No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.
What's new in economic sanctions?
... Особый интерес для нас представляет литература, в которой рассматриваются санкции, введенные Советом Безопасности ООН [6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]. Глава «История и эффективность экономических принуждений (The History and Effectiveness of Economic Coercion» автора Ирины Богдановой [14] в монографии «Unilateral Sanctions in International Law and the Enforcement of Human Rights», содержит исторический обзор используемых санкций в международном праве и защите прав человека. ...
... Достигли цели введенные санкции против России или нет? Предпримем попытку найти ответ на поставленный вопрос в экономической литературе аналитиков из США, в том числе [7][8][9][10][11][12]. ...
... Следует отметить, что практически не существует официальной статистики с объяснением причин и факторов наложения санкций. Среди основных источников следует упомянуть коллектив авторов во главе с Гари Хафбуэра [8][9][10][11][12], который много лет проводит исследования эффективности политических и экономических санкций, которые применялись ООН, США и др. Рассмотрим статистику, характеризующую динамику и их количественное измерение применимых санкций, приведенных в исследовании . ...
В монографии систематизированы различные аспекты санкций, включая их исторический контекст, текущие тенденции, а также многообразие подходов к оценке их эффективности. Особое внимание уделено анализу современных киберсанкций и их влиянию на международные отношения и глобальную экономику. Содержание данной монографии является логическим продолжением проведенных исследований авторов.
Материал предназначен для широкого круга читателей, включая преподавателей, студентов, аспирантов экономических специальностей, научных сотрудников, работников организаций и предприятий.
... This essay examines critically these aspects, paying special particular attention to how US sanctions relating to international trade law and their extraterritorial effects. Foreign companies are frequently forced to negotiate the contradictory legal requirements of both US and non-US countries due to extraterritorial sanctions (Hufbauer & Jung, 2020) . The European Union's reaction to US sanctions on Iran of exemplifying the intricacy of these legal environments. ...
... Giumelli highlighted the effects of sector-specific sanctions on Iran's economy and how they can upset international commerce and economic stability (Giumelli & Ivan, 2013). In a similar vein, Hufbauer & Jung examine how US sanctions affect Russia, highlighting how sanctions may affect global economic linkages and geopolitical dynamics (Hufbauer & Jung, 2020). These case studies offer specific instances of how U.S. sanctions impact foreign trade and the legal difficulties that face multinational corporations. ...
U.S. sanctions' extraterritorial reach has drawn significant attention in the field of international trade law, impacting diplomatic ties and international business activities. This study examines the effects of US sanctions on organizations and people not subject to US law, evaluating the legal ramifications of such actions within the context of international trade law. The study explores how these penalties penetrate international borders, looking at executive and legislative measures including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) rules. The paper uses case studies of Iran, Russia and China to illustrate how extraterritorial U.S. sanctions impact global trade, corporate behavior, and legal responses. Additionally, quantitative data from global institutions assess their economic effects on trade, investment, and supply chains. The study concludes by exploring the legal tensions between U.S. sanctions and international trade law, offering policy recommendations for balancing sanctions with global legal norms. The analysis focuses on essential case studies where foreign entities, such as financial institutions and multinational enterprises, have been severely harmed by U.S. sanctions, leading to legal and compliance issues in multiple jurisdictions. This article clarifies how these sanctions alter the dynamics of international commerce, impose compliance obligations on multinational corporations, and potentially violate national sovereignty and international trade agreements by looking at significant instances and legal precedents. It also considers the wider ramifications for the stability of the world economy and the changing face of international regulatory cooperation. The results show contradictions between unilateral punitive policies and multilateral trade norms, highlighting a complex interplay between national security objectives and global economic obligations. This research aims to present a thorough grasp of the legal ramifications of extraterritorial U.S. penalties and how they affect international trade law. It adds to the continuing discussions over how to balance national regulatory power and international legal norms by providing insights into the operational and legal difficulties faced by multinational entities. According to the research, to effectively manage the intricacies of a globally interconnected economy, sanctions policy, and international legal harmonization need to be approached with greater nuance.
... force in the cited texts-in and of itself-shows that the two categories were meant to be evaluated as, at the very least, comparable by the framers of the declarations. 29 The UN declarations on friendly relations and nonintervention were intended to be authoritative sources for the interpretation of the UN Charter and were quasi-unanimously adopted as such. 30 The case has been made for a narrow interpretation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, arising specifically from the declaration on friendly relations. ...
... 33 The inadequacy of the generally formulated prohibition of economic coercion was pointed out in the literature, with some authors arguing that such actions, as tools of international relations, are in reality often used and rarely complained about. 34 It was also stated that if economic coercion might be considered a use of force (aggression) under the UN Charter, for such measures to be permissible under international law, they would have to fall within the distinct categories of self-defence, UN-authorised reprisals 29 As noted in the literature, legal scholars and states in the Global South from the outset advocated such an interpretation, equating economic coercion with threat or use of force, which was only adopted by the US during the 1973-1974 oil embargo. Lillich, 1975, pp. ...
The study aims to elicit the problems posed under international law and, to a lesser extent, under European Union (EU) law by export controls imposed on foundational transformative technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum information technology in the relations between United States and People’s Republic of China. It examines the notion of export controls and its evaluation under international law, finding that such an evaluation of the legal nature of these measures remains unclear on not only whether these measures may constitute economic coercion but also whether such coercion is prohibited. Further uncertainty persists regarding whether other legal foundations may be identified, which would permit such measures when they affect critical technologies for future development. The study finds that, currently, export controls affecting artificial intelligence and quantum information technology are limited but expanding, thereby creating some urgency in finding legal solutions to counteract their effects. Updating of the EU legal infrastructure, which is not ready to counteract the unintended effects of export controls on the EU, is also found as necessary.
... However, this does not diminish the enthusiasm for some states (primarily the US) and international organizations to adopt sanctions (Table 1). Hufbauer et al. (2007) There are numerous definitions of sanctions (Baldwin, 2020;Pape, 1998;Hufbauer & Jung, 2020). According to (Timofeev et al., 2020, p. 33-34), "sanctions are understood as Theory of sanctions and experience of overcoming the sanctions regime as exemplified by North Korea deliberate actions by a state ('initiating country'), a coalition of such states, or international organizations to reduce, limit, or withdraw from customs, trade, or financial relations with the 'target country' or 'recipient country'". ...
... The experience of sanctions against South Africa, Myanmar (Hufbauer & Jung, 2020;Jones, 2015) Iran (Mamedova, 2021;Sitkevich & Starodubrovskaya, 2022;Timofeev et al., 2022), and North Korea (Bulychev & Korgun, 2019;Vaks, 2018;Demina, 2022;Zakharova, 2019;Korgun & Toloraya, 2022;Lobov, 2020;Toloraya et al., 2020;Drezner, 1999) shows that in most cases the economic, political, and military goals set by the sanctioning countries and organizations were not achieved. This is even more demonstrated by the failure of the sanctions imposed by the US and its allies against Russia (Timofeev, 2021(Timofeev, , 2022Connolly, 2018). ...
