Symbolic Violence as a Form of Violence Against Women in Politics: A Critical Examination

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Nota de iNvestigacióN: Symbolic Violence aS a Form oF Violence
⎥379
Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales⎥ Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
Nueva Época, Año lxv, núm. 238⎥ enero-abril de 2020 pp. 379-389⎥ ISSN-2448-492X
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2020.238.68152
Symbolic Violence as a Form of Violence
against Women in Politics: A Critical Examination
La violencia simbólica como forma de violencia
contra las mujeres en la política: Un análisis crítico
Gabrielle Bardall∗
Recibido: 27 de diciembre de 2018
Aceptado: 20 de mayo de 2019
Violence against women in politics ( ) is an issue that has rapidly gained notoriety in
academic works as well as in the policy world, to the extent that Mexico’s National Electoral
Institute (), the Federal Electoral Tribunal () and the Prosecutor Specialized in
Electoral Crimes presented the “Protocolo para la Atención de la Violencia Política contra
las Mujeres en Razón de Género” (hereaer, ‘the Protocol’, 2017) ahead of the most recent
elections. e protocol aims to detect, prevent and mitigate gender-based political violence,
which is a recurrent problem across Mexico and worldwide, including within political parties
and even in the Chamber of Senators and Deputies. However, the scientic exploration on
  is still imperfect and emerging. is research note expresses reections on one of the
most challenging inquiry areas in this eld, which has signicant implications both for fu-
ture academic directions in this eld and for the practical applications of Mexico’s Protocol
and other similar laws under consideration across Latin America. is is the issue of what
is —and what is not— an actual form of  .
Violence against women in politics is a pervasive and debilitating problem for democracies
worldwide, as demonstrated in the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence against
Women, its Causes and Consequences ( ) report A/73/301 (, ) in October
2018. e category of symbolic violence was adapted from sociology and appended to
earlier typologies of gendered political violence1 by Krook (2017) and Krook and Restrepo
∗ International Foundation for Electoral Systems () and Center for International Policy Studies, University of
Ottawa. E-mail: <gbardall@ifes.org>.
1 e rst four elements of Krook’s classication reprised an existing typology published and presented previously by
Bardall in 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2016, and subsequently adapted with various modications by several international
organizations including the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (), the National Democratic Institute
(), the United Nations Development Program () and  Women.

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doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2020.238.68152
(2016a, b).2 Although not included in the   denition of , the category of symbolic
violence was rapidly integrated into other inuential policy documents, most notably into
the Ley Modelo Interamericana sobre Violencia Política contra las Mujeres (article 3) of the
Follow-up Mechanism to the Belém do Pará Convention () of the Organization of
American States, and into Mexico’s Protocol. e introduction of symbolic violence to the
growing conversation on   is important but fraught.
is research note deepens the examination of symbolic forms of  by situating the
concept in relation to its theoretical origins, deconstructing it to provide further specicity
and considering its value added in terms of conceptual contributions as well as legal and
social attributes. is paper argues that, although symbolic violence impacting women
is a serious issue, it should not be regarded as part of a typology of   because of its
dissimilarities to other recognized types of , including in its forms, outcomes, motives
and governing normative frameworks as well as the inability to document it with quantitative
data. Furthermore, incorporating symbolic violence as a category among others poses distinct
practical and ethical challenges for law enforcement. Instead, symbolic violence should be
studied among other theories of social control and domination.
To understand the place of symbolic violence among other forms of , we need to
recall a few key points about the theoretical progenitors of : political violence () and
gender-based violence (). Mainstream research denes political violence as random or
organized acts that seek to determine, delay or inuence political processes through the use of
destructive and broadly illegal behaviors resulting in material harm. Perpetrators intentionally
seek to coercively dene political outcomes, using methods that violate international norms
and/or national laws. Recognizing that political violence acts dierently on dierent sexes, a
gendered view of political violence incorporates forms of violence that aect women as well
as men, specically physical (including sexual), economic and socio-psychological violence
(Bardall, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2016; Krook, 2017; Krook & Restrepo, 2016a, 2016b; ,
2018). As with the classic denition, these acts of violence are interpersonal, recognizable
by their motive, timing and targets and exercised consciously by their perpetrators upon
victims who resist being harmed.
Symbolic violence is recognized by a growing number of authors as acting upon women’s
political participation (Albaine, 2014; Archenti & Albaine, 2013; Cerva, 2014; Krook, 2017;
2 Since this article was accepted for publication and aer review of an earlier version of this piece, author M.L. Kro-
ok revised this typology, replacing “symbolic” violence with “symbiotic” violence (Krook 2019, cited in Krook and
Restrepo-Sanin, July 2019). According to the revised typology, semiotic violence is perpetrated through degrading
images and sexist language, using strategies of objectication, symbolic annihilation and negative gendered language.
However, the original concept of symbolic violence remains in the Mexican Protocol and ’s model law and
is cited in dozens of scholarly works. It is incumbent to engage in critical conversation about this concept. Further, it
is necessary to understand the distinction between the earlier concept of symbolic violence and symbiotic violence.

