Dispatches from the Front: Theological Engagements with the Secular
... In view of the hermeneutic of demythologization, Rudolf Karl Bultmann employed the interpreters' interaction to the Scriptural text. 32 He insisted that every believer who approaches the Biblical text with certain question must come from the idea by which he understands it and get it from his own life experience. Here, the answer will be that the interpreter does not arrive at what the text actually says or the writer truly implies, but he should get what the text means. ...
... 31 Hence, science developed on naturalistic pre-suppositions is 'differently disposed' and reaches very different conclusions than 'Christian science'. What distinguished Modernist from Christian epistemology and ethics were the understanding of three fundamental relations: ' [1] our relation to God. [2] our relation to man, and [3] our relation to the world'. 32 Because these relations were dismissed by Modernists, their ability to engage in effective cultural progress was sharply curtailed. ...
This article examines the relative efficacy of Abraham Kuyper and Herman Dooyeweerd’s sphere sovereignty for holistic transformation in Asia. It examines interest in China and Malaysia in Neo-Calvinism, Civil Society, and sphere sovereignty and its social, cultural, and political implications. It considers the strengths and weaknesses of sphere sovereignty in a secular age particularly in light of the sharp antithesis Kuyper and Dooyeweerd posited between the epistemological and ethical frameworks of secular modernist versus Christian approaches to understanding and social, cultural, and political engagement. The article concludes that although this antithesis marginalizes Christian perspectives in a secular age, Herman Bavink’s softening of Neo-Calvinist emphasis on antithesis offers a fresh way to consider transformational engagement.
The novelist is not a theologian or a philosopher, but within the enclosed world of Victorian fiction the matter of theology and the nature of good and evil are examined after the disappearance of God. In the fiction of Dickens, this contention is explored together with the responsibility of the reader as stories are told. While theology may sometimes hamper the reader of fiction, in Victorian novels God may be absent while deeply theological issues remain to be explored and responded to.
Social injustice is neither morally neutral nor does it happen in a social vacuum. To create an authentic environment which reflects some measure of social justice will need concrete symbols or life-enhancing goods. Thus, to genuinely reflect humane values requires outward expressions that concretise our social order. This socioreligious and ethical analysis, as a framework, explores the need for such a tangible response to social injustice. For instance, liberty, which is a central value for a civilised society, must provide more than conducive social conditions. It requires actual conditions of liberty that will authenticate and guarantee the continuation of post-independence social conditions. These conditions are needed not for political reasons but as an ethical pursuit to humanise society. We intend to explore tentative answers to the key questions: What does it mean to be human in Namibia? What are the symbols of justice needed to express a fuller human experience?
This article examines the relationship of worship to mission in the life of the church. How does worship shape the Christian for mission and the work of God’s justice in the world? The article sketches what the author contends to be “the standard account” of how worship works within North American mainstream evangelical Protestantism, drawing on several authors who write on spiritual formation, liturgy, and cultural engagement. Exemplary of this standard account is the influential theology of church and culture found within neo-Calvinism. By parsing the social architecture of these authors, this article reveals its strengths and weaknesses—an analysis that can be applied more widely to Protestantism as a whole in North America. Then, the article moves on to propose an alternative account for the relationship of worship to mission that overcomes the weaknesses of the standard account. This alternative approach is labeled “faithful presence,” an approach which has affinities with an Anabaptist approach to worship and mission.
This essay responds to the need for a constructive account of the state that does not over-determine religious community-state relationships in peacebuilding scholarship and practice because experience and historically embodied stances towards the state defy affirmations about the state that produce a static formula. It offers a concept metaphor rooted in the three-fold eschatological reality of the state at home in a world of pluralism that emerges from reflections on fieldwork in Colombia. The metaphor stresses the need to break the state’s claim to ultimacy as the initial movement of engagement that allows for redemptive transformation. The notion of the state as a dynamic process is consistent with the stance Colombian communities have embodied in an ever-changing environment of conflict and peace.
Reinhold Niebuhr stood against forms of perfectionist idealism that either flee the conflicts of history in which work for justice takes place, or speak irrelevantly or dangerously to those conflicts. This chapter provides an exposition of Niebuhr's political ethics. Niebuhr's case for Christian political responsibility as it stands tends to undermine claims for critical independence. The chapter suggests that the claims in political theology require more careful attention to the significance of, first, the practices of the Christian community; second, the lordship of God in history; and third, our discernment of that lordship in its continuing summons to repentance and conversion. In conclusion, Reinhold Niebuhr the “Christian realist” attacked unchastened idealism as well as a cynicism that would jettison moral values from politics. His criticism of many forms of Christian pacifism followed the anti‐perfectionist line, which he joined to his standard charges of irrelevant idealism and the failure to take sin seriously.