The article considers aspects of economic sanctions, including their content, goals, and reasons for use despite relatively low effectiveness. As exemplified by North Korea, the article shows how sanctions are implemented to halt the national nuclear program. It analyzes the negative impact of UN and US sanctions on North Korea’s economic indicators, which failed to affect the pace and scale of the nuclear and missile weapons development program. The article evaluates the impact of sanctions on global trade, highlighting the externalities that become internalized through shadow institutions serving countries under sanction pressure. This contributes to the erosion of international economic cooperation and hurts global public welfare.
... E conomic sanctions, defined as the imposition or the threat imposition of economic measures on one country (the target country) by another (the sender country) to achieve political goals, have been an important weapon in response to geopolitical conflicts (Bornstein, 1968;Hufbauer and Jung, 2020;Hufbauer et al., 1990;Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1988;Pintor et al., 2023;Syropoulos et al., 2024). Due to the growing economic interdependence of countries worldwide, economic sanctions have been increasingly used in recent decades (Biersteker et al., 2016, Felbermayr et al., 2020Morgan et al., 2014Morgan et al., , 2023. ...
... Countries vulnerable to economic sanctions seek effective countermeasures to prevent and combat sanctions (Hackenbroich et al., 2020). Some researchers and policymakers suggested reducing the reliance on trade with potential sender countries through supply chain decoupling to lower the risk of being subjected to sanctions (Eppinger et al., 2021;Hufbauer and Jung, 2020). Others argue that complete decoupling is impossible under the deep integration of economies worldwide (Eppinger et al., 2021;Farrell and Newman, 2020). ...
Economic openness and globalization are under rising pressure from the proliferation of economic sanctions over the past decades. Data-driven evidence is urgently needed to inform the heated debates about the effectiveness of various sanctions and counter-sanction measures. In this research, we provide a game theoretical framework to model the interplays between the sanction sender and target at different stages of political conflicts. Using real-world international trade data, our game-theoretical framework assesses each country’s capability of and vulnerability to economic sanctions and quantifies the feasibility and effectiveness of different counter-sanction measures. Our findings suggest that expanded international trade creates the potential to weaponize economic interdependence for giant economies, imbalanced trade relationships with which is the main source of sanction risk for vulnerable economies. Complete decoupling from these highly capable countries is a costly and ineffective strategy to combat economic sanctions. Bloc-type collective retaliation against the common adversary can be effective under certain scenarios but provides little benefit for major contributors in the bloc, making it impractical in addressing real-world conflicts. Promoting cooperation and dialogue is the ultimate solution to maintaining economic and political stability and security.
... New technology has expanded the nature of sanctions from traditional trade restrictions to financial, travel, and contract cancellation measures. Not only governments but also nonstate actors have both imposed and been subjected to sanctions (Hufbauer and Jung 2020). ...
... President Trump called JCPOA ineffective (Hufbauer and Jung 2020). At the end of 2016, with the victory of Donald Trump in the presidential election and the increasing possibility of the United States withdrawing from the JCPOA, the relative stability that existed in the previous period disappeared. ...
This research examines the effects of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on business models, addressing a research gap in this area. The study focuses on a random sample of seventy-two small firms located in the Science and Technology Park of Tehran University. Data were collected through a questionnaire, and reliability and validity were assessed using Cronbach’s alpha, Dillon-Goldstein’s rho, convergent validity, and discriminant validity. The paired sample test was employed to determine the business model components influenced by the JCPOA. The results indicate significant positive differences in six components, including customer segments, customer relationships, key activities, key partners, cost structure, and revenue stream before and after the JCPOA. However, no significant differences were found in the value proposition, channels, and key resources. The findings suggest that the JCPOA has positively impacted business models overall. Notably, the need for significant differences in the value proposition contradicts previous research, highlighting the need for Iranian firms to adapt to new technologies. Conversely, improvements in customer segments and relationships can be attributed to lifting sanctions, allowing legal business transactions with Iranian companies and access to international markets. Channels and key resources showed no significant differences, implying the need for long-term planning and access to capital and distribution networks for Iranian companies. Key activities, key partners, cost structure, and revenue stream demonstrated significant increases, aligning with the ideas of previous studies.
... The concept of economic stability has further evolved to include economic resilience, particularly in the context of economic vulnerability due to sanctions, pandemics, and military conflicts. The impacts of these factors have been examined by researchers such as Ceylan, Ozkan, and Mulazimogullari (2020) and Hufbauer and Jung (2020), highlighting their significant effects on regional and global economies. This has led to growing interest in economic resilience, defined as the ability to maintain production levels close to capacity after a shock (Duval & Vogel, 2008). ...
This study explores the feasibility of forging trade partnerships between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, emphasizing the crucial role of economic stability in determining trade effectiveness considering the significance of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the region. Using the Morris technique, for measuring economic stability index, the research examines key variables such as inflation rates, unemployment rates, private debt metrics, loans and debt securities relative to gross domestic product (GDP), and government gross debt as a percentage of GDP. Granger Causality analysis has been applied for understanding the relationship between trade partnerships and economic stability index. Spanning from 2000 to 2021, this comprehensive analysis offers valuable insights into economic trends in both nations. The findings reveal similar levels of economic stability on average, with Tajikistan showing slightly higher stability since 2013 due to demographic factors and shifts in trade ratios to GDP. Kyrgyzstan averages a stability score of 63 percent, marginally lower than Tajikistan's 65 percent. The trade partnerships enhance the economic stability of Kyrgyzstan, while there is no significant relationship for the economy of Tajikistan. Therefore, Kyrgyzstan should be keen on following BRI projects for its economic stability.
... politicians, have emerged as a replacement for comprehensive sanctions (Drezner 2011). Second, deterrence, rather than actual implementation, has become the new goal for many recent sanctions (Hufbauer and Jung 2020). Both strategies are considered to be so-called 'smart', because they reduce the economic cost of sanctions. ...
We investigate the deterrent effects of a firm‐targeted sanction and a politician‐targeted sanction deployed by mainland China against Taiwan to deter support for ‘Taiwan independence’. In the short run, we find that the signal sent by the targeted sanctions generated deterrence to firms that were not directly sanctioned, but were politically inclined towards ‘Taiwan independence’. Specifically, we find that those firms that donated more to the party that supports ‘Taiwan independence’, while investing in mainland China before the sanction, experienced a decrease in stock return. In terms of magnitude, for those firms entirely leaning towards ‘Taiwan independence’, their stock returns are expected to decrease by around 1.3–1.5 percentage points after the sanction events, which translates into a decrease in the overall market value of sampled firms by 0.305–0.604%. In the medium to long run, we find no evidence that firms affected by the deterrence of the sanction reduced their investment in mainland China as a behaviour response.
... For foreign MNEs operating in sanctioned regimes such as Iran, Libya, Myanmar, Russia, and Syria, strategic choices include (1) divestment (permanent withdrawal through closure or sale) (Hufbauer & Jung, 2020), (2) alternative arrangements (temporary closure) (Gonchar & Greve, 2022;Meyer & Thein, 2014), and (3) nonconformance or "business as usual" (Panibratov & Gaur, 2022;Weber & Stępień, 2020). In essence, if MNEs choose to close their business operation, they lose legitimacy in the eyes of host country stakeholders. ...
