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2 Resistance and Retaliation
Jennifer Dresden, Ph.D.
6 Civil Disobedience: Existing
and Changed Patterns
Hakan Sönmez
9 Resisting Authoritarianism:
The Internet and Civil Society
Riaz Akbar
13 Haitian Protests, Democratic
Alignment, and Holes in U.S.
Rhetoric
Jonathan Molina
16 Coercion and Contention: The
Interaction of Sanctions and
Social Movements
Hannah B. Akuiyibo
20 Book review • Terms of
Disservice: How Silicon Valley
is Destructive by Design, by
Dipayan Ghosh
Marin Ping
25 Program Highlights
Salil Shetty on Human
Rights, Governance, and
Coalition-Building
P: Salil Shetty, Maeve Edwards, Matison Hearn-Desautels, and Ruby Karki.
In March earlier this year, the Democracy & Society team had the opportunity to
speak with Salil Shetty, who has formerly served as Secretary General of Amnesty
International and Director of the United Nations Millennium Campaign. Given
his extensive advocacy, policy eorts, and academic work, Shetty’s insights unify
our volume under this year’s theme. e following is a narrative of this interview.
e conversation begins with a
discussion of the relationship between
human rights and good governance
today, during which Shetty reveals
that he is “fairly allergic to this ter-
minology of good governance.” He
explains that this is due to the way
that the concept has evolved and de-
veloped in vernacular, as “a very in-
strumentalist kind of concept which is
really designed to [help] governments
and businesses to do what they would
like to do.” In defense of this disagreement, Shetty elaborates on his own understand-
ing of the concept: “to me [...] the only way you’re going to get good governance is
through human rights.” He continues, “human rights, to me, eectively brings in
a citizen-state contract, and puts states where they should be, which is as a serv-
ant of the people.” Explaining what he considered human rights to be, he says that
“human rights [is], to me, the ethical and justice framework within which I look at
governance and how governments should behave.”
Next, he discusses how human rights have progressed since 1948, when the
Universal Declaration of Human Right (UDHR) was formed; “It’s had a pretty
good run, I’d say, because it all depends on the time-frame [you’re] viewing this
from.” He lists “the Torture Convention, the Refugee Convention, the work against
the death penalty, and then this whole issue of how do you deal with conicts like
genocide, [and] war crimes” as important markers of the progress made in this
run. Shetty further adds that “the one big thing that happened in the last seventy
years was that a huge number of countries moved into electoral
Volume 17 –
A P of the C D and C S
I T I
G U
[Cont’d, Page 3]
Resistance and
Retaliation
“... human rights [is],
to me, the ethical and
justice framework within
which I look at governance
and how governments
should behave.”
2
Georgetown University | The Center for Democracy and Civil Society
RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION
Welcome to the 2020 edition of Democracy & Society. is
year’s edition is the result of hard work by Editor-in-Chief
Matison Hearn-Desautels and Assistant Editors William
Condon, Maeve Edwards, and Ruby Karki. is edition of
D&S was completed under highly unusual conditions due
to the COVID-19 pandemic, and my special thanks go to
the editorial team for there perseverance and hard work.
Despite its unusual nish, 2019-2020 was a strong year
for the Democracy & Governance program. We welcomed
our 14th incoming class with 11 new students coming to
the Hilltop. ese students continue our proud tradition of
bringing a wide array of experiences and perspectives to our
classrooms and our community. ey have lived and worked
across ve continents and have rapidly built a tight-knit
cohort that has brought enthusiasm and talent to our halls.
Between the 2018-2019 and 2019-2020 academic years
we also bid farewell to 25 graduates of the M.A. program.
ese outstanding folks have gone on to careers across the
sector of democracy, human rights, and governance. We
are pleased to have them join our strong and ever-growing
community of alumni.
e past academic year has been one of reection and
change for the Democracy & Governance Program. In No-
vember 2019, we secured approval from the Georgetown
University Graduate School to revise and update our degree
requirements, ensuring that the M.A. is best positioned
to serve the academic and professional needs of graduate
students in today’s environment. e COVID-19 pandemic
led the university to shi to a virtual learning environ-
ment in March 2020. is shi presented our community
with myriad challenges but also provided the opportunity
to reimagine some of our teaching methods and standard
programming like our Open House for admitted students.
You can read more about this and other program news in
the Program Highlights section at the back of this issue.
is issue of Democracy & Society is published with the
theme “Resistance and Retaliation.” Even before the wave
of protests that have so powerfully centered questions of
racial injustice in the United States and around the world,
the last two years have been a time of popular pressure on
governments to be more responsive. From Lebanon to Hong
Kong to Venezuela, people’s movements have mobilized
supporters and changed the course of political conversa-
tions. Yet this is not the only mode of resisting democratic
backsliding or perceived injustice. is issue engages with
the many questions raised by these eorts.
We begin with our editors’ report on their insightful
interview with Salil Shetty. Mr. Shetty has a long career de-
fending human rights and supporting improved governance
around the world, formerly serving as the Director of the
United Nations Millennium Campaign and then as Secretary
General of Amnesty International. In the interview, Shetty
oers a clear-eyed assessment of the serious challenges cur-
rently faced by human rights advocates and highlights the
damage being done by some political leaders today.
Hakan Sönmez then oers a useful framing of one of the
key concepts in studies of political resistance: civil disobedi-
ence. Tracing the concept of civil disobedience through some
of the foundational studies in the eld, Sönmez highlights
the eectiveness and particular features of contemporary
nonviolent political action in challenging existing rules
and structures.
e remaining contributions focus on more specic as-
pects or examples of political mobilization and resistance,
as well as the ways that governments respond. Riaz Akbar
sounds a warning on the limitations of the Internet as a tool
for resisting authoritarianism. He renews the call for better
Internet freedom protections and support for civil society
as means of advancing democratic movements.
Other contributors take an even more policy-centric
approach. Jonathan Molina presents the case of recent pro-
tests in Haiti and argues forcefully that the United States’
policy towards the Haitian government is in need of serious
change. Hannah Akuiyibo examines one common policy
tool—sanctions—and its impact on pro-democracy move-
ments in targeted countries. Akuiyibo concludes that a key
strategic question for policymakers is how applying sanc-
tions to a regime will impact the eectiveness of domestic
democracy movements in the country in question.
Finally, a book review from Marin Ping takes a critical
look at Dipayan Ghosh’s Terms of Disservice: How Silicon
Valley is Destructive by Design. Ghosh’s book oers a nu-
anced perspective on how the structure of the tech industry
creates incentives that are deeply dangerous for the health
of democracy. Ping notes some of the key contributions of
the book, but raises additional important questions about
practical regulatory solutions.
Taken together, the contributions to this issue of De-
mocracy & Society call on readers to reexamine their own
beliefs about what works (and what doesn’t) in pursuing and
defending democracy. ey highlight the ways that some
of the technological, organizational, and policy tools that
seem promising in promoting democratic deepening can
R R
• From the Associate Director •
3
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RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION
democracies and a whole lot of institutions came into play,
whether it’s at the local level, national, regional, or global.”
ese new institutions provide even more avenues
through which to explore the progression and expansion
of human rights and the development of good governance.
Furthermore, Shetty mentions that “independent institutions
like media became very important” in the approximately
seventy years since the formulation of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights. is is partly due to the continuous
evolution of technology, which has brought up the very
important issue of transparency — a virtue which is oen
entrusted to be defended by an independent media and
other institutions.
To summarize that particular period of time, Mr. Shetty
declares, “we had a good run [in terms of human rights]
but, in the last een years, that’s a dierent story.” Shetty
notes the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 as a turning
point at which states could say that the paramount priority
of governance is security. He expresses that “we are being
more and more presented with a hard trade-o between
development, security, and human rights,” explaining that
conversations over the last een years have turned towards
a more binary conceptualization, one that places these goals
as opportunity costs for one another, the dialogue is now
being phrased as “Human rights vs Development,” or “Hu-
man rights vs Security.”
During the last decade or so, a separate yet interrelated
development has occurred which presents another set of
challenges: e emergence of elected authoritarians. Shetty
cites Russia and China as those non-elected authoritarian
regimes which have been viewed as “the classical human
rights abusers.” However, “with Trump, and Modi, and Or-
bán, and Erdogan, [and] Duterte in the Philippines,” there are
an increasing number of countries headed by democratically
elected populist leaders with authoritarian tendencies. As
he explains, “they oen have scant respect for human rights
— therefore, in my view, scant respect for good governance.”
As Shetty suggests, “a big question is — why are people
voting for such governments, right?” He tells the team that
the answer has to do with the fact that the “political system[s]
and economic system[s] have both failed the vast majority
of the population.” is has led to disillusionment with
democracy (which has somehow been equated with elec-
tions, adds Shetty), globalisation and neo-liberal economic
models. So we have more elections but less accountability
and more economic growth but even more inequality. us,
the majority of the population feels as though they’ve been
mistreated. “In India, a leading academic has called [this]
a majority’s minority-victimhood feeling,” says Shetty. Fur-
thermore, “Our institutions are not really designed to deliver
what’s needed for today, because most of these [institutions]
are out of date,” a fact which he feels is keenly illustrated by
the current COVID-19 crisis. In the midst of this crisis, he
comments, “I don’t remember a point in time in our history
where we had such a collection of narcissistic, unethical, and
incompetent (but elected!) leaders.”
Shetty names two methodologies, among others, that
leaders employ to sustain their power. He explains that “it
starts with changing the discourse. So, [they] change the
narrative and the discourse to delegitimize anyone who is
seen as [...] intellectual, immediately classifying them as elite.
And oen, anything which is seen as international is seen
as anti-national.” Shetty subsequently poses the question
that begs, “how does one get from being internationalist to
being anti-national?” He classies it as “a very subtle jump,”
but that ordinary people can relate to the concept “if they
are attuned to a kind of nativist thinking.” He adds “most of
these leaders have created a narrative of ethno-nationalist
pride and are harkening back to this great past [...] it’s re-
ally stretching the limits of history” … “it’s obviously very
sellable, and particularly if people are feeling like they’re,
they’re being victimized in some way, they really identify
with this narrative and then it really appeals. And there’s
something macho-masculine and very testosterone, and it’s
all about ‘we are the strongest, we will beat everybody,’ you
know, the ‘make America great again’” model.
Shetty proposes that the second methodology that leaders
use to promote illiberalism — although he himself doesn’t
call it “illiberalism,” and give themselves continuity in power
— aer the manipulation of discourses and narratives, con-
cerns the discrediting of dissenters whether in media or civil
society or judiciary. And the way this is done is procedural
or nancial, oen not substantive; in his words: “a lot of it
is: follow the money.” According to him, powerful actors
are delegitimizing civil society initiatives by calling their
nances into question, and cites India as a recent example.
e modus operandis of the illiberal leaders that Shetty
describes has changed over time. As he tells the D&S team,
“many of the older-style kind of crushing of dissent used to
be coopted or manipulated to have the opposite eect. In
an era of political contention and mobilization, these pieces
should lead us to deeper reection—both as DRG profes-
sionals and as citizens of our own countries.
J R D, P.D. is the Associate Director of the
Democracy & Governance Program.
“I don’t remember a point in time in
our history where we had such a collection
of narcissistic, unethical, and incompetent
(but elected!) leaders.”
S, Continued from Page 1
4
Georgetown University | The Center for Democracy and Civil Society
RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION
happen in a way that you could legally challenge it, but now
what these people are doing is, they change the law rst.” In
this newer approach to crushing dissent, “they will bring in
new laws or resurrect colonial anti-people laws which you
and I would call ‘unlawful laws.’ But, they are operating
within the legal framework. So they will go aer you using
the law, rather than by breaking the law;” “So,” he continues,
“I think these are some important, subtle dierences from
the past.”
We then asked Shetty about a recent policy paper that he
co-authored with Tara Sahgal for the Carr Center for Human
Rights Policy, in which the authors analyze these changing
leadership tactics in relation to India. e piece concerns
states’ “so” and “smart” power.
1
Shetty and Saghal interpret
so power to be the capacity to inuence norms and desires,
particularly through attraction. In addition, they interpret
smart power as the “ideal combination of both hard and
so power,” wherein hard power is warfare and coercion.
At this point in the interview, the question posed has to
do with how resistance movements can use so and smart
power themselves to push against the power of the state. In
response, Shetty suggests that it is an “interesting question,”
whether or not this concept can be stretched to include the
civil society in which resistance movements exist. Taking
for granted that it can be, Shetty reveals that he is “genuinely
positive and optimistic about” the use of technology as a
form of smart power by protest movements. He compares
the soer “petitioning change.org type” end of the scale of
this power, to the more aggressive protests which have taken
place in Chile, Sudan, and Hong Kong.
