Putinomics: Power and Money in Resurgent RussiaPower and Money in Resurgent Russia
Abstract
When Vladimir Putin first took power in 1999, he was a little-known figure ruling a country that was reeling from a decade and a half of crisis. In the years since, he has reestablished Russia as a great power. How did he do it? What principles have guided Putin's economic policies? What patterns can be discerned? In this new analysis of Putin's Russia, Chris Miller examines its economic policy and the tools Russia's elite have used to achieve its goals. Miller argues that despite Russia's corruption, cronyism, and overdependence on oil as an economic driver, Putin's economic strategy has been surprisingly successful. Explaining the economic policies that underwrote Putin's two-decades-long rule, Miller shows how, at every juncture, Putinomics has served Putin's needs by guaranteeing economic stability and supporting his accumulation of power. Even in the face of Western financial sanctions and low oil prices, Putin has never been more relevant on the world stage.
... A key interest of Russian policy has long been to ensure the political survival of Putin, his inner circle and the regime that grants them their elevated position (Frye 2021). This has been established by several thorough studies into the Russian informal system of authority and power (Monaghan 2012), the workings of its dominant party United Russia (Reuter 2017), the Kremlin's macroeconomic policies (Miller 2018) and the development of Russia's force structure and military doctrine (Renz 2019). ...
... First, the Russian regime has consistently sought to maintain macroeconomic stability to protect the regime's social contract with the population and ensure cohesion and loyalty in its own ranks. This has been established by research on Russian macroeconomic policies and the political economy of Russia (Dawisha 2014;Miller 2018). These considerations still rank high on the Kremlin's priority list. ...
With signs of Russia’s aggressive intentions mounting since Fall 2021, Ukraine and NATO allies criticised Germany for not sufficiently contributing to Western efforts at deterring a Russian invasion. The article evaluates this claim by applying deterrence theory and using congruence analysis on foundational policy documents, expert literature and interviews of Russian and Western policymakers. It establishes that states contribute to collective extended deterrence the more they have the capabilities to harm assets that are highly valued by the revisionist and the more the revisionist has reasons to believe that these capabilities would be used if it enacted aggression. The article then evaluates Germany’s potential deterrence contributions, establishing that Germany’s vast arms industry and economic clout allowed it to significantly threaten the Russian regime through economic destabilisation and prospects of high-casualty fighting. It then gauges Germany’s actual deterrence contributions, finding them to have been significantly smaller: Germany deliberately avoided military threats and deliveries of arms to Ukraine. And while Germany did early on threaten to use its significant economic clout against Russia, it remained vague and non-committal over core issues of Russian economic interests, such as the Nord Stream 2 pipeline system. The results provide and inform further hypotheses on the causes of German behaviour and indirect influences on deterrence against Russia. They also urge reconsiderations of strategic thinking in Berlin and elsewhere.
... Политэкономические модели России и Белоруссии описываются через модели «путиномики» [Miller 2018] ...
... 3. опора на частный бизнес для повышения (экономической) эффективности, но только в тех случаях, когда это не входит в противоречие с предыдущими двумя стратегиями [Miller 2018]. ...
The sanctions pressure against Russia in 2022 is specific not only by the volume and nature of the imposed sanctions, but also by the synchronization of the imposed restrictions against the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus. This creates a new reality for the Union State, which in November 2021 received a new development plan in the form of the Main Directions for Implementing the Provisions of the Treaty on the Union State for 2021-2023. Despite the fact that the Main Directions on the whole adequately reflect the nature of the challenges that have arisen before the Union State, and the restrictions imposed by Western countries actually make the intensification of economic cooperation between countries practically uncontested, the current situation does not necessarily stimulate “deep integration”. The reasons may be too large differences in the political and economic models of the two countries, new economic challenges and a change in the focus of foreign policy priorities on the part of Russia. The development of the Union State in these conditions will require increased attention from government agencies and the expert community of the two countries.
... The first and "happiest" period coincides with Putin's first term 1 There are several other recent books on Putin's Russia, although most do not focus on the economy. The two that come closest to Åslund's are Dawisha (2014), which Åslund cites repeatedly, and Miller (2018). Dawisha concentrates on the origins of Putin's power. ...
... Also, and perhaps even more important, as Miller (2018) argues and as was shown by Brown, Earle, and Gehlbach (2013), the Russian privately owned firms in sectors not controlled by state enterprises had become reasonably efficient and productive by the mid-2000s, although still far behind the best international standards. 18 While these firms face some legal or extralegal pressure and even predation from government officials, including the police and security services, this does not seem to affect their operating efficiency very much, although this pressure does significantly weaken the incentives for investment and this is a serious impediment 17 Åslund does say that Russia has a market economy, albeit with restricted competition and weak institutions, but he does not elaborate on this statement. ...
Anders Åslund provides a comprehensive description of the main political and economic events of Vladimir Putin’s 20 years at the helm of the country. In politics, Åslund shows how Putin skillfully maneuvered to destroy democracy in Russia. I argue that the “cultural backlash” by older generations played perhaps an even more important role. I also show that the young generations hold rather liberal values, thus providing hope for the future. In economics, Åslund focuses on large state corporations, assets of Putin’s cronies, and macroeconomic policies, with only general statements about the country’s institutional weakness. I complement Åslund’s analysis by a more detailed examination of the impact of institutions and briefly survey fiscal federalism and informal economic activities—issues without which the workings of the Russian economy are hard to understand. (JEL D72, H77, O52, P26, P35)
... The policies were developed and implemented by Alexei Kudrin, Finance Minister from 2000 to 2011. Fiscal conservatism during those years led to economic prosperity as well as the expected economic stability (Miller, 2018). It seemed that Putin had found the magic formula that saw GDP increasing generally as well as per capita. ...
... Slow overall economic growth continued through 2015 into 2017 and seemed destined to persist unless oil prices would rebound strongly, with predicted GDP growth of only 1.5 percent for 2018. This scenario is explained well in a recent book that focuses on the Russian fiscal policy and its effects over time on the Russian economy during the Putin administration (Miller, 2018). ...
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the dramatically changed role of Russia in the global economy since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, as the Soviet institutions collapsed and were either reformed or replaced in a new Russian institutional landscape. The paper presents a fact-based and balanced view of Russia’s evolving role in the global economy, as distinguished from the sometimes one-sided view presented by some Western commentators. The authors establish that the two countervailing views are fundamentally based on different cultural perspectives about institutions, primarily the roles of business and government.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper is developed as a perspectives article drawing upon the decades of academic and business experience of all three authors with Russian business, management and the economy. The paper focuses on the structure of Russian institutional change and places it within the historical context of the challenges of various periods of time from the late 1980s to the present. The authors posit that cultural foundations complicate that institutional evolution.