... Economic penalties vary in effectiveness depending on the situation and are impacted by several variables. Sanctions are a useful weapon in some circumstances, but they frequently need welldefined goals, exact targeting, widespread international support, and constant use (Hufbauer and Jung 2020). Moreover, the effectiveness of the sanctions can be greatly impacted by the target nation's political dynamics, economic resiliency, and availability of other trading partners. ...
This research delves deeply into the intricate dynamics of economic sanctions levied by Western nations against Russia, investigating their wide-ranging implications. Employing a blend of quantitative analysis and hypothesis testing, the study unravels a notable insight: these sanctions carry a more substantial impact on the economies of the sanctioning nations themselves than on Russia. The study introduces the "Mary-Jeanne" theory, developed by Professors Jeanne Kaspard Kamel and Richard Hanna Beainy from Holy Spirit University. This theory asserts that the inefficacy of the sanctions on Russia, and their subsequent repercussions on Europe, emanate from the targeting of essential raw materials, particularly oil and gas. The research recommends an alternative approach to sanctions, advocating for the utilization of Russian gas at a moderated price cap, rather than a complete embargo on the commodity as currently enforced. This strategic shift would seek to address the present situation, wherein Russia encounters relatively minor losses due to the low raw material value, while Western industrialized nations grapple with substantial declines in their economies due to the high finished goods' value.
... For foreign MNEs operating in sanctioned regimes such as Iran, Libya, Myanmar, Russia, and Syria, strategic choices include (1) divestment (permanent withdrawal through closure or sale) (Hufbauer & Jung, 2020), (2) alternative arrangements (temporary closure) (Gonchar & Greve, 2022;Meyer & Thein, 2014), and (3) nonconformance or "business as usual" (Panibratov & Gaur, 2022;Weber & Stępień, 2020). In essence, if MNEs choose to close their business operation, they lose legitimacy in the eyes of host country stakeholders. ...
This study investigates how multinational enterprises (MNEs) navigate sanctioned regimes using the Myanmar context following a 2021 military coup. We find that without formal institutional pressures, MNEs exit voluntarily due to informal stakeholder pressures. However, such exits are often considered irresponsible as MNEs transfer assets to unethical buyers or the sanctioned regime, thus potentially worsening the human rights conditions. We provide eight propositions that define a responsible exit from a sanctioned regime. This study offers insights into the multifaceted nature of strategic exits thus articulating ethical dilemmas faced when exiting from foreign markets amid sanctions-induced challenges, real or perceived. This study proposes a framework outlining the interplay between formal and informal institutional pressures placed on MNEs in sanctioned regimes, thus theoretically contributing to the institution-based view by highlighting legitimacy concerns and reputational management strategies employed by MNEs.
... В-третьих, введение неэффективных санкций может быть платой за предотвращение нежелательных событий, которые произошли бы в их отсутствие. В-четвертых, многие авторы Hufbauer, Jung, 2020;Simola, 2023) отмечают, что санкции служат важным ингредиентом более широкого набора мер политики, направленных на достижение национальных целей. ...
The article examines the various effects of sanction restrictions on targeted countries. It achieves this by analyzing and structuring the results of over 50 academic studies from the past decade that focus on the impact of sanctions on different nations. This analysis is grounded in the study of sanction episodes, predominantly from the 1980s to 2015. The article notes that sanctions have been extensively employed in the past decade due to the intensification of international competition and increased global conflicts.
The findings reveal that the effects of sanctions exhibit significant ambiguity, temporal variability, and multidirectionality. Both negative impacts and certain stimulating effects are identified and systematized, particularly in the contexts of international trade and foreign direct investment. It is demonstrated that sanctions can sometimes act as triggers for structural changes in the economies of sanctioned countries, altering their integration into global production.
Moreover, the increasing involvement of various countries in sanction confrontations significantly changes the conditions for national economic policies, especially those oriented toward structural changes and long-term perspectives, primarily in industrial policies. For many countries, the task of formulating industrial policies that align with the restructuring of global value chains and their participation in them becomes increasingly relevant. This challenge is characteristic not only of countries targeted by sanctions but also of sanction-sending countries, for whom the reverse effects of sanctions are even less predictable.
... Accordingly, the US's imposition of tariffs on China during the trade war can be viewed as economic sanctions. One primary goal of the US was to compel China to address what the US perceived as longstanding unfair trade practices and intellectual property theft, actions seen as violating international norms (Hufbauer & Jung, 2020). Furthermore, the trade war that began in 2018 marks a significant turning point in the US-China relations, with some suggesting it as a realism-based strategy aimed to weaken China's power and maintain US global dominance (Kim, 2019). ...
... They inflict substantial constraints on the target country's economic activities, forcing the authorities to modify their policies to prevent further impairment (Wang, Shen, and Han 2022). Several studies state that the imposition of sanctions stagnates economic activities and increases the costs of doing business (Besedeš, Goldbach, and Nitsch 2021;Hufbauer and Jung 2020;Nikiforakis 2008). (Yui 2023) finds that due to economic sanctions, the private sector of the target country suffers the most because of this increased cost of doing business. ...
We assess the impact of financial development on Russian regional economic growth (2009–2019). Utilizing Method of Moments Quantile Regression, we find bank credit crucial for growth, especially in high-potential regions. Surprisingly, credit is more effective pre-WTO accession than post-accession. The 2014 sanctions negatively, but insignificantly impact the least developed regions, significantly affecting developing and developed ones. Gross fixed capital formation, export, and innovation significantly contribute to growth. Our findings imply nuanced regional dynamics in Russia and suggest tailored policy responses.
... A more recent example is US President Trump's threat to impose tariffs on all Mexican goods if Mexico did not curb the flow of migrants to the US southern border. Before sanctions were imposed, Mexico agreed to take adequate measures (Hufbauer and Jung 2020). Sanctions do not need to have the goal of reducing emigration from the target country. ...
In this first statistical analysis of how international sanctions affect international migration, we apply two estimation strategies, a panel difference-in-differences model and an event study approach. Our dataset covers 79,791 dyad-year observations, reflecting migration flows from 157 origin countries to 32 industrialized destination countries between 1961 and 2018. We find that UN and joint EU-US sanctions increase emigration from target countries by around 20 percent. Our event study results for joint EU-US sanctions imply a gradual increase in emigration throughout a sanction episode. The impact of UN sanctions on international migration is smaller and less persistent. Moreover, the effects are driven by target countries with limited freedom of political expression, where emigration substitutes for the costly voicing of dissent. Finally, there appear to be no systematic gender differences in the migration effect of sanctions.
... A more recent example is US President Trump's threat to impose tariffs on all Mexican goods if Mexico did not curb the flow of migrants to the US southern border. Before sanctions were imposed, Mexico agreed to take adequate measures (Hufbauer and Jung 2020). Sanctions do not need to have the goal of reducing emigration from the target country. ...
In this first statistical analysis of how international sanctions affect international migration, we apply two estimation strategies, a panel difference-in-differences model and an event study approach. Our dataset covers 79,791 dyad-year observations, reflecting migration flows from 157 origin countries to 32 industrialized destination countries between 1961 and 2018. We find that UN and joint EU-US sanctions increase emigration from target countries by around 20 percent. Our event study results for joint EU-US sanctions imply a gradual increase in emigration throughout a sanction episode. The impact of UN sanctions on international migration is smaller and less persistent. Moreover, the effects are driven by target countries with limited freedom of political expression, where emigration substitutes for the costly voicing of dissent. Finally, there appear to be no systematic gender differences in the migration effect of sanctions.