Next, the conversation turns to Shetty’s own experiences.
Drawing upon his work in coalition-building, he speaks
to the challenge of bringing together movements and civil
society to nd common ground and articulate shared goals.
One of the main challenges, he muses, is a “phenomenon
in civil society” of what he likes to call “Egos and Logos,” or,
the battles between “oldies who have huge egos…[that are]
the maa of civil society––and then, of course, all the largest
civil society organizations,” which each “have institutional
agendas.” Shetty describes his experience managing these
battles, and the diculty which emerges to make these dis-
parate actors agree on policy. He observes that “civil society
can spend one year trying to nalize three lines which they
agree on. If it’s three hundred pages they can do it, but if it’s
three lines, then it’s next to impossible.”
So, they oen have to spend a fair bit of time to discuss
what they disagree on, as a kind of “catharsis activity,” and
then move to what they do agree on, which, he says, “is al-
most close to nothing sometimes, to start with.” His critical
and insightful observation here is that “in the civil society
space, everything has to be value driven.” And rightly so.
Because of this, “if you make it very operational and prag-
matic to start with then it doesn’t go anywhere. So you have
to articulate it using a value-frame.” Next, he suggests that “I
was thinking that in some ways, the question that you asked
is about coalition-building, but I can think of the answer to
it more from a campaigning perspective.”
He tells the team that the chief element of “any half-
decent campaign, and the best ones even more so, is a very
simple and clear demand, which has to be emotional, not just
political.” Furthermore, “it has to be very persistent; you have
to stick to it, and keep at it.” is persistence toward long-
term goals is important of course, but Shetty also mentions
that “you have to have some ongoing wins [...] otherwise
people get disillusioned and give up.” ese campaigns are
references to resistance movements, and he now turns to an
increasingly commonly-used term — “global movements.”
Following up on that point, the team asks Shetty to iden-
tify the main challenges to making movements truly global.
He suggests that this is why it is important to distinguish
between a campaign and a movement. “If sharing a broadly
common set of goals and values is enough, then we could
say there are many global movements. But when it comes to
converting this into common collectivised actions, then it is
easier to think of them as campaigns. ere are, for example,
organizations and activists ghting for women’s rights across
the world — these are the campaigns. But, do they come
together as a cohesive movement?” He says that one of the
biggest challenges in turning these campaigns across the
globe into a truly global movement is that “resources are so
skewed in favor of richer organizations — and pretty clearly,
organizations from richer countries.” e same division of
North-South at the global level exists within countries as well.
“e global South is where the majority of the world’s
problems are — they’re just worse o on all counts.” However,
“they’re not really at the leading edge of these movements”
because of this unequal distribution of resources. You can
look at pretty much any campaign that calls itself global and
you will nd that “they don’t have a rooted ground presence
in the [global] South.” Furthermore, in many campaigns
which do have this presence, “you won’t nd many women
leaders.” He tells the team that “all the contradictions against
which we are ghting, in these so-called social movements,
play out in the social movements themselves.”
e team asks Shetty what it would take to coalesce
these disparate campaigns into global movements, and he
answers by further dierentiating between “campaign” and
“movement.” He characterizes a campaign as something
time-bound and issue-specic, while movements are more
long-lasting. By way of example, he oers: “the Landless
movement, like MST [landless Workers Movement] in Brazil.
“in the civil society
space... everything has to
be value driven.”
5
D S Volume 17 –
RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION
MST is there in Brazil, there’s no question about it. Now, if
you ask me if there’s a movement of landless people at the
global level, I’d say well, I can think of people ghting on
landlessness in Africa, or in India, or Brazil, and they may
have some kind of secretariat with one or two people, but
is this a global movement? I don’t think so.”
Considering the recent actions and publicity around
climate change, the team asks whether Mr. Shetty would
characterize these actions as a global movement. “Climate
is an interesting one, because it is global; by denition, the
challenges are global and the solutions are only at the global
level. Whereas most other issues don’t come together the
same way at the global level as climate does...”. Shetty poses
the rhetorical question, “is there a Greta unberg move-
ment in India or Africa of any comparable scale? Not that I
know of. Although I wish there was, [...] maybe we have to
wait for some more decades for this to happen.” He responds,
“I’d say it’s a very powerful Northern movement,” continuing,
“there will be some kids in fancy schools in Delhi who will
do a Friday action — all power to them — but is what Greta
unberg did a movement in the global South? No. And I
mean, if it’s not in the global South, how does it become
global? By what stretch of imagination?” Shetty’s comments
here are emblematic of his lifelong dedication to connecting
policy in the global South and North.
e team poses one nal question to Shetty, which
prompts him to speak on his more recent experience. Shetty
is currently a Senior Fellow at the Carr Center for Human
Rights Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School. “Aer your
tenure at Amnesty International,” the team asks, “you de-
cided to return to India to live and work there. You have led
several international organizations in your career and for
much of it has been based outside of India. What moved you
to go back?” In answering this question, Shetty contends that
he anticipated the current political and social environment
in India, saying, “in my view, the Hindu(tva)-driven majori-
tarian regime currently in power is wreaking havoc. ey
have been systematically doing that in the last seven years
and it’s only getting from bad to worse. ey’ve presided
over a destruction not just of India’s secular democracy and
constitutional values [...] but also of the economy.”
Shetty remarks that this stress has worsened in the midst
of the novel coronavirus pandemic, observing that “[t]he
ability of the majority of India’s population to be able to
deal with this [global health crisis] without the support
of the government simply doesn’t exist.” He qualies that
this has to do with national and individual wealth, and
resource access, saying, “most people in relatively richer
countries at least have some resources of their own to cope
with something like this. Whereas in India, in developing
countries, the majority of people can’t handle this.” He says
he returned to India because of these mounting challenges
in his home country.
Despite his concerns about the current state of govern-
ance and society, Shetty isn’t pessimistic about the future.
“On the upside,” he says, brightly, “I’m way more hopeful
in terms of what is possible when it comes to the way in
which young people are responding to these challenges.” He
references the examples of Trump and Brexit, and oers: “I
don’t think there’s many young people who support those
phenomenons. ere’s a real generational faultline there,
which, by the way, isn’t necessarily the same in develop-
ing countries, but I think it would still be the case that the
young are less prejudiced when it comes to Islamophobia
and patriarchy...and things like that. So I think there’s more
hope with young people.”
e other contingent to consider, he says, is technology.
“Technology gives us the possibility to work with [youth] at
a scale which we can’t do if we are doing it brick by brick. If
you look at what’s happening in India in the last year — I had
not quite expected this level of resistance from youth and
from women.” He explains that over the previous year, India’s
majoritarian Hindu regime has “brought in a legislation
called the Citizenship [Amendment] Act, which threatens
to make Muslim Indians into second class citizens. [And]
that’s what they’re trying to do, but the resistance — primarily
from muslims but also from youth and from women from
across religions, has been phenomenal, and much much
more than I had expected.”
Shetty’s remarks end on an optimistic note, saying: “I
think there’s a lot of hope in the way in which we can organ-
ize at the local level. And the local level has become more
and more important — just look at [Governor Andrew]
Cuomo compared to Trump during coronavirus. Even in
India, many many local leaders, state leaders, are emerging
as much more sensible and inuential than our national
leadership.”
S S is a longtime activist on poverty and justice who
served as Secretary General of Amnesty International from 2010 until
2018. During his tenure at Amnesty International, he spearheaded
the organization’s move to shi power to the global south. Before
joining Amnesty International, he was Director of the United Nations
Millennium Campaign from 2003 to 2010, credited with signicantly
increasing awareness of and accountability for the Millennium
Development Goals across the world. From 1998 to 2003, Salil
Shetty was Chief Executive of ActionAid, a leading international
development NGO. He is currently a Senior Fellow at the Carr Center
for Human Rights Policy at Harvard Kennedy School. Twitter:
@SalilShetty
E
1 Salil Shetty and Tara Sahgal, “India’s So Power: Challenges and
Opportunities,” Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies, 2019.
https://www.rgics.org/wp-content/uploads/RGICS-Paper-Indias-So-
Power-Challenges-Opportunities.pdf.
6
Georgetown University | The Center for Democracy and Civil Society
RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION
Civil Disobedience:
Existing and
Changed Patterns
H S
Even voting for the right is doing nothing for it.
—H D T
Introduction
e passage “power of rulers derives from consent of the sub-
jects; nonviolent action is a process of withdrawing consent
and thus is a way to challenge the key modern problems of
dictatorship, genocide, war and systems of oppression” is a
brief résumé of Gene Sharp’s theory of power.1 Sharp postu-
lates that consent of citizens is a raison d’être for rulers’ power,
and that nonviolent action is a big threat for the throne.
Civil disobedience, or, in terms drawn from a similar
vocabulary, “collective action,” “movement,” “civil resist-
ance campaign,” or “violent or nonviolent action,” means
challenging rulers to retain power and control. However,
this one-sided focus on citizens’ behavior provides an in-
complete picture because it is also important to take the
countermoves of rulers into account. At best, there is a
mutual trust between rulers and citizens because they have
a great deal of interdependence, otherwise, it can end in a
zero-sum game, as omas Schelling eloquently explained:
e Tyrant and his subjects are in somewhat symmetrical
positions. ey can deny him most of what he wants — they
can, that is, if they have the disciplined organization to refuse
collaboration. And he can deny them just about everything
they want — he can deny it by using the force at his command.
[…] ey can confront him with chaos, starvation, idleness
and social breakdown, but he confronts them with the same
thing and, indeed, most of what they deny him they deny
themselves. It is a bargaining situation in which either side,
if adequately disciplined and organized, can deny most of
what the other wants; and it remains to see who wins.
e following inquiry is designed to nd out how civil
disobedience have evolved over time, what recent campaigns
look like, and what the eects of such campaigns are. To
that end, we can pose the following questions: What is the
nature of modern-day acts of civil disobedience? And, are
certain kinds of acts more likely to succeed than others?
eory of Civil Disobedience
Typically, or from the view of jurists, civil disobedience
is the active refusal by citizens to obey certain laws, and
for this reason, it is seen as an infringement rather than a
democratic exercise. Politically speaking, the civil disobedi-
ent still accepts the frame of an established authority and a
judicial system, in contrast to the revolutionary.
Civil disobedience is, in the common understanding,
practiced openly and with the intention of persuading as
many people as possible, which is therefore more morally
defensible. Whereas ordinary oence is a wrongful act or an
infringement of a right that is motivated by self-interested
reasons. is would suggest that civil disobedience should
not be seen as an ordinary oence in the eyes of the law.
Henry David oreau’s essay, initially titled Resistance to
Civil Government and later changed to On the Duty of Civil
Disobedience, was one of the most illuminating accounts of
this matter. Although the concept itself has been practiced
since ancient times, oreau was the inventor of the theory
of civil disobedience. oreau expounds in his work on
individualism, conscience, and self-reliance:
It is not a man’s duty, as a matter of course, to devote him-
self to the eradication of any, even the most enormous wrong;
he may still properly have other concerns to engage him; but
it is his duty, at least, to wash his hands of it, and, if he gives
it no thought longer, not to give it practically his support.
Civil Disobedience Today
roughout history, civil disobedience campaigns have
helped to redene the moral parameters of societies, es-
pecially campaigns such as that of Mohandas Gandhi and
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. — both of whom were power-
fully inuenced by oreau’s teachings — have practiced
civil disobedience in conscious and systematic ways. e
historical paradigms of Gandhi, King, women’s surage
movements, and others were rather focused on obtain-
ing fundamental rights for a minority or sovereignty for a
colonized country. ese acts of civil disobedience with
maximalist campaign goals are in contrast to contemporary
campaigns, which do not focus on altering the political sys-
tem but on specic interests such as the environment, nuclear
disarmament, better working conditions, and the like. ese
are better characterized as having comparatively minimal-
ist campaign goals. In recent years, civilian populations
have successfully used civil resistance methods, including
strikes, protests, and other forms of noncooperation,to de-
mand political concessions. ese recent campaigns have
achieved their goals much more oen than campaigns in
the 19th and 20th centuries. is shows that, in general,
maximalist campaign goals are less likely to succeed than
minimalist goals.
“When conventional modes of
political participation...no longer have
any desired eect, then it is more likely to
create political apathy among citizens.”
