Content uploaded by Amos C. Fox
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Amos C. Fox on Nov 17, 2020
Content may be subject to copyright.
Volume 8 || Issue 2
Five Models of Strategic Relationship in Proxy War
Amos C. Fox
In the past six years, proxy wars have subtly assumed a position of dominance in contemporary
war. Yet, as proxy wars have voraciously marched into the future it has become apparent that they
are not well understood, which is the byproduct of insufficient strategic theory on the subject.
Within this dynamic, five basic relationship models exist – exploitative, transactional, cultural,
coerced, and contractual. Proxy wars will remain relevant for years to come. Understanding the
contours of strategic relationships amongst partners is important for the policymaker and
practitioner because it allows them to better navigate the waters of proxy war. Understanding the
type of relationship that exists between a proxy and its partner is the first step.
In recent years, many thinkers have
addressed proxy war, but they have done so
in isolation from a strategic theoretical
framework. Beyond offering a cursory
definitions of proxy war, the strategic studies
is bereft of a framework to understand proxy
war. To be sure, analysts at American think
tank New America, posit that, “All of these
analytical approaches offer a window onto
the variegated nature of proxy strategies but
there is nothing in the way of a unified theory
on what drives proxy wars.”
i
While the
strategic studies community is absent
theoretical models that illuminate proxy war,
American military doctrine also fails to
appropriately account for proxy war. Instead,
it stands fast with its shibboleths, security
force assistance and foreign internal defense,
while mentioning proxies or proxy war in
passing. Further, Department of Defense
joint force doctrine incorrectly captures the
role of proxies in modern war, stating that
when state-actors employ proxies in pursuit
of their objectives, they (the state actor) are
operating outside of armed conflict, while
their proxies are operating within the realm
of armed conflict.
ii
This paper clearly
demonstrates that actors employing proxies
are often deeply immersed in armed conflict,
right alongside their proxy, operating within
one of five types of proxy relationships.
Although proxy war is coming back into
vogue, it is not a new phenomenon. Flipping
back through the pages of military and
political history, proxies jump off the page at
almost every turn. For example, historian
Geoffrey Parker calls attention to the pivotal
role of Italian condottieri and Swedish
companies for hire in the Middle Ages, as
well as the Hessians of eighteenth and
nineteenth century Germany working on
behalf of a principal agent.
iii
Meanwhile,
historian John Keegan contends that
surrogates have long, rich role in war, noting
that, “During the eighteenth century the
expansion of such forces – Cossacks,
‘hunters,’ Highlanders, ‘borders,’ Hussars –
had been one of the most noted contemporary
military developments.”
iv
Reality drives the need for a theory of proxy
war. The increasing use of proxies in war,
most recently sparked by Russia’s 2014
invasion of eastern Ukraine through
culturally aligned proxies, demands a fresh
look at the phenomena. Further, legislative
testimony from U.S. military combatant
commanders finds that all geographic
combatant commands, apart from U.S.
Northern Command, argue that proxies play
a critical role within their respective area of
responsibility. Despite the dominant position
proxies play in modern armed conflict, few
theories exist to illuminate the contours and
relationship dynamics that make the
phenomena unique and worthy of discussion.
51|| Georgetown Security Studies Review
Theory and theoretical frameworks are useful
because they provide a common language for
the phenomenon being analyzed. Next,
theories provide a framework for developing
models in which to analyze the environment.
Lastly, theory allow one to unpack and trace
the consequences of how one or more actor
operates in an environment.
v
In turn, a sound
theory facilitates environmental
understanding and what drives relationships
within that environment. Therefore, given the
increasing frequency of proxies in
contemporary armed conflict, it follows to
offer a theory regarding proxy relationships
and proxy employment in proxy war.
This work does not argue that proxy war is a
new phenomenon, but instead it is a strategic
approach to war that requires a fresh
assessment because today’s proxy
environment is insufficiently defined. This
work builds upon existing the existing body
of knowledge that currently frames proxy
war. To do so, this paper contends that five
basic relationship models guide strategic
interaction within proxy war. These
relationships are representative of the
problems of agency and risk-sharing, which
are the defining features in proxy war
partnerships. Before discussing the
relationship models a brief review of
definitions and terms of reference is required.
