The Regulatory State and the Developmental State: Towards Polymorphic Comparative Capitalism

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... Such diffusion processes have been analyzed from the perspective of formal political models and regulatory arrangements (Kayaalp 2012;Kumar 2020), chiefly through the construct of the regulatory State 1 (Majone 1994). There is considerable debate as to whether the Northern and Southern, or neoliberal and developmental States, should be treated as distinct or just a continuum of polymorphic State forms (Levi-Faur 2013). However, both the Northern or Southern focused scholarship ascribes to a functionalist understanding (Hansen & Stepputat 2001) of the regulatory State alluding to the role of specific institutions such as courts, regulators, and public and private actors (Vogel 1996;Jordana & Levi-Faur 2004;Dubash & Morgan 2013a;Kapur & Khosla 2019). ...
This article uses the concept of regulatory cultures to understand the (dis)embedding of “independent” water regulation in India. It analyzes the specific case of the Maharashtra Water Resources Regulatory Authority and explores how discourses and practices (1990–2015) shaped the regulatory development in the water sector. By documenting the practices of meaning-making of “independent” regulation, the paper queries the process(es) of subnational regulatory diffusion and analyzes how water regulation is translated, negotiated, contested, and subverted as situated meanings evolve in the process. Taking an anthropological approach to studying the State and regulation, the article demonstrates how and why the State remains at the very center of the regulatory project in the water sector in India.
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Recent scholarship has emphasized the need to develop a polymorphic conceptualization of the regulatory state. This article contributes to this theory‐building project by outlining a research agenda for exploring the symbiotic interactions and tensions between the regulatory and carceral morphs of the state. Using the case study of cannabis legalization reforms in the United States, we argue that the legitimation deficits of the carceral state stimulate the proliferation of new regulatory frameworks for governing social problems that were traditionally handled by the criminal justice system. We demonstrate how the polymorphic approach illuminates the ways in which the regulatory and carceral morphs of the state compete for influence over shared policy domains, but also complement and reinforce one another. Thus, rather than precipitating the demise of the carceral state, cannabis legalization reforms sustain a bifurcated governance structure perpetuating long‐standing patterns of using drug law as a means for racialized social control.
East Asian countries come most to mind when considering the role of governmental institutions in the contemporary economy. Specifically, it is widely assumed that the openness of economies, the maturation of companies, and their participation in global production chains have created extraordinary pressures that erode opportunities and incentives for government-business collaboration. We test this assumption in the South Korean context, with a focus on the case of robotics. This case is fruitful because it highlights the multiple challenges that face South Korean policymakers. These include the capacity to deliver cutting-edge technologies, to create new industry, to address potential downsides with novel solutions, and to engage the private sector in a relationship of ‘governed interdependence’. In examining Korean strategies for grappling with the pressures they face, we seek to illuminate a pattern of state activity that existing concepts fail to capture. By refocusing the concept of geo-economic statecraft to encompass domestically deployed initiatives at the techno frontier, we intend to breach the impasse in the developmental/post developmental state debate and to open up a new research agenda. That agenda should probe the conditions that might motivate states to craft techno-economy building initiatives, and the relationships of governed interdependence which they must forge to achieve them.
In the last decades, several countries have undertaken institutional reforms in their national housing finance systems (SFH). At the end of the 1990s, the Brazilian government followed this global trend and reformed its national SFH. In 1997, Congress enacted Law no. 9.514, instituting the Real Estate Financial System (SFI) that should gradually replace the former SFH. The new SFI sought a different model of financing based on the creation of a mortgage market, which consisted of securitizing debts and fundraising via the capital market. In contrast, the former SFH was a state-led arrangement that relied on direct credit policies, public subsidies and the performance of state-owned banks. This paper aims to assess the Brazilian housing reform outcomes. Regarding legal security, the data collected pointed to the satisfactory success of these measures. However, concerning the extent to which the market relation expanded over the state domains, the achievement is different. The most apparent effect of the reform is a repositioning of state agents in the new institutional frameworks, most notably the state-owned bank in the housing market.
Since the 1990s, emerging economies such as Brazil, India, and China have adopted transparency‐enhancing public procurement regulations in line with international norms. Yet they have hesitated to join the World Trade Organization's legally binding Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Based on the Special Issue framework, this article scrutinizes the underlying domestic and international determinants, and how they influence emerging countries’ positions in two overlapping international procurement regimes. In particular, reform‐oriented state actors, societal pressure, and lesson‐drawing from international templates have induced a strengthening of domestic procurement institutions and turned emerging countries into “promoters” of the international transparency regime. Conversely, the rising powers have remained, to varying degrees, reluctant “spoilers” of the GPA‐based market access regime in order to keep policy space and use procurement for domestic development objectives. The article suggests that this regulatory‐developmental layering of rule‐based governance and interventionist ambitions characterizes the variegated regulatory state in emerging countries.
What are the origins of global regulation? This article proposes that the developmental state — the state investing in economic development — can be a source of global environmental regulation. Through industrial policy, the developmental state can promote structural economic change in polluting sectors that supports global regulatory policy in two ways: first, providing state support to green industries creates economic interests in support of global regulation; and, second, driving down the cost of technology through government subsidies alters the pay-offs of global cooperation for other states. This article examines the two mechanisms in the case of climate change: the global leadership of the European Union; and international cooperation on the Paris Agreement. The argument advances our theory of the state in global regulatory politics as both a developmental and a regulatory force. This article identifies significant scope for the developmental strategies of major economies to change the interest and cost structures of polluting sectors to support global environmental regulation.
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