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RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION
Ronald Inglehart’s theory of silent revolution sheds light
on the shi in contemporary campaigns. Inglehart indi-
cates that citizens of the modern world — due to their so-
cialization in a milieu of absence of interstate war and global
economic prosperity — place a higher value on equality,
belonging, environmental protection, et cetera. Inglehart was
aware of the intergenerational varieties of post-materialism,
but he was thinking only in terms of party identication
when he suggested that “the changes [in basic value priori-
ties] seem to aect the stand one takes on current political
issues and may have a long-term tendency to alter existing
patterns of political partisanship [le or right preferences].”
But strictly thinking in terms of partisanship, Ingelhart’s
theory abandoned the generation eect; that is, that younger
generations have weaker party identication than previous
generations.
When conventional modes of political participa-
tion — the actions of law-abiding citizens including voting,
volunteering for political campaigns, and making campaign
donations — no longer have any desired eect, then it is more
likely to create political apathy among citizens. Obviously,
there is a remarkable trend of continuing decline in party
identication in today’s society. However, the absence of
political interest does not prevent citizens from becoming
members of NGOs, to sign petitions, or to partake in strikes
and other forms of collective actions, which political scien-
tists call “unconventional political participation.” e feeling
of political unrepresentativeness can easily lead citizens to
resort to unconventional political participation, if not to civil
disobedience (the two activities overlap to some extent). It
is obvious that there is a shi in political engagement, in
which the conventional modes are losing their attractiveness.
Even the most liberal states fall short of delivering on
citizens’ expectations. While it will oen be feasible to amend
the shortcomings within the boundaries of the legal system,
sometimes it will only be possible through civil disobedi-
ence. In her essay, Civil Disobedience, Hannah Arendt
refers to civil disobedience as follows:
Civil disobedience arises when a signicant number
of citizens have become convinced either that the normal
channels of change no longer function […], or that, on
the contrary, the government is about to change and has
embarked upon […] modes of action whose legality and
constitutionality are open to grave doubt.
In contrast to oreau, Arendt presents civil disobedi-
ence as a collective action. Arendt’s view on collective action
relies on the work of Nicholas W. Puner, who indicates that
the acts of single individuals are eccentric cases without any
eectiveness, while signicant civil disobedience can only
be practiced by numerous people who have a community
interest. We can identify two main types of motivations for
why citizens — either as individuals or as a group — become
involved in acts of civil disobedience:
1. On moral grounds
• If they are not willing to recognize the tacit consensus
universalis of the state;
• If they are convinced there is no adequate legal alter-
native for the unjust act;
• If they want to prevent acts of signicant evil.
2. On political grounds
• If they begin to lose condence in political processes;
• If they are convinced to change the status quo for the
sake of common good;
•
If they wish to promote their (opposing or innovative)
vision throughout the society.
Eects of Nonviolent Resistance
Gene Sharp’s theory of nonviolence inspired a generation
of historians and politicologists to tackle major questions of
nonviolence through a comparative and historical approach.
One of these studies is presented by Erica Chenoweth and
her co-authors, who have constructed the NAVCO data
set, which includes data on 389 violent and nonviolent
resistance campaigns involving at least 1,000 people each
from 1900 to 2014. Chenoweth and Stephan conclude that
nonviolent movements are more than twice as likely to
succeed than violent campaigns — “success” meaning that a
movement achieves its stated goals, such as regime change,
anti-occupation, or secession within a year of the peak of its
activities. To be clear, here we are talking about strategic
goals (i.e., long-term political eects), not about tactical
goals (e.g., attention, support, and funding).
e data reveal a clear pattern over the last forty years:
Nonviolent campaigns tend to succeed against democracies
and nondemocracies, weak and powerful authorities, concil-
iatory and repressive regimes, especially in view of the fact
that nonviolent campaigns facilitate active participation of
many more people than violent campaigns, thereby provid-
ing a strong headwind against authorities and making hard
to maintain the status quo. e exception to the success of
nonviolent campaigns is against a genocidal regime.
Graph 1: Success rates of nonviolent and violent
campaigns24
Over time, both the frequency and success rate of nonvio-
lent actions have increased in all parts of the world. What
is striking in Graph 1 is that nonviolent campaigns have
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RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION
become enormously more eective and frequent, compared
to violent campaigns, beginning in the 1980s.
Methods of Nonviolent Resistance
Gene Sharp has also explained the mechanisms through
which nonviolent resistance methods can work. Sharp has
founded 198 methods ranging from formal and informal
statements to economic boycotts, and we can add plenty of
new technological methods to Sharp’s list such as digital ac-
tivism and the use of open source communication channels.
We cannot say that digital tools have led to massive col-
lective actions in streets and squares. In general, there are
fewer people showing up than in the 1990s or early 2000s;
however, the use of digital tools have made collective actions
more eective thanks to hyper-connectedness, for the simple
reason that protesters are able to organize in a decentralized
way, and they do not need a leader or elaborate a strategy.
For instance, no one has claimed to be the originator of
the yellow vest symbol, but the gilets jaunes movement has
become the longest-running protest in France. is move-
ment serves as a good example of how civil disobedience
has evolved in a decentralized way and has spread to every
corner of the country.
Conclusion
Hyper-connectivity is an important factor in civil resist-
ance campaigns. It allows people to organize very quickly,
without requiring a leader to disseminate the resistance
strategy because the strategy disseminates horizontally.
e crucial factor is to preserve the nonviolent character of
the civil resistance. Even though violent methods sometimes
work, the long-term consequences leave much to be desired
because the political elite formed by the insurgents will soon
attempt to consolidate their power and try to ward o the
potential for new mass protests.
To retaliate, a state can use its repressive apparatus and
deploy digital blackouts, but this twentieth century power
structure is under strong pressure. Moreover, stated in
simplest terms, there is no state in history that has been
able to entirely avoid civil disobedience or maintain in-
nite authority. If civil disobedience is here to stay, then
it is of paramount importance that law is compatible and
political institutions exible enough to endure — in Arendt’s
words — “the onslaught of change” without provoking a civil
war or revolution.
H S holds a master’s degree in political science from
Free University of Brussels. As a researcher, he continues his
activities at inkout — a European think tank focusing on human
rights and hate crimes. He regularly presents his insights and policy
recommendations at international conferences of the UN and OSCE.
E
1 Brian Martin, “Gene Sharp’s theory of power,” Journal of Peace Research
26, no. 2 (1989): 213-222.
2 Sharon Erickson Nepstad, Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the
Late 20th Century, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
3 omas C. Schelling, “Some Questions on Civilian Defense,” In Adam
Roberts (ed.), Civilian Resistance as a National Defence: Nonviolent Action
against Aggression (Harrisburg: Stackpole, 1967): 351-52.
4 Carl Cohen, Civil Disobedience: Conscience, Tactics, and the Law, (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1971).
5 Candince Delmas, “Civil Disobedience, Punishment, and Injustice,”
In Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan (eds.), e Palgrave
Handbook of Applied Ethics and the Criminal Law (Cham: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2019): 167-188.
6 Kimberley Brownlee, “Civil Disobedience,” e Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, (2017), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), plato.stanford.edu/entries/
civil-disobedience.
7 Bruce W. Cahoon, A Teacher’s Guide to the Signet Classics Edition of
Walden and “Civil Disobedience” by Henry David oreau, (New York:
Penguin, 2013).
8 Henry David oreau, Civil Disobedience and Other Essays, (New York:
Dover Publications, 1993).
9 Kimberley Brownlee, “Civil Disobedience,” e Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, (2017), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), plato.stanford.edu/entries/
civil-disobedience.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: e
Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conict, (New York: Colombia University Press,
2011).
13 Ronald Inglehart, “e Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational
Change in Post-Industrial Societies,” e American Political Science Review
65, no. 4 (December 1971): 991-1017.
14 Ibid.
15 Pew Research Center, “e Generation Gap in American Politics,”
Internet, https://www.people-press.org/2018/03/01/the-generation-gap-in-
american-politics (date accessed: 23 December 2019).
16 Ten-Herng Lai, “Justifying Uncivil Disobedience,” Oxford Studies in
Political Philosophy 5, (2019): 90-114.
17 Hannah Arendt, “Reections: Civil Disobedience,” Internet, https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/1970/09/12/reections-civil-disobedience
(date accessed: 10 December 2019).
“Politically speaking, the civil
disobedient still accepts the frame
of an established authority and a
judicial system, in contrast to the
revolutionary.”
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RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION
18 Nicholas W. Puner, “Civil Disobedience: An Analysis and Rationale,”
New York University Law Review 43, no: 714 (October 1968).
19 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, (New York: A.A. Knopf,
1945): 419. “e republican government exists in America, without
contention or opposition, without proof or arguments, by a tacit agreement,
a sort of consensus universalis.”
20 Gene Sharp, e Politics of Nonviolent Action, (Boston: Porter Sargent,
1973).
21 Erica Chenoweth and Shay Christopher Wiley, “NAVCO 1.2 Dataset,”
Harvard Dataverse V2 (2019).
22 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: e
Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conict, (New York: Colombia University Press,
2011).
23 Ibid.
24 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, “How the world is proving
Martin Luther King right about nonviolence,” Internet, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/18/how-the-world-
is-proving-mlk-right-about-nonviolence (date accessed: 4 January 2020).
25 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: e
Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conict, (New York: Colombia University Press,
2011).
26 Gene Sharp, e Politics of Nonviolent Action, (Boston: Porter Sargent,
1973).
27 Gene Sharp, “198 Methods of Nonviolent Action,” Internet, https://
www.aeinstein.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/198-Methods.pdf (date
accessed: 4 January 2020).
28 John Licheld, “Just who are the gilets jaunes?,” Internet, https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/09/who-really-are-the-gilets-jaunes (date
accessed: 4 March 2019).
29 Michael Orekoya, “e Global Surge Of Populist Protests In 2019: A
Review,” Internet, https://www.legalnaija.com/2019/12/the-global-surge-of-
populist-protests.html (date accessed: 1 January 2019).
30 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: e
Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conict, (New York: Colombia University Press,
2011).
31 Michael Sa, “Protests rage around the world – but what comes next?,”
Internet, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/25/protests-rage-
around-the-world-hong-kong-lebanon-chile-catalonia-iraq (date accessed:
2 January 2020).
32 Hannah Arendt, “Reections: Civil Disobedience,” Internet, https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/1970/09/12/reections-civil-disobedience
(date accessed: 30 December 2019).
Resisting
Authoritarianism:
The Internet and
Civil Society
R A
e editorial of Foreign Aairs magazine’s September/Octo-
ber 2018 issue starts on a wistful note, “History is lled with
supposed lost utopias, and there is no greater cliché than
to see one’s own era as a lamentable decline from a previ-
ous golden age.” It goes on to say, “And as we explored the
Internet’s future for this Issue’s lead package, it became clear
this was one of those times.” By ‘lost utopia’, they mean the
much touted promise and potential of the internet during its
early years: bringing people together, expanding prosperity,
freedoms, and helping to spread democracy. e early lit-
erature on the Internet during the 1990s and the early 2000s
is lled with scholars and academics debating its impact on
economic openness and political liberalization. Yet, within
a decade the dream has turned sour, as the Foreign Aairs
dolefully concluded. While it has certainly been a force
for good, it has also, especially in recent years, become a
potent tool in the hands of the authoritarian governments
looking to block democracy and freedoms everywhere in-
cluding through intervention into the democratic process
in advanced democracies.
e other element of the “lost utopia” of democratiza-
tion was supposed to be the large-scale proliferation of
civil society organizations in all the countries of the world.
ese organizations were expected to diuse political power
throughout society by promoting high levels of associational
dierentiation — corporatization of citizens. ey would act
in concert with each other to resist the abuse of executive
power — a key feature of a thriving democracy. At the turn of
the millennium, the dream seemed within sight, but things
quickly unraveled around 2004 — making this other dream
turn sour as well. Both of these potent forces for promotion
of democracy thus have hit a roadblock, but it need not be
insurmountable. e Internet and Civil Society still have a
“e complicated history of new
mass communications technologies
should temper today’s optimism, and
also alert us to their pitfalls if they
are weaponized by the authoritarian
powers of the world.”
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RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION
chance to be revived for the future of democracy through
resistance and retaliation against authoritarian attacks on
democracy.
Internet Freedom
Larry Diamond, the prominent political scientist
fromStanford, calls the internet “liberation technology,” a term
he denes as any form of information and communication
technology that can expand political, social and economic
freedom. Further expounding on the concept of liberation
technology, he goes on to say, “In the contemporary era, it
means essentially the modern, interrelated forms of digital
ICT — the computer, the Internet, the mobile phone, and
countless innovative applications for them, including ‘new
social media’ such as Facebook and Twitter.”
