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Some Critical Issues in the Study of Moral Development
This paper reports young (3–5 year-olds’) children’s cognitive and affective understanding of actual moral (harm to others) and prudential (harm to self) transgressions in the family, as reported by the parent, but in a way that provides the child the opportunity to reflect on and reason about the actual events. A total of 38 parent–child dyads participated. Findings illuminate different levels of moral understanding during preschool years. Specifically, there was a sharp break between the understanding of 3 and 4–5 year-olds for both transgressions. However, across all age groups, the rate of increased relevance of the reasoning to the act was greater for prudential than for moral transgressions, and the understanding of own feelings as an agent of the transgression developed more slowly in the moral than the prudential domains. Unexpectedly, many 3 year-olds failed to understand the dangers inherent in prudential transgressions.
Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology.
Decisional bias (false alarm rate) when judging the guilt/innocence of a suspect is offered as an implicit measure of moral judgment. Combining two data sets, 215 participants, ages 10-12, 13-15, and 16-18 watched the visually identical film involving a person setting a fire, framed either as (a) intentional but not resulting in a fire (BI-NF), (b) unintentional but resulting in a major fire (NI-F), or (c) intentional and resulting in a major fire (BI-F). After watching the film, participants identified seriatim who of six individuals was the perpetrator and how certain they were. The data were subjected to a signal detection analysis. Participants also explicitly judged "how bad" the perpetrator and act were. The implicit measure fit Piaget's claim of moral realism, shifting from judging wrongness according to the outcome to judging according to the actor's intentions, better than the explicit traditional measures.
Twenty-four parents, mothers or fathers, of 3-5 year old children in a pre-school nursery kept diaries of problematic encounters within the family. Two of these encounters were later presented as 'pretend' stories to that child who made judgments of and emotionally reacted as if he/she were the story actor including giving reasons for complying. Encounters were coded into different domains (moral, social-conventional, prudential, etc.), and children's reactions compared across domains within each pair of encounters. Instead of the standard "right"/"wrong" question, the children were asked why they would/wouldn't commit the transgression again. All children said that they wouldn't do it again, but their reasons were more often congruent or consistent with the nature of prudential than of other kinds of transgressions, especially than moral transgressions. This suggests that while children may know "right from wrong," they do not see it as relevant to their moral behavior.
A thought-provoking examination of how explanations of social and moral development inform our understandings of morality and culture. A common theme in the latter part of the twentieth century has been to lament the moral state of American society and the decline of morality among youth. A sharp turn toward an extreme form of individualism and a lack of concern for community involvement and civic participation are often blamed for the moral crisis. Turiel challenges these views, drawing on a large body of research from developmental psychology, anthropology, sociology as well as social events, political movements, and journalistic accounts of social and political struggles. Turiel shows that generation after generation has lamented the decline of society and blamed young people. Using historical accounts, he persuasively argues that such characterizations of moral decline entail stereotyping, nostalgia for times past, and a failure to recognize the moral viewpoint of those who challenge traditions.
As the moral philosopher David Wong has noted (2006: xi): "The standard characterizations of [moral] relativism make it an easy target and seldom reveal what really motivates people who are attracted to it. Introductory textbooks in ethics frequently portray the view as an extreme variety of subjectivism (or conventionalism) in which anything goes – a person"s (or group"s) accepting that something is right makes it right for that person (or group)." This variety of moral relativism pictures human subjectivity in terms of human reactions of both acceptance (feelings of approbation) and rejection (feelings of opprobrium). Its central principle states that approving of some act or customary practice makes it right (good, virtuous, moral) and disapproving of the very same act or customary practice makes it wrong (bad, vicious, immoral); and this is so for any conceivable act or customary practice whether it is eating pork, terminating a pregnancy, drinking alcohol, spanking a child, banning a book, marrying a member of your own sex, marrying more than one member of the opposite sex, walking bare breasted on a public beach, covering yourself with a burqa 1 in the public square, conducting a Bris, 2 surgically reshaping the genitals of all the children in ones family regardless of their gender, assisting someone in committing a suicide or immolating yourself on the funeral pyre of your husband. Writing more or less in this vein the anthropologist Ruth Benedict once defined morality as "a convenient term for socially approved habits" (1934). It is not too surprising that this variety of moral relativism is viewed as extreme by many moral philosophers. If for no other reason than the fact that moral relativism of this variety rejects the most basic principle of moral reasoning presupposed by each of the parties to any genuine moral dispute; namely the presupposition that if I am right in judging a particular course of action to be wrong, bad, vicious or immoral then you cannot be equally right in thinking it right, good, virtuous or moral (see for example Rashdall 1914, also Cook 1999). One implication of moral relativism so portrayed is that the very same act or customary practice becomes right and wrong, good and bad, virtuous and vicious, moral and immoral to the very extent that two people (or groups) disagree about whether it is right or wrong, good or bad, virtuous or vicious, moral or immoral. This is because the extreme variety of moral relativism (as subjectivism or conventionalism) asserts that in fact there is nothing objective 1 The enveloping outer garment and face cover worn by women in public spaces in some Islamic traditions. 2 The Jewish ritual in which there is the surgical removal of the foreskin of a male infant eight days after his birth.
Aristotle thinks that we understand something when we know its causes. According to Aristotle but contrary to most recent approaches, causation and explanation cannot be understood separately. Aristotle complicates matters by claiming that there are four causes, which have come to be known as the formal, material, final, and efficient causes. To understand Aristotelian causation and its relationship to explanation, then, we must come to a precise understanding of the four causes, and how they are supposed to be explanatory. Aristotle’s discussion of the causes, however, is compact, and he typically presents them without arguing for them. He thus leaves us with a number of questions, ranging from the highly specific to the highly general. One question in particular has captured the attention of scholars and philosophers over the last century, and it has had a strong influence on recent treatments of the four causes – namely, whether we are right to understand Aristotle as committed to a plurality of kinds of causation, or rather a plurality of kinds of explanation. Sometimes the question is raised as one of whether it would be more accurate to speak of the four ‘becauses’ rather than the four ‘causes’. This worry is highly general, and there are in fact several ways in which it might be formulated; nonetheless, it is important to clarify the precise nature of the problem, and the possible ways of responding to it. At issue is not just whether Aristotle’s notions are sufficiently like the modern notion of causation to be relevant to our concerns, but, more importantly, whether the distinctions he draws are ultimately metaphysical or epistemological in character.
Intention, intentional action and moral considerations
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Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental investigation
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Developmental changes and individual differences in young children’s moral judgments
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