How theological is political theology? Twentieth century American Protestantism illustrates that the answer depends on more than the extent to which a political theology is theological. For example, Walter Rauschenbusch and subsequent emancipatory political theologians understand theology's political significance very differently than John Howard Yoder and other political theologians influenced by the Radical Reformation. Nevertheless, both groups conceive the Christian gospel as a politics and so concur that Christian theology is essentially political. By contrast, Reinhold Niebuhr interpreted the gospel as disclosure of God's mercy and therefore denied that Christian theology is primarily a politics--for society or the church. Hence, although all three of these political theologies are thoroughly theological, they are not political in the same manner or for the same reasons. Accordingly, in addition to quantitative considerations, ascertaining theology's place in political theology involves discerning how a political theology is theological and why a theology is political.
The article brings into focus a series of political arguments of Stanley Hauerwas's “theological politics” and argues that these arguments are in stark contrast with the theoretical perspective of a political rule by a god-like Leviathan, an image inherited in modern and contemporary political culture from the early modern English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. The first section focuses on Hauerwas's arguments regarding the political potential of the term “Catholicity” to represent an alternative to the coercive politics reinforced by the post-Enlightenment nation state. The second section proposes a reflection on the way the Church's Catholicity may be expressed politically without falling into the temptation of involving the Leviathan to sort out the issues generated by its diversity. The concluding section illustrates how Hauerwas uses his approach of a universal unity of Christians “without Leviathan” in his exhortation addressed to American Christians to say “no” to Donald Trump's version of communal unity that is rather based on “total allegiance” to the United States and on “repressive politics”.
Contemporary biomedicine typically identifies conditions and states by what a person lacks rather than what he or she is. Accordingly, those with profound cognitive disability are said to lack agency, making them permanent recipients of unidirectional charity and calling into question their status as persons. Seen theologically, however, the profoundly disabled are essential members of the church, without whom Christians cannot rightly worship God. It is through their mute and vulnerable witness that the Church learns to engage ancient practices of silent prayer and hospitality to strangers.
The authors document a co-operative inquiry involving two social workers, a sociologist, and a theologian, each with personal and professional connections to disability and rurality. They consider the following research question: How do the inquirers perceive the Anglican Church of Australia located in rural, regional and remote communities engage with people living with disabilities? The authors present from a sociological viewpoint the rural Anglican Church of Australia's influence on personal constructs of disability and how these constructs can lead to either inclusion or rural isolation. It reflects through a social work lens on the church's actions in engaging with, advocating for, and ensuring access to services for people living with disabilities who are located in rural areas. Christian theology can critique and deconstruct discriminatory labels that exclude people living with disabilities within a non-urban community, reclaims the concept of weakness and strength from negative stereotypes, and points people living with disabilities toward the hope found in the resurrection of Jesus Christ. The authors amplify the view that all people are to be included in all aspects of the rural Anglican Church of Australia and in general society.
The present article examines the appropriateness of Stanley Hauerwas� ecclesial ethic for the sub-Saharan African churches. Thus, it consists in a Christian ethical assessment of the metaethical foundational categories of his ecclesial ethic. In brief, his proposal is eclectic and pluri-disciplinarily applicable to the churches of various denominations. It reflects the marks of the Aristotelian ethical tradition endorsed by Thomas Aquinas and recovered by several communitarian philosophers. It also includes some discernible ecclesio-centric and postliberal theological accents. The promising insights of this proposal include: (1) the necessity to ordain the church�s worship, polity and its entire way of life to the spiritual and moral formation of church members; (2) the stress on Christian virtuous life, identity formation, witness and non-conformism in social ethics. However, essentially designed against the background of a Western, liberal, autonomous and individualist self, Hauerwas� ecclesial ethic is not a definitive answer for the holistic, normative and communalist moral self, characteristic of the traditional African ethos and influencing a large majority in Africa. Moreover, it stresses the purity of the church in a way that restricts cooperation between Christians and nonChristians for socio-economic justice and the common good.Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: Therefore, Hauerwas� virtue, narrative, community and social ethics provide some valuable insights for moral formation in African churches as it explores the interplay between ecclesiology, Christian ethics, practical theology and philosophical ethics. For sure, other relevant resources should come from African spirituality, developmental psychology and sociology of religion.