Framing Proxy Relationships
Because academia, the strategic studies
community, and the defense community have
not agreed on a common lexicon, the
following definitions are used as terms of
reference herein. A proxy war is one in which
two or more actors, working against a
common adversary, strive to achieve a
common objective. Borrowing from
economics and political science fields,
relationships in this environment are
governed by a principal-agent dynamic that
fuses the partners into a nested package. The
relationship between the actors is tiered. The
principal actor works indirectly through its
agent, or proxy, to accomplish its strategic
objective or curate its strategic interests. By
extension, the principal’s objective becomes
the proxy’s objective.
vi
However, this
generates problems associated with risk-
sharing and agency, neither of which are new
concepts. For example, Prussian military
theorist Carl von Clausewitz contends that,
“One country may support another’s cause,
but will never take it as serious as it takes its
own.”
vii
Meanwhile British military theorist
B.H. Liddell Hart posits that, “No agreement
between governments has had any stability
beyond their recognition that it is in their own
interest to adhere to it.”
viii
With Clausewitz and Liddell Hart as back
drops, contemporary theory suggests that
problem of agency surfaces in situations
when the ambitions or aims of the two actors
(i.e. the principal and the agent) are no longer
aligned or come into conflict with one
another.
ix
On the other hand, the problem of
risk-sharing arises when the two parties’
attitudes toward risk are misaligned, which
then results in divergent action as contact
with risk continues.
x
As with most other partnerships, proxy
relationships are either tight or loosely
coupled. The relationship’s coupling results
from environmental and internal conditions.
Two types of tight-coupled relationships
exist within proxy relationships. The first
type is a relationship in which both parties
possess numerous commonalities. The
second type is a relationship in which the
partners possess a small number of variables
in common, but those variables are vital to
both actors. Those variables could be things
like shared religious virtues and customs,
ethnic ties, or geographic commonalities.
Conversely, in loose coupled relationships
the bond between the principal and agent is
wanting because the actors have few
commonalities or because those
commonalities not indispensable to both
actors.
xi
Volume 8 || Issue 2
Proxy wars are not exclusive to one type of
warfighting. Therefore, they must not be
equated with insurgencies, guerrilla warfare,
counterinsurgencies, or any other specific
type of operational or tactical approach. The
way combatants face off with one another is
subject to each actors’ political narratives,
objectives, resources. For the principal, the
method of warfighting is also subject to the
narratives, objectives, resources limitations
of its respective agent, and the strength of
bond with that proxy. To be sure, the
bludgeoning conventional battles of Russia’s
proxy war against Ukraine has resulted in
over 13,000 Ukrainian dead and 30,000
wounded since the spring of 2014.
xii
This is a
clear indication that today’s proxy wars are
far from just state-sponsored insurgencies in
banana republics or political backwaters, but
instead often manifest in large-scale land
wars in modern nation-states.
Previous work on proxy war theory contends
that two primary models—transactional and
exploitative models—dominate proxy war.
xiii
Further research indicates that these two
models insufficiently capture the breadth of
proxy relationships. Instead, analyzing the
sinew of proxy relationships along the lines
of investment cost and commitment towards
a common goal yields five relationship
models—transactional, exploitative,
coercive, cultural, and contractual. These
models provide a useful tool for analyzing
proxy wars, understanding how partners
operate within a proxy relationship, and
understanding how risk can be manipulated
in proxy relationships to accelerate or
decelerate divergence between principals and
agents.
The Exploitative Model
The exploitative model is characterized by a
proxy that is dependent on its principal for
survival—the relationship could almost be
viewed as one between a parasite and a host.
The principal provides the animus for the
parasitic proxy to survive. Yet, the proxy is
important to the principal. When existential
threat arises, the principal ensures that its
proxy remains intact. Russia’s relief of its
overwhelmed proxies during multiple battels
in the Donbas demonstrates this point.
xiv
This
reliance creates a strong bond between the
proxy and the partner, resulting in the partner
possessing near boundless power and
influence over the proxy.
This model is often the result of a stronger
actor looking for an instrument, or proxy
force, to do its fighting for it. As a result, the
proxy is as useful to the principal as is its
ability to make progress towards the
principal’s ends. Therefore, an exploitative
relationship is temporary—once the
principal’s ends have been achieved, or the
proxy is unable to maintain momentum
towards the principal’s ends then the
principal tends to discontinue the
relationship. Furthermore, if the principal
actor feels that the proxy is growing too
strong or if its influence with the proxy is
waning, it (the principal) will often eliminate
political, strategic, or other influential proxy
leaders in order to maintain order and control
within the relationship.
The assassination of Donetsk People’s
Republic prime minister Alexander
Zakharchenko in August 2018, might well
fall into this category.
xv
Zakharchenko’s
death came on the heels of the assassination
of military commander’s Mikhail Tolstykh
and Arseny Pavlov in February 2017 and
October 2016, respectively.
xvi
Attribution is
far from certain, however. Some sources
contend that Ukrainian forces killed
Zakharchenko, Tolstykh, and Arseny in a
deliberate effort to counter the Russian proxy
movement. Meanwhile, other sources offer
that Russian special forces eliminated those
leaders to keep their proxies weak and
subservient to Moscow.
xvii
Beyond Russian proxies in Ukraine, a similar
dynamic exists between the United States and
its proxies along Syria’s Euphrates River
53|| Georgetown Security Studies Review
valley and expansive eastern deserts. The
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an
American manufactured proxy force, grew
out of amalgamating Syrian Kurdish militias,
most notable of which is the People’s
Protection Units, or YPG.
xviii
The SDF, the
United States’ proxy for fighting ISIS in
Syria, established a political wing—the
Syrian Democratic Council (SDC)—in the
wake of their early success against ISIS.
