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ISRAEL AFFAIRS, 2016
VOL. 22, NO S. 34, 727742
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2016.1174386
© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
Trends in public and media agenda-setting during
the 2015 Israeli elections
Dana Weimann-Saksa, Yaron Arielb, Vered Malkab and Ruth Avidarb
aCommunication Department and Health Systems Management Department; bCommunication
Department, Max Stern Yezreel Valley College, Israel
ABSTRACT
The emergence of new media, primarily social networks, raises questions about
the interactions at play between ‘new’ and ‘old’ media in terms of the media and
the public agendas. This topic is particularly relevant during elections. By analysing
news from three Israeli television channels and using an online monitoring system
to analyse user discourse over six weeks preceding Election Day, this article seeks
to trace the shaping processes of the media agenda and public agenda along
the axes of ‘new media/old media’ and ‘free user discourse/professional media
discourse’.
KEYWORDS Agenda-setting; elections; new media; social networks
Election campaigns in democratic countries are associated with the triangle
of ‘public–politics–media’ driven to its tensest and most sensitive peak. is
tension is manifested in the struggle to determine the media agenda, among
others, and therefore also the public and political agendas.
e rise of new media – particularly online social networks – to the status of
a central element in the media arena raises questions regarding the interactions
at play between ‘new’ and ‘old’ media (television, radio and press) in terms of
the media and public agendas. e present article seeks to examine the public
and media agendas during the March 2015 Israeli general election and explore
the nature of their mutual interaction (which exists in general and is heightened
around crucial events such as elections). e public agenda was examined via
an online monitoring of Internet user discourse that appeared on social net-
works and news websites. e media agenda research was performed in turn
by analysing primary news broadcasts on television channels 1, 2 and 10 over
six weeks preceding Election Day. e article also attempts to estimate the role
of the new media compared with their older counterparts (represented here
by television), as well as to trace the shaping processes of the dierent agendas
CONTACT Dana Weimann-Saks danawe@yvc.ac.il
728 DANA WEIMANNSAKS ET AL.
along the axes of ‘new media/old media’ and ‘free user discourse/professional
media discourse’.
Theoretical framework
Media and election
Perceiving the media as a political player has been commonplace among the
majority of political communication scholars for many years.1 is situation
implies that the media is thought to have far-reaching eects on the many fac-
ets and operative modes of the political system. As a new election campaign is
launched, the system as a whole faces a crucial trial: the behavioural patterns
of all players involved become ever more critical and signicant. is statement
holds all the more true in an age in which candidates are requested to conduct
themselves in a reality dened as a ‘permanent campaign’: a campaign that
stretches between one election and another rather than being conned to the
formal election campaign.2 For the most part, media studies have focused on
the two key elds of activity: election propaganda, with its manifold instances
and aspects, and the news coverage of those tension-lled days. Of particular
interest are instances of election propaganda seeping into the realms of cov-
erage and interpretation, which cumulatively add to other inuences such as
the eects of the campaign’s media coverage on their content and messages.3
In most Western countries, election campaign coverage is subject to ongo-
ing, almost consensual criticism by audiences, political players and political
communication researchers. is fact is due to the tendency of the media to
focus on the dramatic, colorful particulars of the days leading up to the elec-
tion, including the personalities of the candidates themselves. is coverage
comes at the considerable expense of more signicant issues such as platform,
vision, performance analysis, etc.4 e gist of this criticism is well-captured in
a concept commonly employed by researchers to describe the coverage modes
typically utilized by the media during an election: ‘horse-race journalism’, i.e.
coverage focused on the ckle data of public-opinion surveys and the gaps
between candidates on their way to the nishing line.5
e past few decades have experienced a signicant increase in media and
election research in Israel. is increase is partly due to the complex, tur-
bulent political reality of the country, the multiple governments that failed
to reach full tenure and ended their days in early elections, and the largely
autonomous media, which enjoys a wide scope and freedom of operation. Like
their colleagues around the world, media and election researchers in Israel are
mainly engaged in analysing key trends in the patterns of election campaign
coverage and the characteristics of these campaigns; one focus is the ever-
increasing ‘Americanization’ of media coverage trends and propaganda charac-
teristics.
