Rhetorical Spaces: Essays on Gendered Locations
... Discuta con la mujer los beneficios y los riesgos de volver a casa, y respete su decisión» [2008, modificado 2021] ser entendida como un acto de opresión cuya raíz estructural predetermina aquellos sujetos que son considerados como válidos en la producción de conocimiento, excluyendo, al mismo tiempo, a todos aquellos que no son interlocutores epistémicos reconocibles. El concepto de espacio retórico propuesto por Lorraine Code (1995) será de gran ayuda a la hora de entender la disposición ideológica que articula la validez y relevancia del conocimiento producido. ...
... Por ello resulta muy interesante atender al concepto de «espacio retórico» propuesto por Lorraine Code (1995). Esta noción supone un excelente marco conceptual para entender el complejo entramado de fuerzas discursivas que configuran al sujeto reproductivo dentro de los contextos de salud reproductiva. ...
... De acuerdo con Code (1995), en los espacios retóricos se facilita el flujo de aquellos conocimientos que poseen una mayor aceptación o autoridad dentro del contexto social. Como se ha analizado anteriormente, el conocimiento obstétrico es un conocimiento autoritario reforzado por su carácter tecnocrático y científico -cosa que le otorga exclusividad-dentro del ámbito reproductivo. ...
La violencia obstétrica es un concepto internacionalmente reconocido bajo el que se concentran múltiples prácticas abusivas, entre las que se pueden encontrar desde agresiones físicas y abusos verbales, a retenciones en centros hospitalarios o esterilizaciones forzosas (OMS, 2014). La violencia obstétrica es una forma de violencia de género que reproduce una situación de discriminación estructural contra las mujeres (Šimonović, 2019). Resulta incomprensible que mujeres con plena capacidad y reconocimiento de derechos, experimenten diariamente estos abusos que, a pesar de su heterogeneidad, se ejercen en prácticamente todos los contextos gineco-obstétricos del mundo. Entre estos abusos, debemos enmarcar la judicialización del parto como una práctica compleja de violencia en la que los sujetos reproductivos son desestimados como sujetos de conocimiento y sujetos de derechos. A pesar de su escasez, las intervenciones judiciales durante el parto conllevan una vulneración de múltiples derechos fundamentales y limitan la capacidad de las mujeres para tomar decisiones sobre sus cuerpos y sus procesos reproductivos. Entre ellas se encuentra la reciente decisión del Tribunal Constitucional Español (STC 66/2022), popularmente conocida como «Caso Oviedo». Poniendo especial énfasis en la ausencia del principio de audiencia a lo largo del proceso judicial, la desestimación de este recurso de amparo marca una tendencia palpable en la que los sujetos reproductivos son configurados como sujetos de dudosa validez epistémica. El silenciamiento de las mujeres y la desautorización de sus testimonios en los ámbitos de salud reproductiva, así como en el sistema judicial y administrativo deben ser considerados como actos de injusticia epistémica testimonial. En la base de estas injusticias yace una falta de reconocimiento de las mujeres como sujetos epistémicos a partir un déficit de credibilidad constante que las sitúa en la periferia de la producción del conocimiento. Este desplazamiento debe ser entendido como un acto de opresión articulado por unas condiciones estructurales que mantienen a las mujeres fuera de los espacios retóricos donde, tanto la disciplina obstétrica como el derecho, determinan hegemónicamente quién sabe y qué conocimientos cuentan.
... Many principals, especially White principals in schools with a small percentage of students of color, maintain a "color-evasive" perspective (Annamma et al., 2017) and evidenced "impersonal caring" (Code, 1995), with abstract and technical concern for student performance. For principals with race-conscious attitudes, caring for children of color took on different forms, denoted by more marked elaboration of responsibility. ...
... We first present a broad overview of the literature on moral leadership and culturally responsive leadership. To ground our analysis, we merge the works of Biesta (2004), Code (1995), and Bass (2009Bass ( , 2012 to create a conceptual framework for race-conscious leadership ethics. We then share information regarding the method and data source of this study. ...
... The conceptual framework used in this study was guided by our purposeful bridging of the work of ethics scholars Gert Biesta (2004), Lorraine Code (1995), and Lisa Bass (2009Bass ( , 2012. Drawing together the concepts of collective responsibility, genuine caring, and ethic of care in the work of school leaders leads to a unique conceptual framework for analyzing how school leaders describe their practice and the ethics that grounds it. ...
Background/Context
This research is informed by leadership theory and care ethics and how these theories intersect with race-consciousness. This study contributes to the emerging literature on race-conscious leadership ethics that supports building capacity for equity leadership.
Purpose
The authors explore the intersection of race-consciousness and leadership ethics, studying how leaders explain their practices for increasing equity, their leadership ethics, and their sense of responsibility and personal capacity to address racial achievement disparities.
Participants
The participants are 22 school leaders: 20 principals and two school district officials from 14 urban and suburban school districts in a metropolitan region in one northeastern state.
Research Design
This article draws from a semistructured interview study, based on Seidman's three-component interview design but combined in a single interview: history, focus, and reflection. The authors follow a constructivist, exploratory design to develop interpretations and a three-part conceptual framework.
Data Collection and Analysis
Semistructured interviews allowed the researchers to engage participants in deeper explanations and captured the leaders’ lived experiences through their subjective points of view. Analysis proceeded through a collaborative coding and memo-writing process among the three authors, each contributing distinct historical and racial identities and professional backgrounds.
Findings
Finding a broad range of perspectives about race and its significance for the experiences of children in school settings, the authors identify variations in moral perspectives that play out in differential views of caring and responsibility, especially when leaders talked about the racial and socioeconomic diversity among their students and how they address inequities in opportunities and outcomes. The authors explore four themes: (a) community-based caring, (b) tough-love/tough-luck caring, (c) color-evasive caring in “fortunate communities,” and (d) caring with minimal responsiveness. Many principals, especially White principals in schools with a small percentage of students of color, maintain a color-evasive perspective and demonstrate “impersonal caring,” with abstract and technical concern for student performance. Race-conscious principals demonstrate caring that takes on different forms, denoted by more marked elaboration of “critical responsibility” for children of color. Between these two perspectives are varied attitudes and perspectives.
Conclusions/Recommendations
Greater attention is needed for continuing ethical cultivation of school leaders. Across themes, there are multiple routes to developing capacity for race-conscious leadership ethics, through engaging in deeper reflection about personal history, expanding one's understanding of what it means to care across difference, critiquing one's color evasiveness, and learning from colleagues who demonstrate collective responsibility.
... In this sense, the term "blind spots" refers to 1 manifestation of underdeveloped cultural frames or lenses through which to examine nutrition science, practice, and education. The epistemologist Lorraine Code coined the term "hidden subjectivity" in referring to the background assumptions, cultural values and hypotheses implicit to and embedded within a well-established scientific discipline (27,28). This term points to the subjective (and therefore cultural) nature of these dimensions. ...