... On the other hand, North Korea has faced multiple U.N. Security Council sanctions since 2006 for its nuclear programme and human rights abuses (Hufbauer and Jung, 2020). The sanctions and arms embargo prohibit most economic and financial transactions with North Korea. ...
The study examines how economic sanctions affect Iran's economy, society, and regional influence, revealing their effectiveness and long-term implications. It uses quantitative and thematic analysis of government speeches, press releases, and news. The sample included 50 annual data observations from 1969 to 2018. This study's results indicate that economic sanctions negatively impact the Iranian economy, especially Iran's oil exports, banking, and manufacturing sectors. The ARDL model implies that sanctions enormously affect Iran's macroeconomic instability, and the more severe the sanctions imposed on Iran, the more significant the negative impact on the country's macroeconomic stability. The theme analysis demonstrates how sanctions have limited Iran's nuclear program but not stopped it completely. However, they have failed to reduce Iran's ability to support militant groups or its regional influence. Furthermore, sanctions have affected the tone of official speeches by Iranian leaders towards the West, making them more cooperative when Iran faces economic hardship and internal unrest. The study recommends that policymakers should consider using multilateral sanctions besides applying diplomatic strategies to minimise the impact on civilians. Finally, policymakers should support moderate candidates in Iranian elections to encourage positive political changes.
... A more recent example is US President Trump's threat to impose tariffs on all Mexican goods if Mexico did not curb the flow of migrants to the US southern border. Before sanctions were imposed, Mexico agreed to take adequate measures (Hufbauer and Jung 2020). Sanctions do not need to have the goal of reducing emigration from the target country. ...
In this first statistical analysis of how international sanctions affect international migration, we apply two estimation strategies, a panel difference-in-differences model and an event study approach. Our dataset covers 79,791 dyad-year observations, reflecting migration flows from 157 origin countries to 32 industrialized destination countries between 1961 and 2018. We find that UN and joint EU-US sanctions increase emigration from target countries by around 20 percent. Our event study results for joint EU-US sanctions imply a gradual increase in emigration throughout a sanction episode. The impact of UN sanctions on international migration is smaller and less persistent. Moreover, the effects are driven by target countries with limited freedom of political expression, where emigration substitutes for the costly voicing of dissent. Finally, there appear to be no systematic gender differences in the migration effect of sanctions.
... Sanctions have become a popular weapon to win over opponents in the global power war (Hufbauer and Jung, 2020). The objective of enforcing sanctions is to put the target country into economic adversity to change its actions. ...
... More recent literature instead speaks of 'weaponised interdependence' (Farrell & Newman, 2019;Weber & Schneider, 2020;Whang et al., 2013) and policy space constrained by global trade rules (Felbermayr et al., 2020;Hufbauer & Jung, 2020;van Bergeijk, 2021). ...
Multilateral economic sanctions jointly sent by the United States and its allies were studied theoretically and quantitatively. Theory provides an interdependence explanation for the current trend in economic sanctions, arguing that it constitutes an inherent motivation for the United States and its allies to act in concert to maintain the current ‘unipolar’ situation and to impede the development of any ‘multipolar’ alternative. Quantitatively, a computable general equilibrium model simulating the impact of the multilateral trade sanctions imposed in response to the Russia–Ukraine conflict was evaluated to support the interdependence view of economic sanctions. The results suggest that the interdependencies among the United States and its allies would be strengthened by sanctions, especially at the production end. By contrast, economic sanctions weaken the interdependencies between the sanction target and sanction senders, as well as between the sanction target and other major economies. The interdependencies between sanction target and world's major economies tend to be simplified, indicating a weakened role of sanction target in the global economic development.
... A company's reputation can often be linked to the quality of its crossborder political relationships and the strength of its connections with political leaders. Companies may face restrictions imposed by home countries, such as the restrictions placed on Chinese companies like Huawei and Tiktok by the USA (Hufbauer & Jung, 2020), or must comply with host country regulations and norms, like US companies in China with regards to data management and political content (Stevens et al., 2016). ...
his book provides insight into the Examination of institutions in terms of working hours, fragile currency, fragile economies and nominal triple deficits index (r-tdi), digitization of human resource management, regional convergence, and innovation policies in the countries under study, development of skills and processes related to primary school education, private sector activities within the framework of climate policies in relevant areas, the impact of disruptive and turbulent environments on multinational companies in terms of international relations, efficiency analysis of wind power plants in Turkey using enhanced OCRA context and social transformation in mass communication. It also addresses modern issues related to digitalization, innovation, the development of reading skills, and climate policies. Decision-makers and international institutions are interested in it. The book dealt with a set of recent studies related to that time and meanings are created at the intersection of each other based on the worker's life, relationships and employment history, that the issue of good governance is much more important than the issue of additional public investment, that institutions and mechanisms are essential for the diversification of production, that scientific studies in the light of the data obtained from two large databases such as Web of Science and Scopus after theoretical information on the digitalization of HRM are very few studies in this field, One of the skills measured in the internationally recognized PISA exam, which is attended by students from 79 countries, is the ability to read, recent economic disruptions are a close link between political processes and the strategies of multinational corporations (MNCsr) and their affiliates, Turkey continues to view the problem of the climate crisis as a foreign policy issue, and in order to measure the representation of the r-TDI index, other indicators of fragility for a decade or more With the help of tables and graphs, the conclusions of the assessments made on eleven fragile economies and in this context the fragility of the TDI values are primarily the ability to represent and the extent of its effects on institutions and organizations as well. This book is intended for management scholars, researchers, doctoral students, and entrepreneurs and policymakers .
... We do recognize, however, that the distinction between sanctions and tariffs is increasingly becoming blurred (cf. Hufbauer and Jung (2020)). For datasets on specific trade policy tools, we refer the reader to WTO and UN sources. ...
This paper introduces the third update/release of the Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB‐R3). The GSDB‐R3 extends the period of coverage from 1950–2019 to 1950–2022, which includes two special periods—COVID‐19 and the new sanctions against Russia. This update of the GSDB contains a total of 1325 cases. In response to multiple inquiries and requests, the GSDB‐R3 has been amended with a new variable that distinguishes between unilateral and multilateral sanctions. As before, the GSDB comes in two versions, case‐specific and dyadic, which are freely available upon request at GSDB@drexel.edu . To highlight one of the new features of the GSDB, we estimate the heterogeneous effects of unilateral and multilateral sanctions on trade. We also obtain estimates of the effects on trade of the 2014 sanctions on Russia.
... Books, lectures, and films by international celebrities such as Nobel winners, renowned CEOs like Bill Gates, or star politicians like Barack Obama are very prominent in exercising soft power. China is a new actor utilizing ESs and imposed ten sanction cases from 2010 to 2018, which is three times higher than the number of cases from 1978 to 2000 (Hufbauer & Jung, 2020). Its government has implemented policies to promote Chinese culture overseas-for instance, the establishment of 548 Confucius Institute around the world. ...