xix
In
doing so, the SDF and SDC intended to
implement Kurdish self-rule in Syria’s
Western Kurdistan region, or Rojava.
xx
At the same time, proxies like the SDF and
the idea of self-rule, present a unique problem
for principal actors locked in formal politico-
military alliances such as NATO. Kurdish
nationalism has proven a non-starter time and
again for Turkey, a formal military ally of the
United States. On several occasions, most
notably 2018’s Operation Olive Branch,
Turkey militarily intervened in Syria to
stamp out growing Kurdish national and
military strength.
xxi
On more than one
occasions Turkey’s intervention in Western
Kurdistan resulted in a strategic and
operational pause in the campaign to defeat
ISIS in Syria as the SDF split from its
American counterpart to defend its homeland
in northern Syria.
xxii
What makes this problem unique is that
instead of coming to the help of the SDF, the
U.S. military stands idly by as its counter-
ISIS proxy in Syria fights for survival against
its NATO ally, Turkey.
xxiii
As the SDF
battled against the Turks, its force was
battered into a shell of the 60,000-strong
proxy army that battled ISIS for several
years.
xxiv
The U.S.-SDF relationship also demonstrates
how quickly a principal will suspend or
eliminate the relationship with its proxy
when the unifying military strategy is no
longer aligned with policy. America’s
schizophrenic policy attitude towards the
SDF, which has lost over 11,000 fighters on
behalf of the U.S.-led counter-ISIS campaign
in Syria, illustrates the point that a proxy is
only useful so long as military strategy and
policy are in harmony with each other.
xxv
As
the Russian proxies in the Donbas and the
SDF in Syria demonstrate, an agent is vitally
dependent on its principal.
However, success can change the power
relationship between partners. In certain
instances, successful proxies can generate
enough legitimacy that it outgrows the
principal-agent relationship and is no longer
dependent on its principal. If, through
battlefield success, political wrangling, or the
intervention of other actors, the proxy can
transition into the second relational variation,
the transactional model. Further, if the
principal assesses that the proxy is more
useful with more strategic autonomy, it might
elect to allow the proxy to gain more power
and political independence.
The Transactional Model
The transactional model is proxy war’s
second relational variation. Prussian military
theorist Carl von Clausewitz provides an
insightful starting point for understanding
this model. He contends:
But even when both states are in earnest
about making war upon the third, they do not
always say, “we must treat this country as our
common enemy and destroy it, or we shall be
destroyed ourselves.” Far from it: The affair
is more often like a business deal.
xxvi
One finds that an exchange of services and
goods which benefits both the principal and
the proxy are at the heart of the transactional
model.
This model is also paradoxical because most
often the tactical proxy is the strategic
powerbroker in the relationship. In many
cases, the proxy force’s government is
independent but looking for assistance in
defeating an adversary. For example, in 2014
the government Iraq sought international help
Volume 8 || Issue 2
from the United States, among others, to
combat ISIS.
xxvii
Strategically, the
government of Iraq and the Iraqi military
were in charge, but at the tactical level
American forces fought a proxy war against
ISIS through Iraqi regular and irregular land
forces.
Strategically, the proxy possesses the power
in the relationship because its association
with the principal is wholly transactional.
Given the ‘business deal’ character of the
relationship, the clock starts ticking on the
duration of the relationship when the first
shot fired. As a result, the agent’s interest in
the principal recedes at a comparable rate to
the attainment of the two actors’ common
goal. Following ISIS’s defeat at the battle of
Mosul in July 2017 and its unwillingness or
inability to stand and fight at the subsequent
battle of Tal A’far in August 2017, the United
States began to lose influence with the
government of Iraq and Iraqi land forces.
xxviii
To be sure, the Iraqi campaign to quell
Kurdish independence in October 2017 was a
key indicator of this loss of influence. The
Iraqi campaign against the Kurds was levied
against the recommendations of the United
States.
xxix
Further, the subsequent calls for
the departure of American forces in Iraq in
the wake of Prime Minister Haider Abadi’s
formal declaration of victory over ISIS in
December 2017 illustrate this point.
xxx
Think of this model as one in which the proxy
is in the lead, while the principal follows and
supports the proxy. Unlike the exploitative
model, this model sees the proxy force’s
government request support from other
nation(s) to defeat a given threat. In doing so,
the proxy force’s government places
parameters on the principal and on the
duration of the mission. The proxy
government issues parameters to align the
principal with its own political and military
objectives. It is also important to note that the
proxy has fixed political and social interest in
the principal, therefore it attempts to
terminate the partnership upon attainment of
its goals.
Lastly, this model is extremely vulnerable to
external influence. It is vulnerable because
the proxy’s commitment to the principal is
based self-interest on more than survival,
meaning it can divorce itself from the
principal whenever it no longer profits from
the relationship, or if it sees danger in its
partner. In either situation, cynical self-
interest regulates the commitment between
partners in the transactional model.