... This term points to the subjective (and therefore cultural) nature of these dimensions. Materialism, reductionism, mechanistic thought and subject/object dualism for example, are not filtered out by objective, disinterested techniques but represent subjective orientations that permeate the mental models through which disciplinary inquiry proceeds (27,28). Even cursory reflection on Table 1 offers an insight into how subjective orientations infiltrate our disciplinary mental models and paradigms of practice. ...
... Subjective orientations are hidden to the extent they escape peer review and skeptical inquiry. When widely shared by all members of a scientific community, they acquire an invisibility that leaves them unavailable for criticism (27,28). Hidden subjectivities often become implicit as a subconscious cultural foundation, taken-for-granted truths that remain undiscussed yet shape the practice, expectations, and meaning around ideas of what constitutes professional success (7,29). ...
Colonization and decolonization are common concepts within the discourse of Indigenous scholars and show significance within the recently emerging Native Nutrition conferences. Yet these words and the meanings they convey rarely appear within scholarly literature of nutrition professionals. To what extent are the concepts of colonization and decolonization relevant to the scope of nutrition education, practice, and research? If they are relevant, why are they not more common within professional discourse? Here we briefly describe these concepts and address these questions. We report findings from a study designed to examine barriers to Indigenous scholar participation within nutrition professions. Our results suggest that greater awareness and more fully understanding the dynamics of colonization hold potential to improve nutrition research, education, and practice. Not only is colonization woven into the tapestry of North American history, but our results support assertions of Indigenous scholars that its deeply embedded patterns still echo through our food, education, and health professions and systems. We identify several barriers and colonizing patterns and 2 interrelated lines of decolonizing work, and present a cross-cultural engagement protocol for pursuing decolonizing work. Exploring the complexities and nuances of these ideas more thoroughly is both a developmental process and a collective responsibility that we see as deserving more attention within food and nutrition disciplines. If implemented, we suggest that decolonizing practice holds potential for advancing nutrition science while also creating a more welcoming environment for future Indigenous scholars.
... These are some of the questions and concepts, in various iterations, that combined to generate a diverse and highly interdisciplinary field that connects feminist epistemologies, methodologies, and ethics. From its earliest days, many contributors to this field have sought to develop conceptual, epistemological, methodological, and ethical approaches to challenge the alleged value neutrality of investigation and researcher distance from its objects as well as the hegemony of dominant 'spectator epistemologies' premised on interchangeable, disembodied knowers and research practices that were 'abstract, "generalized", and disengaged' (Code, 1995: xi; see also Code, 1993Code, , 1996Code, , 2006. ...
... In this vein, Grasswick recently confirmed (2011: xvi, emphasis in original): 'Situated knowing is the single most influential concept to come out of feminist epistemology'. Finally, while 'epistemic responsibility' initially received a 'mixed reception' (Code, 1995: 3) when first introduced by Code, it has since become one of the most important concepts in discussions of knowledge making and ethics. Yet, what is critical to add here -and this point frames my chapter -is that meanings and practices of epistemic responsibilities, as well as situated knowledges, have shifted across time. ...
... Finally, her recent work on ecological thinking, with its reconfigured notions of knowledge making and subjectivity, builds on and deepens her earlier attention to epistemic responsibility and ethics (Code, 1983(Code, , 1987(Code, , 1991(Code, , 1994(Code, , 1995(Code, , 2001. As Code admits, this work, which was 'a long time in the making' (Code, 2006: xi), builds on her longstanding 'quest for conceptions of knowledge and subjectivity capable of informing transformative, responsible, and responsive epistemic practices' (Code, 2006: xi). ...
... For me, it not simply a struggle for identity and subjectivity but rather a persistent asymmetry in hetero-patriarchal power that is deeply embedded as normal in all our institutional and organisational structures, social, political and cultural practices, intra-and interpersonal relationships, in ideas of what counts as knowledge and in our ways of thinking about ourselves and others and has colonised our collective consciousness. Gender is central to what Lorraine Code (1995) calls the "web of assumptions [the dominant] social imaginaries [that] hold certain conceptual frames in place" (Code, 1995: 29). And of course, it is deeply complex because "gender is not just about gender. ...
... There are now 105 women's and gender museums established in 96 countries worldwide. These institutions are important because as Code (1995) argues, creating a sense of agency is also about location. She speaks of the need for rhetorical spaces where women can be seen, heard, understood, and taken seriously; spaces where subjectivities are variously enacted, and identities are constructed and continually reconstructed in the enactings. ...
... The second and related site is my decade-long research programme on knowledgemaking practices, based on my diffractive 2 reading of feminist philosopher Lorraine Code and her 40-year trajectory of writing about the political, ethical, epistemological and ontological dimensions of knowledge making and epistemic responsibilities, as What does Rachel Carson have to do with family sociology and family policies? 13 well as her recent iterations on 'ecological thinking' or ecological imaginaries (for example, Code, 1995;. ...
... This is in part because ecological social imaginaries are rooted in feminist epistemologies, a field that has always given sustained attention to enduring issues of power and knowledge, especially for marginalised or silenced groups. They also have roots in both Deleuze and John Dewey's philosophical pragmatism; this is not to signal the pragmatic 'what works' approach of some mixed methods research, which has already been well critiqued by others (see Fox and Alldred, 2018: 201), but rather a philosophically and ethically rooted pragmatism that draws creative synergies between 'Deleuzianisms and […] pragmatisms' (Koopman, 2015: xv); here Code's work, and her case study of Carson, straddles Deleuzian ethology and broader influences from Dewey's relational 'transactionalism' (Code, 1995;see also McHugh, 2015). 6 This pragmatism also connects with Code's (2006: 23) claim, which she admits is 'contentious', that 'advocacy is often what makes knowledge possible'. ...
In the past decade, multiple compounding crises – ecological, racial injustices, ‘care crises’ and multiple recent crises related to the COVID-19 pandemic – have reinforced the powerful role of critical and social policy researchers to push back against ‘fake news’, ‘alternative facts’, and a post-truth era that denigrates science and evidence-based research. These new realities can pose challenges for social scientists who work within relational, ontological, non-representational, new materialist, performative, decolonising, or ecological ‘turns’ in social theory and epistemologies. This article’s overarching question is: How does one work within non-representational research paradigms while also attempting to hold onto representational, authoritative and convincing versions of truth, evidence, facts and data? Informed by my research on feminist philosopher and epistemologist Lorraine Code’s 40-year trajectory of writing about knowledge making and ecological social imaginaries, I navigate these dilemmas by calling on an unexpected ally to family sociology and family policy: the late American environmentalist Rachel Carson. Extending Code’s case study of Carson, I argue for an approach that combines (1) ecological relational ontologies, (2) the ethics and politics of knowledge making, (3) crossing social imaginaries of knowledge making and (4) a reconfigured view of knowledge makers as working towards just and cohabitable worlds.
... Harding, 1991, pp. 11 f.;Code, 1995;Barad, 2007, Ch. 8;Elgin, 2017, pp. 157-159;Stephen, 2021, Ch. 4.2) and even declared 'situated knowledge' a "paradigm" of feminist critique of science (cf. ...
