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The Political and the Epistemic in the
Twentieth Century: Historical Perspectives
kijan espahangizi, university of zurich, switzerland
monikawulz,ethzurich,switzerland
In 1934, the french philosopher and historian of science
Gaston Bachelard argued that “objectivity cannot be separated
from the social aspects of proof.”
1
With his socialized perspective
on scientific knowledge, Bachelard, along with many others during
this period, questioned the idea of a linear progression toward uni-
versal truths and highlighted the conventional nature of objectivity.
By shifting the focus to the intersubjectivity and social practice of
knowledge production, epistemology converged with social theories.
Moreover, epistemological considerations gained a new, specifically
political, dimension that did not conflate with the notorious rela-
tionship between knowledge and power or the long-standing histor-
ical entanglements between science and politics. When, in the first
half of the twentieth century, modern epistemology began to con-
sider scientific knowledge as an outcome of social interactions, ne-
gotiations, controversies, critique, agreements, values, norms, rup-
tures, and even revolutions, it forced a reevaluation of that knowledge
through the lens of the political. This new perspective was not lim-
ited to a mere understanding of the exchange between scientific
©2020 the university of chicago. all rights reserved. know v4n2, fall 2020
research and its societal environment or of the mundane “external”
interests that entered into scientific research;
2
it was aimed at a
deeper level—how science itself works as a contested social practice.
The new epistemologies thus hinted not only at different political
conceptions of the social condition of knowledge but also at political
theories aimed at specifying the role of knowledge in society.
3
Recent works in political theory emphasize the distinction be-
tween a narrower understanding of politics as a set of institutional-
ized procedures and conventions—including political parties, govern-
mental institutions, and elections—that organize and pacify the contest
of power within a polity and a wider notion of “the political,”which
highlights a broader field of “agonistic”social interactions, which means
the conflicting interests that constitute the public in the first place
and provide the shifting ground on which naturalized conventional
politics are able to take hold.
4
From that point of view, the social the-
ories of knowledge that emerged in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury reveal the intrinsically political dimensions of scientificreason-
ing.
5
Especially with the development of relativity theory and quantum
physics, science as such could no longer depend on the philosophical
underpinnings of universal naturalism as it had before: the notion of
a self-contained natural world lost its appeal, as well as its power to
stand as the ultimate nonpartisan judge in scientific disputes. Even
experimentation, the stronghold of modern scientific inquiry into the
natural, turned out to be based on reified theory, materialized human
perception, and expectations conditioned on and by social interac-
tions.
6
By jostling its own ontological foundations, scientific reason-
ing increasingly revealed itself as a rather mundane heterogenous land-
scape of conflicting “styles of thought,”
7
socially rooted “paradigms”
(and other forms of intellectual hegemony), and situated struggles
over the theories, models, experiments, instruments, and materials to
be used in scientific practice. In those struggles, the boundaries of
science were demarcated to the nonscientific, culture, politics, and
know: a journal on the formation of knowledge
162
pseudoscience.
8
This politicized understanding of scientific inquiry
shaped a new social epistemology that emerged at the beginning of
the twentieth century, in response to an era of political revolutions,
industrialized warfare mobilizing techno-scientific knowledge, and
deep societal transformation. Conversely, social epistemology also
provided a valuable point of reference for political theorists as they
struggled with the intellectual consequences of World War I, in par-
ticular. The heated disputes over the political and economic founda-
tions of society and the role of knowledge in society and the economy
thus were interrelated.
Since the interwar period, French social epistemologists such as
Bachelard, early neoliberals and related thinkers such as Karl Popper
and Michael Polanyi, pragmatists such as John Dewey, and sociologists
such as Robert K. Merton (and his normativist approaches to scientific
values) continued to radically rearrange the relationship between “the
epistemic”and “the political”on an antifoundationalist basis. In all
of these variations, notions of the political informed perceptions of
the epistemic and vice versa in an attempt to mutually restabilize
not only these spheres but also the shaken foundations of modern so-
ciety. The ways in which the relationship between the epistemic and
the political were interpreted, however, varied widely, giving birth—
especially after World War II—to a vast interdisciplinary field of re-
search on the relationships between science, knowledge, politics, and
policy.