The Coercive Model
The remaining three models are new
relational variations being introduced into
proxy war theory. The first of these is the
coercive model. The coercive model
resembles the exploitative model but differs
in that the proxy isn’t necessarily
manufactured, and because the proxy is either
an unwilling or reluctant partner. Instead, the
proxy is a pre-existing agent that is coerced
into a principal-agent proxy relationship.
Because of the relationship’s coercive nature,
the proxy possesses low willingness to share
the principal’s risk. The principal’s physical
presence is often the only factor that keeps
the agent working on behalf of the principal,
resulting in loosely coupled partnership. This
also results in a low level of autonomy for the
proxy because the principal understands the
tenuous bond between the two partners. The
proxy’s reluctance often manifests as insider
attacks by the proxy against the principal. As
a result, a principal often must employ an
internal security force while working
alongside its proxy, much in the way
American forces use security forces to
protect themselves in Afghanistan when
working with their Afghan proxies.
xxxi
The coerced proxy is often the byproduct of
a situation in which a principal has come into
an area and defeated the existing ruling body
and its security forces. Following that defeat,
the principal coopts trusted elements from the
defeated regime’s security forces as well as
55|| Georgetown Security Studies Review
other forces the principal deems necessary.
The proxy, either indifferent to the occupying
power, or concerned about the effect of
cooperating with the principal, displays little
motivation for working with the occupier and
displays limited capability, whether that be in
the form of governance or security.
The most noticeable example of this model is
the United States’ relationship with the
government of Afghanistan and the Afghan
security forces. In this relationship the U.S. is
the principal actor and the Afghans are the
coerced proxy in the fight against the
Taliban, Al Qaeda, and various other actors
over the course of twenty years of armed
conflict. Following the Taliban’s initial
defeat in Afghanistan in late 2001 and early
2002, U.S. forces created the Afghan army
and its security apparatus from scratch.
xxxii
For the duration of the nineteen-year
relationship the Afghan security forces
demonstrated reluctance to work with U.S.
forces and limited ability to effectively
combat the Taliban and other security threats.
Reports vary, but one notable report states
that the Afghan government and security
forces only control 54 percent of the country,
while 13 percent of the country is controlled
by the Taliban, and the remaining territory is
contested.
xxxiii
The Taliban, on the other
hand, contend that they control 70 percent of
the country.
xxxiv
The inability or
unwillingness of the government of
Afghanistan and its security forces to
systematically root out and eliminate the
Taliban, especially when factoring in the 18
years of dedicated train, advise, and assist
support from the United States and NATO,
infers a coerced agent that is not interested in
the same objectives as the principal. Further,
this also infers a partner that is unwilling to
burden the risk associated with meeting the
principal’s goal. Lastly, the high number of
insider attacks on United States and Afghan
forces further indicates a reluctant and
coerced relationship.
xxxv
The Cultural Model
The cultural model is the fourth model of
relationship within the proxy wars. Historian
John Keegan provides an instructive starting
point for understanding the cultural model.
Speaking of cultural factor in war, Keegan
contends that, “War embraces much more
than politics: that it is always an expression
of cultural, often a determinant of cultural
form, in some societies the cultural
itself.”
xxxvi
The cultural model appears to
share some of the same characteristics as the
transactional model, but due to the cultural
bond between the principal and the agent, the
two are tightly coupled, and thus the proxy is
willing to go to the razors edge of strategic
and tactical risk with the principal.
Not unlike parts of the American southwest,
many countries across the world have
cultural lines that do not neatly align with the
political map. The most common cultural
leverage points are religion, ethnicity,
language, and historical geographic
precedence. Cultural proxies tend to be found
in areas of conflict where culture bleeds
across political boundaries. In this model the
principal manipulates one or more cultural
ties in a location in which they have political
or strategic interest to gain power and
influence over a malleable group of culturally
similar individuals. Although also an
example of an exploitative proxy, Russian
proxies in eastern Ukraine are a good
example of a cultural proxy.
Ukraine’s Donbas is a region in which
Russian culture and the imperial legacy of the
czar’s extends well into Ukraine’s borders.
As a result, the Donbas contains a high
number of ethnic Russians, Russophones,
and Eastern Orthodox Christians. This differs
from central and western Ukraine, which is
predominately Catholic and ethnically
Ukrainian.
Further, Ukraine, either in part or in whole,
has often been part of Russia. To be sure,
under the czar’s Ukraine constituted a
Volume 8 || Issue 2
significant part of what the Romanov’s
stylized as “All Russias.” Appealing to
historical precedent, Russian president
Vladimir Putin used the “All Russias”
concept to legitimize his political and
military activity in the Donbas.
xxxvii
Indeed,
in the early days of the current Russo-
Ukrainian war, Putin and foreign minister
Sergey Lavrov were often found using the
term Novorossiya and its historical pedigree
within the ‘All Russias’ framework to justify
Russian aggression in Ukraine.
xxxviii
Further,
protecting ethnic Russians and Russophones
was also regularly used to justify aggressive
Russian behavior in the Ukraine.
xxxix
Iranian proxies throughout the Shia Crescent
are another exemplar of this model. Iran uses
cultural ties, generally the Shite branch of
Islam, to build strong-bonded proxies
throughout the Middle East. Today, Iran’s
most notable proxies are Lebanon’s
Hezbollah and Iraq’s Kata’ib Hezbollah.
