Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity
Abstract
In this 1989 book Rorty argues that thinkers such as Nietzsche, Freud, and Wittgenstein have enabled societies to see themselves as historical contingencies, rather than as expressions of underlying, ahistorical human nature or as realizations of suprahistorical goals. This ironic perspective on the human condition is valuable on a private level, although it cannot advance the social or political goals of liberalism. In fact Rorty believes that it is literature not philosophy that can do this, by promoting a genuine sense of human solidarity. A truly liberal culture, acutely aware of its own historical contingency, would fuse the private, individual freedom of the ironic, philosophical perspective with the public project of human solidarity as it is engendered through the insights and sensibilities of great writers. The book has a characteristically wide range of reference from philosophy through social theory to literary criticism. It confirms Rorty's status as a uniquely subtle theorist, whose writing will prove absorbing to academic and nonacademic readers alike.
... This argument draws on long-standing traditions in social theory, cultural criticism, and pragmatist philosophy, which emphasize the role of narrative, discourse, and imagination in promoting social justice, change, and solidarity (Benjamin, 2025;Dewey, 1916Dewey, , 1934Rorty, 1989). Culture and discourse, including the outputs of generative AI, need not reproduce historical inequalities, exclusions, or injustices. ...
Recent advances in generative Artificial Intelligence have raised public awareness, shaping expectations and concerns about their societal implications. Central to these debates is the question of AI alignment -- how well AI systems meet public expectations regarding safety, fairness, and social values. However, little is known about what people expect from AI-enabled systems and how these expectations differ across national contexts. We present evidence from two surveys of public preferences for key functional features of AI-enabled systems in Germany (n = 1800) and the United States (n = 1756). We examine support for four types of alignment in AI moderation: accuracy and reliability, safety, bias mitigation, and the promotion of aspirational imaginaries. U.S. respondents report significantly higher AI use and consistently greater support for all alignment features, reflecting broader technological openness and higher societal involvement with AI. In both countries, accuracy and safety enjoy the strongest support, while more normatively charged goals -- like fairness and aspirational imaginaries -- receive more cautious backing, particularly in Germany. We also explore how individual experience with AI, attitudes toward free speech, political ideology, partisan affiliation, and gender shape these preferences. AI use and free speech support explain more variation in Germany. In contrast, U.S. responses show greater attitudinal uniformity, suggesting that higher exposure to AI may consolidate public expectations. These findings contribute to debates on AI governance and cross-national variation in public preferences. More broadly, our study demonstrates the value of empirically grounding AI alignment debates in public attitudes and of explicitly developing normatively grounded expectations into theoretical and policy discussions on the governance of AI-generated content.
... Similarly, Rorty's (1989) "ironism" argued that our beliefs, values, and vocabularies are contingent upon our historical and cultural contexts and are not absolute truths. Researchers and practitioners can cultivate intellectual humility by acknowledging the limits and potential fallibility of their knowledge and expertise. ...
This article presents two checklists designed to help researchers, practitioners, and evaluators address common critiques of Positive Psychology (PP) identified in a recent systematic review. These critiques focus on PP's theorizing, methodology, and its perception as a decontextualized, capitalistic endeavor. The checklists offer practical recommendations for improving future research and practice, with one tailored for researchers and the other for practitioners and evaluators. Key focus areas include self-reflection, cultural sensitivity, methodological diversity, collaboration, and ethical considerations. By acknowledging past critiques and offering concrete solutions, this paper aims to foster a more inclusive and rigorous future for PP.
... Kaplan (2018) demonstrated how the public translation of personal narratives of friendship into coherent large-group ideologies such as nationalism is informed by the logic of social clubs in a process of 'strangers-turn-friends' and the emergence of 'cultural intimacy': the feeling that I have something intimate in common with people I have never met (Herzfeld, 2005;Reed, 2006). Moving away from the dominant prescriptive discussion of solidarity (e.g., Rorty, 1989;Bayertz, 1999;most articles in Banting & Kymlicka, 2017), Kaplan's theory of solidarity can explain the dynamics of groupness as it often takes place, not as it is ought to be. ...
The literature on national solidarity is puzzled by the question of how solidarity can bridge social differences and has not asked how it works through sameness; that question was relegated to the literature on national identity. But can solidarity create nationhood through sameness? This theoretical article rehabilitates Durkheim's underused concept of mechanical solidarity and proposes to study sameness not as a human given, identity or group quality, but as a social performance that constitutes similarity between people and thus also solidarity. Whilst mechanical solidarity can function in all types of groups, it is particularly prominent in the context of nationhood. To explain how, the article explores performances of national customs related to food, which convey a conformist and unreflective subjectivity as well as horizontal unanimity. When people do things collectively, they perform national solidarity without necessarily indicating a collective identity that exists out there or agreeing about ideas and values. Contrary to common stereotypes of modern societies as ‘complex’, the article underscores sameness as crucial to modern nationalism—still the most significant socio‐political principle of our era.