Findings
Russia will remain a major player in world markets for energy, raw materials and armaments for the near future at least. Principal institutional questions facing Russia have to do with how to reduce the country’s overall dependence on raw material exports, with its vulnerability to world market fluctuations, and how to modernize Russian economic and political institutions. The degree of success in addressing these questions will depend largely upon the ability of the new and reformed economic institutions to show the flexibility to respond to changes in the global order, on whether political considerations will continue to supersede economic issues, and how markedly cultural traditions will continue to impede positive changes.
Research limitations/implications
The entire system of international trade is under question, disrupted by the growing nationalism that is threatening the globalization that became institutionalized over decades in the wake of the Second World War. Russia’s future role is partially dependent upon how new patterns of international trade develop in response to the current disruption of established trade regimes, and by how political conflicts are expressed economically. The authors observe that Russia’s historical and cultural traditions, especially acquiescence to a highly centralized government with a strong autocratic leader, limit the country’s options. The authors explore how Russia’s reactions to Western sanctions have led to a new strategic approach, moving away from full engagement in the global economy to selective economic, and sometimes political, alliances with primarily non-Western countries, most notably China. The authors contrast Russia’s situation with that of China, which has been able to make substantial economic progress while still embracing a strong, centralized political institutional structure.
Originality/value
Many Western analysts have viewed Russian institutional evolution very critically through the lens of Western politics and sanctions, while Russia has continued along its own path of economic and institutional development. Each view, the authors argue, is based upon differing cultural perspectives of the roles of business and government. As a result, a distinct difference exists between the Western and Russian perspectives on Russia’s role in the world. This paper presents both points of view and explores the future of Russia’s position in the world economy based upon its evolving strategy for national economic policy. The authors contrast the situations of Russia and China, highlighting how Western-centric cultural views have affected perceptions of each country, sometimes similarly and at times with decided differences.
... The private sector reached its peak. According to Miller (2018) and Brown et al. (2013), the privately owned firms in sectors not controlled by state enterprises had become reasonably efficient and productive by the mid-2000s (although still remained behind the best international standards). ...
The study uses industry-level data to examine the drivers of Russia’s economic growth in 2000–2008, when the average annual growth rate was 6.45%, in comparison with 2010–2016, when it fell to 1.75%. We apply the stochastic frontier method to quantify input-driven, technology-driven, and efficiency-driven growth. The influence of the world oil price on Russia’s growth is estimated from the perspective of its effects on both expansion of inputs (extensive growth) and production efficiency (intensive growth). The oil price movements affected capital and labor growth, but the government used a rent management system to mitigate these effects. As a result, the rate of extensive growth in 2000–2008, when the oil price was rising, was about the same (around 3%) as in 2010–2016 when the oil price was falling. The intensive (TFP-driven) growth rate fell from an average of 2.7% per year in 2000–2008 to − 1% in 2010–2016 due to a substantial decline in production efficiency during the latter period. Although the world price of oil could be partly responsible for this trend, we found the evolution of Russia’s economic system from generally market-oriented to largely controlled by kleptocracy to be the main factor behind it. Despite some changes in the economy’s industrial structure that occurred during both periods, the structural transformation had a negligible effect on growth.
... Third, a robust research program has identified regime survival as a key driving force in all areas of Russian politics (Frye, 2021;Greene & Robertson, 2019), be it economic policy (Miller, 2018), parliamentary politics (Reuter, 2017), or force structure and military doctrine (Renz, 2019). ...
When Russia amassed troops in the winter of 2021–2022, many analysts deemed a large-scale invasion of Ukraine unlikely. Surveying the expert literature, we establish that these arguments largely relied on utility-based reasoning: Analysts thought an invasion was improbable, as it would foreseeably entail massive costs for Russia, its people, and its regime. We show that this regnant expert opinion had not sufficiently accounted for the Russian regime’s tendencies to increasingly accept risks, coupled with an inadequate processing of information on Ukrainian and Western views and policies. We argue that analysts miscalculated partially because the most prominent facts, long-term trends, and causal mechanisms available to them jointly suggested Russian cost-sensitivity, but provided only weak signs of countervailing factors. We thereby showcase that good forecasting requires explicit theory with a view on multiple interacting causal factors, area expertise and Socratic humility on the extent, context and certainty of our findings.
... Foruten endringer i det russiske systemet for fordeling av petroleumsinntekter, bør det legges bedre til rette for privat naeringsliv, blant annet gjennom å innføre reformer som sikrer bedre beskyttelse av privat eiendom og et uavhengig rettsapparat (Aleksashenko 2018: 293). Russlands politiske elite tjener imidlertid på situasjonen slik den er i dag, og innføring av reformer vil kunne true både maktbalansen mellom elitene og den politiske stabiliteten i landet (Acemoglu og Robinson 2012;Miller 2018). Dette gjør det sannsynlig at energisektoren vil spille en hovedrolle i russisk økonomi også i årene fremover. ...
The purpose of this report is to shed light on how Russia may use economic instruments to pursue
strategic, foreign policy goals (economic statecraft) and to discuss the implications for Norwegian
security. We seek to answer this by starting the construction of a data set, based on open sources,
which provides information on Russia's use of economic instruments, and analyze key
characteristics and patterns that emerge from cases in the data set. Combined with information
about Russia's economy and interaction with Norway, the dataset provides a good foundation for
discussing how Russia can use economic statecraft against Norway. We emphasize that this
study mainly was conducted before Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.
In the period 2000–2021, Russia appears to have used economic statecraft in several different
ways. Overall, we distinguish between potential attempts at exercising power and accumulating
power. The latter enables economic – or other types of – use of force in the future. Russia has
potentially exercised power by implementing various forms of import restrictions and using its
control over regional gas networks to put pressure on other countries. We assess that Russia has
also tried to accumulate power through economic statecraft by shaping vested interests and
perceptions in other countries, strengthening Russian military capabilities (e.g. by acquiring
foreign technology), conducting intelligence activities (through economic activity), and strengthen
Russia’s position as a supplier of oil and gas to European and Central Asian countries. However,
there are several types of cases we are unable to detect through open source search. This could
imply that actions with the greatest potential to constitute a threat to Norway’s, and other
countries’, security – such as facilitating future sabotage of infrastructure – are difficult to detect,
understand and assess based on empirical data.
What are the implications for Norway? The Norwegian economy’s dependence on Russia is
limited. We therefore consider that Russia's opportunities to exercise power against Norway
through economic statecraft also are limited. Small reductions in trade, investments or the like,
would usually not pose a threat to Norway’s security. However, some investments, which grant
control over critical functions in Norway or access to military and dual-use technology, may
constitute a security threat. It is also important to understand how Russia can utilize economic
activity in Norway to accumulate power. This can take place as attempts at shaping vested
interests and perceptions of Norwegian businesses, politicians, elites and the population,
conducting intelligence activities on Norwegian territory, facilitating future sabotage, or
strengthening Russia's military capabilities through access to technology, knowledge and
resources. We assess that Norwegian businesses and society should be prepared for such
attempts by Russia to accumulate power, and that these actions, in principle, could pose a threat
to Norwegian security.
