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UNIVERSITÀ DI TORINO
Dipartimento di Culture, Politica e Società
Corso di Laurea Magistrale in
Scienze Internazionali
TESI DI LAUREA
Effects of urbanization on China’s floating population: a case
study of the redevelopment project in Shenzhen’s Baishizhou
urban village
Relatore:
Prof. Giovanni B. Andornino
Correlatore:
Prof. Xiaoding Feng
Candidato:
Stefano Zaccaria
Anno accademico 2019/20
Sessione di settembre
Acknowledgements
This thesis would not have been possible to carry out without the support from a number of people.
First of all, I wish to express my deep sense of gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Giovanni B. Andornino
who has helped me at all stages of my thesis work with great care. His invaluable comments, corrections,
and recommendations steered me through this research.
My sincere thanks to Professor Feng Xiaoding, from Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, for his
willingness to share with me his insight and knowledge into the subject matter through his thoughtful
comments.
I also would like to thank Ms. Arianna Ponzini, her pragmatic knowledge on field research methodology
has simply been fundamental in the writing of the empirical chapter.
A special thank you to all the people of Baishizhou that I got to meet and interview. I am extremely
grateful for having shared your thoughts. Your experience and your incredible kindness have been an
inspiration for me.
My deep and sincere gratitude to my family for their continuous and unparalleled love, help, and support.
Without them, anything of this would never have been possible.
To Chiara, thank you for all our adventures in China, you have been the best shelter in the hard times,
and the best partner in the good ones.
And finally, to Janny, your presence and your support have been invaluable, not as a Shenzhener, but as
a friend. Thank you.
Table of Contents
Introduction 4
1. A General Analysis of Internal Migration in China 7
1.1 Major trends of internal migration in China 7
1.2 The reasons for migration over time 9
1.3 A growing trend: return migration 11
1.4 Challenges in rural-urban migration 12
1.5 The case of Guangdong and Shenzhen 13
2. Features and Dynamics of the Chinese Urbanization Process 15
2.1 The Hukou System: history and features 15
2.2 The dual-track land ownership system 19
2.3 The chengzhongcun, or “villages in the city” 21
2.4 The ongoing process of demolition of the urban villages 23
2.5 Final considerations 25
3. Case study: the redevelopment project of Shenzhen’s Baishizhou urban village 26
3.1 The growth of Shenzhen 26
3.2 History and features of Baishizhou urban village 30
3.3 Methodology of the case study 32
3.4 The current condition of Baishizhou: description of the village 33
3.5 Perceptions of Baishizhou residents about the redevelopment project 35
3.5.1 Villagers’ stance on the redevelopment project 37
3.5.2 Damage suffered by residents 38
3.5.3 Plans for the future 40
3.6 Final considerations 42
Conclusion 44
Appendix 46
Bibliography 64
4
Introduction
The Opening Reforms inaugurated by President Deng Xiaoping in 1978 opened the door of several cities,
especially in the coastal areas, to foreign investments, increasing their economies and employment. Since
then, China has experienced rapid economic growth and a huge urbanization process. These phenomena
are deeply interlinked with the massive rural-urban internal migration, increased by the growing
attractiveness of the more developed coastal provinces in the east of the country.
This constantly increasing group of people composes the so-called “floating population”, a term which
refers to the population that does not have a household registration (called Hukou) status in the city in
which it lives. In China this corresponds to the lack of basic social welfare and economic benefits,
representing thus a category of second-class citizens. On the one hand, these economic immigrants are
perceived as beneficial in providing low-cost labor force and promoting local growth by the city
governments. On the other hand, local governments are also concerned that liberalizing access to the
cities may overwhelm their capacity to provide public goods.
In order to open up the land use rights to foreign investors without distorting the socialist principles of
the state, the PRC adopted a particular approach called the dual-track land ownership system, in which
lands are owned either by the state or by a collective and the property rights are rather unclear. This
approach, alongside with the restriction imposed by the household registration system, contributes to
fuel the dichotomy and the division between the urban and rural spheres. During the period of growing
flows of floating population, these two aspects jointly conduced to the formation of the urban villages,
which are the expression of a unique kind of incomplete urbanization typical of China.
Chinese urban villages emerged as a phenomenon in areas experiencing rapid urbanization in the 1980s
and 1990s. They are basically rural villages which, due to having separate status under the dual land system,
instead of being integrated by the urban sphere they are actually circumvented and absorbed by the
expanding formal urban development undergoing in the major cities of China. Urban villages have
become super-dense residential areas characterized by crumbling buildings, narrow streets, open-air
markets, poor infrastructures, and a low standard of life compared to the rest of the city. For these reasons,
they are often associated, by both the local governments and the public opinion, with physical and social
problems. Nonetheless, urban villages offer low-rent housing for rural migrants, lowering the cost of
living and representing therefore the ideal shelter for starting a life in the city.
In the last few years, in order to modernize the city and to increase the local government revenue through
the building of commodity housing and the developing of profitable industries, urban villages across
China are undergoing demolition and redevelopment at the hands of municipal officials and real estate
developers, and the millions of people living in there are at risk of impending displacement. Therefore,
following the direction of economic growth by urbanization, urban redevelopment has increasingly
become a pivotal financial strategy for the local governments of Chinese cities.
Although this trend is noticeable all over China, it is particularly prominent in the southern coastal
megacity of Shenzhen, in Guangdong province.
Due to the establishment of the first Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in 1980, Shenzhen has been the
testing ground for capitalism in China, experiencing an impressive growth that, in only forty years, made
a rural fishermen village of 30000 inhabitants become a 13 million-city
1
(2018) with a strong high-tech
service sector and manufacturing industries.
1
Shenzhen Bureau of Statistics 2018, Last access 19th May 2020.
5
The incredibly rapid urban development of the city and the large number of job opportunities have
constituted the perfect environment for the emerging of hundreds of urban villages within Shenzhen,
serving, thanks to their affordable housing, as essential locations for the huge and increasing flows of
floating population attracted by the city.
Being the condition for the presence in the city of low-cost labor force, urban villages have been
fundamental for the economic development of Shenzhen throughout the years. However, especially in
the last decade, the widespread low reputation of urban villages among the formal urban citizens, and the
need of retrieving land to renovate the city, pushed the local government to adopt urban redevelopment
strategies which lead in most cases to the complete demolition of many urban villages and the consequent
redevelopment of those areas into modern residential districts, shopping malls, and technological parks.
Among the remaining urban villages of Shenzhen, there is Baishizhou. Besides being one of the largest
villages of the city, it is characterized by its central location, which makes it attractive for many migrants
coming from all over China. The same village has also been for complete demolition, meaning that its
residents live at risk of impending displacement. For these reasons, Baishizhou has been chosen as the
area for the case study.
The aim of the case study is thus to answer the research question of the thesis:
“How does Baishizhou’s redevelopment policy affect the lives of the villagers?”
The question will be answered by conducting interviews with the migrant workers who live in Baishizhou.
In particular, the field research has three purposes. First, to evaluate the impact of the impending
demolition and displacement over the lives of the village’s residents. Second, to assess the perceptions
and the opinions of the participants on the matter. Third, to analyse the future plans of the people
involved.
Besides, since the location has been visited in two different years (in 2017 and 2019), the empirical
research will also highlight the main differences between the two visits.
The qualitative data collected will then be analysed and discussed.
The demolition project is a process which involves three main stakeholders, namely the local government,
the developers and the original villagers, while migrant residents who do not own any property, even if
they represent the majority of the population residing in the urban village, have no say in the matter of
the plan. For this reason, most of the studies about the redevelopment policy of Chinese urban villages
focus on how the three main actors collaborate in order to reach deals about the demolition.
By presenting the empirical analysis of the phenomenon through a bottom-up perspective, the thesis
seeks instead to focus on the viewpoint of the migrant workers residing in Baishizhou, a large sector of
the population whose unique features should be considered as an added value for city development, and
not only as a social burden.
The thesis is structured in three chapters.
In order to understand the dynamics of Chinese urbanization, Chapter 1 will provide a historical
background of internal migration in China, explaining the concept of floating population and exploring
its main features, such as its constantly growing trend throughout the years, the social and economic
condition of the migrants, their reasons for migration and the challenges they have to face. Understanding
the phenomenon of domestic migration will be functional to the comprehension of the field research
since the floating population represents the category of people to which the participants of the case study
belong.
6
Chapter 2 will go on to explaining how the rural-urban division, together with the growing flows of
floating population, and the massive economic development started with the Opening Reforms have
jointly generated a rather unique kind of urbanization that in the large Chinese cities came out through
the formation of the urban villages. First, the history and main features of the Hukou system and the dual-
track land ownership system will be analysed. Afterwards, the chapter will focus on the characteristics of
urban villages and how they have been formed within the context of the dual system. Lastly, the causes
and consequences behind the decision of the progressive demolition of the villages within the major
Chinese cities, which represents the main object of the case study, will be examined.
Chapter 3 will focus on the case study conducted in Shenzhen’s Baishizhou urban village. First, a brief
history of the city and the village will be presented to delineate the setting that the case study takes place
in. The environment of Baishizhou will be further described through ethnographic observations that,
with the support of photographic elements, will aim to highlight the current urban condition and also the
transformation that the village experienced from the first visit of 2017 to 2019. Afterwards, the
methodology of the field research will be introduced, with a discussion on its possibilities and limitations.
Then, the subsequent section will constitute the empirical data and analysis of the case study, where the
interviews carried out with the migrant workers of Baishizhou and the related findings will be presented.
Lastly, the conclusion will first remark the answer to the research question and present a succinct
summary of the overall work. Then, the shortcomings of the dissertation and the recommendations for
future research will be discussed.
7
1. A General Analysis of Internal Migration in China
1.1 Major trends of internal migration in China
Flows of rural-to-urban migration in China are intertwined with the country’s development goals and
remain state-controlled, although the controls have taken different forms in different periods. State policy
severely restricted rural-to-urban migration during and for a few years following the rule of Mao Zedong
(1949–78), in order to pursue the socialist industrialization strategy of catching up with advanced capitalist
countries as quickly as possible. To finance industrialization, the state had to maximize investment in
industry on the one hand and save on the costs of urbanization on the other. Suppression of rural-to-
urban migration was seen necessary for rapid industrialization and to avoid additional expenditures on
an expanding urban population.
2
In 1978, President Deng Xiaoping inaugurated the Opening Reforms, opening the door of many cities,
especially in the coastal areas, to foreign investments, increasing their economies and job opportunities.
Due to the renewed attractiveness of these areas, since then, China has seen major internal population
movements. Rural-urban migrants typically come from rural areas of poorer inland provinces and regions
with poorly developed non-agricultural sectors and they tend to go to richer urban areas; in particular,
they migrate to the economically more developed coastal provinces in the east of the country. Some of
the reasons for these population movements are the large rural-urban and interprovincial differences, the
increased demand for cheap labor in expanding industrial and service sectors, the scarcity of land and the
limited opportunities outside of agriculture in many rural areas.
3
The growing number of opportunities resulting from economic reforms has led to more and more people
moving from their hometown to the cities that have benefited the most from the reforms. These people
could be called the floating population. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, floating
population refers to the population who live in places other than their household registration excluding
those with current residences different from the places of their household registration but still in the
same city.
4
To better understand the floating population, we need to have a basic understanding of the Chinese
household registration system (the Hukou system). China introduced the household registration system
in the late 1950s to prevent and control migration from rural to urban areas. According to the system,
every individual is officially registered in one location, which is also related to benefits and privileges. For
example, people with an urban Hukou have the right to work, health care, pension, unemployment
benefits and access to local public schools for their children. The concept and the characteristics of the
Hukou system will be further analysed in the second chapter.
As already mentioned, the floating population differs from the permanent migrant population because it
does not have a household registration status in the city in which it lives. Due to its enormous size, the
2
Li Zhang. “Economic Migration and Urban Citizenship in China: The Role of Points Systems.” Population and Development
Review 38 (3) (September 2012): 506. Last access 14th February 2020. Doi: 10.1111/j.1728-4457.2012.00514.x
3
Ulrich Kleinwechter. “Rural-urban migration in China: An analytical framework of migrants’ contributions to rural
development” Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences Vol.4 (4) (2012): 758. Last access 14th February 2020.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/239729472
4
Statistical Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China on the 2018 National Economic and Social Development,
National Bureau of Statistics of China, 28th February 2019. Last Access: 25th February 2020.
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201902/t20190228_1651335.html
8
study of China's floating population has become crucial to understand some of China's development
dynamics.
On the one hand, as previously stated, much of this population derives from a shift from rural to urban
areas due to the growing demand for cheap labor, especially in coastal regions. On the other hand, thanks
to the return of migrants, floating population plays an important role in economic development and
income level growth in rural areas. In addition, there are also social issues to consider, such as the relative
lack of benefits, medical care, and education for floating migrants due to the absence of Hukou.
5
Determining the size of the floating population could be challenging given its high mobility and the fact
that members of the floating population could try not to be counted for fear of being sent home.
Moreover, obtaining some of the data could be complicated. For example, the most comprehensive
sources regarding the floating population are the Chinese censuses (at the moment four were drawn up,
in 1982, 1990, 2000 and 2010)
6
, which are carried out on a ten-year basis. Consequently, some of the data
that can be found exclusively through these censuses, especially those regarding the reasons declared by
migrants for migration, are not available more up to date than 2010, the year of the most recent census.
On the contrary, data such as the quantity and increase of the floating population, as well as other features
such as its age and gender composition, can be found updated to 2018 thanks to the National Bureau of
Statistics of China.
From the analysis of the censuses, the resulting trend is the steady increase of the floating population. In
1982 the floating population was around 7 million. By 1990 it had reached almost 22 million. The 2000
census showed a sharp increase to 79 million. However, at the 2010 census, the floating population rose
to 221 million, which is about 17 percent of China's total population. The last data from 2017 showed a
further increase, even if less dramatic, to 244 million
7
(Figure 1).
Therefore, the floating population increased by more than 150 million in the first two decades of the 21st
century. Among its characteristics there is an overall gender balance that in 2018 was 65.2 percent male
and 34.8 percent female. Regarding the age composition, the floating population experienced an
important shift in the last decade: its average age in 2018 was 40 years old compared to just 34 years old
in 2008.
8
A reason for that could be that many of the older generation of migrants are still working
because they lack a proper pension and cannot afford to retire.
Interprovincial migration increased from 38 percent in 1990 to 54 percent in 2000. However, a
fundamental change occurred in the decade: the percentage of interprovincial migration decreased from
54 percent in 2000 to 50 percent in 2010. The magnitude of the 4% decline may not seem so dramatic,
interprovincial migration was still more significant than intra-provincial migration, but it hinted that a
major change was taking place in China. In fact, in 2015, the number of interprovincial migrants dropped
further to 46 percent, becoming less than that of intra-provincial migrants (54 percent).
9
5
Zai Liang; Zhongdong Ma. “China’s Floating Population: New Evidence from the 2000 Census.” Population and Development
Review 30 (3) (September 2004): 468. Last access 14th February 2020. Doi: 10.1111/j.1728-4457.2004.00024.x
6
The 2010 census collected similar information as the 2000 census: basic demographic information on sex, age, marriage,
fertility, migration, mortality as well as questions on household registration (Hukou) status, education, and occupation.
7
National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2017
8
Annual Survey of the National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018. Last access: 26th February 2020.
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201904/t20190429_1662268.html
9
Yaqin Su; Petros Tesfazion; Zhong Zhao. “Where Are Migrants from? Inter- vs. Intra-Provincial Rural-Urban Migration in
China.” GLO Discussion Paper Series 120 (2017): 5. Last Access: 25th February 2020. Doi: 10.1016/j.chieco.2017.09.004
9
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China
1.2 The reasons for migration over time
Migrants are driven by different reasons depending by their provenience and their socio-economic
conditions. There are significant differences between the reasons for the floating population and those
for permanent migrants. According to the 2010 census, over 65 percent of the floating population stated
that the main reason for migration was "looking for manual work or business" compared to only 4
percent of the permanent migrants. Floating migrants are also much less educated than permanent
migrants, which is why the former are more involved in physical work.
10
The comparison between the census of 2000 and the one of 2010 highlights also differences between the
reasons for migration of interprovincial and intra-provincial floating migrants. In both 2000 and 2010,
about three-quarters of interprovincial migrants migrated because of manual labor or factory work.