... The three-world-theory and its derivation into the 'theory of the three landscapes' have the following functions for this paper: First, it forms a quasi-ontological framework and assumes a causal dependency on the outside world but does not assume that its laws are mappable (Rorty, 1997). However, since the Three Worlds Theory has proven itself in understanding the world, it is a quasi-ontology. ...
Both tourism and landscape academia heavily and passionately debate the authentic nature of both destination experiences and appearances. This paper attempts to bridge the gap between the concept of authenticity in landscape research and that in tourism studies. Using the landscape-related derivation of Popper's three world theory, the authors analyse various tourism and landscape-related phenomena that are typically used to determine authenticity in the two disciplines. As a result, they conclude that there is no such thing as an objectively authentic tourist experience, just as there is no such thing as an objectively authentic landscape. The appreciation of each is attained through the eyes and the perspective of the viewer and ultimately leads to a (social) construction of the authentic.
This paper reads the recent British comedy Fleabag through the lens of metamodernism, focusing on its interest in intersubjectivity and communication. It pays attention to the protagonist’s search for ways of connecting with other characters in a social space that appears to be broken. To do so, it examines three different aspects of the series: the ways of constructing subjectivity, the aesthetics of awkwardness, and the presence of love. I conclude by stating that metamodern theory can help us to better understand the series. Fleabag’s cultural relevance and success can be regarded as a consequence of its display of metamodern techniques and sensibilities.
This chapter focuses on Costello’s argument that only poetry, and not philosophy, can provide true access to animal life. It first presents the background of Costello’s argument, that is, the so-called literary turn that took place in the last decades of the twentieth century and argued for the need to complement philosophical arguments with the imaginative élan of literature. It then complicates these theses with the positions proposed by Cora Diamond and Iris Murdoch. In particular, Murdoch’s definition of “attention” as a “just and loving gaze” is adopted as the gaze of the poet. With this theoretical frame, the chapter proposes then a brief examination of animal poetry and analyzes Rilke’s “The Panther” and Ted Hughes’ two “Jaguar” poems.
Дві Світові війни минулого століття поставили під сумнів беззастережну раніше віру у силу розуму людства і викликали нищівну критику європейського проєкту Просвітництва, який розглядали як основне джерело такої віри в розум, науку і здатність людини до відповідальних і розумних рішень і вчинків. Критика віри в розум була частково справедливою, особливо у тій частині, де вона була спрямована проти невиправданого сцієнтизму і схильності до нерідко пов’язаних з ним елітаризму і репресивної інструментальної раціональності. Утім, сама по собі критика розуму є чимось протиприродним, коли йдеться про Homo sapiens. У статті аргументовано потребу у ревізії уявлень про людський розум та його основні завдання – зокрема, висунуто гіпотезу про необхідність зміни епістемологічного підходу до розуму на онтологічний, а інструментального погляду на розум – на моральне розуміння призначення розуму. Виявлено спроби переосмислити метафору Просвітництва у новій онтології світла – зокрема, у працях Мартина Гайдеґера та Карла Ясперса. Аргументовано, що кризу нормативності, яка широко розгорнулася у ХХ ст. не лише у науці, а й у сфері моралі та культури загалом, неможливо подолати відмовою від нормативності або визнанням слабкої релятивістської версії нормативності. Доведено тезу, що, якщо криза класичного Просвітництва є результатом втрати суспільної нормативності, тоді в основі Нового Просвітництва слід покладати нову нормативність, і передусім – нову доброчесність розуму як моральну його доброчесність. Обґрунтовано, що новий спільносвіт має стати не спільносвітом виживання і страху, але відповідальним спільносвітом доброчесного розуму. У межах трансцендентально і інтерсуб’єктивно визначених нормативів, властивих людству і напрацьованих людством у його конкретній історії, яка вже фактично відбулася, представники відповідального спільносвіту можуть створювати нові форми нормативності – на основі множинних суспільних практик втілення доброчесного розуму.