In her essay “Situated Knowledges,” the biologist and philosopher of science Donna Haraway tackles the question of scientific objectivity from a feminist perspective and opts for a ‘re-vision’ of science that overcomes the traditional dualisms of epistemic subject and object as well as of nature and culture (science). Beyond scientific realism and radical social constructivism, Haraway understands ‘nature’ or ‘world’ neither as a passive resource nor as a human product of imagination. Rather, she argues, the world is to be understood as a ‘witty agent’ that has its own efficacy and historicity in the production of knowledge. Instead of epistemic reification, possession, and appropriation of ‘nature’, knowledge production should be understood as a conversation between material-semiotic actors, human, and non-human, from which none of the actors leaves as they entered. In this study, I want to explore what it means to conceive of nature or world in knowledge processes as a “witty agent” and how exactly one is to imagine this form of non-human agency. To this end, I will first explain Haraway’s re-vision of “nature” beyond scientific realism and radical social constructivism (sect. 2). From this, I will discuss her underlying conception of agency (sect. 3). This involves first, a reconception of the traditional relation between epistemic subject and object as dynamic and situational relation (sect. 3.1). Second, Haraway characterizes the world’s epistemic agency in more positive terms by using the ‘trickster’ figure as it appears in Southwest Native American representations in the form of a Coyote (sect. 3.2). Finally, I will come back to Haraway’s initial question of an objective scientific approach to the world, which for her consists in a power-charged social relation of conversations with the world. I will conclude with a critical reflection of what Haraway’s conception of the world as an agent means for scientific practice and its engagement with objects of knowledge.
... Social media platforms can also be understood as rhetorical spaces (Code, 2013) shaped by changing forms of gendered power hierarchies and dynamics on which certain statements are taken more seriously than before. Rhetorical spaces, as arenas for discourses, can be powerfully influential if the arguments made are valued and considered valid by audiences. ...
Platformisation has facilitated the emergence of new rhetorical spaces where activists can creatively structure and present their political statements according to medium-specific affordances. In this article, we examine a group of activists on TikTok who topicalise gender-based violence and gender inequality through multimodal means of communication in short videos. We approached these videos as rhetorical arenas for communicating compelling messages with the aim of appealing to the audience. We used digital ethnography, multimodal discourse analysis, and approaches to the mediality of the body to conduct our investigation and analyses. Our results explicate how affective cues and bodily signals are put to rhetorical and political use in TikTok stories to pursue social change. That is, bodily performances stage interrelational positionings in a visual format, conveying affective evaluations and judgements about the state of the world and forming rhizomatic threads of messages to mobilise support and to affirm identification among the members of the movement.
... In fact, many phenomena that are particular to marginalized groups remain unnamed (Lewis, 1990;Romaine, 1999;Spender, 1998). Cameron (1995), Carter (1995), Code (1995;1991), and Torres (1992) make similar claims. Kramarae (1981) provides a theoretical framework known as the muted group theory in which she claims dominant members of society, namely men, create the language and as such it reflects their experiences. ...
Breastfeeding is valuable sustenance labour performed in society. The intent of this study was to learn about the strategies a group of women who live in Eastern Nova Scotia used to inform themselves about breastfeeding as an infant feeding choice, and how these strategies impacted on their individual perceptions of their breastfeeding success. Two qualitative focus groups were conducted and results were organized around themes and presented in the women's own words. They suggest the women's breastfeeding learning began with their decisions to breastfeed continued throughout their practical breastfeeding experiences, and went on past weaning in the form of self-reflections. The women stated, among other tools, mentors, literature, and particularly, their own practical experiences influenced their success. This study may be a first step towards other breastfeeding learning research studies that explore the lived experiences of women and in turn draws attention to the importance of the learning and working that occurs in their daily lives. Résumé L'allaitement maternel revêt une grande importance dans notre société. L'objectif de cette étude était de voir les stratégies utilisées par un groupe de femmes de l'Est de la Nouvelle-Écosse pour se renseigner sur l'allaitement maternel comme méthode d'alimentation des nourrissons et l'impact de ces stratégies sur les perceptions de ces femmes par rapport à leur succès. Deux entrevues de groupe out été menées; les résultats ont été regroupés par thèmes et reprenaient textuellement les mots des participantes. Ces résultats démontrent que les connaissances des participantes sur l'allaitement maternel se sont développées en trois temps : d'abord quand elles ont pris la décision d'allaiter; ensuite à travers leur propre expérience d'allaitement et, une fois le sevrage de leur enfant terminé, à la relecture de ce qu'elles ont vécu. Parmi les moyens ayant favorisé la réussite de leur expérience, elles ont mentionne l'accompagnement, les écrits sur le sujet et surtout leur propre expérience d'allaitement. Cette étude pent être une amorce à d'autres recherches qui attirent l'attention sur l'importance d'apprendre à allaiter et les efforts consentis au quotidien.
... Para la revisión y adaptación de las tablas a los diferentes contextos, una de las técnicas de aplicación que se propone es la creación de "espacios retóricos", concebida originalmente por la filósofa feminista Lorraine Code (1995), y descrita para su aplicación con la Clasificación Decimal de Dewey en Olson (1998). Para realizar esta tarea se debería contemplar una serie de aspectos específicos de revisión para cada número y cada contexto: "¿Qué otros temas comparten el número?, ¿Cómo está descrito el número?, ¿Cuál es el contexto jerárquico?, ¿Qué temas están situados a cada lado?" ...
Considerando la universalidad una característica intencionada pero no exenta de problemas en los sistemas de clasificación como la Clasificación Decimal Universal (CDU), se presenta una propuesta de aplicación informática que capacite la creación de adaptaciones locales de la CDU, según los intereses de las comunidades de diversos contextos, y que permita una interoperabilidad semántica con otros contextos utilizando para ello un mapeo con las tablas oficiales del Master Reference File (MRF) a modo de lenguaje pivote. El trabajo también presenta recursos científicos y teóricos sobre sesgos estructurales y lingüísticos de los sistemas de organización del conocimiento, haciendo especial hincapié en el caso de la CDU, con la finalidad de presentar herramientas para poder corregirlos en las adaptaciones locales que pudieran realizarse. Se considera que propuestas críticas como la presente constituyen una alternativa a la visión tecnicista y aséptica que pretende impulsar la relevancia de sistemas de organización del conocimiento tradicionales como la CDU en entornos digitales.
... Hoagland's (2001) notion of 'conceptual coercion' highlights strategies of epistemic oppression. Moreover, Code's (1995) account of rhetorical spaces explores hermeneutical marginalization. C The Author(s) 2023. ...
Miranda Fricker’s insightful work on epistemic injustice discusses two forms of epistemic injustice—testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when the victim lacks the interpretative resources to make sense of her experience, and this lacuna can be traced down to a structural injustice. In this paper, I provide one model of how to fill the conceptual gap in hermeneutical injustice. First, I argue that the victims possess conceptual resources to make sense of their experiences, namely phenomenal concepts. Second, I show how one might work the way up in a two-step process from a subjective, phenomenal concept to a novel, public concept. Finally, I discuss the conditions that have to be met for this process to be successful. The resulting model shows a way how the victims might alleviate hermeneutical injustice by developing novel concepts, given that the dominant group does not care about their predicament.