This chapter examines the intricate legal landscape governing the imposition and enforcement of US economic and financial measures. It navigates emergency laws, spotlighting acts like the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977, revealing their jurisdiction over US persons. Shifting to non-emergency laws, it explains milestones like the National Security Act of 1947 and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, outlining the boundaries of presidential powers via export restrictions and the Exports Administration Act of 1979. The chapter also examines presidential powers delving into arms control, non-proliferation, international trade, and culminates in analyzing financial sanctions involving private transactions as well as credit and investment transactions of international financial institutions.
With the help of a new, comprehensive sanctions database and utilizing the latest developments in the structural gravity literature, we estimate the effects of economic sanctions on international trade. We demonstrate that the average effects of sanctions hide significant heterogeneity depending on the type of sanctions considered, their duration, objectives and sender types. We also zoom in on the sanctions against Iran. We find that their effects are significant but also widely heterogeneous across sanctioning countries, even within the European Union, and depend on the direction of trade. We complement the aggregate analysis with estimates for 170 sectors, showing that sanctions have been effective in decreasing bilateral trade at the sectoral level while the effects vary significantly across sectors and across complete versus partial trade sanctions.
As global integration has increased over time, so too has the use of economic sanctions as a policy tool. Sanctions have the potential to affect trade flows regardless of other intended objectives. We use a gravity model framework and the updated Global Sanctions Data Base to characterize the heterogeneous response of exports to various types of sanctions. Specifically, we use disaggregated product‐level trade flows for 247 countries over the period 1962–2019 and focus primarily on exporter and importer sanctions. We extend the literature by showing that, when looking separately at the extensive and intensive margins of trade, complete sanctions have the strongest impact on the extensive margin, while partial sanctions matter most for the intensive margin. We also explore whether the effects of sanctions are anticipated and/or persist over time, and we find some evidence of both effects. We further add to the existing literature by using quantile regression in a panel data context with fixed effects to allow for heterogeneity in the impact of sanctions on trade margins. We find that complete sanctions disproportionately reduce exports for countries with low initial export volume, while partial sanctions are more likely to reduce exports in countries with high initial export volume.
Under what conditions does China openly acknowledge the use of unilateral sanctions against other countries? China is notorious for maintaining an official position that it is against using unilateral sanctions on the international stage. Yet, as recent events have also indicated, China has grown more proactive and obvious in its reliance on these unilateral measures. By considering China’s changing approach to publicly acknowledging its use of sanctions, this paper recognizes that China’s sanctions practice appears to be more complicated. It also recognizes that the seemingly contradictory practices of relying on vagueness and explicitly acknowledging sanctions coexist, forming China’s complex sanctions behavior. This paper turns to the concept of disrespect to explain China’s complex sanctions acknowledgement rhetoric. When China feels that it has been gravely disrespected, China tends to be more explicit in publicly acknowledging the use of sanctions. To test this hypothesis, this paper looks at the cases of China’s use of sanctions towards targeted actors during (1) Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022, (2) Japan’s nationalization of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in 2012, and (3) the Standoff between the Philippines and China at the Huangyan Dao/Scarborough Shoal in 2012. In the first two cases where conditions for salient disrespect were met, China’s sanctions use was explicit and discernible. The Philippines’ case, on the other hand, shows that China’s vague rhetoric coincides with relatively moderate perceptions that it was disrespected. This paper highlights the importance of status, emotions, and constructed meanings in shaping China’s foreign policy by underscoring disrespect as a possible explanatory variable to China’s changing sanctions rhetoric.
In this first statistical analysis of how international sanctions affect international migration, we apply two estimation strategies, a panel difference-in-differences model and an event study approach. Our dataset covers 79,791 dyad-year observations, reflecting migration flows from 157 origin countries to 32 industrialized destination countries between 1961 and 2018. We find that UN and joint EU-US sanctions increase emigration from target countries by around 20 percent. Our event study results for joint EU-US sanctions imply a gradual increase in emigration throughout a sanction episode. The impact of UN sanctions on international migration is smaller and less persistent. Moreover, the effects are driven by target countries with limited freedom of political expression, where emigration substitutes for the costly voicing of dissent. Finally, there appear to be no systematic gender differences in the migration effect of sanctions.
The international arena is transitioning from a period of unipolarity to multipolarity and bearing increasingly dangerous fruit by posing a range of risks to the existing international political order. We argue that the great power politics of the Cold War offer valuable lessons for state behavior in the emerging multipolar world. These lessons draw on Cold War-era behaviors such as balance of power actions, nuclear posturing, proxy conflicts, and economic power competition. Through these behaviors, this article provides a framework for understanding and managing contemporary multipolar competition focusing on the period after the Ukraine invasion. Ultimately, we call for major powers to exercise restraint and strategic foresight to prevent the devastating consequences of unchecked rivalry, ensuring a stable and secure international order.
This paper aims at assessing quantitatively the macroeconomic impact of EU sanctions against Russia for the economy of Cyprus. To this end, we use a medium-scale micro-founded DSGE model of a small open economy participating in a currency union like the euro area calibrated to the economy of Cyprus. The model features two sectors of production, namely the tradable and the non-tradable one. In this model, EU sanctions influence the sanctioning economy (i.e. Cyprus) through a mix of foreign shocks that hit in principle the tradable sector. In particular, to mimic the economic environment (namely, how all this started in 2022), we analyze first the effects of an energy-type shock modeled as a standard cost-push shock on imported goods. In turn, we add to this economic environment the impact of policy reactions like EU sanctions against Russia. In this context and given the strong trade ties of Cyprus with Russia, we model sanctions as two simultaneous negative exogenous shocks, that is, a temporary decrease in the exported goods, reflecting primarily reductions observed in tourism and financial services, and in inward foreign direct investment (FDI). Contrary to the mild impacts reported in the literature for the majority of EU countries we find non negligible negative effects for the economy of Cyprus which range from 1.24% to 3.13% in terms of average output loss in the short run. Given Cyprus’s vulnerable external position we show that the impact of sanctions depends crucially on the degree of tightening financing conditions which are likely to hit particularly more countries with high initial current account deficits and debt stocks.
This chapter addresses the targeted anti-luxury sanctions against Russian individuals in connection with the full-scale war in Ukraine, specifically how the sanctions are justified and enforced with regard to yachts—the ultimate luxury good. Instead of assessing the efficiency of the enforcement or looking for the next loopholes to be fixed, it focuses on the stated motivation of the senders (the sanctioners). The author argues that these sanctions regimes are permeated by the modern Western utilitarian paradigm, where utility and ‘smartness’ are the highest moral values and technocratic expertise the source of moral authority. Through a ‘radical othering’, super-rich Russians are cast as almost ultimate villains whose access to luxurious, wasteful enjoyment must be barred. However, while backed by considerations of utility and shaped as a war on waste, anti-yacht sanctions are so complicated and resource-demanding to enforce that they themselves end up as highly wasteful.