Going forward, it will be important to strengthen institutional and legal mechanisms to identify and
protect against potentially security threatening use of economic statecraft. It will also be important
to strengthen Norway’s ability to coordinate and build knowledge across public authorities,
businesses, society, and between Norway and like-minded countries, for example through
EEA/EU and NATO.
... The political-economic system that has matured in Russia in the 2010s privileges a number of domestic players, including security communities, state monopolies and oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin (Dawisha, 2015;Miller, 2018;Sakwa, 2020). While those actors ultimately remain controlled by the Kremlin, they still have substantial room to manoeuvre, especially in terms of their role in the implementation of broad-brush directives issued by the Kremlin. ...
This open access edited volume (available freely at https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-97012-3) examines Russia-China relations across a variety of civilian and military areas of cooperation. Leading experts in the field present empirical case studies covering a wide range of strategic cooperation areas between Russia and China, such as technological, military, economic and political cooperation. The contributing authors shed new light on Chinese and Russian strategic goals, external push and pull factors, and mutual perception shifts, and discuss the options for Western countries to influence this development.
This book analyses the evolution of the relationship since the watershed moment of the Crimean crisis in 2014, and whether or not a full-blown military alliance, as hinted in late 2020 by President Putin, is indeed a realistic scenario for which NATO will have to prepare. It will appeal to students and scholars of international relations, political decision-makers, as well as anyone interested in Eurasian politics and the potential military-strategic impact of a Russian-Chinese alliance for NATO.
... The political-economic system that has matured in Russia in the 2010s privileges a number of domestic players, including security communities, state monopolies and oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin (Dawisha, 2015;Miller, 2018;Sakwa, 2020). While those actors ultimately remain controlled by the Kremlin, they still have substantial room to manoeuvre, especially in terms of their role in the implementation of broad-brush directives issued by the Kremlin. ...
Arms transfers are an important indicator of the level of strategic trust between countries. During the past 70 years, relations between China and the Soviet Union/Russia have gone through phases that were characterized by dramatically different levels of military-industrial cooperation. This paper explores how the fallout from the Crimea crisis of 2014 has impacted the Russian-Chinese arms trade relationship against the backdrop of a history where Russia aimed to restrict arms transfers to China. It argues that the sanctions imposed on China after the Tiananmen massacre in 1989 and on Russia since early 2014 have had the combined unintended consequence of incentivizing closer Russian-Chinese arms-industrial cooperation than had ever existed before. Western ambiguity toward Ukraine after 2014 furthermore provided China with opportunities to profit from openings in Ukraine’s arms-industrial complex. The chapter starts with a historical overview of the Russian-Chinese arms trade relationship before analyzing the impact of Russian and Ukrainian transfers on China’s military modernization before and after 2014. The final part discusses how changed incentives since 2014 have fostered unprecedented Sino-Russian arms-industrial cooperation. This could solidify the developing Chinese-Russian military relationship and eventually lead toward a more equal relationship in joint arms development.
... The political-economic system that has matured in Russia in the 2010s privileges a number of domestic players, including security communities, state monopolies and oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin (Dawisha, 2015;Miller, 2018;Sakwa, 2020). While those actors ultimately remain controlled by the Kremlin, they still have substantial room to manoeuvre, especially in terms of their role in the implementation of broad-brush directives issued by the Kremlin. ...
China and Russia are both keen to exploit cutting-edge technologies for military use. Most of these advanced technologies are embedded in the so-called fourth industrial revolution (4IR), such as artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning, automation and robotics, quantum computing, big data, 5G networking, and the “Internet of Things” (IoT). At the same time, most research and development (R & D) taking place in the 4IR is occurring in the commercial realm. The usefulness of 4IR technologies to future military capabilities will depend on how well countries can leverage breakthroughs in commercial R & D, via military-civil fusion (MCF). China and Russia are pursuing concurrent and often intertwined R & D programs to develop and advance 4IR technologies in their respective countries—particularly AI—and to subsequently utilize these technologies (via MCF) in military applications. Their mutual interests in exploiting cutting-edge technologies to underwrite military modernization could motivate Beijing and Moscow to collaborate on future 4IR R & D. Nevertheless, such cooperation could be limited. In particular, Russia lacks the resources or overall technological capacities (money and manpower, plus an already low level of innovation in the national economy) to function as an equal to China, and it may not wish to play the junior partner in such a relationship.
... The political-economic system that has matured in Russia in the 2010s privileges a number of domestic players, including security communities, state monopolies and oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin (Dawisha, 2015;Miller, 2018;Sakwa, 2020). While those actors ultimately remain controlled by the Kremlin, they still have substantial room to manoeuvre, especially in terms of their role in the implementation of broad-brush directives issued by the Kremlin. ...
Both China and Russia are heavyweights in multilateral Geneva. While their priorities and strategies are not identical, their interests are often aligned in many forums. Thus, close cooperation can be observed in several Geneva-based organizations. In some, such as the UN Human Rights Council, China and Russia form the backbone of an increasingly assertive “autocratic alliance.” Particularly China has attempted to establish a counter-narrative on questions of democracy, human rights, and international law. This article outlines some factors that increased the effect of Chinese-Russian cooperation, but also depicts its limits. Cooperation between Russia and China is often defensive rather than proactive and not (yet) based on a joint long-term strategy. However, it is a tactical alliance that is, and will likely remain, a major challenge for the proponents of a rules- and values-based multilateralism even though Russia’s war in Ukraine will further shift the balance in this alliance towards China. This article argues in favor of stronger engagement in UN forums by the West and outlines possibilities for how the growing influence of this tandem can be countered.
... The political-economic system that has matured in Russia in the 2010s privileges a number of domestic players, including security communities, state monopolies and oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin (Dawisha, 2015;Miller, 2018;Sakwa, 2020). While those actors ultimately remain controlled by the Kremlin, they still have substantial room to manoeuvre, especially in terms of their role in the implementation of broad-brush directives issued by the Kremlin. ...
Nuclear issues have historically played an important role in the development of relations between Moscow and Beijing, acting as a source of both potential discord and emergent cooperation. From 1964, when China conducted its first nuclear test, until Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s tenure in the 1980s, nuclear relations between the Soviet Union and China were explicitly adversarial. The normalization of Sino-Soviet relations introduced an era of implicitly adversarial relations that lasted until the Ukraine crisis. During this phase, Russia’s concerns about China’s growing military power and its resulting determination to maintain nuclear deterrence of China remained apparent. Since the onset of the Ukraine crisis, Russia and China have built an increasingly close relationship, leading to a new phase of implicitly cooperative nuclear relations featuring coordinated efforts to maintain nuclear deterrence of the United States. The two countries jointly oppose US efforts to build missile defense systems and high-precision conventional weapons. They coordinate their positions on such issues as multilateral arms control and the post-INF strategic landscape. Russia is helping China to build a missile attack early warning system. Growing levels of defense cooperation raise the possibility of coordinated efforts to maintain nuclear deterrence of the United States in a crisis.