More recent historical studies on the relationship between the ep-
istemic and the political have mostly focused on the narrower inter-
play between scientific knowledge and the modern state as a con-
densed locus of political power, including the role of experts and
advisors in policy making and governance within broader structures
of the “scientization of the social”that emerged in the nineteenth
century.
9
On the flip side, historians have also analyzed the impact
of the modern state on scientific institutions, theories, practices,
fall 2020
163
and projects from early biopolitics to planned economies, from dem-
ocratic to totalitarian regimes, from big science to big data.
10
Borrow-
ing from Foucauldian discourse analysis, others depart from the con-
stitutive interrelationship between knowledge and power in order to
reconstruct the historical genealogies of epistemic regimes that shape
the conditions of possibility for scientific inquiry as well as public dis-
course, political life, state agency, and, ultimately, governmentality.
11
Since the 1970s and 1980s, feminist, postcolonial, and environmen-
talist approaches, including within science and technology studies,
have decentered hegemonic knowledge regimes by focusing on the
role of marginalized forms of knowledge beyond established scientific
and political institutions and by emphasizing the sociopolitical situated-
ness of all knowledge claims.
12
These approaches have heightened
awareness for the difference between the plural, heterotopic, and con-
tested field of the epistemic and those privileged institutions and en-
terprises of knowledge production such as the sciences that become
hegemonic in certain historical contexts. Moreover, recent historical
studies address the variety of nongovernmental epistemic actors,
including think tanks and individual initiatives, engaged in power
plays with state institutions and the media since the 1970s.
13
It comes
as no surprise that, in that same period of the 1970s and 1980s, polit-
ical theorists also grappled with a more decentered line of thinking:
thinkers such as Jean-Luc Nancy, Jacques Rancière, Ernesto Laclau,
and Chantal Mouffe argued for an antifoundationalist understand-
ing of the political beyond institutionalized frameworks.
14
The dis-
tinction they make between politics and the political parallels the
distinction between institutionalized forms of knowledge such as sci-
ence and what we propose to call the epistemic: the both nonfounda-
tional and agonistic conditions in which knowledge emerges in an
ever-changing multitude of forms and social contexts.
By bringing together the theoretical debates on social epistemol-
ogy and the political, the scope of historical research simultaneously
know: a journal on the formation of knowledge
164
broadens and deepens, by going beyond a mere analysis of the entan-
glements of seemingly preexisting separate spheres such as science
and politics or science and the state. In a Latourian move, it instead
departs from the underlying question of how these spheres were con-
strued and demarcated as separate entities. Other than Latour, how-
ever, an interest in the emergence of the epistemic within the political
goes beyond determining the participants in a “parliament of things.”
15
Instead, it implies a focus on the epistemic not as a merely deliber-
ative space but as an arena of contesting and conflicting knowledge
claims. What social practices, institutions, values, and representations
form part of the realm of the political respective to the epistemic,and
which do not in certain historical contexts? How does the epistemic
constitution of the political as well as the political constitution of the
epistemic change over time and across different geographical areas?
The political can thus be traced in the interactions and debates be-
tween different actors and claims of knowledge involved in defining
the realm of the political, such as social scientists, economists, politi-
cians, citizens, and civil rights movements.
16
The historically shift-
ing scope of the political relies on contested fields and foundations
of knowledge. Jacques Rancière coined the term “disagreement”for
the entanglement of understanding and nonunderstanding in what
makes social interactions a political sphere.
17
Whereas Rancière re-
peatedly pointed to the aesthetic dimensions of disagreement, a focus
on its epistemic dimensions—the both antifoundational and antago-
nistic status of knowledge as part of the emergence of the political—
is equally important.
Inasmuch as the political is understood as a space of (dis)agree-
ment, shifting not only in concert with the different actors that engage
in it but also with the different epistemic practices, concepts, methods,
and theories in which it is shaped, the epistemic cannot be separated
from the political sphere since it is, in ways of both practice and the-
ory, involved in creating the space of the political, and vice versa.
