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CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
published: 06 November 2020
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.568390
Edited by:
Ryan E. Rhodes,
University of Victoria, Canada
Reviewed by:
Austin Baldwin,
Southern Methodist University,
United States
Andreas Ivarsson,
Halmstad University, Sweden
*Correspondence:
Matthew A. Stults-Kolehmainen
matthew.stults-
kolehmainen@ynhh.org
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Movement Science and Sport
Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 01 June 2020
Accepted: 16 October 2020
Published: 06 November 2020
Citation:
Stults-Kolehmainen MA,
Blacutt M, Bartholomew JB,
Gilson TA, Ash GI, McKee PC and
Sinha R (2020) Motivation States
for Physical Activity and Sedentary
Behavior: Desire, Urge, Wanting,
and Craving.
Front. Psychol. 11:568390.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.568390
Motivation States for Physical
Activity and Sedentary Behavior:
Desire, Urge, Wanting, and Craving
Matthew A. Stults-Kolehmainen1,2*, Miguel Blacutt2, John B. Bartholomew3,
Todd A. Gilson4, Garrett I. Ash5,6 , Paul C. McKee7and Rajita Sinha8
1Bariatric and Minimally Invasive Surgery Program, Yale-New Haven Hospital, New Haven, CT, United States, 2Department
of Biobehavioral Sciences, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, NY, United States, 3Department of Kinesiology
and Health Education, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, United States, 4Department of Kinesiology and Physical
Education, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL, United States, 5Pain Research, Informatics, Multi-morbidities,
and Education (PRIME), VA Connecticut Healthcare System, West Haven, CT, United States, 6Center for Medical
Informatics, Yale School of Medicine, New Haven, CT, United States, 7Department of Psychology, Southern Connecticut
State University, New Haven, CT, United States, 8Yale Stress Center, Yale School of Medicine, New Haven, CT, United States
To better explain daily fluctuations in physical activity and sedentary behavior,
investigations of motivation are turning from social cognitive frameworks to those
centered on affect, emotion and automaticity, such as the Affect and Health Behavior
Framework (AHBF), Integrated Framework and Affective-Reflective Theory (ART). This
shift has necessitated: (a) re-examination of older theories and their constructs, such as
drives, needs and tensions and (b) an inspection of competing theories from other fields
that also attempt to explain dynamic changes in health behaviors. The Dynamical Model
of Desire, Elaborated Intrusion Theory and others commonly share with AHBF the idea
that human behavior is driven strongly by desires and/or the similar concepts of wants,
urges, and cravings. These affectively-charged motivation states (ACMS) change quickly
and may better explain physical activity behavior from one moment to the next. Desires
for movement predominantly derive from negative but also positive reinforcement. Data
from clinical populations with movement dysfunction or psychiatric disorders provides
further evidence of these drivers of movement. Those with Restless Legs Syndrome,
akathisia, tic disorders and exercise dependence all report strong urges to move and
relief when it is accomplished. Motor control research has identified centers of the brain
responsible for wants and urges for muscular movement. Models elaborated herein
differentiate between wants, desires, urges and cravings. The WANT model (Wants
and Aversions for Neuromuscular Tasks) conceptualizes desires for movement and rest
as varying by magnitude, approach or avoidance-orientation (wants versus aversions)
and as occupying independent dimensions instead of opposite ends of the same axis.
For instance, one hypothetically might be in a state of both high desire for movement
and rest simultaneously. Variations in motivation states to move and rest may also be
associated with various stress states, like freezing or fight and flight. The first validated
instrument to measure feelings of desire/want for movement and rest, the CRAVE
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Stults-Kolehmainen et al. Desire, Urge and State Motivation
Scale (Cravings for Rest and Volitional Energy Expenditure) is already shedding light on
the nature of these states. With these advances in theory, conceptual modeling and
instrumentation, future investigations may explore the effects of desires and urges for
movement and sedentary behavior in earnest.
Keywords: urge for movement, desire, physical activity, exercise, motivation, sedentary activity, motivation
states, conceptual analysis
INTRODUCTION
The question of what motivates human movement, physical
activity and sedentary behavior can trace its origin back to
the time of the ancient Greeks. Aristotle was of the conviction
that movement was the outcome of two faculties working
together, practical reason and desire (Frijda, 2016;Shields,
2016;Nascimento, 2017). When weighing the contribution of
each, he concludes that the “mind is not of itself sufficient
to engender motion, but instead relies upon appetite” (Shields,
2016). Furthermore, he refines the roles of desire by stating its
main function is to jumpstart movement. He states succinctly,
“It is manifest, therefore, that what is called desire is the sort
of faculty in the [mind] which initiates movement” (Shields,
2016). In other words, it is desire that actually “prick[s] practical
intellect” and sets muscular movement in motion (Shields, 2016).
Aristotle’s focus, therefore, was on the interaction of affective and
cognitive factors to produce movement in the present moment.
In the last century, however, the emphasis has been on trying
to understand the individual’s stable disposition for physical
activity or exercise and promoting these behaviors on the time
frame of the week, month or longer. Exercise behavior has
typically been studied within the scope of several frameworks,
including the mechanistic, social cognitive, socioecological, and
humanistic/organismic paradigms (Rhodes et al., 2019). These
later traditions are mainly rooted in cognitive-based perspectives
which likely exaggerate the “capacity and willingness [of humans]
to make rational decisions in order to achieve desired goals”
(Brand and Ekkekakis, 2018). They tend to underplay or ignore
affective factors, even though these are tantamount for the
initiation and refinement of much of human behavior (Frijda,
2010;Ridderinkhof, 2017). For instance, only a few of these
theories have considered the idea of desire or similar concepts.
An exception seems to be Self-Determination Theory, (SDT), in
which intrinsic motivation largely overlaps with craving/desire
(Williams and Evans, 2014), and a lack of desire is a central
feature of amotivation (Rhodes et al., 2019). Interventions
based on cognitive constructs typically have low impact, as
gauged by small effect sizes (Ekkekakis and Zenko, 2016), and
they have “modest utility as mechanisms of behavior change”
(Williams et al., 2019).
More recently, models have emerged that incorporate both
conscious and unconscious, affective and deliberative factors
affecting muscular movement in the present moment. Dual
process theories, such as the Affect and Health Behavior
Framework (AHBF), clearly articulate the role of desires and
cravings in instigating various health behaviors, such as exercise
and smoking (Williams and Evans, 2014;Williams et al., 2019).
This model also highlights the central role of hedonic motivation.
Williams and Evans (2014) state, “people typically crave/desire
what they previously had a positive response to.” The central role
of cravings in the formation and maintenance of “habit loops” has
been the focus of a New York Times best-selling book (Atomic
Habits) (Clear, 2018). Nevertheless, no formal theories exclusive
to the domain of physical activity highlight the role of desires
or urges for muscular movement (Brand and Ekkekakis, 2018;
Rhodes et al., 2019;Williams et al., 2019).
Among those specific to movement, perhaps the theories most
aligned with the idea of desires and urges are the Affective-
Reflective Theory (ART) (Brand and Ekkekakis, 2018) and the
model from Conroy and Berry (2017). Both of these models
exist within the dual process framework and attempt to balance
cognitive and affective processes to explain physical activity, and
more specifically, exercise, at the moment activity is initiated
(Brand and Ekkekakis, 2018). A relevant construct within both
theories is the concept of the action impulse, which is the
direct intermediary between automatic affective processes and
movement behavior. These models do not specify, however, if
impulses are conscious and felt. In motor control, the idea of
desires for movement has been formally articulated as “wants,”
which emanate from the inferior parietal lobule of the brain
(Desmurget and Sirigu, 2012). In medicine, the concept of
restless “urges” has been studied for decades (Garcia-Borreguero
et al., 2011). The concept of “appetence” (i.e., strong and
provoking desires for movement) has shed light on mechanisms
of addiction (Ferreira et al., 2006). In musicology, the concept
of “groove” describes the ability of music to generate feelings
of urge to move (Matthews et al., 2019). There appears to
be considerable overlap in the concepts of desires, wants,
urges and related constructs, yet they seem to vary by the
dimensions of magnitude, specificity to movement behavior,
whether the desire is conscious and felt, as well as valence.