Nota de iNvestigacióN: Symbolic Violence aS a Form oF Violence
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doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2020.238.68152
Krook & Restrepo, 2016a, 2016b; Machicao, 2004, 2011) and was formally added to the
academic classication of  by Krook (2017). Comprised of acts which “delegitimize
female politicians through gendered tropes denying them competence in the political sphere”
Krook and Restrepo (2016a) assert that symbolic violence “operates at the level of portrayal
and representation, seeking to erase or nullify women’s presence in political oce” (p. 144).
e acts of symbolic  described in these works can be deconstructed into two
subcategories: acts of commission and acts of omission. According to the examples Krook
(2017) and Krook and Restrepo (2016a, 2016b) provide, symbolic   includes acts of
commission, ranging from inciting bodily harm (such as incitation of physical aggression
via social media), “negative treatment that ‘crosses the line’ and becomes violence when
it entails fundamental disrespect for human dignity…”, sexist comments and harassment,
sexual objectication, and proactive eorts to silence women in public life through legal or
publicity devices. Under this formulation, symbolic  also includes acts of omission,
such as rendering women invisible, “not recognizing, or explicitly denying the existence
of, a female politician for the simple fact of being a woman” and when women experience
diculty in asserting their authority, when their qualications are questioned on the basis
of their sex and where their ideas are appropriated by men (Krook, 2017; Krook & Restrepo,
2016a, 2016b).
e introduction of symbolic violence to the typology of gendered forms of political
violence is signicant for scholars of democratization. It marks a conceptual break from the
origins in comparative democratization and translates the conversation into the languages
of feminist political theory and sociology. e use of the term in the context of recent 
writing diers signicantly from mainstream research, drawing instead on Bourdieu’s
sociological theory, where the dominated class (e.g. women) is the target of inuence, not
a proxy.
e phrase ‘symbolic violence’ was introduced into the   conversation with perfunctory
acknowledgement of its parent theory; however, deep understanding the root concept is vital
to situating it meaningfully as a potential form of  aecting democratization processes
in the world. is author makes no claim of being a sociologist, but a few basic lessons on
Bourdieu’s theory are called for at this juncture if we want to make a meaningful examination
of if and how this concept has its place at the table of other forms of violence in the political
space. Hold on to your hats, this is something of a mind-bender for political science readers:
To Bourdieu (1979, 1991, 2001), symbolic violence is the purposeful imposition of the ideas
and values of a ruling cultural class (for example, men with certain social characteristics) onto a
dominated social group, such as women, oen through subconscious means (Udasmoro, 2013).
Symbolic violence is the voluntary submission to legally-sanctioned relations of domination
resulting in and sustaining a social power imbalance. Key to Bourdieu’s symbolic violence
is the perception of its legitimacy by all parties directly concerned (Bourdieu & Passeron,

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1990; Jenkins, 1992). is legitimacy relies on three core factors: consent, complicity and
misrecognition (Morgan & Björkert, 2006). Coercion occurs when the dominated consent
to their domination because they understand the situation to be normal, legal and legitimate
(Bourdieu, 2001, p. 170). Bourdieu (1991) states: “Symbolic violence can only be exercised…
in a form which results in its misrecognition… which results in its recognition as legitimate”
(p. 140). is unconscious complicity between dominated and dominator is the dening
characteristic of symbolic violence. Although Bourdieu believed the classic example of the
existence of symbolic violence existed in the repression of women in modern western society,
symbolic violence is not considered to be a gender-specic phenomenon (Krais, 1993).
Bourdieu’s theory has sparked decades of intense debate. While political scientists have
overlooked it, sociologists have misinterpreted and misappropriated it (Topper, 2001).
Others question the very existence of symbolic violence, characterizing it as “contentious,
intellectually suspect and conceptually hazardous —not a category of violence the rigorous
analyst of social life is eager to add to the already troubled eld of violence studies” (Colaguori,
2010, p. 396). To Collins (2008), “‘symbolic violence’ is mere theoretical wordplay; to take it
literally would be to grossly misunderstand the nature of real violence” (p. 25).
In adapting symbolic violence as an additional type of  , we too should ask Colaguori’s
(2010) questions: “Is symbolic violence a valid and useful concept that captures some social
scientic fact that adds understanding to the sovereign role of violence in the geopolitics of
the present age? Or is symbolic violence an imprecise way to speak about power relations
and forms of domination that are better accommodated within the existing lexicon of critical
sociology?” (p. 391) —or that of political science?
Sociological symbolic violence deviates from other forms of  in several signicant
ways. Under the four other forms of  (physical, psychological, sexual, economic),
there is no question in recognizing when an act of violence has occurred, by whom and
against whom (as much as perpetrators may try to ee or disguise their acts). In contrast,
Bourdieu’s violence breaks with existing parameters of violence because symbolic violence
is based on the consent of its victims and the shared, unconscious complicity of all parties.
To Bourdieu, symbolic violence can usually exist where both parties are unconscious that
it is occurring and misrecognize it as a legitimate social order. In contrast, other forms of
  are fundamentally conscious behaviors dened by intentional injury. Although the
victims of  may submit to violence for various reasons, they do not consent to it. 
is necessarily illegitimate and illegal under national law and/or international human rights
frameworks.
is distinction is reective of the broader purposes and nature of these violences.
Whereas  violates norms and laws of social relationships, symbolic violence imposes
and legitimizes norms, laws and systems. is kind of violence is a generative one and serves
as “a mechanism to constitute, uphold and organize existing social relations” (Colaguori,