18
A
fall 2020
165
perspective on instances of knowledge in the political (as a realm of
controversies) thus teaches us to consider the coproduction of knowl-
edge and the political within its competing, antagonistic, and discrim-
inatory relationships. The distinctions between science, knowledge,
and the realm of the political are thus not imbued with a clear-cut di-
viding line; instead, the relationship is characterized by ongoing and
contested boundary work performed by various actors with different
resources, strategies, intentions, and interests. Which strategies and
practices allow for the presentation of a certain kind of knowledge
as neutral, objective, and “unpolitical”? And, conversely, why is dis-
senting knowledge often understood as politically biased? Knowl-
edge involves a political dimension insofar as it can be situated in
the controversial interactions and struggles surrounding the episte-
mic foundations within which it emerges.
Examining the political dimension of knowledge thus implies an
empirical engagement with the controversies and frictions involved
in the emergence and implementation of knowledge regimes and an
analysis of the conditions under which different epistemologies and
knowledge claims compete: What are the resources, networks, and in-
stitutional affiliations that competing epistemologies rely on? What
are the practices and strategies of gaining relevance, attention, or in-
fluence in the scientific realm, in the political world, or on a broader
social level? Which discriminatory effects are caused by specificepi-
stemic agendas? A history-of-knowledge perspective can add to our
understanding of the changing and contested history of the distinc-
tion between knowledge and the political. It can make us aware that
this demarcation is part of a history of epistemic practices and strat-
egies in which both the realms of knowledge and of the political take
shape. By analyzing histories of antagonistic and competitive forms
of knowledge, it becomes possible to paint a more detailed picture
of not only the relations between the epistemic and the political but
know: a journal on the formation of knowledge
166
also of the inherently political strategies involved in the boundary
work of knowledge regimes.
In this special issue we are interested in the reconfiguration of the
political and the epistemic since the interwar period and especially
after World War II.
19
In a series of case studies, we look at different
sites and actors in which this broader process is situated, from early
“think tanks”and public debates to expert commissions and interna-
tional organizations. The articles focus in particular on knowledge
from the social sciences in the political sphere, including sociologi-
cal and epistemological knowledge, economic knowledge, and polit-
ical science.
20
The case studies reflect two main axes across which
the relationship between the epistemic and the political was shaped
during this period: first, the definition of both what ought to be the
object of political deliberation within institutionalized politics or “civil
society”and what ought to be the object of technocratic governance
decisions based on scientific knowledge and expert commissions (and
was therefore withdrawn from the political); second, the debate be-
tween the two models of economic life in modern society—namely,
the ideal type of a centrally planned state-centered society based on
aggregated technocratic knowledge and the ideal type of liberal soci-
ety in which knowledge is produced and distributed according to a de-
centralized market-based model. According to Martin Beddeleem, early
“neoliberal”thought emerged out of the controversies surrounding
precisely this latter dichotomy in the 1930s. In his article, he argues
that intellectuals active in private institutions—“think tanks”avant la
lettre—such as the Mont-Pèlerin Society were inspired by the sociolog-
ical understanding of scientific practice developed by Michael Polanyi
and others. Since the 1930s, scholars were no longer able to build on
the naturalist certainties of nineteenth-century liberalism, and thus
this new way of thinking provided an authoritative model with which
to rethink the design of a “free society”as an antidote to centralized
fall 2020
167
state-planned economies. Ultimately, the crisis of liberalism after
World War I was a crisis not only of political legitimacy but also
of liberalism’s underlying philosophical assumptions about the na-
ture of man, state, commerce, science, common sense, and society.
Instead of departing from God-given rules or an axiomatic natural phi-
losophy, social epistemology understood the production of knowledge
as an open-ended, contested practice based on social interactions, ne-
gotiations, man-made conventions, and historically established forms
of dispute resolution, of settling (dis)agreements. This approach also
seemed to allow for an antifoundationalist view on the epistemic as
well as on the political, providing a strategy for arguing for the “free-
dom”of science in the framework of deliberative politics.