... The political-economic system that has matured in Russia in the 2010s privileges a number of domestic players, including security communities, state monopolies and oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin (Dawisha, 2015;Miller, 2018;Sakwa, 2020). While those actors ultimately remain controlled by the Kremlin, they still have substantial room to manoeuvre, especially in terms of their role in the implementation of broad-brush directives issued by the Kremlin. ...
Allies in 1950, at odds in 1960, at war in 1969, on opposite sides of the Cold War during the 1980s, the Russians and Chinese have worked out their border issues in recent years to partner against a common challenge: the United States. While it can be argued that both countries distrust one another, Moscow and Beijing share a common concern and can’t afford bad relations. Both abhor the US-Western interventions of the last two decades that in their view have destabilized the Middle East, generating terrorism and instability within or near their borders. Both resent US support for their domestic opposition or to neighboring intimate “foes,” most notably Taiwan, Ukraine, and Georgia. Both have displayed their support for Syria and Iran. Both have been engaged in a “strategic partnership” within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization since 2001. Both are now conducting joint naval exercises, sometimes in sensitive areas. But beyond those gesticulations, how far can this naval partnership go? Is it a harbinger of a future military alliance? Does it suggest an intent to deter future Western interventions from the sea? Is there evidence and are there documents that formally support this signaling of strategic and naval partnerships?
... The political-economic system that has matured in Russia in the 2010s privileges a number of domestic players, including security communities, state monopolies and oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin (Dawisha, 2015;Miller, 2018;Sakwa, 2020). While those actors ultimately remain controlled by the Kremlin, they still have substantial room to manoeuvre, especially in terms of their role in the implementation of broad-brush directives issued by the Kremlin. ...
After two decades of Global War on Terror, the US is confronted by two near-peer military competitors, Russia and China, which have aligned in their opposition to the US-led international order. Russia is determined to revise the post-Cold War settlement, while China aims to replace it altogether with one built around its economic power, its military, and increasingly its values and ideological tenets. The West’s post-Cold War assumptions that economic globalization would lead to democratization have been proven false, with a new round of great power competition in full view. With the United States military refocusing on great power competition in the Indo-Pacific, Washington needs Europe to rearm and provide real capabilities to deter Russia in the event of a kinetic conflict in Asia. For the NATO alliance, “burden transferring” should be the way forward, with Europe providing core military capabilities while the US maintains its nuclear umbrella and high-end enablers. This approach will ensure deterrence in Europe holds, while the United States confronts China in the Indo-Pacific. It is even more urgent today in light of Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in 2022 that Europe rebuild its militaries.
... The political-economic system that has matured in Russia in the 2010s privileges a number of domestic players, including security communities, state monopolies and oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin (Dawisha, 2015;Miller, 2018;Sakwa, 2020). While those actors ultimately remain controlled by the Kremlin, they still have substantial room to manoeuvre, especially in terms of their role in the implementation of broad-brush directives issued by the Kremlin. ...
This chapter argues that domestic politics plays a significant role in shaping Sino-Russian relations. Domestic political factors strengthen certain trends in the relationship and, more occasionally, generate obstacles. In structural terms, the growing similarity of political systems, characterized by a high degree of centralization of power in leaders’ hands and the rising crackdown on dissent, shapes the threat assessment. The Russian ruling regime is not challenged by Beijing, hence an increase in China’s power and influence. While disadvantageous geopolitically, it does not pose a threat to regime security and regime survival in the Kremlin. Domestic actors have contributed to Russia’s policy towards China in two ways: by influencing the leadership’s threat assessment and by implementing particular policies. In some areas, such as energy cooperation, a privileged position on behalf of certain actors enables them to promote closer cooperation with China. There is no openly anti-Chinese lobby within the ruling elite and its supporters. More often than not, domestic politics act as a facilitating factor, which mitigates systemic pressures related to China’s rise and growing asymmetry between Russia and China and creates a conducive environment for bilateral cooperation with China in certain sectors.
... The political-economic system that has matured in Russia in the 2010s privileges a number of domestic players, including security communities, state monopolies and oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin (Dawisha, 2015;Miller, 2018;Sakwa, 2020). While those actors ultimately remain controlled by the Kremlin, they still have substantial room to manoeuvre, especially in terms of their role in the implementation of broad-brush directives issued by the Kremlin. ...
This paper focuses on Sino-Russian scientific cooperation in the Arctic over the time period from 2012 to the current day. Academic cooperation with China entails more than meets the eye, as Chinese counterparts see the interactions with their partners from the prism of people-to-people diplomacy designed to create positive sentiment towards Chinese interests via non-governmental exchanges. The first part of this paper focuses on this engagement and Chinese attempts to steer the discourse in support of its interests in the Arctic.
Foreign academics and leaders at the local level, untrained in the Chinese language and political system and unfamiliar with the hidden meanings of academic exchanges, become vulnerable and valuable targets for Chinese influence activities due to their high standing and access to valuable knowledge. The second part of the paper investigates the Sino-Russian scientific cooperation and capacity building that enables China to become a great maritime power—not always for the benefit of Russia, and to the disadvantage of NATO.
... The political-economic system that has matured in Russia in the 2010s privileges a number of domestic players, including security communities, state monopolies and oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin (Dawisha, 2015;Miller, 2018;Sakwa, 2020). While those actors ultimately remain controlled by the Kremlin, they still have substantial room to manoeuvre, especially in terms of their role in the implementation of broad-brush directives issued by the Kremlin. ...
In recent years, the Sino-Russian partnership has emerged in Western eyes as the principal threat to the post-Cold War, rules-based international order. According to this narrative, the challenge is no longer simply one of China’s rise or Russia’s resurgence, but a growing strategic convergence: a mutually reinforcing “axis of authoritarians.” Talk of an alliance has become commonplace. In leading Western capitals, the Sino-Russian “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era” has become the existential menace of our time. This sense of alarm has been heightened by a feverish international context, dominated by great-power rivalry and the devastating consequences of the covid-19 pandemic. One region, however, has been largely exempt from such speculation. Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) remains a backwater of Sino-Russian engagement, and Western reactions have been correspondingly muted. Nevertheless, the region provides a useful window through which to assess the dynamics of the relationship.
... The political-economic system that has matured in Russia in the 2010s privileges a number of domestic players, including security communities, state monopolies and oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin (Dawisha, 2015;Miller, 2018;Sakwa, 2020). While those actors ultimately remain controlled by the Kremlin, they still have substantial room to manoeuvre, especially in terms of their role in the implementation of broad-brush directives issued by the Kremlin. ...