However, all these concepts might commonly be characterized
as affectively-charged motivation states (Kavanagh et al., 2005)
and associated feelings that signal a pressing need to approach
or avoid a state of muscular movement (or, conversely a
state of rest).
At this time, no previous analysis or review has attempted
to evaluate, synthesize and expand on these motivation states,
despite their prevalence in several intersecting literatures
(Aristotle; Libet et al., 1983;Hausenblas and Downs, 2002;
Gernigon et al., 2004;Reiss, 2004;Ferreira et al., 2006;Desmurget
and Sirigu, 2012;Williams and Evans, 2014;Brand and Ekkekakis,
2018;Rhodes et al., 2019). In fact, most of the research on physical
activity and cravings/desires investigates the efficacy of exercise to
thwart cravings for other maladaptive behaviors, such as cigarette
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smoking or alcohol consumption (Ussher et al., 2008). Therefore,
the objectives of this conceptual analysis are the following. (1)
To describe the theoretical basis of desire as a primary motive of
movement as well as sedentary behavior. (2) To provide evidence
that such desires/urges exist and may be felt consciously. (3) To
clarify terminology and the overlap between desires, urges, and
cravings for movement. (4) Lastly, we aim to model relevant
situations and emotion states associated with fluctuations in
desires to move and rest and move/rest interactions. This paper
is not intended to describe a multi-factor model of desires for
rest/movement, such as ART or AHBF, but to more clearly
highlight the important role of desires as they currently fit in
established models (e.g., AHBF) or how they might naturally be
included in similar models (e.g., ART). We also do not aim to
describe in detail interactions between desires/urges and other
factors relevant in active behaviors, such as goals, intentions and
other cognitive-related constructs, which is beyond the scope of
this current analysis.
DISCUSSION
Drives, Tension, Reinforcement, and
Reward
Hull and Drive Reduction Theory
Early studies of motivation conceptualized behavior as a function
of instincts, drives, needs and tensions (Reiss, 2004) [see Ford
(1992) for a review]. McDougall (1933) was instrumental in
defining instinct as a function of “native human propensities”
interacting with motor and cognitive “native abilities.” When
propensities are stimulated by the environment they result in
“an active tendency, a striving, an impulse, or drive toward some
goal.” In Drive Reduction Theory, Hull (1943) described drives
(energizers) as arising from innate physiological needs, such as
the needs for water, food, air, and sexual activity. Physiological
deprivation of these needs results in hunger, thirst, etc. and
associated subjective feelings of tension (e.g., being hungry and
thirsty). These felt tensions push those affected into action, and
the amount of drive is proportional to the intensity of the
resulting effort to satisfy the need. Drive reduction theory has
poor performance in explaining complex human behavior, such
as why humans willingly engage in strenuous and exploratory
behavior that does not directly satisfy simple physiological needs
(e.g., climb mountains). Drive reduction theory also includes a
description of secondary drives, such as the drive for earning
money, which are learned through conditioning (Weiner, 1982).
Kurt Lewin– The Dynamic Field, Tensions and
Satiation
The work of Kurt Lewin and his contemporaries provided
an important basis for the study of desires and urges. Lewin
simply thought of human behavior as an interaction of the
person with their environment, varying by the place of the
person in an inner “life space” or dynamic field (Lewin, 1951;
Marrow et al., 1969;Brand and Ekkekakis, 2018). This field
incorporates a constellation of various needs, goals and motives
- all changing with the situation – even on a moment by
moment basis. In his Force Field analysis, driving and restraining
forces act on a person to change behavior by propelling
“locomotion” through a psychological field or environment, thus
achieving an equilibrium. Lewin also described what he called
“psychic tensions” in this field, which are “states of readiness or
preparation for action” (Marrow et al., 1969) – not undesirable
stress or strain. These emerge in response to a need, want or
some other stimulus, manifest as “intention or desire” to carry
out a specific task and are “released” when that task is completed
(Marrow et al., 1969;Ridderinkhof, 2017). Less recognized is
Lewin’s work on satiation of tensions with his protege, Anitra
Karsten. She observed that desire to complete various movement
tasks was indeed related to tension, and as a movement was
repeated the tension dissipated and desire diminished - a state
of satiation resulting in the behavior ending (Karsten, 1928). If
the movement was forced to continue, the participant developed
a great aversion to the task. Lewin saw this as a transition from
psychological hunger to satiation to “oversaturation” and even
related it to burnout – an “exhaustion of the will to work” (Lewin,
1928/2009;Soff, 2012). Importantly, satiation following constant
repetition of a task was not due to muscular fatigue but simply
a lack of desire.
Hedonic Pleasure and Reward
From a simple behaviorist perspective, the key to motivation
is reward (Skinner, 1938;Skinner and Morse, 1958;Niv, 2007;
Williams and Evans, 2014). In short, actions are repeated when
reinforced – regardless as to whether this reinforcement occurs
internally or from outside of the individual. There are two
primary means of reward: positive reinforcement (providing
a pleasurable stimulus) and negative reinforcement (taking
away a negative stimulus). The strongest rewards follow those
behaviors that result in both forms of reinforcement (Skinner,
1938). While the concept of the current study concerns human
perceptions and behaviors, it is easier to demonstrate principles
of reward with rodents. Imagine a rat who has been denied
nourishment and is growing hungry. Providing it with highly
palatable food will reduce the pangs of physical deprivation,
which is negative reinforcement (Loewenstein, 1996;Tiggemann
and Kemps, 2005). This food also provides an immediate
positive reinforcement as it stimulates sensory responses that
activate neural pleasure centers. If the food was acquired
by pressing a lever (a muscular movement) this behavior
will be highly reinforced (Skinner, 1938). Consequently, the
rodent will continue to press the lever many times. Under
conditions of severe hunger, this rodent will be motivated
to contract its musculature with greater intensity (Salamone
and Correa, 2002;Scheurink et al., 2010) in the effort to
counter the aversive stimulus of hunger and in anticipation
of a pleasurable reward. Such principles apply to humans as
well. In neuroeconomics, the strength, persistence and vigor
of muscular movements is considered a key predictor of what
individuals value, find rewarding and prefer in their everyday
choices (Shadmehr and Ahmed, 2020).
However, pressing a lever, like any type of physical activity,
cannot be repeated indefinitely (Niv, 2007). The metabolic cost
of movement (e.g., lactate) eventually sets in, resulting in painful
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and punishing sensations (O’Connor and Cook, 1999;Ekkekakis,
2013;Stults-Kolehmainen et al., 2016). Indeed, with growing
fatigue, the punishment of movement becomes more aversive
than hunger. Hence, movement is stopped, and rest occurs,
which is yet another example of negative reinforcement as the
cessation of muscular movement removes the negative stimulus.
In this illustration, movement is merely instrumental (Salamone
and Correa, 2002;Reiss, 2004); it is completed to acquire an
outside source of reward (food) and remove hunger while
avoiding excessive fatigue. Thus, from a behaviorist perspective,
movement itself is not the source of pleasurable sensations, but it
may be a source of considerable aversive sensations.
Is it possible that the act of movement itself may result in
positive reinforcement? Many species will run purely for the
sake of moving (Skinner and Morse, 1958;Garland et al., 2011;
Roberts et al., 2012) and will even press a bar repeatedly to gain
access to a running wheel (Collier and Hirsch, 1971;Belke and
Pierce, 2014). However, it is debatable whether movement itself
is naturally reinforcing in humans (Schultheiss and Wirth, 2008;
Garland et al., 2011). Based on their empirical evidence, Cacioppo
et al. (1993),Cabanac (2006a,b), and others (e.g., Schultheiss
and Wirth, 2008) have argued that muscular movement must
be reinforcing because it is the primary method of acquisition
and consumption of many pleasurable stimuli, repeated many
times over one’s life. In short, where movement is useful it must
also be pleasant and wanted, at least occasionally. Furthermore,
some human behaviors are fundamentally motivated even when
there is no specific reward associated with them, such as
exploration, perhaps because of the occasional discovery of
a pleasurable, unconditioned stimulus (Schultheiss and Wirth,
2008). The extent to which these arguments are valid in a
modern world, where machines can do both our labor and
exploration, is uncertain. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted
that voluntary physical activity may be agreeable (Garland et al.,
2011;Boecker and Dishman, 2013), and there is an abundance
of observations that some individuals even frolic, particularly
children (Panksepp, 2006). That is, they move with joy and
exuberance (Frijda, 1987;Panksepp, 2006).
