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The Appearance of the Military as A Political Force
in Indonesia
Abdul Rahman*
Fakultas Ilmu Sosial
Universitas Negeri Makassar
Makassar, Indonesia
abdul.rahman8304@unm.ac.id
Firdaus W. Suhaeb
Departemen of Sociology
Faculty of Social Science
Universitas Negeri Makassar
Makassar, Indonesia
firdaus.w.suhaeb@unm.ac.id
Nurlela
Fakultas Ilmu Sosial
Universitas Negeri Makassar
Makassar, Indonesia
nurlela@unm.ac.id
Alfin Dwi Rahmawan
Fakultas Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik
Universitas Bangka Belitung
Bangka, Indonesia
alfindwirahmawan98@gmail.com
Abstract— This study aims to determine the
background of the emergence of the military as a political
force in Indonesia. The method used is the historical
method by performing four stages, namely: heuristics,
criticism, interpretation, and historiography. The results
showed that the occurrence of regional upheaval that
wanted to separate from the Unitary State of the Republic
of Indonesia during the Old Order era, as a form of
disappointment with the central government, was
considered by the military as a threat to the integrity and
sovereignty of the nation and state. Therefore, the
military considers the need for a political concept and
strategy to overcome this. So the concept of an army
middle ground was initiated by Abdul Haris Nasution
which in turn gave birth to Dwifungsi. As the embodiment
of Dwifungsi, the military seeks to ward off threats that
come from within and outside. With the enactment of a
state of danger or martial law law, the military will
increasingly carry out its political functions by keeping in
view the state situation at that time.
Keywords: Military, political force, dwifungsi
I. INTRODUCTION
The Indonesian army never limited itself to being a
military force. During the revolutionary period from 1945 to
1949, the army was involved in the struggle for independence
where political and military actions were inseparably linked
[1]. Immediately after the transfer of power at the end of
1945, the army officially accepted the principle of superiority
of civilian government. The officers assumed that their role
in the political sphere could be necessary at any time, but in
fact they never emerged as a political force as a result of the
parliamentary system of government which was becoming
increasingly apparent [2]. Although the army leadership was
not directly responsible for the breakdown of the
parliamentary system in 1957, they were able to take
advantage of the situation to declare martial law, which
eventually allowed army officers to have a greater role in
political, administrative and economic functions [3].
In July 1958, the military was recognized as a functional
political force. And representatives of military
representatives were successfully seated in the state
institutions of the National Council which were formed by the
government based on the SOB or the martial law. Even
though the National Council which was formed by the
government was said to be institutional, it was a central state
body which played a big role in the political decision-making
process at that time. It was also at that time that the role of
the political parties that had begun to grapple with the
political crisis since the founding of the Republic of
Indonesia. Since that time, the participation of the military in
politics and government has become increasingly stable,
especially after the military in a short time succeeded in
overcoming the national crisis of the rebellion of the
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia.
In order to obtain a justification for the continued role of
the army in these functions after the crisis has passed, the
Chief of Staff of the Army, Abdul Haris Nasution formulated
a concept called the middle way which stipulates that the
army will not seek an opportunity to take over the
government, but also will not. be indifferent to politics. In
addition, the military also demanded their right to remain in
government, representative institutions and administration. In
the first seminar held in April 1965, the army initiated a
doctrine which states that the armed forces have a dual role,
namely as a military force and a socio-political force
(Muhaimin, 2002: 2). The military activities in question cover
the fields of ideology, politics, socio-economy, culture and
religion.
In order to obtain a justification for the continued role of
the army in these functions after the crisis has passed, the
Chief of Staff of the Army, Abdul Haris Nasution formulated
a concept called the middle way which stipulates that the
army will not seek opportunities to take over the government,
Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research, volume 473
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Social Sciences (ICSS 2020)
Copyright © 2020 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press SARL.
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC 4.0 license -http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/. 589
but also will not. be indifferent to politics. In addition, the
army also demands their right to remain in government,
representative institutions and administration. In the first
seminar held in April 1965, the army initiated a doctrine
which states that the armed forces have a dual role, namely as
a military force and a socio-political force (Muhaimin, 2002:
2). The military activities in question cover the fields of
ideology, politics, socio-economy, culture and religion.
