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Linguanomics: Official Language Laws, Entry Barriers and Public Goods
Abstract
Recently, the pros and cons of so-called ‘Official English’ laws have been a matter of contention. These laws vary, but all seek to mandate the language used in public transactions. We consider such regulations from the standpoint of entry barriers which both generate restriction rents and (possibly) may mitigate congestion of local public goods. Using standard econometric techniques, we examine the various factors which might tend to determine whether a state will have a law, including measures of the political clout of organized labor and the degree of congestion of local public goods within the jurisdiction.
... These may, in turn, be construed to be yet another form of coercive advantage, insofar as the cultural signifiers embraced by governmental entities are adhered to by the remainder of society by dint of legal and regulatory edicts. An example of this is the assumption of an official national language by public sector agencies that is used in all political communications with citizens and which, as noted by Anderson et al. (2000), may have the effect of raising access barriers to public services for those individuals who are insufficiently familiar with the official language. Similarly, a heavy reliance upon esoteric jargon or technical terms by bureaucrats (or, in the case of the judiciary, a reliance upon Latin in the conduct of legal cases) may have the effect of reducing public accessibility to government, hence providing opportunities for those skilled in "bureaucratese" several advantages in accessing coercive advantages. ...
This paper seeks to explain the persistence of entangled systems of political economy. It does so by introducing the concept of “coercive advantage.” Coercive advantage refers to the benefits, privileges, and rights conferred to certain actors engaging in political exchanges. The form of advantages obtained are varied, and may include financial transfers, capital returns, rents, and non-material benefits, such as recognition and prestige. The heterogeneity of coercive advantage is owing to the emergent complexity of political arrangements, presenting manifold opportunities for political entrepreneurship in the quest to attain such benefits. Distributional questions also come to the fore, with coercive advantages potentially reflected in upward redistribution benefiting a host of actors, such as interest group representatives, bureaucrats, and politicians themselves. A key proposition of this paper is that the arrangements giving rise to coercive advantages may register broad support under majoritarian political decision rules. Elites capturing the most lucrative rents, and other advantages attributed to coercion, may successfully co-opt non-elites into registering support for such activity. They do this by providing transfer payments, infrastructure, and other programs, together with communicating rhetorical and symbolic justifications for status quo practices. This paper considers key implications of the coercive advantage notion for political economy.
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