In regards to structured exercise, the largest body of human
research has centered on the potential of exercise to provide
both immediate (mood and enjoyment) and delayed (body
image) positive reinforcements, both directly and indirectly (e.g.,
social interactions) (Ekkekakis, 2013). Exercise increases vigor
and feelings of positive well-being in both normal and clinical
populations (Bartholomew et al., 2005). The phenomenon of a
“runner’s high,” a state of euphoria during or following endurance
exercise, is linked to opioid binding in prefrontal/orbitofrontal
cortices of the brain (Dietrich and McDaniel, 2004;Boecker
and Dishman, 2013). Exercise of almost any modality provides
enhancements in affective tone, particularly during moderate
intensity exercise and in the rebound period after strenuous
exercise (Ekkekakis et al., 2011;Ekkekakis, 2013). Variability
in feelings of pleasure during exercise (but not afterward) is a
predictor of adherence to exercise programming (Williams et al.,
2008;Rhodes and Kates, 2015), which seems to indicate that for
some individuals, physical activity is rewarding and reinforcing
for future behavior. Some individuals even “like it vigorous,” in
other words, prefer a high level of intensity for their exercise
(Ekkekakis et al., 2005) and find meaning and pleasure in the face
of displeasure. Collectively, enjoyment, intrinsic motivation and
affective attitudes about exercise appear to be key mediators in
the relationship between affective responses to exercise and future
activity behavior (Rhodes and Kates, 2015).
Physical Activity as a Negative Reinforcer
Movement is motivated not only by the optimization of pleasure,
but by reducing displeasure (Cabanac, 2006a). What is lacking
in the extant literature, however, is a thorough consideration
of physical activity as a negative reinforcer – that movement
may serve to alleviate tension (Williams and Evans, 2014). Some
research exists concerning the relief of negative affective states
(i.e., poor mood and distress) (Salmon, 2001;Stults-Kolehmainen
and Sinha, 2014) and reduction in pain sensation (e.g., exercise-
induced analgesia) (Bartholomew et al., 1996). However, these
mood states have largely been considered as arising from an
external source (e.g., work stress, social anxiety, etc.). That is,
the activity itself is not tied to the source of negative mood. In
these cases, exercise is no more or less effective than other means
to improve mood (Thayer et al., 1994). As such, exercise is a
choice no more compelling than relaxation practices, alcohol use,
distraction (e.g., TV), and other forms of stress coping (Ingledew
et al., 1996;Endrighi et al., 2016).
However, might it be that some of these negative states may
be derived from the lack of physical activity? That is, could
there be a drive for physical activity that requires some degree
of activity to satisfy the need (Collier, 1970;Feige, 1976;Reiss,
2004;Schultheiss and Wirth, 2008;de Geus and de Moor,
2011;Kalupahana et al., 2011)? One might propose that all
humans are “hard wired” for movement for: (a) instrumental
reasons (e.g., foraging for food, seeking and building shelter,
etc.), (b) for play, which helps to develop physical traits, develop
social skills and improve affective tone (Panksepp, 2006), (c)
for seeking out rewards, novel stimuli and new experiences
(Schultheiss and Wirth, 2008;Panksepp and Biven, 2012;Frijda,
2016), (d) for acquisition and processing of information (Parker
et al., 2020) and other reasons (Cabanac, 2006a,b). Aristotle
concluded that desires to move and rest are the drivers
which “prick” these behaviors in the moments before they are
initiated (Aristotle; Shields, 2016;Nascimento, 2017). Other early
literature [summarized by Ekkekakis (2013)] noted that humans
have an “inherent propensity” or “drive for activity,” a need for
stimulation or “susceptibility.” Many people even prefer electric
shocks over total solitude (Wilson et al., 2014). More pertinently,
these drives are felt as a “necessity of body exercise,” “volitional
promptings” (Bain, 1855;Baldwin, 1891, 1894;Shirley, 1929;
Hill, 1956;Finger and Mook, 1971) or tension, perhaps similar
to appetite (Loewenstein, 1996;Rowland, 1998;Ferreira et al.,
2006). Particularly under restrained conditions (i.e., prolonged
sitting) humans feel “intense uneasiness or craving” or “pressing
readiness.” Over 100 years ago, Williams James related the case
of a girl that had a “morbid impulse” causing her to “walk, walk,
walk” (James, 1907).
Almost anyone can identify with the discomfort of sitting
for prolonged periods, feelings of being antsy, jittery, squirmy,
restless and/or fidgety, and the relief provided by movement
(Levine et al., 2005). Several slang terms are also associated
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with similar conditions and feelings, including being “cooped
up,” “stir crazy,” or having “cabin fever.” Those with low back
pain disorders fidget and shift their bodies, sometimes multiple
times every minute, in order to relieve pressure and avoid pain
(Dunk and Callaghan, 2010). However, systematic evidence for
these behaviors are lacking in the current human literature. In
research in the post-behaviorism era, such aversive sensations are
generally linked to a limited number of phenomena, including
urges associated with Restless Leg Syndrome (Garcia-Borreguero
et al., 2011), akathisia (characterized by a compelling need
to be in constant motion) (Iqbal et al., 2007), hyperactivity
(Willerman, 1973;Scheurink et al., 2010), anorexia (Davis and
Woodside, 2002;Scheurink et al., 2010), forced bed rest (Ishizaki
et al., 2002), loss of playtime/recess (Jarrett et al., 1998), sudden
decline in one’s usual exercise routine (Mondin et al., 1996), and
exercise dependence/addiction (Hausenblas and Downs, 2002;
Ferreira et al., 2006). Consequently, urges to move are well-
documented in situations where such sensations are bothersome
and unproductive.
Processes of Wanting
An alternative framework for understanding wants/desires for
physical activity and rest is the incentive sensitization model
(ISM) of rewarding behaviors (Robinson and Berridge, 1993;
Berridge and Robinson, 1998;Roemmich et al., 2008;Boecker
and Dishman, 2013). For any given pleasurable stimulus, the
ISM proposes that there is both a hedonic like and an appetitive
(motivational) want (Smith and Berridge, 2007), which vary in
intensity from transient desires to cravings or urges. Likes and
wants are typically tightly linked (as in the case of food or drugs),
but these constructs differ in several important ways. First, there
is evidence that they are controlled by different neurobiological
systems – opiod for likes and dopaminergic for wants (Roemmich
et al., 2008;Boecker and Dishman, 2013). Furthermore, likes
and wants may become completely uncoupled, whereas in
certain situations one may want to perform a particular behavior
without necessarily liking it. For physical activity, this is most
clearly relevant in the case of exercise dependence/addiction,
in which individuals feel compelled to engage in physical
activity even when it comes at great costs and is not enjoyable
(Hausenblas and Downs, 2002;Ferreira et al., 2006).
The ISM also describes processes of wanting, including
the prediction of when wants and desires may be whetted
(stimulated), consummated and satiated. Wants are triggered
by salient cues (irrespective of rewards), such as interoceptive
sensations of tension, which may be amplified under conditions
of physiological deprivation. In the case of physical activity, an
example might be prolonged periods of unaccustomed sitting.