6
Another prevalent research interest concerns public opinion and voter
ISRAEL AFFAIRS 729
behaviour and the interactions of the public with the media.7 Another realm of
research concerns the application of key theories of studies to the mass media
during elections, including agenda building, setting, framing and priming.8
Elections in the age of the new media
e advent of new media – particularly the Internet, social networks and cel-
lular phones – has changed, and is still changing, patterns of activities during
elections. roughout the political arena, new media opened up fresh avenues
of propaganda promotion and direct communication channels with the pub-
lic, and they also introduced the option of monitoring and following election
discourses even beyond the connes of traditional mass media. In addition,
the online platform, with its dierent aspects, facilitates a largely free kind of
public discourse.
e essence of this change is at the heart of Henry Jenkins’ Media
Convergence eory.
9
According to this theory, the twenty-rst-century media
arena has experienced an accelerated process of media convergence. is pro-
cess includes changes in how media content is produced and consumed, which
alters the relationship between ‘new’ and ‘old’ technologies, markets, industries
and audiences. According to this theory, the dierent types of media are diverse,
ubiquitous and interconnected. Dierent researchers have expressed apprehen-
sion that the introduction of new media will result in the decline of ‘old’ media.
However, Nossek and Adoni argue that a new medium only replaces an ‘old’
one when the two share a functional similarity.10
e online discourse, which is taking place in social networks (e.g. Facebook
and Twitter) as well as in online forums, blogs and candidate pages, is one of
the changes brought about by the online revolution in which media consumers
started doubling as media manufacturers to create, share and distribute infor-
mation that they and their fellow users produced. is situation implies that
‘new’ and ‘old’ media blend with one another even between elections; public
discourse is encouraged by, among other things, information sourced from
‘old’ media (television, radio and press) and oen echoes this information. In
other cases, ‘old’ media cover and echo information that was rst featured on
the Internet on social networks.
In recent years, Israeli research has naturally ventured into examining the
unique eects of new media on the political media arena, particularly during
election campaigns. Despite the fact that political players in Israel are slower
to embrace technological innovations than their counterparts in other Western
countries, the Internet, social networks and mobile media have become signif-
icant elements in the arena in question. is change is partially due to consid-
erable and extensive activity on the part of voters.11
730 DANA WEIMANNSAKS ET AL.
Agenda-setting
e Agenda-Setting eory relates to the power of media news to dictate the
importance of political issues that the public perceives. Agenda-setting is the
assumption that news media emphasize and highlight certain events, people
and issues while overlooking or failing to highlight others by using gatekeep-
ers (i.e. reporters and editors). e salience of these issues in a given channel
or consistently over several channels aects the public agenda and discourse,
which focus on people and issues that the media highlight.
e Agenda-Setting eory has been subjected to a wide variety of test cases
since the 1970s. is theory has been examined in political and other contexts
and utilized various research methods.
12
McCombs and Shaw,
13
most identied
with the Agenda-Setting eory, quote Cohen’s famous saying that ‘e press
may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it
is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.’14 e notion
of the media aecting our thinking patterns is no novelty. Lippmann15 cites
Plato’s Allegory of the Cave, where the shadows cast on the cave’s wall are but
a faint representation of reality in our mind. According to Lippmann, we oen
prefer to rely on the ‘picture in our head’ rather than examine reality.
e majority of studies have examined the media agenda via a quantitative
analysis of the number of news features devoted to a certain topic (coverage and
salience) assuming that the amount of information about a given topic and its
place in the news not only inform readers about the subject but also reect its
importance.16 e public agenda was examined using public opinion surveys
to gauge the importance of these topics as perceived by readers and viewers.17
Over the years, studies have conrmed the core assumptions of the the-
ory18 by demonstrating an apparent link that begs for a causal explanation. As
part of examining correlations between the importance of topics perceived by
the public, experiments have been conducted in which news broadcasts were
manipulated in order to establish a link between news coverage and its salience
in viewers’ eyes.19 Another related course of research focuses on inter-media
agenda-setting, which denotes the possible inuence of mass media agendas on
each other.20 For example, McCombs et al.21 found correlation between local
and national newspapers and television coverage of Spanish general election
candidates. Similarly, Lee et al.22 found that South Korean newspapers and
Internet bulletin boards had a reciprocal inter-media agenda-setting in the
coverage of the 2000 elections.