... Goldman's theory of analogical inference simulation is problematic in a therapeutic context because the therapist is using himself as the standard model for interpreting his care recipient's experiences. According to Lorraine Code (1995), if caregivers attempt to empathize with care recipients by using themselves as models for interpreting others, it reinforces an epistemic authority that is external from the lived experience of the person diagnosed with the medical condition. Similarly, Peter Goldie maintains that an approach to empathy that uses oneself as a model for others is problematic because it essentially "usurps the agent's own first-personal stance" towards what that person is thinking and feeling, which has the potential of undermining the other person's agency and replacing it with one's own (Goldie, 2011, p. 303). ...
I defend Edith Stein's theory of empathy as an alternative to simulation theories of empathy. Simulation theories of empathy involve using one's own cognitive resources to replicate the mental states of others by imagining being in their situation. I argue that this understanding of empathy is problematic within the context of mental healthcare because it can lead to the co-opting and assimilation of another person's experiences. In response, I maintain that Stein's theory is preferable because it involves appreciating others’ experiences as it is for them , and this alternative account of empathy avoids the assimilation of the experiences of others.
... In a similar spirit to the expanded critical questions approach, for feminist communities and others seeking social justice, I and others (Anger and Hundleby 2016;Hundleby 2016;Code 1995;Ivy 2020) suggest new fallacy labels that build on principles of social justice reasoning and liberatory epistemologies, identifying various socially unjust presumptions that we find too easily accepted as sufficient for a good argument. Some of these, like ad feminam, may be tongue-in-cheek. ...
The fallacies approach to argument evaluation can exacerbate problems it aims to address when it comes to social bias, perpetuating social injustice. A diagnosis that an argument commits a fallacy may flag the irrelevance of stereotypical characterizations to the line of reasoning without directly challenging the stereotypes. This becomes most apparent when personal bias is part of the subject matter under discussion, in ethotic argument, including ad hominem and ad verecundiam, which may be recognized as fallacious without addressing whether the ethotic presumptions are true. Yap (2013; 2015) makes this case for ad hominem and the pragma-dialectical understanding of fallacies, expanded here to show related patterns in some other fallacies, and employing the argument schemes understanding of fallacies. Adding critical questions increases the ways reasoners can dismiss arguments as fallacious, and could include directly addressing bias, but if an argument fails on a different critical question, that may yet allow the bias to pass. The fallacies approach is a form of meta-debate and techniques of meta-debate need to address the ubiquity of social bias, not convey them as specialized problems. The view that the fallacies approach to argument evaluation can provide neutrality is dangerously false. Arguers thus should avoid using fallacies for argument evaluation where social stereotypes or schemas might be involved, especially when the subject matter relates closely to social justice.
... En este sentido, la retórica del menosprecio se da como un acto de silencio autoritario que violenta, minimiza y justifica los actos de violencia de género como si no hubiese nada importante qué decir, qué ver, qué saber o qué hacer (Glenn, 1997;De Vault, 1999). Considero que en todo proceso dialéctico se producen diversas situaciones retóricas (Biesecker, 1989;Code 1995) o procesos de deliberación pública, que cristalizan el sustento ideológico de las contradicciones, así como las tensiones y acciones de oposición que exponen, en este caso, los procesos de normalización del género. También se posibilitan las oportunidades para producir discursos contrahegemónicos. ...
En este artículo, presento una versión sumaria de una investigación amplia de corte cualitativo-interpretativa centrada en el análisis de la estructura simbólica de género en la Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez (UACJ), México. En esta versión, ofrezco una deliberación centrada en un análisis de la formación persuasiva/discursiva en donde examiné la relación entre retórica, poder y género a partir de los enfoques de la crítica feminista del discurso y la retórica contemporánea. En este caso, la tesis que guía mi deliberación es que la cultura generizada de la institución no permite la trasversalización de la perspectiva género, porque las creencias y prácticas androcéntricas en la institución no se reconocen, por los y las agentes de la comunidad universitaria, como prácticas sexistas. En este texto, ofrezco el resumen de un análisis de tropos realizado en corpus de entrevistas abiertas aplicadas a profesores/as de tiempo completo, en donde se cristaliza la normalización de la ideología de género en la institución. A partir de los hallazgos ofrezco la metáfora de “andamiaje retórico de género” para explicar un proceso socio-histórico complejo que enmarca la re/producción normalizada del género en la UACJ.
... As Tronto (2010, p. 168) explains: No caring institution in a democratic society can function well . . . without an explicit locus for the need-interpretation struggle, that is, without a 'rhetorical space' (Code, 1995) or a 'moral space' (Walker, 1998) or a political space within which this essential part of caring can occur. ...
It has long been acknowledged that gender matters in social work, not least within justice social work, given the over-representation of men within the criminal justice system. Whilst there is significant theorising about the role of gender in criminal justice, there has been little empirical examination of how social workers understand and address gender in practice. This article sets out to redress this omission by introducing a novel study of the expressed views of justice social workers (JSWs) in Scotland on gender in their work. The findings are challenging. They demonstrate that JSWs talk about gender in complex and, at times, seemingly inconsistent ways; the concept of ideological dilemmas is used as a vehicle through which to interrogate this further. Our conclusions suggest that it is not necessary to resolve the conflicts and complexities that are an inevitable response to, and expression of, the multiple and often competing discourses within which JSW practitioners operate on a daily basis, but we do need to make space for these conflicts in practice. A person-centred approach to gender, and an intersectional approach to understanding personhood, offer a way forward, allowing insight into the complex and demanding environment within which JSWs function.
... This is an important clarification as some researchers have criticised empathy on the basis that we cannot adequately or fully understand or feel how another person feels (Goldie, 2014). That is why Code (1995) cautions against false empathy where one fallaciously assumes that one knows how another person feels. However, it is necessary to point out that empathy does not require identical knowledge or feeling with another person. ...
... Although situational diversity need not result in epistemic diversity, in many cases, it does, because knowledge is situated. Situated knowledge describes the influence of our social and material locations on what and how we know (Anderson, 2020;Code, 1995Code, , 2008Haraway, 1988). Anderson (2020) explains that knowledge can be situated in a wide range of ways: a person's social and material location can influence the information they can access and how they represent that information; their interests (and dislikes); the details they observe (or miss); and the assumptions that are salient to them. ...
A lack of diversity remains a significant problem in many STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) communities. According to the epistemic approach to addressing these diversity problems, it is in a community’s interest to improve diversity because doing so can enhance the rigor and creativity of its work. However, we draw on empirical and theoretical evidence illustrating that this approach can trade on the epistemic exploitation of diverse community members. Our concept of epistemic exploitation holds when there is a relationship between two parties in which one party accrues epistemic benefits from another party’s knowledge and epistemic location and, in doing so, harms the second party or sets back their interests. We demonstrate that the ironic outcome of this nominal application of the epistemic approach is that it undermines the epistemic benefits which it promises. Indeed, we show that epistemic exploitation undermines the relationships and interactions among community members that produce rigor and creativity. Our central argument is that for communities to reap the benefits of an epistemic approach to diversity, to implement a genuine epistemic approach, they need to develop cultures that ameliorate the harms faced by, and protect the interests of, their diverse community members.