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doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2020.238.68152
2010, p. 392). In contrast, political violence is a phenomenon that is “purely destructive and
dysfunctional, deviant and aberrant, but does not necessarily transform the very nature of
social life” (Colaguori, 2010, p. 392).
ese dierences are reected in corresponding methodological and empirical incom-
patibilities. Symbolic violence is diuse and cannot be measured discretely, by prevalence
or by incidence (Ballington, 2016). Colaguori (2010) notes, “because symbolic violence is
a speculation on the sociology of consciousness it oen escapes the quantiable realm of
the empirical” (p. 396). us, symbolic forms of  cannot be recorded with the same
tools as the other forms of  or measured by the same standards. ese distinctions are
summarized in Figure 1.
Figure 1
Summary: Political, Gender-Based and Symbolic Violence Compared
Normative
Framework
Motives
Typ e
Forms
Outcome
Purpose
Political
Violence


Dened by
perpetra-
tor or iden-
tiable by
the object or
timing of at-
tack
Inter-
perso-
nal
Varies -
e most restric-
tive denitions
limit to fatalities;
the most expanded
denitions include
bodily harm, sex-
ual, economic, so-
cio-psychological
Violate
norms and
laws
Func-
tional
(destruc-
tive and
deviant
means to
disrupt
or coerce
political
order)
Gen-
der-Based
Violence

 19

(art 1 & 2)
Identied by
victim or de-
termined by
the form
Inter-
perso-
nal
physical, sexual,
socio-psychologi-
cal, economic
Violate
norms and
laws
Func-
tional
(destruc-
tive and
deviant
means to
enforce
patriar-
chal so-
cial con-
trol)

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Normative
Framework
Motives Type Forms Outcome Purpose
Symbolic
Violence
n/a None - Per-
petrator is
unconscious
of perpetrat-
ing act, vic-
tim is com-
plicit and
consenting
to victimiza-
tion
Collec-
tive
Unconscious acts
of commission and
omission that sus-
tain and nurture
structural inequali-
ties in daily life and
attitudes
Establish
norms and
social or-
der (in-
cluding
laws)
Gen-
erative
(mecha-
nism to
establish
and up-
hold so-
cial order,
including
laws)
Beyond this academic incongruity, legal and ethical applications of the concept reect si-
milar challenges. Where measurement of   can be dened against a (rapidly growing)
framework of national, regional and international laws and normative conventions, there
is and can be no arbiter for symbolic violence. Because, by denition, symbolic violence is
legitimate and legal and not recognized as a violation either by its victims or perpetrators or
by an international normative framework, there is no culturally or legally consistent basis
for dening a scientic standard of measurement. Policy frameworks like the  model
law and the Mexican Protocol that try to codify and penalize symbolic violence are, at best,
tangled in an oxymoronic misuse of Bourdieu’s phrase, and at worst, faithful interpretations
of Bourdieu open a Pandora’s box of legal ethics.3
While (mis)applications of the concept in the policy world may cause confusion, the
disparities described do not imply a dierence in conceptual merit between competing
denitions, but only their scientic dissimilarity: to measure symbolic violence is to assess
how power imbalances are constructed; to measure political, gender-based violence or 
is to gauge how power structures and human rights are violated.
From this brief assessment, how may we respond to Colaguori’s query? Sociologists will
ultimately decide, but political scientists should recognize that adaptations and extensions
of the concept of symbolic violence must fully anchor it to its theoretical origins (or dene
where it deviates), defend it against competing theories of social control and purposefully
situate it among other forms of violence. With these caveats in mind, further research on
symbolic violence’s relationship to  promises to yield rich insight.
For one, we may recognize the benets and limitations of symbolic  in the policy
sphere. Piscopo (2016) rightly argues that expansions of the concept of violence against
3 To extract themselves from this semantic cul-de-sac, policymakers are advised to either invest in deeper, explicit
denitions or to drop the phrase ‘symbolic violence’ altogether and focus instead on legislating enforceable violations.
(continuación)