According to Weaver et al.,23 the analysis unit in most present-day agen-
da-setting studies is the subject; however, the research dilemma is whether
it is sucient to examine the subjects themselves or whether the attending
attributes should be addressed as well because they do not stand by them-
selves. e attributes referred to as ‘second-level agenda-setting’, they argue, are
largely granted by journalists, directly or otherwise, in media reports because
ISRAEL AFFAIRS 731
it is these individuals who highlight dierent sides and aspects of a subject. In
recent years, researchers have been tackling what has been dened as ‘third-
level agenda-setting’: analysis of the reciprocal eects of Internet users on the
agendas of politicians and journalists.
The Agenda-Setting Theory in the new-media age
e Agenda-Setting eory has been stirring up academic interest in the age
of new media. Coleman et al.24 argue that the emergence of the Internet con-
stitutes a wide, fertile scope for agenda-setting studies. Similarly, McCombs et
al.
25
argue that academic attention in the eld of agenda-setting research should
focus on the dynamics of online media in dierent digital platforms, such as
news websites and online social networks. Chaee and Metzger26 suggest that
new media hold a potential for generating a reversed ow of information (i.e.
from the public to electoral candidates). To paraphrase the original phrase, it
is predicted that the theory will move from ‘subjects that the media tell people
to think about’ to ‘subjects that people tell the media that they want to think
about’. McCombs27 refers to this process as ‘reverse agenda-setting’: it is the
public interest that sets the media agenda. Furthermore, we can identify a trend
in which traditional media journalists, i.e. journalists working in digital and
print press, television and radio, turn to social networks in order to sense the
public’s opinion about a certain subject and in turn cover that subject in light of
the public’s interest.
28
Sweetser et al.
29
argue that the question of ‘who sets whose
public agenda’ should continue to be examined in light of the development
of new-media technologies. Johnson and Perlmutter30 argue that even before
the age of the Internet, political propaganda by election candidates was under
relatively tight control (i.e. sponsored advertisements shown according to the
extent, time and place set in advance by campaign managers). e relative high
costs of such marketing eorts translated into centralized management and a
high level of control over messages in general (bumper stickers, billboards,
and radio and television advertising). On the other hand, the emergence of the
Internet and social networks contributed to the multiplicity of voices and mes-
sages distributed over the Internet by individuals, interest groups and various
interested parties; election candidates no longer solely control the online dis-
course. At times, election candidates are even le behind in the public discourse.
Woolley et al. performed an analysis of user-derived content in online social
networks during the 2008 US presidential election campaign between Barack
Obama and John McCain.31 is analysis suggested that there were a few unique
subjects that were typical to social networks in general or could be divided
according to candidate. Nevertheless, much of the content reected the key
themes that pervaded the mainstream media at the time. In particular, these
researchers found that the content aired on the ‘old’ media and that aired on
732 DANA WEIMANNSAKS ET AL.
the new media were consistent. Additionally, the public discourse and the insti-
tutionalized media discourse were similar as well.
Moeller categorizes agenda-setting by three players: agenda-setting by the
government, agenda-setting by the mainstream media and agenda-setting by
‘citizen journalists’.
32
According to this author, the ‘old’ media’s control over the
media’s agenda-setting has been reduced due to changes occurring in the wake
of the Internet revolution.
Research questions
is article attempts to compare the public agenda, as manifested in the free
discourse of Internet users, and the media agenda, as manifested in evening
news broadcasts. Two key research questions were developed in order to exam-
ine the relationship between the two agendas.
e rst research question examines whether, and to what extent, compat-
ibility can be found between the media agenda (as manifested in institution-
alized television news broadcasts) and the public agenda (as manifested in the
discourse of online users) over the course of six weeks preceding the election.
e second research question explores the extent to which television pre-
serves its power as an agenda-setter in an age in which the Internet and social
networks are experiencing increasing popularity. In other words, does television
still function as an autonomous player that inuences the public agenda?
Methodology
e rst part of the study included a quantitative content analysis of 132 main
news broadcasts of every day during the six weeks preceding the election.