... This does not invalidate interpretive efforts to articulate hidden meaning but mandates an ethical stance of epistemological humility and interpretive caution. Code (1995) advocates the notion of 'enhanced subjectivity' to replace the hubristic fiction of epistemic objectivity, noting, 'Subjectivity -however conflicted and multiple -becomes part of the conditions that make knowledge possible . . . . No more, of course, is the missionary activity of making the subjects of study over in the inquirer's image -as traditional epistemologies tacitly advocate' (p.110). ...
Hidden meaning, understood as relationally constituted unformulated or defended experience, presents both opportunities and challenges not adequately theorised and explored in the qualitative research literature. This paper outlines weaker and stronger forms of hiddenness and discusses the epistemological and methodological difficulties that hidden meaning presents. Many qualitative approaches claiming to accommodate hidden meaning are significantly flawed because of their attenuated conceptions of intersubjectivity and consequent reliance on interview transcripts, rather than the rich intersubjective data co-created in the interview process. If the researcher’s subjectivity is the primary research instrument, we need to work with both verbal content and affect-laden embodied experience, reflexively observing its manifestations and intersubjective impacts. The disciplined use of reflexive subjectivity involves paying close attention to our affective resonances, reveries, and/or researcher countertransference, which signal implicit research manifestations of the relational unconscious. I propose an interpretive process model, underpinned by a critical realist ontology and epistemology, and illustrate this with reference to some interview material. I conclude with an overview of the ethical challenges of interpreting hidden meaning and the crucial role that rigorous and holistically conceived reflexivity plays as an interpretive and ethical resource.
... For example, Jaggar (1983 ) has criticised Rawlsian ideal political theory of over-valuing individual characteristics such as rationality over characteristics that humans share as family or community members, and incorrectly seeing rationality as value-neutral and detached. Code (1995 ) has similarly challenged analytic ideal epistemology for being overly concerned with propositional knowledge ('X knows that p') and hardly with the personal and social characteristics one must have before one can say, e.g., that one 'knows a person'. ...
According to Houkes and Vermaas’s use plan approach, engineering design is fundamentally about constructing and communicating use plans: plans to achieve certain goals that involve the use of one or more objects. This chapter details how such use plans should be designed, communicated and executed. It goes into the relation between plan design and artefact design and explains why Houkes and Vermaas consider a plan-based account of design more fundamental and more accurate than traditional function-based designs.
The use plan approach not only offers an abstract conceptualisation of the design process, but also provides standards based on practical rationality to evaluate use plans with, particularly effectiveness and efficiency. In order to give an overview of the strong and weak points of the approach, it will be compared with function-based and affordance-based accounts of design. Finally, some criticisms will be discussed, namely regarding the ability of the use plan approach to deal with artefact components; with situated rather than with plan-based actions and with potential biases in its method of abstraction from actual design processes.
... Med retoriskt rum avses den plats där själva möjligheten att ett yttrande uppfattas som trovärdigt eller inte infinner sig . Det retoriska rummet där offrets vittnesmål uttrycks formas av sociala manus, attityder, stereotyper och diskurser som är kulturellt och historiskt situerade (Code 1995;Carlsson 2009;Jackson 2018) . Sitter med kollegor i matsalen . ...
Artikeln analyserar vittnesmål om sexuella trakasserier utifrån Honneths teori om socialt erkännande och Frickers teori om epistemisk orättvisa. Undersökningen baseras på en innehållsanalys av de vittnesmål om sexuella trakasserier som ingår i de 65 svenska #metoo-uppropen. De som vittnat i #metoo-uppropen berättar om vad som med Honneths begrepp kan beskrivas som en systematisk förvägran av socialt erkännande. De nekas solidaritet och rättigheter genom sexuella fysiska och psykiska övergrepp, vilket har en negativ inverkan på deras självförtroende, självaktning och självuppskattning. De förövande männens agerande leder i praktiken till såväl personligt lidande för de kvinnor som utsätts som deras exkludering från sociala sammanhang. Det senare sker genom att kvinnorna antingen lämnar det sammanhang i vilket de utsatts för sexuella trakasserier eller att deras deltagande i sammanhanget villkoras. De måste till exempel avstå från att berätta om vad de utsatts för eller så uteblir omgivningens stöd när de berättar. Svårigheten att mobilisera stöd för dem som blir utsatta för sexuella trakasserier tolkas i artikeln som en effekt av epistemisk orättvisa.
... Code (1995) defines 'subjectivity' in knowledge as taking into account 'factors that pertain to the circumstances of the subject'. Thus, an account of knowledge that makes space for subjective features is one that suggests that what we (are in a position to) know depends on facts about who we are. ...
Within the last decade, burgeoning interest in the intersection of epistemology and social issues has generated a new set of research questions. These questions range from the relevance of social identity, to peer disagreement, to debates on the significance of moral considerations to epistemic evaluations, to discussions of our epistemic practices and how those practices exclude certain agents and certain bodies of knowledge. Central in this new and emerging body of work is the realization that epistemology has more to do than simply answer questions about what knowledge consists in; it must also acknowledge that our answers to these questions might be influenced by features we have previously failed to make space for. It is in this respect that we are witnessing a renewed interest in a theoretical approach long consigned to the margins of epistemology – that of standpoint epistemology.
Standpoint epistemology can be understood as a family of theses that have been interpreted in various ways, but all of which have in common the claim that features of an epistemic agent’s identity – features that have been ignored or occluded in traditional discussions of epistemology – may be epistemically significant. As I understand it, the principal claim of standpoint epistemology is that what we are positioned to know is sensitive to a number of features traditionally thought to be non-epistemic, and therefore epistemically irrelevant, by those working in mainstream epistemology. There is no canonically precise distinction between those features that are epistemically relevant, but paradigm examples provide some indication: evidence, justification, reliability and other factors that feature in post-Gettier characterizations of knowledge. In short, we might think of epistemic features as those factors that make it more likely that a belief is true.
... Mills is concerned not with simple gaps in or absences of knowledge, but rather more obdurate opacities. His argument builds on but goes beyond scholarship on situated knowledge and social location (Haraway, 1988;Harding, 1991;Code, 1995), positing a more thoroughly structural account (Alcoff, 2007). White ignorance, for Mills, is not just a product of experience -as standpoint theory might suggest -but a necessary mechanism of white supremacy. ...
The essential premise of #MeToo is that, while large numbers of women are subject to sexual harassment and assault, this reality is not known to or understood by unnamed others. This article interrogates the subject of non-knowing that #MeToo points to but does not name, asking: who exactly does not know, and why? These questions provide the starting point to elaborate the concept of male ignorance. While this lexicon has been fleetingly deployed in canonical feminist works – where it denotes something so obvious that it does not require explanation, functioning instead as a kind of feminist common sense – I develop it here so it might be put to greater use as a dedicated analytic. The work of Charles Mills, particularly his writings on white ignorance, provides a critical precedent in this regard. Following Mills in foregrounding the ideological operations of not knowing, I conceive male ignorance as a structure of concerted if unconscious epistemic occlusion which both stems from and serves to protect male privilege. As such, it plays a crucial role in securing the overall relation of domination and oppression within which gendered lives are lived. While male ignorance is itself multiple and has a variety of stakeholders, I argue that the non-knowing that surrounds sexual harassment and assault – which #MeToo draws attention to and seeks to undo – constitutes a paradigmatic manifestation, one in which cisgender heterosexual men have a particular stake.