Benno Nietzel’s study on propaganda strategy expertise moves the
focus toward a consideration of the role of political knowledge in arm-
ing nation-states during World War II. His article demonstrates how
knowledge on popular opinion deployed by state intelligence agen-
cies traveled between peacetime civil politics and the antagonistic
field of the political in the context of a military conflict. By highlight-
ing not only the embeddedness of civil politics in the political but
also the efforts of civilian experts to stand out and distinguish them-
selves in military contexts, Nietzel points to the rising relevance of so-
cial science expertise in the politics of the Cold War.
Zoé Kergomard’s article on debates surrounding voter abstention
in Switzerland in the second half of the twentieth century illustrates
how expert knowledge produced by political scientists played a crucial
role in demarcating the political within the field of legitimate politics.
After World War II, decreasing voter turnout was interpreted as popular
fatigue and a retreat from politics. The new social movements emerging
in the 1960s and 1970s, however, strengthened a consciousness for the
political outside of “politics.”By shifting the epistemic constitution of
the political through activist knowledge, voter abstention could subse-
quently be interpreted as the exact opposite of depoliticization and
know: a journal on the formation of knowledge
168
“postdemocracy”—namely, a repoliticization of what had been de-
politicized in the name of institutionalized politics.
In their article, Eric Hounshell and Verena Halsmayer reconstruct
the public debate between leading economists of the 1960s and 1970s
on questions of economic growth policies, state intervention, and con-
sumerism. Their article illustrates that the basic methodological ques-
tion of how to practice economics determines whether the economy is
perceived either as a realm governed by quantifiable laws from which
state policies can be developed or as an object of the political and thus
a social space open to interpretation, controversy, negotiation, objec-
tion, and conflict. The public debate between John K. Galbraith, Robert
M. Solow, and Robin Marris shows how expertise and counterexper-
tise competed for influence in a deliberative mode of the political and
how their debate on economic methodologies participated in redefin-
ing and reconfiguring the sphere of the political itself.
In his article, Pascal Germann analyzes the history of quality of life
research and policy since the 1970s. The shift from economic growth
to quality of life as the primary goal of politics, promoted by interna-
tional organizations such as the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development, also required an epistemic reconfiguration of
the political. In the aftermath of the social movements of the 1960s
and 1970s, the focus on “objective”macroeconomic indicators such as
gross domestic product growth was challenged by the demand for
social indicators that also acknowledged the “subjective”dimension
of well-being in economic development. From this angle, the knowl-
edge and perception of individual citizens and social collectives be-
came an asset for political negotiations among different institutional
players.
Picking up on the question of good government, Felix Römer an-
alyzes the changing knowledge regimes on economic inequality in the
United Kingdom, from the postwar welfare state to Thatcherism. He
focuses on statistics as a site of the coproduction of knowledge and
fall 2020
169
politics, triggering debates among diverse actors from governmental
and party-political players to nongovernmental associations, academ-
ics, and the public. The actual interactions between those players re-
veal that a space for the political opens up precisely within the pro-
cesses of making and using inequality knowledge as part of creating
or withdrawing welfare policies.
The empirical case studies in this special issue highlight the emer-
gence of the political as part of epistemic processes in the twentieth cen-
tury: they demonstrate not only that knowledge plays a role in twentieth-
century political regimes but that, alongside the political debates, the
foundations of knowledge—its methodological, institutional, and con-
ceptional frameworks—were also at stake. Embracing an antifounda-
tionalist understanding of knowledge, the emergence of the political is
thus connected to controversies, negotiations, and reconfigurations
regarding the epistemic, and vice versa. The history of the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries provides a multiplicity of stories that invite
us to take a closer look at the shifts, frictions, and resonances of the
political and the epistemic and which also lead us to the epistemic as
much as political challenges of the present, including issues such as
dealing with “fake news,”digitalization, or the contested role of ex-
pertise in debates on climate change or pandemics.
know: a journal on the formation of knowledge
170
Notes
1. Gaston Bachelard, The New Scientific Spirit (1934; repr., Boston: Beacon,
1984), 12.