Data were collected from the three main television channels in Israel: two
commercial channels under public supervision (Channels 2 and 10) and a
public–national channel (Channel 1). e coding sheet, originaly developed
and pre-tested for this research, included subject tagging, ordering of the item,
length, item type (report/interview and the like). Two independent encoders
were trained and watched news broadcasts on a daily basis. Each encoder was
instructed to follow the coding sheet and to elaborate as much as possible about
the subject of each media item. In order to ensure uniformity among the encod-
ers and validate the encoding page, the rst week of encoding was declared a
‘pilot’ study in which the list of subjects was subjected to changes and updates
by the authors to reect the list of subjects featured in the news. Whenever a
contradiction or disagreement was found in the encoding work, the researchers
turned to the encoders for help in order to ensure encoding uniformity. us,
inter-coding reliability attained thrugh a process of concensus.33
In the second part of the study, an external monitoring system was employed
to monitor the conversations of Internet users. is system was operated by an
ISRAEL AFFAIRS 733
outside company specializing in monitoring services for dierent research and
business organizations. is external monitoring system made it possible to
monitor the discourse taking place in social networks (e.g. Facebook, Twitter
and Google+) as well as in blogs, forums and articles. e system recorded
the volume and duration of discourses generated by each subject that was
monitored.
For the purpose of monitoring, all subjects included in the encoding page
of the television broadcasts were fed into the system, which made it possible to
follow their online presence. For example, the search phrase ‘Iranian threat’ was
entered into the monitoring system with its various formulations (in dierent
spellings), and the system traced the number of instances (‘conversations’) that
featured the term in social networks, forums, blogs and articles, as well as the
volume and duration of the respective discourses.
Findings
e rst part of the study included a quantitative content analysis of the subjects
discussed in television news broadcasts on three channels (1, 2 and 10) during
the six weeks preceding the 2015 election.
e content analysis suggested that of the 10 key topics reported on the
news on all three television channels, the topic that received the most coverage
was the Prime Minister’s residence (in which harsh criticism had been levelled
against the excessive expenditures associated with Prime Minister Netanyahu’s
residence), followed by incidents and activities concerning ISIS, the Iranian
threat on Israel, the Prime Minister’s speech to the US Congress, sexual scandals
in the Israeli police, the state comptroller report, rotation (Yitzhak Herzog–
Tzipi Livni, in case of an election win), dierent election surveys, local layos
and the Israel awards scandal (in which the Prime Minister’s oce vetoed two
judges from the Israel award for the literature panel, which raised criticism and
suggested politicization of the process).
In addition to the number of occurrences of each topic, the salience of each
topic was also examined. Salience refers to the importance attributed to each
topic during the news broadcasts. is analysis focused on the positionality of
news items according to their order of appearance in the broadcast, and this
analysis attributed additional weight to items that were featured at the start of
each broadcast relative to those that were featured later or at the end of the
broadcast. For the purpose of analysing the degree of salience of each news
item, the rst 15 items of every broadcast were encoded, and each item was
attributed a dierent weight according to its order of appearance; the rst item
received 15 points, the second item received 14 points, and so forth until the
eenth item on the broadcast received a single point. Figure 1 presents
the cumulative salience value of each item from all three broadcasts during
the pre-election period. As one can see, the topics that earned the highest
734 DANA WEIMANNSAKS ET AL.
salience addressed the same issues as topics that earned the largest number of
mentions (although not necessarily in the same order).
In the next stage of the study, the volume of conversation for every salient
topic in the television coverage was examined by the conversation monitoring
system. e goal of this analysis was to reveal whether subjects with a high
salience on television also had a high salience in online public discourse. As
shown by Figure 2, the topics with the highest online conversation volume
included election surveys, the Iranian threat, the coalition assembly and ISIS-
related activities.
Figure 1. Degree of salience of each topic on the television news broadcasts.
Figure 2. Volume of online conversations for each salient topic covered in television
broadcasts.