Between 2000 and 2010, the number of intra-provincial migrants, which was driven by the same reason,
steadily decreased from 48 percent to 37 percent. This difference between the reasons stated by
interprovincial and intra-provincial migrants may be identified in the high will of people from less-
developed provinces to move to further destination in order to obtain a job, even if manual.
However, there are other differences between the two periods. Education and training have been
reported as reasons for migration by more and more interprovincial migrants. A similar pattern has been
observed for intra-provincial migrants, and the difference is even more clear: the rate rose to nearly 21
percent, more than doubling the percentage of migrants who stated the same reasons for migration 10
years earlier. If this 21 percent is converted into the actual number of migrants, it leads to the conclusion
that in 2010 almost 26 million people left their family registration office for education and training
purposes. This is largely in line with China's recent efforts to expand educational opportunities for
primary and higher education. From 2000 to 2018, the total number of annual student admissions
10
Liang and Ma, “China’s Floating Population: New Evidence from the 2000 Census.”, 480
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1982 1990 1995 2000 2010 2017
Millions
Years
Figure 1: Total floating population in the years 1982-2017
Total floating population
10
increased from 2.21 million to 9.27 million in 2018. China's investment in education follows a similar
path: from 2.87 percent of GDP in 2000 to 4.11 percent of GDP in 2018
11
. The expansion of higher
education opportunities has relieved some pressure on the labor market. But perhaps more importantly,
it has helped train the Chinese workforce to be more competitive in the global economy.
12
Before these huge investments in education it was more common for migrant workers to face difficulties
such as occupational separation. The main reason for occupational separation is the relative lack of
education and skills that keep them in manual work. Besides, not only are they not highly qualified, but
due to the high level of professional mobility among migrant workers in rural areas, employers have little
incentive to train them.
However, thanks to the remarkable improvement of the educational situation of migrant workers over
time, the situation is getting better. For example, in 2000 only 1.5 percent of migrants had a degree of
four years or more, while in 2018 the rate was almost 11 percent
13
. This progress is not only in line with
the overall educational gain of the entire Chinese population, but it is also the hallmark of the new
generation of migrant workers in China. In fact, new migrants differ from their predecessors in several
ways: first, their reasons for migrating are likely to include education and training rather than just work.
This group also includes second-generation migrants who were born in the destination city of their
parents' migrants. Second, most members of this new generation of migrants have little or no experience
in rural life and intend to settle permanently in the city in which they grew up.
14
The level of education of migrant workers in the age group of 15-64-year olds has improved significantly.
The proportion of migrants with medium or high education increased from 17.61 percent in 2000 to 27.5
percent in 2018
15
. This group of migrants represents most of the workforce for the Chinese
manufacturing and export industries.
The improvement in access to higher education is even more impressive. In 2000, the educational profile
of migrants was dominated by junior high schools and below, with three quarters of migrant workers
having an education level at or below junior high school. As stated before, only about 1.5% of migrants
have a 4-year university degree. By 2018, over 11% of migrants had 4 years of university education. This
is a significant difference from 10 years earlier. The increase in three-year higher education among
migrants is even more pronounced. It is no longer correct to define China's migrant population as an
uneducated workforce.
The floating population of China has attracted worldwide attention due to its enormous size and
connections to the Chinese economic model and the difficult social and economic situation of these
workers. Migrant workers are known to do difficult and dangerous jobs, earn lower wages and endure
poor living conditions.
The main pattern of professional distribution shows a continuous grouping of migrants in manufacturing
occupations, but the percentage in this category has fallen dramatically from 46 percent in 2010 to 28
percent in 2018. The decline in manufacturing orders for migrants is offset by an increase in prestige jobs
as government officials, skilled workers, followed by employees and sales and service jobs. For instance,
services now account for more than half (50.5 percent) of all migrant worker employment.
16
11
National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018
12
Zai Liang; Zhen Li; Zhongdong Ma. “Changing Patterns of the Floating Population in China 2000-2010.” Population and
Development Review 40 (4) (December 2014): 703. Last access 14th February 2020. Doi: 10.1111/j.1728-4457.2014.00007.x.”
13
Annual Survey of the National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018. Last access: 26th February 2020.
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201904/t20190429_1662268.html
14
Liang, Li and Ma, “Changing Patterns of the Floating Population in China 2000-2010.”, 710
15
Annual Survey of the National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018. Last access: 26th February 2020.
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201904/t20190429_1662268.html
16
Annual Survey of the National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018. Last access: 26th February 2020.
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201904/t20190429_1662268.html
11
1.3 A growing trend: return migration
Another significant development in the dynamics of migration in recent years is the increase in
interprovincial return migration, that is the return of migrants to their place of origin. For example, it is
noteworthy to measure interprovincial return migration from Guangdong to Sichuan and Hunan, two of
the provinces that send the most migrants, which is possible analysing the censuses’ data.
As the cases of Sichuan and Hunan Province show, return migration increased dramatically from 1995.
The number of return migrants from Guangdong to Sichuan Province rose from 28,000 to 89,000
between 2000 and 2010. The same story is even more impressive for another large province that sends
migrants, that is Hunan, which can account an increase from 28,000 to 157,000 interprovincial return
migrants in the same period, a number that has grown even further to 420000 between 2010 and 2015
17
.
Given the striking increase in floating population in the last decades, it is also important to consider the
rate of return migration over time. Interprovincial return migrations from Guangdong to Sichuan,
between 1995-2000 and 2005-2010, were 1.88 percent and 3.27 percent, respectively. For Hunan
Province (which sends most of the interprovincial migrants to Guangdong), interprovincial return
migrations from Guangdong in 1995-2000 and 2005-2010 were 1.61 percent and 4 percent, respectively.
18
Several main factors can be related to the increase of the interprovincial return migration. One is the
policy of the central government about agricultural production. The price of agricultural products rose
significantly during that period. For instance, the price of wheat rose by 40 percent between 2003 and
2004.
19
These measures tend to make agriculture more profitable than before. A second government
initiative called the Western Development Project (WDP) was launched in 2000. The goal of this WDP
is to boost economic development and reduce income inequality between western China and other parts
of China. There was an enormous investment. In the first two years between 2000 and 2001, investments
of 400 billion yuan (approximately US$ 62.5 billion) were expected. And the total investments made in
the years 2000-2010 amount to over 2800 billion yuan (around US$ 438 billion)
20
, especially in
infrastructural projects. The WDP certainly offers plenty of employment opportunities for local farmers,
but it may also create necessary conditions that encourage more returning entrepreneurs with a migrant
background. In fact, many local governments in the sending migrant provinces have developed strategies
to attract returning migrant entrepreneurs.
Another development started in the late 2000s was the steady rise in wages for migrant workers in China’s
coastal areas. Factory owners, who were exposed to rising wage pressures and falling demand for goods
due to the global financial crisis, had to find new business opportunities. For them, Western China was
a good choice because labor costs are reasonable and the infrastructures had improved significantly within
the WDP.
In addition, as in the rest of the world, the global financial crisis since 2008 has also affected the economic
wellbeing of internal migrants in China. The closure of factories in Guangdong Province, the main
migration destination, reached a record 62,000 in 2008 due to lack of demand. The closure of many
factories resulted in a 16% increase in unemployment. In early 2009, an unfavorable economic
environment forced many migrants to return home. Some returning migrants returned later when the
economy started to recover, others never returned.
17
Rongwei Wu; Degang Yang; Lu Zhang; Jinwei Huo. “Spatio-Temporal Patterns and Determinants of Inter-Provincial
Migration in China 1995-2015”, Sustainability 10(11), 3899. (September 2018): 12. Last Access: 25th February 2020. Doi:
10.3390/su10113899
18
Liang, Li and Ma, “Changing Patterns of the Floating Population in China 2000-2010.”, 707
19
Liang, Li and Ma, ibid., 708
20
Zheng Lu; Xiang Deng; “China’s Western Development Strategy: Policies, Effects and Prospects”, MPRA Paper (35201)
(December 2011): 5. Last access: 15th February 2020. https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35201/
12
1.4 Challenges in rural-urban migration
Despite the progress mentioned above, there are clearly challenges for China's floating population. First,
China's monumental migration flow has affected millions of children. For urban migrant children without
a local Hukou, the biggest challenge remains the issue of equal opportunities in education. Although it is
clear in central government policy that migrant children should be allowed to enroll in local public schools,
migrant children continue to be treated unequally in terms of additional fees. High-quality education for
migrant children offers the best hope for socio-economic mobility and for avoiding new intergenerational
disadvantages. There is a significant number of serious issues, such as: late entry into an appropriate grade
(e.g. 13-year-old migrant children who are still in elementary school), a high percentage of migrant
children who are not enrolled in local public schools, and early labor force participation among high
school age migrant children. An important debate recently is whether migrant children should be allowed
to take the national college entrance examination in destination places. By 2014, only a few provinces
allowed migrant children to take the entrance examination at the university in migration areas. For the
rest (including major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou), migrant children must take college
entrance exam in their hometown provinces.
21
Since a large volume of China’s recent migrant population is characterized by rural to urban migration,
migration has obviously important consequences for China’s urbanization patterns.
22
Moreover,
analysing the link between these two phenomena can help to have a clearer picture of the measures taken
by local authorities towards migrants.
Urbanization is one of the most important developments in China during the past four decades. In 1980,
according to official statistics, 19 percent of China’s then population of 975 million lived in urban areas.
By the end of 2010, almost half of the total population of 1.34 billion lived in urban areas, and the rate
has already reached 58% in 2017
23
. Lot of cities are growing so fast that their population will exceed in a
few years the planned population target for the city's socio-economic development plan.
24
With China’s post-1979 transition to a market economy, the role of provincial and city governments in
development has been reshaped, as well as their assessment of migration and urbanization. The reforms
of Socialism with Chinese characteristics have reduced both power and responsibility of central control.
Thus, the once-pervasive state has shifted from emphasizing centralization toward pursuing growth and
decentralization. This shift restructures state power from a unitary national scale to multiple local scales.
While greater economic authority is devolved to local levels to allow city governments to pursue their
development interests, many of the central government’s obligations such as the provision of public
goods are also devolved downward, but without enough financial resources, necessary to fulfill these
obligations. Under the so-called tax-sharing system, city governments are required to meet their expenses
from locally generated revenues, leading to the difficulty to balance the promotion of development and
the provision of social services. The burden of the increase in expenditure falls most heavily on local
governments, which provide over 80 percent of total public spending. A city’s viability depends also on
local efforts to compete for investment and human resources, which are increasingly mobile. Therefore,
city governments are almost transformed into entrepreneurial agencies oriented toward the promotion
of economic development which can quickly raise local revenues.
25
21
“Education in China: a Snapshot”, OECD, 2016, 11. Last access: 26th February 2020.
https://www.oecd.org/china/Education-in-China-a-snapshot.pdf
22
John R. Logan “Urban China in Transition.” Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007, 205
23
National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011-2017
24
Li Zhang. “Economic Migration and Urban Citizenship in China: The Role of Points Systems.”, 503
25
Li Zhang. ibid., 507
13
The transformation of city governments’ role and their strong direction toward growth have redefined
the meaning of urbanization at the local level. If achieved by labor transfer from agricultural to non-
agricultural sectors alongside the upgrading of urban infrastructure, urbanization is regarded by city
governments as an outstanding growth generator and a sign of modernization that should be promoted.
But if urbanization takes place through an increasing number of migrants who have the right to urban
citizenship, however, it is considered as a drain on local resources, since city governments now must bear
much of the costs of providing social goods and services.
26
In conclusion, city governments perceive economic immigrants as both beneficial in promoting local
growth and problematic in placing a burden on local public finances. The high influx of migrant workers
enables cities to reap demographic dividends and serve as low-cost production sites and dynamic leading
economies. However, city governments are also concerned that liberalizing access to urban Hukou for
the floating population may overwhelm their ability to provide public goods.
1.5 The case of Guangdong and Shenzhen
The province of Guangdong, and in particular the city of Shenzhen, which will be the object of the case
study, deserve further attention as they are the places that attract most of China’s floating population.
Since the 21st century, Guangdong has made the best of its unique geographical advantages and caught
the political benefits of the Opening Reforms. As a result, Guangdong has achieved significant economic
development and is now the province with the highest level of economic development in China. Market
vivacity and valuable investments both contribute to making Guangdong a region with a great
concentration of migrants. The rapidly developing economy is the main force that attracts large numbers
of migrants from less developed or rural areas to job work in Guangdong Province.
It is the most attractive place for migrants, receiving the largest migrant population volume in China. In
fact, with a floating population of almost 32 million in 2015 (13 percent of China’s total migrants)
27
Guangdong has been China’s long-term leader in absorbing migrants.
Specifically, the areas with higher migration attractivity are mainly concentrated in the Pearl River Delta
region, where the level of industrialization is the highest. Around 108 million people currently live in the
Pearl River Delta and a GDP of $ 1.5 trillion is currently reported, which is about 9 percent of China's
national GDP.
28
In this area, the city that experienced the most stunning growth is Shenzhen, whose development has
been strictly connected with the creation of the Special Economic Zones (SEZ).
In China, as in many other developing countries, economic development tends to rely on export-oriented
production as firms from advanced industrialized countries seek outsourcing and subcontracting to
reduce production costs at home and maximize profit. Prime examples are the aforementioned Special
Economic Zones, such as Shenzhen and Zhuhai, initially created by the state in the early 1980s. SEZs
are designated by the central or local governments. Located mostly on the fringes of urban centers and
equipped with state-built infrastructure – roads, power supply, water, and sewer systems – these SEZs
aim to attract foreign and domestic capital investment through tax incentives for foreign investments and
26
Li Zhang. “Economic Migration and Urban Citizenship in China: The Role of Points Systems.”, 509
27
Qingsheng Yang, Hongxian Zhang, Kevin M Mwenda. “County-Scale Destination Migration Attractivity Measurement
and Determinants Analysis: A Case Study of Guangdong Province, China”, Sustainability (11) (January 2019): 3. Last access:
15th February 2020. Doi:10.3390/su11020362
28
https://www.ceicdata.com/
14
more independence from the central government on international trade activities. A latent purpose is for
the state to control effectively the anticipated influx of migrant labor.
29
The creation of Shenzhen and other Special Economic Zones in 1979 adjacent to Hong Kong’s territory
was the first of many steps of China’s experimentation with a capitalistic economy, and since the Open-
Door Policy reforms, the region has undergone impressive transformations.
Shenzhen is often referred to as a modern miracle. The city represents the rapid modernization of China
more than any other city. In order to establish the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in 1989, the central
government acquired land rights from the village collectives and designated the land as urban, and
therefore owned exclusively by the Central government. In return, every male villager was given land for
private use to build a new home.
30
In 1978 just a fishermen village of 30000 inhabitants, now 13 million residents are estimated to live in
Shenzhen, mainly young migrants who have a stable average age of 27, which contrasts with the older
average age of the country as a whole.
31
Shenzhen is the city with the highest ratio (57 percent) of floating
population, which in 2019 amounted to almost 8.5 million people, to total population among the biggest
cities in China.
32
29
Logan, “Urban China in Transition”, 227
30
Juan Du. “Shenzhen: Urban Myth of a New Chinese City.” Journal of Architectural Education 63(2), (March 2010): 65. Last
access 15th February 2020. Doi: 10.1111/j.1531-314X.2010.01060.x
31
Swapna Banerjee-Guha. “Status of Rural Migrant Workers in Chinese Cities.” Economic and Political Weekly 46 (26/27)
(June 2011): 34. Last access 15th February 2020. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23018638
32
Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook 2019, 3. Last access: 26th February 2020.
http://tjj.sz.gov.cn/zwgk/zfxxgkml/tjsj/tjnj/201912/P020191230583834903125.pdf
15
2. Features and Dynamics of the Chinese Urbanization Process
Introduction
The purpose of this second chapter is to explore how state policies and spontaneous phenomena have
jointly generated a unique kind of urbanization, characterized by a massive presence of floating
population and by a strong difference between the urban and rural spheres, as well as describing the main
features and the most recent evolutions of this process.
First, the Hukou, namely the household registration system of China, will be discussed, starting from its
adoption until its most recent reforms, focusing on its economic and social effects on the floating
population.
Second, the double-track land ownership system will be analysed, a particular approach through which
the PRC has tried to open up the land use rights to foreign investors without distorting the socialist
principles of the state, however fueling the dichotomy between urban and rural.
Third, the chapter will focus on the formation and the characteristics of urban villages, which are a
product of both the Hukou system and the dual-track land ownership, and, thanks to their affordable
housing, represent the main shelter for the growing tides of floating rural-to-urban population whose
goal is to secure a life in the big cities.