II. METHODOLOGY
The process of writing this article uses the historical
research method which consists of four stages. The stages are
(1) Heuristic, which is looking for historical traces in the form
of a series of events contained in written notes in the form of
books, newspapers and online daily. (2) Criticism, namely
providing an assessment of these historical traces by making
comparisons with each other to find historical facts that are
closer to objective. (3) Interpretation, provides an
interpretation of historical traces that have been objectively
assessed and then connects them with other historical traces
so that historical stories that are related to one another
(causality) are compiled. (4) Historiography, the activity of
compiling historical stories through written reports in the
form of articles for display to the public. Types of research
III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION
A. A Brief History of Military Birth
In the Republic which was just proclaimed on 17 August
1945, there was no regular national army. The new Republic
of Indonesia will slowly but surely need officers in order to
defend and defend the country's independence and
sovereignty. From these things it can be seen that a new
country that was born in a hot situation and an environment
full of threats from outside, does not have an army of
nationalities. This causes most of the youth and armed
fighters to have a strong opinion, it is a delay and a big
mistake if the proclamation of independence is not
immediately followed by a statement or decree by the state
leadership and a revolution to make Heiho and PETA's ex-
soldiers as the National Army. the state army which is the
very important apparatus in determining the upright collapse
or sinking of a country [4]. The first organization to be
formed was the People's Security Agency (BKR) on August
22, 1945 with the aim of maintaining security together with
the people and state agencies concerned. The BKR will be
placed under the direction of the KNIP, and its branches will
be established at all lower levels of government, under the
supervision of the regional branches of the Indonesian
National Committee (KNI).
BKR has succeeded in gathering former PETA, Heiho,
and other laskar soldiers, and the BKR is a maximum defense
institution that can be formed if it has the circumstances and
conditions at that time, however the existence of BKR [5]
does not give satisfaction to youths and fighters who
emphasize on the spirit of leadership and the strength of arms,
especially in the youth kalnhan which later developed in the
Indonesian national army organization. Abdul Haris Nasution
in expressing his opinion about the problems at that time,
which was a reflection of the situation at that time that: "the
main mistakes at the beginning of the revolution were a
source of various difficulties for the state in the following
years, and especially became the state's difficulties, either in
terms of ensuring domestic security as well as in terms of
carrying out the perfect defensive " [6].
The landing of allied forces at the end of September
forced the government to seriously consider the question of
whether it would oppose the Dutch invasion by military
means, or by continuing the low-pitched policy of fighting for
national independence through negotiations with the Dutch
and by ask allies for good in the process. In fact, the Dutch
government in The Hague showed no tendency to voluntarily
relinquish its former colonies, and the laskar were determined
to allow Dutch soldiers to set foot on Indonesian soil [7].
Thus, whatever policy the Indonesian government will adopt,
it must strengthen its armed forces so that it can stay in
control of a dangerous situation. Thus, on 5 October 1945,
the BKR was changed to the People's Security Army (TKR)
[8]. As the name implies, TKR's main function is still to
maintain domestic security and not face enemies from
outside. However, at least his status had been upgraded to
become an army.
The existence of an army organization called TKR, which
is in a modest condition and is formed in a political and state
situation, is not satisfactory, especially for those who have
received training and training (for example in KNIL and
PETA). TKR is still considered to represent the government's
doubts which emphasize its struggle in the field of diplomacy.
In addition, TKR is still populist or still prioritizes domestic
security [9]. According to the opinion of those who focused
on Indonesia's struggle in the field of weapons and violence,
what was more important was needed at that time, a tool and
national defense organization to face allies, especially against
the Dutch who were trying to colonize Indonesia again [10].
With the continued arrival of British troops including
Dutch troops, the Republic of Indonesia took a more
symbolically militant stance. On January 1, 1946, the
Ministry of Security was renamed the ministry of defense, a
clear sign that the ministry of defense at that time assumed
responsibility from the wider State. At the same time the
People's Security Army was transformed into the People's
Salvation Army [11]. However, this name was still
unsatisfactory and on January 24, TKR was given a new
name as Tentara Republik Indonesia (TRI).
The state's situation made its existence even more
dangerous, due to the actions of the Dutch which increasingly
threatened the life of the Republic of Indonesia in the military
and diplomacy fields [12]. In the face of moments like these,
the Republic of Indonesia itself did not take action in one
direction or in tune. The Soekarno-Hatta-Syahrir government
on the one hand, with the army and lasykar on the other, had
a different strategy in dealing with the Dutch, namely the
government used a diplomatic strategy, while the majority of
the military and almost all lasykar used a physical strategy
[13].
To overcome these difficulties and problems in the
military sector, on May 5, 1947, President Soekarno issued
an edict to form a committee led by the President himself.
This State Committee was later named Indonesian National
Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research, volume 473
590
Army Organization Formation Committee with a
membership of 21 people from the leaders of the armed
forces, including the leaders of some of the most influential
lasykar [14]. After how long working with all the difficulties,
on June 7, 1947, a Presidential decree was issued to form an
army organization called the Indonesian National Army,
abbreviated as TNI, as a form of TNI perfection. In this
stipulation, it was decided that at that time the TNI would
function as a means of state defense [15].
B. Army and Politics
The era of guided democracy is the starting point for the
expanding role of the military in the Indonesian political
system. If during Parliamentary democracy there was
subjective civilian control of the military, in the era of guided
democracy, the military responded by exercising subjective
control over political parties. In order to do this, the military
still needed to divide its roles with President Soekarno[16].