Cues may also activate mental networks of associations (memory)
to elicit urges (Rhodes et al., 2019). Furthermore, individuals
become more sensitive to a reinforcing stimulus as it is repeated,
causing the stimulus to be more salient and more attractive,
leading to wanting the stimulus more. Flack et al. (2019a,b)
have investigated exercise protocols lasting 3 months under this
paradigm, and found that more frequent exercise, or exercise with
more total volume (i.e., 300 kcal/day, 5 days/week) can increase
the relative reinforcing value of exercise compared to sedentary
activities in a group of untrained and overweight individuals. It
is unknown if physical activity, outside of exercise, can become
more rewarding and salient with repeated exposure, particularly
for those who are typically inactive.
The ISM model has several drawbacks. First, it was developed
in examination of rewarding substances like food or drugs.
However, physical activity may differ from these substances
in that: (a) the latter emanate from external sources, (b)
consumption is highly tied, at least initially, to the experience of
pleasure, while physical activity may not be, (c) they are subject
to scarcity while movement typically is not and (d) movement
is required for the acquisition of the former. Moreover, given
the great utility of movement, it must be accomplished in
day-to-day life, and thus is likely wanted, even if is not
necessarily liked (Cabanac, 2006a,b). Consequently, liking and
wanting of physical activity may be loosely coupled for most
of the population. Lastly, this model underplays the role of
affect, which is discordant from the well-established literature
describing relationships between movement and emotion (Stults-
Kolehmainen and Sinha, 2014;Ridderinkhof, 2017;Williams
et al., 2019). Despite these downsides, the ISM model is valuable
in emphasizing the importance of craving as an intermediary
state prior to action, representing motivation and intent.
Self-Determination Theory
In the view of Roberts (2012), the aforementioned theories of
drive and behaviorism are “deterministic and mechanistic,” which
“view humans as being passive.” Organismic theories, like Self-
Determination Theory (SDT), and more specifically, the sub-
theory of organismic integration theory, integrate and expand on
the concept of human needs and drives, consider the person’s
goals and feelings and evaluate the person in a social context
(Deci and Ryan, 2000). The three basic psychological needs
are competence, autonomy, and sense of relatedness. However,
Deci and Ryan (1985) state that self-determination itself is the
“capacity or fundamental need to choose and to have choices,
rather than reinforcement contingencies, drives, or any other
forces or pressures be the determinants of one’s actions.” People
who are self-determined act upon fully internalized motivations,
categorized into three distinct drives: intrinsic motivation to
know, to accomplish and to experience stimulation (Vallerand
et al., 1989;Vallerand, 1997). Performing movement for its own
sake and for its enjoyment is considered intrinsic motivation
(Reiss, 2004;Rhodes et al., 2019). Moreover, intrinsic motives
can exert a powerful and long-lasting influence on exercise
behaviors (Teixeira et al., 2012). Williams and Evans (2014)
explicitly distinguish between sources of motivation (e.g., to
experience stimulation) versus the affective charge attached to
a motivation state. They conclude that, “intrinsic motivation
is typically an affectively-charged motivation state that involves
either craving/desire or fear”; however, they also recognize that
movement is accomplished in the absence of strong desire.
According to SDT, behavior is also influenced by extrinsic
motives, such as tangible rewards (e.g., trophies), or wanting
to be someone specific (e.g., a highly competitive athlete),
which are farther down on the continuum of self-determination.
Nevertheless, these also can result in strong desires, as in the case
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of having a strong, affectively-charged desire to perform sport
because it is expected to result in strong social approval and
the admiration of others (Williams and Evans, 2014). Ostensibly,
one might have multiples desires at the same time, such as a
desire for a reward (extrinsic) and a desire for movement itself
(intrinsic). In this case, however, movement might be merely
instrumental and secondary to the more pressing desire (Reiss,
2004). Amotivation, on the other hand, is a state of no motivation,
or a near-total lack of desire or drive to perform a behavior.
Consequently, SDT appears to be a complimentary theory, likely
concordant with the idea of wants or urges for movement,
that could be gleaned for information on how to broaden and
categorize these desires.
Dual Process Theories
Affect and Health Behavior Framework (AHBF)
The AHBF (Williams and Evans, 2014) outlines a dual process
model in which learned automatic (unconscious) associations
(A-system) and reflective/deliberative processes (R-system) work
in concert to propel health-related behavior (Strack and
Deutsch, 2004). In this model, “wanting” is considered automatic
motivation as part of the A-system, along with the opposite
construct, dread. Dread is a concept related to the emotion
of fear – a motivational force that propels a person to move
away from or avoid an aversive stimulus (Kringelbach and
Kent, 2016). Williams and Evans (2014) distinguish these from
desires, cravings and fear, which they label as affectively-charged
motivation (Kavanagh et al., 2005). These are the product of
conflict between automatic impulses (e.g., wanting and dread)
and reflective intentions and goals (R-system) (Williams and
Evans, 2014). Despite these divisions between desire, craving and
wanting in their model, the authors seem to also categorize the
former two as part of wanting and all of these, together with dread
and fear, as part of affectively-charged motivation states (ACMS).
The model provides an understanding, though incomplete,
of how an individual might have motivation states for physical
activity. They note that, “people typically crave/desire what they
previously had a positive affective response to,” which would
seem to include physical activity. However, they later explain that
these factors are typically only implicated with the experience of
highly palatable food, sex, drugs, etc. (Williams and Evans, 2014).
Physical activity is not considered a source of cravings/desire,
but rather it is largely seen as a source of dread. In the
example they provide, exercise is frequently and automatically
associated with fatigue and pain, thus resulting in aversion as
the automatic motivation. This restraining force may come into
conflict, however, with a long-term intention of going outside
to run. Whether an exercise action prevails is also influenced
by competing behaviors (e.g., watching TV) and one’s current
mood state and mental stress (Stults-Kolehmainen and Sinha,
2014). Despite some lack of clarity in this model, it provides an
important advancement in the exploration of desires and cravings
in physical activity research.
Williams et al. (2019) later revamped and extended the
AHBF in their integrated framework (IF or AHBF-IF). Several
improvements are observed in this model. First, it more clearly
structures the relationships of all included factors, with paths
starting with affect proper (specific mood and emotions),
leading to motivation states and ending with behavior. It
highlights the role that incidental affect can have on physical
activity behavior (Lutz et al., 2010). Second, they collectively
categorize wanting, desire, dread and aversion, so as to avoid
the arbitrary divisions between these factors seen in the previous
model. However, they relabel them as “hedonic motivation”
as opposed to affectively-charged motivation states. A third
strength of this revised model is that one can clearly delineate
both the antecedents of affectively-charged motivation states
(e.g., desires/urges) as well as their influence on behavior.
Affectively-charged motivation states are seen in this model as
proximally mediating the relationship between affect processing
and behavior. As with other models discussed below, there is both
an automatic and a reflective pathway, with affective processing
and motivational processes occurring in both paths. Thus,
the model supports goal-directed and purposeful motivation.
Based on these improvements, more testable hypotheses may
be formulated, and it is easier to generate examples of how
desires might work in the real world. For instance, experiences
of post-exercise affect (e.g., post-run euphoria) could result in
an automatic association of running with pleasure. Anticipating
this response again could lead to desires to run at another
opportunity. On the other hand, the experience of inordinate
work stress (incidental affect), resulting in poor mood, might
activate automatic associations of exercise and excessive fatigue,
resulting in an aversion to exercise, which squelches physical
activity (Stults-Kolehmainen and Sinha, 2014). Overall, the
AHBF-IF is an improved multi-factor model explaining how
desires/urges may be generated and result in some movement
behaviors – i.e., exercise.
Despite improvements, the AHBF-IF still has several
limitations. A continued drawback with this model is that it is
not specific to physical activity but generalized to all intentional
health behaviors (e.g., smoking). Also, when considering physical
activity, the models primarily seek to explain purposeful,
structured exercise behavior, and it’s not clear if the model can
explain the greater spectrum of physically active behaviors (i.e.,
task-specific movement, spontaneous movement, fidgeting).