The part will examine the causes and consequences behind the decision of the progressive demolition of
urban villages in major Chinese cities, in order to set the basis for the case study presented in the final
chapter.
2.1 The Hukou System: history and features
The massive presence of floating population within the national territory implies the need of the
government to control these flows. The main internal immigration management tool is represented by
the Hukou, the household registration system used in mainland China. The modern Hukou system was
founded in 1958, modeled on the Soviet Propiska (internal passport) system, but its roots go back to the
Imperial Period, although at the time its original purpose was that of population census.
Different from other similar residence recording systems, the Chinese Hukou is a state institution that
regulates and restricts the mobility of the population.
33
It can practically be considered as an internal passport system, which stipulates that every citizen can be
registered in only one permanent place of residence. Converting a Hukou from one place to another
requires regulatory approval, a process that is subject to the conditions of a variety of regulations.
The place of regular Hukou registration is the only place where all legitimate requests can be made. Many
conventional aspects of citizenship (especially access to school and health care, government-funded social
benefits, and other privileges) are not available to people without local Hukou.
33
Kam Wing Chan. “Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?” The China Quarterly: An International Journal for the Study of
China 195 (September 2008): 587. Last access 30th March 2020. Doi: 10.1017/S0305741008000787
16
Because of its role in access to rights and social stratification, an urban Hukou name corresponds to
"citizenship" in the respective city.
In 1958, the Chinese government began to use the family registration system, through the Ministry of
Public Security, to control population movements from the countryside to the cities, distinguishing
between two different types of citizenship forms: agricultural Hukou (农业户口, nongye Hukou) and non-
agricultural Hukou (非农业户口, fei nongye Hukou).
34
This kind of classification is called leibie (类别, type).
While urban residents, as owners of non-rural Hukou, enjoy preferential treatment from the point of
view of health, housing, education, and pensions, rural Hukou holders continue to have very limited
access to public services.
35
Thus, since an urban Hukou confers great advantages to seize the
opportunities of life, the Hukou system has created two categories of citizens who are highly
differentiated in terms of their standard of living and income.
After the reforms of 1978, peasants were allowed to seek work in the industrial and service sectors. At
the same time, the propensity to migrate from the countryside to the big cities increased. The introduction
of the household responsibility system, which made single families responsible for their own livelihood
and allowed producers to sell on the market any remaining surplus after paying the tax on cereals, had
considerably improved the efficiency of agricultural production, thus generating a large surplus of labor
in rural areas.
36
Since the early 1980s, China has gradually implemented various programs to transfer fiscal and
administrative powers to lower-level governments. This trend included changes in the management of
the Hukou system. Local governments, particularly since the late 1980s, have had greater control over
deciding the levels of both Hukou and non-Hukou migration in their respective administrative areas. This
emerges from the guidelines of the Ministry of Public Security of 1992 and 1998, which among other
things enable city authorities to provide local Hukou to investors and entrepreneurs, mainly professionals
who have stable work, and place of residence in the city. Many local governments took advantage of the
new power by "selling" local Hukou to increase revenue, sometimes to the dismay of the central
government. Market-oriented reforms in the 1980s, combined with greater geographical population
mobility, put strong pressure on the traditional Hukou system and its management. At the same time,
there was increasing criticism of the problems created by the system.
37
In 1984, the State Council opened the doors of market towns to farmers under certain conditions. A new
type of permit called "self-supplied food grain" (自理口粮 zili kouliang)
38
was granted to villagers as long
as they were able to satisfy certain requirements. The main conditions were that a migrant must be
employed in an enterprise, have his own accommodation in the new location and be able to provide his
own food. Cardholders were not yet eligible for many government services and cannot move to urban
areas ranked higher than their own.
Before the 1990s’ reforms, in mainland China, all PRC nationals’ Hukou was categorized by two related
parts: one by socio-economic eligibility and one by residential location.
39
As already mentioned before, it was the distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural status that
essentially defined one’s relationship with the state and the qualification for several state-provided socio-
34
Jijiao Zhang; Catherine Wihtol de Wenden; Myrna Giovanella. “Le Système du Hukou: La Migration des Campagnes vers
les Villes et la Modification de la Frontière d’Appartenance en Chine.” Migration Societé 149 (5) (2013): 34. Last access 30th
March 2020. https://www.cairn.info/revue-migrations-societe-2013-5-page-29.htm
35
Ivan Franceschini. “Esperimenti per una riforma della cittadinanza.” Twai, 31st December 2011. Last access 30th March
2020. https://www.twai.it/articles/cineresie-esperimenti-per-una-riforma-della-cittadinanza/
36
Zhang; Wihtol de Wenden; Giovanella, “Le Système du Hukou: La Migration des Campagnes vers les Villes et la
Modification de la Frontière d’Appartenance en Chine.”, 41
37
Chan, “Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?”, 590
38
Frank N. Pieke “People’s Republic of China: Volumes I and II”, Routledge, 2017, 286.
39
Chan, ibid., 587
17
economic benefits. The designation of a non-agricultural status allowed the bearer to have access to state
housing, employment, grain rations, education, medical care, and other social assistance benefits. The
agricultural population was expected to be largely self-sufficient and to receive very limited government
benefits. Those with non-agricultural status, regardless of their physical location or place of residence,
were automatically entitled to these benefits because they were distributed and financed by the central
government, which made the non-agricultural state very popular throughout the country. Those with
agricultural status did not have legal means to obtain these resources either inside or outside their
registered location.
Alongside with the leibie distinction, people were also differentiated by their official permanent residence.
Under Hukou regulation, each citizen is required to register in one and only one place of permanent
residence. In other words, in addition to the agricultural and non-agricultural classification, everyone was
also distinguished by whether they have a local Hukou concerning an administrative unit (such as a city,
town or village). The local regular Hukou registration defines one’s rights for many activities in a specific
locality.
Since the two classifications mean different things, cities and towns had both non-agricultural and
agricultural Hukou populations living in them and, conversely, the agricultural Hukou population may
exist in the countryside and the cities.
Since the mid-1990s, the Hukou system has experienced a gradual relaxation by allowing, on the one hand,
rural residents to buy a temporary urban residence permit, which meant that they could work legally for
a limited time, whose costs gradually decreased to become affordable, and, on the other hand, through
simplification of the dual classification into a single system based on permanent residence-location,
providing for the elimination of the agricultural and non-agricultural Hukou classification among local
Hukou population within some selective locales, usually big cities (some of them include the Special
Economic Zones, a primary source of foreign investments).
40
Thus, in the selected cities or city districts
in which this initiative has been implemented, agricultural and non-agricultural Hukou had been ‘‘unified’’
into one single category called jumin Hukou (居民户口resident household registration).
41
In summary, the reform had two main effects. First, the power to decide the size of the local Hukou
population and admission requirements shifted from the central government to the local governments,
that received full power and discretion to set their own admission criteria. Second, most of the cities
implemented a system to eliminate the distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural Hukou in
each city. The equalization only applied to those who already had a local Hukou and was not just a new
additional benefit for the former local agricultural population at the urban fringes.
It can be seen that under the first effect of the abolition, the entry requirements that are set locally in
many large cities are so prohibitively high that the change had absolutely no relevance for the vast majority
of rural migrant workers.
The Hukou system experienced another form of liberation in 2001 after China joined the World Trade
Organization (WTO).
The entry into the WTO forced China to accomplish the reform of the system to liberalize the labor
mobility activating economic reform, which was seen as necessary since the Hukou was recognized as an
obstacle to economic development. The entry galvanized labor-intensive sectors such as textile and
clothing. This led to increased demand in urban labor and the intensity of documentation inspections
was relaxed to accommodate this demand. Economic reforms have also created migratory pressure
encouraging inland migration to the coasts.
40
Zhang; Wihtol de Wenden; Giovanella, “Le Système du Hukou: La Migration des Campagnes vers les Villes et la
Modification de la Frontière d’Appartenance en Chine.”, 43
41
Chan, “Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?”, 597
18
Since around 2001, controls on the Hukou have decreased and some provinces have launched pilot
programs to experiment with a system to reduce the treatment gap between rural and urban residents.
42
In some provinces, such as in Jiangsu, governments allow migrants with stable employment and fixed
residence to register where they live and work rather than in their place of birth so that they can take
advantage of the urban system of the welfare state, while Shanghai has decided to take measures to attract
and retain only skilled labor, allowing some professional and qualified categories to request urban Hukou.
43
In Guangdong, since June 2010, the “point-based Hukou” was experimentally adopted, which is basically
a system that allows migrant workers, once a certain score is reached, to request an urban Hukou. The
evaluation criteria include a mixture of indicators decided at the provincial and city levels, such as
participation in social security funds, contribution to society and the employment and tax situation of
individuals.
44
This system has been later adopted also from other cities such as Shanghai, Xi’an, and in
2018 Beijing.
45
In the point-based system, points are awarded for the various requirements that an applicant meets.
Applicants who obtain a sufficient number of points for the qualification score are eligible for
immigration unless the annual immigration quota is exceeded.
Several observations can be drawn from the point-based system.
First, point-based system in different cities have different categories and requirements, but there are
similarities.
Second, the quality attributes of the applicant (suzhi) are classified in relation to the education certificates
(the type of degree awarded) or to the professional level (the type of professional certificate issued). In
an extreme case, under the Guangdong province guideline, a candidate can pass the qualification level
simply by reaching the maximum score for education or professional skills. However, this only applies
to Guangdong guidelines.
Third, the performance-based imperative plays an exceptional role: the contribution can be calculated
based on the investment capital possessed by the applicant; prizes at national or regional competitions or
for exceptional work performances; the number of charitable donations (e.g. donations to local
communities); and volunteering (e.g. volunteering to support the management of events organized by
local governments). According to Guangdong provincial policy, receiving a national award qualifies a
person for urban Hukou.
46
Finally, in order to qualify for an urban Hukou, applicants typically must meet requirements such as
demonstration of ongoing registration of temporary residence, proof of formal occupation, evidence of
homeownership, and participation in the social security system.
The latest Hukou reforms date back to April 8th of 2019, with the publication of the 2019 Urbanization
Plan
47
by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). According to this document,
China will relax Hukou restrictions in many of its small and medium-sized cities to push the national
urbanization rate by at least one percentage point by 2020.
42
Zhang; Wihtol de Wenden; Giovanella, “Le Système du Hukou: La Migration des Campagnes vers les Villes et la
Modification de la Frontière d’Appartenance en Chine.”, 45
43
Zhang; Wihtol de Wenden; Giovanella, ibid., 46
44
Ivan Franceschini. “Esperimenti per una riforma della cittadinanza.”
45
Yamei. “Beijing launches point-based hukou system.” Xinhua, 11th April 2011. Last access 30th March 2020.
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-04/11/c_137103450.htm
46
Li, Zhang. “Economic Migration and Urban Citizenship in China: The Role of Points Systems.” Population and Development
Review 38 (3) (September 2012): 519. Last access 30th March 2020. Doi: 10.1111/j.1728-4457.2012.00514.x
47
National Development and Reform Commission 2019. Last access 2nd April 2020. https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/
19
The 2019 plan requires cities with populations between one and three million to remove all restrictions
on household registration. Moreover, also cities with populations between three and five million will have
to relax limitations on new migrants. In addition to loosening Hukou restrictions, the plan directs local
governments to promote basic public services for permanent residents and further develop urban
infrastructure to handle the increasing population. In contrast, most larger cities will continue to have
even more restrictive Hukou policies.
To conclude, the Hukou system set up barriers between the rural and urban sectors, dividing their
respective residents into two different social, economic and political classes. This led to, on the one hand,
an urban class whose members had basic social welfare and economic opportunities, and on the other
hand, an underclass of peasants with little to no benefits.
48
This division has been the foundation of the
rural-urban dual-track system which will be examined in the following section.
2.2 The dual-track land ownership system
China's political economy has transformed significantly since 1978 when economic reforms were
introduced. Because of profound social and economic changes, the deepening of decentralization and
the transition to a market economy, urbanization has been accepted as a positive process conducive to
the modernization and development of the country. A new political economy of urbanization has fueled
a new kind of dual-track urbanization in China.
49
The dual-track approach (二元制 eryuanzhi) is characteristic of evolutionary reforms in China, and the
most important aspect of this dualism was the reform of the ownership structure. On the one track, new
fundamentally market-oriented institutions have emerged in a parallel economy. This economy includes
non-governmental companies with different forms of ownership such as township and village enterprises,
individual and private enterprises. On the other track, state-owned companies have been preserved and
reforms limited to conservative policy changes.
50
To take into account the interests of foreign investors without violating the socialist principle of public
property, the Chinese state has separated land use rights from land ownership since the 1980s and has
opened up a new market track for the transfer of land use rights to commercial users. The result was a
marked dual-track land system in the new political economy, in which the ownership of rural land belongs
to the village whereas the ownership of urban land belongs to the state.
51
This temporary coexistence of different institutional frameworks has several advantages. First, an
institutional clash can be avoided, since the new rules only serve to complement the existing institutional
order. Compared to reforms belonging to approaches such as the shock therapy undertaken in the former
48
Will Buckingham and Kam Wing Chan. “One City, Two Systems: Chengzhongcun in China’s Urban System” (January
2018): 2. Last access 21st April 2020.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322628538_One_City_Two_Systems_Chengzhongcun_in_China's_Urban_Syste
m
49
Jianfa, Shen. “Understanding dual‐track urbanisation in post‐reform China: conceptual framework and empirical analysis”
Population, Space and Place 12 (6) (October 2006): 498. Last access: 21st April 2020. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.426
50
Sonja, Opper. “Dual-track Ownership Reforms: Lessons from Structural Change in China, 1978‐1997” Post-Communist
Economies 13 (2) (August 2010): 205. Last access: 21st April 2020. Doi: 10.1080/14631370120052672
51
George C.S. Lin and Samuel P.S. Ho. “The State, Land System, and Land Development Processes in Contemporary
China” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95 (2003): 411. Last access: 21st April 2020. Doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
8306.2005.00467.x
20
URSS, a complete loss of control is less likely. Second, inefficient institutions are expected to function
smoothly, as competition between different groups of institutions will eventually force out those that are
inferior. As for flawed state-owned enterprises, developing a competitive environment would eventually
urge an SOE to improve its performance.
52
Conversely, there are also significant drawbacks generated by the dual-track system, such as social and
economic discrimination, and confusion about land property rights.
Regarding property rights, their management system undertook several changes over the past few decades
in China.
Back in 1962, the land property rights of rural collectives and peasants were very limited. A collective
could possess, use and benefit from the land ownership, but did not have the right to dispose of the land.
The peasants, as collective owners of the rural land, actually had only two clear rights. First, to use and
benefit from the very small amount of land assigned to them as private plots and housing sites (although
there were often restrictions on how they could use their own private plots). Second, to work on
collectively owned farmland. Only the state had full property rights of land ownership. This rural land
system was then continued until the introduction of the household production responsibility system in
1978, when the use rights of agricultural land were contracted by the collectives to individual farm
households. Rural land ownership remained collective even after the dismantling of the rural commune
system in 1983.
53
The open-door policy attracted to China many foreign investors, who asked not only for access to land
but also for a clearer definition of land property rights and better information about land use regulations.
The previous land management system, which prohibited the transaction on the land market, had,
therefore, to be modified to meet the interests of foreign investors.
Ambiguous property rights have also led to problems such as the emergence of an active and pervasive
black market for land conversion and transaction, especially in rural areas.
Theoretically, rural land is collectively owned, but it is confusing what ‘‘collective ownership’’ means. For
decades, collectives have made land use decisions in rural areas and often believed they had the rights to
dispose of the land when in fact they did not. Peasants may also believe they have full rights (possess,
use, benefit from, and dispose of) over the land they have contracted for, but, legally, their use rights and
related benefits are very limited. Together, ambiguous property rights and unfamiliarity with land use
regulations explain some of the illegal land conversion and transaction in the black market.
54
Overall, it should be noted that the socialist state apparently did not have a well-designed project or a
predetermined goal for institutional changes in land management. With a strategy known as "groping for
stones to cross the river” the Chinese state has acted as an evolving, indefinite, and dynamic organization
that is constantly confusedly oriented toward an unknown goal of socialist transformation.