ISRAEL AFFAIRS 735
e rst research question concerned the consistency between the media
agenda (as manifested in the institutionalized television news broadcasts) and
the public agenda (as manifested in the discourse of online users) during the
six weeks preceding the 2015 election. e most common and conventional
method for analysing correlations between agenda scales is Spearman rank-or
-
der correlations. is analysis revealed a signicant positive link (r = .406, p
< .001) between the media and public agenda for all six weeks preceding the
election. at is, the topics highlighted by the media on television during each of
these six weeks were similarly and simultaneously highlighted on the Internet.
Moreover, in order to examine the question of directionality in the interac-
tion shared by these two agendas, an ordinal regression model was calculated
in which the dependent variable was dened as ‘online discourse grading’ and
the independent variable was dened as ‘television news broadcast grading’;
the ‘topic’ variable was held xed. e regression model was found to be sig-
nicant (χ2
(df = 587) = 21.205, p < .01) and predictive of 27.5% of the dependent
variable’s explained variance.
e salience of the Iranian threat in the television news’ agenda and in
online public discourse was similar. Both spheres experienced an increase in
salience between the rst and second weeks, a drop in salience in the third
week, a sharp rise in salience the two weeks leading up to the elections (weeks
4–5 in the sample) and a drop in salience in the week immediately before the
election. Nevertheless, it is evident that the public interest expressed in the
online discourse was more salient from as early as the beginning of the study’s
measurement period; the decreasing salience in the week prior to the election
was far more signicant and pronounced.
Similarity can be found in the salience trends of the Prime Minister’s speech
to the US Congress on both television news broadcasts and online discourse.
Again, the salience of the online discourse was found to rank higher on the
online agenda than on the television news broadcasts in the rst week of the
study (i.e. six weeks prior to the election). e salience of the Prime Minister’s
speech to the US Congress experienced a sharp drop approximately a month
before the elections in the online discourse; it then rocketed to the highest
ranking two weeks prior to the election. is trend is similar to what is seen
in the television broadcasts. Both platforms experienced a drop in the topic’s
ranking in the last week prior to the election. Similarity between television
news broadcasts and online discourse was found also regarding the ISIS topic
and the Prime Minister’s residence.
For a more comprehensive picture, we compared the degree of salience of
the television topics with their corresponding degree of salience in the social
networks. Table 1 lists the dierent topics and their salience (with standardized
scores) for both the television coverage and the Internet coverage throughout
the research period.
736 DANA WEIMANNSAKS ET AL.
Table 1.A comparison of the standardized scores (z) of prominent topics from online discourse and television news broadcasts.
Weeks
Topic 654321
Net TV Net TV Net TV Net TV Net TV Net TV
Iranian threat .48 –.56 1.32 1.84 .96 .02 .34 –.89 .45 .00 .34 –.34
Election surveys 2.84 –.10 2.54 .49 2.72 –.25 2.91 –.53 2.88 –.34 2.91 –.53
Israel award –.49 –.56 –.54 –.82 –.54 –1.11 –.46 –.59 –.14 .72 –.50 –.58
Prime Minister’s
speech
–.54 .98 –.47 1.84 –.55 .24 –.57 –.08 –.53 1.94 –.49 .29
Prime Minister’s
residence
–.52 –.21 –.55 –.42 –.50 2.02 –.29 2.00 –.54 –.81 –.42 –.29
Police sex scandals –.55 –.56 –.58 –.88 –.59 –.82 –.60 .85 –.56 1.08 –.51 1.05
State comptroller
report
–.52 –.56 –.51 –.97 –.28 1.39 –.14 1.07 –.52 –.72 –.45 –.58
ISIS –.27 –.45 –.29 –.19 –.24 .28 –.15 .64 –.16 .80 –.08 2.61
Coalition-building .23 –.10 –.13 –.58 –.18 –.91 –.21 –1.07 –.17 –1.09 –.08 –.53
Local layoffs –0.27 2.69 –.35 –.19 –.42 –1.02 –.40 –.98 –.39 –1.09 –.36 –.50
ISRAEL AFFAIRS 737
For the majority of topics (6 out of 10), compatibility was found between
the coverage of the dierent media in the same direction (i.e. above or below
the general salience average). One can also see that the salience in television
broadcasts is lower than that on the Internet when it comes to these topics.
