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Abstract
This article argues that the “saving clause” provision introduced in the 2017 OECD Model conflicts with the entitlement to double taxation relief under Article 23 OECD Model, especially in cases involving the use of hybrid entities. Although this issue is pragmatically solved in the new paragraph 11.1 of the commentaries on Articles 23A and 23B OECD Model, which provides no obligation for the Contracting States to relieve double taxation to the extent that taxation is based exclusively on the residence of the taxpayer, it leaves the taxpayer in the residence state with a potential permanent double taxation status. The foregoing may be however avoided with an optional “reverse saving clause”. Such an option seems to be not only more coherent with the traditional object and purpose of tax treaties (double taxation relief), but it also reflects the tax treaty practice already in force in some countries around the world.
The OECD Programme of Work on the tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the economy comprises a so-called GloBE (Global Base Erosion) or Pillar Two proposal, consisting of a series of measures aimed at establishing a floor to tax competition by achieving minimum taxation of the income obtained by in-scope multinational enterprises. If such a measure is implemented, developing countries would be severely deprived of the possibility to grant tax incentives to attract FDI and potentially foster economic growth. This contribution emphasizes the importance of the thorough review of their tax policy preferences that developing countries should undertake amidst the rapid adoption of GloBE, which the OECD is pushing to achieve. To illustrate this concern, an examination of implementation issues shows that a deficient enactment of the income inclusion rule proposed in GloBE could paradoxically trigger the applicability of tax sparing clauses aimed at protecting the effectiveness of tax incentives, even when both sets of rules pursue opposing goals.
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