55
In particular,
the state had to coordinate and reconcile some contradictory and paradoxical interests, such as fulfilling
foreign investors' demands for access to land with clearly defined land property rights without violating
the constitutional state's sole ownership with the highest authorities; increasing the efficiency of land use
without completely abandoning the socialist tradition of public and collective ownership in which land is
seen as a means of production for free allocation rather than a commodity for trading; promoting
industrialization and urbanization of rural areas without jeopardizing food security and environmental
sustainability.
56
52
Opper. “Dual-track Ownership Reforms: Lessons from Structural Change in China, 1978‐1997”, 205.
53
Lin and Ho. “The State, Land System, and Land Development Processes in Contemporary China”, 417.
54
Lin and Ho. ibid., 429.
55
Lin and Ho. ibid., 419.
56
Lin and Ho. ibid., 419.
21
The incomplete property right regime, which is a product of the dual-track land ownership system,
represented the ideal environment for the emergence of urban villages, as a spontaneous response to
rapid urban development. This dual system created incentives for rural people to join the urban sector
while simultaneously maintaining barriers to their entry, through instruments such as the Hukou system.
2.3 The chengzhongcun, or “villages in the city”
Chinese urban villages emerged as a phenomenon in areas experiencing rapid urbanization in the 1980s
and 1990s due to the high demand for new construction land by municipal governments and the
simultaneous relaxation of Hukou restrictions, which increased the number of rural-to-urban floating
people. Since these urban villages have separate status under the dual land system, instead of being
integrated by the urban sphere they are actually circumvented by formal urban development. For this
reason, in the Chinese language, the urban village is called chengzhongcun (城中村), which literally means
"village surrounded by the city".
Thus, chengzhongcun represent a form of incomplete urbanization that emerged from and that is sustained
by the collision of persistent rural land rights, state expropriation, and the denial of urban Hukou to
villagers and migrants.
57
In the beginning, to speed up the process of converting collective lands on the urban fringe, city
governments expropriated farmland but left housing plots in the village untouched to minimize
compensation costs and political resistance. For the most part, local villagers retained property rights
over their houses and their housing plots within village settlement.
Most of the original village residents have long ago turned to non-agricultural pursuits, built new houses,
and turned their older quarters into rental units for housing and other economic activities for rural
migrants who are excluded from the formal urban sector because of their Hukou. Due to their proximity
to urban areas and new development projects, many chengzhongcun have favorable locations but poor and
cheap infrastructure, making them attractive destinations for those who aspire to start living in the city,
especially for migrant workers. Therefore, the potential rental value of the villagers’ residential properties
increased significantly. Along with the relatively low cost of housing, most of the villagers launched an
energetic housing campaign.
58
Without planning and development control and stimulated by rental income, every villager tries to build
low-quality houses as high as possible. Thus, urban villages become concrete forests with a height of up
to twenty meters and a radius of several kilometers. They are not produced by the developers or by the
village collective, but by the individual families of the villagers. Overall, the urban village is characterized
by narrow streets, internal streets with shops, grocery stores, open-air markets, and underground factories.
59
Over the last two decades, chengzhongcun played a crucial role in the development of Chinese cities,
particularly in the Pearl River Delta. For Example, in Shenzhen there are approximately three hundred
57
Buckingham and Chan. “One City, Two Systems: Chengzhongcun in China’s Urban System”, 9.
58
Yuting Liu, Shenjing He, Fulong Wu, Chris Webster. “Urban villages under China’s rapid urbanization: Unregulated
assets and transitional neighbourhoods”, Habitat International 34 (2010): 137. Last access 1st April 2020. Doi:
10.1016/j.habitatint.2009.08.003
59
Juan, Du. “Shenzhen: Urban Myth of a New Chinese City”, Journal of Architectural Education, Vol.63(2), (March 2010): 66.
Last access 1st April 2020. Doi: 10.1111/j.1531-314X.2010.01060.x
22
villages, which are home to nearly half of the city's population, all clustered in an area of less than ten
percent of the city's territory.
60
Due to their overcrowded and disordered landscape, their unhealthy living environment and the resulting
social and security problems, urban villages in Chinese cities are widely condemned by the media,
government and even academic environment. They are usually associated with inadequate land use, poor
housing, serious lack of infrastructure, severe social disruption and deterioration in the urban context.
61
Although often associated, also by the public opinion, with physical and social problems, the urban village
is also believed to reduce the pressure of socio-economic development and urban poverty.
62
Chengzhongcun offer low-rent housing for rural migrants and also for some city dwellers, lowering the cost
of living in the city. Therefore, the existence of the urban village somewhat alleviates urban poverty.
As a semi-urbanized community, the urban village usually acts as a jumping-off place for the gradual
integration of the floating population into urban society. Indeed, chengzhongcun share the responsibility of
the city government to provide housing for migrants and allow the city to take advantage of cheap and
flexible labor lowering the risk of social instability. As a result, the urbanization process underway during
the reform period was relatively cheap and painless for the government. In this sense, the urban village
has positive functions not only in terms of housing for a large number of rural migrants but also in terms
of inclusion of areas with potential social instability.
63
In fact, despite the associated social problems, the urban village has a positive impact on calming social
conflicts under the rapid urbanization process and offers a survival strategy for local landless farmers and
low-cost shelter for migrant workers, who struggle in finding formal and stable employment.
Besides, the urban village not only remains a strong collective economy but also inherits the village
organization and social and cultural traditions. This enables chengzhongcun to become self-organized basic
units while government intervention and regulations are lacking.
64
As mentioned above, the subordinate status of chengzhongcun in today’s Chinese urban landscape and that
of migrants in the social landscape are products of China’s rural-urban dual system. Chinese urban villages
are structured on this dualism and, in turn, preserve the gap between rural and urban administrations.
65
The legal division of the Chinese population into "rural" and "urban" categories had two main effects on
the formation of chengzhongcun. First, this created a tax disincentive for urban governments to include the
surrounding villages in their jurisdiction since it would have made them responsible for the infrastructure,
sanitation, security, and education of the surrounding villages. At present, most villages are expected to
be self-sufficient. In practice, even if chengzhongcun are included within the city limits and therefore are de
facto urban, they remain rural de jure, and they operate as separate entities from the city governments so
that they are responsible for their own urban services such as the police, schools and garbage disposal.
Second, the use of the Hukou system to classify and exclude the floating population from urban benefits,
particularly access to affordable housing, pushes millions of migrant workers to take advantage of the
unregulated housing market in chengzhongcun throughout the country.
66
In urban villages, the city government, on the one hand, accepts the existence of unclear property rights
from which villagers and the collective benefit, while on the other, it avoids its responsibility for public
60
Buckingham and Chan, ibid., 2.
61
Liu; He; Wu; Webster. “Urban villages under China’s rapid urbanization: Unregulated assets and transitional
neighbourhoods”, 136.
62
Liu; He; Wu; Webster, ibid., 136.
63
Liu; He; Wu; Webster, ibid., 138.
64
Liu; He; Wu; Webster, ibid., 143.
65
Miao Li. “Demolition of Chengzhongcun and social mobility of Migrant youth: a case study in Beijing.” Eurasian Geography
and Economics (August 2018): 4. Last access 1st April 2020. Doi: 10.1080/15387216.2018.1503966
66
Buckingham and Chan. “One City, Two Systems: Chengzhongcun in China’s Urban System”, 6.
23
utility and social welfare provision under these indistinct property rights. In other words, by implicitly
recognizing unclear property rights, the government avoids regulatory costs and social responsibility,
while foregoing some profits (such as land, rental tax, etc.). Thus, this makes the village collective to
become a self-organized unit taking care of its own interests and carrying out the role for which the city
government should be responsible. However, without the support of a wide range of public sectors, the
self-organized management in the urban village is not very efficient.
67
To sum up, in the urban village, where the rules are unclear and ambiguous, it is quite easy to let instability
arise. First of all, the multiple features of the urban village are the result of the dichotomy of the rural-
urban system and excessive expansion of the city. The institution of land requisition generates the
isolation of the urban village in terms of physical forms and institutional regulations. Second, the creation
of urban villages involves both transactions related to property rights and negotiations between different
interest groups based on uncertain rules. The formation of the urban village shows how different interest
groups (the city government, the collective village and the inhabitants of local villages) protect their
interests through negotiations and conflicts. On the one hand, the city government agrees to the existence
of unclear property rights so that the villagers and the collective can make a profit; on the other hand, it
avoids its responsibility regarding management and social security due to these vague property rights.
Third, traditional social norms and social networks in urban villages do not disappear immediately after
urbanization.
68
2.4 The ongoing process of demolition of the urban villages
As a clear obstacle to the explosive expansion of the surrounding cities, after years of negotiation, delay,
and protest, chengzhongcun across China are undergoing demolition and redevelopment at the hands of
municipal officials and real estate developers. Specific strategies and approaches to chengzhongcun
elimination have varied across provinces and even within individual cities, but they share a common
feature. Rather than transcend rural-urban division, redevelopment of chengzhongcun has occurred
predominantly within the framework of the dual system.
69
In official speeches, the removal of chengzhongcun is supposed to improve the standards of living of regular
urban citizens and therefore allowing long-term sustainable economic development. One of the reasons
why governments at all levels are determined to demolish the urban villages is to prevent the social
problems that threaten public security and to control the population. In addition, tearing down
chengzhongcun to build commodity housing and to develop profitable industries will increase local
government revenue.
70
When the government decides to proceed with the demolition of an urban village, it first buys the
property rights from the original inhabitants of the village. Those who agreed to transfer their land rights
received a large sum of money in compensation to sell their properties, transforming the former farmers
into the new rich: some villagers even reached the ranks of RMB millionaires, but the thousands of
displaced migrants who heavily depend on chengzhongcun’s accommodations and therefore had little or no
housing alternatives, had been excluded from the social housing system and abandoned by the market,
making their commutes longer and harder, in some cases even impossible. The demolition is made even
67
Liu; He; Wu; Webster. “Urban villages under China’s rapid urbanization: Unregulated assets and transitional
neighbourhoods”, 139.
68
Liu; He; Wu; Webster, ibid., 144.
69
Buckingham and Chan. “One City, Two Systems: Chengzhongcun in China’s Urban System”, 4.
70
Li, “Demolition of Chengzhongcun and social mobility of Migrant youth: a case study in Beijing”, 3.
24
easier by the informal way in which urban villages have grown, with many tenants having no paperwork
or agreements to use as a protest against eviction.
The second stage is the final conversion of the residential plots into state-owned urban land. Village
houses are demolished to make room for skyscrapers and commercial buildings; The original villagers
receive a local urban Hukou and are housed in the newly built apartments. As the city expands outward
to approach new farmland, new chengzhongcun naturally arise and the cycle continues. While migrant
workers are forced to leave the village looking for affordable housing, villagers in the chengzhongcun remain
in their village to become landlords to migrant workers and entrepreneurs.
71
Urban villages are also spaces that create opportunities to climb the social ladder, therefore their
elimination leads to several undesirable social consequences. Since the destruction does not take into
account the life chances of rural migrants whom de facto live in the urban villages, its effects impact on
the development of the social mobility of migrant workers.
The demolition of the chengzhongcun prevents them from accumulating capital and creating more
permanent roots in the destination city, which are necessary for the social growth, not only of the workers
but also of their children.
For example, for those who want to achieve social mobility through school success, the impending
demolition of urban villages has worsened the already inferior education of young migrants, as the profit-
oriented school owners have no incentive to continue investing in schools. For those who want to thrive
in the informal economy, the removal of chengzhongcun does not allow migrant families to keep their small
businesses through which they succeed to live in the city, and through which the younger generation
planned to build a new future.
72
In conclusion, the lack of state regulation in the urban village provides a means of subsistence for landless
villagers and affordable housing for migrants. Therefore, the transformation of the urban village under
state regulation would be complicated. The strategy of demolition and reconstruction fails in solving the
housing problem for rural migrants, it does not integrate local villagers into urban society, and therefore
does not overcome the social and economic problems brought by the dual system.
To redevelop urban villages, some aspects need to be recognized. First, the problems in chengzhongcun
should not be exaggerated. The urban village has played a large part in easing the pressure of urbanization
and should, therefore, be allowed a moderate tolerance of its existing problems. The rising problems of
social order and governance are the costs that have to be paid for rapid urbanization. In order to reduce
these costs, the key is to promote and guide the existing self-organized grassroots units in the urban
village.
73
2.5 Final considerations
To sum up, the Hukou is not only a powerful means of population control, but it also proves to be a
useful economic instrument, as evidenced by the fact that the majority of the reforms it has undergone
throughout history have been economic-driven, supporting the various stages of Chinese economic
development.
At the same time, the barriers erected by the Hukou system created a significant division between the
rural and urban spheres and represented the root of the dual-track land ownership system.
71
Buckingham and Chan. “One City, Two Systems: Chengzhongcun in China’s Urban System”, 11.
72
Li, “Demolition of Chengzhongcun and social mobility of Migrant youth: a case study in Beijing”, 16.
73
Buckingham and Chan, ibid., 2.
25
During the period of rapid urbanization growth in big cities, the Hukou and the dual-track system jointly
contributed to the formation of chengzhongcun, which are the expression of a particular kind of incomplete
urbanization. These urban villages have crucial economic and social functions and are symbols of China’s
labor-intensive and export-oriented industry.
As big cities develop, and structures of industries moved out to less developed areas, the local government,
developers and villagers all reached deals to demolish the old houses to build brand new residences to
meet the needs of the rising middle class.
Even if often perceived as a problem, floating population appears to be a useful resource. In particular,
the internal immigration management of the PRC could be part of a strategy that aims to achieve three
main goals.
First, the modernization and complete urbanization of the major Chinese cities (in particular Shenzhen,
Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou). Although the chengzhongcun have been key drivers for the economic
growth of these cities, having already reached an advanced stage of development makes these cities much
less dependent on the cheap labor provided by migrant workers. Consequently, the progressive loss of
this workforce, caused by the demolition of urban villages, is considered sustainable and acceptable in
exchange for the release of what is perceived by many as urban "decay". These cities prefer to concentrate
on attracting highly qualified migrants to pursue an advanced type of development, for example, focusing
on cutting-edge technologies and service-oriented industries.
Second, the progressive development of small and medium-sized cities. Through the recent relaxation of
urban Hukou granted since 2019 in all the Chinese small and medium-sized cities, the authorities may
aspire to use these cities, which are still in a stage of economic development prior to the advanced one
of the big cities, as "magnets" for migrant workers who presumably will no longer be able to live in the
major cities. Unlike these, medium-sized cities could make great use of the low-cost labor provided by
migrants.
Third, the achievement of the stated goal of 2017 to reach 70% of urban citizens by 2030.
74
Although
measures such as the demolition of the chengzhongcun may seem in contradiction with this goal, it should
be noted that this percentage refers to regular urban dwellers, and therefore unlike the inhabitants of
urban villages, with an urban Hukou. Consequently, the eventual escape of migrant workers from large
cities would not affect the current share of urban inhabitants, on the contrary, if these migrants will
converge in medium-sized cities, they would have more opportunities to obtain a regular urban Hukou
relatively easily, approaching thus more the number of urban inhabitants towards the set goal.
The following chapter will further investigate the matter of chengzhongcun, and in particular examine the
case study conducted in the urban village of Baishizhou in Shenzhen, discussing the point of view of
migrant workers on the previously analysed issues.
74
The World Bank Development Research of the State Council, The People’s Republic of China. “Urban China. Toward
efficient, inclusive, and sustainable urbanization.” (2017). Last access 1st April 2020.
https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/EAP/China/WEB-Urban-China.pdf
26
3. Case study: the redevelopment project of Shenzhen’s Baishizhou urban village
Introduction
This third chapter will focus on the research question "How does Baishizhou’s redevelopment policy
affect the lives of the villagers?” In order to answer this question, a case study conducted among the
migrant workers of the urban village of Baishizhou, in Shenzhen, will be analysed. Besides, the fieldwork
research also aims to provide an empirical presentation of the chengzhongcun, the spaces created by the
urbanization process typical of China, focusing on how they are perceived by its residents, which mostly
consist of rural-to-urban floating population.
First, a brief history of the city of Shenzhen will be presented, in order to understand the stages of its
impressive growth and the reasons that, since the early 1980s, have made it one of the most popular
destinations for domestic migrants in China.
Second, the chapter will focus on the history and the features of Baishizhou urban village, the site of the
case study.
Afterwards, the case study will be analysed. Firstly, the methodology of the field research will be presented.