More significantly, cravings or desires specifically for movement
are not considered in this model even though it opens the
possibility that these exist. Because of the simplification
and recategorization of affectively-charged motivation states
(“hedonic motivation”), there remains ambiguity in the
interaction between desires and dread for exercise behaviors.
Furthermore, the model lacks a clear articulation on the role of
restraining forces, such as the need or urge for rest and how these
conflicts occur in the moment (Frijda, 2010). Finally, the model
does not provide an explanation for how affectively-charged
motivation states, such as desires, interact with goals and
intentions.
Affective-Reflective Theory of Physical Inactivity and
Exercise (ART)
Several recent dual process models have focused specifically on
exercise behavior, such as the Affective Reflective Theory of
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physical inactivity and exercise (ART) from Brand and Ekkekakis
(2018) and a similar model from Conroy and Berry (2017). These
authors similarly hypothesize that movement is the product of the
interplay between two systems: a type-1 automatic process and a
type-2 process for reflective valuation (Conroy and Berry, 2017;
Brand and Ekkekakis, 2018). They describe the conflict between
an actual state and “desired state” (i.e., exercising) due to driving
forces and restraining forces, as similar to the concept of tension
systems from Lewin (1951). In their model, an exercise stimulus
elicits a spontaneous affective response (i.e., pleasure/displeasure
associated with the activity) through type-1 processing, resulting
in an action impulse. Following this, slower type-2 processing
is used to reflectively generate an action plan. The combination
of the type-1 action impulse and type-2 action plan results
in physical activity behavior. However, discordance can exist
between the action impulse and the action plan. An example of
this would be when a seated individual is exposed to an exercise
stimulus (e.g., sees a person running), and immediately associates
it with an aversive state (e.g., running is tiring – which is bad),
which prompts the individual to remain sedentary. At this time,
however, the individual also thinks about her/his doctor’s advice
to exercise more frequently. In this case, Brand and Ekkekakis
(2018) propose that the behavior that will follow depends on the
availability of self-control resources, where a greater availability
will result in the execution of the action plan (i.e., go exercise)
instead of the action impulse to be sedentary.
There are limitations with the models from Brand and
Ekkekakis (2018) and Conroy and Berry (2017). The first is that
the concept of the action impulse is poorly defined, but seems
to relate to a variety of other concepts, including: (a) Lewin’s
description of psychic tension (Marrow et al., 1969), (b) the
“prick” that was described by Aristotle (Aristotle; Shields, 2016;
Nascimento, 2017), (c) the concept of “wants” as defined in
motor control (Libet et al., 1983;Desmurget and Sirigu, 2012)
or (d) it may be interchangeable with the concepts of states
of action readiness (SOAR), action tendency (McDougall, 1933;
Frijda, 1987;Frijda et al., 1989;Strack and Deutsch, 2004),
activation states or a “specific motive state” in the description of
impulsive action (Frijda et al., 1989, 2014;Frijda, 2010;Frijda,
2016). Nevertheless, the authors note that, “core affective valence
may have a direct, immediate impact on behavior through
behavioral urges” (Brand and Ekkekakis, 2018). The second
problem is that this theory was created to explain the complex
behaviors of exercise and regimented physical activities – as
opposed to the greater spectrum of physically active behaviors,
including spontaneous physical activity (Levine et al., 2005).
The third issue is that the model represents sedentary behaviors
as typically contrasting with physical activity; restraining forces
pulling against propelling forces to alternate from one behavior
to the other (e.g., flipping a single switch). However, rest
and activity may not be in direct opposition. Instead, there
may be restraining and propelling forces for both rest and
movement acting simultaneously (e.g., two separate switches, or
even two dials) (Beeler et al., 2012;Stults-Kolehmainen et al.,
2020). The practical consequence of these limitations relates
to intervening for muscular movement at the moment actions
are being processed and how this might be modified or done
flexibly based on desires for rest as well. Indeed, the purpose
of these dual urges, working in concert, may be to “potentiate
sets of action schemas with equifinality” for adaptive behavioral
flexibility (Frijda, 2010).
Dynamical Model of Desire and Elaborate Intrusion
Theory
Alternative multi-process models specifically highlight the
powerful influences of wants/desires on human behavior.
Hofmann and Van Dillen (2012) and Hofmann et al. (2012a,b)
in their Dynamical Model of Desire draw on a diverse literature,
defining desire as “a psychological state of motivation for a
specific stimulus or experience that is anticipated to be rewarding
[which] may or may not be consciously experienced” (Papies and
Barsalou, 2015). This model also defines two routes by which
desires can influence behavior: (a) an automatic, impulsive and
unconscious route and (b) a route in which desires emerge
into consciousness, become felt (e.g., have a subjective sense
of wanting/feeling wants), interact with working memory and
“hijack” cognitive processing. In the view of Kavanagh et al.
(2005) in their Elaborated Intrusion Theory desire is “an
affectively-charged cognitive event in which an object or activity
that is associated with pleasure or relief of discomfort is in
focal attention. . .it can be referred to as a conscious wish or
urge to gain pleasure, relieve discomfort, or satisfy a want
or to engage in consummatory behavior associated with these
outcomes.” In this model, desire inherently involves cognitive
processing and is often instigated by triggers (i.e., thoughts,
cues, affect, and physical needs) that result in spontaneous,
conscious and intrusive thoughts. Regardless of the definition or
the specific factors in play, Hofmann et al. (2012a) have found
that over 50% of a person’s waking hours are filled with various
desires (Hofmann and Van Dillen, 2012). The most common
desire is that for sleep, but desires abound for many rewarding
stimuli: coffee, leisure, sex, and numerous other activities and
objects (Hofmann et al., 2012b). Desire for muscular exertion
is considered to be one of the most fundamental desires (Reiss,
2004). Unfortunately, only cravings for participation in sport
activities has been systematically investigated (May et al., 2008;
Hofmann et al., 2012a,b). In one exception, Katula et al. (2006)
investigated the desire to be stronger and increase fitness. In this
study, it was found that adding an empowering psychological
intervention to a traditional strength training protocol increased
the desire to gain strength in older adults.
Important Contributions From Motor Control
Up to this point, there has been little clarity on the issue of
“action impulse” or “action readiness” and how they relate to the
initiation of and wants for movement. Research in motor control
appears to address this gap most adequately by investigating
wants (e.g., often referred to as “intentions”) and urges at the
level of simple movements (e.g., standing up, moving a finger).
This work began with Libet et al. (1983), who asked participants
to remember the moment they became aware of their want
to move. This study was ground-breaking at the time because
the data demonstrated that individuals’ neural preparation for
movement (i.e., readiness potential) occurred before they became
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consciously aware of their want/intention to move. Matsuhashi
and Hallett (2008) improved on flaws in Libet’s original study
design and found that the intention to move goes through
multiple layers of awareness and enters consciousness 1.42 s
prior to actual movement initiation. The authors also found
evidence of a “point of no return,” which occurs when the
want/intention to move cannot be vetoed- an urge. Wants for
movement have a neurophysiological basis and seem to originate
in the supplementary motor cortex (SMA), pre-SMA, posterior
parietal cortex (PPC), pre-motor area, motor cortex, intraparietal
sulcus, and in the insular cortex (Lau et al., 2004;Fried et al., 2011;
Desmurget and Sirigu, 2012;Li et al., 2015). Neuronal activity in
the SMA precedes the conscious awareness of wanting/intention
to move by 700 ms and predicts it with 80% accuracy (Fried
et al., 2011). Furthermore, Desmurget and Sirigu (2012) found
that the inferior parietal lobule is responsible for the preparatory
“wanting to move,” while the mesial precentral area is responsible
for the more powerful “urge to move.”. Collectively, the readiness
potential and/or the conscious awareness of wanting to move
might be referred to as the “action impulse.”