Are Russia and China an emerging alliance or eternal rivals? And what would it mean for NATO? NATO reacted to the Russian aggression against Ukraine with a paradigm shift called “NATO Adaptation.” At the 2014 Wales Summit, it increased its responsiveness with the “Readiness Action Plan,” the 2016 Warsaw Summit strengthened its deterrence and defense posture, and the 2018 Brussels Summit re-designed NATO’s Command Structure toward collective defense. Although embedded in a “360-degree approach,” all key defense elements of NATO’s adaptation have been primarily focused on Russia, which was recognized from March 2014 on as potential threat to the territorial integrity of the Eastern European members. However, this changing of the paradigm was based entirely on the understanding that Russia alone poses a serious military threat to the alliance. There was never any consideration given to the question of what it would mean if Russia were supported by a like-minded great power such as China, nor to the question of what simultaneous aggressions—one by Russia in Europe and another by China in the Indo-Pacific—would mean for NATO. Hence, the answers to these questions are of high relevance to NATO’s further adaptation to the new geopolitical realities.
... The political-economic system that has matured in Russia in the 2010s privileges a number of domestic players, including security communities, state monopolies and oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin (Dawisha, 2015;Miller, 2018;Sakwa, 2020). While those actors ultimately remain controlled by the Kremlin, they still have substantial room to manoeuvre, especially in terms of their role in the implementation of broad-brush directives issued by the Kremlin. ...
The contributions to this volume in sum paint a multifaceted picture of the complex and evolving Russian-Chinese strategic partnership. It seems clear that depending on the particular issue area studied and the methods adopted for studying it, a number of varying diagnoses can be made regarding the current state and future prospects of this “strategic partnership.” Capturing such complexity was expressly one of our goals; we consider it dangerous to approach the reality of Russian-Chinese cooperation with ready-made interpretations and thus risk falling victim to confirmation bias. That said, a few clear patterns do emerge from our material when it comes to answering the key questions that this research project set out to study and that were listed in the introduction.
... The political-economic system that has matured in Russia in the 2010s privileges a number of domestic players, including security communities, state monopolies and oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin (Dawisha, 2015;Miller, 2018;Sakwa, 2020). While those actors ultimately remain controlled by the Kremlin, they still have substantial room to manoeuvre, especially in terms of their role in the implementation of broad-brush directives issued by the Kremlin. ...
China no longer sees Russia as a rival. This is not the result of friendly ties, shared values, or growing economic cooperation, but an outcome of the dramatic shift in the balance of power between them. Moreover, China’s contemporary policy toward Russia is not driven by Xi Jinping’s possible fondness for Putin or Russia, but by strategic calculations about what best serves Chinese interests. China’s number one priority today is to balance the United States in the Indo-Pacific naval theatre, and it is thus in Beijing’s interest to keep its strategic rear to Russia safe. This chapter argues that balance of power theories is the best tool to explain China’s growing ties with Russia. History, identity, and ideology are important variables for understanding China’s relationship with Russia. Yet, few, if any, bilateral relationships between two major countries have changed back and forth so dramatically as that of China and Russia. Examining Sino-Russian relations across several time periods, this chapter illustrates that there is no single continuous historical narrative or identity in China on Russia. During the last century, China has seen Russia as an imperialist master, a comrade in arms, a foe, and a partner, and it is now discussing whether it should be an ally.
... The political-economic system that has matured in Russia in the 2010s privileges a number of domestic players, including security communities, state monopolies and oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin (Dawisha, 2015;Miller, 2018;Sakwa, 2020). While those actors ultimately remain controlled by the Kremlin, they still have substantial room to manoeuvre, especially in terms of their role in the implementation of broad-brush directives issued by the Kremlin. ...
The existence of an alliance between Russia and China seems to be changing the European security environment in a fundamental way. In light of historical experiences, one has to start with the assumption that any such alliance between authoritarian powers directed against Western democracies and free societies will increase the likelihood of major wars. In at least two European regions—the Black-Sea and the Baltic Sea area—merely the existence of such an alliance and the ensuing opportunity to overburden the U.S. military might increase the risk-level Russia was ready to accept. This might entail the danger of a high intensity war between Russia and NATO. It is high time for NATO to consider a more effective defence and deterrence posture in order to prevent Russian aggression against the Baltic states and to envision effective measures that would deter Russia from continuing to destroy Ukraine.
... The political-economic system that has matured in Russia in the 2010s privileges a number of domestic players, including security communities, state monopolies and oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin (Dawisha, 2015;Miller, 2018;Sakwa, 2020). While those actors ultimately remain controlled by the Kremlin, they still have substantial room to manoeuvre, especially in terms of their role in the implementation of broad-brush directives issued by the Kremlin. ...
The aim of this volume is to contribute to an ongoing discussion on the scope and meaning of Russian-Chinese cooperation since 2014, the year Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea. During the past few years, the number of research projects on Sino-Russian cooperation at Western think tanks has markedly increased, complementing a likewise increasing number of monographs and edited volumes that had begun to appear on related topics during the preceding years.
... The political-economic system that has matured in Russia in the 2010s privileges a number of domestic players, including security communities, state monopolies and oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin (Dawisha, 2015;Miller, 2018;Sakwa, 2020). While those actors ultimately remain controlled by the Kremlin, they still have substantial room to manoeuvre, especially in terms of their role in the implementation of broad-brush directives issued by the Kremlin. ...
This examination deals with the mental maps and basic assumptions underlying Russia’s foreign policy and how these relate to China. I will take issue with the narrative, advanced in particular by Kremlin officials and pro-Putin apologists in the West, that Russia’s “pivot to Asia,” with China as its centerpiece, can be understood as the consequence of the West having rejected Putin’s outstretched hand for close cooperation, Russia’s exclusion from an all-European security structure by pushing NATO’s eastward expansion, and finally the imposition of economic sanctions. This, to complete the account, had left Russia with no other option but to turn to Asia. Such interpretations will be shown to be fundamentally flawed. Putin’s China policies fit squarely into both the Russian power elite’s global strategic outlook and its narrow perception of what is needed to hold on to power domestically. The benefits accruing to Russia from its liaison with China can be found in military, economic, and systemic dimensions, and they are for the most part asymmetric in favor of the Kremlin. The asymmetries may cause problems in the future, but for the time being, they are carefully managed so that they will not spin out of control.
... 25 Putin moved rapidly to rebuild an authoritarian state, appointing former KGB and army allies to the security services and expanding their remit, rewriting the rules to give himself the power to appoint and dismiss judges, and gaining new powers to remove and appoint governors and dissolve regional legislatures, until 'the security services answered solely to the Kremlin. And at the top of the new vertical power sat Vladimir Putin.' 26 The Chechen playbook was repeated in Syria after Putin joined the war there in September 2015, the only difference being that Putin's brutal ally -Bashar al-Assadwas already in power but facing imminent overthrow by a democratic uprising. 27 And it gives us a clue what Putin was referring to when he quoted the lyrics from a punk-rock song, 'Sleeping Beauty in a coffin,' to tell Ukrainians, 'Whether you like or not, put up with it, my beauty': 28 the fate of Chechnya is what he intended for Ukraine when his armed forces invaded and headed straight to Kyiv in 2022. ...