Larry Diamond says of the unprecedented nature of this
latest technology, ‘… the Internet’s decentralized character
and ability (along with mobile-phone networks) to reach
large numbers of people very quickly, are well suited to
grassroots organizing. In sharp contrast to radio and
television, the new ICTs are two-way and even multiway
forms of communication.” Because the internet is two-way
and unlike any other ICT before, it had huge implications
for political development and thus democracy. e impact
would be positive and unidirectional, in that it would result
in more democracy i.e guaranteed individual freedoms,
economic openness and political liberalization.
But this is not the rst time a new technology has been
called revolutionary and emancipatory. e invention of the
printing press in the eenth century also inaugurated an era
of optimism, and for a while it delivered very well. Some of
the watershed events of human history, like the Renaissance,
the Reformation, and the scientic revolution all came
to be, in part, due to the advent of technology. However,
these dening eras in human history were also facilitated
by the rise of the centralized state and the rst wave of
censorship. Moreover, as argued by Benedict Anderson in
his famous book, “Imagined Communities”, the printing
press also facilitated the rise of nationalism, which led to
much suering for humankind. e complicated history
of new mass communications technologies should temper
today’s optimism, and also alert us to their pitfalls if they
are weaponized by the authoritarian powers of the world.
Some glimpses into the power of the internet inspire
hope. e outrage expressed by Chinese citizens against the
world’s preeminent authoritarian power for the silencing of
Li Wenlian, the doctor who warned of the coronavirus in the
early days of its outbreak is a case in point. e internet’s
power in mobilizing citizens against authoritarians is also
established by the Color Revolutions in Eastern European
countries during the mid-2000s and the Arab Spring of 2011.
Around 2004, something went wrong with the internet’s
potential and promise for democracy. In 2016, news broke
of sophisticated information operations enacted to inter-
fere in the ongoing presidential elections in the U.S.. e
brazen attack on the world’s strongest democracy made it
clear that authoritarian powers were no longer content in
defensively fending o information owing into and within
their countries, but that they were now moved to oensively
deploy asymmetrical technological attacks over the internet
as a weapon against democracies.
e brazen interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential
election has signicantly deepened polarization among the
American people. Authoritarian powers stoked social and
political divisions during the elections making it the most
bitter presidential elections in recent U.S. history. e main
perpetrators of the 2016 election interference is believed
to be RussianInternet Research Agency (IRA). Brookings
reported how the Russians used “trolls” (human-operated
fake accounts) and “bots” (automatic, or machine-controlled
accounts) to interfere in U.S. elections by spreading fake
news and disinformation. e July 2018 indictment of twelve
Russian agents by Special Counsel Robert Mueller, who led
the investigations on Russian interference, revealed that the
IRA engaged in ‘information warfare’ in order to disrupt
the 2016 presidential election and assist Donald Trump’s
candidacy. Troll farms linked to a close aide of Putin, used
the Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube platforms
to inuence the voting public in the U.S., mostly through
thousands of fake ‘bot’ accounts and misleading advertis-
ing. e content of the disinformation campaign targeted
Hillary Clinton and promoted Trump’s candidacy. IRA trolls
“...produced materials intended to promote pro-Trump and
anti-Clinton hashtags on Twitter, including #TrumpTrain,
#MAGA #Hillary4Prison.” According to data released by
Twitter going back to 2016, around 770 Twitter accounts
with 10 million tweets and 2 million media posts, such as
videos and images, could be traced back to Iran.
Freedom House’s annual Freedom on the Net Report
2019 titled, “e Crisis of Social Media”, says that the in-
ternet freedom is declining for the ninth consecutive year.
According to the report, “Of the 65 countries assessed, 33
have been on an overall decline since June 2018, compared
with 16 that registered net improvements. e biggest score
declines took place in Sudan and Kazakhstan followed by
Brazil, Bangladesh, and Zimbabwe.” Obviously, there are
other factors that compound the problem of democracy and
freedoms in these countries, but the scale of loss of internet
“Authoritarian powers stoked
social and political divisions
during the elections making
it the most bitter presidential
elections in recent U.S. history.”
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RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION
freedom is signicant in these countries. e report from the
year before shed light on eorts taken by sovereign countries
to reduce internet freedom. According to the most recent
report, thirty-six countries attended trainings and seminars
on, “new media” or “information management”, seventeen
governments approved or proposed laws controlling the
internet in the name of countering fake news.
According to Ron Deibert, the extent and scope of con-
trols placed on cyberspace is pervasive, ranging from the
“rst generation” of overt controls to the most advanced,
“third generation” form of controls with subtler and harder-
to-detect controls. To understand the complexity and extent
of the controls, he writes, “Over time, authoritarians have
developed an arsenal that extends from technical measures,
laws, policies, and regulations, to more covert and oensive
techniques such as the targeted malware attacks and cam-
paigns to co-opt social media.” e authoritarian groups
around the world are also pushing to include their preferred
cyberspace policies in norm-setting international confer-
ences and online documents. is is a worrying signal, in
that it reveals the will of authoritarian leaders to shrink and
scuttle internet freedom.
It is with this backdrop in mind that democracy promot-
ers must frame the issue of internet freedom, because of its
key role in the emerging contest between democracy and
autocracy. Authoritarians have exploited the openness of
advanced democracies and deployed ‘sharp power’ against
them, while at the same time shielding themselves from
democratic inuence through censorship. As the inuence
and prestige of powerful authoritarian states is on the rise,
it will only embolden their will and capacity to control the
internet. It is quite likely that more brazen and direct attacks
will be launched against democracies over the internet. Just
as the printing press and the telegraph both became tools
of authoritarian and nationalist agendas in the hands of
authoritarian forces, so will be in the case of the internet.
Yet it will be more devastating and compounding because
of its dynamic nature and global reach.
e democratic response to internet freedom is still
evolving. In 2010, realizing that the internet project was
hitting a roadblock, the tentative U.S. policy was outlined by
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. e U.S. would promote
internet freedom which included access to information and
data resources like Wikipedia, Google, Facebook, Amazon,
etc, and help individuals create their own content, and give
them the ability to interact with each other without undue
and unconstitutional government interference. e strategy
also included funding for developing tools to evade the
controls and lters placed by all governments.
In 2011, the Obama administration issued ‘International
Strategy for Cyberspace’ setting its objective to ensure that
the internet is, “open, interoperable, secure, and reliable”
and warned against a “fragmented internet.” e Trump
administration has stuck to the same strategy. One possible
solution to protect it from authoritarian manipulation is
building “e Internet Freedom League”. e league would
be a “virtual Schengen area” but better. ose violating the
principle of free ow of information would be blocked from
access to vital internet services and data mines like Facebook,
Microso, Amazon etc. It is unclear how successful such
a strategy would be. e other solution is to use the same
tools and methods to deny access to such powers to an
open internet. Joseph Nye, however, cautions against such
censorship saying it would result in loss of the moral and
strategic ground enjoyed by democracies today.
While there may be disagreements on the specics of a
response from the democratic world, a consensus is emerg-
ing that an active and comprehensive strategy is long overdue.
e sooner it takes shapes and nds steam, the better.
Civil Society
Expansion of space for civil society organizations is a
signicant component of democracy assistance programs.
At the turn of the millennium, the world was on the cusp
of an ‘associational revolution’, writes Douglas Rutzen.All
indications were visible for most citizens of the world to
corporatize into NGOs, unions, and other forms of associa-
tions paving the way for a durable democracy. Such hope
is a long-held belief of democratization scholars that the
more NGOs, unions and other forms of organizations like
political parties, interest groups a society has, the more
likely it is that democracy will consolidate in those states.
Non-Governmental Organizations have a powerful presence
and impact on all aspects of peoples’ lives around the world.
Perhaps, jolted by the ubiquity and eectiveness of NGOs,
authoritarian leaders and governments have resented them.
e resentment did not translate into any serious crackdown
on civil society organizations until the Rose Revolution in
Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine rattled the
authoritarian overlords, particularly Vladimir Putin. Fareed
Zakaria writes that senior Russians ocers called the color
revolutions, ‘... a new form of warfare invented by Western
governments seeking to remove independently-minded
national governments in favor of ones controlled by the
West.’ is is a common narrative spread by authoritarian
powers to undercut the legitimacy of the demands made by
civil society organizations. In some countries civil society
organizations and activists are branded foreign agents and
harassed.
e second spell of pressure on squeezing NGOs came in
the aermath of the Arab Spring. Frightened by the scale of
“Reclaiming the civil
society space lost to
authoritarians should be
a top priority.”
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Georgetown University | The Center for Democracy and Civil Society
RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION
mobilization of people against governments in the Middle
East, authoritarian and hybrid countries around the world
doubled down on civil society organizations. More than 120
laws restricting NGOs were enacted in 60 countries in the
aermath of the Arab Spring, according to e International
Center for Not-For-Prot Law.Such unfortunate barriers
are being built at a time when democracy is stalling every-
where, and authoritarianism has staged a comeback. e so-
called ‘Big Five’ authoritarian countries are engaged in what
has been called ‘authoritarian cooperation’, mutual learning,
and learning through diusion eects. omas Ambrosio
denes diusion as, ‘…the spread of autocratic practices and
ideas from dominant autocratic powers to potential takers
around the world.’Autocratic diusion is a very powerful
weapon against democracy because, according to Strang, ‘…
prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters
the probability of adoption for remaining non-adopters.’ It
is ‘…an uncoordinated, unilateral, predominantly horizontal
process through which political, policy or institutional in-
novations spread from an innovator or precedent to learners,
imitators or emulators.’ e main thrust of this collaboration
is not only preventing democracy from taking root, but also
propping up their authoritarian allies.
Reclaiming the civil society space lost to authoritarians
should be a top priority. A carrot and stick policy to achieve
this end seems workable. Sanctioning bad behavior, while
at the same time incentivizing good behavior through trade
opportunities has worked before and can work again. For
example, the EU reduces taris on imports from countries
under its Generalized Systems of Preferences, contingent
upon the countries adhering to a number of conditions in-
cluding those of upholding human rights. One might argue
that there is no need for new legal strings since the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights exist. e problems
with these covenants is that they are hard to implement in
very specic incentivizing and punitive ways. More direct,
immediate, and material costs on behavior detrimental to
democratic governance. Regional and other economic blocs
can construct such legal barriers and construct pathways
into their markets of trade and knowledge.
Another important measure for civil society consolida-
tion is the issue of funding. Currently, most of the NGOs are
mainly reliant on foreign sources of funding. e funds from
the United Nations, the World Bank, OECD, and the EU and
the U.S. are used by governments in weaker democracies or
authoritarian states as ‘proof’ of naked Western imperialism.
A narrative like that is hard to resist in some places of the
world, because it ts neatly with the manufactured national
discourses of many countries. Not only are allegations like
those used to pass punitive and restrictive laws for NGOs,
they also result in real and clear danger to the physical well
being of many activists. Helping domestic organizations
build endowment funds, investment opportunities may help
them grow nationally. e world of democracy is undoubt-
edly in a crisis, and all aspects of democratic systems must
be activated to emerge from the crisis.
R A is a democracy and peace activist from Pakistan. He
attended Georgetown’s Democracy and Governance MA program as
a Fulbright scholar and graduated in 2019. You can follow him on
Twitter @riazmda.
E
1 “World War Web: What’s Inside Foreign Aairs,” Foreign
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issue-packages/2018-08-14/world-war-web
2 Larry Diamond, “Liberation Technology.” Journal of Democracy, vol.
21, no. 3, 2010, pp. 69–83. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/
liberation-technology/
3 Ibid.
4 Anderson, Benedict R. O. G. Imagined Communities: Reections on the
Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1991. Print.
5 V. Hu “Hero who told the truth: Chinese rage over coronavirus
death of whistleblower doctor”(2020, February 7). e Guardian.
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coronavirus-chinese-rage-death-whistleblower-doctor-li-wenliang
6 Elad Segev, and Tamir Sheafer, Gadi Wolfsfeld, “Social Media
and the Arab Spring: Politics Comes First,” e International Journal
of Press/Politics, 18, no. 2 (January 16, 2013): 115–137. https://doi.
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7 Cory Bennet and Tim Starks, “Key Takeaways from the Russia
Indictment,” Politico, February 16, 2018, https://www.politico.com/
story/2018/02/16/mueller-indictment-russia-takeaways-353667.
8 Sara Salinas, “Twitter Says it Found more than 10 Million Posts by
‘Potentially State-Backed’ Iranian and Russian Accounts Dating Back to
2009,” CNBC, October 17, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/17/twitter-
found-10-million-posts-by-iran-russia-backed-accounts.html.