I begin by discussing the salience of the idea of hope for the present day with some examples which illustrate its strong political and cultural resonance. However, the now very extensive literature on hope, mostly in moral and political philosophy, is somewhat diverse and unclear as regards how it should be understood in ways that make it meaningful for the present day. While some of the most important perspectives are in the political philosophy of hope, there is almost no discussion of its sociological significance. I offer a brief critical strand of the main themes in recent writing on hope and argue for a conception of hope that incorporates the dimensions of emotion, reason and the imagination. I also link the concept of hope to utopianism and argue that it preserves the possibility of transcendence. On this broad basis I make a proposal for a conception of hope that demonstrates its relevance for understanding alternatives to the forces of destructive capitalism and authoritarianism that prevail today. Hope arises especially in conditions of uncertainty, fear, or suffering. To understand hope, one must understand the temptations of despair and the experience of loss.
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, or, The Modern Prometheus (1818 and 1831) is a novel about aesthetic disability and monstrosity. This chapter examines how Frankenstein’s creature is portrayed in the first German translation of the novel by Heinz Widtmann, published in 1912, for a readership that was interested in alternative science, artificial life, and the occult. Widtmann's translation alters Shelley’s characterisation of the creature in ways that raise ethical concerns about his translation strategy. While Shelley contests the automatic connection between physical and moral monstrosity by emphasising the creature’s emotional, moral, religious, and human dimensions, in contrast, Widtmann alters the novel’s compassionate stance with omissions and modifications that reinforce the assumed links between the creature’s monstrous appearance and monstrous character. Furthermore, Shelley evokes narrative sympathy by depicting the social causes of the creature’s violent acts, whereas Widtmann reduces the reader’s sympathy for the creature by limiting his emotional range and omitting many humanising aspects, such as his cultural and emotional education through reading, which produces complex emotions, enlightened ideas, and moral thoughts. This chapter argues that Widtmann uses a dehumanising translation strategy that compromises the creature’s becoming human story, reduces his redeeming characteristics, and supports the idea that the human exterior reveals the interior.
The debate over whether higher education is a public or private good is primarily shaped by Western epistemologies and neoliberal paradigms, which commodifies education. This framing neglects relational and communal perspectives, such as Ubuntu philosophy, which views education as an interconnected process fostering individual and societal flourishing. This paper explores how Ubuntu philosophy dissolves the public–private dichotomy by offering an integrated vision of higher education that supports personal aspirations while serving the broader social good. Using Zimbabwe as a case, referencing other Southern African contexts, the paper examines how neoliberal agendas have influenced postcolonial higher education policies. While acknowledging critiques of Ubuntu, particularly concerns about social conformity and individual autonomy, the paper argues that a well-theorised Ubuntu-based approach can create a more equitable higher education system. Instead of merely incorporating indigenous knowledge into exclusionary structures, Ubuntu philosophy reimagines the foundations of knowledge production, governance, and access. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for integrating Ubuntu-based principles in higher education, such as participatory governance, shared responsibility funding models, and broader success metrics beyond economic outcomes. The paper contributes to global debates on inclusive, equitable, and sustainable higher education.
The digital sphere of our present era is characterized by transformative technological advancements that reshape our understanding of both material reality and digital hyperreality. As technology propels us towards unprecedented possibilities, questions of identity, societal norms, and ethical considerations come to the forefront. The aim of this paper is to put forward an appropriate conception of authenticity, manifested through a relational form of creativity and a radical form of diversity, within the context of and towards the potential landscape of a digital eutopia. The conjunction of relational creativity and radical diversity could be developed through groundbreaking technologies in society and its economy, avant-garde artistic expressions and novel approaches to sustainable development and equitable communication—this could be the source of social innovative and useful ideas, experiences, and practices through a deviant continuity in-between the physical reality and the digital hyperreal landscape.
This chapter addresses two purposes to justice that are incardinated in the pragmatic dimension of language. I am referring, on the one hand, to the idea of justice supported by the Scottish philosopher and sociologist Alasdair MacIntyre, in the intellectual period in which he wrote two of his best-known monographs: After virtue (1981) and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1987); and, on the other, to the conception of justice promoted by Professor Gregorio Robles, from the three volumes of his Communicational Theory of Law (whose first editions date from 1998, 2015, and 2021, respectively). Both academic contributions come from different—although interrelated—epistemological traditions, such as Moral Philosophy and Political Philosophy—in the case of the Scottish philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre-, and from Law Theory and Philosophy of Law—if we refer to Spanish Professor Gregorio Robles.
The thesis of this contribution defends that both MacIntyre’s purpose and Robles’ Communicational Theory of Law can be compatible with the subsumption of justice in a certain rhetorical construct, although endowed with great scope and relevance, both in academia and in political action.
