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The Political Economy of Immigration Policy: Some Simple Interest Group Analytics
Abstract
Immigration policy is viewed as endogenously determined by interest group competition. The political effectiveness of each interest group depends on its ability to control free riding. Support maximizing politicians supply policies in response to the pressures exerted by interest groups of differing political effectiveness, such differences being the main factor accounting for the adoption of socially inefficient policies. The model demonstrates that immigration policy outcomes are explained by the skill levels of immigrant workers, lengths of stay in the destination country, ethnic and family ties, and the costs of enforcing immigration laws, together with possible voter prejudices toward immigrants.
... 5 Thus, for example, we anticipate that unskilled native workers will lobby for tight immigration controls, while employers of unskilled labor, as well as suppliers of capital and skilled labor, will lobby for weaker regulations on migrant entry. We test these hypotheses by examining the voting records of U.S. Representatives and Senators on immigration policy, based on the assumption 5 For a more detailed exposition of the public choice approach to immigration policy, see Kaempfer, Lowenberg and Mertens (2004). that political-support maximizing politicians will, to some degree, reflect the preferences of their constituents in voting on immigration bills before Congress. ...
... See Kaempfer, Lowenberg and Mertens (2004) for further elaboration of this argument. ...
Immigration policy is supplied endogenously through a political process that weighs the impacts of immigration on factor owners, together with other interests, in determining policy outcomes. The relative significance of constituent interests and legislator ideology in shaping policy is tested by identifying the correlates of congressional voting on immigration legislation. Conservative lawmakers are found to generally support stricter immigration controls. Legislators representing border states and urban areas favor looser restrictions, possibly reflecting the political influence of recent immigrants. There is evidence that immigration reform is a normal good and that substitutability between native and immigrant labor promotes tighter immigration restrictions.
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