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The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, is an independent Think Tank dealing with national
security and conceptual aspects of land warfare, including conventional & sub-conventional conflict and terrorism.
CLAWS conducts research that is futuristic in outlook and policy-oriented in approach.
Website: www.claws.in Contact us: landwarfare@gmail.com
No. 253 October 2020
Is the Naval
Blockade of the
Straits of Malac
ca a
Realistic Option for
India: An
Assessment
Major General PK Mallick, VSM
(Retd), is an Electronics and
Telecommunication Engineering
graduate from BE College, Shibpore.
He was commissioned in the Corps
of Signals. M Tech from IIT, Kharagpur
and an alumni of DSSC, CDM and
NDC, the officer has wide experience
in CI Ops, command, staff and
instructional appointments. He retired
from the National Defence College as
a Senior Directing Staff (Army). The
officer has interest in Electronic
Warfare, Cyber Warfare and
Technology. He has published a large
number of papers in reputed journals.
He runs a popular blog on national
security issues. Currently, he holds the
COAS Chair of Excellence at CLAWS.
Introduction
The Straits of Malacca is the shortest sea route
between Persian Gulf suppliers of oil and key
Asian markets. It links major economies such as
Middle East, China, Japan, South Korea, etc.
Being the 500 nautical mile funneled waterway, the
Strait is only 1.5 nautical miles (2.8 km) wide at its
narrowest point─ the Phillips Channel in the
Singapore Strait. The Strait is not deep enough to
accommodate some of the largest ships, mostly oil
tankers, but it is significant as through the South
China Sea it connects the Indian Ocean with the
Pacific Ocean.
Very often, the blockade of the Straits of Malacca
for disruption of Chinese energy sources and trade
is being offered as a possible Indian strategic
deterrence option against China in a conflict
scenario. 1 With hardly any other deterrence
Key Points
• The Straits of Malacca is a key
corridor of global trade and
commerce, which through the South
China Sea connects the Indian Ocean
with the Pacific Ocean.
• The blockade of the Straits of Malacca
for disruption of Chinese energy
sources and trade is seen as a
possible option for India’s strategic
deterrence against China.
• If the Straits of Malacca is blocked,
nearly half of the world's shipping fleet
would require to be rerouted through
the Lombok Strait or the Sunda Strait.
• India Navy can easily cut off the
narrow Straits of Malacca; however,
blocking a strait is not a viable
strategic goal.
• There are serious issues which need
to be carefully wargamed before
taking any action on naval blockade of
the Straits of Malacca.
CENTR E FOR LAND WAR FAR E STUD I E S ( CLAWS): I S SUE BR I E F
2
options available to India, this strategic perception is gaining prominence in India’s own
deterrence discourse. But opting for such measures would, at the foremost, require careful
deliberations. In this process, a thorough analysis is required about this option of naval
blockade of the Straits of Malacca.
Importance of the Straits of Malacca
As per the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates,2
roughly 80 per cent of global trade by volume and 70 per cent by value is transported by
sea. Of that volume, 60 per cent of maritime trade passes through Asia, with the South
China Sea carrying an estimated one-third of global shipping. Its waters are particularly
critical for China, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea; all of which rely on the Straits of
Malacca, which connects the South China Sea and, by extension, the Pacific Ocean with the
Indian Ocean. Most importantly, the Straits of Malacca is the second-largest oil trade
chokepoint in the world, after the Strait of Hormuz.3
Nearly one-third of the 61 per cent of total global petroleum and other liquids production that
move on maritime routes transit the Straits of Malacca. The high concentration of
commercial goods flowing through the relatively narrow Straits of Malacca has raised
concerns about its vulnerability as a strategic chokepoint.4 Over 80 per cent of China’s oil
and hydrocarbon imports from West Asia and around 60 per cent of Japan’s total oil
imports currently pass through the Malacca Straits. While more than 50 per cent of India’s
trade now goes through the Malacca Straits. But for China, the stakes are much higher as
being the second-largest world economy with over 60 per cent of its trade in value traveling
by sea, China’s economic security is closely tied to the Malacca Straits. Hence, the Straits of
Malacca holds geoeconomic and geostrategic significance for the globe at large, and some
Asian countries in particular such as China, Japan, and India amongst others.