9 Adrian Shahbaz and Allie Funk, “Freedom on the Net 2019,”
Freedom House, 2019, https://www.freedomonthenet.org/sites/default/
les/2019-11/11042019_Report_FH_FOTN_2019_nal_Public_Download.
pdf.
10 Adrian Shahbaz, “Freedom on the Net 2108: e Rise of Digital
Authoritarianism,” Freedom House, March 7, 2020, https://freedomhouse.
org/report/freedom-net/2018/rise-digital-authoritarianism.
11 Ronald Deibert, “Authoritarianism Goes Global:
Cyberspace Under Siege,” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 3 (July
2015): 64-78, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/
authoritarianism-goes-global-cyberspace-under-siege/.
12 Christopher Walker, “What Is ‘Sharp Power’?” Journal of Democracy
23, no. 3 (July 2018): 9-23, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/
what-is-sharp-power/.
13 “International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and
Openness in a Networked World,” e White House, May 2011, https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/les/rss_viewer/international_
strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf.
14 Richard A. Clarke and Rob Knake, “e Internet Freedom League,”
Foreign Aairs, 2019, https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/2019-08-12/
internet-freedom-league.
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15 Joseph Nye, “How Sharp Power reatens So Power,” Foreign Aairs,
January 24, 2018, https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/china/2018-01-24/
how-sharp-power-threatens-so-power.
16 Douglas .Rutzen, “Authoritarianism Goes Global (II): Civil
Society Under Assault.” Journal of Democracy, vol. 26, no. 4,
2015, pp. 28–39. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/
authoritarianism-goes-global-ii-civil-society-under-assault/
17 Gorenburg, Dmitry. PONARS Eurasia. Policy Memo: 342 September
2014. Accessed December 12, 2018, a new form of warfare invented by
Western governments seeking to remove independently minded national
governments in favor of ones controlled by the West.
https://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/countering-color-revolutions-
russia%E2%80%99s-new-security-strategy-and-its-implications-us-policy
18 CRS Report. “ Closing Space: Restrictions on Civil Society Around the
World and U.S. Responses.” April 8, 2016. https://www.everycrsreport.com/
reports/R44458.html
19 Ambrosio, omas. “Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian
Diusion: Concepts, Dynamics, and Future Research.” International Studies
Perspectives 11, no. 4 (2010): 375-92. www.jstor.org/stable/44218696
Haitian Protests,
Democratic Alignment,
and Holes in
U.S. Rhetoric
J M
e ongoing political protests in Haiti necessitate a critical
examination of the United States’ proclaimed commitment
to spreading democracy and global prosperity. A large fac-
tion of people in Haiti have been actively protesting against
their president, Jovenel Moïse, for the better part of the last
year. ey claim that Moïse’s administration is corrupt and
anti-democratic. e Haitian National Police has been
widely accused of violent oppression. e
U.S., however,
continues to support the Moïse regime and provide nan-
cial assistance to the state police. e consistent protests
in Haiti have drawn international media coverage, allowing
normal citizens in nations across the world to ponder the
consequences of international involvement in the small Car-
ibbean nation. Meanwhile, the U.S. is casting harsh economic
sanctions against Venezuela in an attempt to weaken the
incumbent socialist government led by Nicholas Maduro.
Comparing the U.S.’ contradictory response to the political
crisis in Haiti to the crisis in Venezuela illustrates that the
U.S.’ advertised goals of democratic alignment and reduction
of international poverty deeply conict with reality.
Instead, these aunted goals serve as a guise to conceal
sustained eorts to put free markets over public will, and
international business prots over humanitarian care. Ad-
ditionally, due solely to these large-scale protests by a sig-
nicant section of the Haitian public, international media
coverage has begun to shed light on the dark consequences
of U.S. involvement in the country. It is critical to note that
these patterns of U.S. involvement are not a unique product
of the current U.S. presidency, but rather run deep into the
roots of U.S. history, and cannot be easily transformed. is
essay will contend that Haitian people who are outraged and
oppressed by their government have no current avenue for
eective political change other than protest. Additionally, the
protests have successfully brought international awareness
and allow U.S. citizens to actively understand the U.S.’ role
in supporting the repressive Haitian regime.
Protests continue to mount in Haiti, and the overall vio-
lence seems to have no end. e people want their president,
Jovenel Moïse, to step down, and claim that the elections
which brought him to oce were corrupted and fraudulent.
But the people of Haiti are protesting against a system much
grander than one controversial presidency. e people are
ghting for an uprising powerful enough to push foriegn
inuence out of their country. To understand the determi-
nation of the Haitian people and the paramount nature of
their protests takes an understanding of Haitian history,
both distant and near.
Since independence, the people of Haiti have been
consistently exploited by foreign inuence, and have con-
tinually chosen to push back with concerted struggles for
self-determination. Aer the Haitian people fought for and
gained independence in 1804, France –their former colo-
nizer– quickly imposed an astronomical debt of twenty-one
billion USD on Haiti, which the young nation paid through
1947 at the expense of self-investment. France (along with
the United States) claimed that this was “compensation”
for colonial slave owners’ loss of capital. Exploiting this
nancial vulnerability, the U.S. occupied Haiti from 1915
to 1934, eventually installing a brutal right-wing dictator-
ship headed by Papa Doc Duvalier, and later succeeded
by his son. Aer years of protest and constant civil unrest,
the younger Duvalier was removed. Despite this, a series
of military regimes maintained the status quo for another
four years. Again, it was only aer constant protest and civil
“…these patterns of U.S.
involvement are not a unique
product of the current U.S.
presidency, but rather run deep
into the roots of U.S. history, and
cannot be easily transformed.”
14
Georgetown University | The Center for Democracy and Civil Society
RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION
unrest that the Haitian people realized their ultimate goal:
free and fair elections.
In the elections of 1990, the Haitian people made their
choice clear: the overwhelming majority elected leist min-
ister Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Aer the U.S. learned that
Aristide would stay true to distributive socialist goals for
the country, the U.S. government led a coup removing him
from oce. However, considerable public outrage forced
the U.S. to reinstate Aristide under strict conditions in 1994.
In 2000, Aristide won the election again. He continued to
act against U.S. interests and, consequently, was removed
by force through another U.S.-facilitated coup, eectively
installing another undemocratic, right-wing leader. Inter-
vention expanded as a United Nations core group, repre-
senting the U.S. and several other nations, was called in
to coordinate what was deceivingly called a “transitional
election.” Movement leaders in Haiti maintain that these
elections have been fraudulent and not a true reection of
the public will.
Today, the U.S. supports a free market economy and
democratic progress in Haiti to increase GDP and stability.
However, the main political opposition group, the Lavalas
Political Organization, calls attention to other factors to
assess the state of their country. ey note that the impov-
erished masses are denied proper healthcare and education.
Costs of goods such as fuel have been rising. e Petro-
Caribe scandal — in which the Haitian government lost
account of two billion USD intended to be spent on social
programs — has been damaging to the social fabric. Sup-
porters of the Lavalas Political Organization see the wealth
of natural resources in Haiti being extracted, and the prots
only obtained by elites and international businesses. In ad-
dition, there has been a deterioration of public services such
as trash pickup and other sanitation works. And within all
of this, contentions over whether a free and fair ballot box
exists in Haiti have been brewing for over a decade. e
protesters have found that they cannot make valid change
without a functioning democracy.
Compounding the repression, government violence be-
gan to climb aer people started protesting the election of
businessman Jovenel Moïse in 2016. e violence came to a
head on November 1, 2018, in what is now known as the La
Saline massacre. In the impoverished neighborhood of Port-
au-Prince known as La Saline, estimates contend that hun-
dreds of Haitians were murdered or injured, and hundreds
more displaced. Furthering the oppression, the Haitian
government established and weaponized paramilitaries to
work with the police to carry out this terrorization of the La
Saline people. ese paramilitaries have been falsely labeled
as “gangs,” both by the Haitian government — seeking to
immunize itself from responsibility for the repression — and
by the U.S. mainstream media — perpetuating a common
racist narrative linking black populations and gang violence.
La Saline — a long-time stronghold of the oppositional
Fanmi Lavalas Political Organization, the party of Aristide
— endured damage to infrastructure such as schools, homes,
and hospitals. e people of La Saline, as documented by
rst-hand observers, are clear that the killings were ordered
by Moïse’s party in association with the national police. It
is then no wonder that the people of Haiti are taking to the
streets. eir autonomy is at stake once again. Government-
sponsored police are repressive and violent, infrastructure
has been damaged, and those born into poverty lack eco-
nomic mobility. In addition, elections in Haiti are only a
matter of performance: democracy has been eectively
undermined to the point of illegitimacy.
Despite the 2018 massacre and the ongoing protests, the
U.S.’ role in Haiti has not changed. e U.S. government
continues to back Moïse’s presidency — a presidency that
strongly promotes international free market interests at
the expense of public investment — with large amounts of
funding for the Haitian national police. Despite the recent
wake of mainstream media covering the ongoing protests
over the last several months of 2019, a U.S. response remains
absent. With the Haitian protests being made visible in the
U.S., increased public outcry could incentivize Congress
to reexamine U.S. foriegn policy. Currently, there is a dou-
ble standard in regards to democracy promotion and U.S.
economic interests.
A critical illustration of this double standard is seen in the
U.S.’ ongoing eorts to impose regime change in Venezuela.
In contrast to Haiti, the U.S. imposes a coercive economic
embargo against Venezuela to intentionally weaken the
government of Nicolas Maduro. Despite the same issues
of questionable elections and allegations of government-
backed violence in both states, the U.S. is only intervening in
Venezuela. In addition, instead of working with Venezualans
and other actors to create a truly functioning democracy,
the U.S. is leading a campaign to foment undemocratic re-
gime change. Juan Guaidó, the opposition leader backed
and nancially supported by the U.S., has never stood for
a presidential election, has been linked to paramilitaries,
and is widely discredited within the country as a viable
candidate. ere have already been several failed coup
attempts in Venezuela, including one in the spring of this
year. e eorts rage on.
Now, all Venezuelan assets have been frozen by the U.S.,
and crippling economic sanctions have been imposed on
the Maduro government, deeply hurting the people that the
U.S. claims to protect. Not only are the people of Venezuela
being dramatically harmed by these sanctions, but so are
the people of Haiti, as fuel shortages amount due to their
inability to access Venezuelan oil. All of this damage is
“…elections in Haiti are only a
matter of performance: democracy
has been eectively undermined to
the point of illegitimacy.”
15
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RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION
done to weaken Maduro’s government to allow for the rise
of the right-wing, pro-foreign-investment opposition.
If the U.S. was to be true to their oen-stated goal of ad-
vancing democracy and protecting the world’s poor, Ha iti’s
government would be a primary focus of intervention. As
these cases underscore, U.S. promotion of democracy should
be seen as an unsubstantiated goal; it stands as a pretense.
e double standard is this: the U.S. promotes democracy
only if doing so supports their economic goals. More dev-
astatingly, the U.S. is liable to actively corrupt democracy
if its capital interests are at stake, oen at the expense of
human rights and human freedoms. If these priorities were
otherwise, the realities on the ground in Haiti and Venezuela
would be far from what is seen today.
ese policies, however, are not simply a reection of
the current U.S. administration. Rather, these goals are a
continuation of the long-held historical relationship between
the U.S. government and the promotion of global capitalism.
As is well known, during the Cold War the U.S. continually
overthrew democratically-elected leist leaders in favor of
oppressive right-wing regimes. Along with promoting free
markets to serve U.S. economic interests, it was critical that
the governments which the U.S. installed should be politically
resilient and stable. ese two factors created the rationale
behind letting right-wing dictators in Latin America commit
massive humanitarian crimes with impunity. ese realities
are evidenced by the Cold War histories of Guatemala, Chile,
El Salvador, Argentina, Brazil, and so on. Unfortunately
for many, as evidenced by the present-day foreign policy
double standard described, critical and shameful aspects of
U.S. Cold War politics remain. is all evidences the power
behind the forces Hatian protesters face.
With this in mind, the U.S.’ silence on the massacre of the
La Saline people, as well as the ongoing protests, should be
no surprise. It is in line with the U.S.’ long held neoliberal
economic and geopolitical interests and beliefs. ese histor-
ical staples are hard to change; the international businesses
beneting from Moïse’s calls for foreign investment can
fuel campaign contributions in the U.S. e U.S. Congress,
with few exceptions, has done nothing to imply anything
but subservience to corporate desires. In addition, public
knowledge of horric events in developing countries, such
as the massacre in La Saline, is limited.
