as other pandemics.
Short-term eects of the Spanish Flu are assessed in Barro, Ursua,
and Weng’s [17] analysis of how the deaths from the pandemic aected
GDP, stock prices and ination across 43 countries. Although they
nd no signicant eects of the u deaths on realized real returns on
stocks, a signicant negative eect on short-term government securities
is identied in their analysis. Barro, Ursua and Weng [17] also nd
support for temporary inationary eects combined with substantial
declines in GDP and consumption. eir analysis is limited to annual
data, however, thereby abstracting from the dramatic month-to-month
uctuations in the death rate that were especially pronounced around
the October-November 1918 peak.
Burdekin [4] nds that the use of higher frequency monthly
data, rather than the annual series employed by Barro, Ursua, and Weng
[17], suggests that stocks may indeed have been signicantly impacted
by the pandemic. In order to assess the potential stock market eects
of the rise in deaths during the three main waves of the epidemic
(March 1918-March 1919), the year-on-year increase is calculated
based on the monthly data on civilian deaths for each country (Bunle
Figure 1: US monthly deaths, 1918-1919.
Volume 8 • Issue 6 • 1000439
J Infect Dis Ther, an open access journal
ISSN: 2332-0877
Citation: Burdekin RCK (2020) Economic and Financial Eects of the 1918-1919 Spanish Flu Pandemic J Infect Dis Ther 8:439.
Page 3 of 3
[18]; US Department of Commerce [3]). is is consistent with deaths
stemming from the Spanish Flu being typically assessed in terms of
“excess deaths,” meaning deaths above the norm from the pre-epidemic
years [19,20]. By comparing each month’s value to its counterpart a
year earlier, seasonal eects (such as typical increases in deaths during
the regular u season) are minimized. Combining US data with nine
European countries for which both monthly death and stock market
data are available for 1918-1919, the empirical results show the deaths
variable to be statistically signicant with the expected negative sign.
Although the size of the implied stock market response to increased
deaths is very small when evaluated at the mean, the stock market
reaction at maximum deaths is several times higher than the average
change in market returns over the 1918-1919 samples.
Conclusion and Qualications
Despite the main eects of the Spanish Flu being concentrated
at the time of the spike in the death rates in late 1918, international
evidence suggests there may have been a generalized economic and
nancial impact. e negative impact was almost certainly exacerbated
by wartime pressures facing the European economies, and to some
extent the US economy, in 1918. Even neutral European nations were
inevitably facing major supply-chain disruptions at the time. is may
well have magnied the economic disruptions associated with the
death rate amongst the civilian population and thereby factor into the
negative stock market responses identied in Burdekin.
References
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pandemic? A view through high-frequency data,WP 2020-11, Federal Reserve
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Figure 2: US monthly m1 money supply vs. consumer price index, 1915-1921.