Alternatives to the Straits of Malacca
If the Straits of Malacca is blocked, nearly half of the world's shipping fleet would require to
be rerouted through the Lombok Strait between the Indonesian islands of Bali and Lombok
or through the Sunda Strait between the Indonesian islands of Java and Sumatra (Figure
1)5, which will be much longer routes. Lombok and Makassar Straits are much longer routes.
If this be the case, then the most affected state would be China.
CENTR E FOR LAND WAR FAR E STUD I E S ( CLAWS): I S SUE BR I E F
3
Figure 1: Alternative Passages to the Straits of Malacca
Source: Adapted from China Power.6
I. Sunda Strait. For ships travelling by the Cape route to East Asia, as well as for vessels
sailing from Australian ports to Southeast or East Asian destinations, the Sunda Strait is an
important waterway. The Sunda Strait is about 13 nautical miles wide at its narrowest. It is
quite deep at its western entrance but the depth decreases towards its eastern exit with
irregular bottom topography.
The Sunda Strait is less suitable than the Straits of Malacca. It contains many navigational
hazards including strong tidal flows; sandbank formations along the waterway; a live
volcano; poor visibility during squalls and the existence of numerous oil drilling platforms and
small islands and reefs which may disrupt safe navigation. This makes the Sunda Strait
unsuitable for large modern ships. Yearly, about 2,280 ships transit the Sunda Strait carrying
in total some 100 million tonnes of cargo valued at US$ 5 billion.
II. Lombok Strait. The Lombok Strait passes through the Indonesian archipelago and is
used mainly by large crude oil carriers as it is much deeper and ships of all sizes can use it,
while the Straits of Malacca are usable for tankers no larger than 200.000 dwt. Its minimum
CENTR E FOR LAND WAR FAR E STUD I E S ( CLAWS): I S SUE BR I E F
4
width is 11.5 miles. The Strait stretches about 400 nautical miles from its northern gateway
to its southern access. In terms of volume of oil shipped, this route is of near equivalent
importance to the better known Malacca Strait. Yearly, 420 ships ply the Lombok
passageway carrying a total of 36 million tonnes of cargo worth US$ 40 billion.
Blockade— Is It A Viable Option for India?
Geographically, India has a distinct advantage in the Indian Ocean. At the mouth of the
strait, Indian Navy is present in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. In a conflict scenario with
China, there can be a requirement of blocking China’s energy requirements and trade
passing through the Straits of Malacca. As H I Sutton argues that:7 “A potential closure of
the Strait of Malacca in case of an escalation of tension, a crisis, or a war, could allow India
to choke oil shipments to China, the world's largest oil importer, which imports a lot of oil
from the Middle East going through that route”.8Larry Bond, the renowned naval author and
creator of the Harpoon war game series, talking to the Tac Ops podcast on July 5, said that,
“If India wanted to cut off trade with China, all that they have to do is park a bunch of ships at
the Straits of Malacca. And that’s it, nothing else is getting through that way”.9 If this be the
case, the blockade will then create a huge traffic jam in the Strait.
Undeniably, a ‘blockade’ of such a busy waterway like the Straits of Malacca will adversely
affect the global trade and movement of hydrocarbons to East and South East Asia. While
without active support of the United States, no country can do it; however, the role of the
United States in thwarting Chinese activities is not very encouraging. Admiral Arun Prakash,
Former Chief of Naval Staff and Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee has succinctly
posited that:
“US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s latest ‘bombastic statements’ regarding
China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea served only to highlight America’s
helplessness. Having failed to deter China from creating and fortifying artificial
islands in the South China Sea in open defiance of the UN Tribunal’s verdict, all
that the US has been able to demonstrate is the hollow symbolism of US warships
conducting freedom of navigation sailing through Chinese-claimed waters”.10
Blockade is an act of war where general principles and rules of the law of naval warfare - the
maritime jus in bello apply. Blockades are regulated by international law and custom and
require advance warning to neutral states and impartial application. China being a
CENTR E FOR LAND WAR FAR E STUD I E S ( CLAWS): I S SUE BR I E F
5
permanent power in the United Nations Security Council, is sure to take up this issue in the
UNSC. However, the question is : Which country with veto power will side with India?