Defining, Categorizing and Describing
Desires/Urges to Move and Rest
Based on a multitude of evidence, it is apparent at this
juncture that desires/cravings for movement exist, but progress
is still impeded by a lack of conceptual organization and
instrumentation. The first issue is the abundance of related,
yet distinctive, terminology – including the nomenclature above
but also terms from Frijda and colleagues work on states of
action readiness (SOAR), such as motor intention, longing,
striving, “current concerns,” action tendency, urgency, control
precedence, awareness of action readiness and “non-overt
inclination” (Klinger, 1987;Strack and Deutsch, 2004;Pacherie,
2005;Elster, 2009;Frijda et al., 2014;Frijda, 2016;Ridderinkhof,
2017). Part of the confusion seems to stem from considerations
of motivations states [e.g., urgency (Elster, 2009)], processes [e.g.,
“wanting,” (Berridge and Robinson, 1998)] and distinct, concrete
felt perceptions and other unfelt forces (a“want”, an “urge”).
To tackle this issue, the concepts of wants, desires, appetence,
groove and the action impulse (i.e., action readiness) were all
plotted on a field distinguishing them by apparent differences
in valence (negative or positive tension) and their specificity to
movement (see Figure 1). The concept of groove, for instance,
is specific to a felt need to move, and is ostensibly conceived as
a positive force or tension (Matthews et al., 2019). It is highly
contextual to the influence of music, however. Urges to move,
most cited in work on Restless Legs Syndrome, are highly specific
in this context to muscular movement but are clearly gauged as
a negative tension. Patients with Restless Leg Syndrome, other
variants such as Restless Arm or Mouth Syndrome, and Tourette’s
Syndrome report pressing, involuntary and bothersome urges
to move and/or stretch that are often temporarily suppressed
but eventually released (Cavanna and Nani, 2013;Jung et al.,
2017;Ruppert, 2019). Appetence is highly specific to movement,
but neutral in feeling in the same sense that appetite may
be either present or lacking but distinct from the pangs of
hunger (Ferreira et al., 2006). Wants have also been highly related
to movement in the motor control literature, but usually are
considered neutral in valence. Desires, on the other hand, have
lacked specificity to movement and rest and have a positive
connotation. Finally, it must be considered that constructs such
as desire and want, while in this context highly concrete (e.g., they
are discrete, observable and measurable) are typically used in a
much more abstract and conditional sense (e.g., she wants to go
for a walk after work). This makes completing literature reviews
in the area difficult because keyword searches result in tens of
thousands of irrelevant returns.
As mentioned above, there is a question about how
desires/wants to move relate to desires for contrasting behaviors,
such as being sedentary or resting. Thus far, the focus has
been on motivation states for movement, but special attention
is needed to elucidate whether rest-related wants should be
conceived as a restraining force acting simply against movement
or a separate dimension of wants interacting flexibly with those
to move. In his early work, Frijda (Frijda, 1987;Frijda et al.,
1989) characterized rest as a state involving an “absence of action
readiness,” a feeling of not needing to do anything, rather than
a separate dimension or system. However, there is reason to
believe that rest and movement wants/urges operate in separate
planes/continua and are not opposite ends of the same axis.
First, as indicated above, other researchers have separated these
into distinct desires, asking respondents to report whether they
want to sleep, or rest or engage in movement activities (Reiss,
2004;Hofmann et al., 2012a,b). Indeed, sleep likely has its own
drive (Hull, 1943). Second, such conceptualization of desires
and rest as separate factors was demonstrated by a recent factor
analysis (Stults-Kolehmainen et al., 2020). Finally, the idea of
separate systems for rest and movement desires seems to be
concordant with other similar work describing separate “go”
and “no-go” (Beeler et al., 2012) and appetitive versus defensive
systems (Frijda, 2010;Lang and Bradley, 2010). Thus, it appears
reasonable that one can approach or avoid both desires for
rest and movement separately (Frijda, 2010). In other words,
rest and movement desires together do not correspond to a
unidimensional approach/avoidance for movement.
Conversely, it is proposed that there is approach/avoidance
orientation for each system (rest and move) which corresponds
to wants and aversions for each action (Cacioppo et al., 1993).
These forces, in turn, vary by strength as well. One might consider
the concept of dread as being more than the intense lack of
urge to be in a state of movement/rest (i.e., a 0-point) but also
an active avoidance of those states (Williams and Evans, 2014;
Kringelbach and Kent, 2016). For instance, those with chronic
low back pain and/or kinesiophobia exhibit fear and dread of
movement and make attempts to actively avoid it, when possible,
to prevent painful sensations (Barke et al., 2012). Consequently,
it appears that a dimension of avoidance/approach, each of
which varies by magnitude or level of activation/deactivation,
is more appropriate than categorizing them by negative/positive
valence (Watson et al., 1999;Rosenberg, 2009;Kemps et al., 2013;
Williams et al., 2019). Furthermore, wants/desires, while typically
affectively-charged, are independent from emotion (Kavanagh
et al., 2005;Williams and Evans, 2014;Williams et al., 2019).
In contrast, wants/desires appear to often be triggered by and
result in various emotion states (Frijda et al., 1989). Regarding
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FIGURE 1 | Venn diagram illustration of some affectively-charged motivation states (ACMS; urges, wants, appetence, groove, desires, and action impulses) as they
vary by specificity to muscular movement and valence of the tension. Some concepts originated with movement (i.e., groove and appetence) while others are
generally applicable to a multitude of reinforceable behaviors. Circle size denotes degree to which the state covers multiple quadrants. Thickness of circle line
denotes prevalence of theme in current literature. [Not all ACMS constructs are included].
magnitude, desires/wants ostensibly can range from very weak
to very strong. In motor control, strong wants are labeled
as “urges,” and importantly, urges are closer to the actual
manifestation of movement than wants (Desmurget and Sirigu,
2012). Figure 2 provides an intermediary categorization how
wants, desires, urges and cravings, the most described motivation
states, might be conceptually organized to explain movement and
rest behaviors. It explicitly divides move and rest wants/urges
into separate categorizations. A substantial shortcoming of the
simple categorization of motivation states in Figure 2 is that it
does not consider how desires for rest and movement can interact
to produce flexible and adaptive behavior.
The WANT Model
How desires to move and rest interact might be best visualized
in an orthogonal perspective. Given the logic above outlining
separate dimensions or systems for move and rest, it’s proposed
that one might occasionally occupy conditions in which one is
high in both desires to move and rest – as well as low in both.
The same may be true for avoidance orientation (e.g., high in the
need to avoid both movement and rest, i.e., dread) (Jean-Richard-
dit-Bressel et al., 2019). Figure 3 plots the WANT (Wants and
Aversions for Neuromuscular Tasks) model. This is a descriptive,
circumplex model (Guttman, 1954;Acton and Revelle, 2002) of
affectively-charged motivation states (i.e., ACMS; desire, urges,
aversions and dread) to move and rest, the continua of which are
positioned orthogonally from each other. Importantly, and unlike
other models, both desire and dread are modeled on the same
continuum as opposed to being separate constructs (Williams
and Evans, 2014;Williams et al., 2019).
The WANT model was designed to plot, categorize, and
help to describe potential situations in which desires/urges to
move/rest may occur, as well as associated emotional phenomena
that may be generated in those circumstances. For instance,
simultaneously experiencing very high rest and very high move
wants/urges might occur in situations, such as: (a) having just
won a competition and wanting to celebrate, but also being
physically exhausted, (b) being torn between the need to workout
or rest/have a meal, (c) suddenly becoming injured in the
middle of competition, (d) overtraining, or other situations in
which one might feel conflicted. Being low in both move and
rest wants/urges, conversely, would be closer to the intercept
of these axes, a state of deactivation that might be similar to
a state of depression (Frijda, 2016) or possibly a meditative
state of mindfulness and stillness. The WANT model also
delineates avoidant motivation states characterized by feelings of
not wanting to rest to move (diswants), in other words, having
an aversion or dread. Relevant emotional outcomes in these
quadrants include a variety of stressor states, like fight or flight
(Frijda et al., 1989). Conversely, one might experience freezing
behavior in the face of danger, which might be characterized as
motivational states high in dread for both movement and rest
(Frijda, 2016). Frijda (2016) argues that in such situations, there is
no action readiness and individuals face “motivational null states”
because “no meaningful action can be conceived.”