The paper discusses the Gulf War and its economic repercussions, among other things, the article addresses the disastrous effects of the UN Security Council embargo on Iraq. It draws attention to Iraq's strained resources, heightened susceptibility to outside forces, and long-term impacts of the conflict. The study delves into the intricate mechanisms that contribute to Iraq's economic woes as well as the sanctions imposed by the international community. Main Results: The extensive embargo imposed on Iraq by the UN Security Council had disastrous effects on the country's population and economy. The main causes of Iraq's current situation were determined to be the severity and arbitrary character of the sanctions system. The Gulf War that followed Iraq's invasion of Kuwait resulted in heightened international isolation and a tightening of the sanctions system. The Sanctions Committee also arranged for Iraq to receive financial assistance every six months to cover the cost of importing food, medical supplies, and other necessities for humanitarian relief.
Travel sanctions are a strategic diplomatic tool that are generally preferred by sanctioning countries to other invasive actions because they can reduce or avoid casualties and losses and achieve policy goals. The present study investigates the relationship between travel sanctions and the number of international tourist arrivals by employing a gravity model from 1995 to 2015. The empirical results reveal that imposing international travel sanctions leads to a decrease in the number of tourist arrivals. Moreover, sanctions between developed countries have more influential effects than those between developing countries.
UNSC sanctions have been referred to as a powerful tool increasingly used by the UNSC to maintain international peace and security based on Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. This study conducts a bibliometric analysis to provide a comprehensive overview of the current research status, developments trends, and research hotspots in UNSC sanctions research from 1990 to 2023. This study uses CiteSpace to visualize and analyze datasets of 345 articles about UNSC sanctions obtained from the Web of Science (WOS) database. The research on UNSC sanctions has three stages: the initial development stage (1990–2006), the transitional development stage (2007–2017), and the rapid development stage (2018–2023). This study describes UNSC sanctions research status, trends, hotspots, and distributions of publications by journal sources, disciplines, countries, institutions, and authors. It also describes the knowledge-based mapping and research hotspots on UNSC sanctions, including keywords, citation burst, keyword clusters, keyword clusters timeline view, cited references, intellectual base, and descriptive analysis. In addition, this study analyzed UNSC sanctions research divided into four domain categories: implementation, human rights, impacts, and specific regimes. The results showed that the topic of UNSC sanctions was multidisciplinary research and that scholars from different research disciplines had different focuses on UNSC sanctions. This study offers valuable insights into the current hot topics within the field of UNSC sanctions and offers recommendations for future research directions.
Using a gendered crisis approach, this study investigates the impact of sanctions on Iranian women’s nascent entrepreneurial behaviours. Using data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor’s individual-level data and sanctions intensity data on 10,781 individuals, aged 18–65 from 2008 to 2018, the findings indicate that sanctions lower the perceived opportunities to start a business for women more so than for men. Although sanctions did not influence perceived start-up skills, suggesting resilience among women amid the challenges, sanctions did reduce the fear of failure for women more so than for men. Policymakers, both in the Collective West and in Iran, can use these insights to develop gender-inclusive measures and support women’s entrepreneurship in sanction-affected contexts.
The study is structured into three critical sections, each offering a distinct perspective on the evolving relationship. The first section, "Historical Evolution of EU-Russia Relations," meticulously examines the historical context and the evolutionary trajectory of the relationship. It provides insightful analysis, tracing the origins and development of diplomatic, economic, and geopolitical ties between the EU and Russia. The second segment, "Justification and Implementation of Economic Sanctions against Russia," meticulously dissects the rationale behind the EU's imposition of economic sanctions on Russia. It evaluates the factors and circumstances that led to their implementation, shedding light on the diplomatic and geopolitical motivations behind this crucial decision. The study assesses the impact of economic sanctions on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine in the section titled "Evaluation of the Effects of Economic Sanctions on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine." It rigorously analyzes the repercussions of these sanctions on Russia's economy, geopolitics, and overall stance on international relations. This conceptual study provides a comprehensive and nuanced analysis of the EU-Russia relationship, highlighting both the challenges and potential future prospects. It serves as a valuable resource for scholars, policymakers, and individuals interested in understanding the complex dynamics between these influential geopolitical entities. Keywords: EU-Russia relation, EU's sanctions on Russia, The result of EU's sanctions on Russia Introduction The complex and multifaceted relationship between the European Union (EU) and Russia stands as a focal point in global geopolitics, marked by a tapestry of historical, political, and economic intricacies. As the world witnesses evolving power dynamics, the nature of interactions between these influential entities has come under intense scrutiny. The conceptual article "Future Prospects and Challenges in the European Union's Relations with Russia" aims to dissect this intricate relationship, offering insights into its evolution and forecasting potential trajectories. Beginning with an exploration of the historical evolution of EU-Russia relations, this article delves into the roots and evolution of their interactions. From historical alliances to geopolitical rivalries, the nuanced historical context provides a foundation to comprehend the contemporary landscape of this dynamic association. Subsequently, the article examines the rationale and execution behind the EU's implementation of economic sanctions against Russia. This analysis provides critical insights into the diplomatic, economic, and geopolitical motivations guiding the EU's decisions, shaping the narrative of their relationship. Furthermore, a comprehensive evaluation of the effects of economic sanctions on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine forms a pivotal segment of this article. By scrutinizing the socioeconomic impacts, geopolitical shifts, and the resilience displayed by Russia in response to these sanctions, this evaluation sheds light on the intricate repercussions of such measures on bilateral ties. This study sets out to unravel the layers of complexities embedded within the EU-Russia relationship, paving the way for a deeper understanding of its challenges and opportunities. Through this exploration, it seeks to offer a roadmap for envisioning potential future trajectories and navigating the complexities that define the relationship between the European Union and Russia in an ever-evolving global landscape. Historical Evolution of EU-Russia Relations The relationship between the European Union (EU) and Russia stands as a complex tapestry woven through centuries, marked by periods of collaboration, contention, and transformation. Understanding the historical evolution of these relations is crucial to decipher the contemporary geopolitical landscape. The roots of EU-Russia relations trace back to pre-Soviet times when European states and the expansive Russian Empire engaged in various forms of diplomacy, trade, and cultural exchanges. These interactions were characterized by both cooperation and conflict. While cultural and economic exchanges flourished, geopolitical differences and territorial disputes often strained relations. Following World War II, Europe faced a division marked by the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower and the subsequent Cold War. The Iron
In this chapter, Borozna and Kochtcheeva present a comprehensive analysis of research on sanctions, covering their various types, objectives, and their effectiveness in influencing the foreign policy direction of the states they are imposed upon. The synthesis of empirical evidence strongly suggests that, in the realm of coercive diplomacy, economic sanctions are typically ineffective. Targeted nations frequently do not modify their foreign policy stances and tend to maintain their domestic political trajectories. Paradoxically, sanctions can sometimes produce negative consequences for the states imposing them. The research shows that due to the damage that sanctions inflict on the economies of the targeted states, countries subject to sanctions perceive them as a threat to their national security. The destructive effect on the economy of the targeted state is comparable to the destruction of the state economy during a military intervention. Additionally, the research in security studies reveals how states can frame discussions surrounding sanctions as matters of national security. This framing is a strategic tool that governments use to rally their populations to endure the hardships brought about by sanctions. This not only eases the burden on the targeted state but also contributes to the limited success of sanctions in terms of achieving their goals.