Even so, in this era the military has not really been able to
cripple all political parties because President Soekarno still
provided protection for the Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI) [17], which President Soekarno PKI later used as a
balancing force against the military, especially the TNI-
Army. Slowly but surely the military was able to take power
away from the hands of civilian politicians and then paralyze
the power of political parties.
Soekarno and Abdul Haris Nasution were of the opinion
that Indonesia needed an ideology to be accepted, at least by
consensus by all levels of Indonesian society. Politically, it
stands to reason that the Constituent Assembly was dissolved
because it was seen as an arena for politicians to engage in
ideological conflicts [18]. One of the intentions of Nasution
in the National Council to reuse the 1945 Constitution was to
create an ideological pattern for the entire nation, including
especially the TNI itself. In shaping the ideology for guided
democracy, the TNI played no role at all, but President
Soekarno himself was the initiator. The main ideological
formulation put forward by Soekarno was the content of his
state speech on August 17, 1949 entitled "Rediscovery of Our
Revolution", which was considered a Political Manivesto or
MANIPOL [19].
The contents of the Manipol were refined and refined by
Soekarno and Roeslan Abdul Gani as chairman of the
Supreme Advisory Council formed by President Soekarno
under the 1945 Constitution, which was basically a direct
incarnation of the National Council with changes in several
of its members, and then made Manipol the National political
base in under leading democracy. The contents of the
Manipol are then summarized into five principles, namely:
the 1945 Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided
Democracy, Guided Economy and Indonesian Personality
which is abbreviated as USDEK. The Usdek Manipol is
linked to the foundation of the state so that Pancasila and
Manipol Usdek become a series of guided democratic
ideology patterns that quickly dominate all communication
media in an effort to carry out campaigns and propaganda to
the Indonesian people in order to maintain stability and
domestic security.
The period between 1956 and 1958, marked by attempted
coup d'etat in West Java, blatant defiance against the central
government in areas outside Java, and strife within the
broader army constituted the greatest leadership crisis the
TNI has experienced to date, resulting in causing conflict
within the military. The fact that the Headquarters group has
been able to survive and even strengthen its position is thanks
to Abdul Haris Nasution's political acumen, so that he can
slowly reduce the conflict. The military under Nasution was
gradually becoming more assertive in playing a role in
politics. Since the end of 1956, Army Headquarters began to
sound its voice on political issues, and with the enactment of
war conditions throughout the archipelago in March 1957 he
held great power in almost all fields (Muhaimin, 2002: 17).
The role that the Army could try to seize depended
primarily on the strength of the other centers of power. As far
as the regionals were concerned, they would soon be
destroyed. Masjumi and PSI were so closely associated with
the rebellion that their influence quickly declined. But it is
not only the strengths of other centers of power that must be
taken into account, but also the weaknesses of the army itself.
It is true that the army has gained great prestige in certain
circles thanks to its successful campaign against the rebels in
the regions, but on the other hand it has lost the support of the
party, including Masjumi and PSI
Meanwhile, the parties that supported the army against the
rebels were also deeply disappointed by the tough attitude in
carrying out their duties as war rulers. Thus towards the end
of 1958, the army became very unpopular and from a political
point of view found itself isolated and had only relations with
the Juanda cabinet and mutual interests with President
Soekarno [4]. This situation did not become an obstacle for
the Army Headquarters to continue to try to play a broader
political role. This can be partly explained in terms of urgent
military considerations. With the existence of a modern
military force, the national defense strategy is still based on
the concept of guerrilla warfare [20].
The operations which have been carried out against the
various rebels have reinforced the belief that military
campaigns alone, without political and economic policies,
will not provide a lasting solution. Therefore, the right of the
military to participate in determining policies in the non-
military field seems very important for efforts to maintain the
capability of the Indonesian state in the defense and security
sector [3]. There is a growing desire to widen the scope of
military activity in order to minimize the possibility of
civilian politicians' further interference in internal military
affairs. In addition, the military had almost completely lost
confidence in political parties, so that a new force was needed
to overcome the power vacuum.
In this new political order, Abdul Haris Nasution has
succeeded in placing Army representatives in the
government, legislative bodies, and in almost all state
apparatus. The military has a say in administering the law,
and is becoming increasingly involved in managing the
national economy. As such, it appears that the military is in a
good position to defend its interests and policies.
Increasingly, the main military, the Army, is increasingly
consolidating its position in the political arena of the state and
nation [21]. From its political objectives, the Army acts as a
builder of unity and integrity, guardian of the 1945
Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research, volume 473
591
Constitution and Pancasila, national shield, dynamist and
stabilizer of the nation.