However, as analyst Jack Watling notes, Iran
also supports Houthi rebels in Yemen, Hamas
in throughout the Middle East, Shia militia
groups in Syria and Iraq, just to name a few.
xl
These proxy forces are primarily supported,
funded, and advised by Iran’s elite Quds
Force, a pillar of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC).
xli
The tight cultural bond between principal and
agent results in a stalwart proxy that will
often stand by the principal agent, sharing
high degrees of risk.
xlii
Kata’ib Hezbollah’s
steadfastness in spite of American targeting
through the winter of 2019 and early 2020, in
which its headquarters was attacked multiple
time, it had droves of its operatives and senior
leaders killed, and its primary principal
support, Iranian Major General Qasem
Soleimani, was killed alongside a number of
its leaders highlights this point. Kata’ib
Hezbollah’s continued rocket strikes through
2020 on American bases in Iraq demonstrates
its unwavering commitment to its principal
and their unified aims against American
interests in Iraq.
The Contractual Model
The contractual model is the final
relationship within proxy wars. The
contractual model is perhaps one of the oldest
relational models between principal and
agent. As noted earlier, the pages of history
are littered with contractual proxies. In fact,
contractual proxies played such an important
role war that Italian political theorist Niccolò
Machiavelli discussed their utility, or lack
thereof, in his classic political and military
treatise, The Prince.
xliii
In this model, the principal outsources the
pursuit of military objectives to a corporation
that has the military means to accomplish
those objectives. The benefit of employing
contractual proxies is that it increases the
distance between one’s own population from
a war and thereby decreasing the principal’s
potential for political risk. Further, because
the principal’s domestic audience does not
see large formations of uniformed soldiers
deploying from their home stations, this
model increases the principal’s operational
secrecy and deniability. For principal agents
not concerned with either of the two previous
points, a contractual proxy is also a quick,
easy way to increase one’s tactical options
through the leasing of forces, much like the
British use of Hessians during the American
Revolution.
xliv
The wars in the Middle East provide an
instructive look at the use of contractual
proxies. During the dizzying years of
Operation Iraqi Freedom, companies like
such as Blackwater, Aegis, and Triple
Canopy became household names to those
following the conflict. Indeed, in many
instances, contractual proxies like
Blackwater fought alongside American land
forces and were occasionally responsible for,
and participated, in some of the war’s biggest
battles. For example, operatives from
Blackwater fought alongside U.S. Army and
57|| Georgetown Security Studies Review
Marine units during 2004’s battle of Najaf,
helping turn the tide of the battle to an
American victory.
xlv
Furthermore, the killing of several
Blackwater contractors in March 2004 was
directly responsible for the First and Second
Battles of Fallujah which raged through the
remainder of 2004.
xlvi
Meanwhile,
Blackwater’s role in the indiscriminate
killing of over 20 Iraqis in Baghdad’s
Mansour district in 2007 fanned the flames of
a growing insurgency which exacerbated the
increasing problems facing the American
mission in Iraq.
xlvii
Blackwater has since
rebranded itself many times, but its head,
Erik Prince, continues to offer contractual
proxy solutions to stated-based problems in
armed conflict, as his 2018 push to privatize
the war in Afghanistan illustrates.
xlviii
Russian contractual proxy, the Wagner
Group, is the most notable example of this
relationship model today. The Wagner Group
came to prominence following a brief battle
near Deir ez-Zor, Syria. During the battle it
fought against American special operations
forces, resulting in the death of over 200
Wagner contractors.
xlix
Moreover, the group
has been operating in Ukraine, Syria, South
America, and Africa. However, its reach is
likely broader than that.
l
These contractual
proxies roughly follow the model laid out by
Executive Outcomes, the South African
contractual proxy that gain notoriety in the
1990s for its role in wars across southern
Africa.
li
From the standpoint or risk-sharing, the bond
between principal and agent is high because
the proxy would not accept the contract if it
were not comfortable with the contract’s
inherent risk. However, a principal and
contractual proxy’s decoupling point is
associated with strategic risk reaching
ruinous proportions for the proxy, or a
situation in which the proxy’s presence cuts
against the principal’s strategic ambition. For
example, tactical risk, like the Wagner
Group’s defeat at Deir ez-Zor, are within a
contractual proxy’s capacity to absorb.
lii
On
the other hand, situations like Blackwater’s
misstep in Baghdad’s Mansour Square in
September 2007, where it killed over 20 Iraqi
civilians, result in strategic loss because
situations such as that increase the strategic
between actors risk to the point that the
principal-agent relationship becomes
deleterious for both parties.
liii
To close the discussion on proxy
relationships, risk, regardless of the type of
relationship is fundamental to the duration of
any proxy relationship. Tactical and strategic
risk each affect the relationship in different
ways, depending on the strength and
character of bond between principal and
agent. While not scientific because it is nearly
impossible to measure intangibles such as
commitment, it is useful to identify the
relatively strength and weakness of a proxy
partnerships based upon their tolerance for
tactical and strategic risk. Doing so provides
a useful model for further examining and
forecasting proxy wars.