Then, the subsequent paragraph will explore the spaces and the physical features of the site to provide
an empirical framework of the case study’s location. Lastly, the interviews carried out with the migrant
workers of Baishizhou will be analysed.
The presentation of the interviews will be focused on the research question, through the analysis of the
residents’ opinions about the Baishizhou ongoing redevelopment project, the main issues they will face,
and their plans for the future after the incoming demolition, in order not only to provide the usually
overlooked perspective of the chengzhongcun inhabitants but also to explore the consequences that they
will face after their impending displacement.
3.1 The growth of Shenzhen
Shenzhen is considered to be one of the first Chinese cities to adapt to a more capitalist approach in a
centrally controlled land management system. To understand the complexity of Shenzhen's urban
structure, a background analysis of Shenzhen's economic growth and urban development will be
conducted.
The expansion of the city began with the creation of the first Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in 1980,
which allowed Shenzhen to gradually develop from a fishing village to the megacity as it is known today.
The growth exceeded all major cities in China in the 80s and 90s and outpaced its own planned level
several times.
75
From a small border town with a few thousand inhabitants Shenzhen became a large and
dynamic city that in 2018 had over 13 million residents, of whom over 57% belong to the floating
population.
76
75
Ya Ping, Wang; Yanglin, Wang; Jiansheng, Wu. “Urbanization and Informal Development in China: Urban Villages in
Shenzhen.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 33 (4) (2009): 959. Doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2427.2009.00891.x
76
Shenzhen Bureau of Statistics 2018, Last access 19th May 2020.
27
When Shenzhen was chosen as one of the Chinese SEZs, the city adopted a freer market-oriented
economy, a more liberal policy, and more flexible government measures. Shenzhen SEZ was one of the
first and most successful of these areas to attract domestic and foreign investments.
Urban development in the SEZ area is largely led by the government based on State land. State land has
been widely used as collateral to finance high-level infrastructure construction. Land use rights are leased
to land users such as developers and firms in the market. Most of the original collective farmland in the
SEZ area was converted and developed for urban use until the mid-2000s. A majority of the built-up area
was developed based on State land, resulting from a State-led urban development model.
77
Moreover, the emphasis placed on the export-oriented industry has made Shenzhen an important
production center. The city became an industrial manufacturing zone. Later, with the rapid change in the
regional economy, Shenzhen has become an attractive center for the third service sector industry, which
supports the regional manufacturing economy of the large Pearl River Delta region.
Since Deng Xiaoping announced in Shenzhen the opening-up policies that launched China's "socialist
market economy", the city has become one of the representative cases of the new megacities in China
and it is a target for numerous experiments concerning urban development.
Migration played an important role in the urbanization process and the expansion of Shenzhen. The city
began its extraordinary development at the time of the maximum increase of migration flows throughout
China. Processing plants, industrial workshops, and factories set up through foreign direct investments
from Hong Kong and other countries quickly attracted large numbers of migrants from across the
country. Due to their lower-income level, migrants' demand for housing was very different from that of
other city residents. Older and smaller houses in poor areas with substandard internal structures and low-
quality facilities were their only option. Local villages located in the urban-rural interface zones and near
major development sites thus became homes for most rural migrants.
78
There are some unique features of Shenzhen that have enabled the city to become the primary choice for
a large portion of the floating population, such as its proximity to Hong Kong, which has determined its
SEZ designation and the practice of an export-oriented industrial economy. The city's rapid development
was based on negotiated collaboration with local farmers in land expropriation, which not only enabled
them to maintain their residential land but also gave them the possibility to become landowners and to
develop housing for livelihoods. The city's successful economic growth is made possible by the
unprecedented influx of migrant workers, which creates a steadily increasing demand for affordable
housing, that is mainly available in urban villages.
79
77
Yani, Lai; Edwin, Hon Wan Chan; Lennon, Choy. “Village-led land development under state-led institutional
arrangements in urbanising China: The Case of Shenzhen.” Urban Studies 54 (7) (2017): 1747. Doi:
10.1177/0042098016629325
78
Wang; Wang; Wu. “Urbanization and Informal Development in China: Urban Villages in Shenzhen.”, 959
79
Pu, Hao; Pieter, Hooimeijer; Richard, Sliuzas; Stan, Geertman. “What Drives the Spatial Development of Urban Villages
in China?” Urban Studies 50 (16) (2013): 3407. Doi: 10.1177/0042098013484534
28
Figure 1. The current spatial layout of the administrative districts of Shenzhen, with the location of Baishizhou Urban Village, the site
of the case study, marked out. (Source: Johan Backholm, “Urban Redevelopment in Shenzhen, China”).
When the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone was established, the new government took a gradual
approach to acquire land for development from local villages. The new civic center and other important
public buildings were planned on new agricultural land, while the traditional villages were left intact.
Roads and other infrastructure projects also avoided village houses. Since the new government was small
and financially weak, it was difficult for it to offer job opportunities to all the local villagers. These simple
village houses were not intended to cause problems for future renovation projects. In Futian district,
where the new city center is located, it is possible to easily identify a ring of traditional villages surrounding
the center of the modern city. With the intensification of urban development and the removal of more
land from agricultural production, these traditional villages have gradually become urban villages. Village-
led land development has been extensive and has resulted in a large number of urban villages in Shenzhen,
which exceeds formal urban areas developed based on State land ownership. In 2019, according to the
site of Shenzhen local government, there were 437 urban villages in Shenzhen.
80
Although the land
property rights regime under the dual land ownership system imposed severe institutional constraints on
the development of urban villages, they have actually played a much more important and diversified role
in the urbanisation process than previously recognised.
81
The urban villages of Shenzhen were not created simultaneously. Villages in different places have
transformed at different times. From 1979 to 1992, the city government focused on developing new areas,
and local villages had to find their own way of adapting to the changing environment. Very limited
planning control was applied in these villages. At the same time, the government was gradually taking
land from farmers and, in response, farmers shifted their focus from food production to property renting.
They extended the residential area of the village into the nearby agricultural land. Both the government
and the villagers considered land as the most important resource. Competition between them has led to
stronger government intervention. In 1992, the city government decided to "urbanize" rural areas and
villages within the SEZ. The village committees (rural local organizations) were abolished and replaced
by neighbourhood committees (the corresponding urban local organizations); The Hukou status of local
farmers was changed from agricultural to non-agricultural. Production teams were transformed into
80
Shenzhen Government Online, 2019, http://www.sz.gov.cn/en_szgov/news/latest/content/post_1370625.html, last
access: 27th May 2020.
81
Lai; Hon Wan Chan; Choy. “Village-led land development under state-led institutional arrangements in urbanising China:
The Case of Shenzhen.”, 1744.
29
shareholding companies and village residents became shareholders. These mandatory changes gave local
villagers some financial benefits and the right to access urban social and economic services. In return, the
government took control of all the land within the SEZ. It also acquired the right to develop the
remaining agricultural land and the right of planning control over village residential land. Urban villages
outside the SEZ have undergone a similar shift from agriculture to industrial and real estate development
but have undergone a longer period of self-regulation, since they have been less exposed to rapid urban
development.
82
In Shenzhen, and the whole Pearl River Delta region, the importance of urban villages is evident in the
impressive size of land use, the large number of houses that were built in a very short time, and the
millions of migrant workers living in them. The physical growth of urban villages during 1999–2009 was
striking, contributing to an increase in total floor space of 105 million square metres, far above the 58
million square metres floor space of completed commodity housing
83
. Urban villages also offer cheap
spaces and facilities for small businesses and industries. Many of the so-called world factories are actually
located in these villages. Indeed, rapid and flexible economic growth is based on these less regulated and
informally developed properties. Without these urban villages, there would likely have been no economic
miracles in the region.
To sum up, the city of Shenzhen is the earliest example of a Special Economic Zone in China. As an
experimental district for the socialist’s market economy for the country, the city is a pioneer of China’s
opening-up reforms. Thus, reform-related problems and phenomena often emerged first in Shenzhen,
and then followed in other Chinese cities. The city is therefore an ideal case for research to understand
China’s social and economic development and transition. In fact, Shenzhen is a migrant city where the
migrant population outweighs the permanent residents. The growth of the city has been impressive
concerning both population and urban land, which expanded from 20km² in 1983 to 1997km² in 2020
84
.
Emerged as a consequence of this growth, urban villages, which house most of the migrants, play a vital
role in the housing market and in providing shelter for the floating population. Moreover, Shenzhen is
among the first group of cities that introduced and implemented rigid and comprehensive plans to
redevelop these urban villages.
85
82
Wang; Wang; Wu. “Urbanization and Informal Development in China: Urban Villages in Shenzhen.”, 959
83
Shenzhen Statistics Bureau 2010. Last access 19th May 2020.
84
Shenzhen Government Online, http://english.sz.gov.cn/aboutsz/profile/201907/t20190704_18035388.htm. Last access
19th May 2020.
85
Zhou Hang, “Redevelopment of Urban Village in Shenzhen.” (Master thesis, University of Massachussetts, 2014).
30
3.2 History and features of Baishizhou urban village
Figure 2. Drone photo showing an aerial view of Baishizhou urban village. In the background the copy of the Eiffel Tower symbol of
the "Windows of the World" amusement park, green parks, and modern residential complexes can be seen. It is noticeable that t he
boundaries of Baishizhou are very clear and delimited. (Source: the author).
Baishizhou, the site of the case study, is one of several urban villages that are currently involved in a
redevelopment project in Shenzhen. This chengzhongcun is centrally located in Nanshan district, between
the amusement parks Happy Valley and Window of the World, golf courses, high-end shopping malls,
and upper-middle-class residential areas. The village is therefore situated in an advantageous location that
can boast an excellent connection to the rest of the city thanks to metro stations, buses, and the main
road Shennan Avenue passing through it. In 2013, before some sections began to be demolished, it was
the largest urban village in the central part of Shenzhen, occupying a total area of 7.4 km² and hosting
approximately 140,000 people
86
. Since most of the residents are migrant workers that come from almost
every province of China, only about 20,000, which is around 14% of the total population have a local
Hukou from Shenzhen, and just in 1880 are original members of the village.
87
The area that makes up Baishizhou today consists of five original villages that, before the opening-up
reforms, under Mao, worked together as the Shahe State Farm in agricultural production by growing rice,
lychee, and oysters. After the foundation of the Shenzhen SEZ, the Shahe-Farm created new structures
for the manufacturing industry. However, in the mid-1980s, the land destined to these manufacturing
enterprises was divided between Shahe (now Baishizhou) and a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) called
Overseas Chinese Town (located at the east of today’s Baishizhou). The Overseas Chinese Town, which
had stronger management and financial capital, developed into an important land developer, investor,
and electronic company. Baishizhou, on the other hand, was administered by former village chiefs and
86
Mary Ann O’Donnell, Learning from Shenzhen: China’s Post-Mao Experiment from Special Zone to Model City (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 2017), 119.
87
O’Donnell, Learning from Shenzhen: China’s Post-Mao Experiment from Special Zone to Model City, 119.
31
continued to produce on a small scale, but also began building residential rental houses on their land in
the late 1980s. The morphology from rural to urban village was intensified in the 90s and Baishizhou is
today a clearly urban district with small traces of its rural past.
88
Figure 3. The main street of Baishizhou. (Source: the author)
However, like other urban villages, Baishizhou still functions as a transition point between rural and
urban areas due to its high proportion of migrant workers. This is evident in the great mixture of local
cuisines served in restaurants, street food stands, open-air markets, and small shops of every kind located
in the narrow lanes that separate the tall and crumbling buildings. Since rent prices are relatively cheap
compared to the surrounding areas, Baishizhou offers affordable housing, social networks, and also
opportunities for economic and entrepreneurial activities, representing the ideal shelter for migrants
starting life in Shenzhen, their destination city.
89
Baishizhou has been chosen as the area for the case study based on the following considerations. First,
the village has been scheduled by the city government for complete redevelopment since 2014; however,
the majority of Baishizhou has not yet been demolished and continues to be a vibrant district for people
living in and outside of the chengzhongcun. The village of Baishizhou is, therefore, an ideal example for
research about migrants who are at risk of impending displacement. Second, due to the location
advantage, Baishizhou has a more diverse social composition compared to other chengzhongcun in
Shenzhen. As a result of the consequent high accessibility, this village has attracted thousands of migrants
with different socio-demographic characteristics and from different provinces.
88
Johan Backholm, “Urban Redevelopment in Shenzhen, China” (Master thesis, KTH Royal Institute of Technology,
Stockholm, 2019), 26
89
Johan Backholm, ibid., 27
32
3.3 Methodology of the case study
To deepen the study of chengzhongcun, field interviews were conducted with the migrant workers of
Baishizhou, in order to complement the theoretical analysis with a bottom-up perspective by those who
live there. In particular, the fieldwork aims to answer the research question: "How does Baishizhou's
redevelopment policy affect the lives of the villagers?" Therefore, the interviews have the purpose to
discover the perceptions about the redevelopment project and the consequences of the demolition from
the point of view of the inhabitants of Baishizhou.
The overall research method that was chosen for this thesis is the qualitative case study since it is suited
for bringing out the individual perceptions and experiences concerning the main topics of life in the
urban village and the impending displacement.
Interviews seemed to be a suitable method because they allow asking open-ended questions to a small
sample and exploring individual experiences and opinions regarding the researched phenomenon. In
particular, the semi-structured interview format had been chosen because having a set of questions
prepared ahead of time allowed the interviewer to be more confident in starting the conversation, and at
the same time, also allowed informants the freedom to express their views in their own terms, often
adding relevant information and personal experience.
The field research of this study was carried out in Baishizhou on two different occasions: in December
2017 and in December 2019. In total, twenty-one interviews were conducted, ten in 2017 and eleven in
2019, for a total of twenty-five informants (this discrepancy is because in some interviews there were
multiple respondents at the same time, alternating in giving the answers). Further data about the
participants are presented in appendix 2, and exemplary interview transcripts can be found in appendix
3.
The interviews took place in the informants' workplaces. In many cases they were small restaurants,
convenience stores, food stands or shops, other times they were conducted directly on the street.
All the interviews were conducted in Mandarin Chinese by the author. The interviews of 2019 were audio-
recorded, while in 2017 notetaking was done by a Chinese native. Afterwards, the interviews were
transcribed and translated into English by the author in order to make them accessible and analysable.
Among the interviews of 2019 only two people preferred not to be recorded, in that case the notetaking
process has been done by the author.
In general, the first questions asked to the participants were very simple and straightforward and were
meant to get to know their native place, their reason for migration, and also to evaluate their level of
satisfaction with both Shenzhen and Baishizhou. Additional qualitative data that emerged from these
questions, which can provide a supplementary framework of life in the chengzhongcun, are presented in
appendix 1.
In continuing the interview, people had different reactions, basically dividing themselves between those
who provided short answers and those who instead took advantage of it to start a more in-depth
discussion on the topic. The main themes covered were the opinions of the participants about the
redevelopment project of Baishizhou, the consequences that they will face, and their plans for the future
after its definitive demolition. The division of the empirical paragraph in three sections reflects these
three themes.
In total, five people refused to do the interview. Although not giving a specific reason for the refusal, the
cause can easily be attributed to the strangeness of the situation; in fact, it is not frequent for the
inhabitants of the chengzhongcun to ha
ve discussions, or even to just meet, foreign people, who usually have no reason to be in the urban village.
33
In general, however, the informants proved to be very open, well disposed of, friendly and curious in
taking part in the interviews. Some of them showed sincere interest and, sometimes, even gratitude for
having had the opportunity to discuss their life with a foreigner who comes from far away. Therefore,
the general feeling during the interviews was of curiosity at the beginning, and then very informal. In
most cases, this relaxed atmosphere certainly helped both the interviewer and the participants to open
up.
In the analysis of the interviews, the informants are referred to by pseudonyms, since asking their real
names would not only have been of little significance but would also have increased the diffidence
towards the interviewer, risking compromising the formation of an informal atmosphere.
Moreover, ethnographic observations were carried out in Baishizhou with the aim of exploring the social
life and the environment of this urban village, and also of comparing the different conditions of the
chengzhongcun two years after the first visit of the author. Since the object of the observations was the daily
routine, it has been useful to take part into ordinary activities such as walking in the narrow streets of the
village, shopping, eating in its small restaurants or street food stands, and also getting to the roof of the
buildings where migrants live, in order to get another perspective on the spaces which characterize
Baishizhou. Photographic material has been taken by the author to provide the reader with a better
understanding of the spaces where the study took place.