Besides, ‘opting for a blockade, will incur huge political and diplomatic costs for India’. Any
attempt to interfere with trade would be subject to massive pushback from countries around
the world, including from India’s most important strategic partners. Many Indo-Pacific
countries would view India’s disruption of regular shipping in an international sea lane as a
hostile act that imposes unacceptable costs on neutrals. What will be the stance of Japan,
South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and other ASEAN countries?11
Today, experts believe that blocking a strait is not a viable strategic goal. Chris McMahon
argues that the closing of chokepoints has no real impact on global trade.12 Closure of
Straits of Malacca would not severely affect the global shipping network as it would transit
through the alternate route of the Sunda Strait or the Lombok Strait. There will be an
increase in cost, but the market would adjust for the increased cost. To argue, the Suez
Canal has been closed for eight years between 1967 and 1975. As a result of which, the
cost of shipping around the Cape of Good Hope was much higher than the Suez route but
presented no serious economic hardship to global consumers. 13 Thereby, rerouting the
Pacific trade for closed Straits of Malacca would have similar minimal effect on the cost of
global trade.
China’s Options Against Its “Malacca Dilemma”
Hu Jintao in 2003 understood the problem of China in case of United States instigated
blockade of the Malacca Strait and described it as “Malacca Dilemma”. Due to which, China
has taken a number of steps to reduce the country’s over-reliance on the Strait. These
include development of the Gwadar port in Pakistan with plans to transport oil from the port
to inland China, the Myanmar-Yunnan Pipeline which siphons oil and gas from the Bay of
Bengal to the Kunming region of China, the Kazakhstan-China Pipeline which connects the
country to the oil-rich Caspian region and to build a “Polar Silk Road” in the Arctic. However,
these are long term plans. Besides, the Kazakhstan-China and Myanmar-Yunnan provides
only 400,000 and 420,000 barrels a day respectively, compared to the 6.5 million China-
bound barrels that pass through the Malacca strait daily. They would not reduce China's
dependence on the Straits of Malacca for its oil trade. In addition, China has around 80 days
of oil in storage as strategic petroleum reserve (SPR), oil storage at oil firms and commercial
stocks.14 To note, as on 29 June, China had accumulated 73 million barrels of oil on 59
different ships floating at sea off the country's northern coast. This is China's floating
CENTR E FOR LAND WAR FAR E STUD I E S ( CLAWS): I S SUE BR I E F
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storage- defined as barrels of oil on vessels waiting for seven days or longer.15 Thereby,
China is already seeking alternatives against its “Malacca Dilemma”.
China, Thailand and the KRA Canal Project
China has been actively pushing for construction of a man-made waterway, as part of its Belt
and Road Initiative that cuts through Thailand to connect the South China Sea with the
Andaman Sea─ slashing transit times between them by two to three days. The proposed Kra
Canal would stretch more than 100 km across the Kra Isthmus which is the narrowest point
of the Malay peninsula. The new route could be an alternative to the route through the
Straits of Malacca. This would also allow the Chinese navy to move ships quickly between
its newly constructed bases in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.