For the other topics lacking compatibility, their television salience emerged
as above average; their online salience was below average (4 out of 11 top-
ics). Only the ‘election surveys’ topic was more salient online than it was on
television.
Table 1 also shows that the coverage of almost all 10 of the selected key
topics was higher on television than in the online public discourse (relative to
the average prominent discourse in any medium). For example, the topic ‘the
Prime Minister’s speech to the US Congress’ was most prominent on television
in the h week (z = 1.84); on the Internet this topic had a low prominence
for all six weeks (lower than the average online). e ‘Iranian threat’ topic was
the only topic whose salience was similar on both television and the Internet
(the h week was the highest in terms of salience for both media). However,
one can see that for this topic its Internet coverage began to rise from the rst
week (z = .34); its television coverage began to rise only in the h week. e
only topic whose salience was very high on the Internet for all six weeks (above
average) and whose salience was low on television was ‘Election surveys’. From
the rst week until the last week, the Internet focused on this topic intensively
(2.54 < z < 2.91); television broadcasts addressed this topic more intensively
only in the h week (z = .49).
Discussion and conclusions
e present article sought to underscore the degree of compatibility between
the media agenda and the public agenda during an election period. It further-
more sought to explore the current ability of television to set the agenda in a
time when new media and social networks are rapidly gaining in popularity.
e 10 topics most prominently covered by the three main Israeli television
news broadcast stations were examined in terms of their degree of online sali-
ence. Considerable consistency was evident between the media agenda and
the public agenda. ere was no dierence in the most salient subjects on
TV and the Internet. In other words, consistent with the ndings of Woolley
et al.,34 topics that were salient according to their television coverage were also
simultaneously salient in the realm of online public discourse. A comparative
analysis of salience trends in the coverage of the topics at hand – rise, drop or
stagnation – revealed a similarity between the two media spheres.
Despite the fact that issues discussed online without television coverage were
not examined in the present study, it is safe to conclude that both agendas, the
public and the media, maintained an impressive level of similarity as far as key
topics and their relative trends of salience. In other words, topics that generated
738 DANA WEIMANNSAKS ET AL.
salience and media interest on television similarly stirred interest and dis-
cussions online as well. ese ndings emphasize the interconnectedness and
convergence of ‘old’ and ‘new’ media suggested by Jenkins.35 Indeed, it seems
that media users switch from one platform to another, share their insights and
comments on various online platforms and alter the relationship between ‘new’
and ‘old’ media. In other words, as previously suggested, public discourse is
fed by, among other things, information sourced from ‘old’ media (television,
radio and press). Public discourse oen echoes this information; in other cases,
‘old’ media cover and echo information that was rst featured on the Internet.
Although this study does not focus on determining which platform was the
rst to present an issue, ordinal regression analysis, performed with the purpose
of identifying prediction possibility, revealed that the relative salience trends in
the online public discourse followed those of the television news broadcasts.
ese ndings support the assertion that television maintained its status as
an important, leading news medium during the March 2015 general elections
campaign in Israel. e media agenda, examined here based on the primary
television news broadcasts, very much dictated that the public agenda played
out in the online sphere. is nding, it seems, should not be taken lightly.
Conventional beliefs regarding the strengthened presence and scope of the
eect of online media in our everyday lives prompt leaders around the Western
world to channel precious resources into an online presence. e ndings of
the present study demonstrate that television is as strong as ever; at the very
least it is too early to declare its demise as a relevant, inuential arena. On the
other hand, as suggested by Johnson and Perlmutter,36 the Internet pluralized
the public discourse, enabled a multiplicity of voices and messages distributed
by individuals and various interested parties, and made it more dicult for
election candidates to control the conversation and try to dictate media and
public agendas.
Research limitations and follow-up studies
Time-series analysis is one of the most suitable analyses for determining cau-
sality between agendas.37 However, time-series analysis could not be employed
here because this study spanned only a short period (i.e. six weeks). It was
therefore necessary to make do with a Spearman rank-order correlation test
to analyse the link between the rankings and ordinal regression analysis. To
better understand the interaction between the two agendas, follow-up studies
are required that employ a longer period of time, which will make it possible
to employ the best, most suitable analysis method for the purpose at hand (i.e.
Granger’s time-series analysis).