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doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2020.238.68152
women in politics are useful from an advocacy perspective. However, sociological symbolic
violence does not have an application for victim protection (because, where victims exist, they
are unaware, complicit and consenting) or for legal purposes (no law can exist against legal
behavior not identied as harm). As a policy goal in the eld of international elections and
democracy assistance, eliminating symbolic violence conicts with principles of sovereignty
because the “violence” is legal and legitimate to all parties directly concerned. Only when
violence is recognized as a violation is there a basis for intervention.
From an academic perspective, two prerequisite examinations must occur before there
can be consensus on adapting symbolic violence into the typology of  . First, the
case must be made for why symbolic violence is the most compelling sociological control
mechanism where women’s political participation is concerned, among a “constellation of
concepts aimed at the critique of domination” (Colaguori, 2010, p. 394). Specically, symbolic
violence should be examined as one of several competing theories of social control, from
Marx (economic domination) to Durkheim (social regulation through group cohesion) to
Bourdieu’s theoretical antecedent, Weber (legitimate bureaucratic regulation of society)
(Ellickson, 1987, see also Schroyer, 1973). e rapid adoption of the phrase “symbolic
violence” by   scholars and advocates has seized upon a micro-interpretation of the
literal term without examining it as the social theory Bourdieu intended. Comparatively
revisiting symbolic violence as a theory of social control will reveal whether or not it is best
suited to explain or describe aspects of .
Second, if the preceding examination determines that symbolic violence is, indeed, the
most appropriate theory to explain  , the next step for researchers is to prove current
assumptions by demonstrating if and how symbolic  operates as a sub-type within
a classication of multiple forms of violence. Specically, scholars must situate symbolic
  in relation to its parent concept, expounding on how Bourdieu’s core notions of
misrecognition and consent operate in the political sphere. From this, socio-psychological
forms of violence (where harm is consciously perpetrated and experienced) may be better
distinguished from symbolic violence (where no harm is perceived to exist). For example,
threats of physical violence provoking protest or resistance on the part of the victim may
be excluded as forms of symbolic violence.
e answers to these questions will rene our understanding of symbolic   as a form
of violence and help locate it in relation to the typology of  . e preceding analysis
suggests that symbolic violence is fundamentally dierent from other types of . How,
then, can it be interpreted? Is it a cause of acts of “hard” violence (Krook & Restrepo, 2016a;
Morgan & Björkert, 2006) or a form of violence unto itself (or both)? Is there a missing step
between “hard violence” (physical, sexual, psychological, economic) and symbolic violence,
for example other forms of “so violence” that may consciously/illegitimately contribute to
social domination and/or violate rights without threatening the person with direct harm?

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doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2020.238.68152
Is it a sub-type of socio-psychological violence, existing at the level of the unconscious? Or,
as this author has suggested, is it a supra-category, exceeding boundaries of explicit harm
or threat of harm, but dening and establishing structures of domination and inequality?
(Bardall, 2016) Until these questions are addressed, symbolic violence should be excluded
from the typology of forms of  or risk over-extending the concept and diluting it beyond
usefulness. Women’s political inclusion faces numerous barriers, including both violence as
well as structural (sometimes symbolic) obstacles which should be examined and addressed
as distinct, though sometimes related, problems.

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doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2020.238.68152
About the author
G B is Ph.D from the Université de Montréal. She is Gender Advisor at the
International Foundation for Electoral Systems () and a Research Fellow with the Uni-
versity of Ottawa’s Centre for International Policy Studies. Her research helped pioneer the
eld of violence against women in elections and digital forms of gendered political violence.
Her recent publications include (with Elin Bjarnegård and Jennifer M. Piscopo) “How is
Political Violence Gendered? Disentangling Motives, Forms, and Impacts” (Forthcoming,
2019) Political Studies; “Violence, Politics, and Gender” (2018) Oxford Research Encyclope-
dia of Politics; “Coding Competitive Authoritarianism” (2016) Zeitschri für Vergleichende
Politikwissenscha, 10(1).
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