This article introduces the concept of geopolitical decoupling in global production networks (GPNs). Geopolitical decoupling is imposed on coupling participants by geopolitical forces that pressure transnational corporations to exit host regions/economies by cutting investment, production, and trade links with host country firms and industries. It also aims to disrupt inside-out trade, investment, and production links of host country firms abroad. The article identifies the basic features of geopolitical decoupling, the central role of states in geopolitical decoupling, the strategic responses of firms to deal with decoupling pressures, and the state strategies to cope with the negative effects of geopolitical decoupling in affected regions/economies. Empirically, the article investigates geopolitical decoupling on the example of the Iranian automotive industry, which experienced three geopolitical decouplings from automotive industry GPNs since 1979. It demonstrates the short- and long-term effects of geopolitical decoupling and recoupling on the Iranian automotive industry in the context of the strategic responses by the state and the political struggles over the nature of the state industrial development policy in Iran.
In the era of digital transformation, the structure and application of economic sanctions have evolved, expanding from traditional trade embargoes to sophisticated digital and financial sanctions. The recent conflict in Ukraine triggered a spectrum of responses from the Western powers, targeting Russia’s digital sectors. The sanctions include restrictions on quantum computing, IT services, manufacturing, aerospace technology, and other measures that may impede the country’s digital transformation. This study aims to understand if these emerging digital-technology related measures can be perceived as a novel form of economic sanctions and to explore the potential economic implications for Russia. Two primary research questions are addressed in this paper: First, we ask whether sanctions targeting digital technology and development can be seen as an advanced form of economic sanctions, and what would be the subsequent economic losses incurred by Russia. We also explore possible Russian responds or adapt to these economic pressures. As digital transformation continues to revolutionise economies globally, this research posits that digital-technology sanctions hold substantial economic ramifications for targeted countries. By analysing the features and outcomes of the recent sanctions against Russia, the study provides insights into the evolving landscape of sanctions mechanisms and diplomacy in the digital age.
The paper examines the so-called U.S.-China “tech war” of 2017–2020 in the sphere of cutting-edge digital technologies, its origins, factors, and other aspects, with a focus on the American strategy to limit China’s opportunities for technological development. The purpose of this study is to conceptualise the American tech war strategy and to assess the character and prospects of technology conflicts. The article represents the study with the use of comparative, historical approaches, the elements of systematic economic analysis, and some elements of neorealist and constructivist approaches. Based on the examination of key drivers of the tech war (with regard to the U.S. position), as well as the comparative historical analysis of the observed processes and the instruments implemented to fight for technological leadership, it concludes that technology conflictis a new phenomenon, determined, among other things, by the specifics of digital technologies and economic changes of recent decades, which at the same time preserves natural continuity in relation to the past geopolitical and economic conflicts and existing strategies and tools. Taking into account the peculiarities of the new conflict and digital technologies it deduces that it is possible to describe the U.S. policy in the framework of an adjusted concept of neo-techno nationalism (strengthening national technological potential and sovereignty through global economic instruments). It is noted that in the context of the digital revolution and in the analysis of the clash of superpowers this concept implies that goals are achieved through providing preferential access to such specific development resources as global human capital and big primary data, the formation of systems of standards, etc. In the conclusion, it is highlighted that the U.S. strategy under Trump, which led to a tougher American course in the tech war with China, was determined by objective circumstances as well as by personal traits of the president. In particular, such circumstances include the need to break old ineffective practices to design new solutions and approaches. The author draws a conclusion that in the future the United States will focus on building techno-economic regimes as a more systemic strategy for waging a technology conflict considering adjusted neo-techno national logic.
The imposed restrictions actualized the problem areas in the economy of the Russian Federation, new vulnerabilities in the system of economic security were revealed. Restrictions on access to modern technology are particularly dangerous to the country's level of economic development and possible future development. The purpose of the study is to summarize and systematize the measures and experience of the introduction of innovative, including digital, technologies of economic sectors and the use of digital technologies in the process of ensuring the security of national economies applicable in the context of restrictions. It was found that the Russian Federation was more affected by the country destruction and the resulting disruption of economic ties than by the sanctions imposition on Iran. However, while the Russian economy recovered during the decade, the negative dynamics in the Iranian economy persisted during the period under study. It is concluded that an impact of sanctions on national economies is long-lasting. It is found that Iran is inferior to Russia in the level of digitalization, but this gap is not critical. This allowed us to conclude that Iranian industry is adapting to the restrictions and implementing digital technologies in spite of its. An overview is given of some economy sectors that actively and effectively use digital technology, in particular in the defense industry, aircraft construction, the automotive industry and in the social sphere. It is proposed to use the experience of specific projects to study and implement its in Russian industry and services. Proposals have been formulated aimed at combining the resources and potential of countries under sectional pressure to produce analogues of high-tech products, as well as products made using their own technology.KeywordsDigitalizationIranLimitationsRussiaTechnology
Using a new, global data base covering the years 1950 to 2015, we study the impact of sanctions on international trade and welfare. We make use of the rich dimensionality of our data and of the latest developments in the structural gravity literature. Starting with a broad evaluation by sanction type, we carefully investigate the case of Iran. Effects are significant but also widely heterogeneous across sanctioning countries. Moreover, they depend on the direction of trade. We also perform a counterfactual analysis which translates our partial equilibrium sanction estimates into heterogeneous but intuitive general equilibrium effects within the same framework.
This paper examines the effect of financial sanctions on cross-border capital flows. While sanctions can be expected to hinder international transactions, thereby putting political and economic pressure on a target country, we study the patterns of adjustment in bilateral financial relationships after the imposition of sanctions along various dimensions. Our analysis is based on highly disaggregated, monthly data from the German balance of payments statistics for the period from 2005 through 2014. During this time, Germany imposed financial sanctions on 20 countries; two of these sanctions have been lifted. Applying a differences-in-differences approach, we find two key results. First, financial sanctions have a strong and immediate negative effect on direct financial flows with the sanctioned country, with cross-border flows reduced in either direction. Second, sanctions imposed by the European Union alone, and therefore only enforced by their member countries instead of the United Nations, are evaded as flows with major trading partners of sanctioned countries increase. We conclude that financial sanctions do matter for capital flows.
Do export sanctions cause export deflection? Data on Iranian non-oil exporters between January 2006 and June 2011 shows that two-thirds of these exports were deflected to non-sanctioning countries after sanctions were imposed in 2008, and that at this time aggregate exports actually increased. Exporting firms reduced prices and increased quantities when exporting to a new destination, however, and suffered welfare losses as a result.
The use of the EU instrument of political and economic sanctions has continually been rising since 1987. However, the sanctions are used differently according to geographic vicinity, political motivation, and which security objectives the EU promotes. Clara Portela explored the European sanction regime for the period 1987-2003 and showed that the EU has different political motivations and objectives for each region and that, in particular, geographic vicinity plays a significant role for the application for sanctions. This article relates to Portela´s analytic approach from 2005 and verifies her hypotheses for the period 2005-2015. In summary, the article shows that the EU still focuses on geographic vicinity and security relevance. Only the area of sanction application has changed, moving from Eastern Europe to the Middle East.