In recent months, though, with the continued protests
in Haiti and the loss of lives and injuries suered by the
protesters, the mainstream media has begun covering their
demands. However, this coverage is eeting. It is critical now
for the international public to listen carefully to the Haitian
protests, and understand the harm that the current Haitian
government, backed by foreign interests such as those of
the U.S., has brought onto the spirited nation. As the media
coverage is waning, it is imperative to understand that the
struggles of the Haitian people are not.
Reecting on the role of political protest, Haitians have
had no other option to express their deep plight in the midst
of a repressive government and the absence of true democ-
racy. A dierent set of foreign policies guiding the U.S. can
curb support for repressive regimes abroad. But new policies
will not appear without U.S. citizens’ recognizing the suf-
fering of others and being galvanized to voice their support
for a more humanitarian-conscious set of principles guiding
U.S. foreign policy ideals. It is imperative for people outside
of Haiti to understand the validity and historical necessity
of these protests. Now, the demands are able to be listened
to, and the inciting events have reason to be understood.
In all, these protests have brought newfound international
awareness that would otherwise be absent, and has indirectly
allowed U.S. citizens to consider whether their government
is promoting values consistent with their rhetoric, or have,
instead, hurt the international community for domestic gain.
For more information on Haiti, check out this podcast
produced by the Latinx Research Center at UC Berkeley on
the current political crisis: https://soundcloud.com/user-
492842409-340929424/riot-or-uprising-a-conversation-with-
pierre -labbossiere-on-the-haitian-crisis.
J M is a research apprentice of the Latinx Research
Center at UC Berkeley (https://lrc.berkeley.edu). He is a third year
political science major, intending to minor in global studies.
E
1 “Fanmi Lavalas statement: Crisis and resolution, plan for Haiti’s future,”
San Francisco Bay View National Black Newspaper, January 17, 2019, https://
sayview.com/2019/01/fanmi-lavalas-statement-crisis-and-resolution-
plan-for-haitis-future/; Rachelle Krygier, “Daily protests are paralyzing
Haiti. Here’s why,” Washington Post, October 14, 2019, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/daily-protests-are-paralyzing-
haiti-heres-why/2019/10/14/aba02aba-ee9f-11e9-bb7e-d2026ee0c199_story.
html .
2 Jacqueline Charles, “Amnesty International to Haiti president:
End excessive force against protesters,” Miami Herald, October 31,
2019, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/
americas/haiti/article236868528.html; “U.S. Relations With Haiti,”
U.S. Department of State, accessed January 7, 2020, https://www.state.
gov/u-s-relations-with-haiti/.
3 “Venezuela-Related Sanctions,” U.S. Department of State, accessed
February 19, 2020, https://www.state.gov/venezuela-related-sanctions/.
4 Carrie Kohn, “Anti-Government Protesters In Haiti Vow To Resume
Demonstrations In 2020,” NPR, December 31, 2019, https://www.npr.
org/2019/12/31/792545304/anti-government-protesters-in-haiti-vow-to-
resume-demonstrations-in-2020.
“…it was only aer constant
protest and civil unrest that the
Haitian people realized their
ultimate goal: free and fair
elections.”
16
Georgetown University | The Center for Democracy and Civil Society
RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION
5 Ibid.
6 Kim Willsher, “France urged to repay Haiti billions paid for its
independence” e Guardian, August 15, 2010, https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2010/aug/15/france-haiti-independence-debt.
7 Ann Crawford-Roberts, “A History of United States Policy Towards
Haiti,” Brown University Library, accessed January 7, 2020, https://library.
brown.edu/create/modernlatinamerica/chapters/chapter-14-the-united-
states-and-latin-america/moments-in-u-s-latin-american-relations/a-
history-of-united-states-policy-towards-haiti/.
8 “U.S. Relations With Haiti,” U.S. Department of State, accessed January
7, 2020, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-haiti/.
9 Tanya Wadhwa, “Was the ‘fuel shortage’ in Haiti an excuse to increase
the price?” Peoples Dispatch, September 19, 2019, https://peoplesdispatch.
org/2019/09/19/was-the-fuel-shortage-in-haiti-an-excuse-to-incre
ase-the-price/.
10 Jacqueline Charles, “Haiti president accused of embezzlement scheme
in government audit of Venezuela aid money,” Miami Herald, June 4, 2019,
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/
article231122978.html.
11 “Fanmi Lavalas statement: Crisis and resolution, plan for Haiti’s future.”
12 Rebecca Hersher, “You Probably Don’t Want To Know About
Haiti’s Sewage Problems,” NPR, July 29, 2017, https://www.npr.org/
sections/goatsandsoda/2017/07/29/537945957/you-probably-
dont-want-to-know-about-haitis-sewage-problems; Ndiaga
Seck, “Children lose access to water, medicine amidst civil unrest
in Haiti,” Unicef, March 1, 2019, https://www.unicef.org/stories/
children-lose-access-water-medicine-amidst-civil-unrest-haiti.
13 “Fair Elections,” Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, accessed
January 7, 2020, http://www.ijdh.org/fair-elections/.
14 Judith Mirkinson and Seth Donnelly, “e LaSaline Massacre
and the Human Rights Crisis in Haiti.” Haiti Action Committee and
National Lawyers Guild, July 8, 2019, https://www.nlg.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/07/e-Lasalin-Massacre-ONLINE-7-11-19-Nat-NLG.pdf.
15 Ibid.
16 “U.S. Relations With Haiti.”
17 Vivian Salama, “U.S. Expands Sanctions Against Venezuela Into
an Embargo,” e Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2019, https://www.
wsj.com/articles/u-s-expands-sanctions-against-venezuela-into-an-
embargo-11565053782.
18 Carrie Kahn, “Trump’s Venezuela Moves Follow Long History Of
Intervention In Latin America,” NPR, February 22, 2019, https://www.npr.
org/2019/02/22/696057482/trumps-venezuela-moves-follow-long-history-
of-intervention-in-latin-america.
19 Tom Phillips and Joe Parkin Daniels, “Venezuela’s Guaidó pictured
with members of Colombian gang,” e Guardian, September
13, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/13/
juan-guaido-faces-questions-over-links-to-organised-groups.
20 David Noriega and Nick Miriello “Here’s what you need
to know about the attempted coup in Venezuela,” Vice, April
30, 2019, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/d3npkm/
heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-attempted-coup-in-venezuela.
21 “Venezuela-Related Sanctions.”
22 Leonie Rauls, “Haitian fuel crisis: Petrocaribe’s collateral damage,”
Global Americans, November 14, 2019, https://theglobalamericans.
org/2019/11/haitian-fuel-crisis-petrocaribes-collateral-damage/.
Coercion and
Contention:
The Interaction of
Sanctions and
Social Movements
H B. A
In January 2020, the United States announced new sanc-
tions against Iran. Yet, despite the continuous leveraging of
sanctions against the country since 1979, the current nadir
in U.S.-Iran relations and Iran’s lack of progress toward a
more liberal state call into question the ecacy of sanctions
in changing states’ behavior or promoting democracy.
While the U.S. has espoused democracy promo-
tion as part of its foreign policy agenda since the early
1900s, the role of civil society in the democratization of
Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s cemented in the
minds of the West, the importance of civil society and
social movements as essential drivers and components
of democracy. Consequently, the U.S. and much of the
international community have embraced support for
civil society and social movements in their pursuit of
democracy promotion.
Sanctions are among the tools available to states to sup-
port social movements abroad. As a middle ground between
diplomacy and military action,
countries have increasingly
used sanctions since the end of the Cold War. Between 1914
and 1945, the United Nations only enacted sanctions twelve
times, but in the 1990s, this increased to over y instances,
mostly targeted against authoritarian regimes. Democrati-
zation has been the most common goal of these sanctions.
As of 2001, 85 percent of U.S. unilateral sanctions had been
leveled against undemocratic regimes.
As pro-democracy social movements engage in conten-
tious politics to change their domestic political context, they
may seek recognition and support from the international
community. For example, international recognition support-
ed the success of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation
in Mexico and Poland’s Solidarity movement. While sanc-
tions may support social movements in drawing attention
to their claims, there is a great deal of academic and policy
debate on sanctions’ eectiveness both in achieving foreign
policy objectives and the democracy-supporting eect of
17
D S Volume 17 –
RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION
sanctions, with many researchers claiming that sanctions
have no impact or may hurt democracy in target nations.
Early critics argued that sanctions only succeed in 5 to
34 percent of cases, and, instead, cause signicant harm to
civilians.
Later, the discourse shied away from whether or
not sanctions work, but under what conditions they are more
or less eective, distinguishing between dierent typologies
of sanctions. e most recent research emphasized how
domestic political conditions in target countries inuence
sanctions’ chances of success.
But how do pro-democracy movements interact with
international sanctions, and what impact do sanctions have
on their strategies and approaches?
Sanctions Debates: Where do Social Movements Fit In?
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Af-
fairs, Ambassador Princeton Lyman, asserted that “only in
combination with engagement, and organized and eective
domestic democratic pressure can sanctions help lead to
transitions to democracy.” Sanctions are found to be more
eective against democratic regimes, and least eective
against closed, authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, those
led by a personalist dictator are more vulnerable to sanctions
than single-party or military-led states.
e extent to which
autocrats can maintain their winning coalitions diminishes
the eectiveness of sanctions in regime change, regardless
of the sentiments of the overall population. Libya, North
Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Russia serve as examples of past sanc-
tions’ failures to prompt liberalization in closed autocracies.
According to punishment theory, the sanctions-induced
economic harm on countries will translate into domestic
political pressure that may cause rulers to comply with
opposition’s demands. Public choice theory argued that
sanctions eect change “through their impact on the relative
political eectiveness of interest groups within the target
country.” e economic impacts may diminish leaders’
access to nancial resources to maintain their political sup-
port while increasing resources to opposition groups to mo-
bilize. Sanctions can increase preexisting internal dissent
or embolden citizen mobilization with the belief that they
will have external support. Domestic groups may be able
to leverage the reputational boost they gain from foreign
pressures to incentivize collective action.
International
sanctions may also communicate new norms to the popu-
lace as they see their government facing condemnation, or
may validate the existing messaging of social movements.
Even the threat of sanctions can induce domestic protests.
Critically, sanctions may open up the political opportunity
structure for social movements to operate—a key factor in
the emergence, operation, and success or failure of social
movements.20
Sanctions do not always have favorable impacts on do-
mestic opposition, however. Sanctions may spur a “rally
around the ag” eect that strengthens the position of the
leaders who then use the international community as a
scapegoat for the country’s woes. Sanctions can result in
increased repression of the opposition, restricted civil liber-
ties, and human rights abuses.
While more demonstrations
occur in sanctioned than non-sanctioned states, this eect
is marginal in autocratic states, and increased government
repression obstructs groups from mobilizing.
Further, if autocrats control access to the black market,
they may have increased funds to pay rents and maintain
loyalty. Sanctions may strengthen the government’s control
of the economy, allowing them to shield themselves from
economic pain and leaving the brunt of it to citizens. e
population may be less available to mobilize as they will
have to focus their time and eorts on economic survival.
Finally, sanctions may promote insularity and reduce the
inow of and sharing of ideas among social movements and
global civil society.
Among these potential impacts, several themes emerge:
the existing political opportunity structure is important, and
when sanctions are imposed on closed political systems the
opportunity structure likely narrows due to increased repres-
sion; sanctions may help or hurt the resource availability to
movements and their ability to mobilize; the signaling impact
of sanctions is a key element that can bolster, legitimize,
and motivate or can be co-opted by undemocratic leaders
to support a rally around the ag eect which closes the
space for anti-government movements.
South Africa’s anti-apartheid struggle and Iran’s pro-
democracy movement are two cases where pro-democracy
domestic movements interacted with sanctions and dem-
onstrate how these interactions inuenced the tactics and
strategies of the movements.
South Africa
South Africa is the most cited case of the successful use of
sanctions. Beginning in the 1940s, South Africa was under
some type of international sanctions until the end of apart-
heid in the 1990s. e domestic anti-apartheid movement
advocated for and supported their use, and most observ-
ers credit sanctions with playing a pivotal role in ending
apartheid. e African National Congress (ANC) made
sanctions advocacy a part of their strategy and dedicated
resources in their London oce to lobby policymakers on
this issue. Sanctions were not a substitute for mass strikes
and mobilization but part of the movement’s repertoire.
“... the U.S. and much of the
international community have
embraced support for civil society
and social movements in their
pursuit of democracy promotion.”
18
Georgetown University | The Center for Democracy and Civil Society
RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION
Importantly, sanctions enjoyed broad support within the
movement from the main organizing groups, the United
Democratic Front, the Congress of South African Trade
Unions, and the ANC.