... For the DDC, the classification itself was analyzed, as well as the prefatory matter such as introductions, publisher's notes and other associated texts. The concepts, the methodological decision-making processes and justifications, as well as other epistemic clues such as the authority, rhetorical space (Code, 1995), user group interests (Hjørland 2001) and ontology were considered together to find a corresponding epistemic viewpoint that best matched what was expressed through the discourse. Once the approximate epistemic stance was identified, it was compared to the other discourses and the other timeframes. ...
... Finally, and relatedly, we can think of agenda-setting as the establishment of the 'rhetorical space' (Code 1995) or 'common ground' of shared presuppositions which make up the, "mutually accepted background information" of communicative exchange (Stanley 2002: 322), or of shared social and political existence. Individuals may disagree with respect to the veracity of certain items within that common ground, and the common ground may contain falsehoods, political myths (Bottici 2007), implicit prejudices, and even intentional propaganda (Stanley 2015), but if it is widely believed to be 'known', or can be used without widespread conscious questioning of its veracity, an item forms a part of our mutually-shared common understanding. ...
In recent years, a significant body of literature has emerged on the subject of epistemic injustice: wrongful harms done to people in their capacities as knowers (Fricker 2007). Up to now this literature has ignored the role that attention has to play in epistemic injustice. This paper makes a first step towards addressing this gap. We argue that giving someone less attention than they are due, which we call an epistemic attention deficit, is a distinct form of epistemic injustice. We begin by outlining what we mean by epistemic attention deficits, which we understand as a failure to pay someone the attention they are due in their role as an epistemic agent. We argue that these deficits constitute epistemic injustices for two reasons. First, they affect someone’s ability to influence what others believe. Second, they affect one’s ability to influence the shared common ground in which testimonial exchanges take place. We then outline the various ways in which epistemic attention deficits harm those who are subject to them. We argue that epistemic attention deficits are harms in and of themselves because they deprive people of an essential component of epistemic agency. Moreover, epistemic attention deficits reduce an agent’s ability to participate in valuable epistemic practices. These two forms of harm have important impacts on educational performance and the distribution of resources. Finally, we argue that epistemic attention deficits both hinder and shape the development of epistemic agency. We finish by exploring some practical implications arising from our discussion.
... 8. One such account, Cavarero's story-based one, was discussed in Chapter 1. Brison (2003Brison ( , 2017, Code (1995), and Griffiths (1995) also offer narrative accounts of the relational self. Alcoff stresses the role of group and cultural identities in constituting our selves (2006: 59-62 and Ch. 4). ...
This chapter explores how birth bears on the temporality of human life. Temporally, lived human existence is future-oriented towards death and past-oriented towards birth. When we take our natal orientation towards the past into account, we see that when we project forward and create meaning we are always extending inherited horizons that we have received in and from the past. The chapter also considers whether birth can rightly be said to be a gift given to us by our mothers. Although that view has problems, thinking of birth as a gift illuminates some connections between our natality and the relational setting of our ethical lives and obligations. Finally, the chapter sums up the book’s main theses about how human existence is shaped by the fact that we are born.
... 8. One such account, Cavarero's story-based one, was discussed in Chapter 1. Brison (2003Brison ( , 2017, Code (1995), and Griffiths (1995) also offer narrative accounts of the relational self. Alcoff stresses the role of group and cultural identities in constituting our selves (2006: 59-62 and Ch. 4). ...
This chapter sets out the views on birth and being born of Irigaray, Cavarero, and Jantzen. Irigaray’s feminism of sexual difference and her attention to the maternal body lead her to consider birth. She argues that we have psychological difficulties around birth, difficulties that have found expression in canonical works of philosophy. For Irigaray, these expressions help us to piece together what is in fact involved in being born, and to remember our debts to the mothers from whom we are born. The chapter also looks at Cavarero’s understanding of natality, which is informed by Arendt as well as Irigaray, and at how Irigaray, Cavarero, and Jantzen criticize Western culture for being preoccupied with death and mortality while neglecting birth and natality.
... 8. One such account, Cavarero's story-based one, was discussed in Chapter 1. Brison (2003Brison ( , 2017, Code (1995), and Griffiths (1995) also offer narrative accounts of the relational self. Alcoff stresses the role of group and cultural identities in constituting our selves (2006: 59-62 and Ch. 4). ...
This chapter describes the complex relations amongst being born and birth-giving, mothers, women, and child-caring, and then defends the view that Western culture has concentrated narrowly on death at the expense of birth, taking existentialism’s focus on mortality as a case in point. Three aspects of natality are then examined. First, reception and inheritance: in dialogue with Camus and Beauvoir, it is argued that to be born is to receive and inherit the meaningful fabric of our lives and involvements from others around and preceding us. Second, vulnerability: the chapter distinguishes vulnerability in being born—coming into existence in more or less advantageous locations in the world—from vulnerability by virtue of being born—as infants who are helpless and so depend on adult care-givers. Third, negativity: being born is not an exclusively positive condition but has a negative side, in part through its links with vulnerability.
... 8. One such account, Cavarero's story-based one, was discussed in Chapter 1. Brison (2003Brison ( , 2017, Code (1995), and Griffiths (1995) also offer narrative accounts of the relational self. Alcoff stresses the role of group and cultural identities in constituting our selves (2006: 59-62 and Ch. 4). ...
The introduction sets out the project of this book, which is to explore how our existence is shaped by our being born. This is an exploration of how human existence is natal, that is, is the way it is because we are born. Taking birth and natality into account transforms our view of human existence. It sheds new light on our mortality, foregrounds the extent and depth of our dependency on one another, and brings additional phenomena—such as the relationality of the self and the temporality of human life—together in a new way. The introduction sketches these topics and explains how this inquiry is located within and draws on existentialism, psychoanalysis, and feminist philosophy.
Posthumanist thinking has been among the most controversial new departures in archaeological theory. It is particularly contentious as a perspective on “social” questions such as gender and colonialism. Debate has centred on the objectives of posthumanist (and humanist) archaeology, with archaeologists on one side accused of “losing sight of humans”, “ignoring politics”, and on the other, “imposing androcentric definitions of humanity” and “losing sight of things”. We explore the contact zone between posthumanism and humanist gender archaeology, not to declare a single best approach but to identify productive tensions that might enrich a heterodox gender archaeology. In particular we identify shared interest in exploring gender as multiplicity: a set of intersecting but contradictory social (and material) dynamics, with implications stretching far beyond conventional “gender topics”. Mapping is scholarly practice tailored to multiplicity. It invites flexible and undisciplined knowledge work, in which terms of analysis, definitions of scope and empirical tools are relentlessly tweaked and swapped. Mapping multiplicities grows out of conversations between feminist and posthumanist philosophy of knowledge, and represents a workable best practice for exploring gender in more-than-human worlds (without surrendering our commitments to people).