Figure 2: The KRA Canal Project
Source: Adapted from ip defense forum.com.16
Though there is a strong lobby in Thailand for construction of the Kra Canal, recently the
government of Thailand announced that, it will scrap the Kra Canal project. 17 There are
compelling reasons for cancelling the project. For instance, the Kra Canal is estimated to
cost US$ 20 billion to US$ 30 billion. The cost of digging the canal and dredging the sea
around it is only a one-time cost, but maintaining that depth will be an enormous challenge
given the effects of siltation and monsoon seasons. However, the opportunity cost is too
small, as avoiding a voyage of couple of days is not enough to justify creating a new route. A
CENTR E FOR LAND WAR FAR E STUD I E S ( CLAWS): I S SUE BR I E F
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‘too-high’ toll cannot be an alternative to the ‘free-to-sail’ Straits of Malacca. The return on
investment is also not cost effective. Besides, the project would also adversely affect
Thailand’s tourism industry and damage its fisheries.
In such a situation, Thailand risks splitting itself in two. The waterway would create a
geographic split between Buddhist regions in the North and mainly Muslim provinces in the
South. This could make a separation that would last for centuries and would be impossible to
fill in once the channels have been dug out. This will only worsen the domestic situation
given that, the Thai government has been fighting an ethnic and religious based insurgency
since the 1980s in its three southernmost provinces─ which are mainly dominated by Muslim
and ethnic Malay. In view of this, the canal could turn out to be a representational border
between mainland Thailand in the north, and a separatist movement in the south.
In addition, the project will also affect Thailand’s relationship with other southeast Asian
neighbours mainly Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia; as these countries would lose
shipping business to Thailand if the canal is constructed. Furthermore, there are concerns
that it would undercut the independence of poor southeast Asian countries like Myanmar and
Cambodia, that have comparatively weak civil societies that are highly vulnerable to Chinese
interference. While many countries might be on the receiving end, China will benefit the most
from such a canal because it will build it and control it. Wherein, China is likely to be the only
investor that could bring the project to life.
Critical Issues Against the ‘Blockade’ Option
The following issues need to be considered before thinking of a naval blockade in the Straits
of Malacca, such as: First, a disruption to oil flows through Malacca could soar the world’s oil
prices. Today, United States is the highest producer of oil and has a major stake in oil
prices. Will the United States allow this to happen? Second, China has built long-range anti-
access area-denial (A2/AD) weapons and redundant fortified islands within the South China
Sea. China has sufficient naval forces to patrol the Strait and can prevent free transit of the
Strait using Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles(ASBM) and long range Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles
(ASCM). These long range weapons based on the Chinese mainland or in the central South
China Sea can contest the other straits leading into the South China Sea.
In this context, India’s options would require key deliberations such as: What will be the
effect on India’s own trade flow as more than 50 per cent of India’s trade now passes
CENTR E FOR LAND WAR FAR E STUD I E S ( CLAWS): I S SUE BR I E F
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through the Straits of Malacca? How will the Indian Navy identify those vessels that are
actually headed to Chinese ports? Today, transactions take place in high seas and ships are
rerouted in transit. Transactions can happen on board a ship after crossing the Straits of
Malacca for China.18 In such a scenario, can India stop a vessel flying the flag of Greece or
Singapore or such other countries carrying oil and goods to and from China? What will the
Indian Navy do if China retaliates with its own blockade or interdictions against vessels
carrying Indian trade? If India plans for a blockade, what will be the duration of it? To note,
small duration would not have any effect on China whereas India would invite large scale
condemnation for its action.
Though India is in a position to choke Chinese supply lines, it will not have the same effect
due to availability of alternate routes, strategic reserves and the assets that China has
created at South China Sea. India’s energy requirements come from the Persian Gulf and
the Strait of Hormuz. In any conflict scenario, the Indian Navy should be securing India’s vital
energy imports. While, the United States considers this region as its backwater and does not
allow navies like the Indian Navy to operate there; however, the United States encourages
Indian Navy to operate in the South China Sea. Besides, there is also no indication from the
Chinese side that it is concerned of any form of threat of blockade in the Straits of Malacca.
Hence, all the above and such other issues need to be carefully wargamed before taking any
action on opting for a naval blockade of the Straits of Malacca.
End Notes
1 Sudarshan Y. Shrikhande (2020), “The delusion of India trying to throttle China’s maritime trade,” The Lowy
Institute, 25 Augus 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/delusion-india-trying-throttle-china-s-
maritime-trade. Accessed online 02 October 2020.
