From the robust to the nonreplicable, from the trivial to the groundbreaking, virtually
all findings in cognitive neuroscience stem from the same approach: divide and conquer.
Indeed, the field’s ethos has long been to decompose mental phenomena into a
series of separate mechanisms which can be individually operationalized. Imagine
we want to explore how the brain recognizes familiar faces. In a typical experiment,
first, we would select a number of well-known and unknown portraits; second, we
would break them down into a number of measurable features; third, we would retain
the faces from each set that are matched for those features; last, we would ask participants
to sit or lie down very still and to press a button each time they see a familiar
face, while we record behavioral, electrophysiological, or neuroimaging correlates of
their ongoing activity. The impact of every other cognitive domain, ranging from
memory to attention to perception to language to emotion and so on, is factored out
between conditions. Data are then preprocessed, analyzed, interpreted, reported, and
eventually published. The title of the paper is typically some variation along the lines
of “How the brain processes familiar faces” or “Neurological correlates of seeing a
familiar face”—if we are lucky, the authors will also throw in an amusing pun.
However, such titles and their accompanying conclusions are typically inflated
and interpreted beyond their actual scope. As it happens, the very participants who
performed the experiment will never again find themselves in such a scenario. The
moment they leave the laboratory and meet their friends on the street, facial recognition
is no longer stripped of the myriad influences of other neural, bodily, and environmental
factors. Moreover, in ecological settings, it is rarely the case that similar
stimuli appear successively in a fixed, pseudorandomized order. These manipulations
have been instrumental to model the inner workings of specific cognitive domains—
that is, theoretically isolatable processes associated with particular types of information,
partially recurring phenomenological attributes, and sometimes well-defined
neurological correlates, such as language, memory, emotion, and so on. However, the
ensuing findings are blind to the natural interplay among diverse aspects of experience
that characterizes our cognition millisecond after millisecond.
One would, thus, be tempted to measure the neural correlates of our mind and
behavior in natural settings, as has sometimes been done in the field. Unfortunately,
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the limitations of this approach are as evident as those of the previous one: as soon
as we stop controlling for the impact of confounding factors, whatever effect
emerges cannot be justifiably attributed to any process or system in particular;
hence, we are left with a bunch of uninterpretable noise.
In the last few years, we have often found ourselves pondering on these issues.
Typically, we would end up yielding to an unsavory and seemingly inescapable
conclusion: the field is
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We believe this is one move in the right direction, albeit a minor one. While many
models consider interactions between one domain and another, ours are characterized
by placing the integration of neurocognitive mechanisms in the spotlight. In
presenting them against the background of our overarching epistemological rationale,
we aim to instantiate the latter in explicit terms rather than just enunciate it in
abstract. Moreover, in fleshing them out, we have endeavored to combine empirical,
translational, and meta-theoretical arguments. These are, indeed, the three strands
that nurtured the discussions behind all the contents below.
Chapter 1 introduces the premises of our framework and anticipates the dimensions
of context addressed by each of our models, namely the Social Context
Network Model (SCNM) and the Hand-Action-Network Dynamic Language
Embodiment (HANDLE) model. Specifically, the SCNM sets forth a macroanatomical
perspective on the networks supporting contextual modulations of social
cognition processes. In its turn, the HANDLE model constitutes a microanatomical
account of action-language coupling in immediate action settings.
Chapter 2 addresses the role of context in social cognition via the SCNM. First,
we describe the main sources of contextual constraints modulating socio-cognitive
domains. Second, we flesh out the SCNM, specifying the functions subserved by its
main anatomical hubs. Building on the model, we characterize the interplay among
social cognition, interoception, and emotion. To conclude, we discuss the clinical
relevance of our framework and outline outstanding issues for its development.
Chapter 3 introduces HANDLE to characterize the neurocognitive interplay of
manual actions and contextually relevant language. First, we present the model’s
neurocognitive architecture, functional principles, and notational devices. Then, we
summarize its main hypotheses and review critical evidence to test them. Next, we
discuss the relevance of action-language coupling paradigms for detecting early
cognitive deficits in motor disorders, with emphasis on Parkinson’s disease. Finally,
we identify key questions and challenges to be addressed in future research.
Chapter 4 offers a critical and prospective balance of our situated and integrative
proposal. We begin by discussing the salient features shared by the SCNM and
HANDLE. Next, we ponder on the implications of a renewed conception of context
in the light of key findings captured by our models. In particular, we set forth critical
meta-theoretical considerations on the holistic phenomenon of intercognition, a key
determinant of contextual effects. Thereupon, we consider extant and future methodological
possibilities to foster relevant breakthroughs, and address the prospects
for translational and educational innovations immanent in our approach.
The ideas we lay out in the following pages were mostly conceived in the privacy
of post-dinner lucubrations and were first hatched in the often meagre space of scientific
papers. It is most exciting to see them flow more openly and freely in the
present book. They are no longer exclusively ours, and that is positive in itself.
Whatever degree of support or disagreement they inspire should serve to illuminate
the sensus communis of our daily experience.