Nicholas Norman-Krause argues, in this authoritative and sophisticated new treatment of conflict, that contestation is a basic - potentially regenerative - aspect of any flourishing democratic politics. In developing a distinctive 'agonistic theology,' and relating the political theory of agonism to social and democratic life, the author demonstrates that the conflicts of democracy may have a beneficial significance and depend at least in part on faith traditions and communities for their successful negotiation. In making his case, he deftly examines a rich range of religious and secular literatures, whether from the thought of Augustine, Aquinas, and Stanley Cavell or from less familiar voices such as early modern jurist and political thinker Johannes Althusius and twentieth-century Catholic social philosopher Yves Simon. Liberationists including Gustavo Gutiérrez and Martin Luther King, Jr. are similarly recruited for a theological account of conflict read not just as concomitant to, but also as constitutive of, democratic living.
Le thème de la chasse aux sorcières, qui a marqué au tison l’entrée de la Suisse dans la modernité, occupe pourtant une part bien modeste de la méthode officielle d’enseignement de l’histoire. Présentant une belle opportunité de thématique interdisciplinaire avec l’éthique, l’ambiguïté de la notion même de sorcière semble glisser de problèmes épistémologiques et méthodologiques vers une réduction didactique, qui en limite la portée réflexive. Cependant, une analyse centrée sur les relations sociales de la problématique ouvre une lecture pragmatique, qui permet de reformuler la thématique pour offrir de nouvelles options didactiques. Cette reformulation a toutefois un coût méthodologique et normatif, dont le prix dépend de la volonté ou non d’entrer en dialogue.
This paper explores the metaphysical and metaphilosophical irony of the British philosopher F. H. Bradley (1846–1924). Using Richard Rorty's account of irony in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, it advances a reading of Bradley's work as one in which he ironically plays absolute idealism, pragmatism, and skepticism off each other. It then develops an account of the deeper reason for such an ironic approach to metaphysics, namely, that Bradley aimed to secure both the autonomy of metaphysical inquiry against incursions by science, religion, and morality, and the limits of such inquiry against the more exuberant idealists of his generation.
У статті досліджується концепція «предикат морального закону» в контексті доктрини прав людини. Особлива увага приділена поняттю моралі в якості етично-правової категорії. Встановлено, що трансформація моралі відбувається протягом всієї історії людства, адже на кожному етапі розвитку людства наступає певне переосмислення моральних цінностей. Проведено аналіз впливу моральних принципів на правову систему. Основна теза статті полягає в тому, що сучасне правове суспільство не має єдиного розуміння моралі, а законодавство часто стикається з проблемою узгодження моральних імперативів із правовими нормами. Розглянуто сучасні виклики, пов’язані з трансформацією моральних цінностей під впливом новітніх технологій. З одного боку, спостерігається тенденція до розширення прав людини, а з іншого – виникає ризик викривлення моральних постулатів, які були вироблені протягом історії людства. Доведено, що предикат морального закону є ключовим критерієм оцінки законодавчих норм, оскільки будь-який закон має ґрунтуватися на принципах справедливості та гуманізму. Окрему увагу приділено аналізу рішень Європейського суду з прав людини, який у своїй практиці керується моральними імперативами. Серед основних предикатів морального закону розглядаються заборони вбивства, тортур, рабства, дискримінації, примусової праці, порушення приватного життя та свободи переконань. Обґрунтовано, що моральні засади виступають фундаментом правової держави, а їхнє ігнорування може призвести до втрати легітимності правових норм. Наукова новизна статті полягає у введенні концепції предиката морального закону як обов’язкової складової правової доктрини. У статті використано філософські та юридичні підходи, зокрема аналізуються ідеї стародавніх мислителів та сучасних дослідників прав людини. Робиться висновок, що мораль є інтегральною частиною права, а будь-які правові суперечності повинні вирішуватися через моральні категорії.
Kierkegaard's lifelong fascination with the figure of Socrates has many aspects, but prominent among them is his admiration for the way Socrates was devoted to his divinely ordained mission as a philosopher. To have such a destiny, revealed through what one loves and is passionate about as well as through a feeling of vocation, is a necessary condition of leading a meaningful life, according to Kierkegaard. Examining what Kierkegaard has to say about the meaning of life requires looking at his conception of 'subjective truth,' as well as how he understands the ancient ideal of 'amor fati,' a notion that Nietzsche would subsequently take up, but that Kierkegaard understands in a manner that is distinctly his own, and that he sought to put into practice in his own existence. Our life is a work of art, but we are not the artist.