This article discusses how the Women's Art Library fosters creativity through the experience of the many artistic research practices hosted since the collection was installed in Goldsmiths University of London in the Library as a Special Collection.
Widening Scripts: Cultivating Feminist Care in Academic Labor is addressed to scholars, educators, and students devoted to the struggle against precarity, atomization, and the commodification of knowledge. Through shared reading, discussion, and reflection, and gathered around a shared interest in feminist theory and politics, the authors discovered a model of care within academia that helped them to sustain their opposition to dominant academic practices that are diminishing, competitive, and exploitative.
In this book, the authors narrate that discovery and the realization of a desire to share in the assembling of a collective feminist survival kit. In Living a Feminist Life, Sara Ahmed offers a wide-ranging killjoy survival kit that includes books, things, tools, time, life, permission notes, other killjoys, humor, feelings, and bodies. As a response to the stress, strain, and profound grief produced by the COVID-19 pandemic, with its viral acceleration of crises already endemic to neoliberal capitalism, the authors mined an evolving cluster of decolonial feminist texts in an attempt to find meaning, encounter moving premonitions, and engage with radical instigations to thought. By co-creating a survival kit through sustained collaboration during the pandemic, they develop a sense of the value of experimentation and risk-taking and learn how to cultivate an inclusive space that allows them to express their views, reclaim accountability, and learn confidently from each other.
Widening Scripts combines collaborative feminist theory, acts of care, and critical dialogue in an effort to open up decelerated, altruistic, and connected ways of doing academic work together.
Science and higher education have, in many countries, undergone profound changes in recent decades, often leading to the institutionalisation of academic cultures of performativity. These cultures reconceptualise academic work as labour which must aim to achieve the highest possible productivity and profitability, and whose quality can be assessed on the basis of amount of outputs and income generated. In several contexts, these changes transformed longstanding discourses about which kinds of scholars are “excellent” and which disciplines produce valuable knowledge. In this article, I examine how the institutionalisation of performative academic cultures affects the work and lives of scholars in women’s, gender, feminist studies (WGFS), often in paradoxical ways. Drawing on an ethnography of Portuguese academia (conducted between 2008 and 2016), I show that the emphasis on productivity can create possibilities for WGFS, but also make much WGFS work impossible. Many WGFS scholars have been able to use performative academic cultures to expand the space for WGFS. At the same time, however, they are finding several epistemic activities increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to sustain – that is, reading, thinking, peer reviewing, attending academic events – due to intensifying workloads and escalating productivity expectations. This produces a mood of exhaustion, depression and alienation, particularly among women, often disproportionately saddled with the demanding pastoral work that neoliberal universities require but do not reward. I examine this mood and its impacts, arguing that the performative university is both toxic and stimulating, both destructive and seductive, for WGFS. I draw on this paradox to call for debate in WGFS about our ambivalent personal investments in work, our collective working cultures, and our collegial working relationships with each other.
Las demandas de justicia de distintos grupos oprimidos en América Latina/Abya Yala se procesan dentro del marco filosófico-político del liberalismo. Pensar, discutir y corregir la injusticia es posible sólo dentro de sus límites, lo que excluye aquellos intereses, prácticas y conocimientos que salen del paradigma liberal (inclusive el igualitario) que se autolegitima por su supuesta objetividad, neutralidad y universalidad. Esta reducción esconde en sí misma un tipo independiente de injusticia que se materializa institucional y socialmente: la injusticia de marginalizar epistémicamente sujetos y conocimientos subalternizados. En este trabajo sostengo que el liberalismo (y su institucionalidad) es insuficiente para corregir esta injusticia y que contribuye al desperdicio de conocimientos valiosos para la deliberación democrática. El compromiso con la justicia debe exigir ir más allá de él e incorporar el paradigma intercultural y el modelo de conocimiento relacional de los pueblos indígenas para corregir esta injusticia y tener diálogos interculturales que sirvan para transformar el plano institucional y corregir otros tipos de injusticias que se relacionan con ella.
This paper offers an analysis of the primary wrong of epistemic injustice, namely, of the intrinsic harm that constitutes its action itself. Contrary to Miranda Fricker, I shall argue that there is an additional, overlooked dimension of this harm, which consists in a failure to perceive the knower as a concrete other with distinctive needs, features, and perceptions that are always implicit during her epistemic contributions. I shall name this dimension ‘affective’, and I shall consider the harm of epistemic injustice in the broad as simultaneously ‘epistemic-affective’. In Section 1), I explain what I understand as a lack of individuality within feminist epistemology and in Fricker´s theory of epistemic injustice. As a result, in Section 2), I derive my notion of the affective dimension of the knower by drawing from Seyla Benhabib´s notion of the concrete other. Finally, Section 3) and 4) redescribe the primary wrong of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice respectively in terms of the affective wrong of having one´s specific needs and particular contribution as an individual unfairly diminished and downgraded. Overall, this shows that the harm of epistemic injustice should be reconceived as ‘epistemic-affective’.
Socially extended knowledge has recently received much attention in mainstream epistemology. Knowledge here is not to be understood as wholly realised within a single individual who manipulates artefacts or tools but as collaboratively realised across plural agents. Because of its focus on the interpersonal dimension, socially extended epistemology appears to be a promising approach for investigating the deeply social nature of epistemic practices. I believe, however, that this line of inquiry could be made more fruitful if it is connected with the critical notion of epistemic responsibility, as developed in feminist responsibilism. According to feminist responsibilists, at the core of epistemic responsibility is a critical disposition toward correcting epistemic injustice. This epistemic idea is highly relevant to the epistemological context of illness, where patient testimony is often disregarded. Hence, though restricted to the epistemological context of the experience of illness, this chapter delves into epistemic injustice and its robust mechanisms. I thus explore what responsible epistemic practices should involve in order to redress that injustice and how epistemic responsibility should be socially extended. The discussion proceeds as follows. First, by relying on Arthur Frank’s innovative work on illness narratives, I focus on chaotic bodily messages from patients overwhelmed by suffering and then explain why these messages should count as genuine narratives or testimonies despite their inarticulateness. Second, I elaborate on how epistemic injustice concerning such narratives (i.e., chaos narratives) is produced or reproduced, in particular how both a dominant sociocultural norm and our inherent vulnerability can contribute to their production or reproduction. Finally, I propose an extended form of epistemic responsibility that ameliorates this aspect. Laying particular emphasis on the epistemic role of mature empathy, I characterise the extended epistemic responsibility in terms of extended empathic knowledge.