C. Military Political Participation in the Indonesia-
Malaysia Confrontation
One of the very strategic and attention-grabbing issues
that Indonesia has faced in the past is the decision of
President Soekarno to take action to confront Malaysia [22].
This problem started in 1963 and was caused by various
factors. First, the confrontation occurred because Indonesia
was suspicious of the British intention to change the Tanah
Melayu alliance into a Malaysian state which included
Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and North Kalimantan. Because
at that time there was an effort between Indonesia, Malaya,
and the Philippines to form the Maphilindo alliance which
stands for Malaya, Philippines and Indonesia. Maphilindo is
intended as an alliance of the Malay family in Southeast Asia
and is a joint concept between Soekarno, Macapagal from the
Philippines and Tungku Abdul Rahman from the Malay Land
Association [23]. At that time the military fully supported the
creation of Maphilindo as an effort to unite the Malay family.
Second, namely the PKI's insistence which of course received
support from Moscow and Beijing so that Indonesia would
oppose the Malaysia concept [24]. Not only against by means
of diplomacy but also with actions that use physical force.
The PKI has an interest in confrontation, because it is hoped
that it can confuse the atmosphere within the Indonesian state
[25].
For the Indonesian side, the military in general and the
army in particular gave consideration to the immediate end of
the confrontation with peace. There are several reasons for
the military to resolve the confrontation immediately. First is
the consideration of military strategy [26]. Based on these
considerations the Army has carefully calculated that with the
confrontation with Malaysia, Indonesia is far from being able
to achieve the goal of breaking Malaysian military power.
Indonesia will not only face Malaysia, but will also face
Britain and the forces behind it, for example Australia, New
Zealand and the United States, which must be admitted that
they have a fairly strong military force both in terms of
personnel and weaponry. The second consideration is a
political factor. If there was an open war with Malaysia and
its supporting countries, the military would have to devote
many of its fighting forces to the luta island of Java. The
vacuum of Java could pose a danger to the capital Jakarta,
given the national political situation which tended to be
dominated by the PKI [27]. It was not impossible that the PKI
could exploit the void of combat troops in Java in launching
a power struggle. The third consideration which is implicit,
because it has never been clearly revealed, is economic
considerations [28]. War everywhere is also very costly. It is
difficult for Indonesia, which is currently in a very weak
economic condition, to carry out the war successfully.
Basically, the foremost motivation that existed among the
military groups who initiated the reconciliation effort was to
help the Indonesian government end the confrontation as
quickly as possible. Efforts must be made so that both parties
are willing to appear at the negotiating table in a respectful
manner, namely without losing face and without accusing
each other of who is guilty. On the Indonesian side, unlike
the Malaysian side which was initiated by civilian officials,
the pioneers of the reconciliation effort or peace feelers even
came from the military, namely the Army [29]. Among them,
Ahmad Yani, Soeharto, Ali Moertopo, L.B. Moerdani, A.
Rahman Ramli, Soegeng Drajat, Yogie Soegomo Memed,
and Soepardjo Roestam. Meanwhile, on the Malaysian side
there are Tan Sri Muhammad Ghazali Bin Shafis, Tun Abdul
Razak and Muhammad Sulon [30].
So, Indonesia's problem in the confrontation with
Malaysia did not lie in the attitude of the confrontation itself,
but in the attitude of not taking into account the objective
strength of Indonesia to be able to carry out the confrontation
with good results. Politically, the attitude of confrontation
was not wrong, because indeed Britain, with the help of the
United States and friends, showed an opposing attitude
towards the unity of the Malays and wished to resume its
colonial practice in Southeast Asia. However, if the objective
power possessed by Indonesia is inadequate in carrying out
confrontation, what is wrong when some of the Indonesian
nation's children resort to other methods which are
considered more guaranteeing their success in the political
arena.
Based on the maturity of such thinking and strategy,
Army officers considered that the politics of confrontation as
long as it was limited to political and economic confrontation
were tolerable and accommodated. But if the confrontation
had led to open military physical warfare, the impact was
seen to be too great, not only for the military, but also for the
entire Indonesian people.
IV. CONCLUSION
The occurrence of regional upheaval that wanted to
separate itself from the Unitary State of the Republic of
Indonesia as well as the foreign policy problems faced by the
Indonesian State during the Soekarno era had seriously
caught the attention of the military. The civilian government
originating from political parties is deemed incapable of
overcoming this. In fact, they conflict with each other in the
interests of their respective parties. Departing from this, the
military primarily from the Army, on the initiative of Abdul
Haris Nasution, brought the military to participate actively in
overcoming the national issue. The military must be involved
in national policies in the fields of domestic politics, economy
and finance as well as international relations for the sake of
the integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Thanks to the Dean of the Fakultas Ilmu Sosial,
Universitas Negeri Makassar who have provided financial
support for this research.
.
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