The objective of this article is to conduct an in-depth examination of two interrelated emotional concepts: displaced or irrational emotions and factitious (artificial) emotions, using moral guilt as a case study. The analysis incorporates three facets of emotions: their relationship with objects, their role as motivators for actions and the extent to which individuals can control and shape their emotions. Two overarching conclusions emerged: First, the concept of artificial emotions expands to encompass a multitude of emotional states, leading to an inflated category. Second, this prompts a proposal for recognising nuanced differentiations between irrational and factitious emotions, emphasising the significance of context-sensitive distinctions, as broader categori-sations frequently prove inadequate in achieving their intended precision. These conclusions advocate a more precise approach to comprehending the nature of deviant emotions, such as irrational and artificial variants, and their relationship with objects.
Against the backdrop of Rahel Jeaggi’s critique of Harry Frankfurt’s theory of personhood the chapter analyzes the normative import of second-order emotions. The idea is that a disapproving second-order emotional response to a first-order emotional responses that takes us aback, constitutes a moment of normative ambivalence prompted by the unanticipated turn of events that initially gave rise to the first-order response. In view of the crucial role played by normative ambivalation in rational normative self-criticism, to what extent can such moments be sought proactively?
The chapter sets forth from four questions any viable philosophy of humor must address: why only humans can find something funny (as opposed to pleasing or playful)? Why what they find funny is limited to their world? Why is finding something funny the only feat of understanding that is rewarded by an animalistic bark of laughter? And why explaining a joke spoils it? Several theories of humor are briefly examined and rejected in favor of an updated version of Schopenhauer’s so-called “incongruity’ approach.
After discussing the four orders of reflexive emotion separately, this chapter places them side by side, with a view to showing, first, that in addition to being exclusively human, each of them constitutes a profound manifestation of a different grounding component of our humanity: primary shame, of the most rudimentary aspect of human selfhood; secondary shame, of our normativity; humor, of the uniqueness of our conceptual languages; humility, of our very rationality; second-order emotions, of our ability rationally assess our normative commitments. Second, setting them side by side allows us to appreciate the extent to which living up to our full human potential necessarily requires engaging real others—a claim of crucial political significance.
Now in its third edition, this Handbook is essential for students and researchers in Strategic Management and Organizational Theory and Behaviour. The Strategy as Practice approach moves away from the disembodied and asocial study of firm assets, technologies and practices, towards the study of strategizing as an activity. Strategy is understood as something people do rather than something a firm has. This perspective explores how strategizing contributes to an organizations' daily operations at all levels. Through detailed empirical studies of the everyday activities and practice of people engaged in strategizing, the Handbook investigates who strategists are, what strategists do, how they do it, and what the consequences of their actions are. Featuring new authors and additional or fundamentally updated and revised chapters, this edition provides a state-of-the-art overview of recent reflections and works in this rapidly growing stream of strategic management, whilst also presenting a research agenda for the next decade.
Now in its third edition, this Handbook is essential for students and researchers in Strategic Management and Organizational Theory and Behaviour. The Strategy as Practice approach moves away from the disembodied and asocial study of firm assets, technologies and practices, towards the study of strategizing as an activity. Strategy is understood as something people do rather than something a firm has. This perspective explores how strategizing contributes to an organizations' daily operations at all levels. Through detailed empirical studies of the everyday activities and practice of people engaged in strategizing, the Handbook investigates who strategists are, what strategists do, how they do it, and what the consequences of their actions are. Featuring new authors and additional or fundamentally updated and revised chapters, this edition provides a state-of-the-art overview of recent reflections and works in this rapidly growing stream of strategic management, whilst also presenting a research agenda for the next decade.
Now in its third edition, this Handbook is essential for students and researchers in Strategic Management and Organizational Theory and Behaviour. The Strategy as Practice approach moves away from the disembodied and asocial study of firm assets, technologies and practices, towards the study of strategizing as an activity. Strategy is understood as something people do rather than something a firm has. This perspective explores how strategizing contributes to an organizations' daily operations at all levels. Through detailed empirical studies of the everyday activities and practice of people engaged in strategizing, the Handbook investigates who strategists are, what strategists do, how they do it, and what the consequences of their actions are. Featuring new authors and additional or fundamentally updated and revised chapters, this edition provides a state-of-the-art overview of recent reflections and works in this rapidly growing stream of strategic management, whilst also presenting a research agenda for the next decade.