Many political realists reject the idea that the first task for political philosophy is to justify the existence of coercive political institutions (CPIs). Instead, they say, we should begin with the factual existence of CPIs, and ask how they ought to be structured. In holding this view, they adopt a form of political naturalism that is broadly Aristotelian in character. In this article, I distinguish between two forms that this political naturalism might take ‐ what I call a ‘strong’ form, and a ‘weak’ form ‐ and argue that both ought to be rejected.1
1 I would like to thank Enzo Rossi for his helpful and generous feedback on earlier drafts of this article.
The paper focuses on the relationship between the author and a young man who has Down's syndrome. As the author reflectson his experiences with Stephen, he finds his understanding of theology, church and disabilities transformed. Life with Stephen reveals the op- pressive nature of Western societies and the subtle ways in which the church isimplicated in such oppression. Yet at the same time the depen- dence and simplicity of Stephen's life reminds us of forgotten dimen- sions of being human. Beginning with the premise that developmental disabilities in all of their different forms are not problemsto be solved, but rather authentic ways of being human that need to be understood and respected, the paper challengesthe church to be the church in a way that is meaningful and inclusive. If all human beings are truly made in God's image, then the Body of Christ must become a place where discrimination and prejudice are abandoned and uncompromising love is embraced. Only then can the apostle Paul's vision of a community within which there is 'neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female . . . black nor white, able bodied and handicapped,' become a reality.(ArticlecopiesavailableforafeefromTheHaworthDocumentDelivery
Stanley Hauerwas's range of publications is so extensive, diverse, and overlapping that it defies summary and discourages even a simple list. This article sets out to identify the main aspects of Hauerwas's career, demonstrate the inner dynamic guiding his work, assess the key theological and philosophical movements that have been channeled through him, and gauge the significance of his achievement for theology and ethics in the years to come. The author suggests that the inner dynamic running through Hauerwas's career is one that is intrinsic to Methodism. Hauerwas's name is and will undoubtedly continue to be widely linked with such movements as the recovery of virtue in ethics, the emergence of narrative theology and ethics, the distinctiveness of Christian ethics, the strand of theology known as postliberal, and perhaps more latterly the relationship between liturgy and ethics.
A word of explanation is necessary at this point in our study. For, the moral theory to be elucidated in this chapter represents something of a sea-change relative to those theories considered heretofore. We have already noted that Hauerwas differs from McCormick and Ramsey in his insistence upon the priority of considering moral agents’ fundamental constitution, or character, as opposed to focusing upon the content of their specific decisions and actionguiding norms. Indeed, Hauerwas refers to integrity, rather than ‘rational deliberation’ or obedience to moral norms, as the keystone of moral life. He goes so far as to suggest that moral dilemmas or disagreements are what happens “when all else has been lost” — i.e., when the moral ‘vision’ of involved parties is so skewed by self-deception or lack of a communal `narrative’ that they lack the skill truthfully to see the situation for what it is and respond in a manner integral to their formed convictions and life plans. In a sense, then, Hauerwas’s enterprise will appear to some to involve a consideration of just about every factor in agential choosing and doing other than the sorts of abstract ‘values’ or ‘rules’ we have considered thus far.
This paper explores the role of pneumatology in the ethics of Stanley Hauerwas. It
demonstrates that the theme of pneumatology is underdeveloped in his ethical
project. The implications of this inadequate pneumatology are spelled out.
Simultaneously it is indicated how Hauerwas’ ethics and the significance thereof
can be served by a greater emphasis on pneumatology. This paper is structured as
follows: The main themes of and developments in Hauerwas’ thinking is briefly
outlined (1). Thereafter the role of pneumatology in his thinking, or rather perhaps
lack thereof, is specifically investigated (2). In a next part the implications of an
inadequate pneumatology for his ethics – specifically in terms of the relationship
between the anthropological and pneumatologial sides of (a) moral formation and
(b) the sectarian character of his ethics are outlined. The paper concludes with
suggestions for the improvement of his ethical project
The risks of modern politics are significant enough that religious believers ought to be making greater efforts than many of them are currently doing to think soberly about the effects of their political participation. In this article I argue that Stanley Hauerwas's most recent approach to political participation is a promising one but that there are further measures that are equally profitable as ways of facilitating the public witness of the faithful. I develop out of my discussion of Hauerwas some participatory guidelines for religious believers. First I suggest that they ought to be abiding by a worldview integrity condition, and then I argue that they ought also to be subjecting themselves to the assessments of a critical community.
Jeffrey Stout claims that John Rawls's idea of public reason (IPR) has contributed to a Christian backlash against liberalism. This essay argues that those whom Stout calls “antiliberal traditionalists” have misunderstood Rawls in important ways, and goes on to consider Stout's own critiques of the IPR. While Rawls's idea is often interpreted as a blanket prohibition on religious reasoning outside church and home, the essay will show that the very viability of the IPR depends upon a rich culture of deliberation in which all forms of reasoning can be put forth for consideration. This clarification addresses the perception that the IPR imposes an “asymmetrical burden” upon believers. In fact, the essay suggests that there are good reasons why believers, qua believers, might endorse the IPR.