Lastly, a few limitations of this research should be pointed out.
First, the relatively small sample of interviews, on the one hand, was enough to get an idea of the most
popular opinions among the inhabitants and to listen to a good number of interesting testimonials, but
on the other hand, it is not enough to draw up an accurate profile of the socio-demographic composition
of the village population. Moreover, since the analysed sample is characterized by remarkable
heterogeneity, the findings of the research cannot be extended to the entirety of the case study. The study
should therefore be considered as a piece of explorative research for future analyses.
Second, in some cases the speed of the informants’ speech or their dialectal variations compromised the
speed of understanding and the consequent responsiveness of the interviewer. In these cases, a more
advanced listening ability in the Chinese language of the interviewer would have been useful to investigate
further some issues that emerged during the conversations.
3.4 The current condition of Baishizhou: description of the village
The main thing that catches the eye of a visitor who is about to cross the gates of Baishizhou for the first
time is the striking contrast between the surrounding landscape, consisting mainly of tall skyscrapers,
gleaming technology companies, and modern shopping centers, and the more modest and crumbling
typical buildings of urban villages. The contrast escalates when walking on the main road of the
chengzhongcun. The busy streets of Baishizhou, its street vendors, the messy outdoor markets, and the
ruined clinics for migrants represent a completely different world than the orderly, technological, and
clean one of the rest of the city.
Being home to migrants coming from almost every Chinese province, wandering through its streets
means exploring the mix of cultures that Baishizhou has represented since its formation.
34
In 2017 the population of Baishizhou was estimated to be around 140,000 inhabitants, amassed in an
area equal to 7.4 km².
90
The high population density can be guessed from the massive presence of the so-
called handshake buildings (woshoulou 握手楼). These buildings are called this way since the distance
between each other is so small that it is potentially possible for the residents of the two buildings to shake
hands from the windows. Looking at them from the outside, it could be easily imagined that they are
inhabited by lots of people, however, the interior of these buildings is even more impressive. Each
building has many floors, and in each of these there are numerous apartments characterized by narrow
entrance doors and a very low ceiling.
Comparing the 2017 visit and the 2019 visit, some differences can be pointed out. Although the main
road of the village has remained fundamentally unchanged, a certain number of stores that were present
in 2017 were replaced by other activities in 2019.
Moreover, some of the outermost portions of the urban village have already been demolished and now
appear as construction sites, while at the same time, even in the most central streets, the buildings on
which the character 拆 chai (or 拆迁 chaiqian) was painted, have increased considerably. These characters
literally mean destruction and are therefore placed on buildings intended to be destroyed and which must
consequently be cleared as soon as possible. These significant differences in the relatively small period of
two years should not be surprising since change is one of the constant features of the urban village, and
it is therefore normal for its streetscape to be in continuous evolution.
90
O’Donnel, Learning from Shenzhen: China’s Post-Mao Experiment from Special Zone to Model City, 119.
Figure 4. A bottom view, a top view and an interior view of a woshoulou
握手楼
. The first two different perspectives show that
“handshake-building” is not just an expression, but it literally describes this kind of architecture typical of chengzhongcun. Inside,
every floor is filled with apartments. For example, on the floor of the third photo there are four apartments sharing the narrow
space. (Source: the author)
35
Figure 5. The word chaiqian
拆迁
painted on the shutters means that those shops will soon be destroyed. (Source: the author)
Even if it is complicated to have access to official and reliable data concerning the population of
Baishizhou, empirical considerations could be made to find feedback regarding some data. Wang Zhigang,
a student from Shenzhen University but living in Baishizhou with his parents originally from Chaozhou
(Guangdong), claims that at present around 100,000 people are living in the chengzhongcun. In an
environment such as the urban village, in which residents often avoid appearing in censuses and where
the concept of residence itself is rather blurry, it is difficult to obtain reliable data. However, this
significant decrease in population compared to the 140,000 of 2017, which would be a symptom of the
upcoming demolition plan, could be considered realistic. For example, looking at the buildings from the
roof of a tall house at night, it can be noted that a large portion of the chengzhongcun has all the lights
completely off. This dark mass means that a very huge part of the village buildings has already been
cleared, leading thus to a decrease of the resident population compared to the past years.
3.5 Perceptions of Baishizhou residents about the redevelopment project
Because of their association with low-standard housing and an unhealthy and unsafe living environment,
chengzhongcun are perceived as undesirable places by officials and many citizens. The disapproval expressed
by formal urban citizens with the urban villages creates strong political pressure on the local government,
which is sensitive to the social consequences of urban disorder and a negative image of the city. In
Shenzhen, an urban village redevelopment program was first introduced in 2005, called the Master Plan
of Urban Village Redevelopment 2005–2010. This program had the purpose of redeveloping about 10%
of urban villages by 2010 and, conclusively, achieving a ‘city without urban villages’ through
redevelopment in the longer-term.
91
91
Hao, Sliuzas, Geertman. “What Drives the Spatial Development of Urban Villages in China?”, 2183
36
Later, in 2017, as per Shenzhen’s regulations, the Nanshan District government posted on the official
website of Shenzhen Planning and Land Bureau the document “Public Presentation of Urban Renewal
Planning for the Five Shahe Villages in Shahe Neighbourhood Unit, Nanshan District”. The document
contained two site plans for the Baishizhou area, indicating the redevelopment boundary and revealing
that the existing buildings on 459,500 square meters of land were set to be demolished.
92
This impressive plan delayed to be implemented, mostly because of the difficulties of negotiation between
the three main stakeholders. As explained in the previous chapter, the redevelopment of urban villages
is a complex process in which three main actors (the local government, developers, and original villagers)
compete for their own advantage. In the process, the migrants, even if they form the largest group of
residents in urban villages, are excluded from any decision-making activity. To have a comprehensive
view of this phenomenon it is essential to understand their opinions and feelings about this plan, which
definitely has a strong impact on their life.
Overall, all the participants were aware of the ongoing redevelopment project and its scope, although it
is possible to find differences between the answers given in 2017, in which the demolition was perceived
as a possibility, and those of 2019, in which it was already considered a certainty. The most common
intention for the aftermath of the demolition, which is shared by almost every informant, is that in order
to remain in the city, it is mandatory to find accommodation in another urban village, otherwise, they will
be forced to come back to their hometown.
Figure 6. The demolition in the outermost point of the village has already begun. The picture shows three different buildings that
represent three stages of urbanization. In the background, there is a relatively new palace which does not belong to the
chengzhongcun. Closer, a typical building belonging to the urban village could be seen, while the building on the foreground has
already been demolished. (Source: the author)
92
Du Juan, The Shenzhen Experiment: the Story of China’s Instant City (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2020), 301
37
Starting from the qualitative data collected, it is possible to identify three main themes on the Baishizhou
redevelopment policy: the villagers' stance on the project, the damage suffered by the villagers, and their
plans for the future.
3.5.1 Villagers’ stance on the redevelopment project
The way in which a respondent feels about the redevelopment plan strongly depends on how they are
directly influenced by the demolition and the consequent eviction.
Residents who are in a beneficial condition, because for example have already bought a house outside
the urban village, even express their support for the project, considering it advantageous to the
development of the city.
This is the case of Zhao Benshang and Xu Shuren, a couple in their fifties from the northern province
of Liaoning, who have been running a scratch card shop for over 20 years. They praise the efficiency and
modernity of Shenzhen and say they are happy and lucky that the redevelopment project will be
implemented when they had just managed to buy a house outside the chengzhongcun.
Chen Guanxi, an eighteen-year-old student in a zhixiao 职校 (a kind of vocational school), not only does
he say being in favour of the redevelopment plan, but he even hopes that the chengzhongcun will be
demolished. This viewpoint is clearly influenced by his negative opinion about the urban village and by
his favourable familiar economic situation.
He tells of how his parents arrived in the city from Zhanjiang (Guangdong) more than fifteen years ago
when Shenzhen was at the height of job opportunities. In that context, his parents managed to start a
successful business.
Probably due to this beneficial condition, Chen Guanxi's opinions regarding Shenzhen and urban villages
differ greatly from those of most of the other informants.
For example, not only does he say that he loves Shenzhen, but he also considers it the best city in China
to live in and does not believe that the prices are too high, finding them "acceptable". On the contrary,
he has an extremely negative opinion about the chengzhongcun, which in no uncertain terms he judges
"dirty", "ugly", "unsafe" and not "in line" with the rest of the city. He later explains that his parents have
already bought a house outside of the urban village and that the only reason they still live here is because
of its proximity to his school, so in any case, he will still live in the chengzhongcun for a short time.
Some respondents believe that although the demolition represents undoubtedly an inconvenience, they
will not be particularly affected, claiming to feel sufficiently protected to cope with the situation and
showing a certain degree of optimism.
This belief is shared by the sanitation workers interviewed, for example, both Li Peiquan and Wang Li,
two road sweepers in their fifties, who arrived in Shenzhen from Hunan about ten years ago, are quite
positive about the possibility of receiving financial support from the local government due to their status
of public workers.
Even if they explain that working in the chengzhongcun is far more demanding than in the rest of the city
for their type of work, as the environment is much dirtier, and that they usually face exhausting shifts
lasting more than ten hours, since their shift ends only when they have finished cleaning all the roads
they are entitled to, they have a positive opinion of the urban village, and thus they hope that the
demolition project will not go through.
In fact, Wang Li states that the chengzhongcun not only is a good place for migrants because very united
communities are developing within it, but above all because it is the only area in the city where the renting
costs are affordable. He adds that although they now do a more humble job than their previous ones in
38
Hunan, the salary is much higher, and allows, albeit with a little effort, especially regarding the rent, to
cope with the high prices of the city, but only as long as they manage to live in the village. They lastly say
that if the aid they expect from the local government will not be enough, they would return to their
hometown for the inability to afford rents outside the urban village.
Also Guan Liying, another road sweeper of Baishizhou came from Meizhou (Guangdong) eleven years
ago, says she is not particularly worried about losing her job. "Since we are sanitation workers, we have
to sweep as long as the road is still here" (“因为我们是环卫，只要路还在我们就还要扫”), adding
that her employer will provide her with housing.
She continues saying "Even if I'm not a Shenzhen native I would definitely want to live here after having
been in the city all this time, after all, if you came to Shenzhen you are from Shenzhen, right?". Guan
Liying is mentioning the slogan "来了，就是深圳人" (laile, jiu shi shenzhenren), which literally means “as
soon as you arrive, you are a Shenzhener”. This slogan was used years ago by the local government to
attract people from the rest of China during the early period of the city’s growth.
Trust in the city is a reason to be hopeful about the future also for Yang Ouxiao, a twenty-year-old girl
from Chaozhou (Guangdong) who arrived in Shenzhen two years ago with her parents to find a job, and
who now sells soft drinks in a small shop. She claims not to be worried about the demolition, since
"Shenzhen is a city with plenty of possibilities, and I'm sure that it will always be possible to find a way
to keep living here."
It is clear, however, that most of the residents will be heavily damaged by the redevelopment project.
Among these people, the dominant attitude is not of opposition, but rather of acceptance, probably due
to the awareness to be powerless in influencing the situation, a sensation that emerges from the words
of some of the participants, such as “It’s useless to like it (Baishizhou), it’s going to be dismantled” (“喜
欢没用啊，要拆了呀!”; Gao Liang) or “Now the demolition is unstoppable […]” (“计划明年拆，势
不可挡”; Li Changzeng).
3.5.2 Damage suffered by residents
Even if a stance of acceptance is prevailing among the informants, the redevelopment project will
undoubtedly impact on various aspects of their lives.
One of the most frequent consequences will be the loss of business for lots of residents.
For example, Zhang Jianbin, who came from Guilin (Guangxi) ten years ago for running his small
restaurant, says that after the demolition he will have to find another affordable place in the city where
to restart his business again.
Some people in Baishizhou will be even more severely affected. Among these, there is Xiao Ling, a
woman from Hubei who runs a small convenience store. She complains about the high rental cost for
her shop, and about the fact that she has not yet managed to get a return on the capital initially invested
in her business due to the lack of customers, mainly because Baishizhou is depopulating for the incoming
demolition. She considers her situation particularly unfair since when she arrived in Shenzhen in April
2019, at the time of signing the rental contract, they told her that the chengzhongcun would not be destroyed
before 5 years, while instead the demolition could be completed before the end of 2020. She adds that
although the two-years contract indicated that the demolition would take place after 5 years, this also had
an unconditional clause (wutiaojian 无 条 件 ), meaning that she has to unconditionally accept any
government reform and therefore she is not entitled to any refund. Although she is resigned to suffering
a great economic loss, she says she has no intention of coming back to Hubei, but that, on the contrary,
she is already looking for another house in Shenzhen.
39
This situation could have been aggravated by the fact that information concerning demolition mainly
spread through informal channels rather than official ones. For a person like Xiao Ling, arrived in the
urban village just from a few months, and who allegedly has few contacts among locals, it may be
complicated to become aware of this information, thus becoming more vulnerable to possible scams.
Unclear information is also pointed out by Song Chengjin, a young father who came from Jiangxi nine
years ago to find work since he did not expect the redevelopment project to be implemented so that
quickly. He states also that even though the incoming demolition is an inconvenience for him and his
family since it will mean losing his stationery store on Baishizhou's main road, he will not interfere with
the government's plans. On the other hand, he understands the attitude of the inhabitants who refuse
the eviction, since for many of them the home in which they live has belonged to their family for
generations, and therefore the place can be filled with special emotions.
Another consequence of the redevelopment project is the loss of affordable rent, which is indicated by
most of the informants as one of the main
reasons for living in Baishizhou.
Chen Jiayi, a 25-year-old shop assistant who
works in a pastry shop hidden in the narrow
alleys of Baishizhou, particularly highlights
the issue of economic pressure, which
characterizes life in Shenzhen. Coming from
Sichuan province to find work, she claims
that everything in Shenzhen is exaggeratedly
expensive and that the salary does not
increase proportionally to the increase in
prices, and this forces her to a stressful life in
which every month she struggles to make
ends meet and seldom manages to save
something aside. Furthermore, she maintains
that the distance between rich and poor is
enormous and that not only does not it show
signs of decreasing, but rather it always tends
to increase. Four years ago, she decided to
come to Shenzhen because there were little
and poorly paid job opportunities for young
people in her home village in Sichuan. At the
time, she considered it a forced choice but
says that if she could go back, she would
choose another city.
A similar situation is the one of Yang Ouxiao.
Despite her positive opinion of the city, she
also points out that her salary ends almost
totally every month, making it impossible to
save some money. Nonetheless, she believes that the situation in any other city would be worse, and
describes chengzhongcun as "a difficult place, completely different from the rest of the city, but also one of
the few economically affordable places to live".
Both Chen Jiayi and Yang Ouxiao indicate the affordability of the rental costs inside the chengzhongcun as
the only chance to (difficultly) cope with the high economic pressure of the city. Therefore, the loss of
this possibility will heavily impact their lives, compromising their permanence in the city.
Figure 7. One of the many narrow streets of Baishizhou. (Source: the
author).
40
This viewpoint is also shared by Lan Qiyi, Li Jieyi, and Chen Dexian, three men between the ages of
thirty and forty years old came from various cities in northern Guangdong, near Shaoguan, and working
as delivery guys for Meituan, a food delivery company very famous and used in China. Their opinion of
life in Shenzhen is even more critical.
In Shenzhen for more than ten years, they came, like many others, for the large number of job
opportunities, but now they have a very negative opinion of the city, feeling even betrayed and deceived.
As Guan Liying did, they also quote the slogan "来 了 ， 就是 深圳 人" (laile, jiu shi shenzhenren).
However, differently from her, they highlight its hypocrisy, since after ten years they do not feel in the
least integrated into Shenzhen society, complaining that they have been doing the same job for ten years
and that they have never had the chance to find a better one. Besides, they share the abovementioned
opinion of Chen Jiayi, since they claim to have been forced to live always relegated to chengzhongcun
because in all these years, although prices have risen steeply, wages have only had a faint increase, not
enough to save something at the end of the month. Lan Qiyi, in particular, claims to live badly in
Shenzhen and finds it unacceptable that ten years of work here is nowhere near enough to afford to buy
a house in where to start a family with his wife, arguing that house prices are crazy.
In this scenario, despite having a substantially neutral judgment on the place, they praise Baishizhou for
being the only place where the rent reaches sustainable levels, even if he again complains about having
to pay 800 RMB per month for a tiny room. Therefore, also for them, the demolition will most likely
determine the unsustainability of their stay in Shenzhen.