This article uses the relationship between Russia and Ukraine to explore what various Marxists have said about socialist internationalism in such a context. It argues that it is essential to support struggles for national liberation or independence against imperialist oppression, which depends on ethnic supremacism to justify that oppression. It also argues that all ethnic definitions of nationhood should be opposed; a socialist programme has to include the rights of ethnic minorities to full equality before the law and their right to have their own language and culture, as well as local and regional self-government, which is important in any democracy but even more so for enclaves where minorities predominate. If socialists are serious about the interests of working people everywhere, then they have to foreground struggles for democracy, which are also struggles against various forms of discrimination and persecution, and this not only in their own countries but in terms of solidarity with the class struggle of workers of all countries. Finally, in a world where hostility to refugees, immigrants and ‘foreigners’ is rampant, internationalists stand for open borders.
... Despite the constant pressure to balance interests and manage conflicts and tensions, Putin's regime has proved to be stable over time, skilfully using the economic advantages of the soviet legacies, such as industrial and infrastructural potential. According to Miller (2018), 'Putinomics' is based on three strategies: (i) strengthen central authority, ensuring the Kremlin has the power and the money to enforce its writ; (ii) prevent popular discontent; (iii) rely on private business to improve efficiency, but only where it does not contradict the previous two strategies (Miller, 2018: xiii). ...
The phenomenon of state capitalism is attracting growing attention in economic geography and political economy. We contribute to the debate by exploring the authoritarian state capitalism variant whereby the state moves beyond a predominantly regulatory role and appears as the dominant actor. We take Russia to be a prominent example of authoritarian state capitalism because the central state has subjugated economy, created organisational structures and designed development strategies to serve the interests of the kleptocrat, inverting the conventional meaning of ‘state capture’. The paper illustrates the centrality of the state by exploring two state-sponsored megaprojects: (i) the upgrade of the Northern Sea Route and (ii) the construction of innovation clusters (Skolkovo). In the first case, the state directs resources to the Northern Sea Route to secure Russia's control of the Arctic. In the second case, the state attempts to replicate the perceived developmental success stories of the West by fostering technology clusters. Each illustrative case offers an instructive insight into Russia's authoritarian state capitalism characterised by tensions between its own political and economic repertoires and a contentious relationship with the Western-dominated liberal capitalist world order.
... Th e Soviet symbiotic power-sharing relationship between paramount leaders and civil service carried over into the Post-Soviet administrative reality (Barabashev and Klimenko 2018;Barabashev and Straussman 2007). (1924,1936,1977) Labor Code (1922Code ( , 1971 Constitution ( Under presidents Vladimir Putin (2000-2007, and since 2012) and Dmitry Medvedev (2008-2011, the governing strategy also shift ed towards technological development and active social policy, aimed at population growth and social stability (Miller 2018). Contemporary Russia displays complex relations between politics and administration (Barabashev and Klimenko 2018;Noble 2020). ...
Politicians in all types of regimes require bureaucracy to extend their rule over society. To prevent administrators from becoming too powerful and publicly signal independence, they seemingly arbitrarily criticize public officials. But when and how do political leaders blame bureaucracy – and when do they praise it ? This study uses Russia as a case to illustrate the complex and ambiguous politics-administration relationship in non-Western regimes. We argue that public statements about bureaucracy accommodate two different legitimation strategies. We provide a content analysis of 311 public statements, from 1917 – 2017, on the role of administration in the country’s development. We find that attention to administrative affairs coincides with major political changes and periods of political instability in the history of Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. Over a century, the rhetoric of Russian leaders oscillated between blaming and praising bureaucracy to secure stability and overcome obstacles in implementing governing strategies. The strategic interplay between assertive rhetoric and praising bureaucracy is part of an effective political leadership survival strategy.
... The August 1998 partial default set the country on the path of restored economic growth by devaluing the currency, and the steep rise in commodity prices in the 2000s was managed remarkably effectively (Appel 2008). Having built up reserves in a classical counter-cyclical manner, Russia weathered the 2008-2009 global financial crisis reasonably well, although unresolved structural issues meant that high growth rates were not restored (Miller 2018). With foreign currency and gold reserves regularly exceeding half a trillion dollars, a "fiscal rule" diverting energy revenues into the National Welfare Fund, an exceptionally low foreign debt, budget surpluses, and balanced budgets, this would not appear to be a "kleptocracy" (pace Dawisha 2011Dawisha , 2014; see also Belton 2020). ...
Russian governance is a dynamic combination of horizontal and vertical factors. Heterarchy suggests that elements of an organization are not necessarily hierarchical (not ranked), and that they have the potential to be ranked in a number of different ways. Three levels to the system are identified: the macro (where the four major ideological-interest groups of Russian modernity are located); the meso (encompassing the various corporate, regional, and institutional actors as well as social organizations); and the micro (the personalities and networks in the current constellation of power). Vladimir Putin’s statecraft represents a distinctive response to the problem of heterarchy. Putin’s control mechanisms have reproduced features of the late Soviet “stability system,” which in the end proved far from stable. The regime-state is designed to constrain the socio-political reality of heterarchy, but “Hobbesian” mechanical stability impedes the development of more organic and adaptive “Lockean” forms of political integration and societal management. The contradiction between chaos and control is not resolved and has become constitutive of the post-communist Russian polity.
... And third, against this political background, the processes of etatization and even gradual nationalization unfolded, which brought to life various forms of proxy and informal business ownership for federal-level politicians (Åslund, 2019;Miller, 2018). This process should have been additionally exacerbated in the context of the informality that was already prevalent in Russia at least since Soviet times, and more specifically by the existence of informal networks reportedly permeating Russian politics and economics (Ledeneva, 2006). ...
Extensive literature shows that businesspeople thrive on political connections. Most research, however, does not differentiate between types of political connection, thus effectively assuming that economic return on being connected should not differ systematically between federal and regional, legislative and executive, formal and informal connections. We collect a unique comprehensive dataset on Russia’s richest businesspeople in 2003–2010 and demonstrate that only certain types of connections work, depending on the political context. Our analysis shows that as Russian politics became centralized and the federal executive more powerful during the 2000s, businesspeople with informal connections to the federal executive increased their fortunes much faster compared with everyone else—including those with any other type of connections. Businesspeople’s wealth thus dynamically reflected these important political changes. This suggests a procedure for inferring nominally unobservable changes in the political system from politically connected businesspeople’s fortunes, while also shedding additional light on the institutional origins of informality in Russian politics today.
... Furthermore, beyond the never-ending putatively rational calculations of who is 'in the black' versus who is 'in the red', the kinship between plutonomy and a kleptocracy becomes evident when one senses how plutonomics, in far too many bizarre respects, sociologically resembles the illiberal rampages of 'Putinomics' in Russia, Eastern Europe, and many Middle Eastern or North African nations (Miller 2018). From the commanding heights or inner cores of such twenty-first-century 'guided market systems', it appears illiberal indebtedarian ideology brazenly engineers actually capitalist relations to assure those 'on top' or 'at the core' will continue 'in the black' to attain their net positive worth by maintain the ever-more engrossed negative worth of those 'down below' and 'beyond the core' out in 'the red' rising tides of dispossession, disaccumulation, and disinformation. ...