2 China Power Team (2017), “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?,” China Power, 02 August 2017,
https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/. Accessed online 03 October 2020.
3 “The Strait of Malacca, a key oil trade chokepoint, links the Indian and Pacific Oceans,”, U. S. Energy
Information Administration, 11 August 2017, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32452. Accessed
online 04 October 2020.
4 Krishnadev Calamur (2017), “High Traffic, High Risk in the Strait of Malacca,” The Atlantic, 21 August
2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/08/strait-of-malacca-uss-john-mccain/537471/.
Accessed online 04 October 2020.
5Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, Maritime Highways of Southeast Asia: Alternative Straits?, RSIS Commentary
C012024, 10 February 2012, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/1686-maritime-highways-of-
southeast/#.XzrZX_Mza1t. Accessed online 05 October 2020.
6 China Power Team (2017), “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?,” n. 2.
CENTR E FOR LAND WAR FAR E STUD I E S ( CLAWS): I S SUE BR I E F
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7 H I Sutton (2020), “Could The Indian Navy Strangle China’s Lifeline In The Malacca Strait?,” The Forbes, 08
July 2020 https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/07/08/could-the-indian-navy-strangle-chinas-lifeline-in-the-
malacca-strait/#2cb7d18f78e8. Accessed online 08 October 2020.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Rahul Bedi (2020), “Why Indian Navalist Hopes of Using the 'Quad' to Pressure China in Ladakh Are
Misplaced,”28 July 2020, https://thewire.in/security/why-indian-hopes-of-using-the-quad-to-put-pressure-on-
china-in-ladakh-are-misplaced. Accessed online 07 October 2020.
11 Drake Long (2020), “Thinking Like a Pirate: Contesting Southeast Asia’s Chokepoints,” Center for International
Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 05 June 2020, http://cimsec.org/thinking-like-a-pirate-contesting-southeast-asias-
chokepoints/44037#:~:%20text=%20The%%2020current%20fear%20of%20China,the%20Malacca%20Straits%2
0seems%20unlikely. Accessed online 02 October 2020.
12 Christopher J. McMahon (2017), “Maritime Trade Warfare," Naval War College Review, Vol. 70, no. 3,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/3. Accessed online 03 October 2020.
13 Jamie Mcgrath (2020), “There are no Strategic Chokepoints,” Center for International Maritime Security
(CIMSEC), 03 June 2020, http://cimsec.org/there-are-no-strategic-chokepoints/43708. Accessed online 03
October 2020.
14 Tom Daly (2019), “China has enough oil inventories to last about 80 days: NEA,” Reuters, 20 September 2019,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-energy/china-has-enough-oil-inventories-to-last-about-80-days-nea-
idUSKBN1W514V. Accessed online 07 October 2020.
15 Matt Egan (2020), “China is storing an epic amount of oil at sea. Here’s why,” CNN, 01 July 2020,
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/07/01/investing/oil-prices-china-imports/index.html.Accessed online 05 October
2020.
16See, https://ipdefenseforum.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/iPDF_V43N4_eNGMap.jpg. Accessed online 06
October 2020.
17 Sidharth Shekhar (2020), “Double blow for China after Thailand scraps Kra Canal project, delays submarine
deal amid public pressure,” Times Now, 04 September 2020,
https://www.timesnownews.com/international/article/double-blow-for-china-after-thailand-scraps-kra-canal-
project-delays-submarine-deal-amid-public-pressure/647466?fbclid=Iw AR3DYmDCtztF43Z5 7cT_c 1u8
YIrPVrsMjFWrey6yGUjabdXrjDxiRupwTRA. Accessed online 06 October 2020.
18 Sean Mirski (2020), “Could The U.S. Navy Blockade China Into Submission?,” The National Interest, 20
September 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/could-us-navy-blockade-china-submission-
169201?page=0%2C1. Accessed online 05 October 2020.
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