Talking about the difficulties of his job, Chen Dexian brings out another issue that will affect the residents
after the redevelopment project, which is the loss of the central location which characterizes the village,
an optimal factor that often determines the choice to live in Baishizhou over other urban villages.
Being in a central location is certainly an advantage that allows them to have more potential clients.
He continues saying that the work they do is particularly stressful and tiring. The timetable is theoretically
free, but everyone always tries to work as hard as possible to make more money, so on average, they
work about nine hours every day. Another of their problems is that of the need of customers because if
a delivery arrives even slightly late they lose all the money of that delivery, and this makes the job
extremely risky since they are often forced to not respect the road rules and speeding through traffic just
to get there on time.
In a context where great efforts are made and great risks are taken to maximize ridiculously low earnings,
losing both the favorable location and the affordable renting will heavily harm their economic situation.
The loss of location will have repercussions also on people like Han Zhengui, a gas cylinder seller who
came from Wuhan (Hubei) more than twenty years ago, who points out that among all the positive
aspects of Baishizhou the position is the most important since the village is relatively close at the
University of Shenzhen where his son is studying. Losing the position would mean amplifying the
inconvenience and increasing the cost of transportation for daily activities in the city.
3.5.3 Plans for the future
The most common belief regarding the aftermath of the demolition is that in order to remain in the city,
it is mandatory to find accommodation in another urban village, otherwise, villagers will be forced to
come back to their hometown. This viewpoint is shared by 74% of the participants.
One of them is Li Changzeng, a barber in his sixties from Hubei who works straight on the street. He
decided to go down this road because, since he loves Shenzhen, he does not want to leave the city at any
cost, claiming that he will find a home in another chengzhongcun instead.
41
Also Song Chengjin says that he plans to move to another chengzhongcun in Xili, an area located on the
border between Bao'an and Nanshan districts. The progressive demolition of centrally located urban
villages like Baishizhou will force migrants to move out to the outer districts such as Bao'an.
Only 17.4% of the informants claim to remain in Shenzhen, but not in another chengzhongcun. In almost
all these cases the participants had already bought a house in the more modern areas of the city.
Shi Zhen, a retired lady from Sichuan, knows to be in a lucky position and shares the story of her family,
which is an example of successful migration. Having come to look after her grandchildren, she says that
her son arrived with his wife in Shenzhen about ten years ago, and both were able to find work
immediately; over time they have earned enough to buy a house in Futian district, far from Baishizhou.
Even if he did not buy a house yet, Chen Fucai, a 25-year-old shop assistant in a hardware store located
on Baishizhou's main street, shares the widespread positive views about the city. He came from Fujian
six years ago, and although he confirms the common feeling that Shenzhen is a very expensive city to
live in, he also claims to consider it a "beautiful city", and believes that he will find a way to move to the
city center, outside the chengzhongcun, categorically excluding the possibility of returning to the hometown
because of its low standard of living and reduced job opportunities for young people.
Only two participants claimed to have the intention of coming back to the hometown after the demolition
of the urban village.
Lin Siping, a woman from Chongqing working in a print shop, states that she would return to her
hometown because she is afraid of not being able to cope with the difficult economic situation that would
arise. She adds that she does not count on government support, since does not own any property inside
the village, but is living in rented accommodation, like the great majority of migrant workers.
Also Li Lan, a young policeman from Hubei, says that he plans to return to his hometown. However,
this choice would not be due to particular shortcomings of the city or the chengzhongcun, but rather to his
personal preference of living in a quiet village rather than in the hectic and polluted environment typical
of large cities.
Figure 8. The landscape of the roofs of Baishizhou urban village, with the tall and modern skyscrapers on the background. (Source:
the author).
42
3.6 Final considerations
This chapter aimed to provide a better insight of the life inside the urban village and of the redevelopment
project's consequences from the point of view of the migrant workers who live in Baishizhou.
The economic miracle represented by the impressive growth of Shenzhen since the opening reforms of
the early 1980s enabled the city to become a magnet for the growing floating population flows.
Chengzhongcun, which have played a crucial role in the development of the city, are now seen as "bad
images" of the city, and their demolition is already at an advanced stage. This process is fundamentally
based on negotiation between three main stakeholders: the local government, the developers, and the
original villagers, whereas migrants, despite representing the majority of the population residing in urban
villages, have no say in the matter.
Through the use of interviews conducted in the field, the study had the purpose of giving a voice to the
usually overlooked point of view of the urban village’s residents, offering a bottom-up perspective that
allows to have a better understanding of the situation.
First, the physical spaces of Baishizhou urban village have been explored, showing an environment in
constant transformation, characterized by informal development, presence of many low-quality
structures, and harsh living conditions, compared to the rest of the city. This situation, however, leads to
affordable rent costs and makes, therefore, the village attractive for the floating population looking for
accommodation in the city.
Then, the empirical research aimed to answer the research question "How does Baishizhou’s
redevelopment policy affect the lives of the villagers?”, highlighting the point of view of the participants
on the matter. Several consequences of the demolition project have emerged from the interviews.
First, it can be found that the way the plan will impact the lives of respondents influences their attitude
towards the project itself. Consequently, there is a neutral or even favorable opinion among those who
will not suffer much damage, while an attitude of acceptance prevails among those who are most affected.
Second, demolition and displacement will inevitably lead to the loss of business for many migrants, who
will be forced to face additional expenses and inconvenience in order to re-establish their business in
another place. In addition, the economic damage caused by the mass eviction of the village starts to affect
the economy of some activities even before the actual implementation of the project. In fact, for certain
activities that rely heavily on the local clients, the emptying of the village leads to a direct drop in
customers.
Third, one of the consequences that will affect several residents is the loss of the affordable rentals. In
fact, 88% of the informants point out low-cost accommodation as the major reason for living in the
urban village. The loss of this possibility will likely compromise their permanence in Shenzhen.
Besides, a lack of clear information about the details of the project can be noticed. The predominance in
the use of informal channels to convey information, can lead to misunderstandings and exacerbate the
inconveniences, especially for that part of residents who, for various reasons, do not have many ties with
the locals, for example, because they have recently arrived in the city.
Lastly, almost all of the informants said they intend to stay in Shenzhen, planning to go living in another
chengzhongcun. The continuous demolition of urban villages will increasingly push the floating population
to the edge of the city, harming more migrant workers which will have to face additional costs and
inconvenience in their daily lives. This trend, in the long run, will deprive Shenzhen of the low-cost labor
on which the metropolis has based its growth.
43
Comparing the field research conducted in 2017 and that conducted in 2019, some observations can be
made.
First, in 2019 it is possible to perceive an emptying of the chengzhongcun, symptom of the advanced stage
of the redevelopment project, noticeable both by the demolitions and construction sites present in the
most external areas of the village and by the empty buildings in the most central parts, due to the ongoing
eviction process.
Second, awareness about the project is now much higher, and above all, it is now perceived as "certain
and imminent", instead of "probable".
Third, satisfaction towards Shenzhen also seems to have increased. All of the 2019 respondents say they
are satisfied with the city, without hiding considerable enthusiasm. This could be the reason why every
one of them also states the desire of staying in the city after the demolition of Baishizhou, and that to
migrate from their home provinces has been the right choice.
The heterogeneous environment, historical heritage, and cultural diversity present in chengzhongcun like
Baishizhou are an interesting alternative to the hectic atmosphere of the modern city. Looking at urban
villages from this point of view, their gradual transition from rural to urban should not be seen only as a
source of problems for the modern city. It could represent a different kind of economic and social
development that focuses more on the basic needs of the most vulnerable sectors of the population
which, especially in Shenzhen, consist of low-income rural-to-urban migrants. The chaotic and informal
environment in these villages reveals the great creativity and resilience of the rural population in adapting
to modern life, showing a different perspective on urbanization, which should be considered in the
drawing up of the urban redevelopment policies.
44
Conclusion
This thesis aimed to answer the question "How does Baishizhou's redevelopment policy affect the lives
of the villagers?" by providing a framework of the floating population who inhabits the urban villages,
how these villages were formed, and how their demolition process is undergoing across the main cities
of China.
The stunning economic and financial growth experienced by China in general, and Shenzhen in particular,
is profoundly intertwined with the massive internal migration from rural to urban areas. In the last few
decades, these phenomena, within the context of a strict rural-urban dichotomy, have generated the urban
villages, which are the expression of a unique kind of urbanization, underwent by the largest Chinese
cities, and that represent the ideal shelter for the growing rural-to-urban floating population. The
authorities are aware of the economic potential and utility of the floating population, and therefore the
most recent reforms, like the easing of Hukou restrictions in the middle-tier cities and the redevelopment
policy of chengzhongcun in the big cities, are meant to serve the purpose of achieving some specific
government goals. Among these goals are the modernization of cities like Shenzhen, and the supply of
low-cost labor force for supporting the development of the middle-tier cities. However, this approach
does not consider the interests of the migrant residents involved in the demolition process.
In order to explore the perspectives of the affected villagers, qualitative field research has been conducted
through interviews carried out in 2017 and 2019 with the migrant workers residing in Baishizhou urban
village in Shenzhen, China.
From the analysis of the qualitative data collected, several considerations about the impacts of the
redevelopment policy can be drawn.
Although few participants in a beneficial situation pointed out their positive opinion about the demolition
project in the name of the city development, the vast majority of the residents will inevitably be heavily
damaged by the implementation of the project. In particular, uncertainty caused by impending
displacement, loss of central location, economic setbacks, and unaffordability of housing outside the
chengzhongcun, are indicated as the main negative impacts among the affected villagers. This last point is
strictly connected with the future plans of the participants. Most of them intend to look for another
urban village to resettle as it is the only possibility to remain in Shenzhen, but the progressive demolition
of centrally located villages such as Baishizhou will push the migrant workers to the edge of the city,
reducing their chances of a better integration.
However, what emerged from their point of view was that the several negative repercussions that they
will face are mitigated by the trust that they have in Shenzhen, which is often referred to as a city with
plenty of opportunities. This feeling leads to a high level of acceptance among the affected residents
regarding the demolition project rather than of opposition.
The field research conducted in Shenzhen revealed feelings, dreams, and hopes of a part of the population
that made possible one of the most sensational economic developments in recent history. Nonetheless,
the floating population is, in many respects, still ignored by the authorities or even by the formal residents
of the same city whose history it has contributed to. While acknowledging the presence of the problems
and reasons that led to the decision to progressively demolish the chengzhongcun, these issues should not
be exaggerated, and the incredible resilience that characterizes the inhabitants of Baishizhou, together
with the cultural heritage that they bring to the city, should be enhanced or, at least, taken into
consideration during the redevelopment process of these areas, since it can represent an added value, as
well as an opportunity to develop innovative kinds of sustainable urban development. Focusing on the
45
viewpoint of the villagers of Baishizhou, this thesis seeks to stress the necessity to involve bottom-up
perspectives on urban redevelopment policies in China.
The findings of the study have to be seen in the light of some challenges and limitations.
First, collecting up-to-date data on the floating population could be complicated due to its high mobility
and its informal nature. Besides, some information can only be found in the official Chinese censuses,
which are carried out on a ten-year basis. The next one is set to be drawn in 2020 and will provide a
better picture of the current situation.
Moreover, the relatively small sample of participants, its heterogeneity, and the consequent explorative
nature of the empirical research do not allow the findings of the fieldwork to be extended to the entirety
of the case study.
This field research could, however, set the basis for future in-depth studies of urban villages experiencing
redevelopment processes. Given the continuous transformation of these urban spaces, new findings
could constantly emerge in unpredictable ways, which call for additional explorations and research in the
field.
Further research is certainly needed also to better address issues of inequality affecting migrant workers
involved in urban displacement dynamics and to facilitate the formulation of policies that pursue a
trajectory towards sustainable urban development.
46
Appendix 1. The current condition of Baishizhou from the perspective of its residents
In order to have a better comprehension of the dynamics and life in Baishizhou, qualitative data about
how the current condition of the urban village is perceived by its residents are presented and analysed.
Overall, the clear majority of participants (around 85%) claimed to be satisfied with Shenzhen, and that
moving here was a good choice. They point out several positive sides of living in Shenzhen, the most
recurring of these being the greater job supply and higher wages than their hometown.
Higher income is undoubtedly the main reason for migration indicated by the informants. For example,
Gao Ling, a man from Chongqing in his fifties working as a furniture mover, claims that he came to
Shenzhen "many years ago" to make money. When asked if he prefers to live in Chongqing or Shenzhen,
he answered without hesitation "Of course in Shenzhen, Shenzhen has money to earn!" (“当然是深圳,
深圳有钱赚!”).
However, there are also negative sides that are pointed out by the residents. Almost all the informants,
although overall satisfied, agree in defining the daily life rather stressful because of the high cost of living.
Regarding life in the urban village, dirtiness and poverty are among the most recurrently indicated
downsides.
Rui Xinyuan, the owner of a food stand on the street selling Harbin dumplings from Heilongjiang, his
home province, says that the dirty environment typical of Baishizhou makes him feel uncomfortable and
even unsafe, adding that when he chose to move to Shenzhen he was not imagining to live in a place like
Figure 1. The exterior of a clinic for migrants in the chengzhongcun. The difference with the health facilities in the rest
of the city is striking. (Source: the author)
47
this. Besides, he also complains about employment instability. For this reason, he had to change several
jobs during his twenty years of permanence in Shenzhen, even though these efforts were not and are still
not enough for allowing him to gain a sufficient economic situation to get to live outside the chengzhongcun.
In fact, he also says that after the demolition of Baishizhou he will try to live in another urban village.
On the other hand, one of the positive sides of life in the urban village appears to be the strong sense of
community, a widely appreciated feature of Baishizhou, especially among the most satisfied residents.
For example, Shi Zhen says that in the chengzhongcun
there is a good atmosphere in where not only is it
easy to forge ties with residents from the same home
province, but it is also frequent to create excellent
relationships between the inhabitants from different
areas of China. This cultural melting pot makes that
of Baishizhou a vibrant and heterogeneous
community, which according to her "compensates
for the nostalgia she sometimes feels for her
hometown" Although she is aware that compared to
other Chinese cities Shenzhen is rather expensive,
she says that they can bear the burden quite well
since both her son and daughter-in-law work, and
also thanks to the fact that her grandchildren have
managed to be admitted to the public school, which
is free, while according to her, most of the children
of migrants who live in Baishizhou are forced to
attend expensive private schools for migrants.
Finally, she adds that even though she misses her
home village in Sichuan a lot because it is the place
where she was born and where she spent most of
her life, she gladly came to Shenzhen because she
was aware of the large number of job opportunities for children and grandchildren, and would make this
choice again without thinking twice.
The "very good atmosphere" as a positive side of Baishizhou is also pointed out by Sun Chunguang, a
man from Maoming (Guangdong) working in a print shop, and by Li Lan, a young policeman from Hubei.
The latter, also says that over the six years he spent in Baishizhou, the situation in the urban village has
improved a lot, especially regarding security. In this regard, he feels proud to contribute through his work
to the improvement of the community.
Also education is among the reasons for preferring Shenzhen over their own hometown, a topic
particularly considered by migrants workers with children.
Song Chengjin, who works in a stationery store on Baishizhou main road, is a young father who came
from Jiangxi nine years ago to find work. Although he has earned enough to return to his hometown, he
says that staying here is crucial to providing his son with adequate education, which in Jiangxi would be
difficult to have. It also reiterates the importance of education as a tool capable of conferring the
awareness necessary to make the best choices throughout life.
When asked if the children of migrant workers living in the chengzhongcun enjoy the same rights in accessing
schools as the children living in the richer areas of the city, He Qiang, who lives with his family in the
same hardware store he runs, initially seems to take for granted that the interviewer does not know the
characteristics of China, perhaps misinterpreting the question as a criticism.
“I think you don't know much about China's national conditions. Urban villages are mainly made by houses built
by the original inhabitants of the very early cities. Later, the floating population came to work and study, and the
Figure 2. Shi Zhen, a lady from Sichuan, talks about her life
while knitting on the street of Baishizhou. (Source: the
author)
48
villagers could rent out houses for them. Many countries do not have such good policies as we do. Many countries
do not want us to be open on this side. Shenzhen is an open city that can create a good environment for
entrepreneurship and work, which is why it can attract many foreigners to come here to study. Our children go to
school, the Education Bureau is fair and impartial and will give each child a fair learning opportunity, no matter
which city you are from, this is even in the whole of China. After so many years of reform and opening up, these
education reforms and various other policies are very complete. You can feel a sense of security and wealth in life
in China, and you are very happy. [...] In fact, you will see that many countries in the world are still in turmoil. I
don’t say that the United States is good or not, but at least China has made the country more and more peaceful.