This is the first collection focusing on knowledge socialism, a particularly apt term used to describe a Chinese socialist mode of production and socialist approach to development and modernity based around the rise of peer production, new forms of collaboration and collective intelligence. Making the case for knowledge socialism, the book is intended for students, teacher, scholars and policy theorists in the field of knowledge economy.
... Furthermore, beyond the never-ending putatively rational calculations of who is 'in the black' versus who is 'in the red', the kinship between plutonomy and a kleptocracy becomes evident when one senses how plutonomics, in far too many bizarre respects, sociologically resembles the illiberal rampages of 'Putinomics' in Russia, Eastern Europe, and many Middle Eastern or North African nations (Miller 2018). From the commanding heights or inner cores of such twenty-first-century 'guided market systems', it appears illiberal indebtedarian ideology brazenly engineers actually capitalist relations to assure those 'on top' or 'at the core' will continue 'in the black' to attain their net positive worth by maintain the ever-more engrossed negative worth of those 'down below' and 'beyond the core' out in 'the red' rising tides of dispossession, disaccumulation, and disinformation. ...
This chapter begins with a democratic socialist critique of the mainstream neoclassical reading of Hardin’s famous tale of the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’. Then, it considers the neoliberal-led commodification of academic knowledge and counter projects of the ‘Public Digital University’ and ‘knowledge socialism’ as a springboard for examining the broader context of the neoliberal-led commodification of the immaterial world and resulting unstable and unsustainable societal outcomes. Discussion concentrates first on political and economic consequences of privatised regulation of the global information commons that I examine in relation to the democratic ideal of a well-formed global virtual civil society. Following on, this chapter turns to examine globally unstable economic effects of capitalism’s uneven development and the limitations of existing socialist critiques. The final section links ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ with a ‘world knowledge bank’ as key features of a democratic socialist alternative to the neoliberal model of development.
... Of special relevance here isCarr (1984). 3 For a detailed analysis of Putin's economic policy and the role of state, seeMiller (2018). 4 The most vivid example of the contrary is the successful international business of Russian TMK group, which is one of the world's leading producers of tubular products for the oil and gas indus- ...
The economic tools of Russian security strategy include market access including labour market, subsidies, loans and credits . WEell-tailored economic policies to every partucular actor might be enough to aschieve expected outcome as in politics what matters is first and foremost the relative power of states
Ушбу мақолада миллий иқтисодиётни ривожланишида газ қазиб чиқариш компанияларининг тутган ўрни таҳлил қилинган. Шунингдек, саноат ишлаб чиқариш соҳаси ЯИМ кўрсаткичи ёки ЯИМда қишлоқ хўжалиги ва хизматлар соҳаси ҳажмига нисбатан муҳимроқ эканлиги, газ қазиб чиқариш бўйича хорижий мамлакатлар таҳлили, хорижий мамлакатлар томонидан газ қазиб чиқариш тенденциялари, OPECнинг маълумотларига кўра газ захиралари бўйича етакчилик қилаётган мамлакатлар таҳлили баён этилган.
Subject. The article investigates factors of the oil industry that affect the economic well-being of the Russian population. Objectives. The purpose is to examine possible impact of oil industry indicators on the well-being of the Russian population and develop an econometric model to predict the dynamics of living standards of Russians. Methods. We applied correlation and regression analysis to develop an econometric model within the framework of this study. On its basis , we selected factors of the oil industry that affect the level of economic well-being of the Russian population. The study rested on statistical data from open sources for the period from 2000 to 2023. Results. The paper identifies factors of economic activity of the industry that affect Russia’s GDP per capita. We developed an econometric model to determine the magnitude of the impact of oil industry indicators on the well-being of the country's population. Conclusions. The price of oil and the level of demand for it on the international market, as well as investments in the development of new oil fields, are significant factors that have a significant impact on the well-being of the population.
In this fully revised and updated in-depth analysis of the war in Ukraine, Paul D'Anieri explores the dynamics within Ukraine, between Ukraine and Russia, and between Russia and the West that emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union and eventually resulted in Russia's invasion in 2022. Proceeding chronologically, this book shows how Ukraine's separation from Russia in 1991, at the time called a 'civilized divorce,' led to Europe's most violent conflict since WWII. It argues the conflict came about because of three underlying factors-the security dilemma, the impact of democratization on geopolitics, and the incompatible goals of a post-Cold War Europe. Rather than a peaceful situation that was squandered, D'Anieri argues that these were deep-seated pre-existing disagreements that could not be bridged, with concerning implications for the prospects of resolution of the Ukraine conflict.
In 2022 was conducted a joint scientific research project of the two institutions – Institute of International Politics and Economics (Belgrade, Serbia) and Faculty of Political Science, Lomonosov Moscow State University (Moscow Russia). The project’s name was «Russian-Serbian relations: opportunities and limitations». In the conducted research, the following topics were analyzed: limitations concerning formal institutions and informal practices in the social and political life of Serbia and Russia, the foreign policy of the two countries and their priorities in current international relations, including relations with the EU, bilateral economic, energy and military relations, as well as scientific and technological cooperation. The conclusions reached by the researchers on this project are presented in eight points.
In contrast to the liberal orientation in the 1990s, the 2000s saw a strong trend towards the ‘state-led’ system of governance. Emerging market economies such as China and Russia have achieved high economic growth on the basis of state-led capitalist systems, and political and economic frictions with developed countries have become apparent. These economic frictions have intensified the politicisation of economies worldwide. This study provides empirical evidence of the effectiveness of the state-led system and its stability.
Initially Western scholars generally assumed that Russia would become a ‘normal’ democratic state, taking its place in the existing world order. They attributed this to Yeltsin's democratic credentials, but they could do so only by ignoring the clear flaws in Russian democracy as it developed under his presidency. This means that when Russia moved in a more authoritarian direction under Yeltsin’s successor Vladimir Putin, the explanation that most gave for this was the agency of Putin. He was seen as reinstating many of the elements of the Soviet legacy, including the role of the security apparatus. Putin’s rise was also seen as decisive in the shift of Russia’s international position from one seeking accommodation within the existing international architecture to one seeking to revise that architecture in ways objectionable to the West. The result is said to be a new cold war. But there is disagreement about how this should be understood: is Russia acting as a traditional great power, and therefore understandable through the established principles of international relations, or is she still claiming Soviet-style exceptionalism? What is clear, and many do not appreciate, is that even when Putin has gone, Russia’s core interests will likely not change.