Conclusion
Proxy war’s frequency and pervasiveness in
modern armed conflict reveals its political
and strategic relevance. Because of this it is
important to frame proxy wars in order to
develop useful models to help guide
understanding about proxy war. Proxy
relationships are governed by a principal-
agent dynamic. Two types of problems are
inherent in this type of relationship. The first
is the problem of agency, or who owns the
problem. But more important is the problem
of risk-sharing. Risk-sharing, from a broader
perspective, is the defining component of
principal-proxy relationships because it is the
lubricating substance between two
cooperating parties. In most cases risk-
sharing is what determines the duration of
any principal-agent relationship and the tight
or looseness of the bond between partners.
Volume 8 || Issue 2
Building upon the principal-agent dynamic,
analyzing risk as it relates to a proxy war
principal-agent interaction is central to
understanding proxy relationships.
International relations theorist Thomas
Schelling’s comments on risk are helpful
when analyzing risk-sharing in proxy
relationships. Schelling contends that, “The
questions that do arise involve degrees of risk
– what risk is worth taking, and how to
evaluate risk involved in a course of
action…It adds an entire dimension to
military relations: the manipulation of
risk.”
liv
Integrating Schelling’s thoughts on
strategic risk into proxy environments and
the bond between principal and agent, one
finds risk that strategic risk is the priority
cleavage point between actors. This, in
essences, results in five models of
relationship in proxy war—exploitative,
transactional, coercive, cultural, or
contractual.
For exploited proxies, the relationship’s
duration is protracted and the bond between
parties is durable. However, for transactional
partners, the duration of their partnership
lasts as long as their mutual interests serve
both parties. In turn, the bond between
partners in a transactional relationship is
relatively weak, given that it is contingent
upon accomplishing strategic and operational
objectives. For coerced proxies, their
commitment is weak and almost exclusively
linked to the physical presence and direct
interaction of an occupying force. In cultural
relationships, the duration of the relationship
is prodigious because of the steadfast cultural
bond between principal and agent.
Contractual relationships are firm because
the profit motive is a great motivator and
because the agent knowingly accepts the
strategic and tactical risk before entering a
principal-agent relationship. While the
partners are tightly coupled at the tactical
level, that bond loosens towards the strategic
level. It loosens because a principal will sever
the relationship if the agent does something
that brings about existential threat to the
principal’s strategic aims or objective.
Likewise, the agent will find an out if it
approaches strategic collapse. It is also
important to emphasize that contractual
proxyism dominates the global proxy
phenomena today. To be sure, companies like
Aegis, Blackwater, and the Wagner Group
operate globally and often transparent to the
public.
lv
As war continues to push further into
the Grey Zone through hybrid means, one
should expect to find increasing demand for
contractual agents.
The discussion of proxies is far from clean.
Proxy relationships coexist within a world
rife with paradox. For instance, a sensible
argument can be made that transactional
relationships fall under the umbrella of
several other concepts, to include coalition
warfare or alliances. The counterbalance to
this point is found within the definition
outlined earlier in this work. Coalitions and
alliances work toward a common goal, but in
proxy relationships one actor is often
exploiting another for self-serving ends.
Most contractual proxies, on the other hand,
can easily be classified as mercenaries.
Regardless of how one feels about the morals
and ethics surrounding the employment of
mercenaries, they have always been and
continue to be proxies, or intermediaries.
As to the future, proxy wars are here to stay.
They will continue to dominate war so long
as the specter of nuclear weapons continues
to shadow great power and regional power
competition. Further, proxy wars will
continue to dominate conflict so long as
governments want to decrease their political
risks associated with war. Proxy wars do so
by obscuring involvement and by deferring
the butchers bill of war to intermediaries,
thereby making war more palatable to a
domestic audience, and thus, more pervasive
tool for policy makers and strategists.
79|| Georgetown Security Studies Review
Endnotes: Five Models of Strategic Relationship in Proxy War
i
Candace Rondeaux and David Sterman, “Twenty-First Century Proxy Warfare: Confronting Strategic Innovation in
a Multipolar World Since the 2011 NATO Intervention,” New America, February 2019, 15.
ii
Joint Integrated Campaigning (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), 8.
iii
Keegan, 329; Geoffrey Parker, “Dynastic War,” in Geoffrey Parked ed., The Cambridge History of Warfare,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 148-163.
iv
John Keegan, The History of Warfare (New York: Vintage Press, 1993), 5.
v
Joel Watson, Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory (London: W.W. Norton and Company, 2015), 3.
vi
Amos Fox, "Conflict and the Need for a Theory of Proxy Warfare," Journal of Strategic Security 12, no. 1 (2019):
49. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.12.1.1701.
vii
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
984), 603.
viii
B.H. Liddell Hart, Why Don’t We Learn from History? (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1971), 88-89.
ix
Kathleen Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” The Academy of Management Review 14, no.