Contemporary disability theologians have increasingly lighted on 1 Corinthians chapter 12 as a classic biblical depiction of what is today known as an inclusive social model. This article traces theological attempts to define the concept of inclusion and advance that emerging consensus by offering a close reading of 1 Cor. chapter 12. St. Paul's famous “body life” chapter offers a conceptually rich and theologically sophisticated account of the spiritual gifts suggesting that every member of the church is to be understood as an active giver or conduit of divine love, a giving that is not reducible to any person's supposed physiological or intellectual deficiencies, nor the supposed gift of people with disabilities to serve as reminders that we are all destined to be dependent on others. The ecclesial discernment being proposed if Christians are to receive the gifts of all members of the Christian community depends on learning to look beyond the sociological and demographic certainties typically attached to individual congregants.
The involvement of faith-based organizations in public matters may be motivated by compassion, by a desire for political power, or perhaps by some other purpose. This article argues that it is appropriate for organizations with pronounced religious perspectives to play roles in the delivery of public services and in informing public-decision making. We also argue that such involvement has considerable potential for controversy and, under certain circumstances, can have an adverse impact on a pluralistic democracy.
Right intention is one of the staple criteria of traditional just war theory. In classical terms, right intention is met when a belligerent aims to achieve a just and peaceful order. I will address the problem of determining when a belligerent has satisfied the criterion of right intention. I will argue that right intention is determined by observing a belligerent's acts during and after a conflict. Intention is not merely a private mental act known ultimately only by the people who express the intentions of their governments. Rather, right intention is a communal, public act, for the observable circumstances are how intention is determined. I will demonstrate the effectiveness of this way of determining intention by concentrating on the stated intentions of the Allies before World War II and of the U.S. before the First and Second Gulf Wars. The goal of the paper is to demonstrate that the international community can check a belligerent's stated intentions both while the war is in progress and after the war has ended. I will argue that how well a belligerent conforms to the jus in bello and, when appropriate, to the jus post bellum, provide the international community with much of the information it needs to determine whether or not right intention has been met.
Hauerwas is used to hearing that he is a sectarian, that he is fideist, and that he lacks a doctrine of creation. In this essay I have claimed that if he expanded his understanding of eschatology, he could successfully withstand all these criticisms. Hauerwas could avoid being called a sectarian if he stopped using spatial metaphors (such as 'living in between' Church and world) and conceived of the distinction in terms of time. The traditional language of eschatology has much to offer ethics when it becomes clear that it lends a particular approach to time. The community of the new time, embodied in the resurrection, shares a space with the rest of society but has a different view of the timeful dimension of all its actions. Eschatology has much to offer Hauerwas in his controversial use of narrative also. Many of the hermeneutical problems associated with postliberal hermeneutics appear very different when attention is paid to the end of the story. While Hauerwas usually addresses such questions by drawing attention to the hermeneutical community, it would help him greatly if he underlined that this community is eschatological in its understanding of revelation. Eschatology is not a gnostic way of devaluing concrete history and ethical practice, nor is it away of reducing the stress on the centrality of Christ. If one concentrates on the non-violent character of creation and the non-violence of the one who went to the cross, one has a theme - peace - which unites all the stages of the Christian story with the definitive character of the Church.
This article is a review essay on Noah Feldman's 2005 book, Divided by God: America's Church-State Problem, and What We Should Do About It. Divided by God is mostly a history. But it is a history with a trajectory, leading to Feldman's view of the current standoff and his proposal for reframing the American dispensation of church and state. The stand-off, as Feldman sees it, is not only between two legal positions, but two movements. On the one side are legal secularists, who insist on a strict separation between government and religion. On the other side are values evangelicals, who want to allow the government to finance the good work of religious institutions and to engage in more religious expression itself. Feldman's proposal is to give a bit to both sides - to tighten limits on the government's financial aid to religion, while loosening limits on non-coercive religious expression by government. As my essay details, I have doubts about both Feldman's diagnosis and his prescription. The formulation of his proposal strikes me as unclear in crucial ways, and in any event unlikely to produce the peace that Feldman believes it will. More fundamentally, Feldman pays too little attention to the religious undergirding of what he calls legal secularism, as well as the secular forces and sensibilities contributing to what he calls values evangelicalism. Ultimately, any path out of the current debate would require a more complete integration of these complicated cross-currents than Feldman provides. In important ways, Feldman is eminently reasonable, but maybe too reasonable to appreciate fully the radical, indeed theologically radical, meaning embedded in the Establishment Clause. Nevertheless, Feldman has written a lucid and intelligent book. Together with his earlier work, it is a vital contribution to the ongoing consideration of the role of religion in the contemporary nation-state.
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