A key reason for their support was that the movement
felt they had nothing le to lose with sanctions against
their country. As Moses Mayekiso, General Secretary of the
National Union of Metalworkers South Africa, articulated,
“Sanctions hurt but apartheid kills!” e movement was
willing to suer because the harm to the regime outweighed
the damage to the movement. Kaempfer et al. showed that
the decline in employment growth caused by sanctions
was instrumental in enhancing the ability of domestic anti-
apartheid groups to organize labor strikes directed against
the apartheid regime. Sanctions bolstered the domestic
movement’s legitimacy as various international and mul-
tilateral organizations began to recognize the ANC and
the Pan-African Congress formally, while shunning the
apartheid government.
e movement leveraged the sanctions issue to fuel trans-
national activism and link their struggle with other peace
and democracy movements of the time (e.g., Solidarity,
Democracy in China, Sandinistas) to frame their struggle as
part of a broader global movement. is linking “allowed
them to increase education and mobilization for further
sanctions.” In South Africa’s case, social mobilization was
both a cause of sanctions—as the domestic movement ad-
vocated internationally—as well as a consequence of sanc-
tions—as the international anti-apartheid outside of South
Africa mobilized following the sanctions.
Iran
Unlike South Africa, Iran is typically seen as a failure of sanc-
tions. Since 1979, the U.S. has leveraged sanctions against
Iran, at times accompanied by the UN and EU, and usually
for non-compliance on nuclear weapons development or
support for terrorism rather than pro-democracy reasons.
Nevertheless, sanctions have not achieved the desired com-
pliance by Iran regarding terrorism or nuclear weapons, nor
has progress toward democracy occurred. e economic
pressures have not succeeded in creating sucient internal
pressure to result in system change but instead resulted in
more repression.37
Iran’s pro-democracy Green Movement emerged in 2009
in protest to the disputed presidential election, and amid
an ongoing slate of sanctions imposed by the UN and the
U.S.
e movement protested alleged electoral fraud in
favor of the incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and grew
to “a nation-wide force demanding the democratic rights
originally sought in the 1979 revolution.”39
e Green Movement vehemently and deliberately op-
posed sanctions, claiming that sanctions only strengthened
the regime and increased their repression of the opposition.
All major opposition gures in Iran opposed sanctions, mak-
ing similar claims. Furthermore, government-controlled
groups and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard had access to
the black market economy and thus beneted nancially,
while citizens and civil society suered.
Sanctions also
isolated civil society from the resources necessary to connect
with global supporters or access international fora.
Conse-
quently, the Green Movement incorporated anti-sanctions
stances into their messaging and protest slogans.
e Green Movement incorporated sanctions into its
strategic considerations. One reason was to gain popular
support and activate boundaries between the people and
the regime. e Green Movement blamed the Ahmadinejad
government for sanctions and, in doing so, sought to give
the people a reason to mobilize against the regime. is
approach was strategic because they knew that the govern-
ment’s defense of its repression was to claim that pro-democ-
racy groups were in league with the West. By maintaining
an anti-Western sanctions stance and, instead, linking the
regime to the economic pain, the Green Movement sought
popular support. Nevertheless, the Green Movement failed
to withstand the increased pressure that repression inicted
upon the movement or overcome the constricted political
opportunity structure, and did not sustain its contention to
see democratic change occur in Iran.
Some Implications
South Africa and Iran show how domestic opposition can
actively engage with sanctions as part of their strategies and
claim-making. Pro-democracy movements may choose to
interact with sanctions as a part of their contentious politics.
eir goal could be to gain international support or to build
domestic support and mobilize the population. Yet, the
internal political opportunity structure, existing economic
conditions, and how successfully the movement commu-
nicates their sanctions messaging to the population will
constrain the success of these eorts. If sanctions-sending
countries wish to utilize sanctions for pro-democracy ends,
they need to consider the potential impacts of sanctions
on domestic social movements, particularly in light of the
intervening factors of the political opportunity structure,
economic conditions, and strength of the regime to repress.
Pro-democracy groups may wish to consider how best to
“ If sanctions-sending countries
wish to utilize sanctions for pro-
democracy ends, they need to
consider the potential impacts
of sanctions on domestic social
movements…”
19
D S Volume 17 –
RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION
incorporate and leverage sanctions in their repertoires of
contention to maximize the domestic and international sup-
port they need to succeed in the goals of their contention.
H B. A (@hbakuiyibo) is the Program Associate with
the Wilson Center Africa Program and a graduate of the Democracy
and Governance Program at Georgetown University.
E
1 Michael Edwards, “Introduction: Civil Society and the Geometry of Hu-
man Relations,” in e Oxford Handbook of Civil Society, Michael Edwards,
ed., (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3-14.
2 David Cortright and George A. Lopez, e Sanctions Decade: Assessing
UN Strategies in the 1990s (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
3 Hossein G Askari, John Forrer, Hildy Teegen, and Jiawen Yang, Economic
Sanctions: Examining eir Philosophy and Ecacy (Westport, CT: Praeger,
2003).
4 Christian Von Soest and Michael Wahman, “Are Democratic Sanctions
Really Counterproductive?”Democratization22, no. 6 (2014): 957–80.
5 William H. Kaempfer, Anton D. Lowenberg, and William Mertens, “Inter-
national Economic Sanctions Against a Dictator,”Economics and Politics16,
no. 1 (2004): 29–51.
6 Charles Tilly and Sydney Tarrow, Contentious Politics (New York, NY: Ox-
ford University Press, 2015); and José A Muñoz, “International Opportunities
and Domestic Protest: Zapatistas, Mexico, and the New World Economy,”Social
Movement Studies5, no. 3 (2006): 251–74.
7
Dursun Peksen, and A. Cooper Drury, “Coercive or Corrosive: e Negative
Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy,”International Interactions36,
no. 33 (2010): 240–64; Christian Von Soest and Michael Wahman, “Not All
Dictators Are Equal,”Journal of Peace Research52, no. 1 (2014): 17–31; Nikolay
Marinov and Shmuel Nili, “Sanctions and Democracy,”International Interac-
tions41, no. 4 (2015): 765–78.
8
Gary Clyde Huauer, Jerey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott,Economic
Sanctions Reconsidered (Washington: Institute for International Economics,
1990); Robert A. Pape,Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1997); and Reed M. Wood, “‘A Hand upon the roat of the
Nation’: Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976-2001,”International
Studies Quarterly52, no. 3 (2008): 489–513.
9 Daniel W. Drezner,“Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in
eory and Practice,” International Studies Review 13, no. 1 (2018): 96–108.
10
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Sanctions
Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa
and Global Health Policy, 114th Cong., 2nd sess. (June 8, 2016), Testimony by
Princeton N. Lyman.
11 David Lektzian and Mark Souva, “An Institutional eory of Sanctions
Onset and Success,”Journal of Conict Resolution51, no. 6 (2007): 848–71; Susan
Hannah Allen, “e Domestic Political Costs of Economic Sanctions,”Journal
of Conict Resolution52, no. 6 (2008): 916–44; Julia Grauvogel and Christian
Von Soest, “Claims to Legitimacy Count: Why Sanctions Fail to Instigate
Democratisation in Authoritarian Regimes,” European Journal of Political
Research53, no. 4 (2014): 635–53; and Abel Escribà-Folch and Joseph Wright,
“Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian
Rulers,”International Studies Quarterly54, no. 2 (2010): 335–59.
12 Susan Hannah Allen, “e Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success
and Failure.”International Interactions31, no. 2 (2005): 117–38.
13
Jonathan Kirshner, “e Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions.” Se-
curity Studies6, no. 3 (1997): 32–64; Letzkian and Souva, “An Institutional
eo ry,” 848-71; Grauvogel and Von Soest, “Claims to Legitimacy,” 635-53.
14
William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, “e eory of
International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach,”e American
Economic Revie w78, no. 4 (1988): 786-93; William H. Kaempfer and Anton D.
Lowenberg, “Unilateral Versus Multilateral International Sanctions: A Public
Choice Perspective,” International Studies Quarterly43, no. 1 (1999): 37-58;
Kaempfer, Lowenberg, and Mertens, “International Economic Sanctions,” 29-51.
15 Kaempfer, Lowenberg and Mertens, “International Economic Sanctions,”
29-51.
16
Peter Wallensteen, “Characteristics of Economic Sanctions,”Journal of Peace
Research,5, no. 3 (1968): 248–67; and Kaempfer and Lowenberg, “Unilateral
Versus Multilateral,” 37-58; JeanMarc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman,
“Asking the Right Question: When Do Economic Sanctions Work Best? ”Security
Studies9 no. 1-2 (1999): 219–53.
17 Kaempfer and Lowenberg, “Unilateral Versus Multilateral,” 37-58.
18 Neta C. Crawford and Audie Klotz, “How Sanctions Work: A Framework
for Analysis,” in How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa, Neta C.
Crawford and Audie Klotz, eds., (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), 25-45.
19 Julia Grauvogel, Amanda A. Licht, and Christian Von Soest, “Sanctions
and Signals: How International Sanction reats Trigger Domestic Protest
in Targeted Regimes,”International Studies Quarterly 61, no. 1 (2017): 86-97.
20
Jonathan Kirshner, “e Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions,” Se-
curity Studies6, no. 3 (1997): 32–64; Crawford and Klotz, “How Sanctions
Work,” 25-45; Allen, “Domestic Political Costs,” 916-44; and Charles Tilly,
From Mobilization to Revolution, (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1978); Sidney
Tar r ow, Struggling to Reform: Social Movements and Policy Change during
Cycles of Protest, (Ithaca, NY: Center for International Studies, Cornell Uni-
versity, 1983); Sidney Tarrow, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements:
Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, Doug
McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008).
21
Johan Galtung, “On the Eects of International Economic Sanctions, With
Examples from the Case of Rhodesia,” World Politics 19, no. 3 (1967): 378–416.
22 Wood, “A Hand Upon the roat,” 489-513; Peksen and Drury, “Econo-
mic Sanctions,” 393-411; Dursun Peksen, “Political Eectiveness, Negative
Externalities, and the Ethics of Economic Sanctions,”Ethics & International
Aairs33, no. 3 (2019): 279–89.
23
Susan Hannah Allen, “Rallying Cry? Economic Sanctions and the Domestic
Politics of the Target State,” Dissertation. (Emory University, 2004); Tilly, From
Mobilization to Revolution.
24 Allen, “Domestic Political Costs,” 916-44.
25
Daniel W. Drezner,e Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecra and Interna-
tional Relations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Allen,
“Domestic Political Costs,” 916-44; Peksen, “Political Eectiveness,” 279-89.
26 Crawford and Klotz, “How Sanctions Work,” 25-45.
27
Tshidiso Maloka, “‘Sanctions Hurt But Apartheid Kills!:’ e Sanctions
Campaign and Black Workers,” in How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South
Africa, Neta C. Crawford and Audie Klotz, Eds., (Basingstoke: Macmillan
Press, 1999), 178-193.
28 Risa Brooks, “Sanctions and Regime Type: What Works, and When?”Se-
curity Studies11, no. 4 (2002): 1–50.
20
Georgetown University | The Center for Democracy and Civil Society
RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION
29
Neta C. Crawford, “Trump Card or eater: An Introduction to Two
Sanctions Debates,” in How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa, Neta C.
Crawford and Audie Klotz, Eds., (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), 3-24.
30 Maloka, “Sanctions Hurt,” 178-183.
31 Ibid.
32
William Kaempfer, Anton D. Lowenberg, H. Naci Mohan, and Lynne
Bennet, “Foreign reats and Domestic Actions: Sanctions Against South
Africa,” in Justice Without Violence, Heidi Burgess, Guy M. Burgess, and Paul
Wehr, Eds., (London: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 191–216.
33 Audie Klotz, “Diplomatic Isolation,” in How Sanctions Work: Lessons from
South Africa, Neta C. Crawford and Audie Klotz, Eds., (Basingstoke: Macmillan
Press, 1999), 195-211.
34 Crawford, “Trump Card or eater,” 3-24.
35 Ibid.
36 Meg Voorhes, “e US Divestment Movement,” in How Sanctions Work:
Lessons from South Africa, Neta C. Crawford and Audie Klotz, Eds., (Basing-
stoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), 129-143.
37
Wood, “A Hand Upon the roat,” 489-513; Peksen, “Political Eectiveness,”
279-89.
38 “Brief History of US Sanctions on Iran,” (Columbia University, 2017)
39
Abbas Milani, “e Green Movement,” (e Iran Primer, United States
Institute of Peace, October 6, 2010).