1 (January 1989): 58-59, https://www.jstor.org/stable/258191; Joel Watson, Strategy: An Introduction to Game
Theory (London: W.W. Norton and Company, 2015) 303-308.
x
Ibid.
xi
Ibid.
xii
“Death Toll Up to 13,000 in Ukraine Conflict, Says UN Rights Office,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
February 26, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/death-toll-up-to-13-000-in-ukraine-conflict-says-un-rights-
office/29791647.html.
xiii
See the author’s works, “Time, Power, and Principal-Agent Problems: Why the US Army is Ill-Suited for Proxy
War Hotspots,” Military Review (March-April 2019), 28-42; “In Pursuit of a Theory of Proxy Warfare,” Land
Warfare Paper 123, (February 2019); and “Conflict and the Need for a Theory of Proxy Warfare,” Journal of
Strategic Security 12, no. 1 (2019): 44-71, https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.12.1.1701.
xiv
Michael Cohen, “Ukraine’s Battle of Ilovaisk, August 2014: The Tyranny of Means,” Army Press Online Journal
16-25, (February 4, 2017), https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Army-Press-Online-Journal/documents/16-
25-Cohen-10Jun16a.pdf; Amos Fox, “Hybrid Warfare: The 21st Century Russian Way of Warfare,” Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, (2017), 42-51.
xv
“Alexander Zakharchenko: Mass Turnout for Ukraine’s Rebel Funeral,” BBC, September 2, 2018,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45388657.
xvi
“Separatist Commander ‘Givi’ Killed in Eastern Ukraine,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 8, 2017,
https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-donetsk-separatis-leader-givi-killed/28297344.html.
xvii
Marc Bennetts, “Rebel Leader Alexander Zakharchenko Killed in Explosion in Ukraine,” The Guardian, August
13, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/31/rebel-leader-alexander-zakharchenko-killed-in-
explosion-in-ukraine; author interviews with multiple Ukrainian army officers, October 2017-December 2019.
xviii
Ruby Mellen, “A Brief History of the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Kurdish-led Alliance That Helped the U.S.
Defeat the Islamic State,” Washington Post, October 7, 2019,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/10/07/brief-history-syrian-democratic-forces-kurdish-led-alliance-
that-helped-us-defeat-islamic-state/.
xix
Nicholas Heras, John Dunford, and Jennifer Cafarella, “Governing After ISIS: What’s Next for the Syrian
Democratic Forces,” Overwatch, episode 13, February 28, 2020.
xx
Megan Specia, “Why is Turkey Fighting the Kurds in Syria,” New York Times, October 9, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/world/middleeast/kurds-turkey-syria.html.
xxi
Aaron Stein, “Operation Olive Branch: Status Update,” Atlantic Council, March 13, 2018,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/operation-olive-branch-status-update/.
xxii
Idrees Ali, “Turkish Offensive in Syria Leads to Pause in Some Operations Against IS: Pentagon,” Reuters,
March 15, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-turkey-pentagon/turkish-offensive-in-syria-
leads-to-pause-in-some-operations-against-is-pentagon-idUSKBN1GH2YW; “Coalition Continues Operations to
Defeat Daesh in Syria,” U.S. Central Command Press Release, November 23, 2019,
https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/2025134/coalition-continues-
operations-to-defeat-daesh-in-syria/.
Volume 8 || Issue 2
xxiii
Specia.
xxiv
Shawn Snow, “The End of an Era: 60,000 Strong US-Trained SDF Partner Force Crumbles in a Week Under
Heavy Turkish Assault,” Military Times, October 14, 2019, https://www.militarytimes.com/2019/10/14/the-end-of-
an-era-60000-strong-us-trained-sdf-partner-force-crumbles-in-a-week-under-heavy-turkish-assault/.
xxv
Specia.
xxvi
Clausewitz, 603.
xxvii
Michael Gordon, “Iraq’s Leader Requests More Aid in the Fight Against ISIS,” New York Times, December 3,
2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/world/middleeast/iraqi-leader-seeks-additional-aid-in-isis-fight.html.
xxviii
Tamer El-Ghobashy and Mustafa Salim, “Iraqi Military Reclaims City of Tal Afar after Rapid Islamic State
Collapse,” Washington Post, 27 August 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraqi-military-
reclaims-city-of-tal-afar-after-rapid-islamic-state-collapse/2017/08/27/a98e7e96-8a53-11e7-96a7-
d178cf3524eb_story.html.