Why have Russians largely approved of the government’s pandemic response despite having one of the highest excess death rates in the world? The explanation is not that the government has done a good job, that citizens have come to expect little from the state in general, nor entirely because of a pro-government media. Drawing on pre-pandemic survey data, I argue that Russians’ opinions about state-provided healthcare shape their evaluation of the government’s response to COVID-19, and help explain approval of the government's pandemic reaction. Future research on Russian pandemic politics should account for the importance of prior assessments.
Against the background of political instability in Belarus and unsuccessful attempts to "deepen integration" in 2019-2020, the political economy of Russian-Belarusian cooperation as a subject of study goes far beyond academic interest and is of great practical importance. The article suggests that explanation of the integration difficulties in inside the nature of the existing Belarusian political and economic model, which becomes the main object of analysis. By analogy with the political economic model of "Putinomics" by С.Miller and the results of a comparative analysis, the political economic model of "Lukashenomics" and its main strategies (centralization of power, a high level of social obligations, state control of the economy, extraction of "political rent" from relations with Russia and the priority statehood over state solvency) are explained. On the basis of the model of resilience and stability of state systems developed earlier by the author as part of the team, the influence of the "Lukashenomics" on the resilience and stability of the state system of Belarus is determined. The fundamental incompatibility of the existing Belarusian and Russian political economic models is revealed and the prospects for the development of Russian-Belarusian relations in the context of possible scenarios for the transformation of the Belarusian model are determined.
The review of the oil and gas industry in Saudi Arabia is Conducted. Data on oil and gas reserves, consumption, and exports are provided. Saudi Arabia is one of the largest non-FTI producers in the Russian Federation among the non-FTI exporters (OPEC). BL agodarya mirovym za pasam not FTI, one of the most important ones in the world, but the one with the most inquisitive in the field of energy from rasli, Saudi Arabia, is the largest exporter of oil. The data on oil reserves of the largest fields, including the largest in the world of the terikovoye non-oil field of Gavar are presented. Saudi Arabia occupies the fifth place in the world in the field of natural gas passes, with a volume of 294 trillion cubic feet, and the third place in the field of natural gas passes in the Far East. Saudi Arabia they EET de nine EXT morning not preparatively for waste water treatment, of which four PR andlegal Saudi Aramco and the OS the rest of the floor joint PR Adbrite with to foreign companies. The largest oil and gas companies represented in SaudiI Arawia are named, in particular: Saudi Aramco, Saudi Shell, Saudi Exxon Mobil, Saudi Chevron, Total, Eni, Sinopec, Sumitomo. It is shown that Saudi Ar amco is a non-state oil company of Saudi Arabia, the largest in the world in terms of oil production and oil reserves. The company also controls natural gas production in the country. Saudi Aramco is a national non-oil company Of the Saudi Aravia, which is responsible for non-oil and gas operations throughout the Kingdom. Recently, the main goal is to use unconventional gas sources, namely shale gas production. Currently, the company Saudi Aramco has more than 16 drilling rigs for the extraction of shale gas. By the end of 2020, the company is expected to extract 3 billion cubic feet of natural gas per day.
This analysis maps some operational perversities and structural problems at work in the historical contradictions between ‘knowledge socialism’ as it remains trapped within the workings of contemporary ‘knowledge capitalism’. It develops in three parts. First, it considers how the entrenched authorities of ‘knowledge capitalism’ have become an exploitative plutocratic elite, which operates as a ‘plutonomy’ to stall the coming of knowledge socialism. Second, it considers how the workings of democratic elections in many countries developing knowledge capitalist economies can be derailed from moving peacefully toward knowledge socialism as reactionary ‘illiberal capitalist’ forces clandestinely hijack the means of persuasion through disinformation, hacking, and virtual participants in cyber-subversion to spoof electoral systems, spread misinformation, and stop participation. And, third, it provisionally explores three different paths for the transition to knowledge socialism in ‘thought experiments’ to speculate about how that turn could unfold from the on-going creative destruction of knowledge capitalism.
A strong leader – i.e. an individual who concentrates great power in his hands and uses it to solve the country’s problems – is often considered a good thing in contemporary politics. Vladimir Putin has always presented himself as precisely this kind of leader. This article considers whether Putin actually is a strong leader who has used his powers to do great things for Russia. The analysis begins by considering whether Putin is a strong leader in terms of the powers that he holds. It then assesses whether Putin has used these powers to solve Russia’s problems in terms of economic development, order, and national standing. Russia here is compared to the other states of the Former Soviet Union, as they all share a common Soviet heritage and have been subject to comparable structural forces. The study utilizes the data (arguably underused in the field) provided by institutions such as the World Bank to examine a large number of socio-economic factors. If Putin really is a strong leader who has transformed Russia, we would expect performance in Russia to be better than in these other countries. The article finds that Russia’s record is average at best and that Putin is an unexceptional leader.
This research assesses the effects of import substitution on the Russian agricultural sector since the introduction of Russian countersanctions in 2014. It provides a case study on Russian agriculture and its development in recent years, drawing on import substitution literature, the historical context of Russian agriculture, and contemporary Russian policy documents. The effects of import substitution are assessed, first, by analysing the main aggregate developments in import, production, and export levels, and, second, by analysing the side effects of import substitution from a regional, sectoral, and welfare perspective. The research highlights the ambiguity of Russian agricultural policies, which have caused diverging trends in agricultural development. As such, import substitution has caused several positive effects that are considered strategically important by Russian policymakers, but has simultaneously generated substantial economic costs.
Following the argument of urban geographers that “superstar” cities are the engines of economic growth in a globalized era, Kremlin advisor Aleksei Kudrin and others have argued that Russia should invest in a handful of major cities including Moscow and St. Petersburg. That advice has now become part of official government planning. In stark contrast to the developed world, however, Russia's population is not concentrated in a few urban centers, but in several hundred medium-sized cities and towns, many distributed across Russia's vast territory, often far from other metropolitan agglomerations. These include more than a hundred officially-designated “monotowns,” whose fate is dependent on a single industry, which the government ranks according to the severity of their “socio-economic conditions.” This paper will explore the dilemmas faced by monotowns in particular, and the challenge to authorities of balancing the need for new economic growth from urban metropolises against preventing social unrest in declining industrial communities.
The COVID-19 pandemic has already disrupted large swathes of the global economy, threatening the growth models of major oil and gas producer countries like Russia. A collapse in oil prices, triggered by the pandemic, once again exposed Russia’s enduring susceptibility to sharp falls in oil and gas prices. We argue that this decline in oil prices came at a time when tectonic shifts in global energy markets had already threatened to reduce the value of future oil and gas revenues. These structural changes were accelerated by the collapse in demand caused by the pandemic. Because the Russian leadership had done little to address the threat posed by the emergence of a new energy order, the economy remained highly dependent on oil and gas sales as the primary source of growth. While measures undertaken since 2014 to reduce the government’s fiscal dependence on high oil prices will help Russia avoid a worst-case outcome of a fiscal or financial crisis, the dependence of other branches of the economy on the energy sector remains high. This has left Russia set once again to experience a deeper recession than that forecast for other energy exporting economies.
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