The extensive literature on sanctions has mainly focused on a dyadic interaction between sender and target. In contrast, this paper examines sanctions when the sender and target are embedded in a network of linkages to other agents. The sender can assemble a sanctioning coalition of neighbors to sever their links (execute multi-link cuts) to the target and her allies. Efficacy of sanctions is now crucially dependent on the network architecture. We characterize the structural properties of networks in which a sender can effectively sanction a target in the short run (when links can only be deleted) and the long run (when links can be both deleted and added).
Recent research on economic sanctions has produced significant advances in our theoretical and empirical understanding of the causes and effects of these phenomena. Our theoretical understanding, which has been guided by empirical findings, has reached the point where existing datasets are no longer adequate to test important hypotheses. This article presents a recently updated version of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset. This version of the data extends the temporal domain, corrects errors, updates cases that were ongoing as of the last release, and includes a few additional variables. We describe the dataset, paying special attention to the key differences in the new version, and we present descriptive statistics for some of the key variables, highlighting differences across versions. Since the major change in the dataset was to more than double the time period covered, we also present some simple statistics showing trends in sanctions use over time.
Meeting the Challenge of Secondary Sanction
- Ellie Geranmayeh
- Manuel Lafont Rapnouil
Ellie Geranmayeh and Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, "Meeting the Challenge of Secondary Sanction," European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief, June
25, 2019.
- Laurence Norman
Laurence Norman, "EU Ramps Up Trade System With Iran Despite U.S. Threats," Wall Street Journal, March 31, 2020.
Russia expands sanctions against Ukraine
- Alexander Bychkove
- Vladimir Efremov
Alexander Bychkove and Vladimir Efremov, "Russia expands sanctions against Ukraine," SanctionNews, April 23, 2019.
China and economic sanctions: Where does Washington have leverage?
- Richard Nephew
Richard Nephew, "China and economic sanctions: Where does Washington have leverage?" Brookings Institute, September 2019.
China's Response to U.S.-South Korean Missile Defense System Deployment and its Implications
For more details, see Ethan Meick and Nargiza Salidjanova, "China's Response to U.S.-South Korean Missile Defense System Deployment and its Implications," US-China Economic Security Review Commission, Staff Research Report, July 26, 2017.
Iron Curtain" Speech transcript, The History Place
- Winston Churchill
Winston Churchill, "Iron Curtain" Speech transcript, The History Place, March 5, 1946.
42 US trade balance in goods and services with China was $335
- C Michael
- Gordon Bender
- Lubold
- O Kate
- Jeremy 'keeffe
- Page
Michael C. Bender, Gordon Lubold, Kate O'Keeffe and Jeremy Page, "U.S. Edges Toward New Cold-War Era With China," Wall Street Journal, October 12,
2018.
42 US trade balance in goods and services with China was $335.7 billion in 2017, up from $308.4 billion in 2016.
Measuring Smartness: Understanding the Economic Impact of Targeted Sanctions. Department of State The Office of the Chief Economist (OCE) Working Paper Series
- D P Ahn
- R D Ludema
Ahn, D.P., Ludema, RD., 2016. Measuring Smartness: Understanding the Economic Impact of Targeted Sanctions. Department of State The Office of the Chief
Economist (OCE) Working Paper Series December.
Collateral Damage: The Impact of Russia Sanctions on Sanctioning Countries' Exports CEPII Working Paper
- M Crozet
- J Hinz
Crozet, M., Hinz, J., 2016. Collateral Damage: The Impact of Russia Sanctions on Sanctioning Countries' Exports CEPII Working Paper, June.
On Target? The Incidence of Sanctions Across Listed Firms in Iran
- M Draca
- J Garred
- N Warrinnier
- L Stickland
Draca, M., Garred, J., Warrinnier, N., Stickland, L., 2017. On Target? The Incidence of Sanctions Across Listed Firms in Iran. University of Warwick Working
Paper.
How do International Sanctions End? Towards a Process-Oriented, Relational, and Signalling Perspective. German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA)
- J Grauvogel
- H Attia
Grauvogel, J., Attia, H., 2020. How do International Sanctions End? Towards a Process-Oriented, Relational, and Signalling Perspective. German Institute of
Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Hamburg GIGA Working Papers, No. 320.
China's Use of Coercive Economic Measures
- P Harrell
- E Rosenberg
- E Saravalle
Harrell, P., Rosenberg, E., Saravalle, E., 2018. China's Use of Coercive Economic Measures. Center for New American Security.
The 3rd edition of Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Peterson Institute for International Economics
- G C Hufbauer
- J J Schott
- K A Elliott
- B Oegg
Hufbauer, GC., Schott, JJ., Elliott, KA., Oegg, B., 2009. The 3rd edition of Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Peterson Institute for International Economics,
Washington DC.
Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective
- J Hurley
- S Morris
- G Portelance
Hurley, J., Morris, S., Portelance, G., 2018. Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective, p. 121 Center for Global
Development Policy Paper.
The Effects of Embargoes on International Trade: Evidence From Russia Working Paper
- A Miromanova
Miromanova, A., 2018. The Effects of Embargoes on International Trade: Evidence From Russia Working Paper.
The New Deterrent: International Sanctions Against Russia over the Ukraine Crisis. Institute of International and Development Studies
- E Moret
- T Biersteker
- F Giumelli
- C Portela
- M Veber
- D Jarosz
- C Bobocea
Moret, E., Biersteker, T., Giumelli, F., Portela, C., Veber, M., Jarosz, D., Bobocea, C., 2016. The New Deterrent: International Sanctions Against Russia over the
Ukraine Crisis. Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva.
MDs bury their mistakes, we don't have to: learning from empirical findings that suggest your theory is wrong
- Morgan
Morgan, T.C, 2019. MDs bury their mistakes, we don't have to: learning from empirical findings that suggest your theory is wrong. This was presented at
the workshop "Sanctions: Theory, Quantitative Evidence, and Policy Implication. Drexel University, Philadelphia Forthcoming.
The Response of Russian Security Prices to Economic Sanctions: Policy Effectiveness and Transmission
- M Stone
Stone, M., 2016. The Response of Russian Security Prices to Economic Sanctions: Policy Effectiveness and Transmission. U.S. Department of State Office of
the Chief Economist Working Paper.
Aid sanctions and autocratic rule: does regime type matter? This was presented at the workshop "Sanctions: Theory, Quantitative Evidence, and Policy Implication
- C Portela
- J S Mora-Sanguinetti
Portela, C., Mora-Sanguinetti, JS., 2019. Aid sanctions and autocratic rule: does regime type matter? This was presented at the workshop "Sanctions: Theory,
Quantitative Evidence, and Policy Implication. Drexel University, Philadelphia on April 19.
Making the World Safe for Liberalism? Evaluating the Western Sanctions Regime with a New Dataset
- P M Weber
- G Schneider
Weber, P.M., Schneider, G., 2019. Making the World Safe for Liberalism? Evaluating the Western Sanctions Regime with a New Dataset. University of
Konstanz Working Paper.
Aid sanctions and autocratic rule: does regime type matter?
- Portela
Sanctions and export deflection: evidence from Iran
- Haider
You're banned! The effect of sanctions on German cross-border financial flows
- Besedeš