2. See, e.g., the notion of “political epistemology,”the subject of a work-
shop series at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin in
2016/17: “The term ‘political epistemology’highlights the role that social and
normative conditions—political, economic, cultural—play in knowledge produc-
tion and exchange.”“Political Epistemologies,”workshop description, Max
Planck Institute for the History of Science, http://www.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de
/page/political-epistemology.
3. Gary Werskey, The Visible College: The Collective Biography of British Scientific
Socialists of the 1930s (New York: Holt, Rinehardt & Winston, 1978); Hans-Jörg
Rheinberger, On Historicizing Epistemology: An Essay (Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2010); Mary Jo Nye, Michael Polanyi and His Generation: Origins of the
Social Construction of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Johannes
Fehr, “‘...The art of shaping a democratic reality and being directed by it ...’—
Philosophy of Science in Turbulent Times,”Studies in East European Thought
64 (2012): 81–89; Michael Hagner, “Perception, Knowledge and Freedom in
the Age of Extremes: On the Historical Epistemology of Ludwig Fleck and
Michael Polanyi,”Studies in East European Thought 64 (2012): 107–20; Martin
Beddeleem, “Recoding Liberalism: Philosophy and Sociology of Science against
Planning,”in Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, ed. Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian,
and Philip Mirowski (London: Verso, 2020).
4. “Agonistic”is a term used in recent political theory that underscores the
importance of conflict as the driving force of political processes in general and
especially in pluralist democracies. This approach differs from liberal models
of deliberation that depart from a teleology of conflict resolution as well as from
171
antagonistic models of politics based on irreconcilable friend-foe distinctions
in the tradition of Carl Schmitt. Because of this agonist perspective, conflicts
are ongoing and not necessarily solvable. They are, however, based on a certain
mutual recognition of the actors and interests involved as legitimate partici-
pants in the arena of the political. See, e.g., Chantal Mouffe, On the Political
(London: Routledge, 2005); Oliver Marchart, Post-foundational Political Thought:
Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2007). See also the review of Marchart’s book by James
Martin in Contemporary Political Theory 8 (2009): 113–15.
5. Bruno Latour, “Visualisation and Cognition: Drawing Things Together,”
Knowledge and Society: Studies in the Sociology of Culture Past and Present 6 (1986):
1–40, at 13.
6. Gaston Bachelard, The Formation of the Scientific Mind: A Contribution to a Psy-
choanalysis of Objective Knowledge, trans. Mary McAllester (orig. 1938; Manchester:
Clinamen, 2002), 239.
7. Ludwik Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (1935; Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1979).
8. Thomas F. Gieryn, “Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from
Non-science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists,”Amer-
ican Sociological Review 48, no. 6 (1983): 781–95. See also, e.g., Michael D. Gordin,
The Pseudoscience Wars: Immanuel Velikovsky and the Birth of the Modern Fringe (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).
9. Lutz Raphael, “Die Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen als methodische
und konzeptionelle Herausforderung für eine Sozialgeschichte des 20.
Jahrhunderts,”Geschichte und Gesellschaft 22 (1996): 165–93. See, e.g., Mark
Solovey, Shaky Foundations: The Politics-Patronage-Social Science Nexus in Cold War
America (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2013).
10. The literature on these topics is vast; see, e.g., Peter Galison, Big Science:
The Growth of Large-Scale Research (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992);
Alain Desrosières, The Politics of Large Numbers: A History of Statistical Reasoning
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Mark Solovey and Hamilton
Cravens, eds., Cold War Social Science: Knowledge Production, Liberal Democracy,
and Human Nature (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Loren R. Graham,
Lysenko’s Ghost: Epigenetics and Russia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2016); Devin Pendas, Mark Roseman, and Richard F. Wetzell, eds., Beyond the
Racial State: Rethinking Nazi Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2017).
know: a journal on the formation of knowledge
172
11. Foucault’s work on the order of things as well as on the history of sexual-
ity, the clinic, and architectures of punishment has been influential in this re-
gard, as are his lectures at the Collège de France on governmentality.