Before the foundation of sociology as an academic discipline in the late nineteenth century, both social scientific and literary scholars sought to provide tools for navigating increasingly complex societies and ever-more pressing social issues. More than providing a fixed set of definitions, literary texts excelled in theorizing the social in the sense of the Greek theōrein, meaning to consider or speculate. However, due to growing disciplinary specialization, sociology began mimicking methods of the sciences, becoming more plausible in delivering social knowledge. The relationship between sociology and literature has mainly become one of a knowing subject and a passive object – hence the preposition »of« in the sociology of literature. Contemporary sociology of literature has predominantly focused on literary production, subordinating literary works to social interactions and institutions – the work of Pierre Bourdieu and his follower Gisèle Sapiro being prime examples. Even sociologists who recognize the usefulness of literature for its intrinsic qualities often view literary texts as passive objects to be translated into sociological discourse.
I propose a cultural sociology of literature to remedy this epistemological asymmetry. Following the Yale School of Cultural Sociology, the proposed model refuses to reduce literature to a mere epiphenomenon of its social dimensions. Instead, it recognizes literary works »as relatively autonomous cultural entities« possessing their own agency. The key is a symmetrical analytical focus on the inner structures of literary texts as well as their social surroundings. To secure this principle, I employ two concepts. First, I adopt the concept of iconic experience, which the Yale School developed to grasp the nondiscursive, aesthetic dimensions of social life. I employ the iconic experience to account for the meaning-making as it occurs within a spatio-temporally unique reading experience while also being navigated by persistent cultural patterns and norms. Second, I operationalize the concept of structures of feeling to tackle social phenomena broadly shared over time yet lacking more explicit discursive definitions. These nondiscursive collective representations – sometimes called Zeitgeist or generational feeling – can be captured intelligibly by literary forms and aesthetic devices, as these can easily signify ambiguity and openness of meaning. I argue a combination of sociological and literary theoretical discourse is needed to capture aspects of the social-literary interaction usually »lost in translation« between literary and sociological genres.
I develop this research model through a case study of the Irish author Sally Rooney’s novel Normal People. The goal is to trace how the »literary« and the »social« mutually constitute each other and partake in the overall process of meaning-making. What is the role of Normal People’s literary form in creating a well-marketed book product, connected with its supposed extraordinary intellectual merits as a »generational novel«? Thanks to its aesthetic devices, Rooney’s novel presents social relationships as a social fact that escapes discursive definition yet heavily impacts social action. On the one hand, the characters have the intellectual and reflexive capacity to perpetually evaluate and categorize their actions when navigating the turbulent waters of romance and intimacy. On the other hand, the prevalent emotional culture makes them yield their agency to social norms and the normalized ideal of social relationships as effortless and natural. Unlike scholarly accounts, reading Rooney’s novel can account for social relationships both as a unity – relatively stable structures of feeling upon which all social relationships feed – and as a polyvalent ambiguity – experiencing social relationships as self-contradictory, volatile, and tacit. That is possible due to the iconic experience of reading, which renders social theorizing through novels as a condensed and indivisible blend of sensual immediacy and abstract representations.
This article introduces the core themes of the multilevel economic paradigm. This paradigm extends Darwin’s evolutionary framework of thought (concerned with living things) to economics, in contrast to the neoclassical paradigm, which is modeled after Newtonian mechanics (applicable primarily to inanimate objects). The central theme of the multilevel paradigm is functional organization, which refers to the way in which economic agents (individuals and groups) and systems are structured to achieve economic objectives. The multilevel paradigm recognizes that people are engaged in multiple levels of functional organization, and thus, agency is distributed between individuals and groups. These levels are flexible through time and across domains (economic, political, social, and environmental), so that the economy is understood as embedded in the polity, society, and the natural world. Flexible levels of functional organization are both a cause of and response to radical uncertainty. This flexibility of functional organization implies multilevel economic decision-making and multilevel flourishing.
Theory resides in the mind, regarding an external world. While mind and matter are in relation, they are not – and can never be – a singular unity, and how we navigate the ontological gap separating mind from matter makes all the difference for our practices of inquiry, their consequences for the world, and our psychic and professional identities as scholars. That seven commentators offer widely disparate approaches for theorists navigating the relation between thought and action suggests the continuing need to mind the gap.
William Whewell's 19th-century views are seldom given a prominent place in the history of the philosophy of science. There is, however, a key feature of his account that is, upon historical analysis, prescient of later developments, notably in pragmatism. Whewell calls this the "fundamental antithesis of philosophy", which centres around the idea that there is no clear demarcation between subject and object (between mind and world or theory and fact). In this paper, I trace this notion's genealogy. It originated with Kant, who influenced Whewell. Whewell then developed it into a detailed thesis, one that influenced Peirce. It is identifiable in Quine, then (middle) Putnam, and now Cheryl Misak and Steven Levine (aka the new pragmatists). The purpose is to identify a previously overlooked lineage of influence running through the history of philosophy. Whewell's antithesis might also offer a way to resist both the relativism that tends to accompany post-modern styles of pragmatism and the pretensions to a God's-eye view latent in analytic metaphysics.