The WANT model incorporates several advances. First, it
explicitly describes affectively-charged motivation states (ACMS)
along several dimensions: (a) move vs. rest axes, (b) approach
(desire/urge) vs. avoidance (aversion/dread) orientation and (c)
relative strength of desire (inner vs. outer circle symbolizing want
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FIGURE 2 | Want/urge motivation states specific to the domains of movement and inactivity behaviors: Approach/avoidance orientation vs. Intensity. This is a simple
categorical model preceding the model described in Figure 3. *Singular and plural for impulses of dread (multiple instances of dread).
FIGURE 3 | Wants and aversions in neuromuscular tasks (WANT) circumplex model of affectively-charged motivation states (ACMS, i.e., wants, urges, aversions,
and dread) to move and rest. Interactions between these factors are associated with a variety of situations, emotions, and psychological phenomena.
vs. urge strength) with a 0 point and a hypothetical maximum.
This allows the reader to determine relations more easily among
variables. There is also predictive value to this taxonomy. As
suggestive above, a score high in move and low in rest might
be predictive of a highly energized state of action readiness for
action. Frijda (1987) describes excitement as “impulse toward
restless movement, with frequent changes in direction” and not
being able to sit still (Frijda et al., 1989). Likewise, exuberance
is “impulse toward enhanced movement scope and movement
abundance” with those selecting this emotion reporting, “I
wanted to move, be exuberant, sing, jump, undertake things”
(Frijda, 1987;Frijda et al., 1989). Therefore, the model permits
categorization of various situations, emotions and feelings as
described above by quadrant (e.g., high move/low rest; high
move/high rest). One can also map transitions, both sudden and
gradual, in move/rest desires and placement in “fuzzy” situations
(e.g., feeling really tired but also relying on one’s body to get home
after work) (Guttman, 1954;Acton and Revelle, 2002).
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The utility of the WANT model to help formulate testable
hypotheses or predict future states or behaviors is yet to be
determined. How specific desires/urges (or combination of
desires) interact with other factors to ultimately drive behavior
is not modeled. Pacherie (2005),Frijda et al. (2014), and Frijda
(2016) point to the fact that desires and states of action readiness
(SOAR) do not absolutely determine behavior. Rather, desires
are highly flexible in their behavioral outcome since many
different actions can result from the consummation (or not)
of desire (Frijda, 2016). Such flexibility is likely advantageous
and adaptive. This being said, the relative strength of competing
urges plays a part in behavioral choice (Hofmann et al., 2012a,b).
Deliberative factors also can act on specific desires to enhance
or minimize their impact (Hofmann et al., 2015). Lewin’s force
field analysis seems to suggest that a multitude of forces work
in tandem to help an individual achieve a state of equilibrium
(Marrow et al., 1969;Brand and Ekkekakis, 2018), and this
varies by a variety of individual needs, motives and situational
factors which are beyond the scope of this model to include.
From a neuropsychological perspective, how one behaves might
primarily be a function of dopamine regulation, as in the “go”
and “no go” model (Beeler et al., 2012). While the WANT model
is not high in predictive value, it is intended to be helpful for
understanding the nature of desires/urges, which is needed before
adequate path models can be created.
Future Research
Research on desires or urges to move and rest is still in formation,
and many avenues of research exist to realize its potential. To
move forward, the following 10 areas should be considered.
(1) While some progress has been made in defining desires and
urges, how they relate to each other, and how they may
influence physically active or sedentary behaviors, there are
no systematic literature reviews in this area of inquiry.
(2) The fundamental nature and descriptive quality of
desires/urges to move still needs clarification. One basic
issue relates to conscious awareness of desires/urges to
move and how they are experienced or felt (Frijda et al.,
1989;Hofmann et al., 2015). Are they felt as positive or
negative, intrusive, and/or unwanted? Do they vary from
young to old age? How frequently do they occur and how
quickly can they change (Gernigon et al., 2004)? Are they
more prominent during the acquisition or solidification
of physical activity habits (Clear, 2018;Greenwood and
Fleshner, 2019)?
(3) The WANT model (Figure 3), describing the orthogonal
nature of desires to move and rest needs testing and
empirical validation (Acton and Revelle, 2002), the
beginning of which is described in a recent paper (Stults-
Kolehmainen et al., 2020). One drawback is that the model
does not explicitly include an additional dimension of
affect (e.g., pleasure/displeasure), chronicity (i.e., a single
urge versus constant craving), or effect on motor behavior,
which may necessitate refinements of the model.
(4) Is there a threshold of want/urge magnitude to initiate
movement, as suggested by the motor control research
(Desmurget and Sirigu, 2012), and how does this relate
to conscious awareness of the desire or urge (Libet
et al., 1983)? The definition of “maximum” should also
be clarified, whether that is defined psychometrically
(e.g., feel “more than ever”), cognitively (i.e., the urge
dominates thoughts) or behaviorally (e.g., motor actions
have been initiated).
(5) There is an obvious lack of a model, specific to movement
and rest, to expound on the antecedents of desire and the
varying impact on behavior, which could help to create
testable hypotheses for future investigations. Such a model
would be best fashioned in light of the multiple disciplines
that have a shared interest in desires/urges to move, such
as exercise psychology, motor control, clinical medicine
and psychiatry (Hausenblas and Downs, 2002;Ferreira
et al., 2006;Iqbal et al., 2007;Garcia-Borreguero et al.,
2011;Desmurget and Sirigu, 2012;Williams and Evans,
2014). Another possibility is that models, such as AHBF
(Williams et al., 2019), could be slightly modified based on
the observances from the WANT model (Figure 3). Such
a model may consider the bi-directional nature of wants
and urges with affect, emotion and mood. Can unsatisfied
and unremitting urges and cravings exponentiate through
worsening mood in a cyclic fashion? Understanding the
complex relationships between these factors has significant
implications for movement-based interventions.
(6) The processes primarily described here predominantly
relate to automatic and impulsive processes, but much
needs to be done to formulate how desires/urges interact
with deliberative (reflective) processes. Certainly, impulses
can be overridden by higher order cognition (e.g., goals)
(Stults-Kolehmainen et al., 2020) and desires can
relate directly to goals (Gernigon et al., 2004). Feige
(1976) suggests that motivation for physical activity is a
5-level hierarchy, with drives to be active forming the
foundation and goals and values in the highest level.
These interactions have already been briefly detailed by
theories, such as ART and AHBF, but also by: (a) the
Model of Goal Directed Behavior, in which desires interact
with intentions to pursue a goal (Dholakia, 2015), (b) the
Grounded Theory of Desire and Motivated Behavior,
in which environmental cues can spark memories,
cognitions and mental re-enactments, which generate
desires (Papies et al., 2020), and (c) the Elaborated
Intrusion Theory, in which suppression of desire-
related thoughts can lead to stronger desires (Andrade
et al., 2015). Interactions between desires/urges and
deliberative processes are also prominent in research
on clashes between these constructs, as in work on:
(a) want-“should” conflicts (Bitterly et al., 2015),
(b) goal-desire conflicts (Hofmann et al., 2015), and
(c) desires, reasoning and self-regulatory failure (deRidder
et al., 2015). To summarize, there appears to be bi-
directional and dynamic relationships between desires
and goals; desires can hijack thoughts, be diminished
by thoughts, work with thoughts toward a goal or
undermine a goal.
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(7) One question yet to be resolved is concerning a hierarchical
typology for desires to move. More specifically, how
do we distinguish between the human need to move
for the sake of movement (primary desires) or simply
to acquire something or accomplish some other task
(secondary desires) (Reiss, 2004)? For instance, it is
a common sensation to feel the urge to move when
needing to urinate (Coyne et al., 2012), but this urge
is secondary to the primary motive. More information
is needed on how wants to move relate to wants for
structured exercise or “working out,” getting stronger,
becoming leaner, etc., whether complimentary or not
(Katula et al., 2006).