Este texto apresenta um modo de interpretar a ética do cuidado, a epistemologia do ponto de vista e a epistemologia baseada no cuidado como desenvolvimentos na direção de um momento radicalmente particularista do debate ético e epistemológico feminista. Para sustentar tal leitura, o texto foi divido em três movimentos. Dedicamos a primeira seção (I.) à apresentação dos critérios conceituais de uma ética do cuidado feminista. Na segunda seção, (II.) reconstituímos o debate inaugural entre C. Gilligan e L. Kohlberg, para, na sequência, (III.) movermo-nos para o terreno das epistemologias feministas. Neste último movimento, propomos (III.I) uma interpretação da epistemologia do ponto de vista e (III.II) uma interpretação da epistemologia baseada no cuidado como respostas, no campo da teoria do conhecimento, para algumas das conclusões a que podemos chegar quando se adota a perspectiva de uma ética do cuidado. "Ouvir vozes diferentes", de acordo com uma ética do cuidado, passa por justificar, com uma epistemologia do ponto de vista, de um lado, e uma epistemologia baseada no cuidado, de outro, por que devemos, quando enfrentamos questões éticas e relativas à construção do conhecimento, ouvir vozes particulares, antes marginalizadas e silenciadas Palavras chave: ética feminista, cuidado, epistemologias feministas, particularismos. ABSTRACT This article presents a way of interpreting the ethics of care, the feminist standpoint theory, and the care-based epistemology as pieces of a radically particularistic moment of the feminist debate. To advance this task, the text was divided into three movements. We dedicate the first section (I.) to discuss the conceptual criteria of feminist ethics of care. In the second section, (II.) we reconstruct the inaugural debate between C. Gilligan and L. Kohl-berg, so that, (III.) we can move to the feminist epistemology studies. In the last movement (III) we argued that (III.II) an interpretation of the feminist standpoint theory and (III.III) an account of the care-based epistemology, may be helpful to elucidate some of the main conclusions produced by the ethics of care. "Hearing the difference" goes through justifying, with a feminist standpoint theory , on the one hand, and a care-based epistemolo-gy, on the other, why we should hear particular voices, previously marginalized and silenced, is a crucial step both in ethics and epistemology.
Place is not a neutral backdrop against which knowledge production unfolds; it plays an important role in academic practice on many levels, namely in negotiations of what counts as proper knowledge. Specific places are invested with epistemic authority, and thus lend credibility to the knowledge claims produced or presented within them. Place can, therefore, be a valuable resource for academics, especially those working in marginal fields – like Women’s, Gender, Feminist Studies (WGFS) – who are under pressure to prove the value of their work. In this article, I focus on negotiations of the status of WGFS, asking how WGFS scholars strategically use place to build credibility and community for the field. To do this, I draw on a longitudinal ethnography of Portuguese academia, and explore two different types of place. I begin with a discussion of conference venues, using data on two events to analyse how WGFS scholars try to locate conferences in specific places to access particular audiences and create certain moods. In the second example, I zoom in on a bookshelf – a familiar, but overlooked, micro-place – asking how such small but valuable places of WGFS visibility are created and invested with meaning and emotion. Through these examples, I demonstrate that place is very significant in negotiations of the status of WGFS. It is significant not just because of the epistemic credibility it may bestow, but also because of the affective and emotional impacts it may have on the individuals and communities involved in those negotiations.
Screen Space Reconfigured is the first edited volume that critically and theoretically examines the many novel renderings of space brought to us by 21st century screens. Exploring key cases such as post-perspectival space, 3D, vertical framing, haptics, and layering, this volume takes stock of emerging forms of screen space and spatialities as they move from the margins to the centre of contemporary media practice. Recent years have seen a marked scholarly interest in spatial dimensions and conceptions of moving image culture, with some theorists claiming that a 'spatial turn' has taken place in media studies and screen practices alike. Yet this is the first book-length study dedicated to on-screen spatiality as such. Spanning mainstream cinema, experimental film, video art, mobile screens, and stadium entertainment, the volume includes contributions from such acclaimed authors as Giuliana Bruno and Tom Gunning as well as a younger generation of scholars.
Neste ensaio, eu apresento duas maneiras de conceber uma explicação genealógica do conceito de conhecimento. A primeira delas através da hipótese do estado epistêmico de natureza elaborada por Edward Craig, na qual conhecimento é compreendido como um conceito evoluído a partir do conceito de bom informante. Depois de considerar o projeto de Craig, eu traço um paralelo entre essa abordagem e a explicação valorativa de Miranda Fricker sobre o mesmo conceito. Em seguida, eu apresento e discuto o desenvolvimento social que Fricker oferece à genealogia de Craig, onde ela sugere que as noções de bom informante e de conhecimento são necessariamente dependentes do estabelecimento de uma norma de credibilidade, e que esta norma deve ser vista como inerentemente política. Por fim, defendo uma ilustração a partir do trabalho de Kristie Dotson de como ambas as abordagens genealógicas poderiam explicar e oferecer soluções para falhas na normatividade de nossos sistemas epistêmicos.
Ohjaussuhteissa on aina kyse monimuotoisista vuorovaikutussuhteista. Ohjaaja auttaa jatko-opiskelija akateemisiin toimintakulttuureihin tutustumisessa ja tutkimuksessa tarvittavien sosiaalisten yhteyksien luomisessa sekä taitojen hankkimisessa. Ohjaussuhteet ovat ihmissuhteita, joissa kysymys on kohtaamisesta. Elementtejä ovat välittäminen, kuunteleminen ja vastaaminen. Artikkelissa käsitellään paitsi jatko-opiskelijan ohjausta sinänsä, erityisesti naistutkijan kokemuksia ohjauksesta. Kirjoittaja kuvaa kolmea ohjauksen metaforaa, joiden avulla voidaan avata keskustelua tutkimustyön ohjauksesta.
While scientific pluralism enjoys widespread popularity within the philosophy of science, a related position, epistemic relativism, does not have much traction. Defenders of scientific pluralism, however, dread the question of whether scientific pluralism entails epistemic relativism. It is often argued that if a scientific pluralist accepts epistemic relativism, she will be unable to pass judgment because she believes that “anything goes”. In this article, I will show this concern to be unnecessary. I will also argue that common strategies to differentiate relativism and pluralism fail. Building upon this analysis, I will propose a new way of looking at both positions’ relations. This article aims to understand what explains the friction between scientific pluralism and epistemic relativism. I will demonstrate that conceptualizing both epistemic relativism and scientific pluralism as “stances” sheds better light on their relation and demonstrates that it is, in principle, possible to support both positions at the same time. Preferred policies and levels of analysis, however, cause friction in practice.
L’article s’intéresse à la figure de la femme fatale rousse dans le roman d’horreur québécois La peau blanche (2003) de Joël Champetier. Si les criminelles de Champetier reprennent des traits stéréotypiques liés à la rousseur genrée au féminin, tels que la sexualité perverse et la criminalité, nous observons comment ces personnages offrent aussi un potentiel féministe progressiste, entre autres parce qu’ils constituent un groupe féminin non repentant et victorieux. C’est cette tension entre persistance et subversion de la figure de la femme fatale rousse que nous proposons d’analyser chez Champetier.
Mots-clés : Femme fatale ; figure rousse ; succube ; littérature populaire ; littérature de l’imaginaire ; littérature québécoise ; Joël Champetier ; La peau blanche
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