Sustainable development requires not only knowledge and competences but also specific attitudes that arise from distinct forms of awareness. Critical thinking, self-reflection, and empathy encapsulate various but interconnected aspects of the education essential for achieving sustainable educational objectives. This article primarily examines the role and significance of critical reflection in cultivating competence building in sustainable development. Its aims include assessing the current state and comprehension of criticality within didactic processes in this domain. Special emphasis is placed on the power dynamics underlying the context of the discussions and the very understanding of critical thinking. The analysis also encompasses the actual and potential impacts of the rapid advancement of Large Language Models on competence-building processes, as well as the cultural diversity in critical perceptions of sustainability itself. We illustrate this approach with practical examples drawn from a significant teaching experience within the Widening Interdisciplinary Sustainability Education project. Key findings of the chapter include highlighting the necessity of adopting a critical approach to any understanding of sustainability that aspires to be culturally, cognitively, and politically sustainable, while also outlining a framework for a sustainable education model that integrates critical thinking.
In this paper, we examine an overlooked answer to the Special Composition Question (SCQ), termed “Mereological Anti-Conservatism.” This view posits that extraordinary objects exist but that ordinary objects do not. For example, while tables and chairs do not exist, the mereological sums of these items do correspond to real objects. Although such a claim may initially seem absurd, we argue that (i) it is entirely derived from the claims and commitments of traditional rival theories—Nihilism, Universalism, and Conservatism; (ii) it resolves several issues that plague Conservatism, such as problems of vagueness, change and persistence, and the shortcomings of common sense; and (iii) it offers a more plausible perspective than Conservatism when considering the vast scale of possible worlds with differently segmented realities. Ultimately, we contend that if Anti-Conservatism is deemed implausible, then Conservatism must be as well, for structurally similar reasons.
In this chapter is discussed Goffman’s conception of the self as an entity that is strongly influenced by social, contextual and situational factors. The theory of the self as a performer developed by Goffman is considered from the perspective of the identity that it radiates as personal, social and ego identity. In doing so, the issue of the meaning of the body for the construction of modern identity is discussed, whose evolution at the end of the chapter is discussed in the context of the development of social networks. This chapter shows that although Goffman can hardly be said to be a postmodern author, his understanding of the self is much closer to the postmodern than to the modern self.
No prominent pragmatist philosopher to date has offered us a fully developed theory of history or historical interpretation. Nevertheless, a number of pivotal arguments and suggestions made by the pragmatists appeared to many both insightful and pertinent enough to offer a distinctive promise of a cohesive and distinctive general pragmatist perspective in historical theory. The present contribution is intended to secure some advances in this direction, focusing on the relationships between objectivity and perspective; between representation as an accurate correspondence to reality and the social, cultural sense of representation as being represented and being representative; as well as the relationship between individualizing comprehension and generalizing abstraction in historical contexts.
This essay investigates how border solidarity—that is, grassroots coalitions against the current state of migration and border governance—allows for a radical articulation of traditional theories concerning the foundations of solidarity. Drawing on four years of activism and participatory fieldwork with the New Sanctuary Movement in the United States, the author looks at specific coalitions within migrants’ rights social movements to argue against traditional or otherwise familiar conceptions of the normative foundations of solidarity, such as a common social membership, a shared moral feeling, or a shared experience of oppression. Rather, the author argues, border solidarity as a praxis of contesting border regimes clearly shows the conceptual insufficiency of methodological nationalism, implicit in all three familiar conceptions, for articulating the meaning of solidarity. Taking a cue from materialist feminists bell hooks, Beatriz Nascimento, and Verónica Gago, the author argues that border solidarity as praxis is grounded in differential interdependence and heterogeneous transversal alliances that forge new territories (and constituencies) in opposition to hegemonic ones.
The paper describes a form a non-Socratic dialogue which aims at exposing oneself to the normative critique of interlocutors with different commitments. It further argues that such exposure is the only way in which one can achieve critical distance from one's own commitments. It goes on to explore the epistemic and political virtues of this form of dialogue.