This is a situation that everyone wants to see. There are very good policies.” (He Qiang).
He Qiang, who in the course of his explanation turns out to be more and more enthusiastic and friendly,
seems to be decidedly satisfied not only with the education system but with every aspect concerning the
urban village, Shenzhen or China. However, it remains difficult to establish whether this enthusiastic
description corresponds to his real perception or just to what he wanted to convey.
Trust in the authorities and a good impression on China's economic situation are also shared by Wu
Chenling, a Hunan woman who works in a pharmacy, and who claims that Shenzhen is not an isolated
case, but that actually all the Chinese second and third-tier cities enjoy a high happiness index.
According to most of the literature on the subject, the lack of social insurance represents one of the main
sources of discrimination for migrant workers. For example, Swapna Banerjee-Guha (2011) states that:
"The peasant workers in Shenzhen do not enjoy any retirement, unemployment, childbirth or work injury
insurance benefits. They are excluded from the Chinese government’s social security policy. Very few
employers buy insurance policies for them. In case of an injury, a worker is forced to leave the job and
either remain penniless in the city or return to the village without having any compensation allowance."
93
Nonetheless, Wu Chenling does not seem particularly worried about that, saying that in order to have
access to medical care it would be enough to pay for the local social insurance (shebao 社保).
Baishizhou, on the one hand presents critical issues such as its decay, the poor condition of many
structures, and a greater sense of unsafety compared to the rest of the city. On the other hand, it
represents for many people the only opportunity to live in Shenzhen thanks to the affordable renting
costs, and it is perceived as positive by migrants for the strong sense of community and cultural diversity
among its residents. These feelings are generally confirmed by the words of the informants.
Overall, almost all the informants agree in having an excellent opinion of Shenzhen, as it is considered
clean, efficient, and full of job opportunities, in fact, all of them state to have moved because of the lack
of job opportunities or low wages in their hometowns. Nonetheless, there is no lack of differing views
stating the difficulty of living there due to several factors. The most common difficulties usually found
in the literature, such as long working hours, high cost of living, financial pressure, and unstable
unemployment are basically confirmed by the stories of the participants, although this awareness does
not seem to affect their trust in the authorities.
93
Banerjee-Guha, “Status of Rural Migrant Workers in Chinese Cities.”, 36.
49
Appendix 2. Data of the participants
Age. 18-40 years old: 44%
40-60 years old: 44%
Over 60 years old: 12%
Gender. Male: 60%
Female: 40%
Home province. Guangdong: 28%
Hubei: 20%
Hunan: 12%
Sichuan: 8%
Chongqing: 8%
Liaoning: 8%
Fujian: 4%
Jiangxi: 4%
Guangxi: 4%
Heilongjiang: 4%
Permanence in Shenzhen. 1 to 5 years: 16%
5 to 10 years: 36%
More than 10 years: 48%
50
Appendix 3. Exemplary transcript interviews
Informant: Song Chengjin
Interviewer: Stefano Zaccaria
Date of interview: 14th December 2019
Home province of the informant: Jiangxi
Occupation: Stationery shop
List of Acronyms: SC=Song Chengjin; IN=Interviewer
Mandarin Chinese transcription:
IN：你的家乡是哪里的？
SC：江西
IN：你在深圳多久了？
SC：差不多 9年了。
IN：你为什么来深圳？
SC：19 岁来深圳刚好来加工
IN：你对深圳满意吗？
SC：怎么说咧，主要是可以有更好的教育和学习，多学习多了解自己，才能知道你自己喜欢什么。
IN：你喜欢住在白石洲吗？
SC：我一直在白石洲这边
IN：如果政府决定拆迁白石洲，你觉得你还会住在白石洲吗？
SC：可能就在南山附近，西丽那边
IN：城中村外面的租金很贵是吗？
51
SC：是的，主要是我们也没想到拆迁那么快，如果是这个趋势吧，就不干涉政府了，去别的地方呆
吧。如果在一个地方住的很久主要是父母世世代代住在这里，有特别的情感，但我们现在也不是属
于这种情况，还是会搬出去去深圳别的地方。
English translation:
IN: Where is your hometown?
SC: Jiangxi.
IN: How long have you been in Shenzhen?
SC: Almost nine years.
IN: Why did you come to Shenzhen?
SC: I came to Shenzhen at the age of nineteen looking for a job
IN: Are you satisfied with Shenzhen?
SC: How to say it, mainly because you can have better education and learning, learn more, and
understand yourself to know what you like.
IN: Do you like living in Baishizhou?
SC: Yes, I have always lived here in Baishizhou.
IN: If the government decides to demolish Baishizhou, do you think you will still live in Baishizhou?
SC: It might be near Nanshan, in Xili.
IN: Is the rent outside the village in the city very expensive?
SC: Yes, mainly because we didn't expect the demolition to be so fast. If this is the trend, then we will
not interfere with the government and go to other places. If you have lived in one place for a long time
and your parents have lived here for generations, there are special emotions, but we are not in this
situation now, and we will still move out to other places, but always in Shenzhen.
52
Informant: He Qiang
Interviewer: Stefano Zaccaria
Date of interview: 14th December 2019
Home province of the informant: Hubei
Occupation: Hardware store
List of Acronyms: HQ=He Qiang; IN=Interviewer
Mandarin Chinese transcription:
IN：你的老家是哪里吗？
HQ：湖北
IN：你在深圳多久了？
HQ：十多年了
IN：为什么来深圳？
HQ：因为深圳有很多机会呀
IN：你对深圳满意嘛？
HQ：满意呀
IN：那你对白石洲满意吗？
HQ：满意啊，这里很方便
IN：如果政府要拆迁白石洲，你还会住在深圳吗？
HQ：可以啊
IN：但城中村外面很贵呀
HQ：是的
53
IN：你知道如果城中村的孩子可以去市中心的学校吗？市中心的学校和城中村的学校是否一样？
HQ：我觉得你对中国的国情不太了解。城中村主要是很早期的城市的原住民盖的房子，后来的流动
人口来工作、求学，可以出租房子给他们住，很多国家没有想我们这么好的政策。很多国家不想我
们这边这样开放，深圳是个开放的城市可以给创造好的环境创业和工作，这也是为什么可以吸引到
很多外国人来到这里来学习。我们小孩上学，教育局是公平公正的，会给到每个孩子公正的学习机
会，不管你是来自哪个城市，都是这样的乃至整个中国。改革开放那么多年，这些教育改革和各方
面的政策非常的完整，你能感受到在中国生活的安全感和富足，很幸福。幸福来自哪里啊？其实你
会看到全球很多国家还在处于动荡之中，我不说美国好不好，但中国最起码做到了让这个国家国泰
民安，这是每个老百姓希望看到的一个局面中央给每个人民都有很好的政策。
English translation:
IN: Where is your hometown?
HQ: Hubei.
IN: How long have you been in Shenzhen?
HQ: More than ten years.
IN: Why did you come to Shenzhen?
HQ: Because Shenzhen has lots of opportunities.
IN: Are you satisfied with Shenzhen?
HQ: Yes, I’m satisfied.
IN: Are you satisfied with Baishizhou?
HQ: Satisfied, it's very convenient here.
IN: If the government wants to demolish Baishizhou, will you still live in Shenzhen?
HQ: Yes.
IN: But the village outside the city is expensive
HQ: Yes.
54
IN: Do you know if the children of the urban village can attend the schools in the city center? Are the
schools in the city center the same as the schools in the village?
HQ: I think you don't know much about China's national conditions. Urban villages are mainly made by
houses built by the original inhabitants of the very early cities. Later, the floating population came to
work and study, and the villagers could rent out houses for them. Many countries do not have such good
policies as we do. Many countries do not want us to be open on this side. Shenzhen is an open city that
can create a good environment for entrepreneurship and work, which is why it can attract many foreigners
to come here to study. Our children go to school, the Education Bureau is fair and impartial and will give
each child a fair learning opportunity, no matter which city you are from, this is even in the whole of
China. After so many years of reform and opening-up, these education reforms and various other policies
are very complete. You can feel a sense of security and wealth in life in China, and you are very happy.
Where does happiness come from? In fact, you will see that many countries in the world are still in
turmoil. I don’t say that the United States is good or not, but at least China has made the country more
and more peaceful. This is a situation that everyone wants to see. There are very good policies.
Informant: Wu Chenling
Interviewer: Stefano Zaccaria
Date of interview: 14th December 2019
Home province of the informant: Hunan
Occupation: Saleswoman in a pharmacy
List of Acronyms: CW=Wu Chenling; IN=Interviewer
Mandarin Chinese transcription:
IN：你住在深圳多久了？
CW：我今年才来的
IN：你喜欢在深圳生活吗？
CW：还行吧
IN：你觉得深圳有什么缺点？
CW：生活压力大
IN：你喜欢白石洲吗？
55
CW：还行
IN：你觉得白石洲便宜吗？
CW：比关外贵一点，比市内便宜
IN：你觉得白石洲拆迁了，你还会住在深圳吗？
CW：会啊，换个地方住
IN：如果你不是深圳人，你可以用这边的医保吗？
CW：只要交了当地的社保就可以
IN：你家乡的人羡慕你因为你在大城市生活吗？
CW：还不知道耶，还没回去。但我如果说这里的压力他们也不会羡慕，毕竟二三线的城市幸福指数
高。
English translation:
IN: How long have you lived in Shenzhen?
CW: I only came this year.
IN: Do you like living in Shenzhen?
CW: It's ok.
IN: What are the shortcomings of Shenzhen?
CW: Stressful life.
IN: Do you like Baishizhou?
CW: It's ok.
IN: Do you think Baishizhou is cheap?
CW: It is a little more expensive than outside places but cheaper than the city center.
56
IN: After the probable demolition of Baishizhou will you still live in Shenzhen?
CW: Yes, I will live in another place.
IN: If you are not from Shenzhen, can you use the medical insurance here?
CW: As long as you have paid the local social security.
IN: Do people in your hometown admire you because you live in a big city?
CW: I don't know yet. I haven't returned. But if I talk about the pressure here, I do not think they would
envy me, after all, also the city happiness index of the second and third-tier cities is high.
Informant: Li Changzeng
Interviewer: Stefano Zaccaria
Date of interview: 14th December 2019
Home province of the informant: Hubei
Occupation: Barber
List of Acronyms: LC=Li Changzeng; IN=Interviewer
Mandarin Chinese transcription:
IN：你老家是哪里的？
LC：湖北.
IN：你在深圳多久了？
LC：7-8 年.
IN：你为什么来深圳？
LC：来挣钱，不种地了来深圳打工.
IN：你觉得满意吗？
57
LC：深圳打工工资稍微比别的城市高一点，别的城市更低.
IN：那你喜欢住在白石洲吗？
LC：深圳哪里都喜欢.
IN：如果白石洲要拆迁，你还想住在深圳吗？
LC：计划明年拆，势不可挡。这里不给住了，那肯定找别的地方住，还是会在深圳.
IN：但在城中村外面会很贵吗？
LC：会，但还在别的城中村里住.
English translation:
IN: Where is your hometown?
LC: Hubei.
IN: How long have you been in Shenzhen?
LC: Seven or eight years.
IN: Why did you come to Shenzhen?
LC: I came to earn money, to find a job.
IN: Are you satisfied?
LC: The wages for working in Shenzhen are slightly higher than in other cities, it’s lower in other cities.
IN: Do you like living in Baishizhou?
LC: I like every place as long as it’s in Shenzhen
IN: If Baishizhou is to be demolished, do you still want to live in Shenzhen?
LC: The plan to demolish it next year is unstoppable. If it won’t be possible to live here, I will definitely
find another place to live, always in Shenzhen.
58
IN: But will it be expensive outside the chengzhongcun?
LC: Yes, but I will live in another chengzhongcun.
Informant: Guan Liying
Interviewer: Stefano Zaccaria
Date of interview: 14th December 2019
Home province of the informant: Guangdong
Occupation: Road sweeper
List of Acronyms: GL=Guan Liying; IN=Interviewer
Mandarin Chinese transcription:
IN：你的老家在哪里？
GL：广东梅州
IN：你住在深圳多久了？
GL：11 年了
IN：你喜欢住在白石洲吗？
GL：还可以。住了 4年多了
IN：如果白石洲拆迁了，你还想住在深圳吗
GL：想
IN：城中村外面会贵一点，还会住在深圳吗
GL：毕竟来了深圳那么久了，肯定还是会想生活在深圳，毕竟来了深圳就是深圳人，虽然我也是本
地广东的，毕竟也不是深圳市里面的人
IN：那你们下一步打算去哪里啊？因为外面的租金很贵
59
GL：因为我们是环卫，只要路还在我们就还要扫。我们现在的旧改办会给我们提供房子住.
English translation:
IN: Where is your hometown?
GL: Meizhou, Guangdong.
IN: How long have you lived in Shenzhen?
GL: Eleven years.
IN: Do you like living in Baishizhou?
GL: It’s ok. I lived here for more than four years.
IN: If Baishizhou is demolished, do you still want to live in Shenzhen?
GL: Yes, I do.
IN: Outside the chengzhongcun it would be a little more expensive. Will you still live in Shenzhen?
GL: Even if I'm not a Shenzhen native I would definitely want to live here after having been in the city
all this time, after all, if you came to Shenzhen you are from Shenzhen, right?
IN: Where do you plan to go next? Because the rent outside is expensive.
GL: Since we are sanitation workers, we have to sweep as long as the road is still there. Our old office
will provide us with housing.
Informant: Gao Liang
Interviewer: Stefano Zaccaria
Date of interview: 14th December 2019
Home province of the informant: Chongqing
Occupation: Furniture mover
List of Acronyms: GL=Gao Liang; IN=Interviewer
60
Mandarin Chinese transcription:
IN：你的老家是哪里的？
GL：重庆的。
IN：你在深圳多久了？
GL：好多年了。
IN：你为什么来深圳？
GL：来生活嘛，要赚钱。
IN：你最喜欢住在深圳吗？还是重庆
GL：当然是深圳，深圳有钱赚
IN：你喜欢白石洲吗？
GL：喜欢没用啊，要拆了呀
IN：如果白石洲要拆迁了，你觉得你还会住在深圳吗？
GL：会呀，还在找。
English translation:
IN: Where is your hometown?
GL: Chongqing's.
IN: How long have you been in Shenzhen?
GL: For many years.
IN: Why did you come to Shenzhen?
GL: Come to live, make money.
61
IN: Do you prefer to live in Shenzhen or Chongqing?
GL: Of course in Shenzhen, Shenzhen has money to earn!
IN: Do you like Baishizhou?
GL: It’s useless to like it, it’s going to be dismantled
IN: If Baishizhou is going to be demolished, do you think you will still live in Shenzhen?
GL: Yes, I’m still looking.
Informant: Sun Chunguang
Interviewer: Stefano Zaccaria
Date of interview: 14th December 2019
Home province of the informant: Guangdong
Occupation: Print shop
List of Acronyms: SC=Sun Chunguang; IN=Interviewer
Mandarin Chinese transcription:
IN：你的老家是哪里的？
SC：广东茂名
IN：你在深圳多久了？
SC：20 多年了
IN：你为什么来深圳？
SC：随着父母来的
IN：你对深圳满意嘛
SC：还可以吧
62
IN：对白石洲满意吗？
SC；挺好的，很有氛围
IN：城中村外面很贵是吗？
SC：是的，但这里也挺贵。
IN：哦？这里也挺贵？
SC：对，是的
IN：如果白石洲拆迁，你还会住在深圳吗？
SC：会的
English translation:
IN: Where is your hometown?
SC: Maoming, Guangdong
IN: How long have you been in Shenzhen?
SC: More than 20 years.
IN: Why did you come to Shenzhen?
SC: I followed my parents.
IN: Are you satisfied with Shenzhen
SC: I am okay.
IN: Are you satisfied with Baishizhou?
SC: Yes, it is very good, there is a very good atmosphere
IN: Is it expensive outside the village?
SC: Yes, but it's quite expensive also here.
63
IN: Oh? Is it expensive here?
SC: Yes, yes.
IN: If Baishizhou is demolished, will you still live in Shenzhen?
SC: Yes, I will.
64
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