12. See, e.g., Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in
Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective,”Feminist Studies 14, no. 3
(1988): 575–99; Kapil Raj, Relocating Modern Science: Circulation and the Construction
of Scientific Knowledge in South Asia and Europe, 1650–1900 (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2007); Bruno Latour, Facing Gaia: Eight Lectures on the New Climatic Re-
gime (Cambridge: Polity, 2017). See also Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power
and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
13. See, e.g., Naomi Oreskes and Eric Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a
Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global
Warming (New York: Bloomsbury, 2010); Thomas Medvetz, Think Tanks in America
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). For perspectives on “counter-
knowledge”in the 1970s and 1980s, see Max Stadler, Nils Güttler, Niki Rhyner,
et al., GegenFWissen (5cache 01) (Zurich: intercom, 2020).
14. Mouffe, On the Political; Marchart, Post-foundational Political Thought.
15. Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).
16. See, e.g., Kijan Espahangizi, “Migration Research and Epistemic Partici-
pation: A Case Study on the ‘Sociology of Foreign Workers’in Zurich in the
1970s,”in Urban Citizenship: Democratizing Democracy, ed. Katharina Morawek
and Martin Krenn (Vienna: VfmK, 2017), 112–31, and “The ‘Sociologic’of
Postmigration: A Study in the Early History of Social Research on Migration and
Integration in Switzerland, 1960–73,”in Switzerland and Migration: Historical and
Current Perspectives on a Changing Landscape, ed. Barbara Lüthi and Damir
Skenderovic (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 33–59.
17. Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy (Minneapolis: Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press, 1999).
18. Studies such as Audra Wolfe, Freedom’s Laboratory: The Cold War Struggle
for the Soul of Science (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018); George
Reisch, How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy of Science: To the Icy Slopes of Logic
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Nye, Michael Polanyi and His
Generation present remarkable examples of the mutual reconfiguration of the
political and the epistemic in the twentieth century. For epistemology in relation
to politics in the 1970s and 1980s, see also Max Stadler and Monika Wulz,
“Neben Feyerabend: Wissenschaftsforschung neokonservativ,”in Nach
fall 2020
173
Feierabend: Zürcher Jahrbuch für Wissensgeschichte 15 (Zurich: Diaphanes, 2020);
and for accounts regarding more recent debates, see Gil Eyal, The Crisis of Exper-
tise (Cambridge: Polity, 2019); Naomi Oreskes, Why Trust Science? (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2019).
19. The idea for this special issue began at a conference, “Political Culture
and the History of Knowledge: Actors, Institutions, Practices,”in June 2019 in
Washington, DC, co-organized by Simone Lässig and Kerstin von der Krone
(German Historical Institute, Washington, DC), Shadi Bartsch-Zimmer
(Stefanovich Institute on the Formation of Knowledge at the University of
Chicago), and Monika Wulz, Nils Güttler, and Kijan Espahangizi (Center “History
of Knowledge”at the ETH Zurich and University of Zurich). For the conference
report, see http://www.ghi-dc.org/events/event/date/political-culture-and-the
-history-of-knowledge-actors-institutions-practices-06-06-2019. We would like to
thank Shadi Bartsch-Zimmer and Jodi Haraldson, lead editor and managing edi-
tor of KNOW, respectively, for their support with this special issue in the chal-
lenging times sparked by the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as Julia Sittmann for
her support in copyediting the texts.
20. Of course, other fields are also very relevant for studying the relation-
ship between the political and the epistemic—such as legal studies (Monika
Dommann, Kijan Espahangizi, and Svenja Goltermann, eds., “Wissen was Recht
ist,”in Nach Feierabend: Zürcher Jahrbuch für Wissensgeschichte 11 [Zurich:
Diaphanes, 2015]), technology studies, and aesthetics, as one can see in the pre-
viously mentioned work of Jacques Rancière, for example.
know: a journal on the formation of knowledge
174