The paper explores the intersection of feminist legal theory and the concept of neutrality, addressing the challenges contemporary feminist legal scholarship faces in reconciling the ideal of gender or sexual neutrality with the realities of legal practice. It examines the evolution from liberal feminism, which emphasises sex-blind equality, to difference feminism, which highlights the importance of recognising and accommodating differences. Through a critical analysis of supposed ‘double binds’ confronting difference feminism, the paper investigates the implications of contextualising legal subjects within broader social and relational contexts. It also evaluates the interplay between feminist legal theory and other critical theories, particularly concerning class and race. By delving into current debates on legal subject conceptualisation, the role of psychoanalysis in feminist thought, and the advocacy for special rights for women, the paper aims to provide a nuanced understanding of how feminist strategies can navigate and potentially subvert entrenched stereotypes and power dynamics within the legal system.
In the mid-1980s, Richard Rorty debated aspects of Jean-François Lyotard’s evolving theories of language and politics, embracing the latter’s critique of metanarratives as forms of metaphysics we should discard but rejecting Lyotard’s claims about the incommensurability of language games. Largely overlooked was the force of Lyotard’s critique of the transvaluation of knowledge in the emerging digital age, canvased in The Postmodern Condition. This article revisits the encounter between these thinkers to reconstruct the more central challenge that Lyotard’s theory posed to Rorty’s pragmatic politics and to liberal cosmopolitanism more broadly. Lyotard’s work was prescient in detailing an emerging technological order in which ideals of tolerance and solidarity in the form of Rortian translation and redescription come into conflict with imperatives of performativity, profit-seeking, and power – fostering dominance rather than universal progress. The article concludes by drawing implications of the encounter for current scholarship on Rorty and political theory.
The present article explores possibilities for a new theoretical framework in cartography based on a neopragmatist approach. Starting with an outline of Traditional and Critical Cartography, a neopragmatist perspective is developed that promotes inclusivity and problem-solving orientation. This approach draws on the analytical framework of Karl Popper’s Three Worlds Theory, specifically the Theory of Three Spaces. Neopragmatism emphasizes the production of useful knowledge over absolute truth and acknowledges the contingency and flexible interpretability of cartographic representations. In this context, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is described as a dynamic tool for problem-solving, capable of supporting continuous learning and application-oriented adaptation. By employing AI within a neopragmatist framework in cartography, new possibilities emerge for integrating and utilizing diverse social perspectives and (geospatial) data. This approach enables an expansion of the theoretical and practical applicability of cartography. Finally, the article illustrates that the deconstruction—building on J. B. Harley’s influential article Deconstructing the Map (1989)—and reconstruction of maps must exist in a recursive relationship to enable a context- and solution-oriented cartography.
Irony transcends mere rhetorical skill, embodying a significant concept across disciplines including philosophy, literature, and music. Its rich history, spanning from Socrates to the postmodern era, has resulted in a multifaceted tapestry of meanings too diverse to fully enumerate. Nevertheless, the spirit and lineage of an ironic tradition remain discernible, particularly in the evolution of poetry. In this domain, irony continues to play a pivotal role in both composition and linguistic innovation, serving as a catalyst for creative expression and critical reflection.
A challenge for educators is how to teach in a “post-truth” world. Lies, fake news, and a gleeful disregard for facts – what I collectively term mis/information – all seem to undermine the very project of education. The pragmatism of Richard Rorty holds promise to address such issues. I first argue that Rorty’s philosophy of education is of limited use, whereas his broader thoughts on a philosophy without foundations are more relevant. I then suggest that a way forward is to evade the fight against post-truth dynamics altogether. An insistence on rational objectivity and foundational truth are at the root of the challenges of mis/information. We can instead embrace uncertainty and doubt, shifting our educational goals to help students of diverse backgrounds avoid alienation and humiliation at the hands of schooling. Education can instead affirm the dignity of each student through an acculturation into inclusive, coherent narratives, replacing the self-defeating quest for finding the right truths with the more uplifting purpose of forging a common cultural commitment to reducing human suffering.
In efforts to inform a postdigital citizen social science, this paper argues that the traditions of pragmatism are a rich resource for enacting a postdigital citizen social science’s commitment to dialogue and collaboration. Claims as to the value of pragmatism for informing a postdigital citizen social science are rehearsed and assessed through an extension of the Human Data Interaction framework to an engagement with the ‘small’ data and associated regimes that constitute a global governing complex in education. A datafication of education policy and practice offers an unprecedented challenge and opportunity for a postdigital citizen social science, to not only contend and reconfigure the forms and functions of data regimes but also seek to (re)open a neglected epistemological terrain for exploring how data could and should be used to inform education policy and practice. It is asserted that an encounter between pragmatism and a postdigital citizen social science practice, affirms and enriches efforts to enact dialogue with diverse publics, with the aim of generating actionable insights, where what works is itself, a question open to scrutiny and revision.
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