(8) Up to this point, there was a lack of validated
instruments to assess desires/urges for movement and
sedentary behavior. However, this gap was just recently
addressed with the creation of the CRAVE (Cravings
for Rest and Volitional Energy Expenditure) scale to
measure desires/wants for movement and sedentary
behavior (Stults-Kolehmainen et al., 2020). This novel
instrument must be further investigated and validated
under different conditions (e.g., prolonged sedentary
behavior, different psychological moods, and different
exercise activities).
(9) Future investigations should also be sensitive to linguistic
and cultural differences. For instance, how desires,
wants, urges and cravings translate in Portuguese
might correspond to the words desejo or vontade
(desire), querere (want), impulso (urge), necessidade
or “
ansia (craving) or even saudades – intense desires
or longings for almost anything that is missing
(Neto and Mullet, 2014).
(10) Utilize the concepts of desires/urges to move to explain
other phenomena of interest. We focus on two examples.
First, desires/urges for movement and rest might
moderate the relationship between psychological stress
and physical activity (Stults-Kolehmainen and Sinha,
2014), which seems to fit within the tenets of the
AHBF-IF model (Williams et al., 2019). Second, the
development of this concept may also be expanded
to inform how energy availability (e.g., overfeeding or
a deficit), and more generally nutrition, affects urges
to move or be sedentary. For instance, a surplus of
calories might result in altered desires to move for
some people, which then may influence variations in
non-exercise activity thermogenesis (NEAT), particularly
spontaneous physical activity (i.e., fidgeting, posture
adjustments) (Levine et al., 1999;Rosenbaum and
Leibel, 2016) and other compensatory behaviors
(King et al., 2007).
Such considerations provide fodder for a multiplicity of
future investigations.
Practical Implications
Understanding the underpinnings that lead to desires/urges
for movement or rest may have vast practical implications in
fields such as exercise science, motor control, performance, and
physical therapy. Unfortunately, up until this time motivation
states for movement were overlooked, considered irrelevant or
categorized as a nuisance factor other than a real point of
possible intervention. For instance, Williams et al. (2019) did
not identify motivation states as a possible route of intervention
in their integrated framework. However, given the potential
stated above it is reasonable to consider methods that can
enhance the desire to move. There are six general approaches
relating to desires and urges: (1) To improve movement wants,
modifying the reward value of exercise by making it less
punishing and/or more pleasurable (increasing the “like”), (2)
varying physical activity and exercise to result in less rapid
satiation of desires, (3) modifying environmental and situational
conditions to either ramp up motivation states to move and/or
possibly dampen motivation states for rest, (4) modulating
psychological attention to these desires so individuals might be
more sensitive/attuned to desires, both noticing them when they
occur and acting on them and (5) “nudging” people in response to
these noticed desires/cravings, particularly with cues (Thaler and
Sunstein, 2008;Hofmann et al., 2015), and (6) taking advantage
of urges/desires for other rewarding behaviors to encourage
development of desires to move. Regarding this last point, some
work is already being done on gamifying movement, making
games contingent on moving (e.g., Pokemon) to increase the
reward value of movement (Kaczmarek et al., 2017).
It seems sensible to start with this approach of modifying
exercise. Can exercise be modulated to make it more rewarding,
and thus result in greater “wants”? Exercise can be modified
to increase enjoyment by focusing on preferences (Stults-
Kolehmainen et al., 2013;Busch et al., 2016) or reduce punishing
aspects of exercise, like avoiding eccentric contractions (Kerksick
et al., 2009) or excessive buildup of lactate and fatigue (e.g.,
minimized with sprint interval training – SIT) (Benitez Flores
et al., 2018;de Sousa et al., 2018). It is likely important to
avoid sudden, large increases in novel physical activities that
result in excessive muscle damage and soreness, which are
associated with decreases in physical activity (Proske, 2005;
Stults-Kolehmainen et al., 2014) and negative shifts in mood
(O’Connor et al., 1991;Stults-Kolehmainen and Bartholomew,
2012). We could also modify conditions to promote desires so
that desires/urges are felt more frequently and/or with greater
intensity. For instance, music often leads to muscular movement
as humans can sense desires to move in response to a beat (i.e.,
groove), and musical cues appear to elicit neural firing (Levitin
et al., 2018). It is likely that humans can even form internal
representations of a beat so that anticipatory movement can
occur in preparation for music, which is coordinated by the
cerebellum, the supplementary motor area and the pre-motor
cortex (Levitin et al., 2018). Motivational videos and other visual
images (i.e., highly fit individuals, major sport feats, etc.) may
also stimulate improved movement motivation and performance
(Barwood et al., 2009;Cope et al., 2018). Environmental
conditions, particularly daylight, can have a significant impact
on levels of physical activity (Tucker and Gilliland, 2007).
While weather cannot be changed, contingency plans can be
put into place to modulate desires to move, and thus behavior,
in response to varying conditions. One might imagine that it
is possible to nearly perfect exercise conditions (e.g., ambient
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lighting, exercise-related imagery, diet, music, social interactions,
acceptable stimulants, like caffeine) to facilitate greater muscular
movement. Undoubtedly, coaches, commercial gyms and others
already engage in such efforts to create attractive environmental
and motivational climates to spur movement and its enjoyment
(Shaulov and Lufi, 2009;Bird and Karageorghis, 2020).
Regarding approach 4, a large literature, starting with Libet
et al. (1983) demonstrates that even healthy and well-functioning
individuals can be trained to pay attention to urges for movement
(Lau et al., 2004). Unfortunately, protocols in these studies have
not been used in attempts to facilitate greater movement but
were designed to investigate the control of movement. Perhaps
simply asking someone about their desires/wants to move
can instigate motivation states for movement. In populations
suffering from addiction or stress, mindfulness meditation has
been used to help individuals sense desires and then “ride the
wave,” interpreting appetitive stimuli as “mere mental events” as
a method to cope with dysfunctional urges (Braun et al., 2012;
Papies et al., 2015, 2020;Jastreboff et al., 2018). In line with
these advances, perhaps a method, such as mindfulness and/or
vivid imagery, could be developed or modified to promote greater
movement (Kavanagh et al., 2005). This might involve generating
desires/urges to move or simply paying attention and “listening”
to them, thus bringing them fully into conscious awareness,
gauging them, and consequently acting or consciously not acting
on them (Devereaux, 2013;Naves-Bittencourt et al., 2015;Stults-
Kolehmainen et al., 2015;Keesman et al., 2016;Renner et al.,
2019;Papies et al., 2020). This approach seems promising but is
still theoretical, and its efficacy is unknown.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that there is a conceptual basis for desires and
urges to motivate human movement and sedentary behavior.
Such understanding is still in its infancy, particularly because
of numerous similar concepts in literatures isolated from each
other and a corresponding lack of coherence in definitions.
Nevertheless, desires and wants for movement appear to be
common constructs across multiple relevant theories. The
current investigation conceptualizes physical activity primarily as
a negative reinforcer. Humans likely have a “need for activity”
that varies in intensity across the population (Rowland, 1998;
de Geus and de Moor, 2011), is not simply a lack of “need
to rest,” and may be felt as tension when unsatisfied. These
salient, internal cues may elicit wants or desires to rest and
move, in other words, fluctuating states of motivation to either
expend energy or be sedentary. In some situations, or for
individuals with certain conditions, desires for activity may be
experienced as urges or even cravings (Ferreira et al., 2006).
This manuscript describes the WANT (Wants and Aversions
for Neuromuscular Tasks) model, a circumplex model of wants
and urges for movement and rest, where these factors are
placed orthogonally. This heuristic might help to inform how
movement and rest wants might be observed in a variety of
situations. Unfortunately, no models specific to movement and
rest exist to explain both how desires are precipitated and exert
influence. Such models should expand beyond the automatic
and impulsive level of processing predominately described in
this manuscript to include interactions between desires/urges
and reflective factors. The AHBF-IF is, perhaps, closest to this
proposed model. Up to this point, instrumentation to measure