40 omas Erdbrink, “Iranian Opposition Warns Against Stricter Sanctions.”
e Washington Post, October 1, 2009; “Sanctions Misplaced, Iran’s Mousavi
Says.” UPI, May 24, 2010; Ali Fathollah-Nejad, “Why Sanctions against Iran Are
Counterproductive: Conict Resolution and State–Society Relations,”Interna-
tional Journal: Canadas Journal of Global Policy Analysis69, no. 1 (2014): 48–65.
41
Saeed Kamali Dehghan, “Iran Sanctions Strengthen Ahmadinejad Regime
– Karroubi,” e Guardian, August 11, 2010.
42
Fathollah-Nejad, “Why Sanctions against Iran are Counterproductive,”
48-65.
43
Ibid.; Shamil Shams, “Iran’s Green Movement: Why US Policies Strengthen
the Regime,” Deutsche Welle, June 14, 2019.
44
Fathollah-Nejad, “Why Sanctions against Iran are Counterproductive,”
48-65.
45
Abdul Qader Tafesh, “Iran’s Green Movement: Reality and Aspirations.” Al
Jazeera Centre for Studies, November 5, 2012.
Book Review: Terms
of Disservice: How
Silicon Valley is
Destructive by Design,
by Dipayan Ghosh
M P
On May 28, 2020, President Donald Trump signed an Ex-
ecutive Order on Preventing Online Censorship, days aer
Twitter applied a fact-checking notication to his posts
about voter fraud.
e order aimed to weaken Section 302 of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996, a corporate liability
immunity clause for online content. e order reclassied
social media companies as content producers, not passive
platform hosts. As a result, regulators can oversee company
content policies to prevent infringements on freedom of
speech. Sounds good, right?
To see social media companies as content producers may
enhance regulatory oversight. But it doesn’t fully address
the regulatory question. e order misguidedly attempts to
prevent content moderation where free speech is privileged
or amplied by platform algorithms to devastating eect
given misinformation, propaganda, or hate-speech. Such
eects suggest that content moderation, in some form, is
a public good imperative. And here the order fails to give
guidance.
So how to do it? What incentives are embedded in
content policies? What is the desired end state? ese are a
few of many questions that dene a great internet regulatory
puzzle: how must governments and internet companies
protect the public good online, and by extension, oine?
Politicians and corporations alike are opposed to submitting
to each others’ regulatory powers. is makes things dicult.
But perhaps it is better to try than not.
Dipayan Ghosh explores this in Terms of Disservice: How
Silicon Valley is Destructive by Design. Content is but one in-
put of the business models designed by commercial internet
giants to exploit user data to monopolize markets. As Fellow
and Co-Director of the Platform Accountability Project at
the Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy,
Ghosh leverages prior experience advising both the Obama
Administration and Facebook on internet and technology
policies to share his incisive take on the nefarious capabilities,
and corresponding regulatory challenges of the commercial
internet. is includes an overview of predatory data col-
lection, privacy infringements, untransparent and uncom-
petitive market (dis)incentives. He introduces each set of
21
D S Volume 17 –
RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION
challenges generated by
the business models of
a Facebook or Google.
And there’s more.
Ghosh concludes the
consumer internet is
“chiey responsible” for
damage to democracies.
Hosted on the Brook-
ings platform, this book
has potential to dene
and push clear answers
to the above questions
based on the harmful
impact of the inter-
net company business
model on citizens and
markets (and tangentially, democracy). Many of his solu-
tions trace back to his work with the Obama Administration.
For example, Ghosh promotes a new digital social
contract, a collection of principles and policies to protect
individual privacy and market competition. Unfortunately,
the justifying exposition operates in a blurry netherworld
between whistleblower exposés and policy wonk manuals
for a better commercial internet. It unfortunately misses
an opportunity to recruit endorsements from lawmakers,
interest groups or everyday people to pursue stronger law,
regulations, and policies to support the new social contract.
But perhaps it is better to try than not.
Consider the business model the social contract seeks
to address. e rst part is front-end services. is includes
internet-based text messaging, social media, internet search,
online video, and e-commerce. Most users understand
internet companies use data from the content they introduce
on these platforms. Many users do not understand how. e
second is marketing services, or the ads that companies
buy to target front-end users. Most users were surprised
when this capability was rst introduced (“Is my phone
listening to me?”). Many users dare only now, aer foreign
meme promotion during the 2016 election, the dangers of
targeted marketing. e third is collection of proprietary
and personal data and physical computing infrastructures
sold as services to other businesses. Most front-end users
are completely unaware of this revenue stream.
Given this, Terms of Disservice does a great service to
users who want to know how Amazon, Twitter, Google, and
Facebook nd prot in platforms. In particular, consumers
should read this book to know how they are ‘paying’ for these
services with their data and regulators should understand
the business model overall. However, Ghosh does not name
stakeholders to solutions.
en there are front-end services. Users include grandmoth-
ers, presidents of nations, yoga collectives and religious
extremist groups. Internet companies “hoover up highly
sensitive, personal information,” allowing them to accrue
staggering inuence asymmetries on social issues. ey use
this to make money, without an online ‘equal time rule.’
Ghosh oers a solution in the form of the Obama Adminis-
tration’s proposed Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, provides
for data transparency, user choice, user security, etc. He
then promptly laments lack of support for it by consumer
coalitions. And leaves the discussion there.
But isn’t this the work of public intellectuals? To present
facts and persuade specic stakeholders to take better
informed, coordinated action? Isn’t this the very work of
advancing democracy?
Consumer coalitions are made of consumers. Perhaps
Ghosh could have collected primary research data to capture
consumer knowledge about how internet companies use
personal information. If consumers’ awareness of the ills of
the consumer internet is low, then they will be less likely to
demand protections. With this information, Ghosh should
lend strategic insight to consumer coalitions to build demand
for Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights or a new digital social
contract. Americans have a strong incentive to support it,
especially given recent stories about foreign interference in
elections (isn’t another one scheduled soon?), user privacy
violations, etc.
Consider part two of the business model, targeted
marketing. Ghosh eectively leverages his technical expertise
to detail commercialization of bias to target front-end users.
A detail with key policy implications is that algorithms curate
content. Algorithms are functions of machines. Machines
lack competence to judge public fairness. It turns out,
humans also lack competence to judge public fairness. At
least when there is money to be made. So, we need policies
for data mining, and target content algorithm deployment
to prevent discrimination that replicates or exacerbates
oine social injustice.
For example, algorithms may direct ads for high-end
housewares to what they see as rich, white people and direct
home-buying ads away from people of color. Ghosh then
poses an open question of whether minority rights advo-
cates can eectively engage Facebook to resolve unfairness
of “anity groups” that target ads based on the preferences
of cultural groups. Yet he does not take the opportunity to
provide an answer. Again, an opportunity is missed to direct
stakeholders toward specic policy solutions for the damage
done by the platform.
Finally, consider part three of the business model, the
bundling and sale of aggregate consumer data and physical
computing infrastructure to other internet companies and
industries. As a consumer, this aspect of the business model
is the most sinister because it is invisible. is obscures
incentives for users to try a dierent platform. As a regulator,
it is the most sinister because platform capabilities reinforce
natural monopolies that are dicult to break. Ghosh explains
that acquisitions and lack of innovation combined with
network eects (compounding increases in users) create
impenetrable barriers to entry for new companies, leaving
consumers few alternatives. Antitrust laws must be applied
to ensure “a regular cadence of new innovations to hit the
22
Georgetown University | The Center for Democracy and Civil Society
RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION
consumer marketplace.” A great idea that an administration
simply needs to try.
Terms of Disservice is a helpful handbook for the business
models and technical capabilities of the consumer internet,
in support of government regulation. Yet, its attention to
technical functionalities and reiteration of corporate mal-
feasance fails to clarify lessons of past regulatory failures to
steer present and future regulatory attempts. e subtitle,
How Silicon Valley is Destructive by Design, could just as eas-
ily read “How Regulators and the Regulated Fail to Achieve
Either.” But at least the discussion sets our sights on the key
problems that exist, even if a roadmap for policy options
and stakeholder actions is not so clearly rendered.
Aer all, it is always better to try than not.
M P is Chief Strategy Ocer at Cybertek, a global tech
education company focused on transforming people with little to no
experience into top IT professionals. Previously, she directed East
Asia programs and coordinated global advocacy funds for the Lifeline:
Embattled Civil Society Fund at Freedom House. She spent time in
Asia and Latin America doing social impact investment. Marin holds
an M.A. in Democracy and Governance from Georgetown University
and B.A.s in International Studies and Spanish from Allegheny
College.
E
1 Donald Trump, “Executive Order on Preventing Online Censorship,”
e White House, May 28, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
presidential-actions/executive-order-preventing-online-censorship/.
2 “Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act,” Electronic
Frontier Foundation, https://www.e.org/issues/cda230; Christian T
Fjeld and Christopher Harvie, “Trump’s Executive Order and Section 230
of the Communications Decency Act,”e National Law Review June
3, 2020, https://www.natlawreview.com/article/implications-trump-s-
executive-order-and-section-230-communications-decency-act; Anshu
Siripurapu, “Trump’s Executive Order: What to Know About Section 230,”
Council on Foreign Relations, June 4, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/
trumps-executive-order-what-know-about-section-230.
3 Ghosh, Dipayan. Terms of Disservice: How Silicon Valley is Destructive
by Design. 2020. Brookings Institution Press.
4 Shannon K McCraw, “Equal Time Rule,” e First Amendment
Encyclopedia, https://www.mtsu.edu/rst-amendment/article/949/
equal-time-rule.
5 Marcia Hofmann, “Obama Administration Unveils Promising
Consumer Privacy Plan, but the Devil Will Be in the Details,” Electronic
Frontier Foundation, February 23, 2012, https://www.e.org/
deeplinks/2012/02/obama-administration-unveils-promising-consumer-
privacy-plan-devil-details; “Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked
World: A Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation
in the Global Digital Economy,” e White House, February 2012, https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/les/privacy-nal.pdf.
6 Ghosh, Dipayan. Terms of Disservice: How Silicon Valley is Destructive
by Design. 2020. Brookings Institution Press.
23
D S Volume 17 –
RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION
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D S Volume 17 –
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✥
We welcomed our 14th incoming class to the Democracy
& Governance M.A. program during the 2018-2019
academic year. Welcome to Nicholas Albano, Alexander
Baker, Maeve Edwards, Marianna Jardim, Augusto César
Pedro Jo, Ruby Karki, Joseph Laposata, Michael Reinders,
William Ritchey, Bowen Qi, and Isabella Wilkinson
✥
e third annual Democracy & Governance Summer
Book Club ran during summer 2019, oering students,
alumni, and friends of the program the chance to gather for
casual discussion of timely books. is summer’s theme was
Upping Your Watercooler Game and featured recent popular
books on DG issues published for a wide audience.
✥
On October 17th, 2019 the Democracy and Governance
Program hosted Mr. Mustafa Sanalla, Chairman of the
Libyan National Oil Corporation, for a lecture on “e Chal-
lenges of Governance in Conict Zones.” e GU Conict
Resolution M.A. program co-sponsored the event.
✥On October 24th, 2019 the Democracy & Governance
Program hosted its annual career panel. is year we were
joined by Amb. Donald Planty (former U.S. Ambassador
to Guatamala and current DG Advisory Board Member),
Johanna Womer Benjamin ‘09 (Development Alternatives,
Inc.), and Cabell Willis ‘16 (U.S. State Department).
✥
On November 6th, 2019 Larry Diamond of Stanford
University visited Georgetown for a discussion of his new
book Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage,
Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency. e event
was co-hosted by the Democracy & Governance Program,
Georgetown’s Global Human Development program, and
the Walsh School of Foreign Service.
✥
In March 2020, Georgetown University announced a
transition to virtual learning and operations in response
to the health risks associated with the COVID-19 pandemic.
Our students, faculty, and sta demonstrated extraordinary
perseverance, creativity, and patience as all courses, events,
and meetings moved online for the remainder of the aca-
demic year.
✥On March 20th, 2020 the Democracy and Governance
Program hosted our rst-ever online Open House for admit-
ted students. We were able to welcome prospective students
from around the globe for a half-day of panels introducing
the M.A. program, the Government Department, and the
wider Georgetown community.
✥On May 13th, 2020 we had a virtual advising panel for
current students and recent graduates featuring Patrick
Quirk (adjunct faculty) and Shari Bryan (Advisory Board).
✥
ough on-campus Commencement exercises were
postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we celebrated
the class of 2020 with an online graduation on May 29th,
2020. We honored our graduates and welcomed the chance
to “meet” family and friends from New Jersey to Alaska!
Program Highlights
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