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Pragmática para la justicia global
Abstract
This chapter entertains the idea that a pragmatist approach could explain away the discrepancies between the interactive and institutionalist apporach to global justice. In doing so, it develops the idea of a community of rational practitioners in the game of giving and asking minimal reasons of justice.
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Resumen: Este artículo explica que la paz global puede lograrse por medio de un Esta-do de naciones que comprende cuatro variantes, aunque se propone que sólo una variante satisface los requerimientos de la razón jurídica: el Estado de naciones con forma republicana o república mundial. En razón de que la pertinencia de una núcleo de este artículo lo constituye el análisis de los pros y contras de un Estado de naciones con forma republicana. Palabras clave: Analogía del Estado y el individuo, democracia, república mun-dial, Estado de naciones, derechos humanos. Abstract: This paper explains that global peace could be achieved by means of a State of nations which includes four variants, although it is proposed that only one variant meets the demands of the legal reason: the State of nations with republican form or world republic. Because the appropriateness of a philosophical proposal depends on the examination of its strengths and weaknesses, the core of this paper is the analysis of the pros and cons of a State of nations with republican form.
This article explores the Pragmatist and Rawlsian forms of cosmopolitanism that have emerged in recent decades in efforts to extend theories of justice to the global level. The Pragmatist approach is critical and problem-centred, using an account of the problematic situation and a reconstruction of inherited ideals to develop normative theories for action in a specific political context. The Rawlsian approach is abstract and systemic, deducing ideal institutional principles from thought experiments that require later implementation in the non-ideal world. The main argument of the article is that Pragmatists employ three methodological elements that give them important practical advantages over Rawlsians in providing action-guiding norms. First, a detailed account of the problem of injustice provides an indispensable empirical grounding that frames normative responses. Second, a critical reconstruction of the normative vocabulary relating to the problem ensures that the ideals used to guide action are historically relevant to the community of action. And finally, an account of normative theories in terms of their concrete requirements and means of realisation in the particular situation ensures they are attuned to its political constraints and possibilities for change.
Would it be desirable to reform the global institutional order in conformity with the principles Rawls defends in A Theory on Justice? Rawls himself denies this and proposes a different moral theory (The Law of Peoples) for the relations among self-governing peoples. While sharing a questionable, purely recipient-oriented approach, his two theories differ importantly in substance and structure. The former gives weight only to the interests of individual persons, yet the latter gives no weight to these interests at all. The former theory is three-tiered and institutional, centering on a public criterion of justice that is justified through a contractualist thought experiment and in turn justifies particular institutional arrangements and reforms under variable empirical circumstances. Yet, the latter theory is two-tiered and interactional, deploying a contractualist thought experiment to justify rigid rules of good conduct for peoples. Poorly motivated, these asymmetrics help Rawls's anti-cosmopolitan case. But they fail to vindicate his claim that global economic justice demands only a modest "duty of assistance."
The increasingly widespread expression “global justice” marks an important shift in the structure of moral discourse. Traditionally, international relations were seen as sharply distinct from domestic justice. First, it focused on interactions among states, and later, evaluated the design of a national institutional order in light of its effects on citizens. Such institutional moral analysis is becoming applied to supranational institutional arrangements, nowadays more pervasive and important for the life prospects of individuals. The traditional lens suggested fair agreements among states. The new lens shows that the global institutional order is unfair because it enriches elites in both rich and poor countries and perpetuates the oppression and impoverishment of the majority.
A condition of peace among men living near one another is not a state of nature (status naturalis), which is much rather a condition of war, that is, it involves the constant threat of an outbreak of hostilities even if this does not always occur. A condition of peace must therefore be established; for suspension of hostilities is not yet assurance of peace, and unless such assurance is afforded one neighbor by another (as can happen only in a lawful condition), the former, who has called upon the latter for it, can treat him as an enemy.1
This book aims to reconcile pragmatism (in both its classical American and its Wittgensteinian forms) with analytic philosophy. It investigates relations between the meaning of linguistic expressions and their use. Giving due weight both to what one has to do in order to count as saying various things and to what one needs to say in order to specify those doings makes it possible to shed new light on the relations between semantics (the theory of the meanings of utterances and the contents of thoughts) and pragmatics (the theory of the functional relations among meaningful or contentful items). Among the vocabularies whose interrelated use and meaning are considered are: logical, indexical, modal, normative, and intentional vocabulary. As the argument proceeds, new ways of thinking about the classical analytic core programs of empiricism, naturalism, and functionalism are offered, as well as novel insights about the ideas of artificial intelligence, the nature of logic, and intentional relations between subjects and objects.
This book is a collection of papers by Ruth Barcan Marcus, covering much ground in the development of her thought, and spanning from 1961 to 1990. Many of the papers deal with logical, semantic, metaphysical, and epistemological issues in intensional logic, and in particular, modalities. Some important themes that run through these papers are extensionality, the necessity of identity, the directly referential conception of proper names as “tags,” essentialism, substitutional quantification, and possibilia and possible worlds. What emerges from them is a robust defense of quantified modal logic in the light of a host of objections, particularly from Quine. Modalities also includes two papers on belief, which have consequences for epistemic logic and more widely for theories of rationality; two papers on ethical issues, which have consequences for deontic logic and practical reasoning; and finally, two papers on historical figures, Spinoza and Russell, dealing with the ontological proof of God's existence, and the nature of particularity, identity, and individuation, respectively.
This book is a collection of papers by Ruth Barcan Marcus, covering much ground in the development of her thought, and spanning from 1961 to 1990. Many of the papers deal with logical, semantic, metaphysical, and epistemological issues in intensional logic, and in particular, modalities. Some important themes that run through these papers are extensionality, the necessity of identity, the directly referential conception of proper names as “tags,” essentialism, substitutional quantification, and possibilia and possible worlds. What emerges from them is a robust defense of quantified modal logic in the light of a host of objections, particularly from Quine. Modalities also includes two papers on belief, which have consequences for epistemic logic and more widely for theories of rationality; two papers on ethical issues, which have consequences for deontic logic and practical reasoning; and finally, two papers on historical figures, Spinoza and Russell, dealing with the ontological proof of God's existence, and the nature of particularity, identity, and individuation, respectively.
Man and Society: A Substantive Introduction to the Social Science
- H Blumer
Blumer, H. (1937) Social Psychology. In E. P. Schmidt (ed.), Man and Society: A
Substantive Introduction to the Social Science, (pp. 144-198). New York: Prentice-Hall
Rawls y la justicia global
- T Pogge
Pogge, T. (2018). Rawls y la justicia global (M. J. O. Jiménez, Trad.). En J. A. Dávila
(Ed.), Kant y Rawls. Filosofía práctica contemporánea (pp. 217-270). Medellín: Editorial Universidad Ponti cia Bolivariana.
The Life You Can Save. London: Random House
- P Singer
Singer, P. (2009). The Life You Can Save. London: Random House.