xxix
Michael Knights, “Kirkuk: The City That Highlights Iraq’s War Within a War,” BBC, October 17, 2017,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41656398.
xxx
Aaron Mehta, “Tillerson: US Could Stay in Iraq to Fight ISIS, Wanted or Not,” DefenseNews, 30 October
2017, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2017/10/30/tillerson-us-could-stay-in-iraq-to-fight-isis-wanted-or-
not/.
xxxi
The U.S. military refers to these forces as “Guardian Angels” and “Security Forces,” or “SECFOR” as they are
most referred.
xxxii
Kenneth Katzman and Clayton Thomas, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy,”
Congressional Research Service, December 13, 2017, 33-36.
xxxiii
Global Conflict Tracker: War in Afghanistan, Council on Foreign Relations, last updated February 13, 2020,
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-afghanistan.
xxxiv
Jibran Ahmad, “Taliban dismiss Afghanistan’s Peace Talks,” Reuters, December 29, 2018,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban/taliban-dismiss-afghanistans-peace-talks-offer-
idUSKCN1OT051.
xxxv
Kyle Rempfer and Howard Altman, “Afghan Forces Facing an Increase in Insider Killings,” Army Times,
February 14, 2020, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2020/02/14/insider-attack-on-7th-group-involved-
two-anp-shooters/.
xxxvi
Keegan, 12.
xxxvii
Romanovs, define ‘All Russias’ in the following manner: Muscovy is “Great Russia,” Belorussia, or Belarus, is
“White Russia,” Ukraine is “Little Russia,” Crimea (initially annexed by the Romanovs from the Crimean Khanate
in 1783) and southern Ukraine, is “New Russia” or “Novorossiya,” and Galacia (parts of modern-day southeastern
Poland and portions of western Ukraine), is “Red Russia.” Simon Montefiore, The Romanovs, 1613-1918 (New
York: Vintage Books, 2017), 365.
xxxviii
Paul Sonne, “With ‘Novorossiya,’ Putin Plays the Name Game with Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, September
1, 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/with-novorossiya-putin-plays-the-name-game-with-ukraine-1409588947.
xxxix
Timothy Heritage, “Putin Vows to Protect Ethnic Russians Abroad After Ukraine Truce Expires,” Reuters, July
1, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-putin-russians/putin-vows-to-protect-ethnic-russians-
abroad-after-ukraine-truce-expires-idUSKBN0F646620140701.
xl
Jack Watling, “Iran’s Objectives and Capabilities: Deterrence and Subversion,” RUSI Occasional Paper,
(February 2019), 13-32.
xli
Ibid.
xlii
Lyse Doucet, “Qasem Soleimani: US Kills Top Iranian General in Baghdad Airstrike,” BBC News, January 3,
2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50979463.
xliii
Nicollo Machiavelli, The Prince (New York: Signet Classic, 1999). 71-82.
xliv
David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 324-345.
xlv
Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army (New York: Nation Books,
2007), 122-132.
xlvi
Gian Gentile, et al., Reimagining the Character of Urban Operations for the US Army, How the Past Can Inform
the Present and Future (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), 67-85.
xlvii
Dana Priest, “Private Guards Repel Attack on U.S. Headquarters,” Washington Post, August 6, 2004,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/04/06/private-guards-repel-attack-on-us-
81|| Georgetown Security Studies Review
headquarters/fe2e4dd8-b6d2-4478-b92a-b269f8d7fb9b/; David Isenberg, “Blackwater, Najaf – Take Two,” CATO
Institute, May 16, 2008, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/blackwater-najaf-take-two; Jeremy Scahill,
Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army (New York: Nation Books, 2007), 122-132.
xlviii
Rebecca Kheel, “Faced With Opposition, Erik Prince Shops His Plan for Afghanistan,” The Hill, August 24,
2018, https://thehill.com/policy/defense/403146-faced-with-opposition-erik-prince-shops-his-plan-for-afghanistan.
xlix
Neil Hauer, “The Rise and Fall of a Russian Mercenary Army,” Foreign Policy, October 6, 2019,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/06/rise-fall-russian-private-army-wagner-syrian-civil-war/.
l
Ibid.
li
David Smith, “South Africa’s Aging White Mercenaries Who Helped Turn the Tide on Boko Haram,” The
Guardian, April 14, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/14/south-africas-ageing-white-
mercenaries-who-helped-turn-tide-on-boko-haram; Scahill, 361-364.
lii
Maria Tsvetkova, “Russian Toll in Syria Battle Was 300 Killed and Wounded: Sources,” Reuters, February 18,
2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-casualtie/russian-toll-in-syria-battle-was-300-
killed-and-wounded-sources-idUSKCN1FZ2DZ.
liii
Peter Singer, “The Truth About Blackwater,” Brookings, October 2, 2007,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-dark-truth-about-blackwater/.
liv
Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 94.
lv
Robert Baer, “Iraqi’s Mercenary King,” Vanity Fair, March 6, 2007,
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2007/04/spicer200704