In addition, the choice of examining the (online) public discourse charac-
teristics regarding the topics raised by the (television) media agenda very much
limits our understanding as far as the free public discourse occurring on the
ISRAEL AFFAIRS 739
Internet and social networks. Topics that were broached on the Internet but
did not receive any coverage by the ‘old’ media, particularly television, evaded
the monitoring mechanism used in this study. is article’s ndings essentially
imply whether and to what extent online social networks dealt with specic
issues, and hence disregard the nature of the discourse. erefore, it is possi-
ble that the nature of the online discourse is rather dierent (e.g. challenging
the narrative of the media). A comprehensive follow-up study is undoubtedly
required in order to explore the shaping and change patterns of the online
public agenda; such a study will be strongest if no previous restrictions are
placed on the topics that are examined. Nevertheless, it should be noted that
this goal is particularly demanding in terms of the scope of resources required
for its realization.
Notes
1. Patterson and Donsbach, “News Decisions,” 455–468; Wolfsfeld, Making Sense
of Media and Politics.
2. Blumler and Kavanagh, “e ird Age of Political Communication,” 209–230.
3. See for example in Sheafer and Weimann, “Agenda Building, Agenda Setting,”
347–365.
4. Shamir et al., “e Political Communication,” 47–66; Sheafer, “Charismatic Skill
and Media Legitimacy,” 711–736.
5. Dunaway and Stein, “Early Voting and Campaign News Coverage,” 278–296;
Iyengar et al., “Consumer Demand for Election News,” 157–175; Weimann and
Wolfsfeld, “Struggles over the Electoral Agenda,” 269–289.
6. Shamir et al., “e Political Communication of Mandate Elections,” 47–66.
7. Shamir and Shamir, e Anatomy of Public Opinion; Weimann, “e Obsession
to Forecast,” 396–408.
8. Sheafer and Weimann, “Agenda Building, Agenda Setting,” 347–365.
9. Jenkins, “e Cultural Logic of Media Convergence,” 33–43.
10. Nossek and Adoni, “On Gutenberg’s Shoulders,” 35–50.
11. Lev-On, “Campaigning Online,” 1–28.
12. Brosius and Weimann, “Who Sets the Agenda?” 561–580.
13. McCombs and Shaw, “e Agenda-setting Function,” 176–187.
14. Cohen, “e Press and Foreign Policy,” 13.
15. Lippmann, “e Mental Age of Americans.”
16. McCombs and Shaw, “e Evolution of Agenda-setting Research,” 58.
17. Dearing and Rogers, Agenda-setting.
18. See review by Dearing and Rogers.
19. Iyengar and Kinder, News at Matters.
20. Lopez-Escobar et al., “Two Levels of Agenda Setting.”
21. McCombs et al., “Setting the Agenda,” 77–92.
22. Lee et al., “Agenda-setting and the Internet,” 57–71.
23. Weaver et al., “Agenda-setting Research,” 257–282.
24. Coleman et al., “Agenda Setting,” 147–160.
25. McCombs et al., e News and Public Opinion.
26. Chaee and Metzger, “e End of Mass Communication?” 365–379.
27. McCombs, Setting the Agenda.
740 DANA WEIMANNSAKS ET AL.
28. Lee et al., “Agenda-setting and the Internet,” 57–71.
29. Sweetser et al., “Intermedia Agenda Setting,” 197–216.
30. Johnson and Perlmutter, “Introduction: e Facebook Election.”
31. Woolley et al., “e 2008 Presidential Election,” 631–652.
32. Möller, “Sense-making and Agenda Construction,” 361–371.
33. Krippendor’s alpha coecient was 0.86. A few items were further coded until
full agreement was reached among encoders.
34. Woolley et al., “e 2008 Presidential Election.”
35. Jenkins, “e Cultural Logic of Media Convergence.”
36. Johnson and Perlmutter, “Introduction: e Facebook Election.”
37. Granger, “Investigating Causal Relations,” 424–438.
Disclosure statement
No potential conict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Dana Weimann-Saks, Yaron Ariel, Vered Malka and Ruth Avidar are faculty members
at the Communication Department of the Max Stern Yezreel Valley College, Israel.
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